1. Kant’s Refutation of the Proofs for God’s Existence.
        In its traditional guise, the cosmological proof is premised upon finite and contingent being or, more to the point, conditioned being.  What is conditioned has conditions, and the mind is naturally led to infer condition from conditioned without limit.  The only possible way to end this regress (and thereby to satisfy understanding) is by positing unconditioned being.  Kant expresses the proof as follows:  “If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist.  Now I, at least, exist.  Therefore an absolutely necessary being exists” (CPR B633).  Without absolutely necessary (i.e., unconditioned) being to end the regress of causes, there is no completeness to the series and no satisfaction for understanding.  For Kant, this positing is an act of Reason without any known or knowable objective correlate.  As such, it hardly qualifies as a demonstration of the existence of some supersensible entity.  More relevant here is the inherent limitations of this form of proof pointed out by Hume and later by Kant.

        In Hume’s terms, one is never justified in attributing more to a cause than is necessary to account for a given effect (Enquiry p. 94).  The most, then, that might be justified by the cosmological proof is the existence of an unconditioned being.  By ‘God’, traditionally, something far greater is intended.  What this is can never be reached by the cosmological proof.  Kant concludes:

But the cosmological proof uses this experience only for a single step in the argument, namely, to conclude the existence of a necessary being.  What properties this being may have, the empirical premises cannot tell us.  Reason therefore abandons experience altogether, and endeavors to discover from mere concepts what properties an absolutely necessary being must have, that is, which among all possible things contains in itself the conditions essential to absolute necessity (CPR B634-5).

        The physico-theological (or teleological) proof faces the same limitations according to Kant.  While the cosmological proof is premised upon mere finite being, the teleological proof is premised upon determinate finite being.  It reaches its goal in much the same manner, however.  This proof begins with “determinate experience of the specific constitution of the world of sense as thereby known, and [ascends] from it, in accordance with the laws of causality, to the supreme cause outside the world . . .” (CPR B618).  Though closer to the mark, this proof, says Kant, faces the same limitations as the cosmological proof.  Great “variety, order, purposiveness, and beauty” are found in the world (B650), and these determinations are thereby attributed to the unconditioned cause of the world.  But however wondrous, experience can never be adequate to the idea of the most real being (B649).  In the same way, then, the physico-theological proof again falls short of the mark.  “[T]he physico-theological proof can never by itself establish the existence of a supreme being, but must always fall back upon the ontological argument to make good its deficiency” (B653).  Regarding this first form of proof (whereby experience provides what seems to be the foundation for inference), Kant thinks no such proof will ever be adequate.  Kant concludes that “To advance to absolute totality by the empirical road is utterly impossible” (B656).  Only the ontological proof has any hope of succeeding in this endeavor.

        Descartes’ version of the ontological proof is as follows:  “from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God, and that for this reason he really exists” (Med p.44).   This proof begins with a conception of the most perfect being, and its central purpose (as commonly understood) is to prove that there is an objective correlate to this concept.  As with other concepts, certain predications are licensed by definition (and are thereby known a priori).  In Kant’s terminology, Descartes claims that there are analytic truths regarding God.  Just as ‘three angles’ may be predicated of any triangle, ‘existence’ may be predicated of God (i.e., the most perfect being).

        Of Kant’s many worries, the most central concerns the metaphysical status of the predicate ‘existence’.  When we consider existential propositions, says Kant, we find that they are one and all synthetic (CPR B626).  Regarding the claim that a triangle necessarily has three angles, Kant claims, “The above proposition does not declare that three angles are absolutely necessary, but that, under the condition that there is a triangle (that is, that a triangle is given), three angles will necessarily be found in it” (B622).  The same holds for all analytic claims.  That is, analytic claims have the implicit condition (they are implicitly conditionals whose antecedent takes the form), ‘Provided x exists, . . .’.  It is always possible that this antecedent may be false.  Contradiction is only possible within the consequent of such conditionals, and only then just in case the antecedent is true.  Kant argues,

If . . . I reject the predicate while retaining the subject, contradiction results; and I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to the latter.  But if we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction; for nothing is then left that can be contradicted . . . The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being.  If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can then arise (B623).

2. Hegel’s Theory of the Syllogism.

        There is very little regarding Kant’s analysis that Hegel finds objectionable given Kant’s rendition of the proofs.  Rather than refute Kant directly, Hegel is far more concerned that we see these proofs in their ‘true and proper form’.  According to Hegel, Kant “failed to recognize the deeper basis upon which these proofs rest, and so was unable to do justice to their true elements” (Proofs p.261).  In each case, Hegel agrees, the infinite is supposed to be reached from a starting-point which is finite (PR p.162).  This transition, however, is not the static formal mediation Kant believes it to be.  Hegel explains,

this knowledge of God, is inwardly a movement; more precisely, it is an elevation to God.  We express religion essentially as an elevation, a passing over from one content to another.  It is the finite content from which we pass over to God, from which we relate ourselves to the absolute, infinite content and pass over to it (p.162).

• It is a movement in which the finite is negated.
• It is an elevation of mind to the infinite.
• It is a mediation which gives way to unity.
• It is concrete.

        All forms of syllogistic reasoning (when finitude is viewed as the starting-point) involve, according to Hegel, a passing over from finitude (in one guise or other) to infinitude.  Regarding the passage involved in each of the two forms of proof, Hegel directs our attention both to what is diverse amongst the major and minor premises and to what elements are common.  In the first passage, “the common element is being, for this content common to both sides is posited as finite and infinite [respectively]” (PR p.163).  That is to say, from a starting point which is concrete and finite one ascends to a concrete universality.  In the second form of proof, one ascends from a subjective (and therefore finite) infinitude to an objective infinitude.  In this passage “the common element is the infinite, which is posited in the form of the subjective and the objective” (p.163).  In this passage, we shall find, the finitude voiced in the minor premise is negated.  In the Kantian construal of these proofs, this finitude is taken to be affirmed.

        The passage is also, contrary to popular understanding, not an activity of thought which ought to be viewed as a mediation which somehow reflects or represents the mediation inhering in something else (viz., something objective).  According to a traditional understanding of proofs, “[t]he procedure that we follow in demonstration is not a process of the thing itself - it is something other than what is involved in the nature of the thing” (PR p.166).  It is this misconstrual (bound up with the mistake of viewing the finite as something affirmed and preserved in unaltered form - i.e., as being true) which gives rise to the view that the finite is supposed to act as a foundation for the infinite.  According to the ‘distorted’ view,

the mediation through which we pass and the mediation in the thing itself are separate from one another.  Construction and proof serve only as an aid to our subjective cognition; they do not constitute the objective mode by which the thing attained this relationship through mediation (p.166).

        The truth of the proofs, for Hegel, is that they elevate man to God.  They express the profound syllogism relating man to God.  The relation between the minor term and major term is one of identity (though not pure identity but rather one in which the former is subsumed by the latter).  In other words, the upshot of the syllogism is the concrete unity of the minor and major terms.  “The mediation accordingly is in a third [term] over against these two distinct sides, and is itself a third that brings them together and in which they are mediated and identical.  Here we have the familiar relationship of the syllogism . . .” (PR p.164).  The syllogism (the movement of which is dialectic) is the ubiquitous feature of the world.  Man’s grasp of this identity of particular and universal is his distinctive achievement (Logic p.81).

But in its true and proper character, Dialectic is the very nature and essence of everything predicated by mere understanding - the law of things and of the finite as a whole . . . Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there is Dialectic at work (p.116).

        Returning to the proofs themselves, Hegel finds that they evidence the progression of human thought itself.  Kant was in part correct in his claim that the ontological proof is the battlefield on which the outcome of the war is to be determined.  For Hegel, the ontological proof is the most profound achievement of spirit.  It comes late in the historical play of appearances for this reason.  For Hegel, furthermore, the deficiencies particular to each of the earlier proofs are very nearly the ones pointed out by Kant.

3. Hegel’s Cosmological Proof

        The cosmological proof has as its point of departure the nonsystematic cognition of the world (i.e., the world is not seen as Nature) (Proofs p.228).  “By the term world . . . we understand the aggregate of material things . . .” (p.228).  In this mode of proof, consideration is first given to the being of variety, flux, and contingency evidenced by this aggregate (p.228).  “This is the kind of starting-point from which the spirit raises itself to God” (p.228).  This elevation, as already discussed, is impossible if one affirms this contingency. Further, to affirm the contingency of the world is to overlook its self-negating character.

        This Heraclitean flux evident in phenomena belies the truth of its seeming contingency. Hegel argues, “[t]o begin with, therefore, we have the negative aspect, the negation of the finite, the fact that it is its inner nature to be contradiction, i.e., not to be but rather to destroy itself - it is self-sublation” (PR p.170).  The truth of the world is not contingency (and therefore not finitude), it is rather necessity (therefore infinitude).  Here we find a positive element emerging from the negation of the finite (p.170).  So, in the proof, “there is here a mediation of the finite and infinite.  But the essential point is that, in its departure from the finite, the mediation negates this finite in the elevation, does not allow it to subsist” (at least not in its initial form) (Logic p.170).

        Again, this proof is not to be taken as a thought sequence distinct from the world itself. The concrete universality evidenced by the syllogism is the elevation of ourselves to God.  Hegel explains, “There is a progression through different determinations, and it is by no means an external one but is rather necessity itself.  This necessity is the deed of our spirit” (PR p.171).  Nor, therefore, can we view (as does Kant) the proof as a positing of God over and above the world (or as an inference to the existence of the former from the latter).  It is not that there are two beings, for their unity is what is revealed by the syllogism.  In truth, “the finite does not endure, and inasmuch as it does not endure, there is also no longer a gulf present between finite and infinite, [they] are no longer two” (p.173).  What remains of the finite is its subsumption under the infinite.  “Being which is characterized as finite possesses this characteristic only in the sense that it cannot exist independently in relation to the Infinite, but is, on the contrary, ideal merely, a moment of the Infinite” (Proofs p.260).

        However great an achievement of spirit this is, there would be greater ones to follow.  Hegel seems in the end to acquiesce to Kant’s worry that the cosmological proof can at best provide evidence only of necessary being.  The characteristics of God arrived at through the first procedure “are certainly inadequate to express what is or ought to be understood by God . . . [though] these characteristics have great value, and are necessary factors in the idea of God” (Logic p.83).  This shortcoming is, of course, in keeping with Hegel’s position that all is dialectical - including (and especially) the march of human consciousness.

It will at once be seen that if this proof does not bring us any further than to the idea of an absolutely necessary Essence, the only objection which could be urged against it would be, that the idea of God which is limited to what is implied in this characteristic is at any rate not such a profound idea as we, whose conception of God is more comprehensive, wish for.  It is quite possible that individuals and nations belonging to an earlier age, or . . . outside the pale of Christianity . . . might have no more profound idea of God than this (Proofs p.242-243).

4. Hegel’s Teleological Proof.

        This next proof is so similar to the first that it seems unnecessary to consider it in great detail.  There are, however, also some distinctive insights worth mentioning.  Again, the proof departs from an apprehension of finitude - in this case determinate finitude.  “[T]here is finite being on one side, though it is not just abstractly defined, or defined only as being, but rather as being that has within it the more substantial determination of being something physically alive” (PR p.175).  The negation of finitude is, again, at the same time an elevation and affirmation.

        What is perhaps most distinctive of Hegel’s portrayal of this proof is the manner in which he avoids casting purposiveness as something requiring an ends-maker external to the means (i.e., the world).  In the same way that the common conception of the cosmological proof is one in which God (or merely necessary essence) is posited as something outside of the world, the common conception of the teleological proof (which accords with one notion of purpose) places God outside the world.  The paradigm manifestation of purposiveness for Hegel, on the other hand, is to be found in organic life.  Here purposiveness is an inner purposiveness rather than something imposed from without (PR p.176-177).  “[E]very living thing is a telos that has its means implicit within it . . .” (p.177).  It is the finite manifestation of inner purposiveness which is negated in the elevation characterized by this proof.  Hegel explains, “[t]he proper progression, then, is from this finite organic life to absolute organic life, to universal purposiveness - such that this world is a cosmos, i.e., a system in which everything has an essential connection to everything else and nothing is isolated” (p.177).  Paralleling the conception of God stemming from the cosmological proof, here we have “one purpose that articulates itself in particular ends . . .” (p.177).  Also like the cosmological proof, this proof falls shy of the mark, for “here again it is the case that the [resulting] definition is still not yet adequate for the concept of God . . .” (p.178).

        In order to achieve the elevation in its fullest possible form, neither matter nor organic nature will suffice as a starting-point.  Human cognition itself is clearly the only adequate point of departure for an elevation to God.  Its untruth (finitude) will have to be negated and elevated.  The result, of course, is the recognition of the unity of finite and infinite spirit.

merely animated nature is, at the best, incapable of supplying the material for a truthful expression to the idea to God.  God is more than life: he is Spirit.  And therefore if the thought of the Absolute takes a starting-point for its rise, and desires to take the nearest, the most true and adequate starting-point will be found in the nature of spirit alone (Logic p.84).

5. Hegel’s Ontological Proof.
        The ontological proof also finds its point of departure in finitude.  In this case, finitude appears in the form of subjectivity (PR p.181).  Progress is not to be had by affirming the finitude of the mere conception of God.  Such an affirmation amounts to a reduction of all conception to mere representation.  This finitude of consciousness (in which consciousness is construed as subject in contradistinction to object) must, of course, be negated.  Conception must be cast in its true and proper light.

We have God or this content as afflicted with the one-sidedness and finitude that is called representation of God.  It is our interest that representation should strip away this blemish of being merely something represented and subjective, and that the definition for this content should become that of being (p.181).

        Recall, Kant’s worry “is that being is . . . not part of the reality, of a concept” (PR p.183).  This is quite reasonable provided one allows that concepts are purely subjective - i.e., that they are mere representations.  For Hegel, a representation “can of course lack being.  This sort of thing, however, is not to be called a concept” (p.184).  This is, as noted above, a radically mistaken metaphysic whose greatest shortcoming is to deny “that the empirical involves the universal . . .” (Logic p.84) and to oppose thought with truth.  This claim, Hegel takes it, has been amply defended in both Phenomenology and Logic.  Explaining the achievement of these treatises, he claims, “The concept is what is alive, is what mediates itself with itself; one of its determinations is also being” (PR p.184).

        If conception is the immediate apprehension of what is universal manifesting itself in particularity (if “[t]o think the phenomenal world . . . means to recast its form, and transmute it into a universal” (Logic p.81)), then the conception of God is highest of all possible conceptions.

as far as the concept is concerned, it is immediately this universal that determines and particularizes itself - it is this activity of dividing, of particularizing and determining itself, of positing a finitude, negating this its own finitude and being identical with itself though the negation of this finitude.  This is the concept as such, the concept of God, the absolute concept; this is just what God is (185).

        This final proof is the culmination of millennia of progress in the realm of consciousness for Hegel.  “Only when spirit has grown to its highest freedom and subjectivity does it grasp this thought of God as something subjective and arrive at this antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity” (182).  It is natural that the earlier proofs should therefore fall short of their mark.  This elevation fits naturally into Hegel’s larger system for understanding the history of religion, consciousness, being, and culture.  Indeed, Hegel explains, “even within the Christian era it was not accomplished for a long time, because it involves the most profound descent of spirit into itself” (181).

        Clearly Hegel’s proofs presuppose the metaphysical system laid down in Phenomenology of Spirit and elsewhere.  It is striking how naturally this system lends itself to the proofs for God’s existence in the form Hegel espoused.  It seems as though (as Frank Flinn noted in conversation) an attack on these proofs would will require the undermining of Hegel’s system itself.  As is evident even from this very limited sphere of his thought, Hegel has (at the very least) shown himself to be one of the deepest and most sophisticated thinkers to grace philosophy.

Abbreviations:
PR          Philosophy of Religion. Hegel, G.W.F. (1988) trans. Brown, Hodgson, Stewart, and Harris.
Proofs     Proofs for the Existence of God. Hegel, G.W.F. (1895) trans. Speirs and Sanderson
Logic       Logic. Hegel, G.W.F. (1975) trans. Wallace
CPR        Critique of Pure Reason. Kant, I. (1965) trans Smith
Med.        Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes, R. (1993) trans. Cress
Enquiry    An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Hume, D. (1993) ed. Steinberg