ABU AL-WALID
AL-QURTUBI
AVERROES’
E-text Edition
(The
Incoherence of the Incoherence)
TRANSLATED
FROM THE ARABIC
WITH
INTRODUCTION AND NOTES
PUBLISHED AND DISTRIBUTED BY
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
VOLUME
I
TRANSLATION
THE FIRST DISCUSSION
Concerning the Eternity
of the World
THE
FIRST PROOF
THE
SECOND PROOF
THE THIRD PROOF
THE
FOURTH PROOF
THE
SECOND DISCUSSION: The Refutation of their Theory of the Incorruptibility of the World and
of Time and Motion
THE
THIRD DISCUSSION: The demonstration of their confusion in saying that God is the agent and
the maker of the
world and that the world in His product and act, and the demonstration that
these expressions are in their system only metaphors without any real sense
THE
FOURTH DISCUSSION: Showing that they are unable to
prone the existence of a creator of the world
THE
FIFTH DISCUSSION: To show their incapacity to prove God’s unity and the impossibility of
two necessary existents both without a cause
THE
SIXTH DISCUSSION: To
refute their denial of attributes
THE
SEVENTH DISCUSSION: To
refute their claim that nothing cars share with the First its genus and be
differentiated from it through a specific difference, and that with respect
to its intellect the division into genus and specific difference cannot be
applied to it
THE
EIGHTH DISCUSSION: To
refute their theory that the existence of the First is simple, namely that
it is pure existence and that its existence stands in relation to no
quiddity and to no essence, but stands to necessary existence as do other
beings to their quiddity
THE
NINTH DISCUSSION: To
refute their proof that the First is incorporeal
THE
TENTH DISCUSSION: To prove their incapacity to
demonstrate that the world has a creator and a cause, and that in fact they
are forced to admit atheism
THE
ELEVENTH DISCUSSION: To show the incapacity of those philosophers who believe that the First
knows other things besides its own self and that it knows the genera and the
species in a universal way, to prone that this is so
THE
TWELFTH DISCUSSION: About the impotence of the
philosophers to prone that Cod knows Himself
THE
THIRTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refute those who arm that
Gad is ignorant of the individual things which are divided in time into
present, past, and future
THE
FOURTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refute their proof that
heaven is an animal mowing in a circle in obedience to God
THE
FIFTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refute the theory of the
philosophers about the aim which moves heaven
THE
SIXTEENTH DISCUSSION: To refute the philosophical
theory that the souls of the heavens observe all the particular events of
this world
THE
FIRST DISCUSSION: The
denial of a logical necessity between cause and effect
THE
SECOND DISCUSSION: The impotence
of the philosophers to show by demonstrative proof that the soul is a
spiritual substance
THE
THIRD DISCUSSION: Refutation of
the philosophers’ proof for the immortality of the soul
THE FOURTH DISCUSSION: Concerning the philosophers’ denial of bodily resurrection
The
End: E-text note
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APPENDIX:
Changes proposed in the Arabic Text
365
INDEX
of Proper Names
374
VOLUME (II)
NOTES
1
Index of Proper Names mentioned in the Introduction and in the Notes 207
Index
of Subject/ mentioned in the Notes
211
Some
contradictions in Aristotle’s System
215
Arabic-Greek
Index to the Notes
216
Greek-Arabic Index to the Notes 218
I
wish to express my warmest thanks to the Trustees of the Gibb
Memorial Fund for making the publication of this work possible, and especially
to Professor Sir Hamilton Gibb, who asked me to
undertake the work and who has not only read the proofs but has continually
given me his interest and encouragement. I am
also deeply indebted to Dr. R. Walzer, who has
read the proofs, carefully checked the references in my notes, and composed the
indexes and the Greek-Arabic
and Arabic-Greek
vocabularies. I have also to thank Dr.
S. M. Stern for his help in completing the subject-index. Finally, I
wish to pay a tribute to one who is no longer amongst us, Father
Maurice Bouyges, without whose admirable text the work could never have
been undertaken.
The
marginal numbers in Vol. I refer to the text of Father
Bouyges’s edition of the Tahafut al Tahafut in his Bibliotheca
Arabica Scholasticorum, vol. iii, Beyrouth, 1930.
The asterisks indicate different readings from those to be found in Bouyges’s text: cf. the Appendix, Vol. I, pp, 364 ff.
If
it may be said that Santa Maria sopra Minerva is a symbol of our European
culture, it should not be forgotten that the mosque also was built on the Greek
temple. But whereas in Christian Western theology there was a gradual and
indirect infiltration of Greek, and especially Aristotelian ideas, so that it
may be said that finally Thomas Aquinas baptized Aristotle,
the impact on Islam was sudden, violent, and short. The great conquests
by the Arabs took place in the seventh century when the Arabs first came into
contact with the Hellenistic world. At that time Hellenistic culture was still
alive; Alexandria in Egypt, certain towns in Syria-Edessa for instance-were
centres of Hellenistic learning, and in the cloisters of Syria and Mesopotamia
not only Theology was studied but Science and Philosophy also were cultivated.
In Philosophy Aristotle was still ‘the
master of those who know’, and especially his logical works as
interpreted by the Neoplatonic commentators were studied intensively. But also
many Neoplatonic and Neopythagorean writings were still known, and also, very
probably, some of the old Stoic concepts and problems were still alive and
discussed.
The
great period of translation of Greek into Arabic, mostly through the
intermediary of Christian Syrians, was between the years 750 and 850, but
already before that time there was an impact of Greek ideas on Muslim theology.
The first speculative theologians in Islam are called Mu‘tazilites (from about
A. D. 723), an exact translation of the Greek word σχισματικοί
(the general name for speculative theologians is Mutakallimun,
διαλεκτικοί,
dialecticians, a name often given in later Greek philosophy to the Stoics).
Although they form rather a heterogeneous group of thinkers whose theories are
syncretistic, that is taken from different Greek sources with a preponderance of
Stoic ideas, they have certain points in common, principally their theory, taken
from the Stoics, of the rationality of religion (which is for them identical
with Islam), of a lumen
naturale which burns in the heart of every man, and the optimistic
view of a rational God who has created the best of all possible worlds for the
greatest good of man who occupies the central place in the universe. They touch
upon certain difficult problems that were perceived by the Greeks. The paradoxes
of Zeno concerning movement and the infinite
divisibility of space and time hold their attention, and the subtle problem of
the status of the nonexistent, a problem long neglected in modern philosophy,
but revived by the school of Brentano, especially
by Meinong, which caused an endless controversy
amongst the Stoics, is also much debated by them.
A
later generation of theologians, the Ash‘arites, named after Al
Ash‘ari, born A. D. 873, are forced by the weight of evidence to admit
a certain irrationality in theological concepts, and their philosophical
speculations, largely based on Stoicism, are strongly mixed with Sceptical
theories. They hold the middle way between the traditionalists who want to
forbid all reasoning on religious matters and those who affirm that reason
unaided by revelation is capable of attaining religious truths. Since Ghazali
founds his attack against the philosophers on Ash‘arite principles, we
may consider for a moment some of their theories. The difference between the
Ash‘arite and Mu‘tazilite conceptions of God cannot be better expressed than
by the following passage which is found twice in Ghazali
(in his Golden
Means of Dogmatics and his Vivification
of Theology) and to which by tradition is ascribed the breach between
Al Ash‘ari and the Mu‘tazilites.
‘Let
us imagine a child and a grown-up in Heaven who both died in the True Faith, but
the grown-up has a higher place than the child. And the child will ask God, “Why
did you give that man a higher place?” And
God will answer, “He has done many good works.”
Then the child will say, “Why did you let me
die so soon so that I was prevented from doing good?”
God will answer, “I knew that you would grow up
a sinner, therefore it was better that you should
die a child.” Then a cry goes up from the
damned in the depths of Hell, “Why,
O Lord, did you not let us die before we became
sinners?” ’
Ghazali
adds
to this: ‘the imponderable decisions of God cannot be weighed by the scales of
reason and Mu‘tazilism’.
According
to the Ash‘arites, therefore, right and wrong are human concepts and cannot be
applied to God. ‘Cui mali nihil est nec esse potest
quid huic opus est dilectu bonorum et malorum?’ is the argument of the
Sceptic Carneades expressed by Cicero
(De natura
deorum, iii. 15. 38). It is a dangerous theory for the theologians,
because it severs the moral relationship between God and man and therefore it
cannot be and is not consistently applied by the Ash‘arites and Ghazali.
The
Ash‘arites have taken over from the Stoics their epistemology, their
sensationalism, their nominalism, their materialism. Some details of this
epistemology are given by Ghazali in his
autobiography: the clearness of representations is the
criterion for their truth; the soul at birth is a blank on which the
sensations are imprinted; at the seventh year of a man’s life he acquires the
rational knowledge of right and wrong. Stoic influence on Islamic theology is
overwhelming. Of Stoic origin, for instance, are the division of the acts of man
into five classes; the importance placed on the motive of an act when judging
its moral character; the theory of the two categories of substance and accident
(the two other categories, condition and relation, are not considered by the
Muslim theologians to pertain to reality, since they are subjective); above all,
the fatalism and determinism in Islam which is often regarded as a feature of
the Oriental soul. In the Qur’an, however, there is no definite theory about
free will. Muhammad was not a philosopher. The
definition of will in man given by the Ash‘arites, as the instrument of
unalterable fate and the unalterable law of God, is Stoic both in idea and
expression. (I have discussed several other theories in my notes.)
Sometimes,
however, the theologians prefer to the Stoic view the view of their adversaries.
For instance, concerning the discussion between Neoplatonism and Stoicism
whether there is a moral obligation resting on God and man relative to animals,
Islam answers with the Neoplatonists in the affirmative (Spinoza,
that Stoic Cartesian, will give, in his Ethica,
the negative Stoic answer).
The
culmination of the philosophy of Islam was in the tenth and eleventh centuries.
This was the age also of the great theologians. It was with Greek ideas, taken
in part from Stoics and Sceptics, that the theologians tried to refute the ideas
of the philosophers. The philosophers themselves were followers of Aristotle
as seen through the eyes of his Neoplatonic commentators. This
Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle,
although it gives a mystical character to his philosophy which is alien
to it, has a certain justification in the fact that there are in his philosophy
many elements of the theory of his master Plato, which lend themselves to a
Neoplatonic conception. Plotinus regarded himself
as nothing but the commentator of Plato and Aristotle,
and in his school the identity of view of these two great masters was
affirmed. In the struggle in Islam between Philosophy and Theology, Philosophy
was defeated, and the final blow to the philosophers was given in Ghazali’s
attack on Philosophy which in substance is incorporated in Averroës’
book and which he tries to refute.
Ghazali, who was born in the middle of
the eleventh century, is one of the most remarkable and at the same time most
enigmatic figures in Islam. Like St. Augustine,
with whom he is often compared, he has told us in his autobiography how he had
to pass through a period of despair and scepticism until God, not through
demonstration but by the light of His grace, had given him peace and certitude.
This divine light, says Ghazali, is the basis of
most of our knowledge and, he adds, profoundly, one cannot find proofs for the
premisses of knowledge; the premisses are there and one looks for the reasons,
but they cannot be found. Certitude is reached, he says, not through scholastic
reasoning, not through philosophy, but through mystical illumination and the
mystical way of life. Still Ghazali is not only
a mystic, he is a great dogmatist and moralist. He is regarded as Islam’s
greatest theologian and, through some of his books, as a defender of Orthodoxy.
It is generally believed that the Tahafut, the book in which he
criticizes Philosophy, was written in the period of his doubts. The book,
however, is a Defence of Faith, and though it is more negative than positive,
for it aims to destroy and not to construct, it is based on the theories of his
immediate predecessors, many of whose arguments he reproduces. Besides, he
promises in this book to give in another book the correct dogmatic answers. The
treatise to which he seems to refer does not contain anything but the old
theological articles of faith and the Ash‘arite arguments and solutions. But
we should not look for consistency in Ghazali;
necessarily his mysticism comes into conflict with his dogmatism and he himself
has been strongly influenced by the philosophers, especially by Avicenna,
and in many works he comes very near to the Neoplatonic theories which he
criticizes. On the whole it would seem to me that Ghazali
in his attack on the philosophers has taken from the vast arsenal of
Ash‘arite dialectical arguments those appropriate to the special point under
discussion, regardless of whether they are destructive also of some of the views
he holds.
Averroës was the last great philosopher
in Islam in the twelfth century, and is the most scholarly and scrupulous
commentator of Aristotle. He is far better known in Europe than in the Orient,
where few of his works are still in existence and where he had no influence, he
being the last great philosopher of his culture. Renan,
who wrote a big book about him, Averroes
et l’Averro’asme, had never seen a line of Arabic by him. Lately some of
his works have been edited in Arabic, for instance his Tahafut al Tahafut, in a most
exemplary manner. Averroës’ influence on
European thought during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance has been immense.
The
name of Ghazali’s book in which he attacks the
philosophers is Tahafut
al Falasifa, which has been translated by the medieval Latin
translator as Destructio
Philosophorum. The name of Averroës’
book is Tahafut
al Tahafut, which is rendered as Destructio
Destructionis (or destructionum).
This rendering is surely not exact. The word ‘Tahafut’
has been translated by modern scholars in different ways, and the title of Ghazali’s
book has been given as the breakdown, the disintegration, or the incoherence, of
the philosophers. The exact title of Averroës’
book would be The Incoherence of the Incoherence.
In
the Revue des Deux Mondes there was an
article published in 1895 by Ferdinand Brunetiere,
‘La Banqueroute de la Science’, in which he
tried to show that the solutions by science, and especially by biology, of
fundamental problems, solutions which were in opposition to the dogmas taught by
the Church, were primitive and unreasonable. Science had promised us to
eliminate mystery, but, Brunetiere said, not only
had it not removed it but we saw clearly that it would never do so. Science had
been able neither to solve, nor even to pose, the questions that mattered: those
that touched the origin of man, the laws of his conduct, his future destiny.
What Brunetiere tried to do, to defend Faith by
showing up the audacity of Science in its attempt to solve ultimate problems, is
exactly the same as Ghazali tried to do in
relation to the pretensions of the philosophers of his time who, having based
themselves on reason alone, tried to solve all the problems concerning God and
the world. Therefore a suitable title for his book might perhaps be ‘The
Bankruptcy of Philosophy’.
In
the introduction to his book Ghazali says that a
group of people hearing the famous names Socrates,
Hippocrates, Plato,
and Aristotle, and
knowing what they had attained in such sciences as Geometry, Logic, and Physics,
have left the religion of their fathers in which they were brought up to follow
the philosophers. The theories of the philosophers are many, but Ghazali
will attack only one, the greatest, Aristotle;
Aristotle, of whom
it is said that he refuted all his predecessors, even Plato,
excusing himself by saying ‘amicus Plato, amica
veritas, sed magis amica veritas’. I may add that this well-known
saying, which is a variant of a passage in Plato’s Phaedo
and in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, is found in
this form first in Arabic. One of the first European authors who has it in this
form is Cervantes (Don Quijote, ii, c. 52).
I quote this saying-Ghazali
adds-to show that there is no surety and evidence in Philosophy.
According to Ghazali, the philosophers claim for
their metaphysical proofs the same evidence as is found in Mathematics and
Logic. But all Philosophy is based on supposition and opinion. If Metaphysics
had the same evidence as Mathematics all philosophers would agree just as well
in Philosophy as in Mathematics. According to him the translators of Aristotle
have often misunderstood or changed the meaning and the different texts
have caused different controversies. Ghazali considers
Farabi and Avicenna
to be the best commentators on Aristotle in
Islam, and it is their theories that he will attack.
Before
entering into the heart of the matter I will say a few words about Ghazali’s
remark that Metaphysics, although it claims to follow the same method as
Mathematics, does not attain the same degree of evidence. Neither Aristotle
nor his commentators ever asked the question whether there is any
difference between the methods of Mathematics and Metaphysics (it is a
significant fact that most examples of proof in the Posterior
Analytics are taken from Mathematics) and why the conclusions reached
by Metaphysics seem so much less convincing than those reached by Mathematics.
It would seem that Metaphysics, being the basis of all knowledge and having as
its subject the ultimate principles of things, should possess, according to Aristotle,
the highest evidence and that God, as being the highest principle, should
stand at the beginning of the system, as in Spinoza.
In fact, Aristotle could not have sought God if
he had not found Him. For Aristotle all necessary
reasoning is deductive and exclusively based on syllogism. Reasoning-he says-and
I think this is a profound and true remark-cannot go on indefinitely. You cannot
go on asking for reasons infinitely, nor can you reason about a subject which is
not known to you. Reason must come to a stop. There must be first principles
which are immediately evident. And indeed Aristotle acknowledges
their existence. When we ask, however, what these first principles are, he does
not give us any answer but only points out the Laws of Thought as such. But from
the Laws of Thought nothing can be deduced, as Aristotle
acknowledges himself. As a matter of fact Aristotle
is quite unaware of the assumption on which his system is based. He is
what philosophers are wont to call nowadays a naive realist. He believes that
the world which we perceive and think about with all it contains has a reality
independent of our perceptions or our thoughts. But this view seems so natural
to him that he is not aware that it could be doubted or that any reason might be
asked for it. Now I, for my part, believe that the objectivity of a common world
in which we all live and die is the necessary assumption of all reasoning and
thought. I believe indeed, with Aristotle,
that there are primary assumptions which cannot be deduced from other
principles. All reasoning assumes the existence of an objective truth which is
sought and therefore is assumed to have an independent reality of its own. Every
thinking person is conscious of his own identity and the identity of his fellow
beings from whom he accepts language and thoughts and to whom he can communicate
his own ideas and emotions. Besides, all conceptual thought implies
universality, i.e. belief in law and in objective necessity. I can only infer
from Socrates being a man that he is mortal
when I have assumed that the same thing (in this case man in so far as he is
man) in the same conditions will always necessarily behave in the same way.
In
his book Ghazali attacks the philosophers on
twenty points. Except for the last two points which are only slightly touched by
Averroës, Averroës
follows point for point the arguments Ghazali uses
and tries to refute them. Ghazali’s book is
badly constructed, it is unsystematic and repetitive. If Ghazali
had proceeded systematically he would have attacked first the
philosophical basis of the system of the philosophers-namely their proof for the
existence of God, since from God, the Highest Principle, everything else is
deduced. But the first problem Ghazali mentions
is the philosphers’ proof for the eternity of the world. This is the problem
which Ghazali considers to be the most important
and to which he allots the greatest space, almost a quarter of his book. He
starts by saying rather arbitrarily that the philosophers have four arguments,
but, in discussing them, he mixes them up and the whole discussion is
complicated by the fact that he gives the philosophical arguments and
theological counter arguments in such an involved way that the trend is
sometimes hard to follow. He says, for instance, page 3, that to the first
arguments of the philosophers there are two objections. The first objection he
gives on this page, but the second, after long controversy between the
philosophers and theologians, on page 32. I will not follow here Ghazali
and Averroës point for point in their
discussions but will give rather the substance of their principal arguments (for
a detailed discussion I refer to my notes).
The
theory of the eternity of the world is an Aristotelian one. Aristotle
was, as he says himself, the first thinker who affirmed that the world in
which we live, the universe as an orderly whole, a cosmos, is eternal. All the
philosophers before him believed that the world had come into being either from
some primitive matter or after a number of other worlds. At the same time Aristotle
believes in the finitude of causes. For him it is impossible that
movement should have started or can continue by itself. There must be a
principle from which all movement derives. Movement, however, by itself is
eternal. It seems to me that this whole conception is untenable. If the world is
eternal there will be an infinite series of causes and an infinite series of
movers; there will be an infinite series, for instance, of fathers and sons, of
birds and eggs (the example of the bird and egg is first mentioned in ‘Censorinus,
De die natali,
where he discusses the Peripatetic theory of the eternity of the world), and
we will never reach a first mover or cause, a first father or a first bird. Aristotle,
in fact, defends the two opposite theses of Kant’s first antinomy. He
holds at the same time that time and movement are infinite and that every causal
series must be finite. The contradiction in Aristotle is
still further accentuated in the Muslim philosophers by the fact that they see
in God, not only as Aristotle did, the First
Mover of the movement of the universe, but that they regard Him, under the
influence of the Plotinian theory of emanation, as the Creator of the universe
from whom the world emanates eternally. However, can the relation between two
existing entities qua existents be
regarded as a causal one? Can there be a causal relation between an eternally
unchangeable God and an eternally revolving and changing world, and is it sense
to speak of a creation of that which exists eternally? Besides, if the relation
between the eternal God and the eternal movement of the world could be regarded
as a causal relation, no prior movement could be considered the cause of a
posterior movement, and sequences such as the eternal sequence of fathers and
sons would not form a causal series. God would not be a first cause but the Only
Cause of everything. It is the contradiction in the idea of an eternal creation
which forms the chief argument of Ghazali in
this book. In a later chapter, for instance, when he refutes Avicenna’s proof
for God based on the Aristotelian concepts ‘necessary by itself’, i.e.
logical necessity, and ‘necessary through another’, i.e. ontological
necessity, in which there is the usual Aristotelian confusion of the logical
with the ontological, Ghazali’s long argument
can be reduced to the assertion that once the possibility of an infinite series
of causes is admitted, there is no sense in positing a first cause.
The
first argument is as follows. If the world had been created, there must have
been something determining its existence at the moment it was created, for
otherwise it would have remained in the state of pure possibility it was in
before. But if there was something determining its existence, this determinant
must have been determined by another determinant and so on ad infinitum, or we must accept an eternal God in whom eternally new
determinations may arise. But there cannot be any new determinations in an
eternal God.
The
argument in this form is found in Avicenna, but
its elements are Aristotelian. In Cicero’s Academics
we have a fragment of one of Aristotle’s earlier and more popular
writings, the lost dialogue De
philosophia, in which he says that it is impossible that the world
could ever have been generated. For how could there have been a new decision,
that is a new decision in the mind of God, for such a magnificent work? St.
Augustine knows this argument from Cicero and he too denies that God
could have a novum
consilium. St. Augustine is well aware
of the difficulty, and he says in his De
civilate dei that God has always existed, that after a certain time,
without having changed His will, He created man, whom He had not wanted to
create before, this is indeed a fact too profound for us. It also belongs to
Aristotle’s philosophy that in all change there is a potentiality and all
potentiality needs an actualizer which exists already. In the form this argument
has in Avicenna it is, however, taken from a book
by a late Greek Christian commentator of Aristotle,
John Philoponus, De
aeternitate mundi, which was directed against a book by the great
Neoplatonist Proclus who had given eighteen
arguments to prove the eternity of the world. Plato himself
believed in the temporal creation of the world not by God Himself but by a
demiurge. But later followers of Plato differed
from him on this point. Amongst the post-Aristotelian schools only the Stoics
assumed a periodical generation and destruction of the world. Theophrastus
had already tried to refute some of the Stoic arguments for this view, and it
may well be that John Philoponus
made use of some Stoic sources for his defence of the temporality of the world.
The
book by Proclus is lost, but John
Philoponus, who as a Christian believes in
the creation of the world, gives, before refuting them, the arguments given by Proclus.
The book by Philoponus was translated into Arabic
and many of its arguments are reproduced in the Muslim controversies about the
problem (arguments for the temporal creation of the world were also given by Philoponus
in a work against Aristotle’s theory of the eternity of the world, arguments
which are known to us through their quotation and refutation by Simplicius
in his commentary on Physics viii; one of these
arguments by Philoponus was well known to the
Arabs and is also reproduced by Ghazali, see
note 3. 3). The argument I have mentioned is the third as given by Proclus.
Philoponus’ book is extremely important for
all medieval philosophy, but it has never been translated into a modern language
and has never been properly studied. On the whole the importance of the
commentators of Aristotle for Arabic and medieval
philosophy in general has not yet been sufficiently acknowledged.
To
this argument Ghazali gives the following
answer, which has become the classic reply for this difficulty and which has
been taken from Philoponus. One must distinguish,
says Philoponus, between God’s eternally
willing something and the eternity of the object of His Will, or, as St.
Thomas will say later, ‘Deus
voluit ab aeterno mundus esset sed non ut ab aeterno esset’. God
willed, for instance, that Socrates should be
born before Plato and He willed this from
eternity, so that when it was time for Plato to
be born it happened. It is not difficult for Averroës
to refute this argument. In willing and doing something there is more than just
the decision that you will do it. You can take the decision to get up tomorrow,
but the actual willing to get up can be done only at the moment you do it, and
there can be no delay between the cause and the effect. There must be added to
the decision to get up the impulse of the will to get up. So in God there would
have to be a new impulse, and it is just this newness that has to be denied.
But, says Averroës, the whole basis of this
argument is wrong for it assumes in God a will like a human will. Desire and
will can be understood only in a being that has a need; for the Perfect Being
there can be no need, there can be no choice, for when He acts He will
necessarily do the best. Will in God must have another meaning than human will.
Averroës therefore
does not explicitly deny that God has a will, but will should not be taken in
its human sense. He has much the same conception as Plotinus,
who denies that God has the power to do one of two contraries (for God will
necessarily always choose the best, which implies that God necessarily will
always do the best, but this in fact annuls the ideas of choice and will), and
who regards the world as produced by natural necessity. Aristotle also held that for the Perfect Being no voluntary action
is possible, and he regards God as in an eternal blissful state of
self-contemplation. This would be a consequence of His Perfection which, for Averroës
at least, involves His Omniscience. For the Perfect the drama of life is ended:
nothing can be done any more, no decision can be taken any more, for decisions
belong to the condition of man to whom both knowledge and ignorance are given
and who can have an hypothetical knowledge of the future, knowing that on his
decisions the future may depend and to whom a sure knowledge of the future is
denied. But an Omniscient Being can neither act nor decide; for Him the future
is irremediable like the past and cannot be changed any more by His decisions or
actions. Paradoxically the Omnipotent is impotent. This notion of God as a
Self-contemplating Being, however, constitutes one of the many profound
contradictions in Aristotle’s system. And this profound contradiction is also
found in all the works of Aristotle’s commentators. One of Aristotle’s
proofs for the existence of God-and according to a recent pronouncement of the
Pope, the most stringent -is the one based on movement. There cannot be an
infinite series of movers; there must be a Prime Agent, a Prime Mover, God, the
originator of all change and action in the universe. According to the conception
of God as a Self-Contemplating Being, however, the love for God is the motive
for the circular motion of Heaven. God is not the ultimate Agent, God is the
ultimate Aim of desire which inspires the Heavens to action. It is Heaven which
moves itself and circles round out of love for God. And in this case it is God
who is passive; the impelling force, the efficient cause, the spring of all
action lies in the world, lies in the souls of the stars.
Let
us now return to Ghazali. We have seen that his
first argument is not very convincing, but he now gives us another argument
which the Muslim theologians have taken from John
Philoponus and which has more strength. It runs:
if you assume the world to have no beginning in time, at any moment which we can
imagine an infinite series must have been ended. To give an example, every one
of us is the effect of an infinite series of causes; indeed, man is the finite
junction of an infinite past and an infinite future, the effect of an infinite
series of causes, the cause of an infinite series of effects. But an infinite
series cannot be traversed. If you stand near the bed of a river waiting for the
water to arrive from an infinitely distant source you will never see it
arriving, for an infinite distance cannot be passed. This is the argument given
by Kant in the thesis of his first antimony. The
curious fact is that the wording in Kant is almost identical with that of John
Philoponus.
The
answers Averroës gives are certainly not
convincing. He repeats the Aristotelian dictum that what has no beginning has no
end and that therefore there is never an end of time, and one can never say that
at any moment an infinite time is ended: an infinite time is never ended. But
this is begging the question and is surely not true, for there are certainly
finite times. He denies that an infinite time involves an infinite causal series
and the negation of a First Cause. The series involved is but a temporal
sequence, causal by accident, since it is God who is its essential cause. Averroës
also bases his answer on the Aristotelian theory that in time there is only a
succession. A simultaneous infinite whole is denied by Aristotle
and therefore, according to Aristotle,
the world must be limited in space; but in time, according to him, there
is never a whole, since the past is no longer existent and the future not yet.
But
the philosophers have a convincing argument for the eternity of the world.
Suppose the world had a beginning, then before the world existed there was empty
time; but in an empty time, in pure emptiness, there cannot be a motive for a
beginning and there could be nothing that could decide God to start His
creation. This is Kant’s antithesis of his first antinomy. It is very old and
is given by Aristotle, but it is already found in
the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides. Ghazali’s
answer is that God’s will is completely undetermined. His will does not depend
on distinctions in outside things, but He creates the distinctions Himself. The
idea of God’s creative will is of Stoic origin. According to the Neoplatonic
conception God’s knowledge is creative. We know because things are; things are
because God knows them. This idea of the creative knowledge of God has a very
great diffusion in philosophy (just as our bodies live by the eternal spark of
life transmitted to us by our ancestors, so we rekindle in our minds the
thoughts of those who are no more); it is found, for instance, in St.
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza,
and Kant-who calls it intellektuelle Anschauung, intellectual
intuition, and it is also used by the Muslim philosophers when it suits them.
Against Ghazali’s conception, however, Averroës
has the following argument: If God creates the world arbitrarily, if His Will
establishes the distinctions without being determined by any reason, neither
wisdom nor goodness can be attributed to Him. We have here a difficulty the
Greeks had seen already. Either God is beyond the laws of thought and of morals
and then He is neither good nor wise, or He Himself stands under their dominion
and then He is not omnipotent.
Another
argument for the eternity of the world is based on the eternity of time: God
cannot have a priority to time, as the theologians affirm, because priority
implies time and time implies movement. For the philosophers God’s priority to
the world consists solely in His being its simultaneous cause. Both parties,
however, seem to hold that God’s existence does not imply time, since He
exists in timeless eternity. But in this case, what neither of the parties has
seen, no causal relation between God and the world can exist at all, since all
causation implies a simultaneous time.
We
come now to the most important argument which shows the basic difference between
the philosophical and theological systems. For Aristotle
the world cannot have come to be because there is no absolute becoming.
Everything that becomes comes from something. And, as a matter of fact, we all
believe this. We all believe more or less unconsciously (we are not fully aware
of our basic principles: a basement is always obscure) in the dictum rien
ne se crée, rien ne se perd. We believe that everything that comes
to be is but a development, an evolution, without being too clear about the
meaning of these words (evolution means literally ‘unrolling’, and Cicero
says that the procession of events out of time is like the uncoiling of a rope-quasi
rudentis explicatio), and we believe that the plant lies in the seed,
the future in the present. For example: when a child is born we believe it to
have certain dispositions; it may have a disposition to become a musician, and
when all the conditions are favourable it will become a musician. Now, according
to Aristotle, becoming
is nothing but the actualization of a potentiality, that is the becoming actual
of a disposition. However, there is a difficulty here. It belongs to one of the
little ironies of the history of philosophy that Aristotle’s philosophy is
based on a concept, i.e. potentiality, that has been excluded by a law that he
was the first to express consciously. For Aristotle is
the first to have stated as the supreme law of thought (or is it a law of
reality?) that there is no intermediary between being and non-being. But the
potential, i.e. the objective possible, is such an intermediary; it is namely
something which is, still is not yet. Already the Eleatics had declared that
there is no becoming, either a thing is or it is not. If it is, it need not
become. If it is not-out of nothing nothing becomes. Besides, there is another
difficulty which the Megarians have shown.
You
say that your child has a disposition to become a musician, that he can become a
musician, but if he dies as a child, or when conditions are unfavourable, he
cannot become a musician. He can only become one when all the conditions for his
being a musician are fulfilled. But in that case it is not possibly that he will
be a musician, necessarily he will be one. There is in fact no possibility of
his being a musician before he actually is one. There is therefore no
potentiality in nature and no becoming of things out of potencies. Things are or
are not. This Megarian denial of potentiality has been taken over by the
Ash‘arites, and Ghazali in this book is on the
whole, although not consistently, in agreement with them. I myself regard this
problem as one of the cruces of philosophy. The Ash‘arites and Ghazali
believed, as the Megarians did, that things do not become and that the
future does not lie in the present; every event that occurs is new and
unconnected with its predecessor. The theologians believed that the world is not
an independent universe, a self-subsistent system, that develops by itself, has
its own laws, and can be understood by itself. They transferred the mystery of
becoming to the mystery of God, who is the cause of all change in the world, and
who at every moment creates the world anew. Things are or are not. God creates
them and annihilates them, but they do not become out of each other, there is no
passage between being and non-being. Nor is there movement, since a thing that
moves is neither here nor there, since it moves-what we call movement is being at rest at different
space-atoms at different time-atoms. It is the denial of potentiality,
possibility in
rerum natura, that Ghazali uses to
refute the Aristotelian idea of an eternal matter in which the potentialities
are found of everything that can or will happen. For, according to Aristotle,
matter must be eternal and cannot have become, since it is, itself, the
condition for all becoming.
It
maybe mentioned here that the modern static theory of movement is akin to the
Megarian-Ash‘arite doctrine of the denial of movement and becoming. Bertrand
Russell, for instance, although he does not accept the Megarian atomic
conception, but holds with Aristotle that
movement and rest take place in time, not in the instant, defines movement as being
at different places at different times. At the same time, although he
rejects the Megarian conception of ‘jumps’, he affirms that the moving body
always passes from one position to another by gradual transition. But
‘passing’ implies, just as much as ‘jumping’, something more than mere
being, namely, the movement which both theories deny and the identity of the
moving body.
On
the idea of possibility another argument for the eternity of the world is based.
It is affirmed that if the world had been created an infinite number of
possibilities of its creation, that is, an eternal duration of its possibility,
would have preceded it. But nothing possible can be eternal, since everything
possible must be realized. The idea that everything possible has to be realized
is found in Aristotle himself, who says that if
there could be an eternal possible that were not realized, it would be
impossible, not possible, since the impossible is that which will never be
realized. Aristotle does not see that this
definition is contrary to the basic idea of his own philosophy-the reality of a
possibility which may or may not become real-and that by declaring that the
possible will have to happen he reduces it to a necessity, and by admitting that
everything that happens had to happen he denies that the possibility of its not
happening could precede it, i.e. he accepts, in fact, the Megarian conception of
possibility which he himself had tried to refute. Averroës,
who agrees with his master on this point, is not aware either of the implication
of the definition. On the other hand, the Ash‘arites, notwithstanding their
denial of potentiality, maintain that for God everything is possible, a theory
which implies objective possibility (the same inconsistency was committed by the
Stoics). Both philosophers and theologians, indeed, hold about this difficult
problem contradictory theories, and it is therefore not astonishing that Ghazali’s
and Averroës’ discussion about it is full of
confusion (for the details I refer to my notes).
In
the second chapter Ghazali treats the problem of
the incorruptibility of the world. As Ghazali says
himself; the problem of the incorruptibility of the world is essentially the
same as that of its being uncreated and the same arguments can be brought
forward. Still, there is less opposition amongst the theologians about its
incorruptibility than about its being uncreated. Some of the Mu‘tazilites
argued, just as Thomas Aquinas was to do later,
that we can only know through the Divine Law that this world of ours will end
and there is no rational proof for its annihilation. Just as a series of numbers
needs a first term but no final term, the beginning of the world does not imply
its end. However, the orthodox view is that the annihilation of the world,
including Heaven and Hell, is in God’s power, although this will not happen.
Still, in the corruptibility of the world there is a new difficulty for the
theologians. If God destroys the world He causes ‘nothingness’, that is, His
act is related to ‘nothing’. But can an act be related to ‘nothing’? The
question as it is posed seems to rest on a confusion between action and effect
but its deeper sense would be to establish the nature of God’s action and the
process by which His creative and annihilating power exercises itself. As there
cannot be any analogy with the physical process through which our human will
performs its function, the mystery of His creative and annihilating action
cannot be solved and the naive answers the theologians give satisfy neither Averroës
nor Ghazali himself. Averroës
argues that there is no essential difference between production and destruction
and, in agreement with Aristotle,
he affirms that there are three principles for them: form, matter, and
privation. When a thing becomes, its form arises and its privation disappears;
when it is destroyed its privation arises and its form disappears, but the
substratum of this process, matter, remains eternally. I have criticized this
theory in my notes and will only mention here that for Aristotle
and Averroës this process of production
and destruction is eternal, circular, and reversible. Things, however, do not
revolve in an eternal cycle, nor is there an eternal return as the Stoics and Nietzsche
held. Inexorably the past is gone. Every ‘now’ is new. Every flower in the
field has never been, the up-torn trees are not rooted again. ‘Thou’ll
come no more, Never, never, never, never, never!’ Besides, Averroës,
holding as he does that the world is eternally produced out of nothing, is
inconsistent in regarding with Aristotle production
and destruction as correlatives.
In
the third chapter Ghazali maintains that the
terms acting and agent are falsely applied to God by the philosophers. Acting,
according to him, can be said only of a person having will and choice. When you
say that fire burns, there is here a causal relation, if you like, but this
implies nothing but a sequence in time, just as Hume will affirm later. So when
the philosophers say that God’s acting is like the fire’s burning or the
sun’s heating, since God acts by natural necessity, they deny, according to Ghazali,
His action altogether. Real causation can only be affirmed of a willing
conscious being. The interesting point in this discussion is that, according to
the Ash‘arites and Ghazali, there is no
causation in this world at all, there is only one extra-mundane cause which is
God. Even our acts which depend on our will and choice are not, according to the
Ash‘arites, truly performed by ourselves. We are only the instruments, and the
real agent is God. But if this is true, how can we say that action and causation
depend on will and choice? How can we come to the idea of any causal action in
God depending on His Will if we deny generally that there is a causal relation
between will and action? The same contradiction is found in modern philosophy in
Mach. Mach holds
that to speak of causation or action in material things-so to say that fire
burns-is a kind of fetishism or animism, i.e. that we project our will and our
actions into physical lifeless things. However, at the same time he, as a
follower of Hume, says that causation, even in
acts caused by will, is nothing but a temporal sequence of events. He denies
causation even in voluntary actions. Therefore it would follow that the relation
of willing and acting is not different from the relation of fire and burning and
that there cannot be any question of fetishism or animism. According to such a
theory there is no action at all in the universe but only a sequence of events.
Then,
after a second argument by which Ghazali sets
out to show that an eternal production and creation are contradictions in terms,
since production and creation imply the generation of something after its
non-existence, he directs a third argument against the Neoplatonic theory, held
by the philosophers, of the emanation of the world from God’s absolute
Oneness.
Plotinus’
conception of God is prompted by the problem of plurality and relation. All
duality implies a relation, and every relation establishes a new unity which is
not the simple addition of its terms (since every whole is more than its parts)
and violates therefore the supreme law of thought that a thing is what it is and
nothing else. Just as the line is more than its points, the stone more than its
elements, the organism transcending its members, man, notwithstanding the
plurality of his faculties, an identical personality, so the world is an
organized well-ordered system surpassing the multitude of the unities it
encloses. According to Plotinus the Force binding
the plurality into unity and the plurality of unities into the all-containing
unit of the Universe is the Archetype of unity, the ultimate, primordial Monad,
God, unattainable in His supreme Simplicity even for thought. For all thought is
relational, knitting together in the undefinable unity of a judgement a subject
and a predicate. But in God’s absolute and highest Unity there is no plurality
that can be joined, since all joining needs a superior joining unit. Thus God
must be the One and the Lone, having no attribute, no genus, no species, no
universal that He can share with any creatures of the world. Even existence can
be only referred to Him when it expresses not an attribute, but His very
Essence. But then there is no bridge leading from the stable stillness of His
Unity to the changing and varied multiplicity of the world; all relation between
Him and the world is severed. If the One is the truly rational, God’s
rationality can be obtained only by regarding His relation to the world as
irrational, and all statements about Him will be inconsistent with the initial
thesis. And if God is unattainable for thought, the very affirmation of this
will be self-contradictory.
Now,
the philosophers in Islam hold with Plotinus
that although absolutely positive statements are not admissible about God, the
positive statements made by them can be all reduced to negative affirmations
(with the sole exception, according to Averroës,
of His possessing intellect) and to certain relative statements, for neither
negations nor external relations add
anything to His essence.
In
this and several following chapters Ghazali attacks
the philosophers from two sides: by showing up the inanity of the Plotinian
conception of God as pure unity, and by exposing their inconsistency in
attributing to Him definite qualities and regarding Him as the source of the
world of variety and plurality.
The
infinite variety and plurality of the world does not derive directly from God
according to the philosophers in Islam, who combine Aristotle’s astronomical
view of animate planets circling round in their spheres with the Neoplatonic
theory of emanation, and introduce into the Aristotelian framework Proclus’
conception of a triadic process, but through a series of immaterial mediators.
From God’s single act-for they with Aristotle regard
God as the First Agent-only a single effect follows, but this single effect, the
supramundane Intellect, develops in itself a threefoldness through which it can
exercise a threefold action. Ghazali objects in
a long discussion that if God’s eternal action is unique and constant, only
one single effect in which no plurality can be admitted will follow (a similar
objection can be directed against Aristotle,
who cannot explain how the plurality and variety of transitory movements
can follow from one single constant movement). The plurality of the world
according to Ghazali cannot be explained through
a series of mediators. Averroës, who sometimes
does not seem very sure of the validity of mediate emanation, is rather evasive
in his answer on this point.
In a series of rather intricate discussions which I
have tried to elucidate in my notes, Ghazali endeavours
to show that the proofs of the philosophers for God’s uniqueness, for their
denial of His attributes, for their claims that nothing can share with Him His
genus and species, that He is pure existence which stands in no relation to an
essence, and that He is incorporeal, are all vain. The leading idea of the
philosophers that all plurality needs a prior joining principle, Ghazali
rejects, while Averroës defends it.
Why-so Ghazali asks, for instance-since the
essence in temporal things is not the cause of their existence, should this not
be the case in the Eternal? Or why should body, although it is composite
according to the philosophers, not be the First Cause, especially as they assume
an eternal body, since it is not impossible to suppose a compound without a
composing principle? From the incorporeality of God, the First Principle, Avicenna
had tried to infer, through the disjunction that everything is either matter or
intellect, that He is intellect (since the philosophers in Islam hold with Aristotle
and in opposition to Plotinus that God possesses self-consciousness). Ghazali
does not admit this disjunction and, besides, argues with Plotinus
that self-consciousness implies a subject and an object, and therefore would
impede the philosophers’ thesis of God’s absolute unity.
The
Muslim philosophers, following Aristotle’s Neoplatonic commentators, affirm
that God’s self-knowledge implies His knowledge of all universals (a line of
thought followed, for instance, by Thomas Aquinas
and some moderns like Brentano). In man this
knowledge forms a plurality, in God it is unified. Avicenna
subscribes to the Qur’anic words that no particle in Heaven or Earth escapes
God’s knowledge, but he holds, as Porphyry had done before, that God can know
the particular things only in a universal way, whatever this means. Ghazali
takes it to mean that God, according to Avicenna,
must be ignorant of individuals, a most heretical theory. For Averroës
God’s knowledge is neither universal nor particular, but transcending both, in
a way unintelligible to the human mind.
One
thing, however, God cannot know according to Avicenna
(and he agrees here with Plato’s Parmenides)
and that is the passing of time, for in the Eternal no relation is possible
to the fleeting ‘now’. There are two aspects of time: the sequence of
anteriority and posteriority which remains fixed for ever, and the eternal flow
of the future through the present into the past. It will be eternally true that
I was healthy before I sickened and God can know its eternal truth. But in
God’s timeless eternity there can be no ‘now’ simultaneous with the
trembling present in which we humans live and change and die, there is no
‘now’ in God’s eternity in which He can know that I am sickening now. In
God’s eternal stillness the fleeting facts and truths of human experience can
find no rest. Ghazali objects, erroneously, I
think, that a change in the object of thought need not imply a change in the
subject of consciousness.
In
another chapter Ghazali refutes the
philosophers’ proof that Heaven is animated. He does not deny its possibility,
but declares that the arguments given are insufficient. He discusses also the
view that the heavens move out of love for God and out of desire to assimilate
themselves to Him, and he asks the pertinent question-already posed by Theophrastus
in his Metaphysics, but which scandalizes Averroës
by its prosaicness-why it is meritorious for them to circle round eternally and
whether eternal rest would not be more appropriate for them in their desire to
assimilate themselves to God’s eternal stability.
In
the last chapter of this part Ghazali examines
the philosophers’ symbolical interpretation of the Qur’anic entities ‘The
Pen’ and ‘The Tablet’ and their
theories about dreams and prophecy.
It is interesting to note that, although he refutes them here, he largely adopts
them in his own Vivification of Theology. [?]
In
the last part of his book Ghazali treats the
natural sciences. He enumerates them and declares that there is no objection to
them according to religion except on four points. The first is that there exists
a logical nexus between cause and effect; the second, the selfsubsistent
spirituality of the soul; the third, the immortality of this subsistent soul;
the fourth, the denial of bodily resurrection. The first, that there exists
between cause and effect a logical necessity, has to be contested according to Ghazali,
because by denying it the possibility of miracles can be maintained. The
philosophers do not deny absolutely the possibility of miracles. Muhammad
himself did not claim to perform any miracles and Hugo
Grotius tried to prove the superiority of Christianity over Islam by
saying ‘Mahumetis se missum ait non cum miraculis
sed cum armis’. In later times, however, Muhammad’s followers
ascribed to him the most fantastic miracles, for instance the cleavage of the
moon and his ascension to Heaven. These extravagant miracles are not accepted by
the philosophers. Their theory of the possibility of miracles is based on the
Stoic-Neoplatonic theory of ‘Sympathia’,
which is that all parts of the world are in intimate contact and related. In a
little treatise of Plutarch it is shown how
bodily phenomena are influenced by suggestion, by emotion and emotional states,
and it is claimed by him, and later also by Plotinus,
that the emotions one experiences cannot only influence one’s own body but
also other bodies, and that one’s soul can exercise an influence on other
bodies without the intermediary of any bodily action. The phenomena of
telepathy, for instance the fascination which a snake has on other animals, they
explained in this way. Amulets and talismans can receive through psychological
influences certain powers which can be realized later. This explanation of
occult phenomena, which is found in Avicenna’s Psychology,
a book translated in the Middle Ages, has been widely accepted (for
instance, by Ghazali himself in his Vivification
of Theology), and is found in Thomas
Aquinas and most of the writers about the
occult in the Renaissance, for instance Heinricus
Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus,
and Cardanus. It may be mentioned here that Avicenna
gives as an example of the power of suggestion that a man will go calmly over a
.plank when it is on the ground, whereas he will hesitate if the plank be across
an abyss. This famous example is found in Pascal’s Pensées,
and the well-known modern healer, Coué,
takes it as his chief proof for the power of suggestion. Pascal has taken it
from Montaigne, Montaigne
has borrowed it from his contemporary the great doctor Pietro
Bairo, who himself has a lengthy quotation from the Psychology
of Avicenna. Robert
Burton in his Anatomy
of Melancholy also mentions it. In the Middle Ages this example is
found in Thomas Aquinas. Now the philosophers
limit the possibility of miracles only to those that can be explained by the
power of the mind over physical objects; for instance, they would regard it as
possible that a prophet might cause rain to fall or an earthquake to take place,
but they refuse to accept the more extravagant miracles I have mentioned as
authentic.
The
theologians, however, base their theory of miracles on a denial of natural law.
The Megarian-Ash‘arite denial of potentiality already implies the denial of
natural law. According to this conception there is neither necessity nor
possibility in
rerum natura, they are or they are not, there is no nexus between the
phenomena. But the Greek Sceptics also deny the rational relation between cause
and effect, and it is this Greek Sceptical theory which the Ash‘arites have
copied, as we can see by their examples. The theory that there is no necessary
relation between cause and effect is found, for instance, in Galen.
Fire burns but there is, according to the Greek Sceptics, no necessary relation
between fire and burning. Through seeing this happen many times we assume that
it will happen also in the future, but there is no necessity, no absolute
certainty. This Sceptical theory is quasi-identical with the theory of Hume and
is based on the same assumptions, that all knowledge is given through
sense-impression; and since the idea of causation cannot be derived from sense
experience it is denied altogether. According to the theory of the theologians,
God who creates and re-creates the universe continually follows a certain habit
in His creation. But He can do anything He desires, everything is possible for
Him except the logically impossible; therefore all logically possible miracles
are allowed. One might say that, for the theologians, all nature is miraculous
and all miracles are natural. Averroës asks a
good question: What is really meant by habit, is it a habit in man or in nature?
I do not know how Hume would answer this question. For if causation is a habit
in man, what makes it possible that such a habit can be formed? What is the
objective counterpart of these habits? There is another question which has been
asked by the Greek opponents of this theory, but which is not mentioned by Averroës: How many times must such a sequence be observed before
such a habit can be formed? There is yet another question that might be asked:
Since we cannot act before such a habit is formed-for action implies
causation-what are we doing until then? What, even, is the meaning of ‘I
act’ and ‘I do’? If there is nothing in the world but a sequence of
events, the very word ‘activity’ will have no sense, and it would seem that
we would be doomed to an eternal passivity. Averroës’
answer to this denial of natural law is that universals themselves imply already
the idea of necessity and law. I think this answer is correct. When we speak,
for instance, of wood or stone, we express by those words an hypothetical
necessity, that is, we mean a certain object, which in such-and-such
circumstances will necessarily behave in a certain way that the behaviour of
wood, for example, is based on its nature, that is, on the potentialities it
has.
I
may remark here that it seems to me probable that Nicholas
of Autrecourt, ‘the medieval Hume’,
was influenced by Ghazali’s Ash‘arite
theories. He denies in the same way as Ghazali the
logical connexion between cause and effect: ‘ex eo quod aliqua res est cognita esse, non potest evidenter evidentia
reducta in primum principium vel in certitudinem primi principii inferri, quod
alia res sit’ (cf. Lappe, ‘Nicolaus von Autrecourt’, Beitr.
z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. M. B.vi, H.2, p. 11); he gives the same example of ignis
and stupa,
he seems to hold also the Ash‘arite thesis of God as the sole cause of all
action (cf. op. cit., p. 24), and he quotes in one place Ghazali’s
Metaphysics (cf. N. of Autrecourt, ‘Exigit ordo
executionis’, in Mediaeval
Studies, vol. i, ed. by J. Reginald O’Donnell, Toronto, 1931, p. 2o8). Now
Nicholas’s works were burnt during his lifetime in Paris in 1347, whereas the
Latin translation of the Tahafut
al Tahafut by Calo Calonymus was
terminated in Arles in 1328.
The
second point Ghazali wants to refute are the
proofs for the substantiality and the spirituality of the soul as given by the
philosophers. He himself does not affirm that the soul is material, and as a
matter of fact he holds, in other books, the contrary opinion, but the
Ash‘arites largely adopted the Stoic materialism. The ten arguments of the
philosophers for the spirituality of the soul derive all from arguments given by
the Greeks. It would seem to me that Ghazali’s
arguments for the soul’s materiality may be based on the Stoic answers (which
have not come down to us) against the proofs of Aristotle
and the later Platonists for the immateriality of the soul. There is in
the whole discussion a certain confusion, partly based on the ambiguity of the
word ‘soul’. The term ‘soul’ both in Greek and Arabic can also mean
‘life’. Plants and animals have a ‘soul’. However, it is not affirmed by
Aristotle that life in plants and animals is a
spiritual principle. ‘Soul’ is also used for the rational part, the thinking
part, of our consciousness. It is only this thinking part, according to Aristotle,
that is not related to or bound up with matter; sensation and imagination
are localized in the body, and it is only part of our thinking soul that seems
to possess eternity or to be immortal. Now, most of the ten arguments derive
from Aristotle and mean only to prove that the
thinking part of our soul is incorporeal. Still the Muslim philosophers affirm
with Plato and Plotinus
that the whole soul is spiritual and incorruptible, and that the soul is a
substance independent of the body, although at the same time they adopt
Aristotle’s physiological explanations of all the non-rational functions of
the soul and accept Aristotle’s definition of the ‘soul’ as the first
entelechy of an organic body. On the other hand, the Muslim philosophers do not
admit the Platonic theory of the pre-existence of the soul. Aristotle’s
conception of a material and transitory element in the soul and an immaterial
and immortal element destroys all possibility of considering human personality
as a unity. Although he reproaches Plato with
regarding the human soul as a plurality, the same reproach can be applied to
himself. Neither the Greek nor the Muslim philosophers have ever been able to
uphold a theory that does justice to the individuality of the human personality.
That it is my undefinable ego that perceives, represents, wills, and thinks, the
mysterious fact of the uniqueness of my personality, has never been apprehended
by them. It is true that there is in Aristotle’s psychology a faint conception
of a functional theory of our conscious life, but he is unable to harmonize this
with his psycho-physiological notions.
I
have discussed in my notes the ten arguments and will mention here only two
because of their importance. Ghazali gives one
of these arguments in the following form: How can man’s identity be attributed
to body with all its accidents? For bodies are continually in dissolution and
nutrition replaces what is dissolved, so that when we see a child, after
separation from its mother’s womb, fall ill a few times, become thin and then
fat again, and grow up, we may safely say that after forty years no particle
remains of what there was when its mother was delivered of it. Indeed, the child
began its existence out of parts of the sperm alone, but nothing of the
particles of the sperm remains in it; no, all this is dissolved and has changed
into something else and then this body has become another. Still we say that the
identical man remains and his notions remain with him from the beginning of his
youth although all bodily parts have changed, and this shows that the soul has
an existence outside the body and that the body is its organ. Now the first part
of this argument, that all things are in a state of flux and that of the bodily
life of man no part remains identical, is textually found in Montaigne’s Apologv
of Raymond de Sebond. Montaigne has
taken it from Plutarch, and the Arabic
philosophers may have borrowed it from the same source from which Plutarch
has taken it. The argument of the philosophers that matter is evanescent, but
the soul a stable identity, which is also given by the Christian philosopher Nemesius
in his De natura
hominis (a book translated into Arabic), who ascribes it to Ammonius
Saccas and Numenius,
is basically Platonic and Neoplatonic, and strangely enough, although he refutes
it here, it is adduced by Ghazali himself in his
Vivification of
Theology. Socrates says in the Platonic dialogue Cratylus:
‘Can we truly say that there is knowledge, Cratylus,
if all things are continually changing and nothing remains? For knowledge cannot
continue unless it remains and keeps its identity. But if knowledge changes its
very essence, it will lose at once its identity and there will be no
knowledge.’ Plotinus (Enn.
iv. 7. 3) argues that matter, in its continual changing, cannot explain the
identity of the soul. And he says in a beautiful passage (Enn. iv. 7. 10) the idea of which Avicenna
has copied:
‘One should contemplate the nature of everything in its purity,
since what is added is ever an obstacle to its knowledge. Contemplate therefore
the soul in its abstraction or rather let him who makes this abstraction
contemplate himself in this state and he will know that he is immortal when he
will see in himself the purity of the intellect, for he will see his intellect
contemplate nothing sensible, nothing mortal, but apprehending the eternal
through the eternal.’
This
passage bears some relation to Descartes’s dictum cogito ergo sum, but whereas Plotinus
affirms the self-consciousness of a stable identity, Descartes
states only that every thought has a subject, an ego. Neither the one, nor the
other shows that this subject is my ego in the sense of my undefinable unique
personality, my awareness who I am: that I am, for instance, John and not Peter,
my consciousness of the continuity of my identity from birth to death, my
knowledge that at the same time I am master and slave of an identical body,
whatever the changes may be in that body, and that as long as I live I am a
unique and an identical whole of body and soul. Plautus’ Sosia,
who was not a philosopher, expresses himself (Amphitruo,
line 447) in almost the same way as Descartes-‘sed
quom cogito, equidem certo idem sum qui fui semper’-but
the introduction of the words semper
and idem
renders the statement fallacious; from mere consciousness the lasting
identity of my personality cannot be inferred.
Ghazali answers this point by saying
that animals and plants also, notwithstanding that their matter is continually
changing, preserve their identity, although nobody believes that this identity
is based on a spiritual principle. Averroës
regards this objection as justified.
The
second argument is based on the theory of universals. Since thought apprehends
universals which are not in a particular place and have no individuality, they
cannot be material, since everything material is individual and is in space.
Against this theory of universals Ghazali develops,
under Stoic influence, his nominalistic theory which is probably the theory held
by the Ash‘arites in general. This theory is quasi-identical with Berkeley’s
nominalistic conception and springs from the same assumption that thinking is
nothing but the having of images. By a strange coincidence both Ghazali
and Berkeley give the example of a hand:
when we have an idea of a hand as a universal, what really happens is that we
have a representation of a particular hand, since there are no universals. But
this particular hand is capable of representing for us any possible hand, just
as much a big black hand as a small white one. The fallacy of the theory lies,
of course, in the word ‘representing’, which as a matter of fact assumes
what it tended to deny, namely, that we can think of a hand in general which has
neither a particular shape, nor a particular colour, nor is localized in space.
The
next point Ghazali tries to refute is the
argument of the philosophers for the immortality of the soul. According to the
philosophers, the fact that it is a substance independent of a body and is
immaterial shows that a corruption of the body cannot affect it. This, as a
matter of fact, is a truism, since the meaning of substantiality and
immateriality for the philosophers implies already the idea of eternity. On the
other hand, if the soul is the form of the body, as is also affirmed by them, it
can only exist with its matter and the mortality of its body would imply its own
mortality, as Ghazali rightly points out. The
Arabic philosophers through their combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism
hold, indeed, at the same time three theories inconsistent with each other,
about the relation of body and soul: that the soul is the form of the body, that
the soul is a substance, subsistent by itself and immortal, and that the soul
after death takes a pneumatic body (a theory already found in Porphyry). Besides, their denial of the Platonic idea of
pre-existence of the soul vitiates their statement that the soul is a substance,
subsistent by itself, that is, eternal, ungenerated, and incorruptible. Although
Averroës in his whole book tries to come as
near to the Aristotelian conception of the soul as possible, in this chapter he
seems to adopt the eschatology of the late Greek authors. He allows to the souls
of the dead a pneumatic body and believes that they exist somewhere in the
sphere of the moon. He also accepts the theory of the Djinn, the equivalent of the Greek
Daimones.
What he rejects, and what the philosophers generally reject, is the
resurrection of the flesh.
In
his last chapter Averroës summarizes his views
about religion. There are three possible views. A Sceptical view that religion
is opium for the people, held by certain Greek rationalists; the view that
religion expresses Absolute Truth; and the intermediate view, held by Averroës,
that the religious conceptions are the symbols of a higher philosophical truth,
symbols which have to be taken for reality itself by the non-philosophers. For
the unphilosophical, however, they are binding, since the sanctity of the State
depends on them.
When
we have read the long discussions between the philosophers and theologians we
may come to the conclusion that it is sometimes more the formula than the
essence of things which divides them. Both philosophers and theologians Arm that
God creates or has created the world. For the philosophers, since the world is
eternal, this creation is eternal. Is there, however, any sense in calling
created what has been eternally? For the theologians God is the creator of
everything including time, but does not the term ‘creation’ assume already
the concept of time? Both the philosophers and theologians apply to God the
theory that His will and knowledge differ from human will and knowledge in that
they are creative principles and essentially beyond understanding; both admit
that the Divine cannot be measured by the standards of man. But this, in fact,
implies an avowal of our complete ignorance in face of the Mystery of God.
Still, for both parties God is the supreme Artifex who in His wisdom has chosen
the best of all possible worlds; for although the philosophers affirm also that
God acts only by natural necessity, their system, like that of their
predecessors, the Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, is essentially
teleological. As to the problem of possibility, both parties commit the same
inconsistencies and hold sometimes that the world could, sometimes that it could
not, have been different from what it is. Finally, both parties believe in
God’s ultimate Unity.
And
if one studies the other works of Ghazali the
resemblance between him and the philosophers becomes still greater. For
instance, he too believes in the spirituality of the soul, notwithstanding the
arguments he gives against it in this book; he too sometimes regards religious
concepts as the symbols of a higher philosophical or mystical truth, although he
admits here only a literal interpretation. He too sometimes teaches the
fundamental theory of the philosophers which he tries to refute so insistently
in our book, the theory that from the one supreme Agent as the ultimate source
through intermediaries all things derive; and he himself expresses this idea (in
his Alchemy of
Happiness and slightly differently in his Vivification of
Theology)
by the charming simile of an ant which seeing black tracings on a sheet of
paper thinks that their cause is the pen, while it is the hand that moves the
pen by the power of the will which derives from the heart, itself inspired by
the spiritual agent, the cause of causes. The resemblances between Ghazali
and Averroës, men belonging to the same
culture, indeed, the greatest men in this culture, seem sometimes greater than
their differences.
Emotionally
the difference goes deep. Averroës is a
philosopher and a proud believer in the possibility of reason to achieve a
knowledge of ‘was das Innere der Welt zusammenhält’.
He was not always too sure, he knew too much, and there is much wavering and
hesitation in his ideas. Still, his faith in reason remains unshaken. Although
he does not subscribe to the lofty words of his master that man because of the
power of his intellect is a mortal God, he reproaches the theologians for having
made God an immortal man. God, for him, is a dehumanized principle. But if God
has to respond to the needs of man’s heart, can He be exempt from humanity? Ghazali
is a mu’min, that is a believer, he is a
Muslim,
that is he accepts his heart submits to a truth his reason cannot establish, for
his heart has reasons his reason does not know. His theology is the philosophy
of the heart in which there is expressed man’s fear and loneliness and his
feeling of dependence on an understanding and loving Being to whom he can cry
out from the depths of his despair, and whose mercy is infinite. It is not so
much after abstract truth that Ghazali strives;
his search is for God, for the Pity behind the clouds.
IN THE NAME OF THE MERCIFUL AND COMPASSIONATE
GOD: AND AFTER PRAISE TO GOD AND BENEDICTION UPON ALL HIS
MESSENGERS AND PROPHETS:
The
aim of this book is to show the different degrees of assent and conviction
attained by the assertions in The Incoherence of the Philosophers, and to prove
that the greater part has not reached the degree of evidence and of truth.
THE FIRST DISCUSSION
Concerning the Eternity of the
World
Ghazali, speaking of
the philosophers’ proofs for the eternity of the world, says:
Let us restrict ourselves in this chapter to those proofs that make an impression on the mind.
This chapter contains four proofs.
The philosophers say: It is impossible that the temporal should proceed from the absolutely Eternal. For it is clear if we assume the Eternal existing without, for instance, the world proceeding from Him, then, at a certain moment, the world beginning to proceed from Him-that it did not proceed before, because there was no determining principle for its existence, but its existence was pure possibility. When the world begins in time, a new determinant either does or does not arise. If it does not, the world will stay in the same state of pure possibility as before; if a new determinant does arise, the same question can be asked about this new determinant, why it determines now, and not before, and either we shall have an infinite regress or we shall arrive at a principle determining eternally.
I say: This argument is in the highest degree
dialectical and does not reach the
pitch of demonstrative proof. For its premisses are common notions, and common
notions approach the equivocal, whereas demonstrative premisses are concerned
with things proper to the same genus.
For
the term ‘possible’ is used in an equivocal way of the possible that happens
more often than not, of the possible that happens less often than not, and of
the possible with equal chances of happening, and these three types of the
possible do not seem to have the same need for a new determining principle. For
the possible that happens more often than not is frequently believed to have
its determining principle in itself, not outside, as is the case with the
possible which has equal chances of happening and not happening. Further, the
possible resides sometimes in the agent, i.e. the possibility of acting, and
sometimes in the patient, i.e. the possibility of receiving, and it does not
seem that the necessity for a determining principle is the same in both cases.
For it is well known that the possible in the patient needs a new determinant
from the outside; this can be perceived by the senses in artificial things and
in many natural things too, although in regard to natural things there is a
doubt, for in most natural things the principle of their change forms part of
them. Therefore it is believed of many natural things that they move
themselves, and it is by no means self-evident that everything that is
moved has a mover and that there is nothing that moves itself.; But all this
needs to be examined, and the old philosophers have therefore done so. As
concerns the possible in the agent, however, in many cases it is believed that
it can be actualized without an external principle, for the transition in the
agent from inactivity to activity is often regarded as not being a change which
requires a principle; e.g. the transition in the geometer from non-geometrizing
to geometrizing, or in the teacher from non-teaching to teaching.
Further,
those changes which are regarded as needing a principle of change can sometimes
be changes in substance, sometimes in quality, or in quantity, or in place.
In
addition, ‘eternal’ is predicated by many of the eternal-by-itself
and the eternal-through-another. According to some, it is
permissible to admit certain changes in the Eternal, for instance a new
volition in the Eternal, according to the Karramites, and the possibility of
generation and corruption which the ancients attribute to primary matter,
although it is eternal. Equally, new concepts are admitted in the possible
intellect although, according to most authors, it is eternal. But there are also changes which are
inadmissible, especially according to certain ancients, though not according to
others.
Then
there is the agent who acts of his will and the agent which acts by nature, and
the manner of actualization of the possible act is not the same for both
agents, i.e. so far as the need for a new determinant is concerned. Further, is
this division into two agents complete, or does demonstration lead to an agent
which resembles neither the natural agent nor the voluntary agent of human
experience?
All these are multifarious and difficult questions which need, each of them, a special examination, both in themselves and in regard to the opinions the ancients held about them. To treat what is in reality a plurality of questions as one problem is one of the well known seven sophisms, and a mistake in one of these principles becomes a great error by the end of the examination of reality.
Ghazali
says:
There are two objections to this. The first objection is to say: why do you deny the theory of those who say that the world has been created by an eternal will which has decreed its existence in the time in which it exists; that its non-existence lasts until the moment it ceases and that its existence begins from the moment it begins; that its existence was not willed before and therefore did not happen, and that at the exact moment it began it was willed by an eternal will and therefore began? What is the objection to this theory and what is absurd in it?
I say:
This
argument is sophistical: although it is not allowable for him to admit the
possibility of the actual effect being delayed after the actual cause, and in a
voluntary agent, after the decision to act, he regards it as possible that the
effect should be delayed after the will of the agent. It is possible that the
effect should be delayed after the will of the agent, but its being delayed
after the actual cause is impossible, and equally impossible is its being
delayed after a voluntary agent’s decision to act. The difficulty is thus
unchanged, for he must of necessity draw one of these two conclusions: either
that the act of the agent does not imply in him a change which itself would
need an external principle of change, or that there are changes which arise by
themselves, without the necessity of an agent in whom they occur and who causes
them, and that therefore there are changes possible in the Eternal without an
agent who causes them. And his adversaries insist on these two very points: ( 1
) that the act of the agent necessarily implies a change and that each change has a principle which
causes it; (2) that the Eternal cannot change in any way. But all this is
difficult to prove.
The Ash’arites are forced to assume either a first agent or a first act of this agent, for they cannot admit that the disposition of the agent, relative to the effect, when he acts is the same as his disposition, when he does not act. This implies therefore a new disposition or a new relation, and this necessarily either in the agent, or in the effect, or in both? But in this case, if we posit as a principle that for each new disposition there is an agent, this new disposition in the first agent will either need another agent, and then this first agent was not the first and was not on his own account sufficient for the act but needed another, or the agent of the disposition which is the condition of the agent’s act will be identical with the agent of the act. Then this act which we regarded as being the first act arising out of him will not be the first, but his act producing the disposition which is the condition of the effect will be anterior to the act producing the effect. This, you see, is a necessary consequence, unless one allows that new dispositions may arise in the agents without a cause. But this is absurd, unless one believes that there are things which happen at haphazard and by themselves, a theory of the old philosophers who denied the agent,; the falsehood of which is self-evident.
In Ghazali’s objection there is a confusion. For our expressions ‘eternal will’ and ‘temporal will’ are equivocal, indeed contrary. For the empirical will is a faculty which possesses the possibility of doing equally one of two contraries and then of receiving equally one of the two contraries willed. For the will is the desire of the agent towards action. When the agent acts, the desire ceases and the thing willed happens, and this desire and this act are equally related to both the contraries. But when one says: ‘There is a Wilier who wills eternally one of two contraries in Himself’, the definition of the will is abandoned, for we have transferred its nature from the possible to the necessary. If it is objected that in an eternal will the will does not cease through the presence of the object willed, for as an eternal will has no beginning there is no moment in it which is specially determined for the realization of the object willed, we answer: this is not obvious, unless we say that demonstrative proof leads to the existence of an agent endowed with a power which is neither voluntary nor natural, which, however, the Divine Law calls ‘will’, in the same way as demonstrative proof leads to middle terms between things which seemed at first sight to be contrary, without being really so, as when we speak of an existence which is neither inside nor outside the world.
Ghazali
answers, on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers say: This is clearly impossible, for everything that happens is necessitated and has its cause, and as it is impossible that there should be an effect without a necessitating principle and a cause, so it is impossible that there should exist a cause of which the effect is delayed, when all the conditions of its necessitating, its causes and elements are completely fulfilled. On the contrary, the existence of the effect, when the cause is realized with all its conditions, is necessary, and its delay is just as impossible as an effect without cause. Before the existence of the world there existed a Wilier, a will, and its relation to the thing willed. No new wilier arose, nor a new will, nor a new relation to the will-for all this is change; how then could a new object of will arise, and what prevented its arising before? The condition of the new production did not distinguish itself from the condition of the non-production in any way, in any mode, in any relation-on the contrary, everything remained as it was before. At one moment the object of will did not exist, everything remained as it was before, and then the object of will existed. Is not this a perfectly absurd theory?
I say:
This
is perfectly clear, except for one who denies one of the premisses we have laid
down previously. But Ghazali passes from this
proof to an example based upon convention,’ and through this he confuses this
defence of the philosophers.
Ghazali says:
This kind of impossibility is found not only in the necessary and essential cause and effect but also in the accidental and conventional. If a man pronounces the formula of divorce against his wife without the divorce becoming irrevocable immediately, one does not imagine that it will become so later. For he made the formula through convention and usage a cause of the judgement, and we do not believe that the effect can be delayed, except when the divorce depends on an ulterior event, e.g. on the arrival of tomorrow or on someone’s entering the house, for then the divorce does not take place at once, but only when tomorrow arrives or someone enters the house; in this case the man made the formula a cause only in conjunction with an ulterior event. But as this event, the coming of tomorrow and someone’s entering the house, is not yet actual, the effect is delayed until this future event is realized. The effect only takes place when a new event, i.e. entering the house or the arrival of tomorrow, has actually happened. Even if a man wanted to delay the effect after the formula, without making it dependent on an ulterior event, this would be regarded as impossible, although it is he himself who lays down the convention and fixes its modalities. If thus in conventional matters such a delay is incomprehensible and inadmissible, how can we admit it in essential, rational, and necessary causal relations? In respect of our conduct and our voluntary actions, there is a delay in actual volition only when there is some obstacle. When there is actual volition and actual power and the obstacles are eliminated, a delay in the object willed is inadmissible.; A delay in the object willed is imaginable only in decision, for decision is not sufficient for the existence of the act; the decision to write does not produce the writing, if it is not, as a new fact, accompanied by an act of volition, i.e. an impulse in the man which presents itself at the moment of the act. If there is thus an analogy between the eternal Will and our will to act, a delay of the object willed is inadmissible, unless through an obstacle, and an antecedent existence of the volition is equally inadmissible, for I cannot will to get up tomorrow except by way of decision. If, however, the eternal Will is analogous to our decision, it does not suffice to produce the thing decided upon, but the act of creation must be accompanied by a new act of volition, and this brings us again to the idea of a change. But then we have the same difficulty all over again. Why does this impulse or volition or will or whatever you choose to call it happen just now and not before? There remain, then, only these alternatives: either something happening without a cause, or an infinite regress. This is the upshot of the discussion: There is a cause the conditions of which are all completely fulfilled, but notwithstanding this the effect is delayed and is not realized during a period to the beginning of which imagination cannot attain and for which thousands of years would mean no diminution; then suddenly, without the addition of any new fact, and without the realization of any new condition, this effect comes into existence and is produced. And this is absurd.
I say:
This
example of divorce based on convention seems to strengthen the argument of the
philosophers, but in reality it weakens it. For it enables the Ash’arites to
say: In the same way as the actual divorce is delayed after the formula of
divorce till the moment when the condition of someone’s entering the house, or
any other, is fulfilled, so the realization of the world can be delayed after
God’s act of creation until the condition is fulfilled on which this
realization depends, i.e. the moment when God willed it. But conventional
things do not behave like rational. The Literalists, comparing these
conventional things to rational, say: This divorce is not binding and does not
become effective through the realization of the condition which is posterior to
the pronouncement of the divorce by the divorcer, since it would be a divorce
which became effective without connexion with the act of the divorcer. But in
this matter there is no relation between the concept drawn from the nature of
things and that which is artificial and conventional.
Then
Ghazali says, on behalf of the Ash’arites:
The answer is: Do you recognize the impossibility of connecting the eternal Will with the temporal production of anything, through the necessity of intuitive thought or through a logical deduction, or-to use your own logical terminology-do you recognize the clash between these two concepts through a middle term or without a middle term? If you claim a middle term-and this is the deductive method-you will have to produce it, and if you assert that you know this through the necessity of thought, why do your adversaries not share this intuition with you? For the party which believes in the creation of the world in time through an eternal Will includes so many persons that no country can contain them and no number enumerate them, and they certainly do not contradict the logically minded out of obstinacy, while knowing better in their hearts. A proof according to the rules of logic must be produced to show this impossibility, as in all your arguments up till now there is only a presumption of impossibility and a comparison with our decision and our will; and this is false, for the eternal Will does not resemble temporal volitions, and a pure presumption of impossibility will not suffice without proof.
I say:
This
argument is one of those which have only a very feeble persuasive power. It
amounts to saying that one who claims the impossibility of delay in an effect,
when its cause with all its conditions is realized, must assert that he knows
this either by a syllogism or from first principles; if through a syllogism, he
must produce it-but there is none; if from first principles, it must be known
to all, adversaries and others alike. But this argument is mistaken, for it is
not a condition of objective truth that it should be known to all. That
anything should be held by all does not imply anything more than its being a
common notion, just as the existence of a common notion does not imply
objective truth.
Ghazali answers on behalf of the Ash’arites:
If it is said, ‘We know by the necessity of thought that, when all its conditions are fulfilled, a cause without effect is inadmissible and that to admit it is an affront to the necessity of thought,’ we answer: what is the difference between you and your adversaries, when they say to you, ‘We know by the necessity of thought the impossibility of a theory which affirms that one single being knows all the universals, without this knowledge forming a plurality in its essence or adding anything to it, and without this plurality of things known implying a plurality in the knowledge’? For this is your theory of God, which according to us and our science is quite absurd. You, however, say there is no analogy between eternal and temporal knowledge. Some of you acknowledge the impossibility involved, and say that God knows only Himself and that He is the knower, the knowledge and the known, and that the three are one. One might object: The unity of the knowledge, the knower, and the known is clearly an impossibility, for to suppose the Creator of the world ignorant of His own work is necessarily absurd, and the Eternal-who is far too high to be reached by your words and the words of any heretics-could, if He knows only Himself, never know His work.
I
say
This amounts to saying that the theologians do not gratuitously and without proof deny the admitted impossibility of a delay between the effect and its cause, but base themselves on an argument which leads them to believe in the temporal creation of the world, and that they therefore act in the same way as the philosophers, who only deny the well-known necessary plurality of knowledge and known, so far as it concerns their unity in God, because of a demonstration which, according to them, leads them to their theory about Him. And that this is still more true of those philosophers who deny it to be necessary that God should know His own work, affirming that He knows only Himself. This assertion belongs to the class of assertions whose contrary is equally false., For there exists no proof which refutes anything that is evidently true, and universally acknowledged. Anything that can be refuted by a demonstrative proof is only supposed to be true, not really true.] Therefore, if it is absolutely and evidently true that knowledge and known form a plurality, both in the visible and in the invisible world, we can be sure that the philosophers cannot have a proof of this unity in God; but if the theory of the plurality of knowledge and known is only a supposition, then it is possible for the philosophers to have a proof. Equally, if it is absolutely true that the effect of a cause cannot be delayed after the causation and the Ash’arites claim that they can advance a proof to deny it, then we can be absolutely sure that they cannot have such a proof. If there is a controversy about questions like this, the final criterion rests with the sound understanding’ which does not base itself on prejudice and passion, when it probes according to the signs and rules by which truth and mere opinion are logically distinguished. Likewise, if two people dispute about a sentence and one says that it is poetry, the other that it is prose, the final judgment rests with the ‘sound understanding’ which can distinguish poetry from prose, and with the science of prosody. And as, in the case of metre, the denial of him who denies it does not interfere with its perception by him who perceives it, so the denial of a truth by a contradictor does not trouble the conviction of the men to whom it is evident.
This
whole argument is extremely inept and weak, and Ghazali
ought not to have filled his book with such talk if he intended to convince the
learned.
And
drawing consequences which are irrelevant and beside the point, Ghazali goes on to say:
But the consequences of this argument cannot be overcome. And we say to them: How will you refute your adversaries, when they say the eternity of the world is impossible, for it implies an infinite number and an infinity of unifies for the spherical revolutions, although they can be divided by six, by four, and by two.’ For the sphere of the sun revolves in one year, the sphere of Saturn in thirty years, and so Saturn’s revolution is a thirtieth and Jupiter’s revolution-for Jupiter revolves in twelve years-a twelfth of the sun’s revolution. But the number of revolutions of Saturn has the same infinity as the revolutions of the sun, although they are in a proportion of one to thirty and even the infinity of the sphere of the fixed stars which turns round once in thirty-six thousand years is the same as the daily revolution which the sun performs in twenty-four hours. If now your adversary says that this is plainly impossible, in what does your argument differ from his? And suppose it is asked: Are the numbers of these revolutions even or uneven or both even and uneven or neither even nor uneven? If you answer, both even and uneven, or neither even nor uneven, you say what is evidently absurd. If, however, you say ‘even’ or ‘uneven’, even and uneven become uneven and even by the addition of one unit and how could infinity be one unit short? You must, therefore, draw the conclusion that they are neither even nor uneven.
I say:
This
too is a sophistical argument. It amounts to saying: In the same way as you
are unable to refute our argument for the creation of the world in time,
that if it were eternal, its revolutions would be neither even nor uneven, so we
cannot refute your theory that the effect of an agent whose conditions
to act are always fulfilled cannot be delayed. This argument aims only at
creating and establishing a ; doubt, which is one of the sophist’s objectives.
But
you, reader of this book, you have already heard the arguments of the
philosophers to establish the eternity of the world and the refutation of the
Ash’arites. Now hear the proofs of the Ash’arites for their refutation and hear
the arguments of the philosophers to refute those proofs in the wording of Ghazali!
[Here, in the Arabic text, the last
passage of Ghazali, which previously was given
only in an abbreviated form, is repeated in full.]
I say:
This
is in brief that, if you imagine two circular movements in one and the same finite
time and imagine then a limited part of these movements in one and the same
finite time, the proportion between the parts of these two circular movements
and between their wholes will be the same. For instance, if the circular
movement of Saturn in t the period which we call a year is a thirtieth of the
circular movement of the sun in this period, and you imagine the whole of the
circular movements of the sun in proportion to the whole of the circular
movements of Saturn in one and the same period, necessarily the proportion
between their wholes and between their parts will be the same. If, however,
there is no proportion between two movements in their totality, because they
are both potential, i.e. they have neither beginning nor end but there exists a
proportion between the parts, because they are both actual, then the proportion
between the wholes is not necessarily the same as the proportion between the
parts-although many think so, basing their proof on this prejudice -for
there is no proportion between two magnitudes or quantities which are both
taken to be infinite. When, therefore, the ancients believed that, for
instance, the totality of the movements of the sun and of Saturn had neither
beginning nor end, there could be no proportion between them, for this would
have implied the finitude of both these totalities, just as this is implied for
the parts of both. This is self-evident. Our adversaries believe that,
when a proportion of more and less exists between parts, this proportion holds
good also for the totalities, but this is only binding when the totalities are
finite. For where there is no end there is neither ‘more’ nor ‘less’. The
admission in such a case of the proportion of more and less brings with it
another absurd consequence, namely that one infinite could be greater than
another. This is only absurd when one supposes two things actually infinite,
for then a proportion does exist between them. When, however, one imagines
things potentially infinite, there exists no proportion at all. This is the
right answer to this question, not what Ghazali
says in the name of the philosophers.
And
through this are solved all the difficulties which beset our adversaries on
this question, of which the greatest is that which they habitually formulate in
this way: If the movements in the past are infinite, then no movement in the
actual present can take place, unless an infinite number of preceding movements
is terminated., This is true, and acknowledged by the philosophers, once
granted that the anterior movement is the condition for the posterior
movement’s taking place, i.e. once granted that the existence of one single
movement implies an infinite number of causes. But no philosopher allows the
existence of an infinite number of causes, as accepted by the materialists, for
this would imply the existence of an effect without cause and a motion without
mover. But when the existence of an eternal prime mover had been proved, whose
act cannot be posterior to his being, it followed that there could as little be
a beginning for his act as for his being; otherwise his act would be possible,
not necessary, and he would not be a first principle.’ The acts of an agent who
has no beginning have a beginning as little as his existence, and therefore it
follows necessarily that no preceding act of his is the condition for the
existence of a later, for neither of them is an agent by itself and their
sequence is accidental. An accidental infinite, not an essential infinite, is
admitted by the philosophers; nay, this type of infinite is in fact a necessary
consequence of the existence of an eternal first principle., And this is not
only true for successive or continuous movements and the like, but even where
the earlier is regarded as the cause of the later, for instance the man who
engenders a man like himself. For it is necessary that the series of temporal
productions of one individual man by another should lead upwards to an eternal
agent, for whom there is no beginning either of his existence or of his
production of man out of man. The production of one man by another ad infinitum is accidental, whereas the relation of before and after in it
is essential. The agent who has no beginning either for his existence or for
those acts of his which he performs without an instrument, has no first
instrument either to perform those acts of his without beginning which by their
nature need an instrument .
But
since the theologians mistook the accidental for the essential, they denied
this eternal agent; the solution of their problem was difficult and they
believed this proof to be stringent. But this theory of the philosophers is
clear, and their first master Aristotle has explained that, if motion were
produced by motion, or element by element, motion and element could not exists For
this type of infinite the philosophers admit neither a beginning nor an end,
and therefore one can never say of anything in this series that it has ended or
has begun, not even in the past, for everything that has an end must have begun
and what does not begin does not end. This can also be understood from the fact
that beginning and end are correlatives. Therefore one who affirms that there
is no end of the celestial revolutions in the future cannot logically ascribe a
beginning to them, for what has a beginning has an end and what has no end has
no beginning, and the same relation exists between first and last; i.e. what
has a first term has also a last term, and what has no first term has no last
term, and there is in reality neither end nor beginning for any part of a
series that has no last term, and what has no beginning for any of its parts
has no end for any of them either. When, therefore, the theologians ask the
philosophers if the movements which precede the present one are ended, their
answer is negative, for their assumption that they have no beginning implies
their endlessness. The opinion of the theologians that the philosophers admit
their end is erroneous, for they do not admit an end for what has no
beginning.’ It will be clear to you that neither the arguments of the
theologians for the temporal creation of the world of which Ghazali speaks, nor the arguments of the philosophers
which he includes and describes in his book, suffice to reach absolute evidence
or afford stringent proof. And this is what we have tried to show in this book.
The best answer one can give to him who asks where in the past is the starting-point
of His acts, is: The starting-point of His acts is at the starting-point
of His existence; for neither of them has a beginning.
And
here is the passage of Ghazali in which he sets
forth the defence of the philosophers against the argument built on the
difference in speed of the celestial spheres, and his refutation of their
argument.
Ghazali says:
If one says, ‘The error in your argument consists in your considering those circular movements as an aggregate of units, but those movements have no real existence, for the past is no more and the future not yet; “aggregate” means units existing in the present, but in this case there is no existence.’
Then
he says to refute this:
We answer: Number can be divided into even and uneven; there is no third possibility, whether for the numbered permanent reality, or for the numbered passing event. Therefore whatever number we imagine, we must believe it to be even or uneven, whether we regard it as existent or non-existent; and if the thing numbered vanishes from existence, our judgement of its being even or uneven does not vanish or change.
I say:
This is the end of his argument. But this argument-that the numbered thing must be judged as even or uneven, whether it exists or not-is only valid so far as it concerns external things or things in the soul that have a beginning and an end. For of the number which exists only potentially, i.e. which has neither beginning nor end, it cannot truly be said that it is even or uneven, or that it begins or ends; it happens neither in the past nor in the future, for what exists potentially falls under the law of non-existence. This is what the philosophers meant when they said that the circular movements of the past and the future are non-existent. The upshot of this question is: Everything that is called a limited aggregate with a beginning and an end is so called either because it has a beginning and end in the world exterior to the soul, or because it is inside, not outside, the soul. Every totality, actual and limited in the past, whether inside or outside the soul, is necessarily either even or uneven. But an unlimited aggregate existing outside the soul cannot be other than limited so far as it is represented in the soul, for the soul cannot represent unlimited existence. Therefore also this unlimited aggregate, as being limited in the soul, can be called even or uneven; in so far, however, as it exists outside the soul, it can be called neither even nor uneven. Equally, past aggregates which are considered to exist potentially outside the soul, i.e. which have no beginning, cannot be called even or uneven unless they are looked upon as actual, i.e. as having beginning and end. No motion possesses totality or forms an aggregate, i.e. is provided with a beginning or an end, except in so far as it is in the soul, as is the case with time.’ And it follows from the nature of circular movement that it is neither even nor uneven except as represented in the soul. The cause of this mistake is that it was believed that, when something possesses a certain quality in the soul, it must possess this quality also outside the soul, and, since anything that has happened in the past can only be represented in the soul as finite, it was thought that everything that has happened in the past must also be finite outside the soul. And as the circular movements of the future are regarded by the imagination as infinite, for it represents them as a sequence of part after part, Plato and the Ash’arites believed that they might be infinite, but this is simply a judgement based on imagination, not on proof. Therefore those who believe-as many theologians have done-that, if the world is supposed to have begun, it must have an end, are truer to their principles and show more consistency.
Ghazali says after this:
And we say moreover to the philosophers: According to your principles it is not absurd that there should be actual units, qualitatively differentiated, which are infinite in number; I am thinking of human souls, separated through death from their bodies. These are therefore realities that can neither be called even nor uneven. How will you refute the man who affirms that this is necessarily absurd in the same way as you claim the connexion between an eternal will and a temporal creation to be necessarily absurd? This theory about souls is that which Avicenna accented. and it is perhaps Aristotle’s.
I say:
This
argument is extremely weak. It says, in brief, ‘You philosophers need not
refute our assertion that what is a logical necessity for you is not necessary,
as you consider things possible which your adversaries consider impossible by
the necessity of thought. That is to say, just as you consider things possible
which your adversaries consider impossible, so you consider things necessary
which your adversaries do not consider so. And you cannot bring a criterion for
judging the two claims.’ It has already been shown in the science of logic that
this is a weak rhetorical or sophistical kind of argument., The answer is that
what we claim to be necessarily true is objectively true, whereas what you
claim as necessarily absurd is not as you claim it to be. For this there is no
other criterion than immediate intuitive apprehension, just as, when one man
claims that a line is rhythmical and another denies it, the criterion is the
intuition of the sound understanding.
As
for the thesis of a numerical plurality of immaterial souls, this is not a
theory acknowledged by the philosophers, for they regard matter as the cause of
numerical plurality and form as the cause of congruity in numerical plurality.
And that there should be a numerical plurality without matter, having one
unique form, is impossible. For in its description one individual can only be
distinguished from another accidentally, as there is often another individual
who participates in this descriptions but only through their matter do
individuals differ in reality. And also this: the impossibility of an actual
infinite is an acknowledged axiom in philosophical theory, equally valid for
material and immaterial things. We do not know of any one who makes a
distinction here between the spatial and the non-spatial, with the single
exception of Avicenna. I do not know of any other philosopher who affirms this,
it does not correspond with any of their principles and it makes no sense, for
the philosophers deny the existence of an actual infinite equally for material
and for immaterial things, as it would imply that one infinite could be greater
than another. Perhaps Avicenna wanted only to satisfy the masses, telling them
what they were accustomed to hear about the soul. But this theory is far from
satisfactory. For if there were an actual infinite and it were divided in two,
the part would equal the whole; e.g. if there were a line or a number actually
infinite in both directions and it were divided in two, both the parts and the
whole would be actually infinite; and this is absurd. All this is simply the
consequence of the admission of an actual and not potential infinite.
Ghazali
says:
If it is said, ‘The truth lies with Plato’s theory of one eternal soul which is only divided in bodies and returns after its separation from them to its original unity’, we answer: This theory is still worse, more objectionable and more apt to be regarded as contrary to the necessity of thought. For we say that the soul of Zaid is either identical with the soul of Amr or different from it; but their identity would mean something absurd, for everyone is conscious of his own identity and knows that he is not another, and, were they identical, their knowledge, which is an essential quality of their souls and enters into all the relations into which their souls enter, would be identical too. If you say their soul is unique and only divided through its association with bodies, we answer that the division of a unity which has no measurable volume is absurd by the necessity of thought. And how could the one become two, and indeed a thousand, and then return to its unity? This can be understood of things which have volume and quantity, like the water of the sea which is distributed into brooks and rivers and flows then back again into the sea, but how can that which has no quantity be divided? We seek to show by all this that the philosophers cannot shake the conviction of their adversaries that the eternal Will is connected with temporal creation, except by claiming its absurdity by the necessity of thought, and that therefore they are in no way different from the theologians who make the same claim against the philosophical doctrines opposed to theirs. And out of this there is no issue.
I say:
Zaid and Amr are numerically different, but identical in form. If, for example, the soul of Zaid were numerically different from the soul of Amr in the way Zaid is numerically different from Amr, the soul of Zaid and the soul of Amr would be numerically two, but one in their form, and the soul would possess another soul. The necessary conclusion is therefore that the soul of Zaid and the soul of Amr are identical in their form. An identical form inheres in a numerical, i.e. a divisible, multiplicity, only through the multiplicity of matter. If then the soul does not die when the body dies, or if it possesses an immortal element, it must, when it has left the bodies, form a numerical unity. But this is not the place to go deeper into this subject.
His argument against Plato is sophistical. It says in short that the soul of Zaid is either identical with the soul of Amr or different from it; but that the soul of Zaid is not identical with the soul of Amr and that therefore it is different from it. But ‘different’ is an equivocal term, and ‘identity’ too is predicated of a number of things which are also called ‘different’. The souls of Zaid and Amr are one in one sense and many in another; we might say, one in relation to their form, many in relation to their substratum. His remark that division can only be imagined of the quantitative is partially false; it is true of essential division, but not of accidental division, i.e. of those things which can be divided, because they exist in the essentially divisible. The essentially divisible is, for example, body; accidental division is, for instance, the division of whiteness, when the bodies in which it is present are divided, and in this way the forms and the soul are accidentally divisible, i.e. through the division of the substrate. The soul is closely similar to light: light is divided by the division of illuminated bodies, and is unified when the bodies are annihilated, and this same relation holds between soul and bodies. To advance such sophistical arguments is dishonest, for it may be supposed that he is not a man to have overlooked the points mentioned. What he said, he said only to flatter the masses of his times, but how far removed is such an attitude from the character of those who seek to set forth the truth! But perhaps the man may be forgiven on account of the time and place in which he lived; and indeed he only proceeded in his books in a tentative way.
And as these arguments carry no evidence whatsoever, Ghazali says:
We want to show by all this that the philosophers cannot shake the conviction of their adversaries that the eternal Will is connected with temporal creation, by claiming its absurdity by the necessity of thought, and that therefore they do not distinguish themselves from the theologians, who make the same claim against the philosophical doctrines opposed to theirs. And out of this there is no issue.
I say:
When someone denies a truth of which it is absolutely certain that it is such-and-such, there exists no argument by which we can come to an understanding with him; for every argument is based on known premisses about which both adversaries agree. When each point advanced is denied by the adversary, discussion with him becomes impossible, but such people stand outside the pale of humanity and have to be educated. But for him who denies an evident truth, t because of a difficulty which presents itself to him there is a remedy, i.e. the solution of this difficulty. He who does not understand evident truth, because he is lacking in intelligence, cannot be taught anything, nor can he be educated. It is like trying to make the blind imagine colours or know their existence.
Ghazali
says:
The philosophers may object: This argument (that the present has been preceded by an infinite past) can be turned against you, for God before the creation of the world was able to create it, say, one year or two years before He did, and there is no limit to His power; but He seemed to have patience and did not create. Then He created. Now, the duration of His inactivity is either finite or infinite. If you say finite, the existence of the Creator becomes finite; if you say infinite, a duration in which there is an infinite number of possibilities receives its termination. We answer: Duration and time are, according to us, created, but we shall explain the real answer to this question when we reply to the second proof of the philosophers.
I say:
Most people who accept a temporal creation of the world believe time to have been created with it. Therefore his assertion that the duration of His inactivity was either limited or unlimited is untrue. For what has no beginning does not finish or end. And the opponent does not admit that the inactivity has any duration at all. What one has to ask them about the consequences of their theory is: Is it possible, when the creation of time is admitted, that the term of its beginning may lie beyond the real time in which we live? If they answer that it is not possible, they posit a limited extension beyond which the Creator cannot pass, and this is, in their view, shocking and absurd. If, however, they concede that its possible beginning may lie beyond the moment of its created term, it may further be asked if there may not lie another term beyond this second. If they answer in the affirmative-and they cannot do otherwise-it will be said: Then we shall have here a possible creation of an infinite number of durations, and you will be forced to admit-according to your argument about the spherical revolutions-that their termination is a condition for the real age which exists since them. If you say what is infinite does not finish, the arguments you use about the spherical revolutions against your opponents your opponents will use against you on the subject of the possibility of created durations. If it is objected that the difference between those two cases is that these infinite possibilities belong to extensions which do not become actual, whereas the spherical revolutions do become actual, the answer is that the possibilities of things belong to their necessary accidents and that it does not make any difference, according to the philosophers, if they precede these things or are simultaneous with them, for of necessity they are the dispositions of things. If, then, it is impossible that before the existence of the present spherical revolution there should have been infinite spherical revolutions, the existence of infinite possible revolutions is equally impossible. If one wants to avoid these consequences, one can say that the age of the world is a definite quantity and cannot be longer or shorter than it is, in conformity with the philosophical doctrine about the size of the world. Therefore these arguments are not stringent, and the safest way for him who accepts the temporal creation of the world is to regard time as of a definite extension and not to admit a possibility which precedes the possible; and to regard also the spatial extension of the world as finite. Only, spatial extension forms a simultaneous whole; not so time.
Ghazali expounds a certain kind of argument
attributed to the philosophers on this subject against the theologians when
they denied that the impossibility of delay in the Creator’s act after His
existence is known by primitive intuition:
How will you defend yourselves, theologians, against the philosophers, when they drop this argument, based on the necessity of thought, and prove the eternity of the world in this way, saying that times are equivalent so far as the possibility that the Divine Will should attach itself to them is concerned, for what differentiates a given time from an earlier or a later time? And it is not absurd to believe that the earlier or the later might be chosen when on the contrary you theologians say about white, black, movement, and rest that the white is realized through the eternal Will although its substrate accepts equally black and white. Why, then, does the eternal Will attach itself to the white rather than to the black, and what differentiates one of the two possibles from the other for connexion with the eternal Will? But we philosophers know by the necessity of thought that one thing does not distinguish itself from a similar except by a differentiating principle, for if not, it would be possible that the world should come into existence, having the possibility both of existing and of not existing, and that the side of existence, although it has the same possibility as the side of non-existence, should be differentiated without a differentiating principle. If you answer that the Will of God is the differentiating principle, then one has to inquire what differentiates the Will, i.e. the reason why it has been differentiated in such or such way. And if you answer: One does not inquire after the motives of the Eternal, well, let the world then be eternal, and let us not inquire after its Creator and its cause, since one does not inquire after the motives of the Eternal! If it is regarded as possible that the Eternal should differentiate one of the two possibles by chance, it will be an extreme absurdity to say that the world is differentiated in differentiated forms which might just as well be otherwise, and one might then say that this has happened by chance in the same way as you say that the Divine Will has differentiated one time rather than another or one form rather than another by chance. If you say that such a question is irrelevant, because it refers to anything God can will or decide, we answer that this question is quite relevant, for it concerns any time and is pertinent for our opponents to any decision God takes.
We answer: The world exists, in the way it exists, in its time, with its qualities, and in its space, by the Divine Will and will is a quality which has the faculty of differentiating one thing from another,’ and if it had not this faculty, power in itself would suffice But, since power is equally related to two contraries’ and a differentiating principle is needed to differentiate one thing from a similar, it is said that the Eternal possesses besides His power a quality which can differentiate between two similars. And to ask why will differentiates one of two similars is like asking why knowledge must comprehend the knowable, and the answer is that ‘knowledge’ is the term for a quality which has just this nature. And in the same way, ‘will’ is the term for a quality the nature or rather the essence of which is to differentiate one thing from another.
The philosophers may object: The assumption of a quality the nature of which is to differentiate one thing from a similar one is something incomprehensible, nay even contradictory, for ‘similar’ means not to be differentiated, and ‘differentiated’ means not similar. And it must not be believed that two blacks in two substrates are similar in every way, since the one is in one place and the other in another, and this causes a distinction; nor are two blacks at two times in one substrate absolutely similar, since they are separated in time, and how could they therefore be similar in every way? When we say of two blacks that they are similar, we mean that they are similar in blackness, in their special relation to it-not absolutely. Certainly, if the substrate and the time were one without any distinction, one could not speak any more of two blacks or of any duality at all. This proves that the term ‘Divine Will’ is derived from our will, and one does not imagine that through our will two similar things can be differentiated.’ On the contrary, if someone who is thirsty has before him two cups of water, similar in everything in respect to his aim, it will not be possible for him to take either of them. No, he can only take the one he thinks more beautiful or lighter or nearer to his right hand, if he is right-handed, or act from some such reason, hidden or known. Without this the differentiation of the one from the other cannot be imagined.
I say:
The
summary of what Ghazali relates in this section
of the proofs of the philosophers for the impossibility of a temporal
proceeding from an eternal agent is that in God there cannot be a will. The
philosophers could only arrive at this argument after granting to their
opponents that all opposites-opposites in time,b like anterior and
posterior, as well as those in quality, like white and black-are
equivalent in relation to the eternal Will. And also non-existence and
existence are, according to the theologians, equivalent in relation to the
Divine Will. And having granted their opponents this premiss, although they did
not acknowledge its truth, they said to them: It is of the nature of will that
it cannot give preponderance to one thing rather than to a similar one, except
through a differentiating principle and a cause which only exist in one of
these two similar things; if not, one of the two would happen by chance-and
the philosophers argued for the sake of discussion, as if they had conceded
that, if the Eternal had a will, a temporal could proceed from an eternal. As
the theologians were unable to give a satisfactory answer, they took refuge in
the theory that the eternal Will is a quality the nature of which is to
differentiate between two similar things, without there being for God a
differentiating principle which inclines Him to one of two similar acts; that
the eternal Will is thus a quality like warmth which gives heat or like
knowledge which comprehends the knowable. But their opponents, the philosophers,
answered: It is impossible that this should happen, for two similar things are
equivalent for the wilier, and his action can only attach itself to the one
rather than to the other through their being dissimilar, i.e. through one’s
having a quality the other has not. When, however, they are similar in every
way and when for God there is no differentiating principle at all, His will
will attach itself to both of them indifferently and, when this is the case-His
will being the cause of His act-the act will not attach itself to the one
rather than to the other, it will attach itself either to the two contrary
actions simultaneously or to neither of them at all, and both cases are absurd.
The philosophers, therefore, began their argument, as if they had it granted to
them that all things were equivalent in relation to the First Agent, and they
forced them to admit that there must be for God a differentiating principle
which precedes Him, which is absurd. When the theologians answered that will is
a quality the nature of which is to differentiate the similar from the similar,
in so far as it is similar, the philosophers objected that this is not
understood or meant by the idea of will. They therefore appear to reject the
principle which they granted them in the beginning.’ This is in short the
content of this section. It waves the argument from the original question to
the problem of the will; to shift one’s ground, however, is an act of
sophistry.
Ghazali answers in defence of the theological
doctrine of the Divine Will:
There are two objections: First, as to your affirmation that you cannot imagine this, do you know it by the necessity of thought or through deduction? You can claim neither the one nor the other. Your comparison with our will is a bad analogy, which resembles that employed on the question of God’s knowledge. Now God’s knowledge is different from ours in several ways which we acknowledge. Therefore it is not absurd to admit a difference in the will. Your affirmation is like saying that an essence existing neither outside nor inside the world, neither continuous with the world nor separated from it, cannot be understood, because we cannot understand this according to our human measure; the right answer is that it is the fault of your imagination, for rational proof has led the learned to accept its truth. How, then, will you refute those who say that rational proof has led to establishing in God a quality the nature of which is to differentiate between two similar things? And, if the word ‘will’ does not apply, call it by another name, for let us not quibble about words! We only use the term ‘will’ by permission of the Divine Law. It may be objected that by its conventional meaning ‘will’ designates that which has desire, and God has no desire, but we are concerned here with a question not of words but of fact. Besides, we do not even with respect to our human will concede that this cannot be imagined. Suppose two similar dates in front of a man who has a strong desire for them, but who is unable to take them both. Surely he will take one of them through a quality in him the nature of which is to differentiate between two similar things. All the distinguishing qualities you have mentioned, like beauty or nearness or facility in taking, we can assume to be absent, but still the possibility of the taking remains. You can choose between two answers: either you merely say that an equivalence in respect to his desire cannot be imagined-but this is a silly answer, for to assume it is indeed possible or you say that if an equivalence is assumed, the man will remain for ever hungry and perplexed, looking at the dates without taking one of them, and without a power to choose or to will, distinct from his desire. And this again is one of those absurdities which are recognized by the necessity of thought. Everyone, therefore, who studies, in the human and the divine, the real working of the act of choice, must necessarily admit a quality the nature of which is to differentiate between two similar things.
I say:
This
objection can be summarized in two parts: In the first Ghazali
concedes that the human will is such that it is unable to differentiate one
thing from a similar one, in so far as it is similar, but that a rational proof
forces us to accept the existence of such a quality in the First Agent. To
believe that such a quality cannot exist would be like believing that there
cannot exist a being who is neither inside nor outside the world. According to
this reasoning, will, which is attributed to the First Agent and to man, is
predicated in an equivocal way, like knowledge and other qualities which exist
in the Eternal in a different way from that in which they exist in the
temporal, and it is only through the prescription of the Divine Law that we
speak of the Divine Will. It is clear that this objection cannot have anything
more than a dialectical value. For a proof that could demonstrate the existence
of such a quality, i.e. a principle determining the existence of one thing
rather than that of a similar, would have to assume things willed that are
similar; things willed are, however, not similar, but on the contrary opposite,
for all opposites can be reduced to the opposition of being and not being,
which is the extreme form of opposition; and opposition is the contrary of
similarity. The assumption of the theologians that the things to which the will
attaches itself are similar is a false one, and we shall speak of it later. If
they say: we affirm only that they are similar in relation to the First Wilier,
who in His holiness is too exalted to possess desires, and it is through
desires that two similar things are actually differentiated, we answer: as to
the desires whose realization contributes to the perfection of the essence of
the wilier, as happens with our desires, through which our will attaches itself
to the things willed-those desires are impossible in God, for the will
which acts in this way is a longing for perfection when there is an
imperfection in the essence of the wilier; but as to the desires which belong
to the essence of the things willed, nothing new comes to the wilier from their
realization. It comes exclusively to the thing willed, for instance, when a
thing passes into existence from non-existence, for it cannot be doubted
that existence is better for it than non-existence. It is in this second
way that the Primal Will is related to the existing things, for it chooses for
them eternally the better of two opposites, and this essentially and primally.
This is the first part of the objection contained in this argument.
In
the second part he no longer concedes that this quality cannot exist in the
human will, but tries to prove that there is also in us, in the face of similar
things, a will which distinguishes one from the other; of this he gives
examples. For instance, it is assumed that in front of a man there are two
dates, similar in every way, and it is supposed that he cannot take them both
at the same time. It is supposed that no special attraction need be imagined
for him in either of them, and that nevertheless he will of necessity
distinguish one of them by taking it. But this is an error. For, when one
supposes such a thing, and a wilier whom necessity prompts to eat or to take
the date, then it is by no means a matter of distinguishing between two similar
things when, in this condition, he takes one of the two dates. It is nothing
but the admission of an equivalence of two similar things; for whichever of the
two dates he may take, his aim will be attained and his desire satisfied. His
will attaches itself therefore merely to the distinction between the fact of
taking one of them and the fact of leaving them altogether; it attaches itself
by no means to the act of taking one definite date and distinguishing this act
from the act of leaving the other (that is to say, when it is assumed that the
desires for the two are equal); he does not prefer the act of taking the one to
the act of taking the other, but he prefers the act of taking one of the two,
whichever it may be, and he gives a preference to the act of taking over the
act of leaving.’ This is self-evident. For distinguishing one from the
other means giving a preference to the one over the other, and one cannot give
a preponderance to one of two similar things in so far as it is similar to the
other-although in their existence as individuals they are not similar
since each of two individuals is different from the other by reason of a
quality exclusive to it. If, therefore, we assume that the will attaches itself
to that special character of one of them, then it can be imagined that the will
attaches to the.-one rather than the other because of the element of
difference existing in both. But then the will does not attach itself to two
similar objects, in so far as they are similar. This is, in short, the meaning
of Ghazali’s first objection. Then he gives his
second objection against those who deny the existence of a quality,
distinguishing two similar objects from one another.
Ghazali
says:
The second objection is that we say: You in your system also are unable to do without a principle differentiating between two equals, for the world exists in virtue of a cause which has produced it in its peculiar shape out of a number of possible distinct shapes which are equivalent; why, then, has this cause differentiated some of them? If to distinguish two similar things is impossible, it is irrelevant whether this concerns the act of God, natural causality, or the logical necessity of ideas. Perhaps you will say: the universal order of the world could not be different from what it is; if the world were smaller or bigger than it actually is, this order would not be perfect, and the same may be asserted of the number of spheres and of stars. And perhaps you will say: The big differs from the small and the many from the few, in so far as they are the object of the will, and therefore they are not similar but different; but human power is too feeble to perceive the modes of Divine Wisdom in its determination of the measures and qualities of things; only in some of them can His wisdom be perceived, as in the obliquity of the ecliptic in relation to the equator, and in the wise contrivance of the apogee and the eccentric sphere.’ In most cases, however, the secret is not revealed, but the differences are known, and it is not impossible that a thing should be distinguished from another, because the order of the world depends on it; but certainly the times are absolutely indifferent in relation to the world’s possibility and its order, and it cannot be claimed that, if the world were created one moment later or earlier, this order could not be imagined; and this indifference is known by the necessity of thought.-But then we answer: Although we can employ the same reasoning against your argument in the matter of different times, for it might be said that God created the world at the time most propitious for its creation, we shall not limit ourselves to this refutation, but shall assume, according to your own principle, a differentiation in two points about which there can be no disagreement: (1) the difference in the direction of spherical movement; (2) the definite place of the poles in relation to the ecliptic in spherical movement. The proof of the statement relating to the poles is that heaven is a globe, moving on two poles, as on two immovable points, whereas the globe of heaven is homogeneous and simple, especially the highest sphere, the ninth, which possesses no stars at all, and these two spheres move on two poles, the north and the south. We now say: of all the opposite points, which are infinite, according to you philosophers, there is no pair one could not imagine as poles. Why then have the two points of the north and south pole been fixed upon as poles and as immovable; and why does the ecliptic not pass through these two poles, so that the poles would become the opposite points of the ecliptic? And if wisdom is shown in the size and shape of heaven, what then distinguishes the place of the poles from others, so that they are fixed upon to serve as poles, to the exclusion of all the other parts and points? And yet all the points are similar, and all parts of the globe are equivalent. And to this there is no answer.
One might say: Perhaps the spot in which the point of the poles is, is distinguished from other points by a special quality, in relation to its being the place of the poles and to its being at rest, for it does not seem to change its place or space or position or whatever one wishes to call it; and all the other spots of the sphere by turning change their position in relation to the earth and the other spheres and only the poles are at rest; perhaps this spot was more apt to be at rest than the others. We answer: If you say so, you explain the fact through a natural differentiation of the parts of the first sphere; the sphere, then, ceases to be homogeneous, and this is in contradiction with your principle, for one of the proofs by which you prove the necessity of the globular shape of heaven, is that its nature is simple, homogeneous, and without differentiation, and the simplest shape is the globe; for the quadrangle and the hexagon and other figures demand a salience and a differentiation of the angles,’ and this happens only when its simple nature is added to. But although this supposition of yours is in contradiction with your own theory, it does not break the strength of your opponents’ argument; the question about this special quality still holds good, namely, can those other parts accept this quality or not? If the answer is in the affirmative, why then is this quality limited to a few only of those homogeneous parts? If the answer is negative, we reply: the other parts, in so far as they constitute bodies, receiving the form of bodies, are homogeneous of necessity, and there is no justification for attributing this special quality to this spot exclusively on account of its being a part of a body and a part of heaven, for the other parts of heaven participate in this qualification. Therefore its differentiation must rest on a decision by God, or on a quality whose nature consists in differentiating between two similars. Therefore, just as among philosophers the theory is upheld that all times are equivalent in regard to the creation of the world, their opponents are justified in claiming that the parts of heaven are equivalent for the reception of the quality through which stability in position becomes more appropriate than a change of position. And out of this there is no issue.
I say:
This
means in brief that the philosophers must acknowledge that there is a quality
in the Creator of the world which differentiates between two similars, for it
seems that the world might have had another shape and another quantity than it
actually has, for it might have been bigger or smaller. Those different possibilities
are, therefore, equivalent in regard to the determination of the existence of
the world. On the other hand, if the philosophers say that the world can have
only one special shape, the special quantity of its bodies and the special
number of them it actually has, and that this equivalence of possibilities can
only be imagined in relation to the times of temporal creation-since for
God no moment is more suitable than another for its creation-they may be
told that it is possible to answer this by saying that the creation of the
world happened at its most propitious moment. But we, the theologians say, want
to show the philosophers two equivalent things of which they cannot affirm that
there exists any difference between them; the first is the particular direction
of the spherical movement and the second the particular position of the poles,
relative to the spheres; for any pair whatever of opposite points, united by a
line which passes through the centre of the sphere, might constitute the poles.
But the differentiation of these two points, exclusive of all other points
which might just as well be the poles of this identical sphere cannot happen
except by a quality differentiating between two similar objects. If the
philosophers assert that it is not true that any other place on the sphere
might be the seat for these poles, they will be told: such an assertion implies
that the parts of the spheres are not homogeneous and yet you have often said
that the sphere is of a simple nature and therefore has a simple form, viz. the
spherical. And again, if the philosophers affirm that there are spots on the
sphere which are not homogeneous, it will be asked how these spots came to be
of a heterogeneous nature; is it because they are a body or because they are a
celestial body? But the absence of homogeneity cannot be explained in this way.
Therefore-Ghazali says just as among
philosophers the theory is upheld that all times are equivalent in regard to
the creation of the world, the theologians are justified in claiming that the
parts of heaven are equivalent in regard to their serving as poles, and that
the poles do not seem differentiated from the other points through a special
position or through their being in an immovable place, exclusive of all other
places.
This
then in short is the objection; it is, however, a rhetorical one, for many
things which by demonstration can be found to be necessary seem at first sight
merely possible.’ The philosophers’ answer is that they assert that they have
proved that the world is composed of five bodies: a body neither heavy nor
light, i.e. the revolving spherical body of heaven and four other bodies, two
of which are earth, absolutely heavy, which is the centre of the revolving
spherical body, and fire, absolutely light, which is seated in the extremity of
the revolving sphere; nearest to earth is water, which is heavy relatively to
air, light relatively to earth; next to water comes air, which is light
relatively to water, heavy relatively to fire. The reason why earth is absolutely
heavy is that it is farthest away from the circular movement, and therefore it
is the fixed centre of the revolving body; the reason why fire is absolutely
light is that it is nearest to the revolving sphere; the intermediate bodies
are both heavy and light, because they are in the middle between the two
extremes, i.e. the farthest point and the nearest. If there were not a
revolving body, surely there would be neither heavy nor light by nature, and
neither high nor low by nature, and this whether absolutely or relatively; and
the bodies would not differ by nature in the way in which, for instance, earth
moves by nature to its specific place and fire moves by nature to another
place, and equally so the intermediary bodies. And the world is only finite,
because of the spherical body, and this because of the essential and natural
finiteness of the spherical body, as one single plane circumscribes it.’
Rectilinear bodies are not essentially finite, as they allow of an increase and
decrease; they are only finite because they are in the middle of a body that
admits neither increase nor decrease, and is therefore essentially finite. And,
therefore, the body circumscribing the world cannot but be spherical, as
otherwise the bodies would either have to end in other bodies, and we should
have an infinite regress, or they would end in empty space, and the
impossibility of both suppositions has been demonstrated. He who understands
this knows that every possible world imaginable can only consist of these bodies,
and that bodies have to be either circular-and then they are neither
heavy nor light-or rectilinear-and then they are either heavy or
light, i.e. either fire or earth or the intermediate bodies; that these bodies
have to be either revolving, or surrounded by a revolving periphery, for each
body either moves from, towards, or round the centre; that by the movements of
the heavenly bodies to the right and to the left all bodies are constituted and
all that is produced from opposites is generated; and that through these
movements the individuals of these four bodies never cease being in a continual
production and corruption. Indeed, if a single one of these movements should
cease, the order and proportion of this universe would disappear, for it is
clear that this order must necessarily depend on the actual number of these
movements-for if this were smaller or greater, either the order would be
disturbed, or there would be another order-and that the number of these
movements is as it is, either through its necessity for the existence of this
sublunary world, or because it is the best .
Do
not ask here for a proof for all this, but if you are interested in science,
look for its proof, where you can find it. Here, however, listen to theories
which are more convincing than those of the theologians and which, even if they
do not bring you complete proof, will give your mind an inclination to lead you
to proof through scientific speculation. You should imagine that each heavenly
sphere is a living being, in so far as it possesses a body of a definite
measure and shape and moves itself in definite directions, not at random.
Anything of this nature is necessarily a living being; i.e. when we see a body
of a definite quality and quantity move itself in space, in a definite
direction, not at random, through its own power, not through an exterior cause,
and move in opposite directions at the same time, we are absolutely sure that
it is a living being, and we said only ‘not through an exterior cause’ because
iron moves towards a magnet when the magnet is brought to it from the outside-and
besides, iron moves to a magnet from any direction whatever., The heavenly
bodies, therefore, possess places which are poles by nature, and these bodies
cannot have their poles in other places, just as earthly animals have
particular organs in particular parts of their bodies for particular actions,
and cannot have them in other places, e.g. the organs of locomotion, which are
located in definite parts. The poles represent the organs of locomotion in
animals of spherical form, and the only difference in this respect between
spherical and non-spherical animals is that in the latter these organs
differ in both shape and power, whereas in the former they only differ in
power. For this reason it has been thought on first sight that they do not
differ at all, and that the poles could be in any two points on the sphere. And
just as it would be ridiculous to say that a certain movement in a certain
species of earthly animal could be in any part whatever of its body, or in that
part where it is in another species, because this movement has been localized
in each species in the place where it conforms most to its nature, or in the
only place where this animal can perform the movement, so it stands with the
differentiation in the heavenly bodies for the place of their poles. For the
heavenly bodies are not one species and numerically many, but they form a
plurality in species, like the plurality of different individuals of animals
where there is only one individual in the species.
Exactly
the same answer can be given to the question why the heavens move in different
directions: that, because they are animals, they must move in definite
directions, like right and left, before and behind, which are directions
determined by the movements of animals, and the only difference between the
movements of earthly animals and those of heavenly bodies is that in the
different animals these movements are different in shape and in power, whereas
in the heavenly animals they only differ in power. And it is for this reason
that Aristotle thinks that heaven possesses the directions of right and left,
before and behind, high and low. The diversity of the heavenly bodies in the
direction of their movements rests on their diversity of species, and the fact
that this difference in the directions of their movements forms the specific
differentia of their species is something proper to them. Imagine the first
heaven as one identical animal whose nature obliges it-either by
necessity or because it is for the best-to move with all its parts in one
movement from east to west. The other spheres are obliged by their nature to
have the opposite movement. The direction which the body of the universe is
compelled to follow through its nature is the best one, because its body is the
best of bodies and the best among the moving bodies must also have the best
direction. All this is explained here in this tentative way, but is proved
apodictically in its proper place. This is also the manifest sense of the
Divine Words, ‘There is no changing the words of God’, and ‘There is no
altering the creation of God’. If you want to be an educated man, proceeding by
proof, you should look for the proof of this in its proper place.
Now
if you have understood all this, it will not be difficult for you to see the
faults in Ghazali’s arguments here about the
equivalence of the two opposite movements in relation to each heavenly body and
to the sublunary world. On first thoughts it might be imagined that the movement
from east to west might also belong to other spheres besides the first, and
that the first sphere might equally well move from west to east. You might as
well say that the crab could be imagined as having the same direction of
movement as man. But, as a matter of fact, such a thought will not occur to you
about men and crabs, because of their difference in shape, whereas it might
occur to you about the heavenly spheres, since they agree in shape. He who
contemplates a product of art does not perceive its wisdom if he does not
perceive the wisdom of the intention embodied in it, and the effect intended.
And if he does not understand its wisdom, he may well imagine that this object
might have any form, any quantity, any configuration of its parts, and any composition
whatever. This is the case with the theologians in regard to the body of the
heavens, but all such opinions are superficial. He who has such beliefs about
products of art understands neither the work nor the artist, and this holds
also in respect of the works of God’s creation. Understand this principle, and
do not judge the works of God’s creation hastily and superficially-so
that you may not become one of those about whom the Qur’an says: ‘Say, shall we
inform you of those who lose most by their works, those who erred in their
endeavour after the life of this world and who think they are doing good
deeds?’ May God make us perspicacious and lift from us the veils of ignorance;
indeed He is the bounteous, the generous! To contemplate the various actions of
the heavenly bodies is like contemplating the kingdom of heaven, which Abraham
contemplated, according to the words of the Qur’an: ‘Thus did we show Abraham
the kingdom of heaven and of the earth, that he should be of those who are
sure.’ And let us now relate Ghazali’s argument
about the movements.
Ghazali
says:
The second point in this argument concerns the special direction of the movement of the spheres which move partially from east to west, partially in the opposite direction, whereas the equivalence of the directions in relation to their cause is exactly the same as the equivalence of the times. If it is said: If the universe revolved in only one direction, there would never be a difference in the configuration of the stars, and such relations of the stars as their being in trine, in sextile, and in conjunction would, never arise, but the universe would remain in one unique position without any change; the difference of these relations, however, is the principle of all production in the world-we answer: Our argument does not concern the difference in direction of movement; no, we concede that the highest sphere moves from east to west and the spheres beneath it in the opposite direction, but everything that happens in this way would happen equally if the reverse took place, i.e. if the highest sphere moved from west to east and the lower spheres in the opposite direction. For all the same differences in configuration would arise just as well. Granted that these movements are circular and in opposite directions, both directions are equivalent; why then is the one distinguished from the other, which is similar to it?’ If it is said: as the two directions are opposed and contrary, how can they be similar?-we answer: this is like saying ‘since before and after are opposed in the existing world, how could it be claimed that they are equivalent?’ Still, it is asserted by you philosophers that the equivalence of times, so far as the possibility of their realization and any purpose one might imagine in their realization is concerned, is an evident fact. Now, we regard it as equally evident that spaces, positions, situations, and directions are equivalent so far as concerns their receiving movement and any purpose that might be connected with it. If therefore the philosophers are allowed to claim that notwithstanding this equivalence they are different, their opponents are fully justified in claiming the same in regard to the times.
I say:
From
what I have said previously, the speciousness of this argument and the way in
which it has to be answered will not be obscure to you. All this is the work of
one who does not understand the exalted natures of the heavenly bodies and
their acts of wisdom for the sake of which they have been created, and who
compares God’s knowledge with the knowledge of ignorant man.
Ghazali
says:
If it is said: as the two directions are opposed and contrary, how can they be similar?-we answer: this is like saying ‘since before and after in the existing world are opposed, how could it be claimed that they are equivalent?’ Still, it is asserted by you philosophers that the equivalence of times so far as the possibility of their realization, and any purpose one might imagine in their realization is concerned, is an evident fact. Now, we regard it as equally evident that spaces, positions, situations, and directions are equivalent so far as concerns their receiving the movement and any purpose that might be connected with it.
I say:
The
falsehood of this is self-evident. Even if one should admit that the
possibilities of man’s existence and non-existence are equivalent in the
matter out of which he has been created, and that this is a proof for the
existence of a determining principle which prefers his existence to his non-existence,
still it cannot be imagined that the possibilities of seeing and not seeing are
equivalent in the eye. Thus no one can claim that the opposite directions are
equivalent, although he may claim that the substratum for both is indifferent,
and that therefore out of both directions similar actions result. And the same
holds good for before and after: they are not equivalent, in so far as this
event is earlier and that event later; they can only be claimed to be equivalent
so far as their possibility of existence is concerned. But the whole assumption
is wrong: for essential opposites also need essentially opposite substrata and
a unique substratum giving rise to opposite acts at one and the same time is an
impossibility. The philosophers do not believe that the possibilities of a
thing’s existence and of its non-existence are equivalent at one and the
same time; no, the time of the possibility of its existence is different from
the time of the possibility of its non-existence, time for them is the
condition for the production of what is produced, and for the corruption of
what perishes. If the time for the possibility of the existence of a thing and
the time for the possibility of its non-existence were the same, that is
to say in its proximate matter, its existence would be vitiated, because of the
possibility of its non-existence, and the possibility of its existence
and of its non-existence would be dependent only on the agent, not on the
substratum.
Thus
he who tries to prove the existence of an agent in this way gives only
persuasive, dialectical arguments, not apodictic proof. It is believed that
Farabi and Avicenna followed this line to establish that every act must have an
agent, but it is not a proof of the ancient philosophers, and both of them
merely took it over from the theologians of our religion. In relation, however,
to the temporal creation of the world-for him who believes in it-before
and after cannot even be imagined, for before and after in time can only be
imagined in relation to the present moment, and as, according to the
theologians, there was before the creation of the world no time, how could
there be imagined something preceding the moment when the world was created? A
definite moment cannot be assigned for the creation of the world, for either
time did not exist before it, or there was an infinite time, and in neither
case could a definite time be fixed to which the Divine could attach itself.
Therefore it would be more suitable to call this book ‘Incoherence’ without
qualification rather than ‘The Incoherence of the Philosophers’, for the only
profit it gives the reader is to make him incoherent.
Ghazali
says:
If, therefore, the philosophers are allowed to claim that, notwithstanding this equivalence, they are different, their opponents are fully justified in claiming the same in regard to times.
I say:
He
wants to say: If the philosophers are justified in claiming a difference in the
direction of movement, the theologians have the right to assert a difference in
times, notwithstanding their belief in their equivalence. This is only a verbal
argument, and does not refer to the facts themselves, even if one admits an
analogy between the opposite directions and the different times, but this is often
objected to, because there is no analogy between this difference in times and
directions. Our adversary, however, is forced to admit that there is an analogy
between them, because they are both claimed to be different, and both to be
equivalent! These, therefore, are one and all only dialectical arguments.
Ghazali says:
The second objection against the basis of their argument is that the philosophers are told: ‘You regard the creation of a temporal being by an eternal as impossible, but you have to acknowledge it too, for there are new events happening in the world and they have causes. It is absurd to think that these events lead to other events ad infinitum, and no intelligent person can believe such a thing. If such a thing were possible, you need not acknowledge a creator and establish a necessary being on whom possible existences depend. If, however, there is a limit for those events in which their sequence ends, this limit will be the eternal and then indubitably you too acknowledge the principle that a temporal can proceed from an eternal being.’
I say:
If
the philosophers had introduced the eternal being into reality from the side of
the temporal by this kind of argument, i.e. if they had admitted that the
temporal, in so far as temporal, proceeds from an eternal being, there would be
no possibility of their avoiding the difficulty in this problem. But you must
understand that the philosophers permit the existence of a temporal which comes
out of a temporal being ad infinitum in
an accidental way, when this is repeated in a limited and finite matter-when,
for instance, the corruption of one of two things becomes the necessary
condition for the existence of the other. For instance, according to the
philosophers it is necessary that man should be produced from man on condition
that the anterior man perishes so as to become the matter for the production of
a third. For instance, we must imagine two men of whom the first produces the
second from the matter of a man who perishes; when the second becomes a man
himself, the first perishes, then the second man produces a third man out of
the matter of the first, and then the second perishes and the third produces
out of his matter a fourth, and so we can imagine in two matters an activity
continuing ad infinitum, without any
impossibility arising. And this happens as long as the agent lasts, for if this
agent has neither beginning nor end for his existence, the activity has neither
beginning nor end for its existence, as it has been explained before. And in
the same way you may imagine this happening in them in the past: When a man
exists, there must before him have been a man who produced him and a man who
perished, and before this second man a man who produced him and a man who
perished, for everything that is produced in this way is, when it depends on an
eternal agent, of a circular nature in which no actual totality can be reached.
If, on the other hand, a man were produced from another man out of infinite
matters, or there were an infinite addition of them, there would be an
impossibility, for then there could arise an infinite matter and there could be
an infinite whole. For if a finite whole existed to which things were added ad
infinitum without any corruption
taking place in it, an infinite whole could come into existence, as Aristotle
proved in his Physics. For this reason the ancients introduce an eternal
absolutely unchanging being, having in mind not temporal beings, proceeding
from him in so far as they are temporal, but beings proceeding from him as being
eternal generically, and they hold that this infinite series is the necessary
consequence of an eternal agent, for the temporal needs for its own existence
only a temporal cause. Now there are two reasons why the ancients introduce the
existence of an eternal numerically unique being which does not suffer any
change. The first is that they discovered that this revolving being is eternal,
for they discovered that the present individual is produced through the
corruption of its predecessor and that the corruption of this previous
individual implies the production of the one that follows it, and that it is
necessary that this everlasting change should proceed from an eternal mover and
an eternal moved body, which does not change in its substance, but which
changes only in place so far as concerns its parts, and approaches certain of
the transitory things and recedes from certain of them, and this is the cause
of the corruption of one half of them and the production of the other half. And
this heavenly body is the being that changes in place only, not in any of the
other kinds of change, and is through its temporal activities the cause of all
things temporal; and because of the continuity of its activities which have
neither beginning nor end, it proceeds from a cause which has neither beginning
nor end. The second reason why they introduce an eternal being absolutely
without body and matter is that they found that all the kinds of movement
depend on spatial movement, and that spatial movement depends on a being moved
essentially by a prime mover, absolutely unmoved, both essentially and
accidentally, for otherwise there would exist at the same time an infinite
number of moved movers, and this is impossible. And it is necessary that this
first mover should be eternal, or else it would not be the first. Every
movement, therefore, depends on this mover and its setting in motion
essentially, not accidentally. And this mover exists simultaneously with each
thing moved, at the time of its motion, for a mover existing before the thing
moved-such as a man producing a man-sets only in motion
accidentally, not essentially; but the mover who is the condition of man’s
existence from the beginning of his production till its end, or rather from the
beginning of his existence till its end, is the prime mover. And likewise his
existence is the condition for the existence of all beings and the preservation-
of heaven and earth and all that is between them. All this is not proved here
apodictically, but only in the way we follow here and which is in any case more
plausible for an impartial reader than the arguments of our opponents.
If
this is clear to you, you certainly are in no need of the subterfuge by which Ghazali in his argument against the philosophers
tries to conciliate them with their adversaries in this matter; indeed these
artifices will not do, for if you have not understood how the philosophers
introduce an eternal being into reality, you have not understood how they
settle the difficulty of the rise of the temporal out of the eternal; they do
that, as we said, either through the medium of a being eternal in its essence
but generable and corruptible in its particular movements, not, however, in its
universal circular movement, or through the medium of what is generically
eternal-i.e. has neither beginning nor end-in its acts.
Ghazali answers in the name of the philosophers:
The philosophers may say, ‘we do not consider it impossible that any temporal being, whatever it may be, should proceed from an eternal being, but we regard it as impossible that the first temporal should proceed from the eternal, as the mode of its procession does not differ from that which precedes it, either in a greater inclination towards existence or through the presence of some particular time, or through an instrument, condition, nature, accident, or any cause whatever which might produce a new mode. If this therefore is not the first temporal, it will be possible that it should proceed from the eternal, when another thing proceeds from it, because of the disposition of the receiving substratum, or because the time was propitious or for any other reason.
Having
given this reply on the part of the philosophers, Ghazali
answers it:
This question about the actualization of the disposition, whether of the time and of any new condition which arises in it, still holds good, and we must either come to an infinite regress or arrive at an eternal being out of which a first temporal being proceeds.
I say:
This question is the same question all over again as he asked the philosophers first,’ and this is the same kind of conclusion as he made them draw then, namely that a temporal proceeds from an eternal, and having given as their answer something which does not correspond with the question, i.e. that it is possible that a temporal being should proceed from the Eternal without there being a first temporal being, he turns the same question against them again. The correct answer to this question was given above: the temporal proceeds from the First Eternal, not in so far as it is temporal but in so far as it is eternal, i.e. through being eternal generically, though temporal in its parts. For according to the philosophers an eternal being out of which a temporal being proceeds essentially’ is not the First Eternal, but its acts, according to them, depend on the First Eternal; i.e. the actualization of the condition for activity of the eternal, which is not the First Eternal, depends on the First Eternal in the same way as the temporal products depend on the First Eternal and this is a dependence based on the universal, not on individuals.
After
this Ghazali introduces an answer of the
philosophers, in one of the forms in which this theory can be represented,
which amounts to this: A temporal being proceeding from an eternal can only be
represented by means of a circular movement which resembles the eternal by not
having beginning or end and which resembles the temporal in so far as each part
of it is transient, so that this movement through the generation of its parts
is the principle of temporal things, and through the eternity of its totality
the activity of the eternal.
Then
Ghazali argues against this view, according to
which in the opinion of the philosophers the temporal proceeds from the First
Eternal, and says to them:
Is this circular movement temporal or eternal? If it is eternal, how does it become the principle for temporal things? And if it is temporal, it will need another temporal being and we shall have an infinite regress. And when you say that it partially resembles the eternal, partially the temporal, for it resembles the eternal in so far as it is permanent and the temporal in so far as it arises anew, we answer: Is it the principle of temporal things, because of its permanence, or because of its arising anew? In the former case, how can a temporal proceed from something because of its permanence? And in the latter case, what arises anew will need a cause for its arising anew, and we have an infinite regress.
I say:
This argument is sophistical. The temporal does not proceed
from it in so far as it is eternal, but in so far as it is temporal; it does
not need, however, for its arising anew a cause arising anew, for its arising
anew is not a new fact, but is an eternal act, i.e. an act without
o beginning
or end. Therefore its agent must be an eternal agent, for an eternal act has an
eternal agent, and a temporal act a temporal agent. Only through the eternal
element in it can it be understood that movement has neither beginning nor end,
and this is meant by its permanence, for movement itself is not permanent, but
changing.
And since Ghazali knew this, he said:
In order to elude this consequence the philosophers have a kind of artifice which we will expose briefly.
Ghazali says:
They assert that he who affirms that the world is posterior to God and God prior to the world cannot mean anything but that He is prior not temporally but essentially like the natural priority of one to two, although they can exist together in temporal existence, or like the priority of cause to effect, for instance the priority of the movement of a man to the movement of his shadow which follows him, or the movement of the hand to the movement of the ring, or the movement of the hand in the water to the movement of the water, for all these things are simultaneous, but the one is cause, the other effect, for it is said that the shadow moves through the movement of the man and the water through the hand in the water, and the reverse is not said although they are simultaneous. If this is what you mean by saying that God is prior to the world, then it follows that they must both either be temporal or eternal, for it is absurd that the one should be temporal and the other eternal. If it is meant that God is prior to the world and to time, not essentially, but temporally, then there was, before the existence of the world and of time, a time in which the world was non-existent, since non-existence preceded the world and God preceded it during a long duration which had a final term but no initial one, and then there was before time an infinite time, which is self-contradictory. Therefore the assertion that time had a beginning is absurd. And if time-which is the expression of the measure of movement -is eternal, movement must be eternal. And the necessity of the eternity of movement implies the necessity of the eternity of the thing in motion, through the duration of which time endures.
I say:
The
mode of their reasoning which he reproduces does not constitute a proof. It
amounts to saying that the Creator, if He is prior to the world, must either be
prior not in time, but in causation, like the priority of a man to his shadow,
or prior in time, like a builder to a wall. If He is prior in the same way as
the man is prior to his shadow, and if the Creator is eternal, then the world
too is eternal. But if He is prior in time, then He must precede the world by a
time which has no beginning, and time will be eternal, for if there is a time
before the actual, its starting-point cannot be imagined. And if time is
eternal, movement too is eternal, for time cannot be understood without motion.
And if motion is eternal, the thing in motion will be eternal, and its mover
will necessarily be eternal too. But this proof is unsound, for it is not of
the nature of the Creator to be in time, whereas it belongs to the nature of
the world to be so; and for this very reason it is not true that He is either
simultaneous with it or prior to it in time or in causation.
Ghazali
says
The objection to this is: Time is generated and created, and before it there was no time at all. The meaning of our words that God is prior to the world and to time is: He existed without the world and without time, then He existed and with Him there was the world and there was time. And the meaning of our words that He existed without the world is: the existence of the essence of the Creator and the non-existence of the essence of the world, and nothing else. And the meaning of our words that He existed and with Him there was the world is: the existence of the two essences, and nothing else. And the meaning of priority: the uniqueness of His existence, and nothing else. And the world is like a singular person; if we should say, for instance: God existed without Jesus, then He existed with Jesus-these words contain nothing but, first, the existence of an essence and the non-existence of an essence, then, the existence of two essences, and there is no need to assume here a third essence, namely time, although imagination cannot desist from assuming it. But we should not heed the errors of the imagination.
I say:
These
words are erroneous and mistaken, for we have already proved that there are two
kinds of existence: one in the nature of which there is motion and which cannot
be separated from time; the other in the nature of which there is no motion and
which is eternal and cannot be described in terms of time. The first is known
by the senses and by reason; the existence of the second-in the nature of
which there is neither motion nor change-is known by proof to everyone
who acknowledges that each motion needs a mover and each effect a cause, and
that the causes which move each other do not regress infinitely, but end in a
first cause which is absolutely unmoved. And it has also been established that
the entity in the nature of which there is no movement is the cause of the
entity in the nature of which there is movement. And it has been proved also that
the entity in the nature of which there is motion cannot be separated from
time, and that the entity in the nature of which there is no movement is
entirely free from time. Therefore the priority of the one entity over the
other is based neither on a priority in time, nor on the priority of that kind
of cause and effect, which belongs to the nature of things in motion, like the
priority of a man to his shadow. For this reason anyone who compares the
priority of the unmoved being to the thing in motion to the priority existing
between two things in motion is in error; since it is only true of each one in
pairs of moving things that, when it is brought in relation to the other, it is
either simultaneous with it or prior or posterior in time to it. It is the
later philosophers of Islam who made this mistake, since they enjoyed but
slight comprehension of the doctrine of the ancients. So the priority of this
one being to the other is the priority of the unchanging timeless existence to
the changing existence which is in time, and this is an altogether different
type of priority. It is therefore not true of these existences that they are
simultaneous, or that the one precedes the other, and Ghazali’s
observation that the priority of the Creator to the world is not a temporal
priority is true. But the posteriority of the world to the Creator, since He
does not precede the world in time, can only be understood as the posteriority
of effect to cause,’ for posteriority and priority are opposites which are
necessarily in one genus, as has been shown in the sciences.’ Since therefore
this priority is not in time, the posteriority also cannot be in time, and we
have the same difficulty all over again: how can the effect be delayed after
the cause when the conditions of acting are fulfilled? The philosophers,
however, since they do not recognize a beginning in the totality of this
existence in moti/n, are not touched by this difficulty, and it is possible for
them to indicate in what way the temporal beings proceed from the eternal. One
of their proofs that existence in motion has no beginning, and that in its
totality it does not start, is that, when it is assumed to start, it is assumed
to exist before its existence, for to start is a movement, and movement is of
necessity in the thing in motion, equally whether the movement is regarded as
taking place in time or at an instants Another proof is that everything that
becomes has the potentiality of becoming before it actually becomes, although
the theologians deny this (a discussion with them on this point will follow);
now potentiality is a necessary attribute of being in motion, and it follows
necessarily that, if it were assumed to become, it would exist before its
existence. What we have here are only dialectical arguments; they have,
however, a much greater plausibility than what the theologians advance.
As for Ghazali’s words:
If we should say, for instance, that God existed without Jesus, and then He existed with Jesus, these words contain nothing but, first, the existence of an essence and the non-existence of an essence, then, the existence of two essences, and there is no need to assume here a third essence, namely time.
I say:
This
is true, provided that Jesus’ posteriority is not regarded as an essential
temporal posteriority, but, if there is a posteriority, it is an accidental
posteriority, for time precedes this posterior entity, i.e. it is a necessity
of Jesus’ existence that time should precede Him and that His existence should
have begun, but the world is not subject to such a necessity, except in so far
as it is a part of a moving existence beyond which time extends in two
directions,’ as happens to Jesus and other transitory individuals.z Nothing of
this is proved here; here it is simply explained that the objection is not
valid. In addition, what he says afterwards of the proofs of the philosophers
is untrue.
Answering
in the name of the philosophers, Ghazali says:
One might say that our expression ‘God existed without the world’ means a third thing, besides the existence of one being and the non-existence of another, because, if we should suppose that in the future God should exist without the world, there would be in the future the existence of one being and the non-existence of another, still it would not be right to say ‘God existed without the world’, but we should say ‘God will exist without the world’, for only of the past do we say ‘God existed without the world’; and between the words ‘existed’ and ‘will exist’ there is a difference, for they cannot replace each other. And if we try to find out where the difference between the two sentences lies, it certainly does not lie in the words ‘existence of one being’ and ‘non-existence of another being’, but in a third entity, for if we say of the non-existence of the world in the future ‘God was without the world’, it will be objected: this is wrong, for ‘was’ refers only to the past. This shows therefore that the word ‘was’ comprises a third entity, namely the past, and the past by itself is time, and through another existent it is movement, for movement passes only through the passing of time. And so it follows necessarily that, before the world, a time finished which terminated in the existence of the world.
I say:
In
this in brief he shows that when it is said ‘such-and-such was
without such-and-such’ and then ‘such-and-such was with
such-and-such’ a third entity is understood, namely time. The word
‘was’ shows this, because of the difference in the meaning of this concept in
the past and in the future, for if we assume the existence of one thing with
the non-existence of another in the past, we say ‘such a thing existed
without such a thing’, but when we assume the non-existence of the one
with the existence of the other in the future, we say ‘such a thing will exist
without such a thing’, and the change in meaning implies that there is here a
third entity. If in our expression ‘such-and-such existed without
such-and-such’ the word ‘existed’ did not signify an entity, the
word ‘existed’ would not differ from ‘will exist’. All this is self-evident,
but it is only unquestionable in relation to the priority and posteriority of
things which are by nature in time. Concerning the timeless the word ‘was’ and
the like indicate in such a proposition nothing but the copula between
predicate and subject, when we say, for example, ‘God was indulgent and
compassionate’;’ and the same holds when either predicate or subject is
timeless, e.g. when we say ‘God was without the world, then God was with the
world’. Therefore for such existents the time-relation to which he refers
does not hold. This relation is, however, unquestionably real when we compare
the non-existence of the world with its existence, for if the world is in
time, the non-existence of the world as to be in time too. And since the
non-existence and the existence of the world cannot be in one and the
same time, the non-existence must precede; the non-existence must
be prior and the world posterior to it, for priority and posteriority in the
moving can only be understood in this relation to time. The only flaw in this
argument is to assume this relation between God and the world. Only in this
point is the argument which Ghazali relates
faulty and does it fail to constitute a proof.
Then
Ghazali gives the theologians’ objection to
this argument of the philosophers:’
The primitive meaning of the two words is the existence of one thing and the non-existence of another. The third element which is the connexion between the two words is a necessary relation to us. The proof is that, if we should suppose a destruction of the world in the future and afterwards a second existence for us, we should then say ‘God was without the world’, and this would be true, whether we meant its original non-existence or the second non-existence, its destruction after its existence. And a sign that this is a subjective relation is that the future can become past and can be indicated by the word ‘past’.’ All this is the consequence of the inability of our imagination to imagine the beginning of a thing without something preceding it, and this ‘before’ of which the imagination cannot rid itself is regarded as a really existing thing, namely time. This resembles the inability of the imagination to admit a limited body, e.g. overhead, without anything beyond its surface, so that it is imagined that behind the world there is a space either occupied or empty; and when it is said there is above the surface of the world no beyond and no farther extension, this is beyond the grasp of the imagination. Likewise, when it is said that there is no real anterior to the existence of the world, the imagination refuses to believe it. But the imagination may be called false in allowing above the world an empty space which is an infinite extension by our saying to it: empty space cannot be understood by itself, for extension is the necessary attribute of a body whose sides comprise space;’ a finite body implies the finiteness of extension, which is its attribute and the limitation of occupied space; empty space is unintelligible, therefore there is neither empty nor occupied space behind the world, although the imagination cannot admit this. And in the same way as it is said that spatial extension is an attribute of body, temporal extension is an attribute of motion, for time is the extension of movement just as the space between the sides of a body is the extension of space. And just as the proof that the sides of a body are finite prevents the admission of a spatial extension behind the world, so the proof of the finite character of movement in both directions prevents the supposition of a temporal extension behind the world, although the imagination, subject to its illusion and supposition, admits it and does not hold back from it. There is no difference between temporal extension, which is apprehended as divided through the relation of before and after, and spatial extension, which is apprehended as divided through the relation of high and low. If it is therefore permissible to admit a highest point above which there is nothing, it is equally permissible to admit a beginning, not preceded by anything real, except through an illusion similar to that which permits a beyond for the highest space. This is a legitimate consequence; notice it carefully, as the philosophers themselves agreed that behind the world there is neither empty nor occupied space.
I say:
There
are two parts to this objection; the first is that, when we imagine the past
and the future, i.e. the prior and the posterior, they are two things existing
in relation to our imagination, because we can imagine a future event as
becoming past and a past event as having been future. But if this is so, past
and future are not real things in themselves and do not possess existence
outside the soul; they are only constructs of the soul. And when movement is
annihilated, the relation and measure of time will not have sense any more.
The
answer is that the necessary connexion of movement and time is real and time is
something the soul constructs in movement, but neither movement nor time is
annihilated: they are only abolished in those things which are not subject to
motion, but in the existence of moving things or in their possible existence
time inheres necessarily. For there are only two kinds of being, those that are
subject to motion and those that are not, and the one kind cannot be converted
into the other, for otherwise a conversion of the necessary into the possible
would become possible. For if movement were impossible and then afterwards
occurred, the nature of things which arc not subject to motion would have
changed into the nature of things subject to motion, and this is impossible.
This is a consequence of the fact that motion inheres necessarily in a
substratum. If movement were possible before the existence of the world, the
things which are subject to movement would be necessarily in time, for movement
is only possible in what is subject to rest,’ not in absolute non-existence,
for in absolute non-existence there is no possibility whatever, or one would
have to admit that absolute non-existence could be converted into
existence. Therefore, the non-existence or privation which necessarily
precedes the occurrence of a thing has to be connected with a substratum, and
will be disconnected from it when the substratum actually receives this
occurrence, as happens with all contraries. For instance, when a warm thing
becomes cold, the essence of warmth does not change into coldness; it is only
the receptacle and the substratum of warmth that exchange their warmth for
coldness.
The
second part of this objection-and it is the most important of these
objections-is sophistical and malicious. It amounts to saying that to
imagine something before the beginning of this first movement (which is not
preceded by any moving body) is like the illusion that the end of the world,
for example, its highest part, ends necessarily either in another body or in
empty space, for extension is a necessary attribute of body, as time is a
necessary attribute of movement. And if it is impossible that there should be
an infinite body, it is impossible that there should be an infinite extension,
and, if it is impossible that there should be infinite extension, it is
impossible that every body should end in another body or in something which has
the potentiality of extension, i.e. for instance, emptiness, and that this
should continue without end. And the same applies to movement which has time as
a necessary attribute, for if it is impossible that there should be infinite
past movements and there exists therefore a first movement with a finite
initial term, it is impossible that there should exist a ‘before’ before it,
for, if so, there would be another movement before the first.
This
objection is, as we said, malicious, and belongs to the class of sophistical
substitutions-you will recognize what I mean if you have read the book On sophistic refutations. In other
words, Ghazali treats the quantity which has no
position and does not form a totality, i.e. time and motion, as the quantity
which possesses position and totality, i.e. body. He makes the impossibility of
endlessness in the latter a proof of its impossibility in the former, and he
deals with the act of the soul when it imagines an increase in the one quantity
which is assumed to be actual, i.e. body, as if it concerned both quantities.
This is a manifest error. For to imagine an increase in actual spatial
magnitude, so that it must end in another actual spatial magnitude, is to
imagine something which does not exist in the essence and definition of spatial
magnitude, but to imagine priority and posteriority in a movement that occurs
is to imagine something that belongs to its essence. For a movement can only
occur in time, i.e. time has to pass beyond its beginning. For this reason one
cannot represent a time the initial term of which is not the final term of
another time, for the definition of ‘the instant’ is that it is the end of the
past and the beginning of the future,’ for the instant is the present which
necessarily is the middle between the past and the future, and to represent a
present which is not preceded by a past is absurd. This, however, does not
apply to the point, for the point is the end of the line and exists at the same
time as the line, for the line is at rest. Therefore one can imagine a point
which is the beginning of a line without its being the end of another line, but
the instant cannot exist without the past and tile future, and exists
necessarily after the past and before the future, and what cannot subsist in itself
cannot exist before the existence of the future without being the end of tile
past. The cause of this error is the comparison of the instant with the point.
The proof that each movement which occurs is preceded by time is this:
everything must come to exist out of a privation, and nothing can become in the
instant-of which it can be truly said that its becoming is a vanishing-and
so it must be true that its privation must be in another moment than that in
which it itself exists, and there is time between each pair of instants,
because instant is not continuous with instant, nor point continuous with
point. This has been proved in the sciences. Therefore before the instant in
which the movement occurs there must necessarily be a time, because, when we represent
two instants in reality, there must necessarily be time between them.
And what is said in this objection that ‘higher’ resembles ‘before’ is not true, nor does the instant resemble the point, nor the quantity which possesses position the quantity which does not possess position.’ He who allows the existence of an instant which is not a present, or of a present which is not preceded by a past, denies time and the instant, for he assumes an instant as having the description which we have mentioned, and then assumes a time which has no beginning-which is a self-contradictory assumption. It is, therefore, wrong to ascribe to an act of imagination the fact that there is a prior event for every occurrence, for he who denies priority denies the event in time. The contrary is the case with the man who denies the real character of the high, for he denies the absolutely high and, when he denies the absolutely high, he denies also the absolutely low,’ and when these two are denied, also the heavy and the light are denied’, and the act of the imagination that a body with straight dimensions must end in another body is not false; no, this is a necessary truth, for the body with straight dimensions has the possibility of increasing, and what has this possibility is not limited by nature. Therefore the body with straight surfaces must end in the circumscribing circular body, since this is the perfect body which is liable neither to increase nor to decrease. Therefore when the mind seeks to imagine that the circular body must end in another body, it imagines the impossible. These are all matters of which the theologians and those who do not start their inquiry in the proper scientific order are unaware.
Further,
the relation between time and motion is not the same as that between spatial
limit and spatial magnitude, for the spatial limit is an attribute of spatial
magnitude, in so far as it inheres in it, in the way that the accident inheres
in its substratum and is individualized by the individuality of its substratum
and is indicated by pointing at its substratum and by its being in the place in
which its substratum is. But this is not the case with the necessary relation
between time and motion. For the dependence of time on motion is much like the
dependence of number on the thing numbered: just as number does not become
individualized through tire individuation of the thing numbered, nor pluralized
through its plurality, so it stands with the relation between time and
movement. Time, therefore, is unique for all movement and for each thing
moving, and exists everywhere, so that if we should suppose people confined
from youth in a cave in the earth, still we should be sure that they would
perceive time, even if they did not perceive any of the movements which are perceived
in the world. Aristotle therefore thought that the existence of movements in
time is much like the existence of the things numbered in numbers for number is
not pluralized through the plurality of the things numbered, nor is it
localized through the individuation of the places numbered. He thought,
therefore, that its specific quality was to mesaure the movements and to
measure the existence of moving things, in so far as they are moving, as number
counts the individual moving things, and therefore Aristotle says in his
definition of time that it is the number of movement according to the relations
of anterior and posterior.’ Therefore, just as the supposition that a thing
numbered occurs does not imply that number comes into existence, but it is a necessary
condition for the occurrence of a thing numbered that number should exist
before it, so the occurrence of movement implies that there was time before it.
If time occurred with the occurrence of any individual movement whatever, time
would only be perceived with that individual movement. This will make you
understand how different the nature of time is from the nature of spatial
magnitude.
Ghazali answers on behalf of the philosophers:
It may be said: This comparisons is lame, for there is neither above nor below in the world; for the world is spherical, and in the sphere there is neither above nor below; if the one direction is called above, because it is overhead, and the other below, because it is under foot, this name is always determined in relation to you, and the direction which is below in relation to you is above in relation to another, if you imagine him standing on the other side of the terrestrial globe with the sole of his foot opposite the sole of your foot. Yes, these parts of heaven which you reckon above during the day are identical with what is below during the night, and what is below the earth comes again above the earth through the daily revolution. But it cannot be imagined that the beginning of the world becomes its end. If we imagined a stick with one thick and one thin end and we agreed to call the part nearest the thin end ‘above’ and the other ‘below’, there would not arise from this an essential differentiation in the parts of the world; it would simply be that different names would have been applied to the shape of the stick, so that if we substituted the one name for the other, there would be an exchange of names, but the world itself would remain unchanged. So ‘above’ and ‘below’ are a mere relation to you without any differentiation in the parts and places of the world. The non-existence, however, preceding the world and the initial term of its existence are essential realities, a substitution or a change of which cannot be imagined. Nor can it be imagined that the non-existence which is supposed to occur at the disappearance of the world and which follows the world can become the non-existence preceding it. The initial and final terms of the world’s existence are permanent essential terms, in which no change can be imagined through the change of the subjective relation to them, in contrast with ‘above’ and ‘below’. Therefore we philosophers, indeed, are justified in saying that in the world there is neither ‘above’ nor ‘below’, but you theologians have not the right to assert that the existence of the world has neither a ‘before’ nor an ‘after’.
And when the existence of ‘before’ and ‘after’ is proved, time cannot mean anything but what is apprehended through the anterior and the posterior.
I say:
This
answer given in the name of the philosophers is extremely unsound. It amounts
to saying that ‘above’ and ‘below’ are relative to us and that therefore
imagination can treat them as an infinite sequence, but that the sequence of
‘before’ and ‘after’ does not rest on imagination-for there is here no
subjective relation-but is a ~ purely rational concept. This means that
the order of above and below in a thing may be reversed in imagination, but
that the privation before an event and the privation after an event, its before
and its after, are not interchangeable for imagination. But by giving this
answer the problem is not solved, for the philosophers think that i there
exists a natural above; to which light things move and a natural below to which
heavy things move, or else the heavy and the light would be relative and exist
by convention, and they hold that in imagination the limit of a body, having by
nature its place above, may end either in occupied or in empty space. And this
argument is in- valid as a
justification of the philosophers for two reasons. First, that the philosophers
assume an absolute above and an absolute below, but no absolute beginning and
no absolute end; secondly that their opponents may object that it is not the
fact of their being relative that causes the imagination to regard the sequence
of low and high as an infinite series, but that this happens to the imagination
because it observes that every spatial magnitude is continuous with another
spatial magnitude, just as any event is preceded by another event. n Therefore Ghazali transfers the question from the words ‘above’
and ‘below’ to ‘inside’ and ‘outside’s and he says in his answer to the
philosophers:
There is no real difference in the words ‘above’ and ‘below’, and therefore there is no sense in defining them, but we will apply ourselves rather to the words ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. We say: The world has an inside and an outside; and we ask: Is there outside the world an occupied or empty space? The philosophers will answer: There is outside the world neither occupied nor empty space, and if you mean by ‘outside’ its extreme surface, then there is an outside, but if you mean anything else, there is no outside. Therefore if they ask us theologians if there is anything before the existence of the world, we say: If you mean by it the beginning, i.e. its initial term, then there is a before, just as there is an outside to the world according to your explanation that that is its ultimate limit and its final plane, but if you mean anything else, then there is not, in analogy with your answer.
If you say: A beginning of existence, without anything preceding it, cannot be understood, we say: A limit of a body existing without anything outside it cannot be understood.’ If you say: Its exterior is its furthest plane and nothing else, we say: Its before is the beginning of its existence, nothing else. The conclusion is that we say: We affirm that God has an existence without the world’s existing, and this assumption again does not force us to accept anything else. That to assume more rests on the act of imagination is proved by the fact that imagination acts in the same way in regard to time as in regard to place, for although our opponents believe in the eternity of the world, their imagination is willing to suppose it created; whereas we, who believe in its creation, are often allowed by our imagination to regard it as eternal. So much as far as body is concerned; but to revert to time, our opponents do not regard a time without a beginning as possible, and yet in opposition to this belief their imagination can represent it as a possible assumption, although time cannot be represented by the imagination in the way that body is represented, for neither the champion nor the opponent of the finitude of body can imagine a body not surrounded by empty or occupied space; the imagination simply refuses to accept it. Therefore one should say: a clear thinker pays no attention to the imagination when he cannot deny the finitude of body by proof, nor does he give attention to the imagination when he cannot deny the beginning of an existence without anything preceding it, which the imagination cannot grasp. For the imagination, as it is only accustomed to a body limited by another body or by air, represents emptiness in this way, although emptiness, being imperceptible, cannot be occupied by anything. Likewise the imagination, being only accustomed to an event occurring after another event, fears to suppose an event not preceded by another event which is terminated. And this is the reason of the error.
I say:
Through
this transference, by his comparing the time-limit with the spatial limit
in his argument against the philosophers, this argument becomes invalid and we
have already shown the error through which it is specious and the sophistical
character of the argument, and we need not repeat ourselves.
Ghazali says:
The philosophers have a second way of forcing their opponents to admit the eternity of time. They say: You do not doubt that God was able to create the world one year, a hundred years, a thousand years, and so ad infinitum, before He created it and that those possibilities are different in magnitude and number. Therefore it is necessary to admit before the existence of the world a measurable extension, one part of which can be longer than another part, and therefore it is necessary that something should have existed before the existence of the world. If you say the word ‘years’ cannot be applied before the creation and revolution of heaven, let us drop the word ‘years’ and let us give another turn to our argument and say: If we suppose that from the beginning of the world till now the sphere of the world has performed, for instance, a thousand revolutions, was God able to create a second world before it, which, for example, would have performed eleven hundred revolutions up to now? If you deny it, it would mean that the Eternal had passed from impotence to power or the world from impossibility to possibility, but if you accept it, and you cannot but accept it, it may be asked if God was able to create a third world which would have performed twelve hundred revolutions up to now and you will have to admit this. We philosophers say: Then, could the world which we called by the order of our supposition the third, although as a matter of fact it is the first, have been created at the same time as the world we called the second, so that the former would have performed twelve hundred revolutions and the latter eleven hundred revolutions, it being understood that both, in revolving, complete the same distance at the same speed? If you were to admit this, you would be admitting something absurd, for it would be absurd that in that case the number of the two revolutions, having the same speed and finishing at the same moment, should be different. But, if you answer that it is impossible that the third world which has up to now performed twelve hundred revolutions could have been created at the same time as the second world which has up to now performed eleven hundred revolutions, and that on the contrary it must have been created the same number of years earlier than the second, as the second has been created before the first-we call it first, as it comes first in order, when in imagination we proceed from our time to it-then there exists a quantity of possibility double that of another possibility, and there is doubtless another possibility which doubles the whole of the others. These measurable quantitative possibilities, of which some are longer than others by a definite measure, have no other reality than time, and those measurable quantities are not an attribute of the essence of God, who is too exalted to possess measure,’ nor an attribute of the non-existence of the world, for non-existence is nothing and therefore cannot be measured with different measures. Still, quantity is an attribute which demands a substratum, and this is nothing other than movement, and quantity is nothing but the time which measures movement. Therefore also for you theologians there existed before the world a substratum of differentiated quantity, namely time, and according to you time existed before the world.’
I say:
The
summary of this argument is that, when we imagine a movement, we find with it
an extension which measures it, as if it were its measurement, while
reciprocally the movement measures the extension, and we find that we can
assume in this measure and this extension a movement longer than the first
supposed movement, and we affirm through the corresponding and congruous units
of this extension that the one movement is longer than the other.’ If therefore
for you theologians the world has a certain extension from its beginning till
now-let us suppose, for instance, a thousand years and since God
according to you is able to create before this world another world, we may
suppose that the extension He can give it will be longer than the extension of
the first world by a certain definite quantity, and that He can likewise create
a third world before this second and that the existence of each of them must be
preceded by an extension through which its
existence can be measured. If this is true, and there is an infinite regress of
this possibility of anterior worlds, there is an extension which precedes all
these worlds. And this extension which measures all of them cannot be absolute
nonexistence, for non-existence cannot measure; it has, therefore, to be
a quantity, for what measures a quantity has to be quantity itself, and the
measuring quantity is that which we call time. And it is clear that this must
precede in existence anything we imagine to occur, just as the measure must
precede the measured in existence. If this extension which is time were to
occur at the occurrence of the first movement, then it would have to be
preceded by an extension which could measure
it, in which it could occur, and which could be like its measurement. And
in the same way any world which could be imagined would have to be preceded by
an extension which measures it. Therefore this extension has no beginning, for
if it had a beginning it would have to have an extension which measured it, for
each event which begins has an extension which
measures it and which we call
time.
This is the
most suitable exposition of this argument, and this is the method by which
Avicenna proves infinite time, but there is a difficulty in understanding it,
because of the problem that each possible has one extension and each extension
is connected with its own possible and this forms a point of discussion;’ or
one must concede that the possibilities prior to the world are of the same
nature as the possible inside the world, i.e. as it is of the nature of this
possible inside the world that time inheres in it, so also with the possible
which is prior to the world. This is clear concerning the possible inside the
world, and therefore the existence of time may be imagined from it.
Ghazali says:
The objection is that all this is the work of imagination, and the most convenient way of refuting it is to compare time with place; therefore we say: Was it not in God’s power to create the highest sphere in its heaven a cubit higher than He has created it? If the answer is negative, this is to deny God’s power, and if the answer is affirmative, we ask: And by two cubits and by three cubits and so on ad infinitum? Now we affirm that this amounts to admitting behind the world a spatial extension which has measure and quantity, as a thing which is bigger by two or three cubits than another occupies a space bigger by two or three cubits, and by reason of this there is behind the world a quantity which demands a substratum and this is a body or empty space. Therefore, there is behind the world empty or occupied space. And how can you answer this? And likewise we may ask, whether God was not able to create the sphere of the world smaller than He has created it by a cubit or two cubits? And is there no difference between those two magnitudes in regard to the occupied space taken away from them and the space they still occupy, for the occupied space withdrawn is bigger when two cubits are taken away than when one cubit is taken away? And therefore empty space has measure. But emptiness is nothing; how can it have measure? And our answer is: ‘It belongs to the illusion of imagination to suppose possibilities in time before the existence of the world’, just as your answer is: ‘It belongs to the illusion of imagination to suppose possibilities in space behind the existence of the world.’ There is no difference between those two points of view.’
I say:
This
consequence is true against the theory which regards an infinite increase in
the size of the world as possible, for it follows from this theory that a
finite thing proceeds from God which is preceded by infinite quantitative
possibilities. And if this is allowed for possibility in space, it must also be
allowed in regard to the possibility in time, and we should have a time limited
in both directions, although it would be preceded by infinite temporal
possibilities. The answer is, however, that to imagine the world to be bigger
or smaller does not conform to truth but is impossible. But the impossibility
of this does not imply that to imagine the possibility of a world before this
world is to imagine an impossibility, except in case the nature of the possible
were already realized and there existed before the existence of the world only
two natures, the nature of the necessary and the nature of the impossible? But
it is evident that the judgement of reason concerning the being of these three
natures is eternal, like its judgement concerning the necessary and the
impossible.
This
objection, however, does not touch the philosophers, because they hold that the
world could not be smaller or bigger than it is,
If
it were possible that a spatial magnitude could infinitely increase, then the existence
of a spatial magnitude without end would be possible and a spatial magnitude,
actually infinite, would exist, and this is impossible and Aristotle has
already shown the impossibility of this.’ But against the man who believes in
this possibility, because the contrary would imply a denial of God’s power,
this argument is valid, for this spatial possibility is just as much a purely
rational concept as the possibility of temporal anteriority according to the
philosophers. Therefore, he who believes in the temporal creation of the world
and affirms that all body is in space, is bound to admit that before the
creation of the world there was space, either occupied by body, in which the
production of the world could occur, or empty, for it is necessary that space
should precede what is produced.’ The man who denies empty space and affirms
the finiteness of body-like certain later Ash’arites who, however,
separated themselves from the principles of the theologians; but I have not
read it in their books and it was told to me by some who studied their
doctrines-cannot admit the temporal production of the world. If the fact
of this extension which measures movement and which stands in relation to it as
its measurement were indeed the work of an illusion-like the
representation of a world bigger or smaller than it really is-time would
not exist, for time is nothing but what the mind perceives of this extension
which measures movement. And if it is self-evident that time exists, then
the act of the mind must necessarily be a veracious one, embodying reason, not
one embodying illusion.
Ghazali says:
It has been objected: we declare that what is not possible is what cannot be done and increase or decrease in the size of the world is impossible, and therefore could not be brought about .
I
say
This
is the answer to the objection of the Ash’arites that to admit that God could
not have made the world bigger or smaller is to charge Him with impotence, but
they have thereby compromised themselves, for impotence is not inability to do
the impossible, but inability to do what can be done.
Ghazali, opposing this, says:
This excuse is invalid for three reasons: The first is that it is an affront to reason, for when reason regards it as possible that the world might be bigger or smaller than it is by a cubit, this is not the same as regarding it as possible to identify black with white and existence with non-existence; impossibility lies in affirming the negative and the positive at the same time, and all impossibilities amount to this. This is indeed a silly and faulty assertion.’
I say:
This statement is, as he says, an affront to reason, but only to the reason of him who judges superficially; it is not an affront to true reason, for a statement about its being possible or not’ requires a proof. And therefore he is right when he declares that this is not impossible in the way in which the assumption that black might be white is impossible, for the impossibility of the latter is self-evident. The statement, however, that the world could not be smaller or larger than it is is not self-evident. And although all impossibilities can be reduced to self-evident impossibilities, this reduction can take place in two ways. The first is that the impossibility is self-evident; the second is that there follows sooner or later from its supposition an impossibility of the same character as that of self-evident impossibilities.’ For instance, if it is assumed that the world might be larger or smaller than it is, it follows that outside it there would be occupied or empty space. And from the supposition that there is outside it occupied or empty space, some of the greatest impossibilities follow: from empty space the existence of mere extension existing by itself; from occupied space a body moving either upward or downward or in a circle which therefore must be part of another world. Now it has been proved in the science of physics that the existence of another world at the same time as this is an impossibility and the most unlikely consequence would be that the world should have empty space: for any world must needs have four elements and a spherical body revolving round them. He who wants to ascertain this should look up the places where its exposition is demanded-this, of course, after having fulfilled the preliminary conditions necessary for the student to understand strict proof .
Then
Ghazali mentions the second reason:
If the world is in the state it is, without the possibility of being larger or smaller than it is, then its existence, as it is, is necessary, not possible. But the necessary needs no cause. So say, then, as the materialists do that you deny the creator and that you deny the cause of causes! But this is not your doctrine.
I say:
To
this the answer which, Avicenna gives in accordance with his doctrine is quite
appropriate.’ According to him necessity of existence is of two kinds: the
necessary, existent by itself, and the necessary, existent through another. But
my answer on this question is still more to the point: things necessary in this
sense need not have an agent or a maker; take, for example, a saw which is used
to saw wood-it is a tool having a certain determined quantity, quality,
and matter, that is, it is not possible for it to be of another material than
iron and it could not have any other shape than that of a saw or any other
measure than the measure of a saw. Still nobody would say that the saw has a
necessity of being= See, therefore, how crude this mistake is! If one were to
take away the necessity from the quantities, qualities, and matters of things
produced by art, in the way the Ash’arites imagine this to happen concerning
the created in relation to the creator, the wisdom which lies in the creator and
the created would have been withdrawn, any agent could be an artificer and any
cause in existence a creator. But all this is a denial of reason and wisdom.
Ghazali says:
The third reason is that this faulty argument authorizes its opponent to oppose it by a similar one, and we may say: The existence of the world was not possible before its existence, for indeed possibility-according to your theory-is coextensive with existence, neither more nor less. If you say: ‘But then the eternal has passed from impotence to power’, we answer:
‘No, for the existence was not possible and therefore could not be brought about and the impossibility of a thing’s happening that could not happen does not indicate impotence.’ If you say: ‘How can a thing which is impossible become possible?’ We answer: ‘But why should it be impossible that a thing should be impossible at one moment and possible at another?’ If you say: ‘The times are similar,’ the answer is: ‘But so are the measures, and why should one measure be possible and another, bigger or smaller by the width of a nail, impossible?’ And if the latter assumption is not impossible, the former is not impossible either.’ And this is the way to oppose them.
But the true answer is that their supposition of possibilities makes no sense whatever. We concede only that God is eternal and powerful, and that His action never fails, even if He should wish it. And there is nothing in this power that demands the assumption of a temporal extension, unless imagination, confusing God’s power with other things, connects it with time.
I say:
The
summary of this is that the Ash’arites say to the philosophers: this question
whether the world could be larger or smaller is impossible according to us; it
has sense only for the man who believes in a priority of possibility in
relation to the actualization of a thing, i.e. the realization of the possible.
We, the Ash’arites, however, say: ‘Possibility occurs together with the
actuality as it is, without adding or subtracting anything.’
Now
my answer is that he who denies the possibility of the possible before its
existence denies the necessary, for the possible is the contrary of the
impossible without there existing a middle term, and, if a thing is not
possible before its existence, then it is necessarily impossible.’ Now to posit
the impossible as existing is an impossible falsehood, but to posit the
possible as existing is a possible, not an impossible, falsehood.’ Their
assertion that possibility and actuality exist together is a falsehood, for possibility
and actuality are contradictory, and do not exist together in one and the same
moment. The necessary consequence for them is that possibility exists neither
at the same time as the actuality nor before it. The true consequence for the
Ash’arites in this discussion is not that the eternal passes from impotence to
power, for he who cannot do an impossible act is not called impotent, but that
a thing can pass from the nature of the i impossible to the nature of
existence, and this is like the changing of the necessary into the possible. To
posit a thing, however, as impossible at one time and possible at another does
not cut it off from the nature of the possible, for this is the general
character of the possible; the existence of anything possible, for instance, is
impossible at the moment when its contrary exists in its substratum. If the
opponent concedes that a thing impossible at one time is possible at another,
then he has conceded that this thing is of the nature of the absolutely
possible’ and that it has not the nature of the impossible. If it is assumed
that the world was impossible for an infinite time before its production, the
consequence is that, when it was produced, it changed over from impossibility
to possibility. This question is not the problem with which we are concerned
here, but as we have said before, the transference from one problem to another
is an act of sophistry.
And
as to his words:
But the true answer is that their supposition of possibilities makes no sense whatever. We concede only that God is eternal and powerful and that His action never fails, even if He should wish it. And there is nothing in this power that demands the assumption of a temporal extension, unless imagination confusing God’s power with other things connects with it time.
I say:
Even
if there were nothing in this supposition-as he says-that implies
the eternity of time, there is something in it that demands that the
possibility of the occurrence of the world and equally of time should be
eternal. And this is that God never ceases to have power for action, and that
it is impossible that anything should prevent His act from being eternally
connected with His existence; and perhaps the opposite of this statement
indicates the impossibility better still, namely, that He should have no power
at one time but power at another, and that He could be called powerful only at
definite limited times, although He is ark eternal and perpetual being. And
then we have the old question again whether the world may be either eternal or
temporal, or whether the world cannot be eternal, or whether the world cannot
be temporal, or whether the world may be temporal but certainly cannot be
eternal, and whether, if the world is temporal, it can be a first act or not.
And if reason has no power to pronounce for one of these opposite propositions,
let us go back to tradition, but do not then regard this question as a rational
one! We say that the First Cause cannot omit the best act and perform an
inferior, because this would be an imperfection; but can there be a greater
imperfection than to assume the act of the Eternal as finite and limited, like
the act of a temporal product, although a limited act can only be imagined of a
limited agent, not of the eternal agent whose existence and action are
unlimited? .All this, as you see, cannot be unknown to the man who has even the
slightest understanding of the rational. And how can it be thought that the
present act proceeding from the Eternal cannot be preceded by another act, and
again by another, and so in our thinking infinitely, like the infinite
continuation of His existence? For it is a necessary consequence that the act
of Him whose existence time cannot measure nor comprehend in either direction
cannot be comprehended in time nor measured by a limited duration. For there is
no being whose act is delayed after its existence, except when there is an
impediment which prevents its existence from attaining its perfection,’ or, in
voluntary beings, when there is an obstruction in the execution of their
choice. He, therefore, who assumes that from the Eternal there proceeds only a
temporal act presumes that His act is constrained in a certain way and in this
way therefore does not depend on His choice.
Ghazali says:
They insist on saying: The existence of the world is possible before its existence, as it is absurd that it should be impossible and then become possible; this possibility has no beginning, it is eternally unchangeable and the existence of the world remains eternally possible, for at no time whatever can the existence of the world be described as impossible; and if the possibility never ceases, the possible, in conformity with the possibility, never ceases either; and the meaning of the sentence, that the existence of the world is possible, is that the existence of the world is not impossible; and since its existence is eternally possible, it is never impossible, for if it were ever impossible, it would not be true that the existence of the world is eternally possible; and if it were not true that the existence of the world is eternally possible, it would not be true that its possibility never ceases; and if it were not true that its possibility never ceases, it would be true that its possibility had begun; and if it were true that its possibility had begun, its existence before this beginning would not be possible and that would lead to the assumption of a time when the world was not possible and God had no power over it.
I say:
He
who concedes that the world before its existence was of a never-ceasing
possibility must admit that the world is eternal, for the assumption that what
is eternally possible is eternally existent implies no absurdity. What can
possibly exist eternally must necessarily exist eternally, for what can receive
eternity cannot become corruptible, except if it were possible that the
corruptible could become eternal. Therefore Aristotle has said that the
possibility in the eternal beings is necessary.’
Ghazali says:
The objection is that it is said that the temporal becoming of the world never ceased to be possible, and certainly there is no time at which its becoming could not be imagined. But although it could be at any time, it did not become at any time whatever, for reality does not conform to possibility, but differs from it. You yourself hold, for instance, in the matter of place, that the world could be bigger than it is or that the creation of an infinite series of bodies above the world is possible, and that there is no limit to the possibilities of increase in the size of the world, but still the actual existence of absolutely infinite occupied space and of any infinite and limitless being is impossible. What is said to be possible is an actual body of a limited surface, but the exact size of this body, whether it is larger or smaller, is not specified. In the same way, what is possible is the coming into existence of the world in time, but the exact time of its coming into existence whether earlier or later, is not specified. The principle of its having come into being is specified and this is the possible, nothing else.’
I say:
The man who assumes that before the existence of the world there was one unique, never-ceasing possibility must concede that the world is eternal. The man who affirms, like Ghazali in his answer, that before the world there was an infinite number of possibilities of worlds, has certainly to admit that before this world there was another world and before this second world a third, and so on ad infinitum, as is the case with human beings, and especially when it is assumed that the perishing of the earlier is the necessary condition for the existence of the later. For instance, if God had the power to create another world before this, and before this second world yet another, the series must continue infinitely, or else we should arrive at a world before which no other world could have been created (however, the theologians do not affirm this nor use it as a proof for the temporal production of the world). Although the assumption that before this world there might be an infinite number of others does not seem an impossible one, it appears after closer examination to be absurd, for it would follow from it that the universe had the nature of an individual person in this transitory world, so that its procession from the First Principle would be like the procession of the individual person from Him-that is to say, through an eternal moving body and an eternal motion. But then this world would be part of another world, like the transient beings in this world, and then necessarily either we end finally in a world individually eternal or we have an infinite series. And if we have to bring this series to a standstill, it is more appropriate to arrest it at this world, by regarding it as eternally unique.
Ghazali says:
The fourth proof is that they say everything that becomes is preceded by the matter which is in it, for what becomes cannot be free from matter.’ For this reason matter never becomes; what becomes is only the form, the accidents and the qualities which add themselves to matters The proof is that the existence of each thing that becomes must, before its becoming, either be possible, impossible, or necessary: it cannot be impossible, for the essentially impossible will never exist; it cannot be necessary, for the essentially necessary will never be in a state of non-existence, and therefore it is the essentially possible.’ Therefore, the thing which becomes has before its becoming the possibility of becoming, but the possibility of becoming is an attribute which needs a relation and has no subsistence in itself.’ It needs, therefore, a substratum with which it can be connected, and there is no substratum except matter, and it becomes connected with it in the way in which we say this matter receives warmth and coldness, or black and white, or movement and rest, i.e. it is possible that these qualities and these changes occur in it and therefore possibility is an attribute of matter. Matter does not possess other matter, and cannot become; for, if it did, the possibility of its existence would precede its existence, and possibility would subsist by itself without being related to anything else, whereas it is a relative attribute which cannot be understood as subsisting by itself. And it cannot be said that the meaning of possibility amounts to what can be done and what the Eternal had the power to do, because we know only that a thing can be done, because it is possible, and we say ‘this can be done because it is possible and cannot be done because it is not possible’; and if ‘this is possible’ meant ‘this can be done’, to say ‘this can be done because it is possible’ would mean ‘this is possible because it is possible’, and this is a circular definition; and this shows that ‘this is possible’ is a first judgement in the mind, evident in itself, which makes the second judgement ‘that it can be done’ intelligible. It cannot be said, either, that to be possible refers to the knowledge of the Eternal, for knowledge depends on a thing known, whereas possibility is undoubtedly an object of knowledge, not knowledge; further, it is a relative attribute, and needs something to which it can be related, and this can only be matter, and everything that becomes is preceded by matter.
I say:
The
summary of this is that everything that becomes is possible before it becomes,
and that possibility needs something for its subsistence, namely, the
substratum which receives that which is possible. For it must not be believed
that the possibility of the recipient is the same as the possibility of the
agent. It is a different thing to say about Zaid, the agent, that he can do
something and to say about the patient that it can have something done to it.
Thus the possibility of the patient is a necessary condition for the
possibility of the agent, for the agent which cannot act is not possible but
impossible. Since it is impossible that the possibility prior to the thing’s
becoming should be absolutely without substratum, or that the agent should be
its substratum or the thing possible-for the thing possible loses its
possibility, when it becomes actual-there only remains as a vehicle for
possibility the recipient of the possible, i.e. matter. Matter, in so far as it
is matter, does not become; for if it did it would need other matter and we
should have an infinite regress. Matter only becomes in so far as it is
combined with form. Everything that comes into being comes into being from something
else, and this must either give rise to an infinite regress and lead directly
to infinite matter which is impossible, even if we assume an eternal mover, for
there is no actual infinite; or the forms must be interchangeable in the
ingenerable and incorruptible substratum, eternally and in rotation.’ There
must, therefore, be an eternal movement which produces this interchange in the
eternally transitory things. And therefore it is clear that the generation of
the one in each pair of generated beings is the corruption of the other;
otherwise a thing could come into being from nothing, for the meaning of
‘becoming’ is the alteration of a thing and its change, from what it has
potentially, into actuality. It is not possible that the privation itself should
change into the existent, and it is not the privation of which it is said that
it has become. There exists, therefore, a substratum for the contrary forms,
and it is in this substratum that the forms interchange.
Ghazali says:
The objection is that the possibility of which they speak is a judgement of the intellect, and anything whose existence the intellect supposes, provided no obstacle presents itself to the supposition, we call possible and, if there is such an obstacle, we call it impossible and, if we suppose that it cannot be supposed not to be, we call it necessary. These are rational judgements which need no real existent which they might qualify. There are three proofs of this. The first is: If possibility needed an existent to which it could be related, and of which it could be said that it is its possibility, impossibility also would need an existent of which it might be said that it is its impossibility; but impossibility has no real existence, and there is no matter in which it occurs and to which it could be related.
I say:
That
possibility demands an existing matter is clear, for all true intellectual
concepts need a thing outside the soul, for truth, as it has been defined, is
the agreement of what is in the soul with what is outside the soul.’ And when
we say that something is possible, we cannot but understand that it needs
something in which this possibility can be. As regards his proof that the
possible is not dependent on an existent, because the impossible is not
dependent on an existent, this is sophistical. Indeed the impossible demands a
substratum just as much as the possible does, and this is clear from the fact
that the impossible is the opposite of the possible and opposite contraries
undoubtedly require a substratum. For impossibility is the negation of
possibility, and, if possibility needs a substratum, impossibility which is the
negation of this possibility requires a substratum too, e.g. we say that the
existence of empty space is impossible, because the existence of independent
dimensions outside or inside natural bodies is impossible, or that the presence
of opposites at the same time in the same substratum is impossible, or that the
equivalence of one to two is impossible, i.e. in reality. All this is self-evident,
and it is not necessary to consider the errors here committed.
Ghazali says:
The second proof is that the intellect decides that black and white are possible before they exist.’ If this possibility were related to the body in which they inhere, so that it might be said that the meaning is that this body can be black and white, then white would not be possible by itself and possibility would be related only to the body. But we affirm, as concerns the judgement about black in itself, as to whether it is possible, necessary, or impossible, that we, without doubt, will say that it is possible. And this shows that the intellect in order to decide whether something is possible need not admit an existing thing to which the possibility can be related.
I
say
This
is a sophism. For the possible is predicated of the recipient and of the
inherent quality. In so far as it is predicated of the substratum, its opposite
is the impossible, and in so far as it is predicated of the inherent, its
opposite is the necessary.’ Thus the possible which is described as being the
opposite of the impossible is not that which abandons its possibility so far as
it is actualized, when it becomes actual, because this latter loses its
possibility in the actualizing process.’ This latter possible is only described
by possibility in so far as it is in potency, and the vehicle of this potency
is the substratum which changes from existence in potency into existence in
actuality.’ This is evident from the definition of the possible that it is the
nonexistence which is in readiness to exist or not to exists This possible non-existent
is possible neither in so far as it is non-existent nor in so far as it
is actually existent. It is only possible in so far as it is in potency, and
for this reason the Mu’tazilites affirm that the nonexistent is a kind of
entity. For non-existence is the opposite of existence, and each of the
two is succeeded by the other, and when the non-existence of a thing
disappears it is followed by its existence, and when its existence disappears
it is succeeded by its non-existence. As non-existence by itself
cannot change into existence, and existence
by
itself cannot change into non-existence, there must be a third entity
which is the recipient for both of them, and that is what is described by
‘possibility’ and ‘becoming’ and ‘change from the quality of non-existence
to the quality of existence’. For non-existence itself is not described
by ‘becoming’ or ‘change’; nor is the thing that has become actual described in
this way, for what becomes loses the quality of becoming, change, and
possibility when it has become actual. Therefore there must necessarily be
something that can be described by ‘becoming’ and ‘change’ and ‘transition from
nonexistence to existence’, as happens in the passage of opposites into
opposites; that is to say, there must be a substratum for them in which they
can interchange-with this one difference, however, that this substratum
exists in the interchange of all the accidents in actuality, whereas in the
substance it exists in potency.’
And
we cannot think of regarding what is described by ‘possibility’ and ‘change’ as
identical with the actual, i.e. which belongs to the becoming in so far as it
is actual, for the former again vanishes and the latter must necessarily be a
part of the product. Therefore there must necessarily be a substratum which is
the recipient for the possibility and which is the vehicle of the change and
the becoming, and it is this of which it is said that it becomes, and alters,
and changes from non-existence into existence. Nor can we think of making
this substratum of the nature of the actualized, for if this were the case the
existent would not become, for what becomes comes into being from the non-existent
not from the existent.’ Both philosophers and Mu’tazilites agree about the
existence of this entity; only the philosophers are of the opinion that it
cannot be exempt from a form actually existent, i.e. that it cannot be free
from existence, like the transition, for example, from sperma to blood and the
transition from blood to the members of the embryo. The reason is that if it
were exempt from existence it would have an existence of its own, and if it had
an existence of its own, becoming could not come from it. This entity is called
by the philosophers ‘lyle’, and it is the cause of generation and corruption.
And according to the philosophers an existent which is free from Kyle is neither generable nor
corruptible.
Ghazali says:
The third proof is that the souls of men, according to the philosophers, are substances which subsist by themselves’ without being in a body or in matter or impressed on matters they had a beginning in time, according to the theory of Avicenna and the acknowledged philosophers, they had possibility before their beginning, but they have neither essence nor matter’ and their possibility is a relative attribute, dependent neither on God’s power nor on the Agent;’ but on what then is it dependent? The difficulties are therefore turned against them themselves.
I say:
I
do not know any philosopher who said that the soul has a beginning in the true
sense of the word and is thereafter everlasting except -as Ghazali relates-Avicenna. All other
philosophers agree that in their temporal existence they are related to and
connected with the bodily possibilities, which receive this connexion like the
possibilities which subsist in mirrors for their connexion with the rays of the
suns According to the philosophers this possibility is not of the nature of the
generable and corruptible forms, but of a kind to which, according to them,
demonstrative proof leads, and the vehicle of this possibility is of another
nature than the nature of the Kyle. He
alone can grasp their theories in these matters who has read their books and
fulfilled the conditions there laid down by them, and has besides a sound
understanding and a learned master. That Ghazali
should touch on such questions in this way is not worthy of such a man, but
there are only these alternatives: either he knew these matters in their true
nature, and sets them out here wrongly, which is wicked; or he did not
understand their real nature and touched on problems he had not grasped, which
is the act of an ignoramus. However, he stands too high in our eyes for either
of these qualifications. But even the best horse will stumble’ and it was a
stumble of Ghazali’s that he brought out this
book. But perhaps he was forced to do so by the conditions of his time and his
situation.
Ghazali says, speaking on behalf of the
philosophers:
It may be said: To reduce possibility to a judgement of the intellect is absurd, for the meaning of ‘judgement of the intellect’ is nothing but the knowledge of possibility, and possibility is an object of knowledge, not knowledge itself; knowledge, on the contrary, comprises possibility and follows it and depends on it as it is, and if knowledge vanished the object of knowledge would not, but the disappearance of the object of knowledge would imply the disappearance of knowledge. For knowledge and the object-known are two things, the former dependent on the latter, and if we supposed rational beings to turn away from possibility and neglect it, we should say: ‘It is not possibility that is annulled, for the possibilities subsist by themselves, but it is simply that minds neglect them or that minds and rational beings have disappeared; but possibility remains, without any doubt.’ And the three proofs are not valid, for impossibility requires an existent to which it can be related, and impossibility means identifying two opposites, and if the substratum were white it could not become black as long as the white existed, and therefore we need a substratum, qualified by the quality during the inherence of which its opposite is spoken of as impossible in this substratum, and therefore impossibility is a relative attribute subsistent in a substratum and related to it. And where the necessary is concerned it is evident that it is related to necessary existence.
As concerns the second proof, that black is in itself possible, this is a mistake, for if it is taken, abstracted from the substratum in which it inheres, it is impossible, not possible; it only becomes possible when it can become a form in a body; the body is then in readiness for the interchange, and the interchange is possible for the body; but in itself black has no individuality, so as to be characterizable by possibility.
As concerns the third proof about the soul, it is eternal for one school of philosophers, and is only possible in the attaching of itself to bodies, and therefore against those philosophers the argument does not apply= But for those who admit that the soul comes into existence-and one school of philosophers has believed that it is impressed on matter and follows its temperament, as is indicated by Galen in certain passages-it comes into existence in matter and its possibility is related to its matter.’ And according to the theory of those who admit that it comes into existence, although it is not impressed on matter-which means that it is possible for the rational soul to direct matter-the possibility prior to the becoming is relative to matter , and although the soul is not impressed on matter, it is attached to it, for it is its directing principle and uses it as an instrument, and in this way its possibility is relative to matters
I
say
What
he says in this section is true, as will be clear to you from our explanation
of the nature of the possible.
Then
Ghazali, objecting to the philosophers, says:
And the answer is: To reduce possibility, necessity, and impossibility to rational concepts is correct, and as for the assertion that the concepts of reason form its knowledge, and knowledge implies a thing known, let them be answered: it cannot be said that receptivity of colour and animality and the other concepts, which are fixed in the mind according to the philosophers-and this is what constitutes the sciences-have no objects ; still these objects have no real existence in the external world, and the philosophers arc certainly right in saying that universals exist only in the mind, not in the external world, and that in the external world there arc only particular individuals, which arc apprehended by the senses, not by reason; and yet these individuals arc the reason why the mind abstracts from them a concept separated from its rational matter; therefore receptivity of colour is a concept, separate in the mind from blackness and whiteness, although in reality a colour which is neither black nor white nor of another colour cannot be imagined,’ and receptivity of colour is fixed in the mind without any specification-now, in the same way, it can be said that possibility is a form which exists in minds, not in the exterior world, and if this is not impossible for other concepts,, there is no impossibility in what we have said.
I say:
This
argument is sophistical because possibility is a universal which has
individuals outside the mind like all the other universals, and knowledge is
not knowledge of the universal concept, but it is a knowledge of individuals in
a universal way which the mind attains in the case of the individuals, when it
abstracts from them one common nature which is distributed among the different
matters. The nature, therefore, of the universal is not identical with the
nature of the things of which it is a universal. Ghazali
is here in error, for he assumes that the nature of possibility is the nature
of the universal, without there being individuals on which this universal, i.e.
the universal concept of possibility, depends. The universal, however, is not
the object of knowledge; on the contrary through it the things become known,
although it exists potentially in the nature of the things known;’ otherwise
its apprehension of the individuals, in so far as they are universals, would be
false. This apprehension would indeed be false if the nature of the object
known were essentially individual, not accidentally individual, whereas the
opposite is the case: it is accidentally individual, essentially universal.
Therefore if the mind did not apprehend the individuals in so far as they are
universal, it would be in error and make false judgements about them. But if it
abstracts those natures which subsist in the individual things from their
matter, and makes them universal, then it is possible that it judges them
rightly; otherwise it would confuse those natures, of which the possible is
one.
The
theory of the philosophers that universals exist only in the mind, not in the
external world, only means that the universals exist actually only in the mind,
and not in the external world, not that they do not exist at all in the
external world, for the meaning is that they exist potentially, not actually in
the external world; indeed, if they did not exist at all in the outside world
they would be false. Since universals exist outside the mind in potency and
possibilities exist outside the soul in potency, the nature of universals in
regard
to
this resembles that of possibilities. And for this reason Ghazali tried to deceive people by a sophism, for he
compared possibility to the universals because of their both being potentially
in reality, and then he assumed that the philosophers assert that universals do
not exist at all outside the soul; from which he deduced that possibility does
not exist outside the soul. What an ugly and crude sophism!
Ghazali says:
As regards their assertion that, if it were assumed that rational beings had vanished or had neglected possibility, possibility itself would not have disappeared, we answer: ‘If it were assumed that they had vanished, would not the universal concepts, i.e. the genera and species, have disappeared too?’ and if they agree to this, this can only mean that universals are only concepts in the mind; but this is exactly what we say about possibility, and there is no difference between the two cases; if they, however, affirm that they are permanent in the knowledge of God,’ the same may be said about possibility, and the argument is valid, and our aim of showing the contradiction in this theory has been attained.
I say:
This
argument shows his foolishness and proneness to contradiction. The most
plausible form in which it might be expressed would be to base it on two
premisses: the first, that the evident proposition that possibility is
partially individual, namely, outside the soul, partially universal, namely,
the universal concept of the individual possibles, is not true; and the second,
that it was said that the nature of the individual possibles outside the soul
is identical with the nature of the universal of possibility in the mind; and
in this case the possible would have neither a universal nor an individual
nature, or else the nature of the individual would have to be identical with
that of the universal. All this is presumptuous, and how should it be else, for
in a way the universal has an existence outside the soul.
Ghazali says:
And as regards their subterfuge where the impossible is concerned, that it is related to the matter qualified by its opposite, as it cannot take the place of its opposite this cannot be the case with every impossible, for that God should have a rival is impossible, but there is no matter to which this impossibility could be related. If they say the impossibility of God’s having a rival, means that the solitude of God in His essence and His uniqueness are necessary and that this solitude is proper to Him, we answer: This is not necessary, for the world exists with Him, and He is therefore not solitary. And if they say that His solitude so far as a rival is concerned is necessary, and that the opposite of the necessary is the impossible, and that the impossible is related to Him, we answer: In this case the solitude of God in regard to the world is different from His solitude in regard to His equal and in this case His solitude in regard to His rival is necessary, and in regard to the created world not necessary.’
I say:
All
this is vain talk, for it cannot be doubted that the judgments of the mind have
value only in regard to the nature of things outside the soul. If there were outside
the soul nothing possible or impossible, the judgment of the mind that things
are possible or impossible would be of as much value as no judgment at all, and
there would be no difference between reason and illusion. And that there should
be a rival to God is just as impossible in reality as God’s existence is i
necessary in reality. But there is no sense in wasting more words on this
question.
Ghazali says:
The subterfuge concerning the becoming of the souls is worthless too, for they have individual essences and a possibility prior to their becoming, and at that time there is nothing with which they could be brought into relation. Their argument contends that it is possible for matter that the souls direct it is a remote relation and, if this satisfies you, you might as well say that the possibility of the souls becoming lies in the power of Him who can on His own authority produce them, for the souls are then related to the Agent-although they are not impressed on Him-in the same way as to the body, on which they are not impressed either. And since the imprint is made neither on the one substrate nor on the other, there is no difference between the relation to the agent and that to the patient.
I say:
He
wants to force those who assume the possibility of the soul’s becoming without
there being an imprint in matter to concede that the possibility in the
recipient is like the possibility in the agent, because the act proceeds from
the agent and therefore these two possibilities are similar. But this is a
shocking supposition, for, according to it, the soul would come to the body as
if it directed it from the outside, as the artisan directs his product, and the
soul would not be a form in the body, just as the artisan is not a form in his
product. The answer is that it is not impossible that there should be amongst i
the entelechies which conduct themselves like formsb something that is separate
from its substratum as the steersman is from his ships and the artisan from his
tool, and if the body is like the instrument of the
soul,
the soul is a separate form, and then the possibility which is in the
instrument is not like the possibility which is in the agent; no, the
instrument is in both conditions, the possibility which is in the patient and
the possibility which is in the agent, and therefore the instruments are the
mover and the moved, and in so far as they are the mover, there is in them the
possibility which is in the agent, and in so far as they are moved, the
possibility which is in the recipient.’ But the supposition that the soul is a
separate entity does not force them into the admission that the possibility
which is in the recipient is identical= with the possibility which is in the
agent. Besides, the possibility which according to the philosophers is in the
agent is not only a rational judgement, but refers to something outside the
soul. Therefore his argument does not gain by assimilating one of these two
possibilities to the other. And since Ghazali
knew that all these arguments have no other effect than to bring doubts and
perplexity to those who cannot solve them-which is an act of wicked
sophists, he says:
And if it is said you have taken good care in all your objections to oppose the difficulties by other difficulties, but nothing of what you yourself have adduced is free from difficulty, we answer: the objections do show the falsity of an argument, no doubt, and certain aspects of the problem are solved in stating the opposite view and its foundation. We have not committed ourselves to anything more than to upsetting their theories, and to showing the faults in the consequence of their proofs so as to demonstrate their incoherence. We do not seek to attack from any definite point of view, and we shall not transgress the aim of this book, nor give full proofs for the temporal production of the world, for our intention is merely to refute their alleged knowledge of its eternity. But after finishing this book we shall, if it pleases God, devote a work to establishing the doctrine of truth, and we call it ‘The Golden Mean in Dogmatic Beliefs’,’ in which we shall be engaged in building up, as in this book we have been in destroying.
I say:
To
oppose difficulty with difficulty does not bring about destruction, but only perplexity
and doubts in him who acts in this way, for why should he think one of the two
conflicting theories reasonable and the opposite one vain? Most of the
arguments with which this man Ghazali opposes
the philosophers are doubts which arise when certain parts of the doctrine of
the philosophers come into conflict with others, and when those differences are
compared with each other; but this is an imperfect refutation. A perfect
refutation would be one that succeeded in showing the futility of their system
according to the facts themselves, not such a one as, for instance, his
assumption that it is permissible for the opponents of the philosophers to
claim that possibility is a mental concept in the same way as the philosophers
claim this for the universal. For if the truth of this comparison between the
two were conceded, it would not follow that it was untrue that possibility was
a concept dependent on reality, but only either that the universal existed in
the mind only was not true, or that possibility existed in the mind only was
not true. Indeed, it would have been necessary for him to begin by establishing
the truth, before starting to perplex and confuse his readers, for they might
die before they could get hold of that book, or he might have died himself
before writing it. But this book has not yet come into my hands’ and perhaps he
never composed it, and he only says that he does not base this present book on
any doctrine, in order that it should not be thought that he based it on that
of the Ash’arites. It appears from the books ascribed to him that in
metaphysics he recurs to the philosophers. And of all his books this is most
clearly shown and most truly proved in his book called The Niche for Lights.
Ghazali says:
Know that this is part of the first question, for according to the philosophers the existence of the world, having no beginning, does not end either; it is eternal, without a final term. Its disappearance and its corruption cannot be imagined; it never began to exist in the condition in which it exists’ and it will never cease to exist in the condition in which it exists.
Their four arguments which we have mentioned in our discussion of its eternity in the past refer also to its eternity in the future, and the objection is the same without any difference. They say that the world is caused, and that its cause is without beginning or end, and that this applies both to the effect and to the cause, and that, if the cause does not change, the effect cannot change either; upon this they build their proof of the impossibility of its beginning, and the same applies to its ending. This is their first proof.
The second proof is that an eventual annihilation of the world must occur alter its existence, but ‘after’ implies an affirmation of time.
The third proof is that the possibility of its existence does not end, and that therefore its possible existence may conform to the possibility.’ But this argument has no force, for we regard it as impossible that the world should not have begun, but we do not regard it as impossible that it should last eternally, if God should make it last eternally, for it is not necessary that what begins has also an end, although it is necessary for an act to have a beginning and an initial term. Only Abu Hudhail al-Allaf thought that the world must needs have an end, and he said that, as in the past infinite circular movements are impossible, so they are in the future s but this is wrong, for the whole of the future never enters into existence either simultaneously or successively, whereas the whole of the past is there simultaneously but not successively.’ And since it is clear that we do not regard the incorruptibility of the world as impossible from a rational point of view-we regard indeed its incorruptibility and corruptibility as equally possible-we know only through the Divine Law which of the two possibilities will be realized. Therefore let us not try to solve this problem by mere reason!
I say:
His
assertion that the argument of the philosophers for the eternity of the world in
the past applies also to its eternity in the future is true, and equally the
second argument applies to both cases. But his assertion that the third argument
is not equally valid for the future and for the past, that indeed we regard the
becoming of the world in the past as impossible, but that with the exception of
Abu Hudhail al-Allaf, who thought that the eternity of the world was impossible
in either direction, we do not regard its eternity in the future as absolutely
impossible, is not true. For when it was conceded to the philosophers that the
possibility of the world had no beginning and that with this possibility a
condition of extension, which could measure this possibility, was connected in
the same way as this condition of extension is connected with the possible
existent, when it is actualized, and it was also evident that this extension had
no initial term, the philosophers were convinced that time had no initial term,
for this extension is nothing but time, and to call it timeless eternitys is
senseless. And since time is connected with possibility and possibility with
existence in motion, existence in motion has no first term either. And the
assertion of the theologians that everything which existed in the past had a
first term is futile, for the First exists in the past eternally, as it exists
eternally in the future. And their distinction here between the first term and
its acts requires a proof, for the existence of the temporal which occurs in the
past is different from the existence of the eternal which occurs in the past.
For the temporal which has occurred in the past is finite in both directions,
i.e. it has a beginning and an end, but the eternal which has occurred in the
past has neither beginning nor end.’ And therefore, since the philosophers
have not admitted that the circular movement has a beginning, they cannot be
forced to admit that it has an end, for they do not regard its existence in the
past as transitory, and, if some philosopher does regard it as such, he
contradicts himself and therefore the statement is true that everything that has
a beginning has an end. That anything could have a beginning and no end is not
true, unless the possible could be changed into the eternal, for everything that
has a beginning is possible. And that anything could be liable to corruption and
at the same time could be capable of eternity is something incomprehensible’
and stands in need of examination. The ancient philosophers indeed examined this
problem, and Abu Hudhail agrees with the philosophers in saying that whatever
can be generated is corruptible, and he kept strictly to the consequence which
follows from the acceptance of the principle of becoming. As to those who make a
distinction between the past and the future, because what is in the past is
there in its totality, whereas the future never enters into existence in its
totality (for the future enters reality only successively), this is deceptive,
for what is in reality past is that which has entered time and that which has
entered time has time beyond it in both directions and possesses totality. But
that which has never entered the past in the way the temporal enters the past
can only be said in an equivocal way to be in the past; it is infinitely
extended, with the past rather than in the past, and possesses no totality in
itself, although its parts are totalities. And this, if it has no initial term
beginning in the past, is in fact time itself. For each temporal beginning is a
present, and each present is preceded by a past, and both that which exists
commensurable with time, and time commensurable with it, must necessarily be
infinite. Only the parts of time which are limited by time in both directions
can enter the past, in the same way as only the instant which is everchanging
and only the instantaneous motion of a thing in movement in the spatial
magnitude in which it moves can really enter the existence of the moved.’ And
just as we do not say that the past of what never ceased to exist in the past
ever entered existence at an instant-for this would mean that its existence had
a beginning and that time limited it in both directions-so it stands with that
which is simultaneous with time, not in time. For of the circular movements only
those that time limits enter into represented existence,’ but those that are
simultaneous with time do not afterwards enter past existence, just as the
eternally existent does not enter past existence, since no time limits it. And
when one imagines an eternal entity whose acts are not delayed after its
existence-as indeed must be the case with any entity whose existence is
perfect-then, if it is eternal and does not enter past time, it follows
necessarily that its acts also cannot enter past time, for if they did they
would be finite and this eternal existent would be eternally inactive and what
is eternally inactive is necessarily impossible. And it is most appropriate for
an entity, whose existence does not enter time and which is not limited by time,
that its acts should not enter existence either, because there is no difference
between the entity and its acts. If the movements of the celestial bodies and
what follows from them are acts of an eternal entity, the existence of which
does not enter the past, then its acts do not enter past time either. For it is
not permissible to say of anything that is eternal that it has entered past
time, nor that it has ended, for that which has an end has a beginning. For
indeed, our statement that it is eternal means the denial of its entering past
time and of its having had a beginning. He who, assuming that it entered past
time, assumes that it must have a beginning begs the question. It is, therefore,
untrue that what is coexistent with eternal existence, has entered existence,
unless the eternal existence has entered existence by entering past time.
Therefore our statement `everything past must have entered existence’ must be
understood in two ways: first, that which has entered past existence must have
entered existence, and this is a true statement; secondly, that which is past
and is inseparably connected with eternal existence cannot be truly said to have
entered existence, for our expression `entered existence’ is incompatible with
our expression `connected with eternal existence’. And there is here no
difference between act and existence. For he who concedes the existence of an
entity which has an eternal past must concede that there exist acts, too, which
have no beginning in the past. And it by no means follows from the existence of
His acts that they must have entered existence, just as it by no means follows
from the past permanency of His essence that He has ever entered existence. And
all this is perfectly clear, as you see.
Through
this First Existent acts can exist which never began and will never cease, and
if this were impossible for the act, it would be impossible, too, for existence,
for every act is connected with its existent in existence. The theologians,
however, regarded it as impossible that God’s act should be eternal, although
they regarded His existence as eternal, and that is the gravest error. To apply
the expression `production’ for the world’s creation as the Divine Law does
is more appropriate than to use it of temporal production, as the Ash’arites
did,’ for the act, in so far as it is an act, is a product, and eternity is
only represented in this act because this production and the act produced have
neither beginning nor end. And I say that it was therefore difficult for Muslims
to call God eternal and the world eternal, because they understood by
`eternal’ that which has no cause. Still I have seen some of the theologians
tending rather to our opinion.
Ghazali says:
Their fourth proof is similar to the third, for they say that if the world were annihilated the possibility of its existence would remain, as the possible cannot become impossible. This possibility is a relative attribute and according to them everything that becomes needs matter which precedes it and everything that vanishes needs matter from which it can vanish, but the matter and the elements do not vanish, only the forms and accidents vanish which were in them.
I say:
If
it is assumed that the forms succeed each other in one substratum in a circular
way and that the agent of this succession is an eternal one, nothing impossible
follows from this assumption. But if this succession is assumed to take place in
an infinite number of matters or through an infinite number of specifically
different forms, it is impossible, and equally the assumption is impassible that
such a succession could occur without an eternal agent or through a temporal
agent. For if there were an infinite number of matters, an actual infinite would
exist, and this is impossible. It is still more absurd to suppose that this
succession could occur through temporal agents, and therefore from this point of
view it is only true that a man must become from another man, on condition that
the successive series happens in one and the same matter and the perishing of
the curlier men can become the matter of the later. Besides, the existence of
the earlier men is also in some respect the efficient cause and the instrument
for the later-all this, however, in an accidental way, for those men are nothing
but the instrument for the Agent, who does not cease to produce a man by means
of a man and through the matter of a man. The student who does not distinguish
all these points will not be able to free himself from insoluble doubts. Perhaps
God will place you and us among those who have reached the utmost truth
concerning what may and must be taught about God’s infinite acts. What I have
said about all these things is not proved here, but must be examined by the
application of the conditions which the ancients have explained and the rules
which they have established for scientific research. Besides, he who would like
to be one of those who possess the truth should in any question he examines
consult those who hold divergent opinions.’
Ghazali says:
The answer to all this has been given above. I only single out this question because they have two proofs for it.
The first proof is that given by Galen, who says: If the sun, for instance, were liable to annihilation, decay would appear in it over a long period. But observation for thousands of years shows no change in its size and the fact that it has shown no loss of power through such a long time shows that it does not suffer corruption.’ There are two objections to this: The first is that the mode of this proof-that if the sun suffers corruption, it must suffer loss of power, and as the consequence is impossible the antecedent must be impossible too-is what the philosophers call a conjunctive hypothetical proposition,’ and this inference is not conclusive, because its antecedent is not true, unless it is connected with another condition. In other words the falsehood of the consequence of the proposition `if the sun suffers corruption, it must become weaker’ does not imply the falsehood of the antecedent, unless either (z) the antecedent is bound up with the additional condition that, if it suffers corruption through decay, it must do so during a long period, or () it is seriously proved that there is no corruption except through decay. For only then does the falsehood of the consequence imply the falsehood of the antecedent. Now, we do not concede that a thing can only become corrupt through decay; decay is only one form of corruption, for it is not impossible that what is in a state of perfection should suddenly suffer corruption.
I say:
He
says in his objection here to this argument that there is no necessary relation
between antecedent and consequent, because that which suffers corruption need
not become weaker, since it can suffer corruption before it has become weaker.
The conclusion, however, is quite sound, when it is assumed that the corruption
takes place in a natural way, not by violence, and it is assumed besides that
the celestial body is an animal, for all animals super corruption only in a
natural way-they necessarily decay before their corruption. However, our
opponents do not accept these premisses, so far as they concern heaven, without
proof. And therefore Galen’s statement is only of dialectical value. The
safest way to use this argument is to say that, if heaven should suffer
corruption, it would either disintegrate into the elements of which it is
composed or, losing the form it possesses, receive another, as happens with the
four elements when they change into one another. If, however, heaven passed away
into the elements, those elements would have to be part of another world, for it
could not have come into being from the elements contained in this world, since
these elements are infinitely small, compared with its size, something like a
point in relation to a circle.’ Should heaven, however, lose its form and
receive another there would exist a sixth element opposed to all the others,
being neither heaven, nor earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire. And all this is
impossible. And his statement that heaven does not decay ; is only a common
opinion, lacking the force of the immediately evident axioms; and it is
explained in the Posterior Analytics of what kind these premisses area
Ghazali says:
The second objection is that, if it were conceded to Galen that there is no corruption except through decay, how can it be known that decay does not affect the sun? His reliance on observation is impossible, for observations determine the size only by approximation, and if the sun, whose size is said to be approximately a hundred and seventy times that of the earth, decreased, for instance, by the size of mountains the difference would not be perceptible to the senses. Indeed, it is perhaps already in decay, and has decreased up to the present by the size of mountains or more; but perception cannot ascertain this, for its knowledge in the science of optics works only by supposition and approximation. The same takes place with sapphire and gold, which, according to them, are composed out of elements and which are liable to corruption. Still, if you left a sapphire for a hundred years, its decrease would be imperceptible, and perhaps the decrease in the sun during the period in which it has been observed stands in proportion to its size as the decrease of the sapphire to its size in a hundred years. This is imperceptible, and this fact shows that his proof is utterly futile.
We have abstained from bringing many proofs of the same kind as the wise disdain. We have given only this one to serve as an example of what we have omitted, and the have restricted ourselves to the four proofs which demand that their solution should be attempted in the way indicated above.
I say:
If
the sun had decayed and the parts of it which had disintegrated during the
period of its observation were imperceptible because of the size of its body,
still the effect of its decay on bodies in the sublunary world would be
perceptible in a definite degree, for everything that decays does so only
through the corruption and disintegration of its parts, and those parts which
disconnect themselves from the decaying mass must necessarily remain in the
world in their totality or change into
other parts, and in either case an appreciable change must occur in the world,
either in the number or in the character of its parts. And if the size of the
bodies could change, their actions and affections would change too, and if their
actions and affections, and especially those of the heavenly bodies, could
change, changes would arise in the sublunary world. To imagine, therefore, a
dissipation of the heavenly bodies is to admit a disarrangement in the divine
order which, according to the philosopher, prevails in this world. This proof is
not absolutely strict.
Ghazali says:
The philosophers have a second proof of the impossibility of the annihilation of the world. They say: The substance of the world could not be annihilated, because no cause could be imagined for this and the passage from existence to non-existence cannot take place without a cause. This cause must be either the Will of the Eternal, and this is impossible, for if He willed the annihilation of the world after not having willed it, He would have changed; or it must be assumed that God and His Will are in all conditions absolutely the same, although the object of His Will changes from non-existence to existence and then again from existence to non-existence. And the impossibility of which we have spoken in the matter of a temporal existence through an eternal will, holds also for the problem of annihilation. But we shall add here a still greater difficulty, namely, that the object willed is without doubt an act of the wiper, for the act of him who acts after not having acted-even if he does not alter in his own nature-must necessarily exist after having not existed: if he remained absolutely in the state he was in before, his act would not be there. But when the world is annihilated, there is no object for God’s act, and if He does not perform anything (for annihilation is nothing), how could there be an action? Suppose the annihilation of the world needed a new act in God which did not exist before, what could such an act be? Could it be the existence of the world? But this is impossible, since what happens is on the contrary the termination of its existence. Could this act then be the annihilation of the world? But annihilation is nothing at all, and it could therefore not be an act. For even in its slightest intensity an act must be existent, but the annihilation of the world is nothing existent at all; how could it then be said that he who caused it was an agent, or he who effected it its cause?`
The philosophers say that to escape this difficulty the theologians are divided into four sects and that each sect falls into an absurdity.
I say:
He
says here that the philosophers compel the theologians who admit the
annihilation of the world to draw the consequence that from the Eternal, who
produced the world, there proceeds a new act, i.e. the act of annihilation, just
as they compelled them to draw this consequence in regard to His temporal
production. About this problem everything has been said already in our
discussion of temporal production, for the same difficulties as befall the
problem of production apply to annihilation, and there is no sense in repeating
ourselves. But the special difficulty he mentions here is that from the
assumption of the world’s temporal production it follows that the act of the
agent attaches itself to non-existence, so that in fact the agent performs a
non-existing act and this seemed to all the parties too shocking to be
accepted,’ and therefore they took refuge in theories he mentions later. But
this consequence follows necessarily from any theory which affirms that the act
of the agent is connected with absolute creation-that is, the production of
something that did not exist before in potency and was not a possibility which
its agent converted from potency into actuality, a theory which affirms in fact
that the agent created it out of nothing. But for the philosophers the act of
the agent is nothing but the actualizing of what is in potency, and this act is,
according to them, attached to an existent in two ways, either
in production, by converting the thing from its potential existence into
actuality so that its non-existence is terminated, or
in destruction, by converting the thing from its actual existence into
potential existence, so that it passes into a relative non-existence. But he who
does not conceive the act of the agent in this way has to draw the consequence
that the agent’s act is attached to non-existence in both ways, in production
as in destruction; only as this seems clearer in the case of destruction, the
theologians could not defend themselves against their opponents. For it is clear
that for the man who holds the theory of absolute annihilation the agent must
perform something non-existent, for when the agent converts the thing from
existence into absolute non-existence, he directs his first intention to
something non-existent, by contrast with what happens when he converts it from
actual existence into potential existence; for in this conversion the passage
into non-existence is only a secondary fact. The same consequence applies to
production, only here it is not so obvious, for the existence of the thing
implies the annulment of its non-existence, and therefore production is nothing
but the changing of the non-existence of a thing into its existence; but since
this movement is directed towards production, the theologians could say that the
act of the agent is attached solely to production. They could not, however, say
this in regard to destruction, since this movement is directed towards
non-existence. They have, therefore, no right to say that in production the act
of the agent attaches itself only to production, and not to the annulment of
non-existence, for in production the annulment of non-existence is necessary,
and therefore the act of the agent must necessarily be attached to
non-existence. For according to the doctrine of the theologians, the existent
possesses only two conditions: a condition in which it is absolutely
non-existent and a condition in which it is actually existent., The act of the
agent, therefore, attaches itself to it, neither when it is actually existent,
nor when it is non-existent . Thus only the following alternatives remain:
either the act of the agent does not attach itself to it at all, or it attaches
itself to non-existence,’ and non-existence changes itself into existence. He
who conceives the agent in this way must regard the change of nonexistence
itself into existence, and of existence itself into non-existence, as possible,
and must hold that the act of the agent can attach itself to the conversion of
either of these opposites into the other. This is absolutely impossible in
respect to the other opposites, not to speak of non-existence and existence.
The
theologians perceived the agent in the way the weaksighted perceive the shadow
of a thing instead of the thing itself and then mistake the shadow for it. But,
as you see, all these difficulties arise for the man who has not understood that
production is the conversion of a thing from potential into actual existence,
and that destruction is the reverse, i.e. the change from the actual into the
potentials It appears from this that possibility and matter are necessarily
connected with anything becoming, and that what is subsistent in itself can be
neither destroyed nor produced.
The
theory of the Ash’arites mentioned here by Ghazali,
which regards the production of a substance, subsistent in itself, as possible,
but not so its destruction, is an extremely weak one, for the consequences which
apply to destruction apply also to production, only, it was thought, because in
the former case it is more obvious that there was here a real difference. He
then mentions the answers of the different sects to the difficulty which faces
them on the question of annihilation.
Ghazali says:
The Mu’tazilites say: the act proceeding from Him is an existent, i.e. extinction, which He does not create in a substratum; at one and the same moment it annihilates the whole world and disappears by itself, so that it does not stand in need of another extinction and thus of an infinite regress.
And
mentioning this answer to the difficulty, he says:
This is wrong for different reasons. First, extinction is not an intelligible existent, the creation of which can be supposed. Moreover, why, if it is supposed to exist, does it disappear by itself without a cause for its disappearance? Further, why does it annihilate the world? For its creation and inherence in the essence of the world are impossible, since the inherent meets its substratum and exists together with it if only in an instant; if the extinction and existence of the world could meet, extinction would not be in opposition to existence and would not annihilate it’ and, if extinction is created neither in the world nor in a substratum, where could its existence be in order to be opposed to the existence of the world? Another shocking feature in this doctrine is that God cannot annihilate part of the world without annihilating the remainder; indeed He can only create an extinction which annihilates the world in its totality, for if extinction is not in a substratum, it stands in one and the same relation to the totality of the world.
I say:
The
answer is too foolish to merit refutation. Extinction and annihilation are
synonymous, and if God cannot create annihilation,
He
cannot create extinction either. And even if we suppose extinction to be an
existent, it could at most be an accident, but an accident without a substratum
is absurd. And how can one imagine that the non-existent causes non-existence?
All this resembles the talk of the delirious.
Ghazali says:
The second sect, the Karramites, say that the act of God is annihilation, and annihilation signifies an existent which He produces in His essence and through which the world becomes non-existent. In the same way, according to them, existence arises out of the act of creation which He produces in His essence and through which the world becomes existent. Once again, this theory is wrong as it makes the Eternal a substratum for temporal production . Further it is incomprehensible, for creation and likewise annihilation cannot be understood except as an existence, related to will and power, and to establish another entity besides the will and the power and their object, the world, is inconceivable.
I say:
The
Karramites believe that there are here three factors: the agent, the act-which
they call creation-and an object, i.e. that to which the act attaches itself,
and likewise they believe that in the process of annihilation there are three
factors: the annihilator, the act-which they call annihilation-and a
non-existent. They believe that the act inheres in the essence of the agent and
according to them the rise of such a new condition’ in the agent does not
imply that the agent is determined by a temporal cause, for such a condition is
of a relative and proportional type, and a new relation and proportion does not
involve newness in the substratum; only those new events involve a change in the
substratum which change the essence of the substratum, e.g. the changing of a
thing from whiteness to blackness. Their statement, however, that the act
inheres in the essence of the agent is a mistake; it is only a relation which
exists between the agent and the object of the act which, when assigned to the
agent, is called `act’ and when assigned to the object is called `passivity’
Through this assumption the Karramites are not obliged to admit that, as the
Ash’arites believed, the Eternal produces temporal reality’ or that the
Eternal is not eternal, but the consequence which is forced upon them is that
there must be a cause anterior to the Eternal, for, when an agent acts after not
having acted, all the conditions for the existence of his object being fulfilled
at the time he did not act, there must have arisen a new quality in the agent at
the time when he acts, and each new event demands a new causes So there must be
another cause before the first, and so on ad infinitum.
Ghazali says:
The third sect is that of the Ash’arites, who say that
accidents pass away by themselves and cannot be imagined to persist, for if they
persisted they could not, for this very reason, be imagined ever to pass away.b
Substances do not persist by themselves either, but persist by a persistence
added to their existence. And if God had not created persistence, substances
would have become non-existent through the nonexistence of persistence. This too
is wrong, in so far as it denies the evidence of the senses by saying that black
and white do not persist and that their existence is continually renewed; reason
shrinks from this, as it does, too, from the statement that the body renews its
existence at each moment, for reason judges that the hair which is on a man’s
head today is identical with, not similar to, the hair that was there yesterday,
and judges the same about the black and the white.’ There is yet another
difficulty, namely, that when things persist through persistence, God’s
attributes must persist through persistence and this persistence persists
through persistence and so on ad in finitum.
I say:
This
theory of the flux of all existing things is a useless one, although many
ancients held it, and there is no end to the impossibilities it implies. How
could an existent come into existence, when it passes away by itself and
existence passes away through its passing away? If it passed away by itself, it
would have to come into existence by itself, and in this case that by which it
becomes existent would be identical with that by which it passes away and this
is impossible. For existence is the opposite of passing away, and it is not
possible that two opposites should occur in the same thing in one and the same
connexion. Therefore in a pure existent no passing away can be imagined, for if
its existence determined its passing away, it would be non-existent and existent at one and the same moment, and
this is impossible. Further, if the existents persist through the persistence of
an attribute by itself, will this absence of change in them occur through their
existence or through their non-existence? The latter is impossible, so it
follows that they persist because of their existence. If, then, all existents
must persist because they are existent, and non-existence is something that can
supervene upon them, why in Heaven’s name do we need this attribute of
persistence to make them persist? All this resembles a case of mental disorder.
But let us leave this sect, for the absurdity of their theory is too clear to
need refutation.
Ghazali says:
The fourth sect are a group of Ash’arites who say that accidents pass away by themselves, but that substances pass away when God does not create motion or rest or aggregation and disintegration in them, for it is impossible that a body should persist which is neither in motion nor at rest, since in that case it becomes non-existent. The two parties of the Ash’arites incline to the view that annihilation is not an act, but rather a refraining from acting, since they do not understand how non-existence can be an act. All these different theories being false---say the philosophers -it cannot any longer be asserted that the annihilation of the world is possible, even if one were to admit that the world had been produced in time; for although the philosophers concede that the human soul has been produced, they claim the impossibility of its annihilation by means of arguments which are very close to those we have mentioned. For, according to the philosophers, nothing that is self-subsistent and does not inhere in a substratum’ can be imagined as becoming non-existent after its existence, whether it is produced or eternal.’ If one objects against them, that when water is boiled it disappears, they answer that it does not disappear, but is only changed into steam and the steam becomes water again, and its primary matter, i.e. its hyle, the matter in which the form of water inhered, persists when the water has become air, for the hyle only loses the form of water and takes up that of air; the air, having become cold again, condenses into water, but does not receive a new matter, for the matter is common to the elements and only the forms are changed in it.
I say:
He
who affirms that accidents do not persist for two moments, and that their
existence in substances is a condition of the persistence of those substances,
does not know how he contradicts himself, for if the substances are a condition
of the existence of the accidents-since the accidents cannot exist without the
substances in which they inhere-and the accidents are assumed to be a condition
for the existence of the substances, the substances must be necessarily a
condition for their own existence; and it is absurd to say that something is a
condition for its own existence. Further, how could the accidents be such a
condition, since they themselves do not persist for two moments? For, as the
instant is at the same time the end of their privation and the beginning of
their period of existence, the substance mint be destroyed in this instant, for
in this instant there is neither anything of the privative period nor anything
of the existent. If there were in the instant anything of the privative period
or of the existent, it could not be the end of the former and the beginning of
the latter.’ And on the whole, that something which does not persist two
moments should be made a condition for the persistence of something for two
moments is absurd. Indeed, a thing that persists for two moments is more capable
of persisting than one which does not persist for two moments, for the existence
of what does not persist for two moments is at an instant, which is in flux, but
the existence of what persists for two moments is constant, and how can what is
in flux be a condition for the existence of the constant, or how can what is
only specifically persistent be a condition for the persistence of the
individually persistent? This is all senseless talk. One should know that he who
does not admit a Kyle for the corruptible must
regard the existent as simple and as not liable to corruption, for the simple
does not alter and does not exchange its substance for another substance.
Therefore Hippocrates says `if man were made out of one thing alone, he could
not suffer by himself’ ,’ i.e. he could not suffer corruption or change. And
therefore he could not have become either, but would have to be an eternal
existent. What he says here about Avicenna of the difference between the
production and the destruction of the soul is without sense.
Ghazali says, answering the
philosophers:
The answer is: So far as concerns the different sects you have mentioned, although we could defend each of them and could show that your refutation on the basis of your principle is not valid, because your own principles are liable to the same kind of objection, we will not insist on this point, but we will restrict ourselves to one sect and ask: How will you refute the man who claims that creation and annihilation take place through the will of God: if God wills, He creates, and if He wills, He annihilates, and this is the meaning of His being absolutely powerful, and notwithstanding this He does not alter in Himself, but it is only His act that alters? And concerning your objection that, inasmuch as an act must proceed from the agent, it cannot be understood which act can proceed from Him, when He annihilates, we answer: What proceeds from Him is a new fact, and the new fact is non-existence, for there was no non-existence; then it happened as something new, and this is what proceeds from Him. And if you say: Non-existence is nothing, how could it then proceed from Him? we reply: If non-existence is nothing, how could it happen? Indeed, `proceeding from Him’ does not mean anything but that its happening is related to His power. If its happening has an intelligible meaning, why should its relation to His power not be reasonable?
I say:
All
this is sophistical and wrong. The philosophers do not deny that a thing becomes
non-existent when a destroying agent destroys it; they only say that the
destroying act does not attach itself to it, in so far as the thing becomes
non-existent, but in so far as it changes from actual being to potential being,
and non-existence results from this change, and it is in this way that
non-existence is related to the agent. But it does not follow from the fact that
its non-existence occurs after the act of the agent that the agent performs it
primarily and essentially. For when it was conceded to Ghazali
during the discussion of this problem that the non-existence of the corrupting
thing will necessarily occur after the act of the corrupting agent, he drew the
conclusion that its non-existence would follow essentially and primarily from
the act, but this is impossible. For the agent’s act does not attach itself to
its non-existence in so far as it is non-existent, i.e. primarily and
essentially. And therefore , if the perceptible existences were simple, they
could neither be generated nor destroyed except through the act of the agent
being attached to their nonexistence essentially and primarily. But the act of
the agent is only attached to non-existence accidentally and secondarily through
its changing the object from actual existence into another form of existence in
an act followed by non-existence, as from the change of a fire into air there
follows the non-existence of the fire. This is the philosophical theory of
existence and non-existence.
Ghazali says:
And what is the difference between you and the man who denies absolutely that non-existence can occur to accidents and forms, and who says that non-existence is nothing at all and asks how then it could occur and be called an occurrence and a new event? But no doubt non-existence can be represented as occurring to the accidents, and to speak of it as occurring has a sense whether you call it something real or not. And the relation of this occurrence, which has a reasonable sense, to the power of the Omnipotent, also has an intelligible meaning.’
I say:
That
non-existence of this kind occurs is true, and the philosophers admit it,
because it proceeds from the agent according to a second intention and
accidentally; but it does not follow from its proceeding or from its having a
reasonable meaning that it happens essentially or primarily, and the difference
between the philosophers and those who deny the occurrence of non-existence is
that the philosophers do not absolutely deny the occurrence of non-existence,
but only its occurring primarily and essentially through the agent. For the act
of the agent does not attach itself necessarily, primarily, and essentially to
non-existence, and according to the philosophers non-existence happens only
subsequently to the agent’s act in reality. The difficulties ensue only for
those who affirm that the world can be annihilated in an absolute annihilation.
Ghazali says:
Perhaps the philosophers will answer: This difficulty is only acute for those who allow the non-existence of a thing after its existence, for those may be asked what the reality is that occurs. But according to us philosophers the existing thing does not become non-existent, for we understand by the fact that the accidents become non-existent the occurrence of their opposites, which are existing realities, and not the occurrence of mere non-existence which is nothing at all, and how could what is nothing at all be said to occur? For if hair becomes white, it is simply whiteness that occurs, for whiteness is something real; but one cannot say that what occurs is the privation of blackness.’
I say:
This
answer on behalf of the philosophers is mistaken, for the philosophers do not
deny that non-existence occurs and happens through the agent, not, however,
according to a primary intention as would be the consequence for one who assumes
that a thing can change into pure nothingness; no, non-existence, according to
them, occurs when the form of the thing that becomes non-existent disappears,
and the opposite form appears. Therefore the following objection which Ghazali
makes is valid.
Ghazali says:
This is wrong for two reasons. The first is: Does the occurrence of whiteness imply the absence of blackness? If they deny it, this is an affront to reason, and if they admit it, it may be asked: Is what is implied identical with that which implies? To admit this is a contradiction, for a thing does not imply itself, and if they deny it, it may be asked: Has that which is implied an intelligible meaning? If they deny it, we ask, `How do you know, then, that it is implied, for the judgement that it is implied presupposes that it has a sensible meaning?’ If they admit this, we ask; `Is this thing which is implied and has a sensible meaning, i.e. the absence of blackness, eternal or temporal?’ The answer `eternal’ is impossible; if they answer `temporal’, how should what is described as occurring temporally not be clearly understood? And if they answer `neither eternal nor temporal, this is absurd, for if it were said before the occurrence of whiteness that blackness was non-existent, it would be false, whereas afterwards it would be true.’ It occurred, therefore, without any doubt, and this occurrence is perfectly intelligible and must be related to the Omnipotent.
I say:
This
is an occurrence which is perfectly intelligible and must be related to the
Omnipotent, but only accidentally and not essentially, for the act of the agent
does not attach itself to absolute non-existence, nor to the non-existence of
anything, for even the Omnipotent cannot bring it about that existence should
become identical with nonexistence. The man who does not assume matter cannot be
freed from this difficulty, and he will have to admit that the act of the agent
is attached to non-existence primarily and essentially. All this is clear, and
there is no need to say more about it. The philosophers, therefore, say that the
essential principles of transitory things are two: matter and form, and that
there is a third accidental principle, privation, which is a condition of the
occurrence of what becomes, namely as preceding it: if a thing becomes, its
privation disappears, and if it suffers corruption, its privation arises.’
Ghazali says:
The second objection is that according to the philosophers there are accidents which can become non-existent otherwise than through their contrary, for instance, motion has no contrary, and the opposition between motion and rest is, according to the philosophers, only the opposition of possession and non-possession, i.e. the opposition of being and not-being, not the opposition of one being to another being,’ and the meaning of rest is the absence of motion, and, when motion ceases, rest does not supervene as its contrary, but is a pure non-existence.’ The same is the case with those qualities which belong to the class of entelechies, like the impression of the sensible species on the vitreous humour of the eyes and still more the impression of the forms of the intelligibles on the soul; they become existent without the cessation of a contrary, and their non-existence only means the cessation of their existence without the subsequent occurrence of their opposites, and their disappearance is an example of pure nonexistence which arises. The occurrence of such a non-existence is an understandable fact, and that which can be understood as occurring by itself, even if it is not a real entity, can be understood as being related to the power of the Omnipotent. Through this it is clear that, when one imagines an event as occuring through the eternal Will, it is unessential, whether the occurring event is a becoming or a vanishing.
I say:
On the contrary, when non-existence is assumed to proceed from the agent as existence proceeds from it, there is the greatest difference between the two. But when existence is assumed as a primary fact and non-existence as a secondary fact, i.e. when non-existence is assumed to take place through the agent by means of a kind of existence, i.e. when the agent transforms actual existence into potential existence by removing the actuality-which is a quality possessed by the substrate-then it is true. And from this point of view the philosophers do not regard it as impossible that the world should become non-existent in the sense of its changing into another form, b for non-existence is in this case only a subsequent occurrence and a secondary fact. But what they regard as impossible is that a thing should disappear into absolute nothingness, for then the act of the agent would have attached itself to non-existence, primarily and essentially.
Throughout
this discussion Ghazali has mistaken the
accidental for the essential, and forced on the philosophers conclusions which
they themselves regard as impossible. This is in general the character of the
discussion in this book. A more suitable name, therefore, for this book would be
`The Book of Absolute Incoherence’, or `The Incoherence of Ghazali’,
not `The Incoherence of the Philosophers’, and the best name for my book `The
Distinction between Truth and Incoherent Arguments’.’
Ghazali says:
All philosophers, except the materialists, agree that the world has a maker, and that God is the maker and agent of the world and the world is His act and His work. And this is an imposture where their principle is concerned, nay it cannot be imagined that according to the trend of their principle the world is the work of God, and this for three reasons, from the point of view of the agent, from the point of view of the act, and from the point of view of the relation common to act and agent. As concerns the first point, the agent must be willing, choosing, and knowing what he wills to be the agent of what he wills, but according to them God does not will, He has no attribute whatever, and what proceeds from Him proceeds by the compulsion of necessity. The second point is that the world is eternal, but ‘act’ implies production. And the third point is that God is unique, according to their principles, from all points of view, and from one thing-according to their principles-there can only proceed one thing. The world, however, is constituted out of diverse components; how could it therefore proceed from Him?
I say:
Ghazali’s words ‘The
agent must be willing, choosing, and knowing what he wills to be the agent of
what he wills’ are by no means self evident and cannot be accepted as a
definition of the maker of the world without a proof, unless one is justified in
inferring from the empirical to the divine. For we observe in the empirical
world two kinds of agents, one which
performs exclusively one thing and this essentially, for instance warmth
which causes heat and coldness which causes cold; and this kind is called by the
philosophers natural agents. The second kind of agents are those that perform a
certain act at one time and its opposite at another; these, acting only out of
knowledge and deliberation, are called by the philosophers voluntary and
selective agents. But the First Agent cannot be described as having either of
these two actions, in so far as these are ascribed to transitory things by the
philosophers. For he who chooses and wills lacks the things which he wills, and
God cannot lack anything He wills. And he who chooses makes a choice for himself
of the better of two things, but God is in no need of a better condition.
Further, when the willer has reached his object, his will ceases and, generally
speaking, will is a passive quality and a change, but God is exempt from
passivity and change. God is still farther distant from natural action, for the
act of the natural thing is a necessity in its substance, but is not a necessity
in the substance of the willer, and belongs to its entelechy. In addition,
natural action does not proceed from knowledge: it has, however, been proved
that God’s act does proceed from knowledge. The way in which God becomes an
agent and a willer has not become clear in this place, since there is no
counterpart to His will in the empirical world. How is it therefore possible to
assert that an agent can only be understood as acting through deliberation and
choice? For then this definition is indifferently applied to the empirical and
the divine, but the philosophers do not
acknowledge this extension of the definition, so that from their refusal to
acknowledge this definition as applying to the First Agent, it cannot be
inferred that they deny that He acts at all.
This
is, of course, self-evident and not the philosophers are impostors, but he who
speaks in this way, for an impostor is one who seeks to perplex, and does not
look for the truth. He, however, who errs while seeking the truth cannot be
called an impostor, and the philosophers, as a matter of fact, are known to seek
the truth, and therefore they are by no means impostors. There is no difference
between one who says that God wills with a will which does not resemble the
human will, and one who says that God knows through a knowledge which does not
resemble human knowledge; in the same way as the quality of His knowledge cannot
be conceived, so the quality of His will cannot be conceived.
Ghazali
says:
We will now test each of these three reasons at the same time as the illusory arguments which the philosophers give in their defence.
The first reason. We say: ‘Agent’ means someone from whom there proceeds an act with the will to act according to choice and with the knowledge of the object willed. But according to the philosophers the world stands in relation to God as the effect to the cause, in a necessary connexion which God cannot be imagined to sever, and which is like the connexion between the shadow and the man, light and the sun, but this is not an act at all. On the contrary, he who says that the lamp makes the light and the man makes the shadow uses the term vaguely, giving it a sense much wider than its definition, and uses it metaphorically, relying on the fact that there is an analogy between the object originally meant by it and the object to which it is transferred, i.e. the agent is in a general sense a cause, the lamp is the cause of the light, and the sun is the cause of luminosity; but the agent is not called a creative agent from the sole fact that it is a cause, but by its being a cause in a special way, namely that it causes through will and through choice. If, therefore, one said that neither a wall, nor a stone, nor anything inanimate is an agent, and that only animals have actions, this could not be denied and his statement would not be called false. But according to the philosophers a stone has an action, namely falling and heaviness and a centripetal tendency, just as fire has an action, namely heating, and a wall has an action, namely a centripetal tendency and the throwing of a shadow, and, according to them each of these actions proceeds from it as its agent; which is absurd.’
I say:
There are in brief two points here, the first of which is that only those who act from deliberation and choice are regarded as acting causes, and the action of a natural agent producing something else is not counted among acting causes, while the second point is that the philosophers regard the procession of the world from God as the necessary connexion obtaining between shadow and the person, and luminosity and the sun, and the downward rolling in relation to the stone, but that this cannot be called an action because the action can be separated from the agent.
I say:
All
this is false. For the philosophers believe that there are four causes: agent,
matter, form, and end. The agent is what causes some other thing to pass from
potency to actuality and from nonexistence to existence; this actualization
occurs sometimes from deliberation and choice, sometimes by nature, and the
philosophers do not call a person who throws a shadow an agent, except
metaphorically, because the shadow cannot be separated from the man, and by
common consent the agent can be separated from its object, and the philosophers
certainly believe that God is separated’ from the world and according to them
He is not to be classed with this kind of natural cause. Nor is He an agent in
the sense in which any empirical agent, either voluntary or involuntary, is; He
is rather the agent of these causes, drawing forth the Universe from
non-existence to existence and conserving it, and such an act is a more perfect
and glorious one than any performed by the empirical agents. None of these
objections therefore touch them, for they believe that God’s act proceeds from
Him through knowledge, not through any necessity which calls for it, either in
His essence or outside His essence, but through His grace and His bounty. He is
necessarily endowed with will and choice in their highest form, since the
insufficiency which is proper to the empirical willer does not pertain to Him.
And these are the very words of Aristotle in one of his metaphysical treatises:
We were asked how God could bring forth the world out of nothing, and convert it
into something out of nothing, and our answer is this: the Agent must be such
that His capacity must be proportionate to His power and His power proportionate
to His will and His will proportionate to His wisdom, if not, His capacity would
be weaker than His power, His power weaker than His will, and His will weaker
than His wisdom. And if some of His powers were weaker than others, there would
be no difference between His powers and ours, and imperfection would attach to
Him as to us-a very blasphemous theory. But in the opposite case each of these
powers is of the utmost perfection. When He wills He has the power, and when He
has the power He has the capacity and all this with the greatest wisdom. And He
exists, making what He wants out of nothing. And this is only astonishing
through this imperfection which is in us. And Aristotle said also: Everything
that is in this world is only set together through the power which is in it from
God; if this power did not exist in the things, they could not last the
twinkling of an eyes
I
say:
Composite
existence is of two classes; in the one class the composition is something
additional to the existence of the composed, but in the other the composition is
like the existence of matter and form and in these existents the existence
cannot be regarded as anterior to the composition, but on the contrary the
composition is the cause of their existence and anterior to it. If God therefore
is the cause of the composition of the parts of the world, the existence of
which is in their composition, then He is the cause of their existence and
necessarily he who is the cause of the existence of anything whatever is its
agent. This is the way in which according to the philosophers this question must
be understood, if their system is truly explained to the student.
Ghazali
says, speaking on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers may say: we call an object anything that has no necessary existence by itself, but exists through another, and we call its cause the agent, and we do not mind whether the cause acts by nature or voluntarily, just as you do not mind whether it acts by means of an instrument or without an instrument, and just as ‘act’ is a genus subdivided into ‘acts which occur by means of an instrument’ and ‘acts which occur without an instrument’, so it is a genus subdivided into ‘acts which occur by nature’ and ‘acts which occur voluntarily’. The proof is that, when we speak of an act which occurs by nature, our words ‘by nature’ are not contradictory to the term ‘act’; the words ‘by nature’ are not used to exclude or contradict the idea of act, but are meant only to explain the specific character of the act, just as, when we speak of an act effected directly without an instrument, there is no contradiction, but only a specification and an explanation. And when we speak of a ‘voluntary act’, there is not a redundancy as in the expression a ‘living being-man’;’ it is only an explanation of its specific character, like the expression, ‘act performed by means of an instrument’. If, however, the word ‘act’ included the idea of will, and will were essential to act, in so far as it is an act, our expression ‘natural act’ would be a contradiction.
I say:
The
answer, in short, has two parts. The first is that everything that is necessary
through another thing is an object of what is necessary by itself,z but this can
be opposed, since that through which the ‘necessary through another’ has its
necessary existence need not be an agent, unless by ‘through which it has its
necessary existence’ is meant that which is really an agent, i.e. that which
brings potency into act. The second part is that the term ‘agent’ seems like
a genus for that which acts by choice and deliberation and for that which acts
by nature; this is true, and is proved by our definition of the term
‘agent’. Only this argument wrongly creates the impression that the
philosophers do not regard the first agent as endowed with will. And this
dichotomy that everything is either of necessary existence by itself or existent
through another is not self-evident.
Ghazali, refuting the philosophers,
says:
This designation is wrong, for we do not call any cause whatsoever an agent, nor any effect an object; for, if this were so, it would be not right to say that the inanimate has no act and that only the living exhibit acts-a statement generally admitted.
I
say:
His assertion that not every cause is called an
agent is true, but his argument that the inanimate is not called an agent is
false, for the denial that the inanimate exhibits acts excludes only the
rational and voluntary act, not act absolutely, for we find that certain
inanimate things have powers to actualize things like themselves; e.g. fire,
which changes anything warm and dry
into another fire like itself, through converting it from what it has in potency
into actuality. Therefore fire cannot make a fire like itself in anything that
has not the potency or that is not in readiness to receive the actuality of
fire. The theologians, however, deny that fire is an agent, and the discussion
of this problem will follow later. Further, nobody doubts that there are in the
bodies of animals powers which make the food a part of the animal feeding itself
and generally direct the body of the animal. If we suppose them withdrawn, the
animal would die, as Galen says. And through this direction we call it alive,
whereas in the absence of these powers we call it dead.
Ghazali goes on:
If the inanimate is called an agent, it is by metaphor, in the same way as it is spoken of metaphorically as tending and willing, since it is said that the stone falls down, because it tends and has an inclination to the centre, but in reality tendency and will can only be imagined in connexion with knowledge and an object desired and these can only be imagined in animals.
I say:
If
by ‘agent’ or ‘tendency’ or ‘willing’ is meant the performance of an
act of a willer, it is a metaphor, but when by these expressions is meant that
it actualizes another’s potency, it is really an agent in the full meaning of
the word.
Ghazali
then says:
When the philosophers say that the term ‘act’ is a genus which is subdivided into ‘natural act’ and ‘voluntary act’, this cannot he conceded; it is as if one were to say that ‘willing’ is a genus which is subdivided into willing accompanied by knowledge of the object willed, and willing without knowledge of the object willed. This is wrong, because will necessarily implies knowledge, and likewise act necessarily implies will.
I say:
The
assertion of the philosophers that ‘agent’ is subdivided into
‘voluntary’ and ‘non-voluntary agent’ is true, but the comparison with a
division of will into rational and irrational is false, because in the
definition of will knowledge is included, so that the division has no sense. But
in the definition of ‘act’ knowledge is not included, because actualization
of another thing is possible without knowing it. This is clear, and therefore
the wise say that God’s word: ‘a wall which wanted to fall to pieces” is a
metaphor.
Ghazali proceeds:
When you affirm that your expression ‘natural act’ is not a contradiction in terms you are wrong; there is as a matter of fact a contradiction when ‘natural act’ is taken in a real sense, only this contradiction is not at once evident to the understanding nor is the incompatibility of nature and act felt acutely, because this expression is employed metaphorically; for since nature is in a certain way a cause and the agent is also a cause, nature is called an agent metaphorically. The expression ‘voluntary act’ is as much redundant as the expression ‘he wills and knows what he wills’.
I say:
This
statement is undoubtedly wrong, for what actualizes another thing, i.e. acts on
it, is not called agent simply by a metaphor, but in reality, for the definition
of ‘agent’ is appropriate to it. The division of ‘agent’ into
‘natural’ and ‘voluntary agent’ is not the division of an equivocal
term, but the division of a genus. Therefore the division of ‘agent’ into
‘natural’ and ‘voluntary agent’ is right, since that which actualizes
another can also be divided into these two classes.
Ghazali says:
However, as it can happen that ‘act’ is used metaphorically and also in its real sense, people have no objection in saying ‘someone acted voluntarily’, meaning that he acted not in a metaphorical sense, but really, in the way in which it is said ‘he spoke with his tongue’, or ‘he saw with his eye’. For, since one is permitted to rise ‘heart’ metaphorically for ‘sight’, and motion of the head or hand for word-for one can say ‘He nodded assent’-it is not wrong to say ‘He spoke with his tongue and he saw with his eye’, in order to exclude any idea of metaphor. This is a delicate point, but let us be careful to heed the place where those stupid people slipped.
I say:
Certainly it is a delicate point that a man with scientific pretensions should give such a bad example and such a false reason to explain the repugnance people seem to have in admitting the division of ‘act’ into ‘natural’ and ‘voluntary act’. No one ever says ‘He saw with his eye, and he saw without his eye’ in the belief that this is a division of sight; we only say ‘He saw with his eye’ to emphasize the fact that real sight is meant, and to exclude the metaphorical sense of ‘sight’. And the intelligent in fact think that for the man who understands immediately that the real meaning is intended, this connecting of sight with the eye is almost senseless. But when one speaks of ‘natural’ and ‘voluntary act’, no intelligent person disagrees that we have here a division of ‘act’. If, however, the expression ‘voluntary act’ were similar to ‘sight with the eye’ the expression ‘natural act’ would be metaphorical. But as a matter of fact the natural agent has an act much more stable than the voluntary agent, for the natural agent’s act is constant-which is not the case with the act of the voluntary agent. And therefore the opponents of the theologians might reverse the argument against them and say that ‘natural act’ is like ‘sight with the eye’ and ‘voluntary act’ is a metaphor-especially according to the doctrine of the Ash’arites, who do not acknowledge a free will in man and a power to exercise an influence on reality. And if this is the case with the agent in the empirical world, how can we know that it is an accurate description of the real Agent in the divine world to say that He acts through knowledge and will?
Ghazali
says, speaking on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers may reply: The designation ‘agent’ is known only through language. However, it is clear to the mind that the cause of a thing can be divided into voluntary and non-voluntary cause, and it may be disputed whether or not in both cases the word ‘act’ is used in a proper sense, but it is not possible to deny this since the Arabs say that fire burns, a sword cuts, that snow makes cold, that scammony purges, that bread stills hunger and water thirst, and our expression ‘he beats’ means he performs the act of beating, and ‘it burns’ it performs the act of burning, and ‘he cuts’ he performs the act of cutting; if you say, therefore, that its use is quite metaphorical, you are judging without any evidence.
I say:
I This, in short, is a common-sense argument. The
Arabs indeed call that which exerts
an influence on a thing, even if not voluntary, an agent, in a proper, not in a
metaphorical, sense. This argument, however, is dialectical and of no
importance.
Ghazali
replies to this:
The answer is that all this is said in a metaphorical way and that only a voluntary act is a proper act. The proof is that, if we assume an event which is based on two facts, the one voluntary, the other involuntary, the mind relates the act to the voluntary fact. Language expresses itself in the same way, for if a man were to throw another into a fire and kill him, it is the man who would be called his killer, not the fire. If, however, the term were used in the same sense of the voluntary and the non-voluntary, and it were not that the one was a proper sense, the other a metaphorical, why should the killing be related to the voluntary, by language, usage, and reason, although the fire was the proximate cause of the killing and the man who threw the other into the fire did nothing but bring man and fire together? Since, however, the bringing together is a voluntary act and the influence of the fire non-voluntary, the man is called a killer and the fire only metaphorically so. This proves that the word ‘agent’ is used of one whose act proceeds from his will, and, behold, the philosophers do not regard God as endowed with will and choice.
I
say:
This
is an answer of the wicked who heap fallacy on fallacy. Ghazali is above this, but perhaps the people of his time obliged
him to write this book to safeguard himself against the suspicion of sharing the
philosophers’ view. Certainly nobody attributes the act to its instrument, but
only to its first mover. He who killed a man by fire is in the proper sense the
agent and the fire is the instrument of the killing, but when a man is burned by
a fire, without this fact’s depending on someone’s choice, nobody would say
that the fire burned him metaphorically. The fallacy he employs here is the
wellknown one a dicto secundum quid ad
dictum simpliciter, e.g. to say of a negro, because his teeth are white,
that he is white absolutely. The philosophers do not deny absolutely that God
wills, for He is an agent through knowledge and from knowledge, and He performs
the better of two contrary acts, although both are possible; they only affirm
that He does not will in the way that man wills.
Ghazali says, answering in defence of
the philosophers:
If the philosophers say: We do not mean anything by God’s being an agent but that He is the cause of every existent besides Himself and that the world has its subsistence through Him, and if the Creator did not exist, the existence of the world could not be imagined. And if the Creator should be supposed non-existent, the world would be non-existent too, just as the supposition that the sun was non-existent would imply the non-existence of light. This is what we mean by His being an agent. If our opponents refuse to give this meaning to the word ‘act’, well, we shall not quibble about words.
I
say:
Such
an answer would mean that the philosophers would concede to their opponents that
God is not an agent, but one of those causes without which a thing cannot reach
its perfection; and the answer is wrong, for against them it might be deduced
from it that the First Cause is a principle, as if it were the form of the
Universe, in the way the soul is a principle for the body; no philosopher,
however, affirms this.
Then
Ghazali says, answering the philosophers:
We say: Our aim is to show that such is not the meaning of ‘act’ and ‘work’. These words can mean only that which really proceeds from the will. But you reject the real meaning of ‘act’, although you use this word, which is honoured amongst Muslims. But one’s religion is not perfect when one uses words deprived of their sense. Declare therefore openly that God has no act, so that it becomes clear that your belief is in opposition to the religion of Islam, and do not deceive by saying that God is the maker of the world and that the world is His work, for you use the words, but reject their real sense!
I say:
This
would indeed be a correct conclusion against the philosophers, if they should
really say what Ghazali makes them say. For in
this case they could indeed be forced to admit that the world has neither a
natural nor a voluntary agent, nor that there is another type of agents besides
these two. He does not unmask their imposture by his words, but lie himself
deceives by ascribing to them theories which they do not hold.
Ghazali says:
The second reason for denying that the world is according to the principle of the philosophers an act of God is based on the implication of the notion of an act. ‘Act’ applies to temporal production, but for them the world is eternal and is not produced in time. The meaning of ‘act’ is ‘to convert from not-being into being by producing it’ and this cannot be imagined in the eternal, as what exists already cannot be brought into existence. Therefore ‘act’ implies a temporal product, but according to them the world is eternal; how then could it be God’s act?
I say:
If
the world were by itself eternal and existent (not in so far as it is moved, for
each movement is composed of parts which are produced), then, indeed, the world
would not have an agent at all. But if the meaning of ‘eternal’ is that it
is in everlasting production and that this production has neither beginning nor
end, certainly the term ‘production’ is more truly applied to him who brings
about an everlasting production than to him who procures a limited production.
In this way the world is God’s product and the name ‘production’ is even
more suitable for it than the word ‘eternity’, and the philosophers only
call the world eternal to safeguard themselves against the word ‘product’ in
the sense of ‘a thing produced after a state of nonexistence, from something,
and in time’.
Then Ghazali
says, on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers may perhaps say: The meaning of ‘product’ is ‘that which exists after its non-existence’. Let us therefore examine if what proceeds from the agent when He produces, and what is connected with Him, is either pure existence, or pure non-existence, or both together. Now, it is impossible to say that previous non-existence was connected with Him, since the agent cannot exert influence upon non-existence, and it is equally impossible to say ‘both together’, for it is clear that nonexistence is in no way connected with the agent, for non-existence qua non-existence needs no agent at all. It follows therefore that what is connected with Him is connected with Him in so far as it is an existent, that what proceeds from Him is pure existence, and that there is no other relation to Him than that of existence. If existence is regarded as everlasting, then this relation is everlasting, and if this relation is everlasting, then the term to which this relation refers is the most illustrious and the most enduring in influence, because at no moment is non-existence connected with it. Temporal production implies therefore the contradictory statements that it must be connected with an agent, that it cannot be produced, if it is not preceded by non-existence, and that non-existence cannot be connected with the agent.
And if previous non-existence is made a condition of the existent, and it is said that what is connected with the agent is a special existence, not any existence, namely an existence preceded by non-existence, it may be answered that its being preceded by non-existence cannot be an act of an agent or a deed of a maker, for the procession of this existence from its agent cannot be imagined, unless preceded by non-existence; neither, therefore , can the precedence of this non-existence be an act of the agent and connected with him, nor the fact that this existence is preceded by non-existence. Therefore to make non-existence a condition for the act’s becoming an act is to impose as a condition one whereby the agent cannot exert any influence under any condition.’
I say:
This
is an argument put forward on this question by Avicenna from the philosophical
side. It is sophistical, because Avicenna leaves out one of the factors which a
complete division would have to state.
For
he says that the act of the agent must be connected either with an existence or
with a non-existence, previous to it and in so far as it is non-existence, or
with both together, and that it is impossible that it should be connected with
non-existence, for the agent does not bring about non-existence and, therefore,
neither can it effect both together. Therefore the agent can be only connected
with existence, and production is nothing but the connexion of act with
existence, i.e. the act of the agent is only bringing into existence,’ and it
is immaterial whether this existence be preceded by non-existence or not. But
this argument is faulty, because the act of the agent is only connected with
existence in a state of non-existence, i.e. existence in potentiality, and is
not connected with actual existence, in so far as it is actual, nor with
non-existence, in so far as it is non-existent. It is only connected with
imperfect existence in which non-existence inheres. The act of the agent is not
connected with non-existence, because non-existence is not actual; nor is it
connected with existence which is not linked together with non-existence, for
whatever has reached its extreme perfection of existence needs neither causation
nor cause. But existence which is linked up with non-existence only exists as
long as the producer exists. The only way to escape this difficulty is to assume
that the existence of the world has always been and will always be linked
together with non-existence, as is the case with movement, which is always in
need of a mover. And the acknowledged philosophers believe that such is the case
with the celestial world in its relation to the Creator, and a fortiori with the
sublunary world. Here lies the difference between the created and the
artificial, for the artificial product, once produced, is not tied up with
non-existence which would be in need of an agent for the continued sustenance of
the product.’
Ghazali
continues:
And your statement, theologians, that what exists cannot be made to exist, if you mean by it, that its existence does not begin after its nonexistence, is true; but if you mean that it cannot become an effect at the time when it exists, we have shown that it can only become an effect at the time when it exists, not at the time when it does not exist. For a thing only exists when its agent causes it to exist, and the agent only causes it to exist at the time when, proceeding from it, it exists, not when the thing does not exist; and the causation is joined with the existence of the agent and the object, for causation is the relation between cause and effect. Cause, effect, and causation are simultaneous with existence and there is no priority here, and therefore there is causation only for what exists, if by ‘causation’ is meant the relation through which the agent and its object exist. The philosophers say: It is for this reason that we have come to the conclusion that the world, which is the work of God, is without beginning and everlasting, and that never at any moment was God not its agent, for existence is what is joined with the agent and as long as this union lasts existence lasts, and, if this union is ever discontinued, existence ceases. It is by no means what you theologians mean, that if the Creator were supposed to exist no longer, the world could still persist; you, indeed, believe that the same relation prevails as between the builder and the building, for the building persists when the builder has disappeared. But the persistence of the building does not depend on the builder, but on the strength of the structure in its coherence, for if it had not the power of coherence-if it were like water, for example-it would not be supposed to keep the shape which it received through the act of the agent.’
I
say:
Possibly
the world is in such a condition, but in general this argument is not sound. For
it is only true that the causing agent is always connected with the effect , in
so far as the effect actually exists without this actuality’s having any
insufficiency and any potency, if one imagines that the essence of the effect
lies in its being an effect, for then the effect can only be an effect
through the causation of the agent. But if its becoming an effect through a
cause is only an addition to its essence, then it is not necessary that its
existence should cease when the relation between the causing agent and the
effect is interrupted. If, however, it is not an addition, but its essence
consists in this relation of being an effect, then what Avicenna says is true.
However, it is not true of the world, for the world does not exit on account of
this relation, but it exists on account of its substance and the relation is
only accidental to it. Perhaps what Avicenna says is true concerning the forms
of the celestial bodies, in so far as they perceive the separate immaterial
forms; and the philosophers affirm this, because it is proved that there are
immaterial forms whose existence consists in their thinking, whereas knowledge
in this sublunary world only differs from its object because its object inheres
in matter.’
Ghazali, answering the philosophers,
says:
Our answer is that the act is connected with the agent only in so far as it comes into being, but not in so far as it is preceded by non-existence nor in so far as it is merely existent. According to us the act is not connected with the agent for a second moment after its coming to be, for then it exists; it is only connected with it at the time of its coming to be in so far as it comes to be and changes from non-existence into existence. If it is denied the name of becoming, it cannot be thought to be an act nor to be connected with the agent. Your statement, philosophers, that a thing’s coming to be means its being preceded by non-existence, and that its being preceded by non-existence does not belong to the act of the agent and the deed of the producer, is true; but this prior non-existence is a necessary condition for the existent’s being an act of the agent. For existence not preceded by non-existence is everlasting, and cannot be truly said to be an act of the agent. Not all conditions necessary to make an act an act need proceed from the agent’s act; the essence, power, will, and knowledge of the agent are a condition of his being an agent, but do not derive from him. An act can only be imagined as proceeding from an existent, and the existence, will, power, and knowledge of the agent are a condition of his being an agent, although they do not derive from him.’
I
say:
All this is true. The act of the agent is only
connected with the effect, in so far as it is moved, and the movement from
potential to actual being is what is called becoming. And, as Ghazali
says, nonexistence is one of the conditions for the existence of a movement
through a mover. Avicenna’s argument that when it is a condition for the act
of the agent to be connected with the existence, the absence of this connexion
implies that the agent is connected with its opposite, i.e. non-existence, is
not true. But the philosophers affirm that there are existents whose essential
specific differences consist in motion, e.g. the winds and so on; and the
heavens and the sublunary bodies belong to the genus of existents whose
existence lies in their movement, and if this is true, they are eternally in a
continual becoming. And therefore, just as the eternal existent is more truly
existent than the temporal, similarly that which is eternally in becoming is
more truly coming to be than that which comes to be only during a definite time.
And if the substance of the world were not in this condition of continual
movement, the world would not, after its existence, need the Creator, just as a
house after being completed and finished does not need the builder’s
existence, unless that were true which Avicenna tried to prove in the preceding
argument, that the existence of the world consists only in its relation to the
agent; and we have already said that we agree with. him so far as this concerns
the forms of the heavenly bodies.
Therefore the world is during the time of its
existence in need of the presence of its agent for both reasons together,
namely, because the substance of the world is continually in motion and because
its form, through which it has its subsistence and existence, is of the nature
of a relation, not of the nature of a quality, i.e. the shapes and states which
have been enumerated in the chapter on quality. A form which belongs to the
class of quality, and is included in it, is, when it exists and its existence is
finished, in no need of an agent. All this will solve the problem for you, and
will remove from you the perplexity which befalls man through these
contradictory statements.’
Ghazali
says, on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers might say: If you acknowledge that it is possible that the act should be simultaneous with the agent and not posterior to it, it follows that if the agent is temporal the act must be temporal, and if the agent is eternal the act must be eternal. But to impose as a condition that the act must be posterior in time to the agent is impossible, for when a man moves his finger in a bowl of water, the water moves at the same time as the finger, neither before nor after, for if the water moved later than the finger, finger and water would have to be in one and the same space before the water disconnected itself, and if the water moved before the finger, the water would be separated from the finger and notwithstanding its anteriority would be an effect of the finger performed for its sake. But if we suppose the finger eternally moving in the water, the movement of the water will be eternal too, and will be, notwithstanding its eternal character, an effect and an object, and the supposition of eternity does not make this impossible. And such is the relation between the world and God.
I say:
This
is true in so far as it concerns the relation of movement and mover, but in
regard to the stable existent or to that which exists without moving or resting
by nature (if there exist such things ) and their relation to their cause, it is
not trues Let us therefore admit this relation between the agent and the world
only in so far as the world is in motion. As for the fact that the act of every
existent must be conjoined with its existence, this is true, unless something
occurs to this existent which lies outside its nature, or one or another
accident occurs to it,b and it is immaterial whether this act be natural or
voluntary. See, therefore, what the Ash’arites did who assumed an eternal
existent, but denied that He acted during His eternal existence, but then,
however, allowed this agent to act eternally in the future, so that the eternal
existence of the Eternal would become divided into two parts, an eternal past
during which He does not act and an eternal future during which He acts! But for
the philosophers all this is confusion and error.
Ghazali
answers the philosophers on the question of priority:
We do not say that the simultaneity of agent and act is impossible, granted that the act is temporal, e.g. the motion of the water, for this happens after its non-being and therefore it can be an act, and it is immaterial whether this act be posterior to the agent or simultaneous with him. It is only an eternal act that we consider impossible, for to call an act that which does not come into being out of not-being is pure metaphor and does not conform to reality. As to the simultaneity of cause and effect, cause and effect can be either both temporal or both eternal, in the way in which it may be said that the eternal knowledge is the cause of the fact that the Eternal is knowing; we are not discussing this, but only what is called an act. For the effect of a cause is not called the act of a cause, except metaphorically. It can only be called an act on condition that it comes into being out of non-being. And if a man thinks he may describe the everlasting Eternal metaphorically as acting on something, what he thinks possible is only the use of a metaphor. And your argument, philosophers-that if we suppose the movement of the water to be eternal and everlasting with the movement of the finger, this does not prevent the movement of the water from being an act-rests on a confusion, for the finger has no act, the agent is simply the man to whom the finger belongs, that is the man who wills the movement; and, if we suppose him to be eternal, then the movement of the finger is his act, because every part of this movement comes out of not-beings and in this sense it is an act. So far as the motion of the water is concerned, we do not say that it occurs through the act of this man-it is simply an act of God. In any case, it is only an act in so far as it has come to be, and if its coming to be is everlasting, it is still an act, because it has come to be.
Then
Ghazali gives the philosophers’ answer:
The philosophers may say: ‘If you acknowledge that the relation of the act to the agent, in so far as this act is an existent, is like the relation of effect and cause and you admit that the causal relation may be everlasting, we affirm that we do not understand anything else by the expression “that the world is an act” than that it is an effect having an everlasting relation to God. Speak of this as an “act” or not just as you please, for do not let us quibble about words when their sense has once been established.’
Ghazali says:
Our answer is that our aim in this question is to show that you philosophers use those venerable names without justification, and that God according to you is not a true agent, nor the world truly His act, and that you apply this word metaphorically-not in its real sense. This has now been shown.
I say:
In
this argument he supposes that the philosophers concede to him that they only
mean by God’s agency that He is the cause of the world, and nothing else, and
that cause and effect are simultaneous. But this would mean that the
philosophers had abandoned their original statement, for the effect follows only
from its cause, in so far as it is a formal or final cause, but does not
necessarily follow from its efficient cause, for the efficient cause frequently
exists without the effect’s existing. Ghazali
acts here like a guardian who tries to extract from his ward the confession
of having done things he did not allow him to do. The philosophers’
theory, indeed, is that the world has an agent acting from eternity and
everlasting, i.e. converting the world eternally from non-being into being. This
question was formerly a point of discussion between Aristotelians and
Platonists. Since Plato believed in a beginning of the world, there could not in
his system be any hesitation in assuming a creative agent for the world. But
since Aristotle supposed the world to be eternal, the Platonists raised
difficulties against him, like the one which occupies us here, and they said
that Aristotle did not seem to admit a creator of the world. If was therefore
necessary for the Aristotelians to defend him with arguments which establish
that Aristotle did indeed believe that the world has a creator and an agent.
This will be fully explained in its proper place.
The
principal idea is that according to the Aristotelians the celestial bodies
subsist through their movement, and that He who bestows this movement is in
reality the agent of this movement and, since the existence of the celestial
bodies only attains its perfection through their being in motion, the giver of
this motion is in fact the agent of the celestial bodies. Further, they prove
that God is the giver of the unity through which the world is united, and the
giver of the unity which is the condition of the existence of the composite;
that is to say, He provides the existence of the parts through which the
composition occurs, because this action of combining is their cause (as is
proved), and such is the relation of the First Principle to the whole world. And
the statement that the act has come to be, is true, for it is movement, and the
expression ‘eternity’ applied to it means only that it has neither a first
nor a last term. Thus the philosophers do not mean by the expression
‘eternal’ that the world is eternal through eternal constituents,s for the
world consists of movement. And since the Ash’arites did not understand this,
it was difficult for them to attribute eternity at the same time to God and to
the world. Therefore the term’ eternal becoming’ is more appropriate to the
world than the term ‘eternity’.
Ghazali
says:
The third reason why it is impossible for the philosophers to admit according to their principle that the world is the act of God is because of a condition which is common to the agent and the act, namely, their assertion that out of the one only one can proceed. Now the First Principle is one in every way, and the world is composed out of different constituents. Therefore according to their principle it cannot be imagined that the world is the act of God.
I say:
If
one accepts this principle, and its consequences, then indeed the answer is
difficult. But this principle has only been put forward by the later
philosophers of Islam.’
Then
Ghazali says, on behalf of the philosophers:
The philosophers may say perhaps: The world in its totality does not proceed from God without a mediator; what proceeds from Him is one single existent, and this is the first of the created principles, namely, abstract intellect, that is a substance subsisting by itself, not possessing any volume, knowing itself and knowing its principle, which in the language of the Divine Law is called ‘angel’. From it there proceeds a third principle, and from the third a fourth, and through this mediation the existent beings come to be many. The differentiation and multiplicity of the act can proceed either from a differentiation in active powers, in the way that we act differently through the power of passion and through the power of anger; or through a differentiation of matters, as the sun whitens a garment which has been washed, blackens the face of man, melts certain substances and hardens others; or through a differentiation of instruments, as one and the same carpenter saws with a saw, cuts with an axe, bores with an awl;’ or this multiplication of the act can proceed through mediation, so that the agent does one act, then this act performs another act, and in this way the act multiplies. All these divisions are impossible in the First Principle, because there is no differentiation nor duality, nor multiplicity in His essence, as will be proved in the proofs of His unity. And there is here neither a differentiation of matters-and the very discussion refers to the first effect, which is, for example, primary matter, nor a differentiation of the instrument, for there is no existent on the same level as God-and the very discussion refers to the coming into existence of the first instrument. The only conclusion possible is that the multiplicity which is in the world proceeds from God through mediation, as has been stated previously.
I say:
This
amounts to saying that from the One, if He is simple, there can proceed only
one. And the act of the agent can only be differentiated and multiplied either
through matters (but there are no matters where He is concerned), or through an
instrument (but there is no instrument with Him). The only conclusion therefore
is that this happens through mediation, so that first the unit proceeds from
Him, and from this unit another, and from this again another, and that it is in
this way that plurality comes into existence.
Then Ghazali
denies this, and says:
We answer: The consequence of this would be that there is nothing in the world composed of units, but that everything that exists is simple and one, and each unit is the effect of a superior unit and the cause of an inferior, till the series ends in an effect which has no further effect, just as the ascending series ends in a cause which has no other cause. But in reality it is not like this, for, according to the philosophers, body is composed of form and Kyle, and through this conjunction there arises one single thing; and man is composed out of body and soul and body does not arise out of soul, nor soul out of body: they exist together through another cause. The sphere, too, is, according to them, like this, for it is a body possessing a soul and the soul does not come to be through the body, nor the body through the soul; no, both proceed from another cause. How do these compounds, then, come into existence? Through one single cause? But then their principle that out of the one only one arises is false. Or through a compound cause? But then the question can be repeated in the case of this cause, till one necessarily arrives at a point where the compound and the simple meet. For the First Principle is simple and the rest are compound, and this can only be imagined through their contact. But wherever this contact takes place, this principle, that out of the one only one proceeds, is false.
I say:
This
consequence, that everything which exists is simple, is a necessary consequence
for the philosophers, if they assume that the First Agent is like a simple agent
in the empirical world. But this consequence is binding only upon the man who
applies this principle universally to everything that exists. But the man who
divides existents into abstract existents and material, sensible existents,
makes the principles to which the sensible existent ascends different from the
principles to which the intelligible existent ascends, for he regards as the
principles of the sensible existents matter and form, and he makes some of these
existents the agents of others, till the heavenly body is reached, and he makes
the intelligible substances ascend to a first principle which is a principle to
them, in one way analogous to a formal cause, in another analogous to a final
cause, and in a third way analogous to an efficient cause. All this has been
proved in the works of the philosophers, and we state
this proposition here only in a general way. Therefore these difficulties
do not touch them. And this is the theory of Aristotle.’
About
this statement-that out of the one only one proceeds-all ancient philosophers
were agreed, when they investigated the first principle of the world in a
dialectical way (they mistook this investigation, however, for a real
demonstration), and they all came to the conclusion that the first principle is
one and the same for everything, and that from the one only one can proceed.
Those two principles having been established, they started to examine where
multiplicity comes from. For they had already come to the conclusion that the
older theory was untenable. This theory held that the first principles are two,
one for the good, one for the bad; for those older philosophers did not think
that the principles of the opposites could be one and the same; they believed
that the most general opposites which comprehend all opposites are the good and
the bad, and held therefore that the first principles must be two. When,
however, after a close examination, it was discovered that all things tend to
one end, and this end is the order which exists in the world, as it exists in an
army through its leader, and as it exists in cities through their government,
they came to the conclusion that the world must have one highest principle; and
this is the sense of the Holy Words ‘If there were in heaven and earth gods
beside God, both would surely have been corrupted’. They believed therefore,
because of the good which is present in everything, that evil occurs only in an
accidental way, like the punishments which good governors of cities ordain; for
they are evils instituted for the sake of the good, not by primary intention.
For there exist amongst good things some that can only exist with an admixture
of evil, for instance, in the being of man who is composed of a rational and an
animal soul. Divine Wisdom has ordained, according to these philosophers, that a
great quantity of the good should exist, although it had to be mixed with a
small quantity of evil, for the existence of much good with a little evil is
preferable to the non-existence of much good because of a little evidence.
Since
therefore these later philosophers were convinced that the first principle must
of necessity be one and unique, and this difficulty about the one occurred, they
gave three answers to this question. Some, like Anaxagoras and his school,
believe that plurality is only introduced through matter,’ some believe that
plurality is introduced through the instruments, and some believe that plurality
comes only through the mediators; and the first who assumed this was Plato. This
is the most convincing answer, for in the case of both the other solutions one
would have to ask again; from where does the plurality come in the matters and
in the instruments? But this difficulty touches anyone
who acknowledges that from the one only one can proceed: he has to
explain how plurality can derive from the one. Nowadays, however, the contrary
of this theory, namely, that out of the one all things proceed by one first
emanation, is generally accepted, and with our contemporaries we need discuss
only this latter statement.
The
objection which Ghazali raises against the
Peripatetics, that, if plurality were introduced through mediators, there could
only arise a plurality of qualitatively undifferentiated agglomerates which
could only form a quantitative plurality, does not touch them. For the
Peripatetics hold that there exists a twofold plurality, the plurality of simple
beings, those beings namely that do not exist in matter, and that some of these
are the causes of others and that they all ascend to one unique cause which is
of their own genus, and is the first being of their genus, and that the
plurality of the heavenly bodies only arises from the plurality of these
principles; and that the plurality of the sublunary world comes only from matter
and form and the heavenly bodies. So the Peripatetics are not touched by this
difficulty. The heavenly bodies are moved primarily through their movers, which
are absolutely immaterial, and the forms of these heavenly bodies are acquired
from these movers and the forms in the sublunary world are acquired from the
heavenly bodies and also from each other, indifferently, whether they are forms
of the elements which are in imperishable prime matters or forms of bodies
composed out of the elements, and, indeed, the composition in this sublunary
world arises out of the heavenly bodies. This is their theory of the order which
exists in the world. The reasons which led the philosophers to this theory
cannot be explained here, since they built it on many principles and
propositions, which are proved in many sciences and through many sciences in a
systematic way. But when the philosophers of our religion, like Farabi and
Avicenna, had once conceded to their opponents that the agent in the divine
world is like the agent in the empirical, and that from the one agent there can
arise but one object (and according to all the First was an absolutely simple
unity), it became difficult for them to explain how plurality could arise from
it. This difficulty compelled them finally to regard the First as different from
the mover of the daily circular movement; they declared that from the First, who
is a simple existent, the mover of the highest sphere proceeds, and from this
mover, since he is of a composite nature, as he is both conscious of himself and
conscious of the First, a duality, the highest sphere, and the mover of the
second sphere, the sphere under the highest can arise. This, however, is a
mistake,’ according to philosophical teaching, for thinker and thought are one
identical thing in human intellect and this is still more true in the case of
the abstract intellects. This does not affect Aristotle’s theory, for the
individual agent in the empirical world, from which there can only proceed one
single act, can only in an equivocal way be compared to the first agent. For the
first agent in the divine world is an absolute agent, while the agent in the
empirical world is a relative agent, and from the absolute agent only an
absolute act which has no special individual object can proceed. And thereby
Aristotle proves that the agent of the human intelligibles is an intellect free
from matter, since this agent thinks all things, and in the same way he proves
that the passive intellect is ingenerable and incorruptible,s because this
intellect also thinks all things.
According
to the system of Aristotle the answer on this point is that everything whose
existence is only effected through a conjunction of parts, like the conjunction
of matter and form, or the conjunction of the elements of the world, receives
its existence as a consequence of this conjunction. The bestower of this
conjunction is, therefore, the bestower of existence. And since everything
conjoined is only conjoined through a unity in it, and this unity through which
it is conjoined must depend on a unity, subsistent by itself, and be related to
it, there must exist a single unity, subsistent by itself, and this unity must
of necessity provide unity through its own essence. This unity is distributed in
the different classes of existing things, according to their natures, and from
this unity, allotted to the individual things, their existence arises; and all
those unities lead upwards to the First Monad, as warmth which exists in all the
individual warm things proceeds from primal warmth, which is fire, and leads
upwards to it? By means of this theory Aristotle connects sensible existence
with intelligible, saying that the world is one and proceeds from one, and that
this Monad is partly the cause of unity, partly the cause of plurality. And
since Aristotle was the first to find this solution, and because of its
difficulty, many of the later philosophers did not understand it, as we have
shown. It is evident, therefore, that there is a unique entity from which a
single power emanates through which all beings exist. And since they are many,
it is necessarily from the Monad, in so far as it is one, that plurality arises
or proceeds or whatever term is to be used. This is the sense of Aristotle’s
theory, a sense very different from that in which those thinkers believe who
affirm that from the one only one can proceed. See therefore how serious this
error proved among the philosophers! You should, therefore, see for youself in
the books of the ancients whether these philosophical theories are proved, not
in the works of Avicenna and others who changed the philosophical doctrine in
its treatment of metaphysics so much that it became mere guessing.
Ghazali
says, on behalf of the philosophers:
It may be said: If the philosophical theory is properly understood, the difficulties disappear. Existents can be divided into what exists in a substratum, like accidents and forms, and what does not exist in a substratum. The latter can be divided again into what serves as a substratum for other things, e.g. bodies, and what does not exist in a substratum, e.g. substances which subsist by themselves. These latter again are divided into those which exert an influence on bodies and which we call souls, and those which exert an influence not on bodies but on souls, and which we call abstract intellects. Existents which inhere in a substratum, like accidents, are temporal and have temporal causes which terminate in a principle, in one way temporal, in another way everlasting, namely, circular movement. But we are not discussing this here. Here we are discussing only those principles which exist by themselves and do not inhere in a substratum, which are of three kinds: (i) bodies, which are the lowest type, (ii) abstract intellects, which are not attached to bodies, either by way of action or by being impressed upon them, which are the highest type, and (iii) souls, which are the intermediate agencies, attached to the bodies in a certain way, namely, through their influence and their action upon them, and which stand midway in dignity; they undergo an influence from the intellects and exert an influence upon the bodies.
Now the number of bodies is ten. There are nine heavens, and the tenth body is the matter which fills the concavity of the sphere of the moon. The nine heavens are animated; they possess bodies and souls, and they have an order in existence which we shall mention here. From the existence of the First Principle there emanates the first intellect-an existent which subsists by itself, immaterial, not impressed on body, conscious of its principle and which we philosophers call First Intellect, but which (for we do not quibble about words) may be called angel, or intellect, or what you will. From its existence there derive three things, an intellect, the soul, and the body of the farthest sphere, i.e. the ninth heaven. Then from the second intellect there derive a third intellect and the soul and the body of the sphere of the fixed stars, then from the third intellect there derive a fourth intellect and the soul and the body of the sphere of Saturn, then from the fourth intellect there derive a fifth intellect and the soul and the body of the sphere of Jupiter, and so on till one arrives at the intellect from which there derive the intellect, the soul and the body of the sphere of the moon, and this last intellect is that which is called the active intellect. Then there follows that which fills the sphere of the moon, namely, the matter which receives generation and corruption from the active intellect and from the natures of the spheres. Then through the action of the movements of the spheres and the stars the matters are mixed in different mixtures from which the minerals, vegetables, and animals arise. It is not necessary that from each intellect another intellect should derive endlessly, for these intellects are of a different kind, and what is valid for the one is not valid for the other. It follows from this that the intellects after the First Principle are ten in number and that there are nine spheres, and the sum of these noble principles after the First Principle is therefore nineteen; and that under each of the primary intellects there are three things, another intellect and a soul and body of a sphere. Therefore there must be in each intellect a triple character, and in the first effect a plurality can only be imagined in this way: (i) it is conscious of its principle, (ii) it is conscious of itself, (iii) it is in itself possible, since the necessity of its existence derives from another. These are three conditions, and the most noble of these three effects must be related to the most noble of these conditions. Therefore the intellect proceeds from the first effect; in so far as the first effect is conscious of its principle; the soul of the sphere proceeds from the first effect, in so far as the first effect is conscious of itself; and the body of the sphere proceeds from the first effect, in so far as by itself the first effect belongs to possible existence. We must still explain why this triple character is found in the first effect, although its principle is only one. We say that from the First Principle only one thing proceeds, namely, the essence of this intellect through which it is conscious of itself. The effect, however, must by itself become conscious of its principle, and this kind of consciousness cannot derive from its cause. Also the effect by itself belongs to possible existence, and i cannot receive this possibility from the First Principle, but possesses it in its own essence. We do indeed regard it as possible that one effect should proceed from the one, although this effect possesses by itself and not through its principle certain necessary qualities, either relative or nonrelative. In this way a plurality arises, and so it becomes the principle of the existence of plurality. Thus the composite can meet the simple, as their meeting must needs take place and cannot take place in any other g manner, and this is the right and reasonable explanation, and it is in this way that this philosophical theory must be understood.
I
say:
All
these are inventions fabricated against the philosophers by Avicenna, Farabi,
and others. But the true theory of the ancient philosophers is that there are
principles which are the celestial bodies, and that the principles of the
celestial bodies, which are immaterial existents, are the movers of those
celestial bodies, and that the celestial bodies move towards them in obedience
to them and out of love for them, to comply with their order to move and to
understand them, and that they are only created with a view to movement. For
when it was found that the principles which move the celestial bodies are
immaterial and incorporeal, there was no way left to them in which they might
move the bodies other than by ordering them to move. And from this the
philosophers concluded that the celestial bodies are rational animals, conscious
of themselves and of their principles, which move them by command. And since it
was established-in the De Anima-that
there is no difference between knowledge and the object of knowledge, except for the latter’s being
in matter, of necessity the
substance of immaterial beings-if there are such -had to be knowledge or
intellect or whatever you wish to call it. And the philosophers knew that these
principles must be immaterial, because they confer on the celestial bodies everlasting
movement in which there is no fatigue or weariness,’ and that anything
which bestows such an everlasting movement must be immaterial, and cannot be a
material power. And indeed the celestial body acquires its permanence only
through these immaterial principles. And the philosophers understood that the
existence of these immaterial principles must be connected with a first
principle amongst them; if not, there could be no order in the world. You can
find these theories in the books of the philosophers and, if you want to make
sure of the truth in these matters, you will have to consult them. It also
becomes clear from the fact that all the spheres have the daily circular
movement, although besides this movement they have, as the philosophers had
ascertained, their own special movements, that He who commands this movement
must be the First Principle, i.e. God, and that He commands the other principles
to order the other movements to the other spheres. Through this heaven and earth
are ruled as a state is ruled by the commands of the supreme monarch, which,
however, are transmitted to all classes of the population by the men he has
appointed for this purpose in the different affairs of the state. As it says in
the Qur’an: ‘And He inspired every Heaven with its bidding.
This heavenly injunction and this obedience are the prototypes of the
injunction and obedience imposed on man because he is a rational animal. What
Avicenna says of the derivation of these principles from each other is a theory
not known amongst the ancients, who merely state that these principles hold
certain positions in relation to the First Principle, and that their existence
is only made real through this relation to the First Principle. As is said in
the Qur’an: ‘There is none amongst us but has his appointed place. It is the
connexion which exists between them which brings it about that some are the
effect of others and that they all depend on the First Principle. By ‘agent’
and ‘object’, ‘creator’ and ‘creature’, in so far as it concerns
this existence nothing more can be understood than just this idea of connexion.
But what we said of this connexion of every existent with the One is something
different from what is meant by ‘agent’ and ‘object’, ‘maker’ and
‘product’ in this sublunary world. If you imagine a ruler who has many men
under his command who again have others under their command, and if you imagine
that those commanded receive their existence only through receiving this command
and through their obedience to this command, and those who are under those
commanded can only exist through those commanded, of necessity the first ruler
will be the one who bestows on all existents the characteristic through which
they become existent, and that which exists through its being commanded will
only exist because of the first ruler. And the philosophers understood that this
is what is meant by the divine laws when they speak of creation, of calling into
existence out of nothing, and of command. This is tire best way to teach people
to understand the philosophical doctrine without tile ignominy attaching to it,
which seems to attach when you listen to the analysis Ghazali
gives of it here. Tire philosophers assert that all this is proved in their
books, and the man who, (raving fulfilled the conditions they impose,’ is able
to study their works will find the truth of what they say---or perhaps its
opposite--and will not understand Aristotle’s theory or Plato’s in any other
sense than that here indicated. And their philosophy is tire highest point human
intelligence can reach. It may be that, Nvlrerr it man discover, these
explanations of philosophical theory, lie will find that they happen not only to
be true but to be generally acknowledged, and teachings which are f;errerally
acceptable are pleasing and delightful to all.
One
of the premisses from which this explanation is deduced is that when one
observes this sublunary world, one finds that what is called ‘living’ and
‘knowing’ moves on its own account in welldefined movements towards
well-defined ends and well-defined acts from which new well-defined acts arise.
For this reason the theologians say that any act can only proceed from a living,
knowing being. When one has found this first premiss, that what moves in
welldefined movements from which arise well-defined and ordered actions is
living and knowing, and one joins to this a second premiss which can be verified
by the senses, that the heavens move on their own account in well-defined
movements from which there follow in the existents under them well-defined acts,
order, and rank through which these existents under them receive their
subsistence, one deduces from this, no doubt, a third principle, namely, that
the heavenly bodies are living beings endowed with perception. That from their
movements there follow well-defined acts from which this sublunary world, its
animals, vegetables, and minerals receive their subsistence and conservation ,
is evident from observation, for, were it not that the sun in its ecliptic
approaches the sublunary world and recedes from it, there would not be the four
seasons, and without tile four seasons there would be no plants and no animals,
and the orderly origination of elements out of each other necessary for the
conservation of their existence would not take place. For instance, when the sun
recedes towards tile south the air in the north becomes cold and rains occur and
tire production of the watery element increases, whereas in tile south tile
production of the airy element becomes greater; whereas in summer, when the sun
approaches our zenith, the opposite takes place. Those actions which the sun
exercises everlastingly through its varying distance from the different
existents which always occupy one and the same place are also found in the moon
and all the stars which have oblique spheres, and they produce tile four seasons
through their circular movements, and the most important of all these movements,
in its necessity for tire existence and conservation of the creation, is tire
highest circular movement which produces day and night. The Venerable Book
refers in several verses to the providential care for man which arises out of
God’s subjection of all tile heavens to His bidding, as, for instance, in tile
Qur’anic verse ‘And the sun and the moon and the stars are subjected to His
bidding’, and wlrcn man observes these acts and this guidance which proceed
necessarily and permanently from tire movcnrcnts of tile stars, and sees how
these stars move in fixed movements, and drat they have well-defined shapes and
move in well-defined directions towards well-defined actions in opposite
motions, he understands that these well-defined acts can only arise from beings
perceptive, living, capable of choice and of willing.
And
he becomes still more convinced of this when he sees that many beings in this
world which have small, despicable, miserable, and insignificant bodies are not
wholly devoid of life, notwithstanding the smallness of’ their size, the
feebleness of their powers, the shortness of their lives, the insignificance of
their bodies; and that divine munificence has bestowed on them life and
perception, through which they direct themselves and conserve their existence.
And he knows with absolute certainty that the heavenly bodies are better fitted
to possess life and perception than the bodies of this sublunary world, because
of the size of their bodies, the magnificence of their existence, and the
multitude of their lights,’ as it says in the Divine Words: ‘Surely the
creation of the heavens and the earth is greater than the creation of man, but
most men know it not. But especially when he notices how they direct the living
beings of this sublunary world, does he understand with absolute certainty that
they are alive, for the living can only be guided by a being leading a more
perfect life. And when man observes these noble, living, rational bodies,
capable of choice, which surround us, and recognizes a third principle, namely,
that they do not need for their own existence the providence with which they
guide the sublunary world, he becomes aware that they are commanded to perform
these movements and to control the animals, vegetables, and minerals of this
sublunary world, and that He who commands them is not one of them and that He is
necessarily incorporeal (for, if not, He would be one of them) and that all
these heavenly bodies control the existents which are under them, but serve Him,
who for His existence is in no need of them. And were it not for this Commander,
they would not give their care everlastingly and continuously to this sublunary
world which they guide willingly, without any advantage to themselves,
especially in this act. They move thus
by way of command and obligation the heavens which repair to them, only in order
to conserve this sublunary world and to uphold its existence. And the Commander
is God (glory be to Him), and all this is the meaning of the Divine Words ‘We
come willingly’.
And another proof of all this is that, if a man sees a great many people, distinguished and meritorious, applying themselves to definite