AVERROES
A
translation, with introduction and notes, of Ibn Rushd’s
Kitab fasl al-maqal, with
its appendix (Damima)
and
an
extract from Kitab
al-kashf
‘an
manahij
al-adilla
by
GEORGE
F. HOURANI
PRINTED
FOR
THE
TRUSTEES OF THE “E. J. W. GIBB MEMORIAL”
AND
PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LUZAC & CO.
46
GREAT RUSSELL STREET, LONDON,.W.C.I
1976
E-text note: Omitted are the Introduction and Notes and
now diacritical marks.
CONTENTS
THE DECISIVE TREATISE (Kitab fasl al-maqal).
Chapter I. The Law makes philosophic studies obligatory
.
Chapter 2.
Philosophy contains nothing opposed to Islam .
Chapter 3. Philosophical
interpretations of Scripture
should not be taught to the majority. The Law provides other methods of
instructing them .
AN EXTRACT FROM Kitab al-kashf ‘an manahij al-adilla
I AM grateful to the
International Commission for the Translation of Great Works and the Trustees of
the Gibb Memorial Fund for sponsoring the publication of this book, and to the
Graduate School of the University of Michigan for financial assistance towards
research. I have been fortunate in having the translation carefully read and
criticized by R. P. Georges Anawati, Professor N. Golb, Professor I. Kawar and
Rev. Richard J. McCarthy; their help has led to many improvements and is warmly acknowledged. Very
substantial, too, is my debt to the published works of Alonso, Asín, Bouyges, Gauthier,
Goichon, Van den Bergh and others referred to
in my notes. I thank my wife and Mrs. Cynthia Goldstein for typing the greater
portion of my manuscript, and my wife for her encouraging interest which has
sustained my effort.
GEORGE F. HOURANI.
Ann
Arbor,
1960.
The
translation is based on the Arabic text in Ibn
Rushd (Averroes)
Kitab
fasl
al-maqal, ed. G. F.
Hourani (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1959). But all references are to the editio princeps of M. J. Müller, Philosophie and Theologie von Averroes (Munich, 1859). The numbers in the margins of my edition and translation
indicate Müller’s pages and lines. (ed. these have been eliminated in the
e-text.)
(
) Parentheses or numerations attributable to Ibn Rushd.
< >
Editor’s conjectural additions to the text as found in the Arabic manuscripts.
[ ] Translator’s explanatory
additions, including all chapter headings and summaries.
The Arabic article is omitted in front of single names, e.g. “Farabi” for “al-Farabi”, but “Abu Nasr al-Farabi”. Diacritical marks are omitted where an Arabic name is incorporated in an English form, e.g. “Hanbalites”, but “Ibn Hanbal”.
Ed.
Note: in this e-text version I have eliminated
diacritical marks from the properly transliterated terms for easy viewing for those
who do not have the original font that this document was created in.
THE DECISIVE TREATISE, DETERMINING THE
NATURE
OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN
RELIGION
AND PHILOSOPHY (1)
[What is the attitude of the Law to philosophy?]
Thus
spoke the lawyer, imam, judge, and unique scholar, Abul Walid Muhammad Ibn
Ahmad Ibn Rushd:
Praise
be to God with all due praise, and a prayer for Muhammad His chosen servant and apostle. The purpose of this
treatise (2) is
to examine, from the standpoint of the study of the Law, (3) whether the study of philosophy and logic (4) is allowed by the Law, (5) or prohibited, or commanded, either by way of recommendation or
as obligatory. (6)
[THE LAW MAKES PHILOSOPHIC STUDIES OBLIGATORY]
[If teleological study of the world is
philosophy, and if the Law commands such a study, then the Law commands
philosophy.] (7)
We
say: If the activity of ‘philosophy’ is nothing more than study of existing
beings (8) and reflection on them as indications 9 of the
Artisan, 10 i.e. inasmuch as they are products of art (for
beings only indicate the Artisan through our knowledge of the art in them, and
the more perfect this knowledge is, the more perfect the knowledge of the Artisan becomes),”
and if the Law has encouraged and urged reflection on
beings, then it is clear that what this name signifies is either obligatory or
recommended by the Law.
[The Law commands such a study.]12
That
the Law summons to reflection on beings, and the pursuit of knowledge about
them, by the intellect is clear from several verses of the Book of God, Blessed and
Exalted, such as the saying of the Exalted, ‘Reflect, you have vision:’ 13 this is textual authority for the obligation 14 to use intellectual reasoning, or a combination
of intellectual and legal reasoning. 15
Another example is His saying, ‘Have they not studied the kingdom of the heavens
and the earth, and whatever things God has created ?’:
16 this is a text urging the study of the totality
of beings. Again, God the Exalted has taught that one of those whom He singularly honoured by this knowledge
was Abraham, peace on him, for the Exalted said, ‘So we made Abraham see the kingdom of the
heavens and the earth, that he might be’ [and so on to the end of the verse].
17 The Exalted also said, ‘Do they not
observe the camels, how they have been created, and the sky, how it has been raised up?’, 18
and He said, ‘and they give
thought to the creation of the heavens and the earth’, 19
and so on in countless other verses. 2o
[This study must be conducted in the best manner,
by demonstrative reasoning.] 21
Since
it has now been established that the Law has rendered obligatory the study of
beings by the intellect, and reflection on them, and since reflection is
nothing more than inference and drawing out of the unknown from the known, and
since this is reasoning 22 or at any rate
done by reasoning, therefore we are under an obligation to carry on our study
of beings by intellectual reasoning. It is further evident that this manner of
study, to which the Law summons and urges, is the most perfect kind of study
using the most perfect kind of reasoning; 23
and this is the kind called ‘demonstration’. 24
[To master this instrument the religious thinker
must make a preliminary study of logic, just as the lawyer must study legal reasoning. This is no more
heretical in the one case than in the other. And
logic must be learned from the ancient masters, regardless of the fact that
they were not Muslims.]
The
Law, then, has urged us to have demonstrative knowledge of God the Exalted and all the beings of His
creation. But it is preferable and even necessary for anyone, who wants to
understand God the Exalted and the other beings demonstratively, to have first understood the kinds of
demonstration and their
conditions [of validity], and in what respects
demonstrative reasoning differs from dialectical, rhetorical and fallacious reasoning. 25 But this is not possible
unless he has previously learned what reasoning as such is, and how many kinds
it has, and which of them are valid and which invalid. 26
This in turn is not possible unless he has previously learned the parts of reasoning, of which it is composed, i.e. the premisses
and their kinds. 27 Therefore he who believes in the Law, and obeys
its command to study beings, ought prior to his study to gain a knowledge of
these things, which have the same place in theoretical studies as instruments have in
practical activities. 28
For
just as the lawyer infers from the Divine command to him to acquire knowledge
of the legal categories 29 that he is under
obligation to know the various kinds of legal syllogisms, 30 and which are valid and which invalid, 31 in the same way he who would know [God] 32 ought to
infer from the command to study beings that he is under obligation to acquire a knowledge of
intellectual reasoning and its kinds. Indeed it is more fitting
for him to do so, for if the lawyer infers from the saying of the Exalted,
‘Reflect, you who have vision’, the obligation to acquire a knowledge of legal
reasoning, how much more fitting and proper that he who would know God should
infer from it the obligation to acquire a knowledge of intellectual reasoning!
It
cannot be objected: ‘This kind of study of intellectual reasoning is a heretical
innovation since it did not exist among the first believers.’ For the
study of legal reasoning and its kinds is also something which has been
discovered since the first believers, yet it is not considered to be a heretical
innovation. So the objector should believe the same about the study
of intellectual reasoning. 33 (For this
there is a reason, which it is not the place to mention here.) But most (masters) of this religion support
intellectual reasoning, except a small group
of gross literalists, who can be refuted by [sacred]
texts. 34
Since
it has now been established that there is an obligation of the Law to study
intellectual reasoning and its kinds, just as there is an obligation to study
legal reasoning, it is clear that, if none of our predecessors had formerly examined
intellectual reasoning and its kinds, we should be obliged to undertake such an
examination from the beginning, and that each succeeding scholar would have to seek help in
that task from his predecessor in order that
knowledge of the subject might be completed 35
For it is difficult or impossible for one man to find out by himself and from
the beginning all that he needs of that subject, as it is difficult for one man to discover
all the knowledge that he needs of the kinds of legal reasoning; indeed this is even truer of knowledge of
intellectual reasoning. 36
But
if someone other than ourselves has already examined that subject, it is clear
that we ought to seek help towards our goal from what has been said by such a predecessor on the subject,
regardless of whether this other one shares our
religion or not. 37 For when a valid sacrifice 38 is performed with
a certain
instrument, no account is taken, in judging the validity of the sacrifice, of
whether the instrument belongs to one who shares our religion or to one who
does not, so long as it fulfils the conditions for validity. By ‘those who do
not share our religion’ I refer to those ancients who studied these matters
before Islam. So if such is the case, and everything that is required in the
study of the subject of intellectual syllogisms has already been examined in
the most perfect manner by the ancients, presumably we ought to lay hands on
their books in order to study what they said about that subject; and if it is all correct we should
accept it from them, while if there is anything incorrect
in it, we should draw attention to that. 39
[After logic we must proceed to philosophy
proper. Here too we have to learn from our predecessors, just as in mathematics
and law. Thus it is wrong to forbid the study of ancient philosophy. Harm from
it is accidental, like harm from taking medicine, drinking water, or studying law.]
When
we have finished with this sort of study and acquired the instruments by whose aid we
are able to reflect on beings and the indications of art in them (for he
who does not understand the art does not understand the product of art, and he
who does not understand the product of art does not understand the Artisan),
then we ought to begin the examination of beings in the order and manner we have
learned from the art of demonstrative syllogisms. 4o
And
again it is clear that in the study of beings this aim can be fulfilled by us
perfectly only through successive examinations of them by one man after another, 41 the
later ones seeking the help
of the earlier in that task, on the model of what has happened in the mathematical sciences. For if we suppose
that the art of geometry did not exist
in this age of ours, and likewise the art of astronomy, and a single person wanted to
ascertain by himself the sizes of the heavenly bodies, their shapes, and their
distances from each other, that would not be possible for him, e.g.
to know the proportion of the sun to the earth or other facts about the sizes
of the stars even though he were the most intelligent of men by nature, unless
by a revelation or something resembling revelation. 42
Indeed if he were told that the sun is about 150 or 160 times 43 as great as the earth, he would think this statement
madness on the part of the speaker, although this is a fact which has
been demonstrated in astronomy so surely that no one who has mastered that
science doubts it.
But what calls even more strongly for comparison with the art of mathematics in this respect is the art of the principles of law; and the study of law itself was completed only over a long period of time. And if someone today wanted to find out by himself all the arguments which have been discovered by the theorists of the legal schools on controversial questions, about which debate has taken place between them in most countries of Islam (except the West), 44 he would deserve to be ridiculed, because such a task is impossible for him, apart from the fact that the work has been done already. Moreover, this is a situation that is self-evident not in the scientific arts alone but also in the practical arts; for there is not one of them which a single man can construct by himself. Then how can he do it with the art of arts, philosophy? If this is so, then whenever we find in the works of our predecessors of former nations a theory about beings and a reflection on them conforming to what the conditions of demonstration require, we ought to study what they said about the matter and what they affirmed in their books. And the should accept from them gladly and gratefully whatever in these books accords with the truth, and draw attention to and warn against what does not accord with the truth, at the same time excusing them. 45
From
this it is evident that the study of the books of the ancients is obligatory by
Law, since their aim and purpose in their books is just the purpose to which
the Law has urged us, and that whoever forbids the study of them to anyone who
is fit to study them, i.e. anyone who, unites two qualities, (1) natural
intelligence and (2) religious integrity and moral virtue, 46 is blocking people from the door by which the Law summons them to knowledge of God, the door of
theoretical study which leads
to the truest knowledge of Him; and such an act is the extreme of ignorance and
estrangement from God the Exalted. 47
And
if someone errs or stumbles in the study of these books owing to a deficiency
in his natural capacity, or bad organization of his study of them, or being
dominated by his passions, or not finding a teacher to guide him to an understanding of their contents, or
a combination of all or more than one of
these causes, 48 it does not follow that one should forbid them to
anyone who is qualified to study them. For this manner of harm which arises owing to them is
something that is attached to them by accident, not by essence; and when a thing is
beneficial by its nature and essence, it ought not to be shunned because of something
harmful contained in it by accident. 49 This was the
thought of the Prophet, peace on him, on the occasion when he ordered a man to
give his brother honey to drink for his diarrhea, and the diarrhea increased after he
had given him the honey: when the man complained to him about it, he said, ‘God spoke the truth; it
was your brother’s stomach that lied.’ 50 We can even say that a man who prevents a qualified person from studying books of philosophy,
because some of the most
vicious people may be thought to have gone astray through their study of them, 51 is like a man who prevents a thirsty person
from drinking cool, fresh water until he dies of thirst, because some people have choked to
death on it. For death from water by choking is an accidental matter, but death by thirst is
essential and necessary.
Moreover,
this accidental effect of this art is a thing which may also occur accidentally
from the other arts. To how many lawyers has law been a cause of lack of piety and immersion in this world! Indeed we find most
lawyers in this state, although their art by its essence calls for nothing but
practical virtue. Thus
it is not strange if the same thing that occurs accidentally in the art which calls for
practical virtue should occur accidentally in the art which calls for intellectual virtue. 52
[For every Muslim the Law has provided a way to
truth suitable to his nature, through demonstrative, dialectical or rhetorical
methods.] 53
Since
all this is now established, and since we, the Muslim community, hold that this
divine religion of ours is true, 54 and that
it is this religion which incites and summons us to the happiness that consists
in the knowledge of God, Mighty and Majestic, and of His creation, that [end] 55 is appointed for every Muslim by the method of
assent which his temperament and nature require. For the natures of men are on different levels with respect to [their paths to] assent. One of them comes to assent
through demonstration; another comes to assent through dialectical arguments,
just as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstration, since his nature
does not contain any greater capacity; while another comes to assent through
rhetorical arguments, again just as firmly as the demonstrative man through
demonstrative arguments. 56
Thus
since this divine religion of ours has summoned people by these three methods, assent to it
has extended to everyone, except him who stubbornly denies it with
his tongue or him for whom no method of summons to God the Exalted has been appointed in religion owing to his own neglect of such
matters. 57 It was for this purpose that the Prophet, peace on
him, was sent with a special mission to ‘the white man 58
and the black man’ alike; I mean because his religion embraces all the methods
of summons to God the Exalted. This is clearly expressed in the saying of God
the Exalted, ‘Summon to the way of your Lord by wisdom and by good preaching, and
debate with them in the most effective manner’. 59
[CHAPTER Two]
[PHILOSOPHY CONTAINS NOTHING OPPOSED TO ISLAM]
[Demonstrative truth and scriptural truth cannot conflict.]
60
Now
since this religion is true and summons to the study which leads to knowledge
of the Truth, we the Muslim community know definitely that demonstrative study
does not lead to [conclusions] conflicting with
what Scripture has given us; for truth does not oppose truth but accords with
it and bears witness to it.
[If the apparent meaning of Scripture conflicts
with demonstrative conclusions it must be interpreted allegorically, i.e. metaphorically.]
This
being so, whenever demonstrative study leads to any manner of knowledge about any being,
that being is inevitably either unmentioned or mentioned in
Scripture. If it is unmentioned there is no contradiction, and it is in the same
case as an act whose category is unmentioned, so that the lawyer has to
infer it by reasoning from Scripture. 61 If Scripture
speaks about it; the apparent meaning of the words inevitably either accords or conflicts with the
conclusions of demonstration about it. If this [apparent
meaning] accords there is no argument. If it conflicts there is a call
for allegorical interpretation of it. The meaning of ‘allegorical interpretation’ is: extension of the
significance of an expression from real to metaphorical significance, without
forsaking therein the standard metaphorical practices of Arabic, such as calling
a thing by the name of something
resembling it or a cause or consequence or accompaniment of it, or other
things such as are enumerated in accounts of the kinds of metaphorical speech. 62
[If the lawyer can do this, the religious thinker
certainly can. Indeed these allegorical interpretations always receive confirmation from the
apparent meaning of other passages of Scripture.]
Now
if the lawyer does this in many decisions of religious law, with how much more
right is it done by the possessor of demonstrative knowledge! 63 For the lawyer has at his disposition only reasoning
based on opinion, 64 while he who
would know [God] <has
at his disposition> reasoning based on certainty. So we affirm
definitely that whenever the conclusion of a demonstration is in conflict with
the apparent meaning of Scripture, that apparent meaning admits of allegorical
interpretation according to the rules for such interpretation in Arabic. This
proposition is questioned by no Muslim and doubted by no believer. 65 But its certainty is immensely increased for those
who have had close dealings with this idea and put it to the test, and made it
their aim to reconcile the assertions of intellect and tradition. 66 Indeed we may say that whenever a statement in
Scripture conflicts in its apparent meaning with a conclusion of demonstration,
if Scripture is considered carefully, and the rest of its contents searched page by
page, there will invariably be found among the expressions of Scripture
something which in its apparent meaning bears witness to that allegorical
interpretation 67 or comes close to bearing
witness.
[All Muslims accept the principle of allegorical
interpretation; they only disagree about the extent of its application.]
In
the light of this idea the Muslims are unanimous 68
in holding that it is not obligatory either to take all the expressions of
Scripture in their apparent meaning or to extend them all from their apparent meaning by
allegorical interpretation. They disagree [only]
over which of them should and which should not be so interpreted the Ash’arites
for instance give an allegorical interpretation 69
to the verse about God’s directing Himself 70
and the Tradition about His descent, 71 while
the Hanbalites take them in their apparent meaning. 72
[The double meaning has been given to suit
people’s diverse intelligence. The apparent contradictions are meant to stimulate the
learned to deeper study.]
The
reason why we have received a Scripture with both an apparent and an inner meaning lies in the diversity of people’s
natural capacities and the difference
of their innate dispositions with regard to assent. The reason why we have
received in Scripture texts whose apparent meanings contradict each other is in
order to draw the attention of those who are well grounded in science to the
interpretation which reconciles them. 73 This is
the idea referred to in the words received from the Exalted, ‘He it is who has
sent down to you the Book, containing certain verses clear and definite’ [and
so on] down to the words ‘those who are well grounded in science’. 74
[In interpreting texts allegorically we must never violate Islamic consensus, when it is certain. But to establish it with certainty with regard to theoretical texts is impossible, because there have always been scholars who would not divulge their interpretation of such texts.]
It
may be objected: ‘There are some things in Scripture which the Muslims have unanimously
agreed to take in their apparent meaning, others [which they have agreed] to interpret allegorically, and others
about which they have disagreed; 75
is it permissible, then, that demonstration should lead to interpreting allegorically
what they have agreed to take in its apparent meaning, or to taking in its apparent
meaning what they have agreed to interpret allegorically?’ We reply: If unanimous
agreement is established by a method
which is certain, such [a result] is not sound;
but if [the existence of] agreement on those
things is a matter of opinion, then it may be sound. This is why Abu Hamid, 76
Abul-Ma’ali, 77 and other leaders of thought said that no one
should be definitely called an unbeliever for violating unanimity on a point of
interpretation in matters like these. 78
That
unanimity on theoretical matters is never determined with certainty, as it can
be on practical matters, may be shown to you by the fact that it is not
possible for unanimity to be determined on any question at any period unless that period is strictly limited by us,
and all the scholars existing in that period are known to us (i.e. known as
individuals and in their total number), and the
doctrine of each of them on the question has been handed down to us on unassailable
authority, 79 and, in addition to all this, unless we
are sure that the scholars existing at the time were in agreement that there is not both
an apparent and an inner meaning in Scripture, that knowledge of any question ought not to be kept secret from
anyone, and that there is only one way for people to understand Scripture. But it is recorded
in Tradition that many of the first believers used to hold that Scripture has
both an apparent and an inner meaning, and that the inner meaning ought not to
be learned by anyone who is not a man of learning in this field and who is incapable of
understanding it. Thus, for example, Bukhari reports a saying of
‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib, may God be pleased with him, ‘Speak to people about what
they know. Do you want God and His Prophet to be accused of lying?’ 80 Other examples of the same kind are reported about a
group of early believers. 81 So how can it
possibly be conceived that a unanimous agreement can have been handed down to
us about a single theoretical question, when we know definitely that not a single period
has been without scholars who held that there are things in
Scripture whose true meaning should not be learned by all people?
The
situation is different in practical matters: everyone holds that the truth about these should be disclosed to
all people alike, and to establish the
occurrence of unanimity about them we consider it sufficient that the question
[at issue] should have been widely discussed and that no report of controversy about it should
have been handed down to us. 82
This is enough to establish the occurrence of unanimity on matters of practice,
but on matters of doctrine the case is different.
[Ghazali’s charge of unbelief against Farabi and Ibn Sina, for asserting the world’s eternity and God’s ignorance of particulars and denying bodily resurrection, is only tentative, not definite.]
You
may object: ‘If we ought not to call a man an unbeliever for violating unanimity in
cases of allegorical interpretation, because no unanimity is conceivable in such
cases, what do you say about the Muslim philosophers, like Abu Nasr 83
and Ibn Sina? 84 For Abu Hamid called them both definitely
unbelievers in the book of his known as The
disintegration [Tahfut
- full
title is better translated as Incoherence of the philosophers. ed.
], 85 on
three counts: their assertions of the pre-eternity of the world and that
God the Exalted does not know particulars’ (may He be Exalted far above that [ignorance]!), ‘and their allegorical interpretation
of the passages concerning the resurrection of bodies and states of existence
in the next life.’
We
answer: It is apparent from what he said on the subject that his calling them
both unbelievers on these counts was not definite, since he made it clear in The book of the distinction that calling
people unbelievers for violating unanimity can only be tentative. 86
[Such a charge cannot be definite,
because there has never been a consensus against allegorical interpretation. The Qur’an itself
indicates that it has
inner meanings which it is the special function of the demonstrative class to
understand.]
Moreover, it is evident from what we have
said that a unanimous agreement cannot be established in questions of this
kind, because of the reports that many of the early believers of the first generation,
as well as others, have said that there are allegorical interpretations which ought not to be expressed except to those who
are qualified to receive allegories. These are ‘those who are well grounded in
science’; for we prefer to place the stop after the words of God the Exalted
‘and those who are well grounded in science’, because if the scholars did not
understand allegorical interpretation, there would be no superiority in their assent which would oblige them to
a belief in Him not found among the unlearned. 87 God
has described them as those
who believe in Him, and this can only be taken to refer to the belief which is based on
demonstration; and this [belief] 88
only occurs together with the science of allegorical interpretation. 89 For the unlearned believers are those whose belief
in Him is not based on demonstration; and if this belief which God has attributed to the
scholars is peculiar to them, it must come through demonstration, and if it comes through
demonstration it only occurs together with the science
of allegorical interpretation. 90 For God the Exalted
has informed us that those [verses] have 91
an allegorical interpretation which is the truth, and demonstration can only be
of the truth. That being the case, it is not possible for general unanimity 92 to be established about allegorical interpretations, which God
has made peculiar to scholars. This is self-evident
to any fair minded person.
[Besides, Ghazali was mistaken in ascribing to the Peripatetics
the opinion that God does not know particulars. Their view is that His
knowledge of both particulars and universals differs from ours, in being the cause, not
an effect, of the object known. They even hold that God sends
premonitions in dreams of particular events.] 93
In
addition to all this we hold that Abu Hamid was mistaken about the Peripatetic philosophers, in
ascribing to them the assertion that God, Holy and Exalted, does not know particulars
at all. 94 In reality they hold that God the Exalted knows them in
a way which is not of the same kind as our way of knowing them. For our knowledge of them is
an effect of
the object known, originated when it comes into existence and changing when it
changes; whereas Glorious God’s Knowledge of existence is the opposite of this:
it is the cause of the object known, which is existent being. Thus to suppose
the two kinds of knowledge similar to each other is to identify the essences and properties of opposite things,
and that is the extreme of ignorance. And if
the name of ‘knowledge’ is predicated of both originated and eternal knowledge,
it is predicated by sheer homonymy, as many names are predicated of opposite
things: e.g. jalal of great and small, sarim of light and darkness. 95 Thus there exists no definition
embracing both kinds of knowledge at once, as the theologians of our time imagine. We
have devoted a separate essay to this question, impelled by one of
our friends. 96
But
how can anyone imagine that the Peripatetics say that God the Glorious does not
know particulars with His eternal Knowledge, when they hold that true visions 97 include premonitions of particular events due to
occur in future time, and that this warning foreknowledge comes to people in
their sleep from the eternal Knowledge which orders and rules the universe? 98 Moreover, it is not only particulars which they say
God does not know in the manner in which we know them, but universals as well;
for the universals known to us are also effects of the nature of existent
being, while with His Knowledge the reverse is true. Thus the conclusion to
which demonstration leads is that His Knowledge transcends qualification as
‘universal’ or ‘particular’. Consequently there is no point in disputing
about
this question, i.e. whether to call them unbelievers or not.
[On the question of the world, the ancient philosophers agree with
the Ash’arites that it is originated and coeval with time. The Peripatetics
only disagree with the Ash’arites and the Platonists in holding that past time
is infinite. This difference is insufficient to justify a charge of unbelief.]
99
Concerning
the question whether the world is pre-eternal or came into existence, the disagreement between the
Ash’arite theologians and the ancient philosophers is
in my view almost resolvable into a disagreement about naming, especially in
the case of certain of the ancients. For they agree that there are three classes of beings: two extremes
and one intermediate between the extremes. They agree also about naming the extremes; but they
disagree about the intermediate class.
[1] One extreme is a being which is brought into
existence from something other than itself and by something, i.e. by an
efficient cause and from some matter; and it, i.e. its existence, is preceded
by time. This is the status of bodies whose generation is apprehended by sense,
e.g. the generation of water, air, earth, animals, plants, and so on. All alike,
ancients and Ash’arites, agree in naming this class of beings
‘originated’. [2] The opposite extreme to this
is a being which is not made from or by anything and not preceded by time; and
here too all members of both schools agree in naming it ‘pre-eternal’.
This being is apprehended by demonstration; it is God, Blessed and Exalted, Who
is the Maker, 100 Giver of being and Sustainer
of the universe; may He be praised and His Power exalted!
[3] The class of being which is between these two
extremes is that which is not made from anything and not preceded by time, but
which is brought into existence by something, i.e. by an agent.
This is the world as a whole. Now they
all agree on the presence of these three characters in the
world. For the theologians admit that time does not precede it, or rather this
is a necessary consequence for them since time according to them is something
which accompanies motion and bodies. They also agree with the ancients in the
view that future time is infinite and likewise future being. They only disagree about
past time and past being: the theologians hold that it 101 is finite (this is the doctrine of Plato and his
followers), 102 while Aristotle and his school
hold that it is infinite, as is the case with future time.
Thus
it is clear that [3] this last being bears a
resemblance both to [1] the being which is really
generated 103 and to [2] the pre-eternal Being. So those who are more
impressed with its resemblance to the pre-eternal than its resemblance to
the originated name it ‘pre-eternal’, while those who are more impressed
with its resemblance to the originated name it ‘originated’. But in truth it
is neither really originated nor really pre-eternal, since the really originated is
necessarily perishable and the really pre-eternal has no cause. Some, Plato and his followers,
name it ‘originated and coeval
with time’, 104 because time according to them
is finite in the past.
Thus
the doctrines about the world are not so very far apart from each other that
some of them should be called irreligious and others not. For this to happen,
opinions must be divergent in the extreme, i.e. contraries such as the theologians suppose to exist on this question; i.e.
[they hold] that the names
‘pre-eternity’ and ‘coming into existence’ as applied to the world as a whole
are contraries. But it is now clear from what we have said that this is
not the case. 105
[Anyhow, the apparent meaning of Scripture is that there was a being and time before God created the present being and time. Thus the theologians’ interpretation is allegorical and does not command unanimous agreement.]
Over and above all this, these opinions 106 about the world do not conform to the apparent meaning of Scripture. For if the
apparent meaning of Scripture is searched, it
will be evident from the verses which give us information about the bringing
into existence of the world that its form really is originated, 107 but that being itself and time extend continuously at both extremes, i.e. without interruption. Thus the words of God the
Exalted, ‘He it is Who created the heavens and the earth in six days, and His
throne was on the water’, 108 taken in their apparent
meaning imply that there was a being before this present being, namely
the throne and the water, and a time before this time, i.e. the one which is
joined to the form of this being, namely the number of the movement of the
celestial sphere. And the words of the Exalted, ‘On the day when the earth shall be
changed into other than earth, and the heavens as well,’ 109 also in their apparent meaning imply that there
will be a second being after this being. And the words of the Exalted ‘Then He
directed Himself towards the sky, and it was smoke’, 110
in their apparent meaning imply that the heavens were created from something.
Thus
the theologians too in their statements about the world do not conform to the apparent
meaning of Scripture but interpret it allegorically. For it is not stated in Scripture
that God was existing with absolutely nothing else: a text
to this effect is nowhere to be found. Then how is it conceivable that the
theologians’ allegorical interpretation of these verses could meet with unanimous
agreement, when the apparent meaning of Scripture which we have
mentioned about the existence of the world has been accepted by a school of
philosophers!...
[On such difficult questions, error committed by a
qualified judge of his subject is excused by God, while error by an unqualified person is not excused.] 112
It
seems that those who disagree on the interpretation of these difficult
questions earn merit if they are in the right and will be excused [by God] if they are in error. 113 For assent to a thing as a result of an indication
[of it] arising in the soul is something compulsory,
not voluntary: i.e. it is not for us [to choose]
not to assent or to assent, as it is to stand up or not to stand up. 114 And since free choice is a condition of obligation, 115
a man who assents to an error as a result of a consideration that has occurred to him is excused, if he is
a scholar. This is why the Prophet, peace on him, said, ‘If the judge after
exerting his mind makes a right decision, he will have a double reward; and if
he makes a wrong decision he will [still] have a
single reward.’ 116 And what judge is more
important than he who makes judgments about being, that it is thus or not
thus? These judges are the scholars, specially chosen by God for [the task of] allegorical interpretation, and this
error which is forgivable according to the Law is only such error as proceeds
from scholars when they study the difficult matters which the Law obliges them
to study. 117
But
error proceeding from any other class of people is sheer sin, equally whether
it relates to theoretical or to practical matters. For just as the judge who is
ignorant of the [Prophet’s] way of life is not
excused if he makes an error in judgment, so he who makes judgments about
beings without having the proper qualifications for [such]
judgments is not excused but is either a sinner or an unbeliever. And if he
who would judge what is allowed and forbidden is required to combine in himself
the qualifications for exercise of personal judgment, namely knowledge of the
principles [of law] and knowledge of how to draw inferences from those principles by
reasoning, how much more properly is
he who would make judgments about beings required to be qualified, i.e. to
know the primary intellectual principles and the way to draw inferences from
them! 118
[Texts of Scripture fall into three kinds with
respect to the excusability of error. [1] Texts which must be taken in their apparent
meaning by everyone. Since the meaning can be understood plainly by demonstrative,
dialectical and rhetorical methods alike, no one is excused for
the error of interpreting these texts allegorically. [2] Texts which must be taken in their
apparent meaning by the lower classes and interpreted allegorically by the
demonstrative class. It is inexcusable for the lower classes to interpret them allegorically or for the
demonstrative class to take
them in their apparent meaning. [3] Texts whose classification under the
previous headings is uncertain. Error in this matter by the demonstrative class
is excused.] 119
In
general, error about Scripture is of two types: 120
either error which is excused to one who is a qualified student of that matter in
which the error occurs (as the skilful doctor is excused if he commits an
error in the art of medicine and the skilful judge if he gives an erroneous
judgment), 121 but not excused to one who is not
qualified in that subject; or error which is not excused to any person whatever,
and which is unbelief 122 if it
concerns the principles of religion, or heresy 123
if it concerns something subordinate to the principles.
This
[latter] error is that which occurs about [1] matters, knowledge of which is provided by all
the different methods of indication, 124 so that knowledge of the
matter in question is in this way possible for everyone. Examples are acknowledgement of God, Blessed
and Exalted, of the prophetic
missions, and of happiness and misery in the next life; for these three
principles are attainable by the three classes of indication, by which everyone
without exception can come to assent to what he is obliged to know: I mean the
rhetorical, dialectical and demonstrative indications. So whoever denies such a thing, when it is one of the principles of the
Law, is an unbeliever, who
persists in defiance with his tongue though not with his heart, or neglects to
expose himself to learning the indication of its truth. For if he belongs to
the demonstrative class of men, a way has been provided for him to assent to
it, by demonstration; if he belongs to the dialectical class, the way is by dialectic;
and if he belongs to the class [which is convinced] by preaching,
the way for him is by preaching. With this in view the Prophet, peace on him, said, ‘I
have been ordered to fight people until they say “There is no god but
God” and believe in me’; he means, by any of the three methods. of attaining
belief that suits them.
[2] With regard to things which by reason of their
recondite character are only knowable by demonstration, God has been gracious
to those of His servants who have no access to demonstration, on account of
their natures, habits or lack of facilities for education: He has coined for
them images and likenesses 125 of these things, and summoned them to
assent to
those images, since it is possible for assent to those images to come about
through the indications common to all men, 126 i.e. the
dialectical and rhetorical indications. This is the reason why Scripture is divided into
apparent and inner meanings: the apparent meaning consists of those images
which are coined to stand for those ideas, while the inner meaning is those ideas [themselves], which
are clear only to the demonstrative class. These are the four or five classes of beings mentioned by
Abu Hamid in The book of the
distinction. 127
[1]
But when it happens, as we said, that we know the thing itself by the three
methods, we do not need to coin images of it, and it remains true in its apparent
meaning, not admitting allegorical interpretation. 128 If an apparent text of this kind refers to
principles, anyone who interprets it allegorically is an unbeliever, e.g. anyone who thinks
that there is no happiness or misery in the next life, and that the only purpose of this
teaching is that men should be safeguarded from each other in their bodily and sensible lives,
that it is but a practical
device, and that man has no other goal than his sensible existence. 129
If
this is established, it will have become clear to you from what we have said that there
are [1] apparent texts of Scripture which it is not permitted to
interpret allegorically; to do so on fundamentals is unbelief, on subordinate
matters, heresy. 130 There are also [2] apparent
texts which have to be interpreted allegorically by men of the demonstrative class; for such men to
take them in their apparent meaning is unbelief, while
for those who are not of the demonstrative class to interpret them allegorically
and take them out of their apparent meaning is unbelief or heresy
on their part. 131
Of
this [latter] class are the verse about God’s
directing Himself and the Tradition about His descent. 132
That is why the Prophet, peace on him, said in the case of the black woman,
when she told him that God was in the sky, ‘Free her; for she is a believer’. 133 This was because she was not of the demonstrative
class; and the reason for his decision was that the class of people to whom assent comes only through the
imagination, i.e. who do not assent to a thing
except in so far as they can imagine it, find it difficult to assent to the
existence of a being which is unrelated to any imaginable thing. 134 This applies as well to those who understand from
the relation stated 135 merely [that God has] a place; these are people who have advanced 136
a little in their thought beyond
the position of the first class, <by rejecting>
belief in corporeality. 137 Thus the [proper] answer to them with regard to such passages
is that they belong to the ambiguous texts, and that the stop is to be placed after the words of God the
Exalted ‘And no one knows the interpretation thereof
except God’. 138 The demonstrative class, while
agreeing unanimously that this class of text must be interpreted allegorically,
may disagree about the interpretation, according to the level
of each one’s knowledge of demonstration.
There
is also [3] a third class of Scriptural texts falling
uncertainly between the other two classes, on which there is doubt.
One group of those who devote themselves to theoretical study attach them to the
apparent texts which it is not permitted to interpret allegorically, others attach them to the texts with inner
meanings which scholars are not permitted
to take in their apparent meanings. This [divergence
of opinions] is due to the difficulty and ambiguity of this class of
text. Anyone who commits an error about this class is excused, I mean any scholar.
[The texts about the future life fall into [3],
since demonstrative scholars do not agree whether to take them in their apparent
meaning or interpret them allegorically. Either is permissible. But it
is inexcusable to deny the fact of a future life altogether.]
139
If
it is asked, ‘Since it is clear that scriptural texts in this respect fall into
three grades, to which of these three grades, according to you, do the
descriptions of the future life and its states belong?’, we reply: The position
clearly is that this matter belongs to the class [3]
about which there is disagreement. For we find a group of those who claim an affinity with
demonstration saying that it is obligatory to take these passages
in their apparent meaning, because there is no demonstration leading to the
impossibility of the apparent meaning in them, this is the view of the Ash’arites; while
another group of those who devote themselves to demonstration
interpret these passages allegorically, and these people give the most diverse
interpretations of them. In this class must be counted Abu Hamid and many
of the Sufis; some of them combine the two interpretations of the passages, 140 as Abu Hamid does in some of his books.
So
it is likely that a scholar who commits an error in this matter is excused,
while one who is correct receives thanks or a reward that is, if he acknowledges the existence [of
a future life]
and merely gives a certain sort of allegorical interpretation, i.e. of the mode
of the future life not of its existence, provided that the interpretation given
does not lead to denial of its existence. In this matter only the negation of
existence is unbelief, because it concerns one of the principles of religion and one of those points to which
assent is attainable through the three methods
common to ‘the white man and the black man’. 141
[The unlearned classes must take such texts in
their apparent meaning. It is unbelief for the learned to set down allegorical
interpretations in popular writings. By doing this Ghazali caused
confusion among the people. Demonstrative books should be banned to the unqualified, but not to the
learned.] 142
But
anyone who is not a man of learning is obliged to take these passages in their apparent
meaning, and allegorical interpretation of them is for him unbelief because it leads to unbelief.
That is
why we hold that, for anyone whose duty it is to believe in the apparent meaning,
allegorical interpretation is unbelief, because it leads to unbelief. Anyone of the
interpretative class who discloses such [an interpretation] to him is summoning him to unbelief,
and he who summons
to unbelief is an unbeliever.
Therefore
allegorical interpretations ought to be set down only in demonstrative books,
because if they are in demonstrative books they are encountered by no one but
men of the demonstrative class. But if they are set down in other than demonstrative books
and one deals with them by poetical, rhetorical or dialectical methods, as Abu Hamid does, 143
then he commits an offence against the Law and against philosophy, even though
the fellow intended nothing but good. For by this procedure he wanted to increase the number of
learned men, but in fact he increased the number of the
corrupted not of the learned! As a result, one group came to slander
philosophy, another to slander religion, and another to reconcile the [first] two [groups].
144 It seems that this [last]
was one of his objects in his books; an indication that he wanted by this [procedure] to arouse minds is that he adhered to no
one doctrine in his books but was an Ash’arite with the Ash’arites, a Sufi with
the Sufis and a philosopher with the philosophers, so that he was like the man
in the verse
‘One day a Yamani, if
I meet a man of Yaman,
And
if I meet a Ma’addi, I’m an ‘Adnani.’ 145
The
imams of the Muslims ought to forbid those of his books which contain learned
matter to all save the learned, just as they ought to forbid demonstrative books to those who
are not capable of understanding them. But the damage done to people by demonstrative books is lighter,
because for the most part only persons of superior natural intelligence become acquainted with
demonstrative
books, and this class of persons is only misled through lack of practical
virtue, unorganized reading, and tackling them without a teacher. 146 On the other hand their total prohibition
obstructs the purpose to which the Law summons, because it is a wrong to the
best class of people and the best class of beings. For to do justice to the
best class of beings demands that they should be known profoundly, by persons
equipped to know them profoundly, and these are the best class of people; and
the greater the value of the being, the greater is the injury towards it, which
consists of ignorance of it. Thus the Exalted has said, ‘Associating [other gods] with God is indeed a great wrong.’ 147
[We have only discussed these questions in a popular work because they were
already being publicly discussed.]
This
is as much as we see fit to affirm in this field of study, i.e. the
correspondence between religion and philosophy and the rules for allegorical
interpretation in religion. If it were not for the publicity given to the matter
and to these questions which we have discussed, we should not have
permitted ourselves to write a word on the subject; 148
and we should not have had to make excuses for doing so to the interpretative
scholars, because the proper place to discuss these questions is in demonstrative books. God is the Guide
and helps us to follow the right course!
[PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATIONS
OF SCRIPTURE SHOULD NOT BE TAUGHT TO THE MAJORITY. THE LAW PROVIDES OTHER
METHODS OF INSTRUCTING THEM.]
[The purpose of Scripture is to
teach true theoretical and practical science and right practice and attitudes.]
You
ought to know that the purpose of Scripture is simply to teach true science and
right practice. True science is knowledge of God, Blessed and Exalted, and the
other beings as they really are, and especially of noble beings, 149 and knowledge of happiness and misery in the next
life. 150 Right practice consists in performing
the acts which bring happiness and avoiding the acts which bring misery; 151 and it is knowledge of these acts that is called
‘practical science’. They fall into two divisions: (1) outward bodily acts; the
science of these is called ‘jurisprudence’; and (2) acts of the soul such as
gratitude, patience and other moral attitudes which the Law enjoins or forbids;
the science of these is called ‘asceticism’ or ‘the sciences of the future
life’. To these Abu Hamid turned his attention in his book: as people had
given up this sort [of act] and become immersed
in the other sort, 152 and as this sort [2] involves the greater fear of God, which is the cause of
happiness, he called his book ‘The revival of the sciences of religion’. 153 But we have digressed from our subject, so let us
return to it.
[Scripture teaches concepts both directly and by
symbols, and uses demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical arguments. Dialectical
and rhetorical arguments are prevalent because the main aim of
Scripture is to teach the majority. In these arguments concepts are indicated
directly or by symbols, in various combinations in premisses and conclusion.]
We
say: The purpose of Scripture is to teach true science and right practice; and
teaching is of two classes, [of] concepts and [of] judgments, 154
as the logicians 155 have shown. Now the methods
available to men of [arriving at] judgments are three:
demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical; 156
and the methods of forming concepts are two: either [conceiving]
the object itself or [conceiving] a symbol of
it. 157 But not everyone has the natural ability
to take in demonstrations, or [even] dialectical arguments, let alone demonstrative
arguments which are so hard to learn and need so much time [even] for those who are qualified to learn them.
Therefore, since it is the purpose of Scripture simply to teach everyone,
Scripture has to contain every method of [bringing about]
judgments of assent and every method of forming concepts.
Now
some of the methods of assent comprehend the majority of people, i.e. the
occurrence of assent as a result of them [is comprehensive]:
these are the rhetorical and the dialectical [methods],
and the rhetorical is more comprehensive than the dialectical. Another
method is peculiar to a smaller number of people: this is the demonstrative.
Therefore, since the primary purpose of Scripture is to take care of the majority (without neglecting to
arouse the elite), the prevailing methods of
expression in religion are the common methods by which the majority comes to
form concepts and judgments. 158
These
[common] methods in religion are of four classes : 159
One
of them occurs where the method is common, yet specialized 160 in two respects: i.e. where it is certain in its
concepts and judgments, in spite of being rhetorical or dialectical. These
syllogisms are those whose premisses, in spite of being based on accepted ideas or on opinions, 161
are
accidentally certain, and whose conclusions are accidentally to be taken in their direct
meaning without symbolization. Scriptural texts of this class have no allegorical
interpretations, and anyone who denies them or interprets them allegorically is an unbeliever.
The
second class occurs where the premisses, in spite of being based on accepted ideas or on opinions,
are certain, and where the conclusions are symbols for
the things which it was intended to conclude. [Texts
of] this [class], i.e. their
conclusions, admit of allegorical interpretation.
The third is the reverse of this: it occurs where the
conclusions are the very things which it was intended to conclude, while the
premisses are based on accepted ideas or on opinions without being accidentally
certain. [Texts of] this [class] also, i.e. their conclusions, do not admit of
allegorical interpretation, but their premisses may do so.
The fourth [class] occurs where the premisses are based on accepted
ideas or opinions, without being accidentally certain, and where the
conclusions are symbols for what it was intended to conclude. In these cases
the duty of the elite is to interpret them allegorically, while the duty of the
masses is to take them in their apparent meaning.
[Where symbols are used, each class of men,
demonstrative, dialectical and rhetorical, must try to understand the inner meaning symbolized or rest content with the
apparent meaning, according to
their capacities.]
In
general, everything in these [texts] which admits of
allegorical interpretation can only be understood by demonstration.
The duty of the elite here is to apply such interpretation; while the duty of
the masses is to take them in their apparent meaning in both respects, i.e. in
concept and judgment, since their natural capacity does not allow more than that.
But
there may occur to students of Scripture allegorical interpretations due to
the superiority of one of the common methods over another in [bringing about] assent, i.e. when the indication
contained in the allegorical interpretation is more persuasive than the indication
contained in the apparent meaning. Such interpretations are popular; 162
and [the making of them] is
possibly a duty for those whose powers of theoretical understanding have attained the
dialectical level. To this sort belong some of the interpretations
of the Ash’arites and Mu’tazilites, though the Mu’tazilites are generally
sounder in their statements. 163 The masses on
the other hand, who are incapable of more than rhetorical arguments, have the
duty of taking these [texts] in their apparent
meaning, and they are not permitted to know such interpretations at all.
Thus
people in relation to Scripture fall into three classes:
One
class is those who are not people of interpretation at all: these are the
rhetorical class. They are the overwhelming mass, for no man of sound intellect
is exempted from this kind of assent.164
Another
class is the people of dialectical interpretation: these are the dialecticians,
either by nature alone or by nature and habit.
Another
class is the people of certain interpretation: these are the demonstrative class,
by nature and training, 165 i.e. in the art of
philosophy. This interpretation ought not to be expressed to the dialectical class, let
alone to the masses.
[To explain the inner meaning to people unable to understand it is
to destroy their belief in the apparent meaning without putting anything in its
place. The result is unbelief in learners and teachers. It is best for the learned to profess
ignorance, quoting the Qur’an on the limitations of man’s understanding.]
When
something of these allegorical interpretations is expressed to anyone unfit to receive
them, especially demonstrative interpretations because of their
remoteness from common knowledge both he who expresses it and he to whom it is
expressed are led into unbelief. The reason for that [in
the case of the latter] 166 is that allegorical
interpretation comprises two things, rejection of the apparent meaning and affirmation of the
allegorical one; so that if the apparent meaning
is rejected in the mind of someone who can only grasp apparent meanings,
without the allegorical meaning being affirmed in his mind, the result is
unbelief, if it [the text in question] concerns
the principles of religion.
Allegorical
interpretations, then, ought not to be expressed to the masses nor set down in
rhetorical or dialectical books, i.e. books containing arguments of these two
sorts, as was done by Abu Hamid. They should <not>
be expressed to this class; and with regard to an apparent text, when there is a
<self-evident> doubt whether it
is apparent to everyone and whether knowledge of its interpretation is
impossible for them, they should be told that it is ambiguous 167 and [its meaning] known by no one except God; and
that the stop should be put here in the sentence of the Exalted, ‘And no one
knows the interpretation thereof except God’. 168
The same kind of answer should also be given to a question about abstruse matters, which there is no
way for the masses to understand; just as the Exalted has answered in Isis saying, ‘And they will
ask you about the Spirit. Say, “The Spirit is by the command of my Lord; you have been given only
a little knowledge” ’.169
[Certain people have injured the masses particularly, by giving them
allegorical interpretations which are false. These
people are exactly analogous to bad medical advisers. The true doctor is related to bodily
health in the same way as the Legislator to spiritual health,
which the Qur’an teaches us to
pursue. The true allegory is “the deposit” mentioned in the Qur’an.]
As for the man who expresses these allegories to unqualified
persons, he is an unbeliever on account of his summoning people to unbelief. 170 This is contrary to the summons of the Legislator,
171 especially when they are false allegories
concerning the principles of religion, as has happened in the case of a group
of people of our time. 172 For we have seen some
of them thinking that they were being philosophic and that they perceived, with
their remarkable wisdom, things which conflict with Scripture in every respect,
i.e. [in passages] which do not admit of allegorical
interpretation; and that it was obligatory to express these things
to the masses.
But
by expressing those false beliefs to the masses they have been a cause of
perdition to the masses and themselves, in this world and the next. 173
The
relation between the aim of these people and the aim of the Legislator [can be illustrated by] a parable, 174 of a man who goes to a skilful doctor. [This doctor’s] aim is to preserve the health and
cure the diseases of all the people, by prescribing for them rules which can be
commonly accepted, about the necessity of using the things which will preserve
their health and cure their diseases, and avoiding the opposite things. He is unable to
make them all doctors, because a doctor is one who knows by demonstrative methods the things which preserve
health and cure disease. Now
this [man whom we have mentioned] goes out to
the people and tells them, ‘These methods prescribed by this doctor for you are
not right’; and he sets out to discredit them, so that they are rejected by the
people. Or he says, ‘They have allegorical interpretations’; but the people
neither understand these nor assent to them in practice. Well, do you think that people in this condition will do
any of the things which are useful for
preserving health and curing disease, or that this man who has persuaded them
to reject what they formerly believed in will now be able to use those [things] with them, I mean for preserving health? No,
he will be unable to use those [things] with
them, nor will they use them, and so they will all perish.
This
[is what will happen] if he expresses to them true allegories175 about those matters, because of their inability to
understand them; let alone if he expresses to them false allegories, because
this will lead them to think that there are no such things as health which
ought to be preserved and disease which ought to be cured, let alone that
there are things which preserve health and cure disease. 176 It is the same when someone expresses allegories
to the masses, and to those who are not qualified to understand them, in the
sphere of Scripture; thus he makes it appear false and turns people away from
it; and he who turns people away from Scripture is an unbeliever.
Indeed
this comparison is certain, 177 not poetic as
one might suppose. It presents a true analogy, in that the relation of the
doctor to the health of bodies is [the same as]
the relation of the Legislator to the health of souls: i.e. the doctor is he
who seeks to preserve the health of bodies when it exists and to restore it
when it is lost, while the Legislator is he who desires this [end] for the health of souls. 178 This
health is what is called ‘fear of God’. The precious Book has told us to seek it by
acts conformable to the Law, in several verses. Thus the Exalted has said, ‘Fasting
has been prescribed for you, as it was prescribed for those who were before
you; perhaps you will fear God.’ 179 Again the
Exalted has said, ‘Their flesh and their blood shall not touch God, but your
fear shall touch him’; 180 ‘Prayer prevents
immorality and transgression’; 181 and other
verses to the same effect contained in the precious Book. Through knowledge of
Scripture and practice according to Scripture the Legislator aims solely at
this health; and it is from this health that happiness in the future life
follows, just as misery in the future life follows from its opposite.
From
this it will be clear to you that true allegories ought not to be set down in
popular books, let alone false ones. The true allegory is the deposit which man
was charged to hold and which he held, and from which all beings shied away,
i.e. that which is mentioned in the words of the Exalted, ‘We offered the
deposit to the heavens, the earth and the mountains’, [and so on to the end of]
the verse. 182
[It was due to the wrong use of allegorical
interpretation by the Mu’tazilites and Ash’arites that hostile sects arose in
Islam.]
It
was due to allegorical interpretations, especially the false ones, and
the supposition that such interpretations of Scripture ought to be expressed to
everyone, that the sects of Islam arose, with the result that each one accused
the others of unbelief or heresy. Thus the Mu’tazilites interpreted many verses
and Traditions allegorically, and expressed their interpretations to the masses,
and the Ash’arites did the same, although they used such interpretations
less frequently. 183 In consequence they threw
people into hatred, mutual detestation and wars, tore the Scriptures to shreds, and completely divided people. 184
In addition to all this, in the methods which they followed
to establish their interpretations they neither went along with the masses nor
with the elite: not with the masses, because their methods were <more> obscure than the methods common to the majority,
and not with the elite, because if these methods are inspected they are
found deficient in the conditions [required]
for demonstration, 185 as will be understood after the slightest inspection by
anyone acquainted with the conditions of demonstration. Further, many of the principles on which the
Ash’arites based
their knowledge are sophistical, 186 for they
deny many necessary truths such as the permanence of accidents, the action of
things on other things, the existence of necessary causes for effects, of substantial forms,
and of secondary causes. 187
And their theorists wronged the Muslims in this sense, that a sect of
Ash’arites called an unbeliever anyone who did not attain knowledge
of the existence of the Glorious Creator by the methods laid down by them in
their books for attaining this knowledge. But in truth it is they who are the
unbelievers and in error! From this point they proceeded to disagree, one group
saying ‘The primary obligation is theoretical study’, another group saying ‘It
is belief’; i.e. [this happened] because
they did not know which are the methods common to everyone, through whose doors
the Law has summoned all people [to enter];
they supposed that there was only one method. Thus they mistook the aim of the
Legislator, and were both themselves in error and led others into error.
[The proper methods for teaching the people are indicated in the
Qur’an, as the early Muslims knew. The popular portions of the Book are miraculous in providing for the needs of every
class of mind. We intend to make a study of its teachings at the apparent level,
and thus help to remedy the
grievous harm done by ignorant partisans of philosophy and religion.]
It
may be asked: ‘If these methods followed by the Ash’arites and other theorists
are not the common methods by which the Legislator has aimed to teach the masses,
and by which alone it is possible to teach them, then what are those [common] methods in this religion of ours’? We
reply: They are exclusively the methods set down in the precious Book. For if
the precious Book is inspected, there will be found in it the three methods that
are available for all the people, <namely>
the common methods for the instruction of the majority of the people and the
special method. 188 And if their merits are
inspected, it becomes apparent that no better common methods for the instruction
of the masses can be found than the methods mentioned in it.
Thus
whoever tampers with them, by making an allegorical interpretation not apparent
in itself, or [at least] not more apparent
to everyone than they are (and that [greater apparency] is
something non-existent), is rejecting their wisdom and rejecting their intended effects in procuring
human happiness. This is very apparent from [a comparison of] the
condition of the first believers with the condition of those who came after
them. For the first believers arrived at perfect virtue and fear of God only by
using these sayings [of Scripture] without
interpreting them allegorically; and anyone of them who did find out an allegorical
interpretation did not think fit to express it [to others]. But when those who came after them
used allegorical interpretation, their fear of God grew less, their dissensions
increased, their love for one another was removed, and they became divided into
sects.
So
whoever wishes to remove this heresy from religion should direct his attention
to the precious Book, and glean from it the indications present [in it]
concerning everything in turn that it obliges us to believe, arid exercise his
judgment in looking at its apparent meaning as well as he is able, without interpreting
any of it allegorically, except where the allegorical meaning is apparent in
itself, i.e. commonly apparent to everyone. 189
For if the sayings set down in Scripture for the instruction of the people are
inspected, it seems that in mastering their meaning 190
one arrives at a point, beyond which none but a man of the demonstrative class can
extract from their apparent wording a meaning which is not apparent in
them. 191 This property is not found in any
other sayings.
For
those religious sayings in the precious Book which are expressed to everyone have three properties
that indicate their miraculous character: 192 (1) There exist none more completely persuasive and convincing to everyone
than they. (2) Their meaning admits naturally of mastery, up to a point beyond which their
allegorical interpretation (when they are of a kind to have such an interpretation)
can only be found out by the demonstrative class. (3) They contain means of drawing the
attention of the
people of truth to the true allegorical meaning. 193
This [character] is not found in the
doctrines of the Ash’arites nor in those of the Mu’tazilites, i.e. their
interpretations do not admit of mastery nor contain [means
of] drawing attention to the truth, nor are they true; and this is why
heresies have multiplied.
It
is our desire to devote our time to this object and achieve it effectively, 194 and if God grants us a respite of life we shall
work steadily towards it in so far as this is made possible for us; and it may
be that that work will serve as a starting point for our successors. For our
soul is in the utmost sorrow and pain by reason of the evil fancies and
perverted beliefs which have infiltrated this religion, and particularly such [afflictions]
as have happened to it at the hands of people who claim an affinity with philosophy. 195 For injuries from
a friend are more severe than injuries from an enemy. I refer to the fact that
philosophy is the friend and milk-sister of religion; thus injuries from
people related to philosophy are the severest injuries [to
religion], apart from the enmity, hatred and quarrels which such
[injuries] stir up between the two, which are companions by nature and lovers
by essence and instinct. It has also been injured by a host of ignorant friends
who claim an affinity with it: these are the sects which exist within it. But
God directs all men aright and helps everyone to love Him; He unites their hearts in the
fear of Him, and removes from them hatred and loathing by His grace and His mercy!
Indeed
God has already removed many of these ills, ignorant ideas and misleading practices, by
means of this triumphant rule. 196
By it He has opened a way to
many benefits, especially to the class of persons who have trodden the path of study
and sought to know the truth. This [He has done] by summoning the
masses to a middle way of knowing God the
Glorious, [a way] which is raised above the
low level of the followers of authority 197 but
is below the turbulence of the theologians; and by drawing the attention of the
elite to their obligation to make a thorough study of the principles of
religion. God is the Giver of success and the Guide by His Goodness.
[APPENDIX: Damima] 198
THE
QUESTION MENTIONED BY THE SHAYKH
ABUL-WALID
IN THE DECISIVE TREATISE
[We shall try to solve your problem about God’s Knowledge.]
May
God prolong your power, continue to bless you, and keep you out of sight of
misfortunes! 199
By
your superior intelligence and Abundant talents you have surpassed many of
those who devote their lives to these sciences, and your sure insight has led
you to become aware of the difficulty that arises about the eternal, Glorious
Knowledge,’ 200 on account of Its being
connected with the things originated by It. It is therefore our obligation, in
the interests of truth and of ending your perplexity, to resolve this
difficulty, after formulating it; for he who does not know how to tie a knot cannot untie it. 201
[The problem: How can God be aware of a change
in reality without a corresponding change occurring in His eternal Knowledge?]
The
difficulty is compelling, as follows. If all these things were in the Knowledge
of God the Glorious before they existed, are they in their state of existence [the same] in His Knowledge as they were before
their existence, or are they in their state of existence other in His Knowledge
than they were before they existed? If we say that in their state of existence
they are other in God’s Knowledge than they were before they existed, it
follows that the eternal Knowledge is subject to change, and that when they pass from nonexistence to existence, there comes into existence
additional Knowledge: but that is impossible for the eternal Knowledge. 202 If on the other hand we say that the Knowledge of
them in both states is one and the same, it will be asked, ‘Are they in
themselves’, i.e. the beings which come into existence, ‘the same before they
exist as when they exist?’ The answer will have to be ‘No, in themselves they
are not the same before they exist as when they exist’; otherwise the existent
and the non-existents 203 would be one and
the same. If the adversary admits this, he can be asked, ‘Is not true knowledge
acquaintance with existence as it really is?’ If he says ‘Yes’, it will be
said, ‘Consequently if the object varies in itself, the knowledge of it must vary; otherwise it will not be known
as it really is’. Thus one of two alternatives is necessary: either the eternal Knowledge
varies in Itself, or
the things that come into existence are not known to It. But both alternatives are impossible for God the Glorious.
This
difficulty is confirmed by what appears in the case of man: His knowledge of
non-existent things depends on the supposition of existence, while his
knowledge of them when they exist depends <on
existence itself>. For it is self-evident that the two states
of knowledge are different; otherwise he would be ignorant of things’ existence
at the time when they exist.
[God’s foreknowledge of all change does not
solve the problem, as the theologians think, for the actual occurrence of the change
presumably adds something new to His Knowledge.]
It
is impossible to escape from this [difficulty]
by the usual answer of the theologians about it, that God the Exalted knows
things before their existence as they will be at the time of their existence,
in respect of time, place and other attributes proper to each being. For it can
be said to them: ‘Then when they come to exist, does there occur any change or
not?’, with reference to the passage of the thing from non-existence
to existence. If they say ‘No change occurs’, they are merely being
supercilious. But if they say ‘There does occur a change’, it can be said to
them: ‘Then is the occurrence of this change known to the eternal Knowledge or
not?’ Thus the difficulty is compelling. In sum, it can hardly be conceived that the knowledge of
a thing before it exists can be identical with the
knowledge of it after it exists. Such, then, is the formulation of this problem
in its strongest possible form, as we have explained it to you in conversation.
204
[Nor is Ghazali’s solution satisfactory. He
regards God’s Knowledge as a term in a relation, which does not change in
itself when that to which it is related, the known object, changes its relation
to it. But knowledge is a relation, not a related term.]
The
[full] solution of this difficulty would call for a lengthy discourse; but here
we shall only go into the decisive point of the solution. Abu Hamid in his
book entitled The disintegration wanted to resolve this difficulty in a way
which carries no conviction. 205 He stated an argument the gist of which is
as follows. He asserted that knowledge and the
object known are related; and as one of two related things may change without
the other changing in itself, this is just what seems to happen to things in
the Knowledge of God the Glorious: they change in themselves, but the Knowledge
of God the Glorious about them does not change. A parallel case of related
things would be if a single column were first on the right of Zayd and then came to be on his left:
meanwhile Zayd 206 would
not have changed in himself. But this [argument]
is not correct. For the relation has changed in itself: the relation which was a
right-handed one has become a left-handed one, and the only thing
which has not changed is the subject of the relation, i.e. its bearer, Zayd. If
this is so, and knowledge is the relation itself, it must necessarily change
when the object known changes, just as, when the column changes [its position], the relation of the column to Zayd
changes, coming to be a left-handed relation after having been a right-handed
one.
[The correct solution is that the eternal Knowledge is the cause
of beings, not their effect as originated knowledge is. Therefore It does not change when they
change.]
The
way to resolve this difficulty, in our opinion, is to recognize that the
position of the eternal Knowledge with respect to beings is different from the
position of originated knowledge with respect to beings, in that the existence
of beings is a cause and reason for our knowledge, while the eternal Knowledge
is a cause and reason for beings. If, when beings come to exist after not having existed, there occurred
an addition in the eternal Knowledge such as
occurs in originated knowledge, it would follow that the eternal Knowledge
would be an effect of beings, not their cause. Therefore there must not occur any
change such as occurs in originated knowledge. The mistake in this matter has arisen simply from
making an analogy between the eternal Knowledge and originated knowledge, i.e. between the
supra sensible and the sensible; and the falsity of this analogy is well known. Just
as no change occurs in an agent
when his act comes into being, i.e. no change which has not already occurred,
so no change occurs in the eternal Glorious Knowledge when the object of Its
Knowledge results from It.
Thus
the difficulty is resolved, and we do no, have to admit that if there occurs no
change, i.e. in the eternal Knowledge, He does not know beings at the time of
their coming into existence just as they are; we only have to admit that He
does not know them with originated knowledge but with eternal Knowledge.
For
the occurrence of change in knowledge when beings change is a condition only of
knowledge which is caused by beings, i.e. originated knowledge.
[The philosophers hold that God knows particulars with
eternal Knowledge, not that He does not know them at all.
Indeed, they consider that His knowledge is the cause of their coming into
existence, also that It sends premonitions of particulars in dreams.]
Therefore
eternal Knowledge is only connected with beings in a manner other than that in
which originated knowledge is connected with them. This does not mean that It
is not connected at all, as the philosophers have been accused of saying, in
the context of this difficulty, that the Glorious One does not know particulars. Their position is not
what has been imputed to them; rather they
hold that He does not know particulars with originated knowledge, the
occurrence of which is conditioned by their occurrence, since He is a cause of
them, not caused by them as originated knowledge is. This is the furthest
extent to which purification [of concepts] 207 ought to be admitted.
For
demonstration compels the conclusion that He knows things, because their
issuing from Him is solely due to His knowing; it is not due to His being
merely Existent or Existent with a certain attribute, but to His knowing, as
the Exalted has said: ‘Does He not know, He who created? He is the Penetrating,
the Omniscient! 208 But demonstration also
compels the conclusion that He does not know things with a knowledge of the same
character as originated knowledge. Therefore there must be another
knowledge of beings which is unqualified, 209
the eternal Glorious Knowledge. And how is it conceivable that the Peripatetic
philosophers could have held that the eternal Knowledge does not comprehend particulars,
when they held that It is the cause of warning in dreams, of revelation, and of
other kinds of inspiration? 210
[Conclusion]
This
is the way to resolve this difficulty, as it appears to us; and what has been said is
incontestable and indubitable. It is God who helps us to follow the
right course and directs us to the truth. Peace on you, with the mercy and
blessings of God.
[EXTRACT: Kitab
al-kashf
‘an
manahij
al-adilla,
pp. 122-27]
[THE FUTURE LIFE] 211
[Corporeal symbols are more effective than
spiritual ones. in instructing the masses about the life beyond, and are used
in the Qur’an which is
primarily
concerned with the majority.] 212
All
religions, as we have said, agree on the fact that souls experience states of
happiness or misery after death, 213 but they disagree in the
manner of symbolizing these states and explaining their
existence to men. And it seems that the [kind of] symbolization
which is found in this religion of ours is the most perfect means of explanation to the
majority of men, and provides the greatest stimulus to their
souls to [pursue the goals of] the life
beyond; and the primary concern of religions is with the majority. Spiritual
symbolization, on the other hand, seems to provide less stimulus to the souls
of the masses towards [the goals of] the life beyond, and the masses have less
desire and fear of it than they do of corporeal symbolization. Therefore it
seems that corporeal symbolization provides a stronger stimulus to [the goals
of] the life beyond than spiritual; the spiritual [kind]
is more acceptable to the class of debating theologians, but they are
the minority.
[There are three interpretations of the
symbols by Muslims. (1) The life beyond is the same in kind as’ this one, but
it is permanent, not limited in duration. (2) It differs in kind: (a) The life
beyond is spiritual, and is only symbolized by sensible images for the purpose
of exposition. (b) It is corporeal, but the bodies are other, immortal ones not
these perishable ones. This opinion is suitable for the elite. It avoids the absurdity of (1 ),
arising from the fact that our bodies here provide material
for other earthly bodies and so cannot at the same time exist in the other
world. But every opinion is permissible except total rejection of another
life.]
For
this reason we find the people of Islam divided into three sects with regard to
the understanding of the symbolization which is used in [the texts of] our religion referring to the states of the
future life. One sect holds that that existence is identical with this.
existence here with
respect to bliss and pleasure, i.e. they hold that it is of the same sort and that the two existences differ only in respect of
permanence and limit of duration, i.e. the former is permanent and the latter of limited
duration. Another group holds that there is a difference in the kind of existence. This [group] is divided into two subdivisions. One [sub-] group holds that the existence
symbolized by these sensible images is spiritual, and that it has been
symbolized thus only for the purpose of exposition; these people are supported
by many well known arguments from Scripture, but there would be no point
in enumerating them 214 Another [sub-] group thinks that it is corporeal,
but believes that that corporeality existing in the life beyond differs from
the corporeality of this life in that the latter is perishable while the
former is immortal. They too are supported by arguments from Scripture, and it
seems that Ibn ‘Abbas was one of those who held this opinion, for he is reported
to have said, ‘There is nothing in this lower world like the next world except
the names.’ 215
It
seems that this opinion is more suitable for the elite; 216 for the admissibility of this opinion is founded on facts which are not discussed in front of everyone. One is
that the soul is immortal. The
second is that the return of the soul to other bodies 217
does not involve the same absurdity as <its>
return <to> those same [earthly] bodies. This is because it is apparent that
the materials of the bodies that exist here are successively transferred from
one body to another: i.e. one acid the same material exists in many persons at
different times. Bodies like these cannot possibly all exist actually [at the same time], because their material is one:
for instance, a man dies, his body is transformed into dust, that dust is transformed into
a plant, another man feeds on that plant; then semen proceeds
from him, from which another man is born. But if other bodies are supposed,
this state of affairs 218 does not follow as a consequence.
The
truth in this question is that every man’s duty is [to
believe] whatever his study of it leads him to [conclude],
provided that it is not such a study as would cause him to reject the principle altogether, by denying the existence [of the future
life] altogether; for this manner of belief obliges us to call its
holder an unbeliever, because the existence of this [future]
state for man is made known to people through their Scriptures and their
intellects. 219
[The basic assumption of all the permissible
views is the immortality of the soul. It can be proved from the Qur’an,
which equates death with sleep; now since we know that the soul is not
dissolved in sleep, the same applies to death. In both cases the organ, not the
soul itself, ceases.] 220
The
whole of this [argument] is founded on the
immortality of the soul. If it is asked ‘Does Scripture contain an indication
of the immortality of the soul or [at least] a hint of it?’, we reply: This is found in the precious Book in the words of the
Exalted, ‘God receives the souls at the time of their death, and those which have not died He receives in their sleep’, [and so on
to the end of] the verse. 221 The significant
aspect of this verse is that in it He has equated sleep and death
with respect to the annihilation of the soul’s activity. Thus if the cessation
of the soul’s activity in death were due to the soul’s dissolution, not to a
change in the soul’s organ, the cessation of its activity in sleep [too] would have to be due to the dissolution of its
essential being; but if that were the case, it would not return on waking to
its normal condition. So since it does return to it, we know that this cessation does not
happen to it through anything which attaches to it in its substantial nature, but is only something which
attaches to it owing to a cessation of its organ; and [we know]
that it
does not follow that if the organ ceases the soul must cease. Death is a cessation; it must therefore be of the
organ, as is the case in sleep. As the
Philosopher says, ‘If the old man were to find an eye like the young man’s eye,
he would see as the young man sees’. 222
This
is as much as we see fit to affirm in our investigation of the beliefs of this
religion of ours, the religion of Islam.
[ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION]
[Texts of Scripture fall into the following classes
(1) Where the apparent meaning is the meaning really intended. Such texts
may not be interpreted allegorically.
(2) Where there is symbolization:
(i) Where it is difficult to know both that there is symbolization and what is symbolized. Such texts
may be interpreted allegorically only by the learned.
(ii) Where it is easy to know both that there is symbolization and what
is symbolized. Such texts must be interpreted allegorically by everyone.
(iii) Where it is easy to know that there is symbolization but difficult
to know what is symbolized. In these cases the masses must be told that only
the learned are able to understand the true interpretation; or they must be
given an easy allegorical explanation, according to the rules laid down by Ghazali.
(iv) Where it is difficult to know that there is symbolization, but easy
to know what it symbolizes. In these cases it is preferable to deny the
existence of symbolization. When it is made known, the resulting popular
beliefs are apt to cause confusion .] 223
It
now remains for us out of our programme only to study what portions of
Scripture it is permissible and what it is not permissible to interpret allegorically,
and, when it is permissible, to whom the permission is given.
With this [topic] we shall conclude the argument of this book.
We
say that the ideas found in Scripture fall into five classes
i.e. they are divided
into two primary classes, and the second of the two is divisible into four [sub-] classes.
[1] The first, indivisible class consists of [the cases] where the idea which is [outwardly] expressed is identical with the idea really intended. 224
[2] The second, divisible class consists of [the cases] where the
idea expressed in Scripture is not the idea really intended,
but is merely substituted for ii as a means of symbolization. 225 This class is divided into four parts. [i] The first is where the idea, which is expressed
by its symbol, is known <in> its reality
only by difficult composite syllogisms, taking a long time and many skills to learn,
and which superior minds alone can grasp; and where the fact that the
symbol expressed is distinct from the thing symbolized is known only with as
much difficulty as that we have [just] described. [ii]
The second is the opposite of this, where it is easy to know both things, i.e.
that what is expressed is a symbol, and what it symbolizes. [iii] The third is where it is easy to know that it
is a symbol for something, but difficult to know what it symbolizes. [iv] The fourth is the reverse of this, where it is easy to know
what it symbolizes but difficult to know [in
the first place] that it is a symbol. 226
Now
it is undoubtedly an error to interpret allegorically [1]
the first of the two primary classes.
In
the case of [2, i] the first [sub-]class of the second [class], that which is difficult in both respects, allegorical
interpretation is the special task of ‘those who are well grounded
in science’, and it is not permitted to be expressed to any but ‘the well
grounded’.
[ii] In the opposite class, that which is easy in
both respects, an allegorical interpretation is intended and it is obligatory
to express it.
[iii] <In the third class the
case is otherwise,> because in this class on account of its
difficulty symbolization does not occur for the purpose of explanation to the masses, but only occurs to
stimulate souls towards to it. 227 Thus for example in the words of the Prophet, peace on him, ‘The
Black Stone is the right hand of God on earth’, 228 and other similar sayings, it is self-evident
or easily known that there is a symbol, but it is difficult to know what it
symbolizes. Therefore such [a text] ought not
to be interpreted allegorically by any but the elite and the scholars; and
those who notice that it is symbolic, without being of the class of people who can
understand what it symbolizes, should either be told that it is of the ambiguous kind whose
meaning is known by the well grounded scholars, or the symbolization in it should be
translated for them into something [even] easier than what they know, the fact that it
is symbolic. The latter course seems more suitable as a means of ending the
doubt which arises in the soul from this [class of
text].
The
rule in this regard is that which was followed by Abu Hamid in The book of the distinction: 229 that
this class of persons should learn that one and the same thing has five [modes of] existence, which are called by Abu Hamid ‘essential’, ‘sensible’, ‘imaginary’, ‘intellectual’
and ‘metaphorical’.
Thus when the question arises one considers which of these four [last named modes of] existence is more persuasive 230 to the
class of persons who find
it impossible [to believe] that what is meant
by it is essential existence, i.e. that which is external; then he brings down
this symbolization for them to [the level of]
that [mode of] existence whose possibility is
moss acceptable to their way of thinking. To this sort [of texts] belong the
words of the Prophet, peace on him, ‘There is nothing that I have not seen, but
I have seen it already in this place of mine -even Paradise and the Fire’;
231 and ‘Between my basin and my pulpit there is
one of the gardens of Paradise, and my pulpit is close by my basin’; 232 and ‘Dust consumes all of a son of Adam except
his os coccygis’. 233 It is easy to perceive
that all these sayings are symbolic, but difficult to perceive what they
symbolize. Thus to the class [of people] who notice this much, these sayings
ought to be brought down to that one of those four modes of existence which
most nearly resembles [the essential mode].
This
manner of interpretation, if it is employed in these contexts and in this way,
is authorized by Scripture; but if it is employed in other contexts, it is an
error. Abu Hamid did not make such a distinction: for instance [2, i] when it is difficult to understand the context
in both respects, i.e. that it is a symbol and what it symbolizes, but there arises
at first glance a suspicion of the imagination that it is symbolic. That
suspicion is idle; 234 therefore in such a case
that suspicion ought to be discredited and it [the
text] should not be made an object of allegorical interpretation, as has
happened in so many contexts (as I have shown you in this book) at the hands of
the theologians, i.e. the Ash’arites and Mu’tazilites.
[iv] The
fourth class is the opposite of this: that in which it is difficult to know that it [the text] is symbolic, but when once it is,
admitted that it is
symbolic, it easily becomes apparent what it symbolizes. Here again we must be
circumspect in giving allegorical interpretations, i.e. among the class [of people] who, if they perceive that it is
symbolic, perceive what it symbolizes, but who only perceive that it is
symbolic through a suspicion or persuasion, since they are not scholars, ‘well
grounded in science’. So it is possible to say that the surest way to maintain
respect for Scripture is not to interpret these [texts]
allegorically, and to discredit in the minds of these people the things through
which they have come to think that such sayings are symbolic; and this is the
most suitable course.
It
is also possible to release the allegorical interpretation to them, because of
the strong resemblance between the thing mentioned and what it symbolizes.
However, when allegorical interpretations of these two classes [of texts] [iii and iv] are declared openly, they
give birth to strange beliefs, remote from the apparent meaning of Scripture; and sometimes these become
widespread, until they are denied by the masses.
This is what happened to the Sufis and to those scholars who followed this path: when
allegorical interpretation of this Scripture was controlled by men
who did not distinguish either these contexts or the class of people to whom it
is permissible to give allegorical interpretations, the situation became
confused, and various sects arose among them, each accusing the other of
unbelief; and all this is ignorance of the purpose of the Law and transgression against it.
[Conclusion]
From our account you have now become aware of the amount of error that occurs as a result of allegorical interpretation. It is our desire to have the chance to fulfill this aim with regard to all the statements of Scripture: i.e. to discuss which of them have to be interpreted allegorically and which not, and, when they have to be interpreted, to whom the interpretations should be given; I mean, [to deal thus] with every difficult passage in the Qur’an and the Traditions, and show the place of all the statements in these four classes. 235 But the aim which we have pursued in this book is now accomplished; and we have given it precedence only because we have held it to be the most important of aims connected with Scripture. It is God who helps us to follow the right course and guarantees our reward, through His favour and mercy.
This book
was concluded in the year 575. 236
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