A Treatise on Love

By IBN SINA

Translated by Emil L. Fackenheim

INTRODUCTION

I.

IBN SINA'S Risalah f't-l 'iqah, a translation of which is offered here, was edited critically by M. A. F. Mehren in 1894 and again in Cairo in 1917, the latter edition being mostly, though not invariably, in agreement with the former. Our translation is based on Mehren's edition as the critical one of the two, but attention is drawn to any important deviation of the Cairo edition. Manuscripts in addition to those used by these two editions are listed by Brockelmann and Ritter.

Along with the edition of the text Mehren published a resumé in French. Nevertheless, a new and complete translation can be offered without apology for the following reasons: (i) not being a complete and literal translation, Mehren's resumé cannot adequately serve the student who does not read Arabic; (ii) in addition to being not literal and incomplete, Mehren's resumé is at times inaccurate or incorrect; (iii) Mehren's work is not readily accessible; but the Risalah f't-l 'iqah is of sufficient historical and systematical importance to merit wide accessibility in a complete English translation.

II.

To show the historical importance of the Risalah f't-l 'iqah would be a task transcending the scope of the present article. Ritter has already given some impression of its position in the development of the general Arabic doctrines of love, thus correcting the erroneous impression in Ritter's article that Ibn Sina's Risalah f't-l 'iqah had no predecessors in the field of Arabic philosophy.

As a matter of fact, it is known that al-Khazini wrote a special treatise on love although that treatise itself is not extant. Furthermore, the thirty-sixth treatise of the Contemplative Discourse of the Brethren of Purity is entirely devoted to the subject of love. The treatise on love, which is also a special treatise, still found favor with later Arab scholars such as the famous jurist Abul Qasim al-Kharaizmi, who wrote two works on love. Thus, the treatise on love was a well-established and popular subject in Arabic philosophy, and its study was an integral part of the general philosophical tradition.

of love. In addition thereto, there are scattered references to this subject in the so-called Theology of Aristotle and in the writings of al-Parabi.

The doctrine of love found in the Theology of Aristotle is determined by its Neoplatonic evaluation of reality, i.e., by a radical differentiation in value between the "higher", "spiritual" and the "lower", "natural" world. Thus the beauty of an "image" is, in Platonist fashion, characterized as inferior compared with that of the idea. Even external bodily beauty is due to form not to matter, a type of beauty which thus may be found also in non-material things. Furthermore, in human beings the beauty of character and disposition is much to be preferred to external beauty, and internal beauty goes often hand in hand with external ugliness. The most significant fact to remember is that bodily beauty is merely derived from the beauty of soul, a fact which proves the superiority of the latter. Since the degree of the beauty of a being depends on the position it has in the cosmic hierarchy, God is the highest beauty and the desire of the multitude for external beauty notwithstanding, man's true destiny is to seek the highest beauty.

Insofar as it is attraction to external beauty, such as that of women, love is a desire to possess "nature" charmed by a certain "serenity" or "seduction" (syruth). When, which, although not to be condemned since it is "natural", is yet to be looked on with disapproval since it leads man to "nature" and away from true spirituality. A truly speculative man who has freed himself from practical affairs will be immune to this seduction and free from the dependence on the external object of love it involves, free in his self-sufficiency with his inner resources. However, insofar as love is "true", i.e., "intellectual" love, it is a force binding together everything spiritual and truly living; it is an eternal force in the "high world" where all discord and contrast are overcome. More than that, "the high world is identical with love.""
part of it. Nevertheless it is part of that emanation which ultimately stems from the One. For it is a quality whereby human beings are connected and harmonized with each other, and it is of the nature of the One to bestow on the beings along with their substances such states as are conducive to order, harmony and organization."

The treatise On the Essence of Love found in the Encyclopaedia of the Brethren of Purity is probably the most explicit and important treatise on love to be found in Arabic philosophy prior to Ibn Sina, a treatise which would well merit a new translation and a detailed analysis. The basis of the doctrine of this treatise, which deals exclusively with love as a quality of the human soul, is the Platonic division of the soul into (i) nutritive-appetitive, (ii) emotional-animal and (iii) rational parts. Each of these three parts has a specific type and specific objects of love, namely, (i) food and sexual gratification, (ii) victory, revenge and supremacy, and (iii) knowledge and the acquisition of perfection, respectively. In all its manifestations love is definitely a quality of the soul, never of the body; for love is most properly defined as the desire for unification with the object of love, and is an entirely spiritual achievement, being allowed merely of mixture and proximity. Even in the manifestations of the lowest type of love the body serves merely as an instrument in an activity which is of the soul.

Thus all love has its place and type of unification. Embracing, kissing and sexual intercourse, for instance, are types of unification in accordance with the capacity of the animal soul, the desire for the preservation of the species being part of the nature of most animals. And all love—which is never ceasing in the souls—is a perfection given by God’s grace for the purpose of leading the souls toward good aims."

However, all love is of a perishing nature except spiritual love and especially the love of God; and God is the "first object of love". The real and final aim of all love is to "awaken the soul from slumber and folly" and to lead it away from the sensual-body to the spiritual-world, away from matter and beauty to the beauty of the spiritual world. Therefore, those who are truly wise try in their actions, insights and character to become assimilated to the universal soul just as the universal soul attempts to become assimilated to the Creator Himself.

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FL: 7th, with its basic division of the nutritive soul into three parts, is virtually a summary of doctrines expounded more fully elsewhere" with the addition of such conclusions as appertain to the subject of love; the division of the animal soul into appetitive and receptive parts and the division of sensory-perception into external and internal, which are basic to the conclusions arrived at in the fourth chapter, are likewise summary of doctrines fully expounded elsewhere.

But Ibn Sina’s psychology is in a yet deeper sense the basis of his doctrine of love. In Ibn Sina’s psychology as a whole, Platonie has given way to Aristotelian conceptions. The concept of a harmonious hierarchical order of the parts of the soul has taken the place of a concept leading readily to a doctrine advocating the suppression of the lower parts of the soul in the attempt to reach the perfection of the highest. It is on this basis that some of Ibn Sina’s most important doctrines on love are formulated, especially those of the fifth chapter, where a great attempt is made to allot to the love of external beauty a role which will remain positive, valuable and honorable even when compared with the most exalted and unearthly love.

TRANSLATION

In the name of the all-merciful God: O Abdullah ‘I-Ma’sumi, the lawyer, you have asked me to compose one for you a clear and brief treatise on love. In reply let me say that with the following treatise I have done my utmost to win your approval and to satisfy your desire. I have let consist of the following seven chapters:

(i) On the power of love as pervading all beings;
(ii) On the existence of love in those substances which are simple and immaterial;
(iii) On the existence of love in those beings which have the faculty of assimilating food, insofar as they possess that faculty;
(iv) On the existence of love in the animal substances, in respect of their possession of the animal faculty;
(v) On the love of those who are noble-minded and young for external beauty;
(vi) On the love of the divine souls;
(vii) General conclusion.

more explicitly his Opus egregium De Animalia, Amosi, which is part of the sub-ideal. Of this work we have used a tworaten copy of the Latin edition of 1560, the Arabic original being unavailable. Chapter 73 of the Rasilah

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On the Power of Love As Persuading All Beings.

Every being which is determined by a design strives by nature toward its perfection, i.e., that goodness of reality which ultimately flows from the reality of the Pure Good, and by nature it shies away from its specific defect which is evil in it, i.e., materiality and non-being—ever for every evil results from attachment to matter and non-being. Therefore, it is obvious that all beings determined by a design possess a natural desire and an inborn love, and it follows of necessity that in such beings love is the cause of their existence. For everything that can be signified as existing belongs into one of these three categories: (i) either it has arrived at the specific perfection, (ii) or it has reached the maximum of defect, (iii) or it vacillates between these two states with the result that it is essentially in an intermediate position between two things. Now that which has arrived at the specific perfection of defect has been carried to absolute non-being, and to that which has no attachments left the term “absolute non-being” is suitably applied. Thus, while that which is disposed with complete non-being may deserve to be counted among the “beings” in a classification or in thought, its “being” must not be considered as real being. And existence, in an unqualified sense, cannot appropriately be applied to it except by way of metaphor. And in a classification it must not be made to belong to the group of beings except per accidens. Beings in the real sense, then, are either such as are prepared for the maximum of perfection or such as are in a position intermediate between a defect occurring by reason of some cause and a perfection existing in the nature itself. Therefore, no being is ever free from some connection with a perfection, and this connection with it is accompanied by an innate love and desire for that which may unite it with its perfection. This becomes clear also from another aspect, that of causality and the “why”; since (i) no being which is determined by a design is devoid of a perfection specific to it; since (ii) such a being is not in itself sufficient for the existence of its perfection, because the perfections of the beings determined by a design emanate from the perfect as Perfect; and since (iii) one must not imagine that the Principle from which perfection emanates intends to cause a loss to any one of its actions.

"This rendering of the term swaddhah must be preferred to Metzerr's interpretation, and Nisaburians have in fact adopted it, as is evident from the internal etymology and the dependence upon the concept of svarc for cosmic principle; (ii) because it is free from such connotations as would make it inappropriate to be used in the "inorganic" but nevertheless according to the "good" (as used by hand determined by a design). Cf. also note 25.

"We shall therefore use the technical term for God, cf. Ibn Sinas, al-Shifâ (Teheran, 1939), vol. ii, p. 335, use "surmâ" and "surmâ li-sura"; they are essentially per se the terms used by the authors, e.g. Ibn Sina, in his "Al-Faruq.""

"If we accept the exegesis suggested by al-Shifâ (text 2), then the text reads: 'Then its root is essentially...'

"We should perhaps read bilâri instead of Michâr's bilâriyâr (text 2), cf. Lane, Arabic-Latin Dictionary, pp. 98, 99.

"While there is no differentiation between the Arabic personal and the imitative perfects in the context, cf. text 2 and note 25. However, the design of the above construction allows complete consistency in the translation. Ibn Sina’s doctrine obliges the translator to use the impersonal, pronoun where a noun is made to God except where the context has particular connotations deriving from divine or godlike origins. Cf. notes 88, 91, 94.

"The love which the Being which desires the Matter" (next p. note e), completely confused.

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the particular beings—as the philosophers have expounded—since all this is so, it is a necessary outcome of His" wisdom and the excellence of His governance to plant into everything the general principle of love. The effect is that He thus indirectly preserves the perfections which He gave by emanation, and that He thus expresses His desire to bring them into being when they are absent, the purpose being that the administration [of the universe] should run according to a wise order. The never-ceasing existence of this love in all beings determined by a design is, therefore, a necessity. If this were not so, another love would be necessary to preserve this general love in its existence, to guard against its non-being and to retrieve it when it has lapsed, anxious lest it might disappear. But one of these two loves would be superfluous, and the existence of something superfluous in nature—which is divinely established—is impossible." Therefore, there is no principle of love other than this absolute and general love. And we conclude that the existence of every being determined by a design is invariably accompanied by inborn love.

Let us now in this undertaking set out from a platform higher / (p. 254) than our previous one by proceeding to an examination of the Highest Being and the way things behave under the governance of the Governor, to the full extent of its magnitude. Here we make the statement: The goods love is loved in its very essence. Why? If this were not so, why should every being be set up before itself as work and aim something it desires, aims at and works for, in imagining its goodness? If goodness were not in its very essence loved, why should every type of endeavour invariably be directed toward the good, in all its free actions? Therefore the good loves the good, for love is in truth nothing but whole-hearted approval of the existing and suitable. And this love is the source of its yearnings for it when it is absent—"if it is the sort of thing which may be absent"—, and of its unification with it when it is present. Therefore everything approves of what is fitting and yearns for it when it is not there. And the specific good is the natural propensity of a being and the recognition of the truly suitable as such. Now approval and desire, and approval and aversion result in a thing from the attachment to its goodness. And a thing is in itself approved of only by reason of its goodness; for if approval is due to a thing in itself, then this is on account of its goodness and goodness. It is clear, then, that the good is loved for good, whether it is the specific goodness of a thing or a goodness it has in..."
common with others. Every type of love has as object either something already attained or something which is still to be attained. Whenever the goodness of a thing increases, the merit of the object of its love (p. 5) increases also, / and so does the love itself.

If this is established, then let us proceed to say this: that Being which is too exalted to be subject to the governance must be the highest object of love, because it must be the nature in maximum in goodness. And the highest subject of love is identical with the highest object of love, namely, Its high and sublime Essence. Because the good loves the good through that attainment and penetration whereby it is connected with it, and because the First Good penetrates Itself in eternal actuality, therefore Its love for Itself is the most perfect and complete. And because there is no distinction among the loves of Its Essence love is here the essence and the being purely and simply, i.e. in the case of the Pure Good.

In all being, therefore, love is either the cause of their being, or being and love are identical in them. It is thus evident that no being is devoid of love, and this it was our intention to show:

II.

On the Existence of Love in the Simple Inanimate Entities.

Simple inanimate entities are divided into three groups: (i) matter in the real sense of the term, (ii) that type of form which cannot subsist in separation, and (iii) accidents. The difference between accidents and this type of form lies in the fact that this type of form is constitutive of the substance. Therefore earlier metaphysicians have considered it proper to classify this type of form among accidents, because it is a part of the self-subsisting substances, and they did not deny it the name of substantiality merely because it cannot exist separately by itself, but because the substance of which it is a part is self-subsisting. Furthermore, the metaphysicians assign a special value to it, i.e. to form ever matter with respect to the attainment of substantiality.

The reason for this is that the substance subsists as an actual substance on account of the substantiality of this type of form, and the removal of the latter exists it necessitates the actual existence of the substance.

For this reason it has been said that form is a substance in the mode of actuality.

As for matter, this is accounted among those which receive substantiality potentiality. For actual existence does not necessarily result from the existence of the matter of a substance. Therefore it has been said that it is a substance in the mode of potentiality.

To sum up, it has not been evidently established, and, also, that it has nothing at all in common with the accident, because the latter is not a constituent of the substance and cannot be considered as a substance from any point of view.

If that is clear, then we proceed to say this: every one of these simple inanimate entities is accompanied by an inborn love, from which it is never free, and this love is itself the love of the non-being. As for matter, this is not there for the time when it merely desires to have a form, and when it exists it does so on account of its yearning for form. For that reason you will find that whenever it is deprived of a form it will hurry to receive another form in its stead, being always on guard against absolute non-being. For it is an inexorable law that all beings by nature shye away from absolute non-being. But matter is the absence of non-being. Thus, whenever a form does not substantially subsist in it, this will be equivalent to relative non-being, and if matter is not connected with a form at all, there will be absolute non-being. There is no need here for a water-tank to disclose that this is water. Matter is like a born-horn and harmless woman who tries to prevent her ugliness from becoming known / and whenever her veil is uncovered she conceals her defects with her sleeve. It is established, then, that matter possesses an inborn love.

As for the type of form which is our concern here, the existence of inborn love in it is obvious in two respects: (i) one type of evidence lies in its clinging to its subject and its rejection of those things which would remove it from that subject; (ii) the second type of evidence lies in its adherence to its perceptions and natural places when it happens to be at them, and its yearning movement toward them when it is separated from them, as is the case with the forms of the five simple bodies and the things composed of the four elements. These are the only causes of thing to which form ever adheres.

As for accidents, the existence of love in them is quite obvious in their adherence to the subject, and the way this works is that the subject is connected with opposites by turns.

We conclude, then, that none of these simple entities is devoid of love which is inborn in their nature.

III.

On the Existence of Love in the Vegetative Forms, i.e. the Vegetative Souls.

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Putting this matter briefly let us say: the vegetative souls are subject to a division into three parts, namely, (i) the nutritive faculty, (ii) the faculty of growth and (iii) the faculty of procreation. Correspondingly, there is a specific love in the vegetative faculty according to these three parts: (i) The first of these is specific to the nutritive faculty, and this is the source of its desire for the presence of food in accordance with the need of matter for it, and for its maintenance in the body which receives it after its assimilation to the nature of the latter. (ii) The second type of love is specific to the faculty of growth, and this is the source of its desire for the increase fitting the proportions of the body which is nourished. (iii) The third type of love is specific to the faculty of procreation, and this is the source of its desire to produce a new principle similar to the one from which it derives itself.

It is clear, then, that whenever these faculties exist, these types of love are attached to them. They, too, are therefore by nature endowed with love.

IV.

On Love in the Animal Souls.

There is no doubt that all animal faculties and souls are characterized by a type of behaviour which is impelled by an inborn love. If this were not so—if they did not possess a natural aversion whose source is an inborn detestation, and a natural desire whose source is inborn love—then their existence in the animal body would have to be considered as superfluous and without function. And this is obvious in all parts into which these faculties may be divided.

As far as that part of sense-perception which is external, this function is by way of seeking familiarity with some sense-objects in preference to others, and by finding some more repulsive than others. Otherwise, the animals would not be able to discriminate perceptible events and to guard against the occupation with things that cause harm, and the faculty of sense-perception would really be superfluous. As far as that part of sense-perception which is internal, this function is by way of finding rest in the enjoyment of restful imaginations and suchlike when they are present, and by striving for them with desire when they are absent.

As for that part which contains anger, this results from the animal's desire for revenge and mastery and from its shying away from weakness and humiliation and what resembles it; and that portion of our discourse which is constructed on our conclusions here.

(p. 9) Love branches off into two parts: (i) the first part is natural love. Its possessor will not come to rest at any state other than its aim, as far as its essence is concerned and as long as no external force interferes with it. A stone, for instance, cannot possibly fall short of reaching its aim—to arrive at its natural place and find rest in it, which is its essential intention—except by reason of a forcing obstacle. Into this category of love falls the nutritive faculty and the other vegetative faculties: the former at no time ceases to attract food and to feed it to the body, except when an alien impediment prevents it from doing so. (ii) The second type of love is spontaneous and voluntary. Its possessor will sometimes turn away under its own initiative from the object of its love. For when it foresees some harm about to befall it, it will weigh the extent of this harm against that of the benefit of which the object of love would be. Thus, for instance, when a donkey sees a far a wolf approaching, he will stop crunching barley and run away in flight. For he knows that the impending harm that would befall him far outweighs the benefit of pasture.

Sometimes two subjects of love have one and the same object, and one of the two is natural and instinctive, the other spontaneous and voluntary. For instance, both the procreating vegetative and the appetitive animal faculties are related to the aim of procreation.

If this is established, then let us proceed to the following statement: the existence of this disposition in the appetitive faculty of the animal is most obvious to all of us to the man of the people, and there is no need to exhibit this as a fact. Generally speaking, the object of the love of the non-rational animal is identical with that of the vegetative faculty, except that from the vegetative faculty only such actions derive as belong to the natural, lower and inferior kind, whereas from the animal faculty actions result / which are accompanied by free will, belong to a higher and more excellent kind and stem from a finer and more beautiful source, so much so that at times some animals employ therein the faculty of sense-perception. People usually imagine that the type of love here alluded to is specific to the latter, but in truth it is specific to the appetitive faculty, even though the sense-faculty has a sort of mediating partnership. Quite often the appetitive animal faculty gives rise to actions that are not unconnected to what is irrational, while, on the other hand, the vegetative faculty sometimes resembles the appetitive one, because it reaches its aim through free will.

The obvious is true that there is a differentiation in the way activity springs forth from these faculties according to the presence or absence of free will, as we see for instance in the case of the propagation of the species. But, nevertheless, in another sense even the non-rational animal set in motion by natural and inborn love has also some free-willed motion, and this is by reason of divine providence. The immediate aim is here not intended per se, for this type of love has two kinds of aim. In saying that, this is what we mean: Divine providence necessarily establishes the preservation of sowing and reaping; but this cannot be achieved through the extension of the duration of the individuals whose aim is to come into being, owing to the necessary occurrence of destruction wherever there is generation; therefore, His wisdom establishes of...
made by reason and fancies complete and independent attainment in the contemplation of the intelligible beings with which, in truth, the soul [i.e., the rational soul] alone is familiar and wherein the understanding finds rest. In all this it acts like a bad servant whom his master has commanded to assist him by joining him in an important enterprise and who thinks, after its successful completion, that he himself has achieved the desired end, that he has achieved it without his master's assistance, that his master would have been unable to do it and that he himself is the true master, whereas in truth he has merely carried out the desired end whose attainment the master has planned; but of this he knows nothing. Similar is the situation in the case of the human faculty of desire. True, this faculty is one of the causes of corruption, but it is necessary in the general desired order which is good, and it is not part of the divine wisdom to abandon a great good because of the adverse character of an evil which is small in relation to it.

(ii) Many human activities, impressions and reactions belong to the animal soul alone and by itself, such as extra-perception, imagination, sexual intercourse and the spirit of aggression and warfare. However, because the animal soul of man acquires some excellence on account of the proximity of the rational soul, it executes such functions in a holier and more refined manner, and it pursues among the objects of sense those which are of a better constitution and have a sounder composition and relationships—things of which the other animals are not mindful, let alone that they pursue them. Along the same lines man applies his faculty of imagination toward noble and more than ordinary matters, so much so that the activity of his imagination often almost resembles that of the pure intellect. As for the various types of action due to anger, he prefers here to act in conformity with the opinion of the people of taste, perfection, justice and intelligence.

Often human actions are quite evidently based on an essential relationship between the rational and the animal faculties, as, for instance, when the rational faculty of a man makes use of his faculty of sense in order to derive universals from the particulars by way of induction. The same thing is the case when in his reflection he resorts to the faculty of imagination. This sometimes leads to a point where he fully reaches with it the penetration of whatever his aim may be among the objects of the intellect. A further example of this we find when the rational faculty imposes on the appetitive sexual faculty something other than its essential aim and different from pleasure, viz. the imitation of the First Cause by way of the preservation of the species, and especially the most excellent of them, the human species; or when the rational faculty bids the appetitive faculty strive for food and drink not at random, but from the point of view of aims different from the mere desire for pleasure, namely, with the purpose in view of assisting the natural constitution to preserve an individual belonging to the most excellent species, viz. the human individual; or when it makes the faculty of anger wish to fight heroes and to embrace war for the sake of turning an enemy away from a flourishing city or a righteous people. Thus, sometimes actions result which appear to derive purely from the rational faculty, such as the conception of intelligible beings, the desire

"Cf. supra, note 7.

*Lit. finds pleasing. (218)"
for high purposes, the love of the world to come and intimacy with the All-Merciful.

(iii) There is some goodness in every part of the divinely established order (p. 14) and each one of these goods ought to be sought after. However, the pursuit of one of these worldly goods often interferes with the acquisition of a good which is of greater value. Thus, it is generally accepted that an ample enjoyment of life pursued at random should be avoided, although it may in itself be desirable. For it would do harm to something more desirable than it, viz. the abundance of wealth and the sufficiency of property. Here is another example taken from the functions of bodies: to drink an ounce of opium is desirable and good to stop bleeding of the nose, but nevertheless it should be flung away because of the harm it does to something more desirable than it, viz. good health in general and life. In the same way those characteristics of the animal soul which are considered as an excess when they are found in the non-rational animal, however, in animals such an excess is not considered as a vice, but rather as an excellence of their faculties—, are considered as vices in the case of men because of the harm they do to the rational faculty; and it is proper to esteem it proper to esteem something which is not an excellence.

This I have explained in a treatise entitled “The Present” (st-Tubahk).

(iv) Both the rational and the animal soul—the latter by reason of its proximity to the former—invariably love what has beauty of order, composition and harmony, as for example harmonious sounds, harmoniously blended tastes of well-prepared dishes and suchlike. But, whereas in the animal soul this is due to natural instinct, in the case of the rational soul it results from its occupation with the conception of the ideas which are higher than nature. It recognizes that the closer a thing is to the First Object of love, the more steadfastly it is in its order, and the more beautiful in its harmony, and that what follows it immediately attains a greater degree of unity and of such qualities as result therefrom, etc. The metaphysicians agree in this respect.

The more remote a thing is from it, the nearer it is to multiplicity and such characters as follow it, viz. contrast and disharmony. This the metaphysicians have fully explained. Where a rational being obtains possession of a thing of beautiful harmony, it watches it with an eager eye.

After having explained these premises we can now make the statement that it is part of the nature of being endowed with reason to covet a beautiful sight; and that this is sometimes—certain conditions granted—, to be considered as refinement and nobility. This disposition is either specific to the animal partnership [of the rational and to the animal faculty alone, or it results from the love of a beautiful and refinement and nobility. For, it

Mehren translates: “La manifestation et l’imitation” (cfr. p. 2), but this is not true to the text.

Cf. on this Mehren’s remarks p. 7. (note 3).

Dr. “... with the comparison of the highest world with nature”, of Mehren’s remarks p. 8. (note 4).

In the text the phrase “on the contrary” has obviously got into the wrong place.

For this Neoplatonic doctrine incomprehensible passages from the “Panthéon d’Arcturus” and the writings of the

Brethren of Purity could be adduced. For “la Purification de l’âme”, e.g. Arcturus, “la Sainteté de l’âme”, p. 292 ff.; “la Sainteté du corps”, p. 272, ff. “Of. also the passages of Arcturus, pp. 120, 117, 205, 71 etc.

Brethren of Purity could be adduced. For instance, the “De la Philosophie et des Sciences” (p. 7) has a the “Livre des Sciences” and the writings of the

a man expresses animal desires in an animal-like fashion, he becomes involved in vice and is harmed in his rational soul. On the other hand, [the type of love] is not specific to the rational soul alone either for the endearing of the latter requires the intelligible and eternal universals, not sensible and perishable particulars. This [type of love], then, results from an alliance between the two. This is obvious also from another angle: If a man loves a beautiful form with animal desire, he deserves reproach, even condemnation and the charge of sin, as, for instance, those who commit unnatural adultery and in general people who go astray. But whenever he loves a pleasing form with an intellectual consideration, in the manner we have explained, then this is to be considered as an approximation to nobility and an increase in goodness. For he covets something whereby he will come nearer to the influence of That which is the First Source of influence and the Pure Object of love, more similar to the exalted and noble beings. And this will dispose him to grace, generosity and kindness. For this reason one will never find the wise—those who belong to the noble and learned, and who do not follow the way of those who make greedy and avaricious demands—, to be free from having their hearts occupied with a beautiful human form. Therefore, if a man acquires anything above those perfections which human beings have in addition to those possessed by other beings / the excellence of a harmonious form, which derives from the integrity and harmony of nature and from the exhibition of a divine impression, then man has the strongest claim to receive the very kernel of the fruit of the heart and the very essence of the purest kind of love. Therefore the prophet says: Seek ye satisfaction of your needs in those of intelligent perspicacity, the plain meaning of which is that beauty of form is to be found only where there is a good natural composition, and that this good harmony and composition serve to improve the internal disposition and to sweeten the character. It does sometimes happen, however, that a man is ugly in external form and beautiful in internal disposition. In such a case one of the explanations is possible: either his external ugliness is not due to an ugliness of harmony within lying in the very essence of the composition, but to an external accidental damage; or else the beauty of his external disposition is not due to nature but to long habit. Similarly it sometimes happens that a man who is beautiful in external form is of an ugly disposition. In that case, again, only two explanations are possible: either the ugliness of his character is something that has happened accidentally to his nature after the completion of its composition, or it is due to a strong influence of habit. "Sage things are a "beautiful human" form: (i) the urge to embrace it, (ii) the urge to kiss it and (iii) the urge for conjugal union with it."

"Lit. steadfastness. St. P. reads: "the plain and certain meaning".

"This word is added by St. P. These same three urges are mentioned in St. P., pp. 846, 506; St. P. Witzel, pp. 34, 35."

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especially that of the First Cause, just as it is impossible for the intelligible beings to exist, except if the causes themselves, and especially the First Cause, exist prior to them. All this we have explained in our commentary on the beginning of the first chapter of the Physics.\footnote{Emel L. Facchinetti}

The First Cause is identical with the Pure Good\footnote{Emel L. Facchinetti} which is absolute in its essence. [This is proven in the following way:] reality\footnote{Emel L. Facchinetti} is absolute in It, and the reality of nothing that is is devoid of some goodness. Now goodness is either absolute and part of the essence or derived from something else. The goodness of the First Cause—\footnote{Emel L. Facchinetti} which is good—will (p. 19) thus either be essential \footnote{Emel L. Facchinetti} or absolute, or derived from something else. But if it is derived from something else it can be so only in one of two ways: either the existence of Its goodness is necessary for the existence of the First Cause,—in which case that from which the goodness derives will be the cause of the First Cause, which is absurd; or the existence of Its goodness is not necessary for Its subsistence, and this is also absurd, as we have explained above.\footnote{Emel L. Facchinetti} Should we, however, not admit the absurdity of the latter alternative, then the question is still open. Nonetheless, if we allow this goodness to be non-essential and eliminate it as such, then clearly Its essence still remains both existing and endowed with goodness. That goodness will either be necessary and essential or derived from something else. If the latter alternative is accepted, we are reduced to an infinite regress which involves an impossibility.\footnote{Emel L. Facchinetti} If, on the other hand, this goodness is posited to be essential, then we have arrived at what we search for.

Again, it is impossible that the First Cause should derive from somewhere a goodness which is not part of its essence and does not necessarily belong to It. For the First Cause necessarily achieves perfection by Its very substance. For if the First Cause did not have Its own essence completely receive all those qualities which in their relation to It really merit to be classified as "goodness", and if there was some element of potency in Its goodness, the First Cause would derive this goodness from something else. But since there is nothing outside It except the sum of the things caused by It, that from which It would derive goodness would be something caused by It. Now that which is caused by It has no goodness either in Its nature or in Its derivations apart from that which is derived from the First Cause. Therefore, if that which is caused by It is to bestow by emanation goodness on It, it can bestowed only such goodness on It as is derived from It to begin with. But, in the case at hand, the goodness derived from the First Cause is to have Its ultimate origin in something else. In that case, this goodness would have to be not in the First Cause but in something (p. 20) outside It from which the First Cause would derive It. But it has already been said that it must be in the First Cause. Thus the whole suggestion [that any goodness in It is non-essential] is absurd.

In the First Cause there can be no defect of any kind or in any respect. [This is proven in the following way:] a perfection which is the opposite of a defect is (i) either impossible, and in that case there can be no defect correlative to it, or (ii) it is possible. Now, to conceive...
the possibility of that type of thing whose existence does not rest in anything else" is to conceive along with that thing itself the cause which leads to actual achievement that which in itself has merely the potency for it. But we have made clear that the First Cause has for its perfection no outside cause of any kind or in any respect. Thus, there is no real possibility to a "possible" perfection in it, and consequently no defect relative to it. The First Cause achieves per se completely anything that may, in its relation to it, be characterized as good. Those exalted goods which are good in every respect are not relative, and this is the type of good to which the First Cause has a relation of complete possession.

It is clear, then, that the First Cause possesses per se the complete sum of those perfections which in relation to it deserve that name, and that there is no element of possibility in it. It is also clear that the First Cause is good not only in its substance but also in its relations to all other beings, because it is the First Cause of their existence and preservation, more especially, of their being and their desire for their respective perfections. Therefore, the First Cause is good, absolutely and in every respect.21

The perfection of both human and angelic souls lies in two things: (p. 21) (i) the conception / of those intelligible beings to which they have a possible relation,—such according to its capacity; this is in an effort to become assimilated to the essence of the Absolute Good25,— and (ii) in the consequent emanation from them of such actions as are in harmony with their nature, and as are just in relation to the latter. Examples of such actions are noble deeds of men, and the movements imparted to the high substance26 by the angelic souls whose purpose is to preserve generation and destruction,27 again in an effort to become assimilated to the essence of the Absolute Good. These imitations occur for no other purpose than to make possible an approximation to the Absolute Good, and in order that from this proximity excellence and perfection should result. Now this can happen only by reason of help given by it,28 and they conceive this as coming from it. And we have already explained29 that in such a situation a being loves the thing toward which it moves. According to the preceding discourse it is necessary, then, that the Absolute Good should be loved by all souls conducive to a divine nature.

This love exists in them without ever ceasing. For they are always either in the state of perfection or in that of preparation. We have already explained30 that love exists in them in necessity whenever they are in the state of perfection. As for the state of preparation, this is to be found only in human and not in angelic souls. For the latter possess eternally the perfection in which their existences rests. The former...

21 Lit. "the thing which is not in any other thing itself; its substance. This qualification rests because of the case of possibility to an outside cause of the First Cause, which is not possible in the case of the First Cause."
25 Cf. the explicit treatment of this word in the eighteenth section of the Metaphysics, Hore occupied, p. 471 ff., and the first section of the second period of the Permanence, op. cit., p. 472 ff., Caramo, op. cit., p. 472 ff.
26 This phrase, based on a passage in Plato (Phaedrus 245 B), is commonly used by all Neoplatonists, cf. Pachyschem, art. cit., p. 411 note 4, al-Parra, Philosophiae Al- 
29 B.M. reads instead: "by reason of desire nearness of the second period of the Permanence, op. cit., p. 371 cf. Lecq, p. 231,
30 Cf. supra, pp. 222 ff.
affecting, in turn affects with heat another entity, by imposing on it its image which is its heat. Thus, with the occurrence of heat, it heats and blackens. This much can be concluded from induction. But as for a general demonstration, this is not the place for it.

Returning now to our actual subject, we say this: the agent intellect receives the manifestation without mediation, by penetrating its essence and that of the other intelligible beings through which it which does per se, actually and eternally. For those entities which conceive the intelligible beings without the assistance of sense-perception or imagination cognize what is posterior as implied in what is prior, what is caused as implied in that which causes it, and the inferior as implied in the superior.

Next, the divine souls receive the manifestation, again without mediation. Or rather, if we say mediation, we mean the assistance given by the agent intellect which leads from potency to act and procures the means of forming and preserving conceptions.

Next, the animal faculty receives it, then the vegetative one and then nature. Every entity which receives the manifestation does so with the desire to become assimilated to it to the full extent of its capacity. Thus the natural motions of the natural bodies imitate it in these aims—which is to remain in the positions specific to them when they have reached their natural places—even if they have no resemblance to that aim in their beginning, namely, motion.

In the same way, the animal and vegetable substances imitate it in their aims when they carry out the actions specific to them. The aim is here the preservation of the species, or that of the individuals, or the development of the power and strength of the latter and suchlike, even though in their beginnings aims such as sexual intercourse and suchlike have no resemblance to It. In the same way the human souls perform their general activities, both intellectual and practical, by way of imitating It in their aims. This assimilation is brought about by the exercise of justice and intelligence. However, there is, again, no resemblance to It in the beginnings of these aims, e.g., self-instruction and suchlike. The divine angelic souls, too, imitate It when they perform their motions and other activities whereby they maintain the continuity of generation and destruction, and of sewing and reaping.

The reason why the animal, vegetative, natural and human powers resemble It in the aims of their activities but not in the origins of the latter, lies in the fact that these origins are merely preparatory and preparatory; and the Absolute Good must be declared free from any community with states of preparation and potency—whereby their aims are actual perfections, and for the First Cause actual actual

Interpreter its as follows: thus the corps de la philosophia ab-
perfection must be attributed. / Thus, it is possible that they should resemble It in the perfections which are their aim, but it is impossible that they should resemble It in their inconstant states of preparation. As for the angelic souls, the veerquire resemblance to It in the forms of their essence and thus possess it eternally in complete actuality. For they contemplate It eternally and love It eternally, inasmuch as they contemplate It. And they are assimilated to It eternally inasmuch as they love It. Their desire lies in their penetration and conception of It—the most excellent kind of penetration and conception. On account of these they turn away from the direct penetration of everything else and from the direct conception of what is similar to It among the other intelligible beings. However, true knowledge of It becomes indirectly also the knowledge of the rest of existence. They conceive It, as it were, purposely and with desire, and what is similar to It consequently. If it could happen that the Absolute Good did not manifest itself, nothing could be obtained from It, and if nothing were obtained from It, nothing could exist. Thus, there can be nothing if Its manifestation is not present, since it is the cause of all existence. Because It, by Its very nature, loves the being of what is caused by It, It desires to manifest itself. And since the love of the Most Perfect for Its own perfection is the most excellent love, it has as its true object the reception by others of Its manifestation, and this is most properly its reception by those divine souls which have reached the highest degree of assimilation to It. In this way it is possible that they become the object of Its love. This is the meaning of the tradition: God hath said: the servant of such and such a quality loves Me, and I love him. Just as wisdom in general will not allow anything that is precious in some respect to be overlooked, even though it fall short of the peak of excellence, the Absolute Good desires in Its wisdom that things should obtain some of Its gifts, even though the degree in which they will be obtained will not reach perfection. Thus, the Exalted King desires that others should imitate Him, in contrast with earthly kings / who become angry when someone dares to imitate them. For the Exalted King will not bid those turn back from their aim who desire to imitate Him, whereas earthly kings will.

As we have now completed the task of this treatise—we conclude it at this point. God is the Lord of all the worlds, and it is with His help alone that this treatise has been completed.

114 Cf. supra, p. 225.
115 Cf. supra, notes 14, 87 and 88.
116 Lit., kings that pass away.

The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century. II.

G. B. FLAHHIFF C.S.B.

TWO topics have already been dealt with in this study of the writ of prohibition in the thirteenth century: first, the exact nature and the different forms of the writ; secondly, the historical conflict between royal and ecclesiastical authorities over the use and abuse of prohibitions. The present article treats of the actual procedure in matter of prohibition: the issue of the writ by order of the king and its reception by the ecclesiastical court, and then the steps of procedure in the subsequent plea of prohibition, if the writ is not obeyed.

The second half of the twelfth century and the first three quarters of the thirteenth constitute an extremely important epoch in the history of English legal procedure. It was the high period in the development of the writ-system with its written and authoritative formalism characteristic of mediæval English procedure. At the very moment, Maitland has remarked, when the other nations of Western Europe were beginning to adopt as their own the ultimate results of Roman legal history, England was unconsciously reproducing that history. For, while the renaissance of Roman law was causing the impact of Justinian's statute law to be felt in these countries, England was, for her part, developing a formulary system not unlike that earlier Roman experience which had become long since obsolete in the time of Justinian. Not that it owed its inspiration to Rome; even on the contrary, the movement in England was quite spontaneous and its evolution eminently empirical. This is not the place to recount the extraordinary growth of the writ-system during those years of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Suffice it to note, for what concerns procedure, the intimate link between writ and action; to choose a writ was at the same time to choose an action, for it was the writ in each case that initiated the action and gave it its direction even to the very formulary to be used in court. If some new need made itself felt, a new writ would have to be created and with it a corresponding form of action. Hence the great increase and rationalization of writs during this period. One of these writs was the Writ of Prohibition to court christian.

We are concerned here with the procedure in connection with the writ of prohibition only; to this we shall confine ourselves. Indeed, from what has just been said, it is obvious that this is all that can be done; there is no such thing in mediæval English law as a general or common procedure like Roman or canonical procedure or like that of modern England. Procedure varies with each type of action. At the same time, however, actions are not so diverse that each one differs completely from the next; all personal actions, for example, have certain family features in common which distinguish them from real actions, as also civil cases have common traits differentiating them from criminal. That is why, although we are describing here the procedure in a plea of prohibition only, we shall nevertheless be presenting features common to other actions that are likewise personal actions in civil matter. And finally,

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