Classical Arabic Philosophy: Sources and Reception

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Al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id: An Important Summa of Avicennian Falsafa

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The manuscript Feyzullah 1217 preserved in the Beyazıt Library in Istanbul contains a text of 181 folios entitled al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id, 'Important Points and Useful Remarks'. After a brief prologue (fol. 1'), this philosophical summa is divided into three parts: a logic part consisting of ten maslaks, 'ways' (fols 1'–71'); five fanns, 'fields', of physics (fols 72'–121'); seven fanns of Divinālia (fols 121'–180'). It is concluded by a short 'Rule and Recommendation' (qā‘ida wa-wasīyya) (fols 180'–181').

In an article published in 1956, the Jesuit Wilhelm Kutsch was, as far as I know, the first modern scholar to pay attention to this manuscript, which had been neglected by both George Anawati and Yahya Mahdavi in their bibliographies of the Shaykh al-Ra‘is. On the basis of the title-page, where the name ‘Ibn Sinā’ is mentioned, Kutsch attributed the work to the great Iranian philosopher and found it quite close to the Ishārāt and Najāt. He dated the manuscript to AH 1112 or 1113/AD 1700–1701 and edited the longest and last of the five fanns of the Physics, Fi l-nufis, the Psychology (fols 101'–121').

The next and most important academic study of the manuscript Feyzullah 1217 was the Tübingen doctoral dissertation of 1957 by another Jesuit, the Italian Paul Wernst. It included a handwritten transcription of the title-page, the prologue, fanns I–III of the Divinālia (fols 121'–148'), and the conclusion of the work, as well as their translation into German.

The inaccessibility of Kutsch’s article and the fact that Wernst’s dissertation remained unpublished probably explain why al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id was almost never used in Avicennian studies of the last decades of the twentieth century. In 1997 Joseph Kenny republished, and translated into English, selected passages of the Psychology edited some forty years earlier by Kutsch. As his study appeared in a Nigerian journal, its publication did not really improve the situation. For example, in the bibliography of

1. Abbreviated Nukat in references below, where page and line references are to the edition of Kutsch (see n. 3).
2. See the detailed table of contents in Appendix 1.
5. See Kutsch, 'Ein neuer Text' (n. 3 above), p. 147.
7. J. Kenny, Ibn-Sinā on the Human Soul in Notes and Observations on Natural Science, Book II, Section
the edited version of his important doctoral thesis on Avicenna’s Mubāḥathāt, David Reisman mentions Kutsch’s edition and Kenny’s translation but in fact does not use al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id in his research: the work is missing from the index of the works of Avicenna that he analysed, and Feyzullah 1217 is missing from the index of manuscripts that he studied.8

As for myself, I became interested in al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id during the winter of 2002–3, from the perspective of dating the Iṣḥārāt and, more specifically, in relation to Dimitri Gutas’s article claiming that there are two Avicennian doctrines of intuition, a standard one and a revised one.9 The Psychology of al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id contains a very interesting page on hads – including a philosophical exegesis of the Qur’ānic verse of Light10 – which, like similar pages of important Avicennian works such as The Beginning and the Return [al-Mabda’ wa-l-ma’ād] or The Action and Passion [al-Fi’l wa-l-infi’dl], had not been taken into account by Gutas in his analysis.11

Following a closer look at the Kutsch edition of the Psychology of al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id, I soon felt more enthusiasm for this work itself than for contesting Gutas’s theory – a task that I will, nevertheless, come back to on another occasion.12 The main reason for this enthusiasm was the many similarities that had become manifest between the text edited by Kutsch and, not only pages of (a) the Iṣḥārāt13 or (b) the Psychology of the Shīfi’14 but also (c) the Compendium on the Soul written by Avicenna for the Sāmānīd ruler Nūḥ b. Mānsūr,15 (d) his Ta’līqāt,16 and (e) the Risāla Adhawiyya.17 Here was an amazing text combining, among other elements, reworked pages of a work written by Avicenna before the age of eighteen, while he was still in Bukhārā, variations

on chosen passages of his Notes, and what appeared to be a different version of long sections of the summa considered by some to be one of his last books! 18

Here are three samples:

(1) Of the apparent senses nothing gathers the perception of colour, odour, and softness. We sometimes come across a yellow body and, of [this body], we perceive that it is honey, sweet, having a nice odour, fluid, without however having tasted it, smelled it, touched it. It is thus obvious that we have a faculty in which the perceptions of [these] four senses are gathered and in which they all become a single form. If [this faculty] did not exist, we would not know that sweetness, for example, is other than blackness, for that which differentiates between the two things is what knows them all. This faculty is the one called the 'common sense' and the 'representative' [faculty]. (Avicenna, al-Nafs 'ala sunnat al-ikhwasr, p. 166, ll. 3–7)

Among the internal senses, there is the common sense. We can indeed find in ourselves a faculty in which the perceptions of the apparent senses are gathered, three or four, or less or more, like colour, odour, taste, and smell. In the apparent senses, nothing gathers any of these. We sometimes come across a body whose colour is yellowish and we perceive that it is honey, has sweetness and a nice odour, and is fluid, without however having tasted it, smelt it, and touched it. By means of this faculty, we know the distinction between whiteness and sweetness, for that which differentiates between them is what knows them, its knowledge of them coming from the fact that they are both there in it. (Nukat, p. 154, ll. 1–7)

(2) When it is separated [from the body, the soul] is appropriately prepared to receive the flow [fayd] [coming down from] the active intellect, for it is always active in actum and its action does not depend on anything when the receiving matter is appropriately prepared to receive its flow. (Avicenna, Ta'liqat, p. 83, ll. 20–22)

When it is disengaged [from the body, the soul] is appropriately prepared to receive the flow [fayd] [coming down from] the active intellect, for it is active in actum and its action does not depend on anything else when matter is made appropriate to receive and prepared for the flow. (Nukat, p. 168, ll. 10–11)

(3) Know that imagining is one thing, being aware that imagination is there busy imagining is another thing, and having this awareness preserved in the memory [still another] thing. You do not necessarily have to deny the existence of the imagining [process] because one of the other two [things] is missing. (Avicenna, Isharat, p. 137, ll. 15–18)

Supplement. One ought to know that imagining takes place during sleep, although the soul is not aware of it when it wakes up. [The case] is like someone who sees many things in his dream and, when he wakes up, does not know them [any more]. Imagining may also take place [during sleep] with the soul being aware of it when it is awake. [This case] is like someone remembering, while awake, that which he imagined in his sleep and telling it to somebody else. This imagining process can also either last in the memory,

18. On the debate concerning the date of the Isharat, see Michot, 'Le riz trop cuit du Kirmani' (n. 11 above).
or not. When either of the two things, or both, are missing, no one doubts about the imagining process and its existence. (Nukat, p. 177, ll. 3–7)

My enthusiasm grew even more when, in May 2003, I was allowed for one afternoon to examine the manuscript Feyzullah 1217 itself in Istanbul. The thick slightly brownish rag paper was obviously an old oriental paper; this fact, as well as the regularity and quality of the dotted and vocalized naskh script, sufficed to undermine the dating of AH 1112–13/AD 1700–1701 proposed by Kutsch. Moreover, as had in fact already been noticed by Wernst, the date given by Kutsch was simply the one appearing on the waqf stamp of the Shaykh al-Islām Fayḍ Allāh Efendi found on fol. 1r. Wernst dates this otherwise undated manuscript to the first half of the eighth/fourteenth century and speaks of a ‘Persian hand’. I myself would rather date this codex to the seventh/thirteenth century. This early date of the Feyzullah unicum of al-Nukat wa-l-fawā‘id made it an even more important manuscript than I had previously thought. However, my enthusiasm turned into frustration as I had no complete copy of it at my disposal.

![Figure 1. Waqf stamp of the Shaykh al-Islām Fayḍ Allāh Efendi (fol. 1r)](image)

It was only some months later that, thanks to the kindness of my friend Professor Bekir Karlığa of the Marmara University and of his assistant Dr Burhan Koroğlu, I was able to obtain from Dr Nevzat Kaya, the Director of the Süleymaniyê Library, a complete set of colour photographs of the manuscript on CD-ROM. On the basis of these images, a more precise structure in al-Nukat wa-l-fawā‘id, about which Kutsch and Wernst give no information, can now be defined. The titles of the ten maslaks of the Logic and of the ten nahjis of the Logic of the Isḥārāt correspond to each other:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nukat, Logic</th>
<th>Isḥārāt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maslak 1. The quiddity of logic</td>
<td>Nahj 1. The aim of logic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Ibid., p. 8.
23. I am most grateful to Dr Kaya for allowing me to examine the manuscript in May 2003, and for subsequently providing me with the CD-ROM.
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Maslak II. The five simple predicates, definition, and description

Nahj II. The five simple [predicates], definition, and description

Maslak III. The enunciative compositions and their kinds

Nahj III. The enunciative compositions

Maslak IV. The matters from which the propositions are composed and their modes

Nahj IV. The matters of the propositions and their modes

Maslak V. Contradiction and conversion

Nahj V. The contradiction of the propositions and their conversion

Maslak VI. The propositions that are accepted as true

Nahj VI. The propositions, from the viewpoint from which they are accepted as true

Maslak VII. The second composition of proofs

Nahj VII. Beginning with the second composition of proofs

Maslak VIII. The conditional propositions

Nahj VIII. The conditional syllogisms and the [formations] following the syllogism

Maslak IX. Reminder of [various] points concerning demonstration

Nahj IX. The demonstrative sciences

Maslak X. The sophisms in the syllogism

Nahj X. The sophistic syllogisms

The parallelism with the Ishārāt would seem to continue beyond the Logic as the titles of the two first fanns of the Physics echo those of the first and second namaṭs of the Ishārāt:

Nukat, Physics

Fann I. The substantiaity of the bodies

Namaṭ I. The substantiaity of the bodies

Fann II. The directions and their first and second bodies

Namaṭ II. The directions and their first and second bodies

This impression is nevertheless misleading as the division of the work into two main distinctive parts after the Logic – Physics and Divinālia – is itself lacking in the Ishārāt. Moreover, with fanns III and IV of the Physics – ‘The consequent attributes [lawḥāq] of the natural bodies’ and ‘The meteors’ – the link with the Ishārāt is completely severed. Instead, we now find that the Najāt serves as the basis for the text, albeit with extensive and illuminating variations. The composite nature of the fifth and last fann of the Physics – ‘The souls’ – has already been mentioned.

On the whole, the order and content of fanns II–VI of the Divinālia of al-Nukat wa-l-fawīl‘ād illustrate a return to the Ishārāt, as they correspond to those of its namaṭs IV–VIII:

Nukat, Divinālia

II. The essence of the Necessary Being, Its oneness, Its transcendency [tanzil], and what follows that

Namaṭ IV. Existence and its causes

24. See the concordance in Appendix 2a.
III. Its action, its work, and its creation  
IV. Finalities and their principles  
V. The [things] disengaged [from matter]  
VI. The return and its states – happiness and misery

Namât V. The work [of God] and the creation
Namât VI. The finalities, their principles, and the arrangement [of the creation]
Namât VII. The disengagement [from matter]
Namât VIII. Felicity and happiness

I have not yet been able to link the first *fann* of the *Diviniâa* – ‘Summaries and syntheses that will introduce us to what we are going to undertake’ – to any particular Avicennian writing.

The seventh and last *fann* of the *Diviniâa* of *al-Nukat wa-l-fawâ’îd* is entitled ‘The establishment of prophethood, the states of the prophets and the secrets of the signs, the prodigies of the Friends [of God], the states of the knowers and of the inspired ones, the masters in magic and talismans, the way to differentiate between these [people], and the answering of invocations’. As the *namâts* IX and X of the *Ishârât* are entitled ‘The stations of the knowers’ and ‘The secrets of the signs’, one would expect a strong link between the two works. But in fact there is only a very tenuous connection between them.

As the title of this seventh *fann* makes clear, its main object is prophetology. We therefore have a situation which is, in fact, the opposite of what Avicenna does in the two last sections of the *Ishârât*. In the latter, prophetology is an element of a broader philosophy of gnostic spirituality. In *al-Nukat wa-l-fawâ’îd*, prophetology is itself the general doctrine out of which a philosophy of *‘irfân* develops as a particular element.

Furthermore, the literal content of this last *fann* has in fact very little in common with the two last *namâts* of the *Ishârât*. The aforementioned composite nature of *al-Nukat wa-l-fawâ’îd* in its chapter on psychology reappears in the most glaring manner in the last section of the work. In contradistinction to the preceding *fann* on ‘The return and its states – happiness and misery’, which fundamentally corresponds to the eighth *namât* of the *Ishârât*, this seventh *fann* of the *Diviniâa* successively combines, among other elements that I have not yet been able to link to any particular Avicennian text, more or less close variations on five different works of the Shaykh al-Ra‘îs:

(a) pages of the *Shîfà*, Metaphysics, Book X, Section 1 on ‘The origin and the return’;
(b) most of the 13th chapter of the Epistle on the States of the Soul on ‘The establishment of prophethood’, which is one of the parts of the epistle that have no equivalent in the *Shîfà* or the *Najât*, and which also circulated independently under the title *Epistle on the Soul of the [Celestial] Sphere*;26

25. See the concordance in Appendix 2c.
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(c) most of the Epistle on Action and Passion, also called The Divine Flow [al-Fayd al-lâhî];

(d) a few lines from the beginning of the ninth namat of the Ishârât on 'The stations of the knowers';

(e) two passages of the Ta'liqât.

My systematic comparison between Avicenna's works and al-Nukat wa-l-fawa'id is far from complete. The multiplicity and heterogeneity of the connections already identified between them, the frequent linguistic virtuosity apparent in the variations on, or alternative versions of, these writings as well as their far-reaching philosophical implications all contribute to making al-Nukat wa-l-fawa'id one of the most amazing and extraordinary texts of Avicennian falsafa I have yet come across. Let us just think of the consequences of the wide-ranging transtextuality of this book for the questions of the chronology of the Shaykh al-Ra'is's corpus, the evolution of his thought, and, in particular, a proper understanding of the Ishârât, the work to which it has the clearest relation by frequently being close to it, yet sometimes departing from it in favour of various other more or less central Avicennian writings.

There is, however, a slight problem. Kutsch, Wernst, and Kenny were all wrong. So was I when, for the conference at the Warburg Institute in 2004 I phrased the original title announcing this paper, 'Al-Nukat wa-l-fawa'id: A New, Essential Source on the Evolution of Avicenna's Thought, from the Hadiyat al-Ra'is to the Ishârât'. Although Avicennizing to a remarkable level, al-Nukat wa-l-fawa'id is not a work written by Avicenna.

The real author of the book regularly refers to, and strongly criticizes, two persons whom he does not name but calls shaykh al-Yahudi, 'the Shaykh of the Jews', and hashawi l-A'âjim, 'the paddler — or humbug, or verbose one' — among the non-Arabs, i.e. the Iranians. The two expressions are found in the psychological part edited by Kutsch, but he does not pay them any special attention. The same is true of Kenny, who omits from his selection the passages in which they appear. As for Wernst, he simply declares in a footnote that 'die Identität dieses „jüdischen Meisters” ist unbekannt'. Elsewhere, he explains the meanings of hashawi and a'âjim but does not give any clue as to the possible identity of the thinker alluded to.

Avicenna himself declares that, while in Hamadhân, he wrote some sermons to refute, not only the Šabians, the Magi, and the Nazarenes, but also the Jews. He

27. Avicenna, Risalat al-Fī'l wa-l-inf'āl, ed. Z. Š. al-Mūsawi, Hyderabad, 1353/1934; no. 190 in Anawati, Essai (n. 4 above).
28. See the concordance in Appendix 2d.
29. On the hashawiyya, see Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn, s.v. ‘Hashawiyya’. This contemptuous term is often used to denigrate naïve anthropomorphists; see e.g. Abû l-Fadl al-Shahrastâni, Livre des religions et des sectes, I: Traduction, avec introduction et notes par D. Gimaret et G. Monnot, Louvain, 1986, pp. 340–341.
30. See Nukar, pp. 154, 156, 159, 171.
31. Wernst, 'Die Seins- und Gotteslehre' (n. 6 above), p. 73 n. 5.
32. Ibíd., p. 83 n. 2; p. 149 n. 3; see also p. 74 n. 1.
33. See Michot, 'Le riz trop cuit du Kirmâni' (n. 11 above).
can also be ferocious against anthropomorphists of the Ḥashwiyya type.\textsuperscript{34} Now that
the hostile milieux that he sometimes had to face during his professional career are
better understood, one could imagine that the shaykh al-Yahūd and the ḥashawī l-
Aʿājīm would have been two more of his enemies, in some way similar to Abū l-Qāsim
al-Kirmānī and, like the latter, unduly ignored in modern Avicennian research until
recently.\textsuperscript{35} As the Shaykh al-Rāʿīs puts it, we should however not be 'unwary' (ghāfīl),
let ourselves be taken away into 'the city of imagination' (mādiḥat al-takhayyul),\textsuperscript{36} and
build up pseudo-historical philosophical scenarios. All these hypotheses would indeed
never amount to anything other than sheer, vain conjectures as Avicenna did not write
al-Nukat wa-l-fawāʾid.

If the unfortunate Wernst had included in his doctoral research two more chapters of
the Metaphysics of al-Nukat wa-l-fawāʾid, he would certainly have realized that, since
in a passage in its fifth fann paraphrasing a hikāya of the seventh namat of the Ištārī,\textsuperscript{37}
one reads:

\begin{center}
\textbf{\textsc{Warning}. Beware of preoccupying yourself with that which Porphyry of Tyre [al-ṣūrī]
said about this, in ancient times, in his book on the intellect and the intelligibles,\textsuperscript{38} and
that which the Shaykh of the Jews says, in modern times, in his book which would deserve to
be called \textit{The Book of the Examples Not to be Followed} [Kīṭāb al-Ibar], not \textit{The Book of
What has been Established by Personal Reflection}\textsuperscript{39} [Kīṭāb al-Muʿtabar]. To preoccupy
oneself with such [ideas] is indeed corrupting for minds. (Nukat, fols. 162\textsuperscript{v}–163\textsuperscript{v}; see
Figure 2 on p. 98)
\end{center}

The Kīṭāb al-Muʿtabar referred to in this passage is of course the major work of the
famous philosopher and critic of Avicenna, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, who probably
died after AH 560/AD 1164–5 at the age of 80 or 90.\textsuperscript{40} A Jew by birth, Abū l-Barakāt
converted to Islam in his old age. The fact that he is nevertheless called the 'Shaykh of
the Jews' in al-Nukat wa-l-fawāʾid should not come as a surprise. Al-Suhrawardi, for
example, also mentions his Jewish origin when he attacks him in his Kīṭāb al-Mashārī
wa-l-muṭārahāt.\textsuperscript{41}

Many are the passages of al-Nukat wa-l-fawāʾid where the 'Shaykh of the Jews' is
attacked,\textsuperscript{42} and it should be possible, in theory, to link them all to specific pages of the
Kīṭāb al-Muʿtabar. Two examples:

\textsuperscript{34} See Y. J. Michot, \textit{Ibn Sīnā: Lettre au vizir Abu Saʿd, édition princeps} d'après le manuscrit de Bursa,
\textsuperscript{35} See Michot, ibid., pp. 27–68; 'Le riz trop cuit du Kirmānī' (n. 11 above); Reisman, \textit{The Making of
the Avicennan Tradition} (n. 8 above), pp. 166–85.
\textsuperscript{38} Another reference to Porphyry is at fol. 12v, l. 6: 'Do not pay attention to what Porphyry says.'
\textsuperscript{39} This is in S. Pines' translation of Kīṭāb al-Muʿtabar (\textit{Studies in Abūl Barakat al-Baghdādī: Physics
and Metaphysics}, Jerusalem, 1979, p. 262).
\textsuperscript{40} On Abū l-Barakāt see Pines, \textit{Studies} (n. 39 above).
\textsuperscript{41} Yahyā al-Suhrawardi, Kīṭāb al-Mashārī wa-l-muṭārahāt, ed. H. Corbin, \textit{Šuhūboddīn Yaḥyā Suhrawārdī: Œuvres
\textsuperscript{42} See the list in Appendix 3.
(1) Do not listen at all to what the Shaykh of the Jews says—i.e. that earth is colder than water because it is denser and density is a necessary concomitant of coldness! The matter is not as he claimed... (Nukat, Physics, Fann II, fol. 87v, ll. 10–11)

[Water] only cools when fire, hot air and the rays of the sun are far from it and [when] it is next to [something] cooling like earth and cold air [...]. Coldness requires density and creates it, while density preserves coldness and reinforces it. There is no other power there. Similarly for earth. (Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādi)43

(2) ... and it will be a tail for this star. The Shaykh of the Jews said: 'This is not true because, if it were so, the tail would [also] be seen without a star. We say that when this [takes place] without a star or without anything looking like it, it is an extended shooting star, it is not a comet as the term 'comet' is said only for that which has the tail.' What the Shaykh of the Jews imagines is of a corrupt [nature]. Similarly for most of the questions [about which he gives his opinion]. (Nukat, Physics, Fann IV, fol. 98r, ll. 1–4)

People have said that the tail is that which is made to occur and that, when the fume comes to a stop under one of the existing stars to which we are used, it is seen as a tail for this star. If it were so, the tail would [also] be seen without a star, as it would not be inevitably for it to be under a star. (Abū l-Barakāt, Kitāb al-Mu’tabar, II, p. 223, ll. 3–5)

Self-evidently, the Shaykh al-Ra‘is cannot be the author of a work criticizing a thinker born one generation after his death. This being the case, what should one make of the mention of the name 'Ibn Sīnā' on the title-page of the manuscript Feyzullah 1217?

In fact, this title-page presents a serious problem as some words of the rhymed prose (ṣaj) of the incipit have been deliberately smudged and erased at an undefined moment in the history of the manuscript. Kutsch did not say anything on the subject. As for Wernst, he conjectured that the deleted words were titles honouring Avicenna, whose Shi‘ite connotation must have displeased some ‘theological censorship’ in Sunnite

Istanbul, where the manuscript had finally been set as a waqf. He therefore translated the title and incipit in this erroneous way:


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**Figure 3. Smudged words on the title-page (fol. 1')**

One should rather translate:

**BOOK OF THE IMPORTANT POINTS AND USEFUL REMARKS,** composed by our master, the greatest erudite man of the universe, the most eminent of the later thinkers, who honours this world and the religion, the product of the extreme point reached by the intellects [muhṣāl nihāyat al-‘uqūl], the resplendence of Avicenna [sanā Ibn Sīnā], the

44. Werner, 'Die Seins- und Gotteslehre' (n. 6 above), p. 43 n. 8.
45. Ibid., p. 42.
imam of the community and the most accomplished of the imams, . . . . . . . . [X, son of Y], . . . . . . . . – May God make the Muslims benefit from him by lengthening his life!

Sānū Ibn Šīnā, ‘the resplendence of Avicenna’, i.e. the most splendid illustration, or manifestation, of Avicenna: this rhymed expression is not honouring the Shaykh-al-Ra’is but is a title conferred, just like the other titles preceding or following it, upon the person whose names originally came after ‘imams’ but were subsequently deleted. Another sign that Avicenna is not the author of al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id can be found in the Logic section of the book, where the philosopher is referred to as ‘azim al-fuṣulā’, ‘the greatest of the eminent ones’, in relation to the Ishārāt and to two of his minor works on logic:

(1) As for the greatest of the eminent ones, he mentions in all his books, except the book of the Ishārāt, that . . . (Nukat, Logic, Maslak V, fol. 38v, ll. 11–12)

(2) The greatest of the eminent ones says in the book al-Awsat that . . . (Nukat, Logic, Maslak V, fol. 39r, l. 4)⁴⁶

(3) The greatest of the eminent ones has made that clear in his Epistle on the Conversion of the Modal Propositions [Risāla fi ‘Ukūs dhawāt al-jiha]. (Nukat, Logic, Maslak V, fol. 39r, l. 10)⁴⁷

All the expectations, hopes, and hypotheses one could have attached to the Avicennian authenticity of al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id affirmed by Kutsch, Wernst, and Kenny have now evidently vanished. Who then was the real author of the book? The question cannot yet be addressed, the more so as we still do not know whom he means by ḥashawi l-A’ājim.

The author of al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id nowhere discloses the identity of the ‘humbug of the non-Arabs’ as he does with the ‘Shaykh of the Jews’, having been unable to resist a pun about the Kitāb al-Mu’labar. However, on the basis of various passages in which he refers to him,⁴⁸ there is but one particular name that comes to mind: Fakhru al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. AH 606/AD 1209):

(1) These elements are generated from each other and corrupted into each other. Their change in quality only is, however, called ‘transmutation’ [istiḥāla], whereas the change in their forms is called ‘corruption’, for what loses that form, and ‘generation’ for that to which its form comes about. When their transmutation in quality intensifies, they are prepared for a form convenient for them, their original preparation disappears, and the other form is generated at once, because [that preparation] becomes [some] corruption or generation. Beware of taking an interest in what the humbug of the non-Arabs says.

⁴⁶. *Al-Awsat*, or *The Medium Compendium on Logic* [al-Mukhāsar al-awsat fi l-mantiq], is no. 45 in Anawati’s Avicennian bibliography (Essai [n. 4 above], p. 115), no. 108 in Mahdavi’s *Bibliographie* [n. 4 above], pp. 217–18.

⁴⁷. This epistle appears in Mahdavi’s bibliography as no. 42 (*Bibliographie*, [n. 4 above] p. 54); it is not mentioned in Anawati, *Essai* [n. 4 above]. Other references to ‘the greatest of the eminent ones’ are at fol. 9r, l. 7; fol. 36v, ll. 4, 7–8; fol. 38v, l. 1; fol. 54r, l. 13; fol. 55r, l. 14; fol. 56r, ll. 8–9; fol. 62r, l. 4; fol. 78r, l. 11; fol. 83r, l. 9; fol. 145v, l. 15; fol. 148v, l. 6.

⁴⁸. See the list in Appendix 4.
about that! It is indeed an error and a curse. Praised be He Who made him become confused, made him stumble, forbade him to grasp the truths, predestined him to evolve towards heterodoxy [sūr al-i'tiqād], and inspired him to defame those among the ancients and the moderns who have realized the truth! These are indeed matters that are observed, perceived by the senses, and that are rejected only by his like or people treading on his path. (Nukat, Physics, Fann II, fol. 88r, l. 9–fol. 89r, l. 1)

(2) Beware of preoccupying yourself with what the humbug of the non-Arabs says and believes about this – i.e. that existence is added [zā'īd 'alā] to the essence of God Most High. [To have] such [an idea] is to err [dālāl] and to be cursed [wabāl] in this world and in the hereafter. It leads the one who believes that to stay eternally in the sempiternal torment. 'Their torment shall not be lightened.' 49 'Therein they shall abide as long as the heavens and the earth endure.' 50 May God protect us and those who deserve [it] from what he believed! He [really] alleged against that [doctrine], by way of nonsense [khurāfāt], things that are not allowed. (Nukat, Divinaria, Fann II, fol. 135r, ll. 2–6)

(3) USEFUL REMARK. Every time two things that are other than each other emanate from a cause, they [do so] in two different respects because that which requires the emanation of one of them is other than that which requires the emanation of the other. [That which is] one from every viewpoint requires only sheer oneness and the two different respects either are constituents or necessary concomitants. If the two are constituents, the essence is composed, and this is absurd. If the two are necessary concomitants, either this leads to the essence being divided into two [things] other than each other – [in which case] it will be composed of the two of them although it had been supposed one from every viewpoint, and that is [also] absurd – [or it does not lead to that]. The humbug of the non-Arabs did not know at all what is intended by this section. Moreover, he believed that the two concepts themselves are that about which the division takes place, [i.e.] between their being constituents or necessary concomitants. He thus alleged, by way of babble [hadhar], what he alleged, by contesting [tā'īn 'alā] the greatest of the eminent ones. The latter had however not made the division take place but for the two different respects; which is the truth. Furthermore, the humbug of the non-Arabs rebuked ['annafā] the philosophers and reproved [wabbahā 'alā] them for alleging such things. If he had been clever [tafaṭana], he would have found himself worthier of rebuke and reproach. (Nukat, Divinaria, Fann III, fol. 145v, l. 8–fol. 145r, l. 2)

(4) As for the first multiplicity, it [comes] to the [first caused being] with respect to what its essence requires and with respect to its cause, as [said] earlier. This is not [coming about] by way of arbitrary decision [tahakkum] and choice [ikhtiyār] as the Shaykh of the Jews thought and abominably claimed in his rhetoric. In our time [fi zamānī-nū], the humbug of the non-Arabs followed him [in this] and alleged, by way of babble, things that prove his bad understanding [of the topic] and his deprivation [hīrmān]. You, you know that the Creator – praised is He! – is one from every viewpoint. You are also convinced that from the one, nothing emanates but the one. (Nukat, Divinaria, Fann IV, fol. 160r, ll. 6–10)

(5) COMPLEMENT TO THIS FIELD. The noblest [thing] to come about in this elementary world is the rational souls, as they are intellectual substances. It is not possible

49. Qur'ān, II.86.
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for them to come about all at once because of the finiteness of matters. They thus come about by way of succession, forever, semiternally. If you check what I have earlier on established as principles, the ways to demonstrate this will appear to you. It is indeed the conclusion of truthful premises. Beware of what the Shaykh of the Jews alleges against this and of what, following him, the humbug of the non-Arabs says by way of insanities [takhliṯ] and ineptitudes [takhliṯ] [that are] corrupting the order [to be respected by] intelllections . . . (Nukat, Dīvignūla, Fann IV, fol. 161", II. 2–7)

Concerning the essence and the existence of God (cf. passage 2 above), al-Rāzī writes in his Oriental Investigations: "We have proved that the existence of the Most High is added to His quiddity and that His quiddity is the cause of that existence and described by it."51 On the origin of the first multiplicity and the theory that from the one, nothing emanates but the one (cf. passage 4 above), he says in the same work: "The truth, for me, is that there is nothing forbidding making all the possibles depend on [istinād ilā] God Most High.52

Al-Rāzī was a follower of Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, who attacked Avicenna on a number of issues and, among other non-Avicennian views, held that ‘existence is added to the essence of God’ or that multiplicity can be traced back to the One Himself. These various elements therefore fit perfectly with what is well known regarding the main source and the nature of the great Ash’arite theologian’s ideas as well as the way he opposed them to the doctrine of the Shaykh al-Ra’is. This identification also helps to explain, and is somehow supported by, the two following factors. First, the very harsh manner in which the ‘humbug of the non-Arabs’ is regularly condemned in al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id,53 from both a religious and a philosophical point of view, particularly suits a personality like al-Rāzī, who is himself notorious for his animosity and lack of mercy in the debates and controversies into which he loved to drag his contemporaries.54 Secondly, to the ear of someone acquainted with al-Rāzī’s corpus, the rhymed expression ‘the product of the extreme point reached by the intellects [mahṣūl nihāyat al-‘uqūl],’ used in the incipit of al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id to praise its author, must undoubtedly ring as a caelambourg on the titles of two of the works of the great theologian: al-Mahṣūl fi ilm usūl al-fiqh and Nihāyat al-‘uqūl fi dirāyat al-usūl.55

But who wrote al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id? The waqf stamp of the Feyzullah library takes us back before the twelfth/eighteenth century. The relative antiquity of the paper of the manuscript puts it back even further, to the eighth/quarter of the seventh/

52. Ibid., II, p. 535, l. 4.
53. See the passages translated in Appendix 4.
thirteenth centuries. One could think of Ibn Taymiyya, who knows of Abū l-Barakāt and deeply dislikes al-Rāzī.56 Although the Damascene theologian sometimes shows his appreciation for Avicenna and comments on some of his writings,57 a Taymiyyan authorship of al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’īd can easily be excluded. In a text often attributed to Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. AH 748/AD 1348), Ibn Taymiyya is accused of having ‘repeatedly swallowed the poison of the philosophers and their works’.58 There is however no chance that one would ever have referred to him as sanā’ Ibn Sīnā, ‘the resplendence of Avicenna’! Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. AH 672/AD 1274) would be a more likely candidate. In his commentary on the Ishārāt, however, he calls al-Rāzī ‘the eminent scholar’ (al-fādil al-‘ulāma’) or ‘the eminent commentator’ (al-shārīh al-fādil),59 whereas the author of al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’īd constantly uses insulting and contemptuous words to refer to him. Many thinkers of the seventh/thirteenth century, from Sayf al-Dīn al-Amīdī (d. AH 631/AD 1233), Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn Yūnus (d. AH 639/AD 1242), or Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. AH 663/AD 1264) to Abū l-Thana‘a Maḥmūd al-Urmawī (d. AH 682/AD 1283), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shahrāzūrī (d. AH 678/AD 1288), et alii, might well have been those whose names were once apparent at the end of the incipit of the manuscript Feyzullah 1217. Since the author of al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’īd speaks of the hubris of the non-Arabs as someone of his time—zamānu-ni60—it may be useful to take this expression in its narrowest and most literal sense, which would result in his being a contemporary of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī himself.

One might be tempted to suggest that al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’īd is a work of Shīhāb al-Dīn Abū l-Futūḥ Yahyā b. Ḥabash b. Amīrāk al-Suhrawardī, the famous ishāraqi thinker martyred in Aleppo in AH 587/AD 1191. Al-Suhrawardi was a fellow student of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in Marāḡheh when he attended the courses of Majd al-Dīn al-Jīlī, but seems to have had reservations about the philosophical abilities of the Ash’arite theologian.61 As already remarked, he attacks Abū l-Barakāt in his Kitāb al-Mashā‘ir wa-l-mutāraḥāt. He then blames him for attributing to ‘the Necessary Existent infinitely renewed wills, antecedently and subsequently’,62 calls him a ‘filthy madman’ (al-majnūn al-qadhir),63 and denounces his ‘impudence’ (jāsāra) as well as the ‘intensity with which he engages in such things about God’. He adds, ‘because a researcher is a human being, it is no wonder that he makes mistakes. As for refusing the patent truth by means of wicked thoughts [wās-wās], this is inexcusable.’64

58. See Michot, ‘Vanités intellectuelles’ (n. 56 above), p. 600.
60. Nukat, fol. 126, l. 3; fol. 160, l. 8.
62. al-Suhrawardi, Kitāb al-Mashā‘ir, p. 436, l. 2.
63. Ibid., p. 437, l. 13.
64. Ibid., p. 438, ll. 14, 16–17.
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Al-Suhrawardi’s debt to Avicenna is common knowledge and remains enormous even when he develops his Oriental Wisdom beyond the teachings of the Shaykh al-Ra’is. The way some of the texts from his hand embroider an essentially Avicennian canvas demonstrates both an interest in the kind of Philosophical exercise also illustrated by al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’id and the expertise necessary to make it a success.65 One should also notice two things: (1) the internal organization of the topics covered in the Divinaia of this work is not without similarity to the table of contents of a book like his Talihihat; (2) some expressions used in al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’id are of a clearly ‘illuminationist’ (ishrāqi) nature.66

One might also incline to attribute al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’id to the famous ‘Iraqi polygraph Muwaffa’i al-Din Abū Muhammad Abul-Latif b. Yusuf b. Muhammad b. Ali b. Abi Sa’d al-Baghda’di, also called Ibn al-Labbād (AH 557/AD 1162–AH 629/AD 1231).67 Ibn Abi Usaybi’a introduces him as a radical opponent of Avicenna.68 In his youth, ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghda’di nevertheless ‘devoured all the writings of Avicenna which he could obtain’.69 He himself acknowledges having learnt by heart the Book of the Na’jat and says that he had ‘copied the Shifat’ and searched into it’.70 He also writes that, at some point, he ‘was of the opinion that Avicenna had possessed wisdom [al-ḥikma] in its entirety and had filled his books with it’.71 It is only around AH 586/AD 1190 that he forsook his allegiance to the Shaykh al-Ra’is and returned to the study of ancient philosophers and physicians, regretting ‘the time lost in reading the wrong books’72 and passionately burning the idol that he had once adored.73 So, could it be that ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghda’di composed al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’id during the first part of his life, when he was a great admirer of the Shaykh al-Ra’is?

At least four considerations would support such a conjecture:

(1) Abū l-Barakat al-Baghda’di’s name does not appear in any of the works of ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghda’di whose titles are listed by Ibn Abi Usaybi’a. This being the case, since ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghda’di wrote no fewer than three Refutations of the Christians and the Jews,74 he may well have been the same person who, in al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’id, repeatedly

65. Compare e.g. the faṣl relating to God’s love of Himself in Yahyā al-Suhrawardi, Kīthā al-Talihihat, ed. H. Corbin, Sihhaboddin Yahya Suhrawardi: Œuvres philosophiques et mystiques, 1, pp. 1–121 (p. 91, l. 5–p. 94, 1, 7), with the ishara on the same subject in Avicenna, Isharat, p. 197, l. 4–p. 198, l. 8. Such a comparison with the Isharat could be extended to many other passages of the Talihihat.
66. See e.g. Nukat, fols 113’, 13, and 154’, l. 3; ‘the shining of the lights of Holiness’ (ishrāq anwār al-qudā); fol. 178’, l. 5; ‘the shining of its lights’ (ishrāq anwārāt).
73. Al-Baghda’di would then say: ‘Most people were only led to perdition by Avicenna’s books and alchemy’; see Ibn Abi Usaybi’a, ‘Uyûn al-anbâ’a’, p. 688.
calls Abū l-Barakāt the 'Shaykh of the Jews'. As a matter of fact, his prejudices against Jews are obvious in the despicable way in which he speaks of one of his colleagues during his stay in Aleppo (AH 613/AD 1216–AH 617/AD 1220), the Jewish physician Abū l-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf b. Yahyā b. Shamʿūn, of Maghribī origin.75

2. When he mentions 'Abd al-Latīf al-Baghdādī's propensity for criticizing his eminent contemporaries or predecessors, Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿā writes that he was also prejudiced against the Iranians: 'He very often attacked the scholars of the non-Arabs [almādū al-ʿajam] and their writings, especially the Shaykh al-Raʿīs Avicenna and his ilk.'76 In particular the 'humbug of the non-Arabs', i.e. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī? This could well have been the case, as 'Abd al-Latīf al-Baghdādī considers that his books are 'full of errors' and that his contemporaries are 'fools through being taken in by him.'77 He did in fact write a Refutation of Ibn Khāṭīb al-Rayy, concerning his Exegesis of Sūra CXII of the Qurʾān and a Refutation of Ibn al-Khaṭīb, concerning his Commentary on some General Matters of the Canon [of Medicine].78 Occasionally, he was very rude to the Iranian theologian.

3. The fact that 'Abd al-Latīf al-Baghdādī, according to his autobiographical account, studied 'Avicenna's books, the minor and the major ones', would explain the familiarity that the author of al-Nukat wa-l-fawāʾid shows with an unusual number of the works of the Shaykh al-Raʿīs.

4. Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿā not only calls 'Abd al-Latīf al-Baghdādī 'the shaykh' but also 'the eminent imam'.79 This same title is found in the incipit of al-Nukat wa-l-fawāʾid, whose author is introduced as 'the imam of the community and the most accomplished of the imams'.

This being so, a simple look at the manuscript Feyzullah 1217 suffices to make one realize that the name of neither al-Baghdādī nor al-Suhrawardī – if written in part or in full – fits the space of the smudged words of its incipit, what is left of their vowels, and the few tiny traces surviving of their consonants.

Furthermore, potentially important information about our author and his milieu can be found in the Logic part of al-Nukat wa-l-fawāʾid, a part of the work that, following the example of Kutsch, Wernst, and Kenny, one would perhaps be tempted, on a first examination of the manuscript Feyzullah 1217, to neglect in favour of its Psychology and Divinālia.80

In the Logic, al-Nukat’s author indeed gives the titles of two of his writings devoted to the figures of the syllogism:81

77. Stern, 'A Collection of Treatises' (n. 67 above), p. 58.
79. Ibid., p. 683. Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿā also gives the title imām to various other individuals, e.g. al-Suhrawardī (p. 641) and Sayf al-Dīn al-Amīdī (p. 650).
80. I am very grateful to A. Shihadeh for encouraging me to read the Nukat's Logic entirely before publishing the paper I read in April 2001 at the Warburg Institute conference.
81. At fol. 171r, l. 3, the author also expresses a hope of developing his ideas on love (ʾishq) in some 'simple book' (kitāb baṣīt).
(1) I have made that manifest, exhaustively and at length, I have made it clear and made all its syllogisms clear in our book called *The Decisive Demonstration of the Necessity of the Fourth Figure* [al-Burhān al-qaṭī‘ ‘alā wujūb al-shakl al-rābī‘]. (Nukat, Logic, Maslak VII, fol. 52’, ll. 13–14)

(2) We would have a lot to say about the figures. We expound it in the *Book Explaining the Problem, as far as Stating Clearly the Manifest Nature of the Figures is Concerned* [Kitāb Īḍāh al-ishkāl fil-īfā‘āh an bayān al-ashkāl]. (Nukat, Logic, Maslak VIII, fol. 58’, ll. 8–9)

The titles of these two works are unfortunately absent from the bibliographies of Kātib Čelebi, Iṣmā‘īl Bağdat, C. Brockelmann, and F. Sezgin.82 Nor can they be found in N. Rescher’s pioneering survey of the evolution of Arabic logic.83 A search in various historical, bio-bibliographical, literary, and doctrinal Arabic databases on CD-ROM or the Internet produced no result. Until another, unaltered, copy of the Nukat or manuscripts of al-Burhān al-Qaṭī‘ and Īḍāh al-Iṣhkāl are discovered in some library, the precise identity of our philosopher will therefore continue to be a puzzling mystery. As for ‘Abd al-Latīf al-Baghdādi and al-Suhrawardi, is it really conceivable that the titles of three of their works would have remained unknown to their biographers?84

Most interestingly, in the Logic of al-Nukat, our author also refers to other thinkers than the ‘Shaykh of the Jews’ and the ‘humbug of the non-Arabs’. And he does so explicitly, criticizing two of them by name and giving the title of a work by the third:

(1) As for what the author of the Baṣā‘ir said — i.e. that the existential [proposition] is converted into an existential one [al-wujūdiyya yaṯn’ak isu wujūdiyyat] — it is not correct. (Nukat, Logic, Maslak V, fol. 38’, ll. 4–5)85

(2) Do not preoccupy yourself at all with the stupidity [ṣukha] of Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī in what he says. All of it is indeed dates of bad quality [ḥashaf] and counterfeit stuff [ṣaf]. (Nukat, Logic, Maslak VII, fol. 50’, l. 11)

(3) Do not listen to what al-Jīlī says — i.e. that the conclusion of these two types [of syllogism] does not become manifest, as for the first figure. This is indeed nothing. Likewise, the humbug of the non-Arabs followed him in this [matter]. (Nukat, Logic, Maslak VII, fol. 53’, ll. 11–12)


85. Other references to ‘the author of the Baṣā‘ir’ are at fol. 55’, ll. 12–14 (criticized for wrongly trying to correct ‘the greatest of the eminent ones’, i.e. Avicenna); fol. 67’, l. 2 (‘Do not listen to what the author of the Baṣā‘ir says . . . ’).
Al-BAŠA’IR AL-NAŠIRIYYA (The Nasirî Observations, concerning the
Science of Logic) is the most famous work of logic composed by the qâdî Zayn al-
Dîn Umar b. Sahîlân al-Sâîdî (or al-Sawajî). Born in Sâveh (between Tehran and
Hamadân), al-Sâîrî moved to Naysâbûr. He is said by al-Bayhaqi to have lived by
the work of his hands, notably copying Avicenna’s Shifâʾ. Another Avicennian text he
was interested in is The Bird (al-Ta’arî), which he translated into Persian. Among his
other works are an Answer to al-Shahristânî’s Jâwâb ‘alâ l-Shahristânî’s, whose friend
he seems to have been, and an abridgement of the Siwân al-Hikma. According to
al-Shahrazûrî, al-Suhrawardi’s ‘books show that he thought a lot about the Bašâ’ir’,
which he reads in Ishâfân. H. Ziai calls al-Sâîdî a ‘non-Aristotelian Persian logician’
and confirms that his ‘novel ideas’ concerning the reorganization of the Organon had
a major impact on al-Suhrawardi’s writings on logic.’ For N. Pourjavady, the presence
of two of his writings in the Marâghheh anthology of AH 596–7/AD 1200 indicates
that his works were then studied in that philosophical school. The first one, the Epistle
Called ‘The Accusation of Error’ (al-Risâlât al-Musammâmât bi-l-tawâlî’a), examines the
prophetic powers of contemplation and action. The second, the Epistle Stating the
Truth about the Contradiction Relating to Existence (Risâlât fî Tahqîq naqîd al-wujûd),
relates to one of the conundrums of logic [ghâwâmîd al-mantîç] studied in his books
by ‘the most eminent of the later thinkers [âfdal al-muta’akhkhîrîn] – may God reward
him well on behalf of the people of knowledge!’ – i.e. Avicenna, but not really solved
by him ‘despite the sublimity of his worth and the accuracy of his insight [jalâl qadrihi
wa-isâba nazarârîhî]’. Brockelmann dates al-Sâîdî’s death to AH 540/AD 1145.77

To see the author of “al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’id” refer to Ibn Ghâilân al-Balkhî comes as
a most pleasing surprise since, a few years ago, I had the opportunity to underline
the importance of the latter as a direct witness to the Avicennian pandemic in Central
Asia (Marw, Naysâbûr), one generation after the death of al-Ghazâlî.86 In the last of his

87. See Zâhir al-Dîn al-Bayhaqi, Tátrimma Siwân al-hikma, ed. M. Kurd ‘Ali [under the title Tarikh
hukamî al-Islâm], Damascus, 1365/1946, pp. 128–30, no. 74; al-Shahrazûrî, Nuzhat al-arwâh, II, pp. 56–7,
no. 47.
89. See N. Pourjavady, Majmû‘ah-yè falsafî-e Marâghah: A Philosophical Anthology from Marâghah,
Majdûddîn Jîlî, and others, facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and English, Tehran, 2002,
pp. ix–x.
90. See Reisman, The Making of the Avicennan Tradition (n. 8 above), p. 121.
93. See Pourjavady, Majmû‘ah-yè falsafî-e Marâghah (n. 89 above), pp. ix–x.
94. See ibid., pp. 289–300.
95. See ibid., pp. 301–6.
97. Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur (n. 82 above), suppl. 1, pp. 830–31; K. D. al-Zirkhî,
al-A‘lam: Qâmites tarâjim li-ashar al-rîjîl wa-l-misâ’i min al-‘arb wa-l-musta’rabîn wa-l-mustashriqîn,
98. See Y. I. Michot, ‘La pandémie avicennienne au vii/e siècle: présentation, editio princeps et
Controversies, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī reports how, after his first visit to Bukhārā in AH 582/ AD 1186,99 he had discussions in Samarkand with this ill-informed critic of Avicenna and answered his rudeness with ‘explicitly insulting actions and words’.100 The author of al-Nukat wa-l-fawa′id does not in fact seem to be more positively inclined towards one than the other: two of the three abusive expressions of the above passage 2 – the only time he refers to Ibn Ghaylān – are also used by him, in other pages of the work, against al-Rāzī.101 Ibn Ghaylān strove to attack Avicenna in works like The Temporal Origination of the World [Hudūth al-ālam] and Paving the Way for the Accusation of Error [al-Tawṣi′a lī-l-takḥīṭa′]. He himself presents the latter as seeking to refute the Shaykh al-Ra′is on various topics of logic, so as to be able to ‘accuse him of error in questions related to the principles of the religion’.102 The second figure of the syllogism, about which the author of al-Nukat wa-l-fawa′id tells his reader to pay no attention to Ibn Ghaylān, also seems to have been one of the topics of logic over which the latter criticized Avicenna in his al-Tawṣi′a.103 Ibn Ghaylān’s death can be dated to c. AH 590/ AD 1194.104

Very little is in fact known about Majd al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Jīlī.105 When reporting that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī studied with him, Ibn Abī Usaybi′a, for example, says only: ‘He was among the greatest eminent ones [al-afāḍil al-‘uzamā′] in his time and he composed important works [taṣāwīf jiḥāla].’106 Originally from the northern Iranian province of Gilān, he flourished around the middle of the sixth/twelfth century and must have died before its end. According to Ibn Khallikān (d. AH 681/AD 1282), al-Jīlī studied with Muhammad b. Yahyā l-Naysābūrī (d. AH 548/AD 1153), a student of al-Ghazzālī.107 Pourjavad hopes that some evidence will be found one day that will show that he also studied with Ibn Sahālīn al-Sawwī. Al-Jīlī taught logic and philosophy in Rayy before going to Marāgheh, c. AH 570/AD 1174. Apart from al-Rāzī, his other most famous student there was al-Suhrawardi. The Marāgheh anthology of 596–7/1200 includes the text of his Kitāb al-Lāmi′ fi l-shakl al-rābi′ [The Book of What is Radiant, concerning the Fourth Figure]. It is with reference to this same syllogistic figure that


101. See Appendix 4.

102. See Michot, ‘La pandémie avicennienne’ (n. 98 above), p. 317.

103. See Pourjavad, Majmū′ah-ye falsafi-e Maragheh (n. 89 above), p. 19*. The title of one of the works of ‘Abd al-Laṭif al-Baghdādī listed in Ibn Abī Usaybi′a′ (n. 695, is Treatise against the Viewpoint from Which to Pave the Way in Logic [Maqala ′alsā fiḥat al-tawṣi′a fi l-mantuq]).

104. See Shihadhe, ‘From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī’ (n. 54 above), p. 151.

105. See Pourjavad, Majmū′ah-ye falsafi-e Maragheh (n. 89 above), pp. iii–iv, ix, 18*–19*.


the author of *al-Nukat wa-l-fawā'id* criticizes al-Jilī and, after a cursory examination of *al-Lāmi‘*, there is some reason to believe that it is indeed this work that he has in mind.\(^{108}\)

Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Fakhir al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and now Ibn Sahlān al-Sawī, Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī, and Majd al-Dīn al-Jilī . . . Once they are put together, these five names attacked in *al-Nukat wa-l-fawā'id* somehow contribute to a better understanding of its author’s place in the evolution of Islamic thought after Avicenna, with the consequence that new light can then be shed on this evolution.

From our writer’s constant reference to al-Rāzī as an ‘ajam, one might infer that he himself is possibly an Arab, not an Iranian. Geographically, it is nevertheless difficult to determine where he lived: among the five authors he criticizes there are two Central Asians, two Iranians, and an Iraqi. The simple and direct way he refers to Ibn Ghaylān al-Balkhī seems to indicate that the latter was relatively well known to the people to whom he addressed *al-Nukat wa-l-fawā'id*. Could this be a sign that he too, like Ibn Ghaylān, was then living in Transoxiana? Politically, he was perhaps a subject of the Saljuqs or of the Khwārazm-Shāhs. As already noticed, he presents al-Rāzī as someone of his own time. He must therefore have been active around AH 596/AD 1200 or, at the latest, during the first third of the seventh/thirteenth century.\(^{109}\) In other words, he lived during the second part of this century of Turkish dynasties that ruled the greater Middle East from the time of al-Ghazālī until the Mongol invasions.

Philosophically, *al-Nukat wa-l-fawā'id* probably offers the best and most comprehensive confirmation of the Avicennian tidāt wave having flooded, according to Ibn Ghaylān, not only the intellectual and theological milieux but the whole society of the sixth/twelfth century.\(^{110}\) Its author is indeed a very expert and convinced Avicennian philosopher. He has access to a wide range of major and minor works of the Shāykh al-Rā‘ī’s and is able to combine and render them, in form as well as in content, into an amazingly Avicennizing *summa*. For the many parts of the *Ishārāt* with which it has links, *al-Nukat wa-l-fawā'id* constitutes a commentary that could be almost as early as al-Rāzī’s,\(^{111}\) and that is as sympathetic towards Avicenna as al-Rāzī was unsympa-

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108. See Pourjavady, *Ma‘ṣūmat-ye falaṣīf-e Marāghahī* (n. 89 above), pp. 345–64. The title of one of the works of ‘Abd al-Latīf al-Baghdādī listed in Ibn Abī Usaybi‘a, ‘*Uyūn al-anbā‘*, p. 695, is *Treatise Showing the Counterfeit Character of the Fourth Figure* [*Maqāla fī tāzyīf al-shu‘ā‘ al-rā‘ī*].

109. If it is right to see in the incipit of *al-Nukat wa-l-fawā'id* some veiled allusion to F. D. al-Rāzī’s *al-Maḥṣūl fī lham waqīf an-faṣṣ and Nihāyat al-‘usūl fī dīriyāt al-‘usūl*, the work could well have been written as early as c. AH 581/AD 1185. According to A. Shihadeh, *The Teleological Ethics of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī*, Leiden, 2006, p. 7, *al-Maḥṣūl* was completed in AH 576/AD 1180 and *Nihāyat al-‘usūl* is also a relatively early work.

110. See Michot, ‘*La pandémie avicennienne*’ (n. 98 above).

111. A. Shihadeh informs me (pers. comm.) that the passage from the ‘humbug among the non-Arabs’ quoted in *al-Nukat wa-l-fawā'id*, fol. 108‘, II, 3–4 (see the translation in Appendix 4) is taken verbatim from Rāzī’s *Sharḥ of the Ishārāt* (see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, ed. ‘U. H. al-Khushshāb, in the margins of Ḥāfīz 1-Kītāb al-Manāsīm bi-Sharḥay al-Ishārāt . . . 2 vols., Cairo, 1325/1907, I, p. 124, II, 35–6), a work which, in his opinion, written around the year AH 580/AD 1184 (see Shihadeh, *The Teleological Ethics* [n. 109 above], p. 9). I am most grateful to A. Shihadeh for this very useful identification.

At fol. 151‘, II, 6–7 (see the translation in Appendix 4), the author of *al-Nukat wa-l-fawā'id* quotes verbatim another passage from Rāzī’s *Sharḥ of the Ishārāt*, this time II, p. 8, II, 1–4.
thetic. It could also reveal a far better understanding of the philosopher than al-Ṭūsī’s commentary, as this later thinker often pursues his own doctrinal agenda. That said, our author is far from being a blind imitator. First, I have already mentioned the way he departs from the last two names of the Ishārāt in order to focus, on the basis of other Avicennian writings, on prophecy rather than on ‘irfān.\(^{112}\) Second, again as noted earlier, his Avicennism is sometimes tinged with ishrāq, perhaps because he is influenced by al-Suhrawardī, with whom he has various things in common, or simply because illuminationism had become part of the honnête homme’s world-view at the time. Third, whereas Avicenna remains silent about it in the Ishārāt, the fourth syllogistic figure is examined at length in al-Nukat wa-l-fawa‘īd.\(^{113}\)

In fact, our author is passionate about logic. The two works from his pen whose titles he quotes also deal with the figures of the syllogism. As for the three thinkers he explicitly refers to apart from Abū l-Barakāt and al-Rāzī, they all appear to have been directly involved in what, following T. Street, could be called some ‘logical problematic as presented by, and articulated in terms of, Avicenna’s writings. They would perceive a formal problem or tension implicit in what Avicenna had written, or a lacuna, and would set about finding a repair.\(^{114}\) In this respect, al-Nukat wa-l-fawa‘īd seems to participate in the same philosophical preoccupations and endeavours illustrated in various texts of the Marāḡeh anthology.

In logic or other philosophical disciplines, the ‘Shaykh of the Jews’ and his main follower, the ‘humbug of the non-Arabs’, were themselves particularly active in the debates on the Shaykh al-Ra‘ī’s views, and it is on them, especially the latter, that our author focuses his attacks. At this stage, it is still impossible to decide whether his animosity was due to poor personal relations with al-Jīlī’s former student or to a realization of the potential damage to be expected from that student’s close scrutiny of Avicenna’s works, notably his commentary on the Ishārāt. Whichever it was, it is obvious that al-Nukat wa-l-fawa‘īd is on the defensive.

This fact corroborates a situation that no one should forget: Avicenna’s empire over minds was never exclusively positive and led to opposition as much as to fascination. A whole spectrum of positions therefore developed in relation to him – totally or partly positive, mixed and hybrid, partly or totally negative – with people as devoted to the Shaykh al-Ra‘ī as our author not hesitating to disassociate themselves from some of his views, while others would carry on Avicennizing even in their anti-Avicennism.\(^{115}\)

\(^{112}\) Was this a kind of corrective process the Ishārāt had to undergo in order to be able to exert its full influence among religiously minded intellectuals and be opposed by them, as an ideal antidote, to philosophies that were far less favourable to the prophets and the religions?

\(^{113}\) Nukat, fols 51’ ff.


That said, we still have only elementary knowledge of the precise paths along which all these forms of more or less positive or negative Avicennizing evolved during the sixth/twelfth century. Thanks to the recent publication of Ibn Ghaylān’s testimony and of the Marāqīghēh anthology, and thanks also to studies such as that by A. Shihadeh, things are slowly starting to improve. One of the main interests of al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’id is to contribute to this progress, the result of which is a richer and far more complex picture of post-Ghazālīan Avicennism than the one traditionally drawn.

Let us take, for example, the ‘outline of Arabic philosophy’ chart published by D. Gutas in 2002. It distinguishes three main dimensions: ‘Mainstream Avicennism’, ‘Anti-Avicennist Peripatetics & others’ in Andalusia or in Baghdad, and ‘Illuminationist Avicennism’. Leaving Andalusia aside, we therefore have correspondingly, for the sixth/twelfth century, the names of al-Lawkārī, al-’Ilāqi, al-Sāwī, (al-Ghazālī, (al-Sharāstānī, Abraham b. Dāwūd, and (al-’Rāzī) in a first column (the angle-brackets indicating Avicenna’s ‘opponents’). Abū 1-Barakāt stands alone in a second column, and al-Suhrāwardī in a third. Because the attention of Western scholars was drawn to the importance of Ibn Ghaylān as early as 1993, his name could at least have been added after al-Ghazālī. In relation to the Marāqīghēh anthology, one should moreover, henceforth, also make room in such a chart for names such as Majd al-Dīn al-’Ālī, ‘Ayn al-Qudāt al-Hamadhānī (d. AH 529/AD 1131), and Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mas’ūdī (d. C. AH 585–90/AD 1189–94).

More inspiring even than the addition of a few names would nevertheless be the remapping of the sixth/twelfth century’s Avicennizing landscape into a more intricate and dynamic reality than suggested by a few columns. For Ibn Ghaylān, al-Ghazālī was not totally against Avicenna. In Marāqīghēh, texts of both thinkers relating to eschatology and other topics circulated – and were perhaps taught – together, as proved by their presence alongside each other in the anthology of AH 596–7/AD 1200. In al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’id, no reference is made to the author of the Tadhkīr, and it is Abū l-Barakāt who, ahead of his follower al-’Rāzī, is considered to be Avicenna’s most radical opponent. The ‘Shaykh al-Yahūd’ becomes in this respect not marginal at all, and any line drawn from Avicenna to al-’Rāzī should pass through him.

It also appears that special attention should be given to Avicenna’s logic, rather than to illuminationism, for example. Thinkers as pro-Avicennian as al-Nukat wa-l-fawa’id’s author or, before him, al-Sāwī in fact disagreed with the Shaykh al-Ra’īs on various logical questions, such as, for example, the fourth figure of the syllogism. A fortiori,
the same is true of those who were in any case less favourably inclined towards him, such as Ibn Ghaylân and al-Jîlî, or Abu l-Barakât, al-Râzî, and Abû al-Latîf al-Baghîdî in his later works. A number of texts of the anthology of AH 596–7/AD 1200 attest that such questions were then discussed in Marâjîheh. They appear of great importance in the logic of al-Nukat wa-l-fawa‘îd.\(^1\)

The surprising nature of Al-Nukat wa-l-fawa‘îd and the extraordinary interest it has for the history of Islamic philosophical thought after Avicenna are undeniable, especially in relation to Abû l-Barakât al-Baghîdî and Fâkhîr al-Dîn al-Râzî. Much more investigation will however be necessary to solve the enigma of our author’s name and to evaluate fully his contribution to Avicennism around AH 596–7/AD 1200. In particular, his text will have to be entirely and systematically examined in relation to Avicenna’s works (with the possibility of interesting consequences for the question of the authenticity or inauthenticity of some of them). All the references to the ‘Shaykh of the Jews’ will have to be linked to pages of the Mu’âtabar. Similarly, each of the passages in which the ‘humbug of the non-Arabs’ is attacked will have to be linked to some passage of al-Râzî’s writings and also (a) passages of the Mu’âtabar, when he is said to follow the Shaykh of the Jews; and (b) the Ishârât and/or other Avicennian texts against which his own views were developed. Finally, the references to al-Sâwî, Ibn Ghaylân, and al-Jîlî will have to be checked against their works, in the Marâjîheh anthology or other sources.

Some of these tasks require interests and qualifications which I do not have, notably in logic. Moreover, in the present paper my purpose was simply to share the results of a first examination of this stubbornly anonymous pseudo-Avicennian work. Most unexpectedly, al-Nukat wa-l-fawa‘îd provides a new, original, golden opening to the various perspectives adopted in the greater Middle East, around the end of the sixth/twelfth century, by the debates on logic, physics, psychology, metaphysics, theology, prophetology, etc., as inspired by the philosophical corpus of the ‘greatest of the eminent ones’ and animated, among other important Muslim thinkers, by a ‘Shaykh of the Jews’, a ‘non-Arab humbug’, and a mysterious sanâ Ibn Sûnâ.

be more than three figures. Al-Khindî, al-Fârâbî, Avicenna, and Averroes all ignored the fourth figure. In the first half of the twelfth century, Najm al-Dîn Abû l-Futûh Ahmad b. Muhammad Ibn al-Sarî, also known as Ibn al-Salâh (d. Damascus, AH 548/AD 1153–4), not only defended and expounded the theory of the fourth figure against his famous predecessors, especially Avicenna, but reported in some detail the discussions concerning it (see A. I. Sbrâ, ‘A Twelfth-Century Defence of the Fourth Figure of the Synagigam’ (1965), repr. in Sbrâ, Optics, Astronomy and Logic: Studies in Arabic Science and Philosophy, Aldershot, 1994, no. xvi, which includes a translation of Ibn al-Salâh’s reporti). Al-Nukat wa-l-fawa‘îd provides a new illustration of the centrality of these discussions after Avicenna.

121. D. Gutas, ‘Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works’, in Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions, London, 1993, pp. 29–76 (56–64), rightly explains that, in the Islamic East, ‘Avicenna’s influence was decisive for the further development of logical studies in Arabic.’ Following Ibn Khaldûn, he attributes a central role to al-Ghazalî and mainly analyses this role in relation to theology and jurisprudence. He then quotes Ibn al-Afînî (d. AH 749/AD 1348) to give an idea of the way logic was taught and thought of in the Mamlûk sultanate. Gutas does not, however, mention Avicennian logic and logicians in the Islamic East during the twelfth century. Al-Nukat wa-l-fawa‘îd will surely contribute to a better knowledge of that period.

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Figure 4. Title-page of the manuscript Feyzullah 1217 (fol. 1')
APPENDIX I

Table of Contents of al-Nukat wa-l-fawā'īd

PROLOGUE

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Maslak III: The enunciative compositions and their kinds (fol. 15')
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Maslak IX: Reminder of [various] points concerning demonstration (fol. 65')
Maslak X: The sophisms in the syllogism (fol. 69')

BOOK II: THE SCIENCE OF PHYSICS

Fann I: The substantiality of the bodies (fol. 72')
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Fann IV: The meteors (fol. 95')
Fann V: The souls (fol. 101'; chapter edited by Kutsch)

BOOK III: THE SCIENCE OF DIVINALIA

Fann I: Summaries and syntheses that will introduce us to what we are going to undertake (fol. 121'; chapter transcribed and translated by Wernst)
Fann II: The essence of the Necessary Being, Its oneness, Its transcendency (tanzih), and what follows that. (fol. 132'; chapter transcribed and translated by Wernst)
Fann III: Its action, Its work, and Its creation (fol. 139'; chapter transcribed and translated by Wernst)
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Fann V: The [things] disengaged [from matter] (fol. 161')
Fann VI: The return and its states – happiness and misery (fol. 167')
Fann VII: The establishment of prophethood, the states of the prophets and the secrets of the signs, the prodigies of the Friends [of God], the states of the knowers and of the inspired ones, the masters in magic and talismans, the way to differentiate between these [people] and the answering of invocations (fol. 171')

RULE AND RECOMMENDATION (fol. 180')
APPENDIX 2

Concordance of Four Chapters of al-Nukat wa-l-fawā’id and Various Works of Avicenna

ABBREVIATIONS:  
AN 3  al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbiḥāt  
AN 8  al-Tawqāt  
AN 14  al-Shi’a  
AN 74  Risālat al-Naṣf al-falakiyya  
AN 102  al-Naṣf ‘alā sunnat al-ikhtiṣār  
AN 190  Risālat al-Fi’l wa-l-infī’il  
AN 200  al-Risālat al-Adhawīyya

(a) Physics, Fann II: The directions and their first and second bodies

fol. 80’, l. 5–8, Fā’ida

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fol. 81’, l. 4–11, Nukta  
AN 3, p. 108, l. 1–6, Ishāra

fol. 81’, l. 11–fol. 82’, l. 4, Tadhyīl  
AN 3, p. 108, l. 7–15, Tadhkir

fol. 82’, l. 4–9, Nukta  
AN 3, p. 108, l. 16–19, Ishāra

fol. 82’, l. 9–10, Fā’ida

fol. 82’, l. 11–15, Ziyāda fā’ida

fol. 82’, l. 1–9, Nukta  
AN 3, p. 108, l. 20–p. 109, l. 7, Ishāra

fol. 82’, l. 9–14, Fā’ida

fol. 82’, l. 15–fol. 83’, l. 8 . . . abta’, Fā’ida wa-tahjīl (followed by attacks on al-Rāzi and Abū l-Barakāt)

fol. 83’, l. 13–fol. 83’, l. 7, Nukta  
AN 3, p. 109, l. 18–p. 110, l. 9, Ishāra

fol. 83’, l. 7–10, Tadhyīl  
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AN 3, p. 110, l. 13–p. 111, l. 10, Wahm wa-tanbih

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fol. 85’, l. 13–fol. 85’, l. 1, Wahm wa-fā’ida  
AN 3, p. 113, l. 1–3, Wahm wa-tanbih

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fol. 85’, l. 3–fol. 86’, l. 1, Nukta (includes two attacks on al-Rāzi)  
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fol. 86’, l. 1–6, Tadhyīl

fol. 86’, l. 6–fol. 86’, l. 10, Nukta

fol. 86’, l. 11–14, Tadhyīl  
AN 3, p. 113, l. 13–p. 114, l. 9, Tanbih

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fol. 87v, l. 2–6, Tadbīyl
fol. 87v, l. 6–fol. 88v, l. 1, Ziyādat irshād
fol. 88v, l. 1–5, Wāhm wa-fāʿida
fol. 88v, l. 5–11, al-hayāli. Fāʿida (beginning) (followed by a report of personal experiences and a diatribe against al-Rāzī)
fol. 89v, l. 2–8, Nukta wa-fāʿida
fol. 89v, l. 8–fol. 89v, l. 6, Fāʿida
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p. 155, l. 20 . . . al-rūḥ, Hidaya (beginning)
p. 156, l. 3–4, Ziyāda tabṣira (beginning) (followed by an attack on al-Rāzī)
p. 156, l. 13–21, al-radhiḥa, Nukta (beginning)
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(begning)

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p. 161, ll. 11–19, Nukta
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lines)

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APPENDIX 3

References to the 'Shaykh of the Jews' (shaykh al-Yahūd)

fol. 4r, l. 5  'Do not preoccupy yourself with what the Shaykh of the Jews says!'

fol. 7r, l. 13  'As for what the Shaykh [of the Jews] [shaykh al-a'ājm] imagined, as well as those who followed him [among] the non-Arabs ...

fol. 8r, l. 4  'Turn away from what the Shaykh [of the Jews] [shaykh al-a'ājm] mentioned about this! It is all dates of bad quality [hashaf]!'

fol. 26r, l. 5  'Do not pay attention to what the Shaykh of the Jews says!'

fol. 47r, l. 3  'Do not listen to what the Shaykh of the Jews says about this!'

fol. 54r, l. 8  'As for the Shaykh [of the Jews] [shaykh al-a'ājm], he said ...'

fol. 54r, ll. 6–7  'The Shaykh of the Jews thinks that the two possibilities give a conclusion in the second figure when ...'

fol. 74r, l. 4  'Beware of what the Shaykh of the Jews says on these topics!'

fol. 78r, l. 7  'Do not listen to what the Shaykh of the Jews says!'

fol. 83r, l. 13  'In this [thing that he] imagined, the humbug of the non-Arabs followed the Shaykh of the Jews. It is incorrect, for the reason we have made clear.'

fol. 87v, l. 10  'Do not listen at all to what the Shaykh of the Jews says — i.e. that earth is colder than water ...'

fol. 98v, l. 1  '... and it will be a tail for this star. The Shaykh of the Jews said: “This is not true ...”'

fol. 98v, l. 4  'What the Shaykh of the Jews imagines is of a corrupt [nature]. Similarly for most of the questions [about which he gives his opinion].'

fol. 105v, l. 4  (Kutsch, p. 154)  'Do not listen at all to what the Shaykh of the Jews says — i.e. that what perceives this is the soul, by its essence, not by an instrument!'

fol. 116r, l. 7  (Kutsch, p. 171)  'It is no secret, the possibility of the intellect of the essence is then included in the possibility of intellect absolutely. [Things] are thus not as [. . . .] ( ) thought — i.e. that it is included in its intellect of something else.'

fol. 124v, l. 9  (Wernst, p. 7)  'The Shaykh of the Jews maintained that [the existent] is a genus. This is not correct.'

fol. 125v, l. 14  (Wernst, p. 10)  'It is therefore obvious that the existent is not a genus, contrarily to what the Shaykh of the Jews maintained.'

fol. 138v, l. 8  (Wernst, p. 32)  'Do not preoccupy yourself with the rhetoric of the Shaykh of the Jews, who offers nothing but error on this topic!'

fol. 160v, l. 8  'This is not [coming about] by way of arbitrary decision and choice as the Shaykh of the Jews thought and abominably claimed in his rhetoric.'

fol. 161r, l. 6  'Beware of what the Shaykh of the Jews alleges against this!'

fol. 163r, l. 1  'Beware of preoccupying yourself with that which Porphyry of Tyre [al-šārī] said about this, in ancient times, in his book on the intellect and the intelligibles, and that which the Shaykh of the Jews says, in modern times, in his book which would deserve to be called The Book of the Examples Not to be Followed [Kūṭūb al-ʻībar], not The Book of What has
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been Established by Personal Reflection [Kitāb al-Mu’tabar]. To preoccupy oneself with such [ideas] is indeed corrupting for minds.’

APPENDIX 4

References to the ‘Humbug of the Non-Arabs’ (hashawi l-A’ājim)

fol. 4r, l. 15  ‘There is no need for the proviso [qayd] mentioned by the humbug.’

fol. 7r, l. 14  ‘As for what the Shaykh [of the Jews] [shaykh] imagined, as well as those who followed him [among] the non-Arabs [al-a’ājim] . . .’

fol. 25v, l. 6  ‘Do not pay attention to what the humbug of the non-Arabs says—i.e., that it is not possible to forecast with certainty the rise and the setting [of a star]! This is indeed due to his stupid understanding [of the matter] [fa-dhālīka sukhf min fahmihi].’

fol. 25v, l. 13  ‘Do not turn towards what the humbug of the non-Arabs says—i.e., that the minds of the commonalty are far away from grasping these considerations! Indeed, what is meant by the term commonalty [‘āmmat] is not the riffraff [ra‘ā] and the silly people [safāf] as he came to believe. What is thereby meant is the Kalām theologians [mutakallimān].’

fol. 31v, l. 5  ‘Do not pay attention to what the humbug of the non-Arabs says—i.e., that the [things that can be known] [al-ma‘lumāt] are to be traced back to the Necessary Existent, are predetermined by [muqaddar ‘inda] Him, and have a specified time [waqt mu‘ayyan]! This is indeed babble [hadhar] with which one must not preoccupy oneself.’

fol. 47v, l. 8  ‘Do not listen at all to what the humbug of the non-Arabs says—i.e., that the fourth [figure] comes about from the conversion [‘aks] of each one of its two premises! This is a mistake, null and void [lā yu’awwalu ‘alay-hi].’

fol. 53v, l. 12  ‘Likewise, the humbug of the non-Arabs followed him123 in this [matter].’

fol. 56v, l. 4  ‘Do not listen to what the humbug of the non-Arabs says about this, as well as those who follow him, among those pretending to be clever [mutahadīqi].’

fol. 75v, l. 4  ‘Do not listen at all to what the humbug of the non-Arabs alleges against this by way of ineptitudes [takbīti].’

fol. 77v, l. 9  ‘Do not listen at all to what the humbug of the non-Arabs says here! All this is indeed stupid [sukhf].’

fol. 83v, l. 9  ‘This is not due to the fact that the natural impetus [mun] exists with, in itself, the violent [one], as the humbug of the non-Arabs imagined on the basis of things said by the greatest of the eminent ones.’

fol. 83v, l. 12  ‘In this [thing that he] imagined, the humbug of the non-Arabs followed the Shaykh of the Jews. It is incorrect, for the reason we have made clear.’

fol. 85v, l. 8  ‘There is no cream [zulda] in what the humbug of the non-Arabs says in order to question [tashkīk] that, as it is meagre [rākīk].’

fol. 85v, l. 15  ‘Do not preoccupy yourself at all with the ineptitude [khah] of the hum-


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bug of the non-Arabs! Praised be He Who made him neglect to notice the meanings [of things] and made him convinced by nonsense [khurāfāt] which does not induce anything other than misconduct [tadlīl]!

fol. 88v, l. 14

"Beware of taking an interest in what the humbug of the non-Arabs says about that! It is indeed an error [dulāl] and a curse [wabāl]. Praised be He Who made him become confused, made him stumble [zalālahu], forbade him to grasp the truths, predestined [ātāhu] him to evolve towards heterodoxy [ṣiʿ al-iʿtiqād], and inspired him to defame those among the ancients and the moderns who have realized the truth [muhāqqiq]! These are indeed matters that are observed, perceived by the senses, and that are rejected only by his like or people treading on his path."

fol. 106r, l. 15

(Kutsch, p. 156)

"Do not turn towards what the humbug of the non-Arabs says in this place! It is all dates of bad quality [hashaf]. Such insanities [takhbīt] and ineptitudes [tahkib] leading towards erring and abandoning what is right would not escape anyone having a sound mind and a minimum of familiarity with matters of wisdom. Praised be He Who made him be convinced by the envelope [qishr] and deprived him of the gist [lubāb]!"

fol. 108v, l. 3

(Kutsch, p. 159)

"The humbug of the non-Arabs proposed this demonstration in a manner similar to this and then, afterwards, said: "This is self-contradictory. Everyone indeed knows his particular essence although the representation of the soul which they speak about did not cross his mind", adding to this dates of bad quality [hashaf] that there was no need to come up with.... The insanities [takhbīt] that these [views] imply are no secret. How amazing is his departing [inkhāf] from the way of the truth and his turning away away [zaygh] from the right path!"

fol. 124r, l. 11

(Wernst, p. 8)

"Do not waste your time with what [.....] (......) says – i.e. that [the substance] is not a genus. This is indeed babble [hadhār], null and void [lā yuʿawwallu ʿalay-hi]."

fol. 126r, l. 3

(Wernst, p. 10)

"Substance is a genus, contrarily to what the humbug of our time [hashawī zamānī-nā] maintained."

fol. 135r, l. 3

(Wernst, p. 27)

"Beware of preoccupying yourself with what the humbug of the non-Arabs says and believes about this – i.e. that existence is added [zāʿild ʿalā] to the essence of God Most High! [To have] such [an idea] is to err [dulāl] and to be cursed [wabāl] in this world and in the hereafter. It leads the one who believes that to stay eternally in the sempiternal torment. "Their torment shall not be lightened."124 "Therein they shall abide as long as the heavens and the earth endure."125 May God protect us and those who deserve [it] from what he believed! He [really] alleged against that [doctrine], by way of nonsense [khurāfāt], things that are not allowed."

fol. 136r, l. 14

(Wernst, p. 29)

"Beware of what the humbug of the non-Arabs says about this! It is all dates of bad quality [hashaf]!"

fol. 145r, l. 2

(Wernst, p. 42)

"It is not as the humbug of the non-Arabs thought – i.e. that this is rhetoric."

124. Qurʾān, II.86.
125. Qurʾān, XI.107.

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fol. 145v, l. 13  ‘The humbug of the non-Arabs did not know at all what is intended by this section . . . He thus alleged, by way of babble [hadhar], what he alleged, by contesting [tā‘in ‘alā] the greatest of the eminent ones.’

fol. 145v, l. 1  ‘Furthermore, the humbug of the non-Arabs rebuked [‘amāfa] the philosophers and reproved [wabbakha ‘alā] them for alleging such things. If he had been clever [taftattach], he would have found himself worthier of rebuke and reproach.’

fol. 148v, l. 5  ‘How the dogma of God’s oneness [tawḥīd] and its demonstration are involved in this question was not evident to the humbug of the non-Arabs. He therefore criticized this in the greatest of the eminent ones. He himself was nevertheless worthier to be criticized.’

fol. 151r, ll. 4–5  ‘As for the humbug of the non-Arabs, he wandered about [takhabbata] in these topics by saying things that are all babble [hadhar]. After wandering in such manner, he eventually said: “Why would it not be permitted that God Most High be profiting, such a precedence [avlawipyta] arising for Himself, or such a blame being actually rejected? The controversy indeed had to do only with this” . . . We take refuge with God, His greatness, His Majesty, and His Power, from falling into the heterodoxy [sū‘ al-i‘tiqād] into which he fell and from becoming absorbed in the darkness of ignorance.’

fol. 152v, l. 13  ‘Beware of preoccupying yourself with the stupidity [sukhj] of the humbug of the non-Arabs about this! He is among those whom God has driven far away from adequacy to the truth.’

fol. 153v, l. 5  ‘By making this clear, the stupidity [sukhj] of what the humbug of the non-Arabs alleges against this, by way of babble [hadhar] and ineptitudes [takhbīt], becomes evident, if cleverness [fata‘a] takes your hand.’

fol. 160v, l. 8  ‘In our time [fi zamān-nī], the humbug of the non-Arabs followed [the Shaykh of the Jews in this] and alleged, by way of babble [hadhar], things that prove his bad understanding [of the topic] and his deprivation [hirmān].’

fol. 161r, l. 6  ‘Beware of what the Shaykh of the Jews alleges against this and of what, following him, the humbug of the non-Arabs says by way of insanities [takhbt] and ineptitudes [takhbīt] [that are] corrupting the order [to be respected by] intellections.’

fol. 165v, l. 3  ‘Do not waste time with what the humbug of the non-Arabs says about this! It is ineptitudes [khābt] that offer nothing but error.’

fol. 168v, l. 5  ‘Do not listen at all to what the humbug of the non-Arabs says about this subject, by way of babble [hadhar]!’