A HISTORY OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY

WITH SHORT ACCOUNTS OF OTHER DISCIPLINES AND THE MODERN RENAISSANCE IN MUSLIM LANDS

EDITED AND INTRODUCED BY

M. M. SHARIF

VOLUME ONE

1963

OTTO HARRASSOWITZ - WIESBADEN
COMMITTEE OF DIRECTORS

1. I. I. Kazi, Vice-Chancellor, University of Sind (Chairman)
2. The Educational Adviser and Secretary to the Government of Pakistan
3. Mumtaz Hasan, Secretary Finance, Government of Pakistan
4. Khalilah Abdul Hakim, Director, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore
5. Serajul Haque, Professor and Chairman, Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Daaka
6. M. Abdul Hye, Vice-Principal, Government College, Rajshahi
7. M. Ahmed, Vice-Chancellor, Rajshahi University
8. M. M. Sharif, President, Pakistan Philosophical Congress (Secretary and Editor)
PREFACE

About four years ago I received a letter from Mr. S. M. Sharif, Educational Adviser to the Government of Pakistan and now Secretary in the Ministry of Education, drawing my attention to the fact that there was no detailed History of Muslim Philosophy in the English language and inviting me to draw up a scheme for the preparation of such a History. The scheme prepared by me envisaged the collaboration of eighty scholars from all over the world. The blue-print of the plan was placed before Mr. S. M. Sharif by the Government of Pakistan for approval and provision of funds. The Cabinet by a special ordinance deputed me to edit the History, and appointed a Committee consisting of the following to steer the scheme through:

Mr. I. I. Kari, Vice-Chancellor, University of Sind (Chairman)
The Educational Adviser to the Government of Pakistan (Member)
Mr. Munirul Haq, then Secretary Finance, Government of Pakistan, and now Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission (Member)
Dr. Khalifah Abdul Hakim, Director, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore (Member)
Dr. Serajul Haq, Head of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Dacca (Member)
Professor M. Abdul Hye, Vice-Principal, Government College, Rajshahi (Member)
Myself (Member-Secretary)

The Committee was later enlarged by the addition of Dr. M. Ahmed, Vice-Chancellor, Rajshahi University.

But for the initiative taken by Mr. S. M. Sharif and the constant help and encouragement received from him, a liberal grant from the State, and most willing co-operation from the Chairman and members of the Committee, it would not have been possible for me to bring this work to completion.

From the very beginning I have been aware of the sheer impossibility of doing full justice to such a vast canvas of movements, thinkers, and thoughts. I am most grateful to the large number of contributors who have made at least the outlines of the entire picture possible. As this is the first major work on the history of Muslim philosophy it is bound to have many deficiencies, but a beginning had to be made and it has been made with the hope that it will pave the way for future improvements.

vii
Preface

In a collaboration work like this complete uniformity of language, style, and points of view, and evenness of quality and length, are hard to achieve. However, efforts have been made to keep disparity in these matters as well as in transliteration, capitalization and punctuation as much within bounds as possible. Credit for whatever merits these volumes have must go to those who have joined this venture; responsibility for whatever faults it may have is mine.

I wish to express the Committee of Directors' deep gratitude to Asia Foundation for its gift of the paper used in this work, and my personal thanks to its Representative in Pakistan, Mr. Curtis Farrar, for the keen interest evinced by him throughout the course of its preparation. I have to acknowledge my great obligation to Mr. R. K. V. Goldstein of Aitchison College, Lahore, and Mr. Hugh Gethin of the University of the Punjab for their helpful guidance in the matter of language. I am equally indebted to Professor M. Saeed Sheikh of Government College, Lahore, who has not only gone over the whole typescript and read proofs but has also suggested many improvements in thought and expression. I must also express my thanks to Mr. Mumtaz Hasan for his valuable suggestions towards the removal of some apologetic passages from the original manuscript, and to him as well as to Professor M. Abdul Hye, Mr. A. H. Kardar, and Dr. Serajul Haque for reading several chapters and drawing my attention to some omissions. My thanks are also due to Mr. Asraf Dar for preparing the Index and helping me in proof-reading, to Mr. Ahsiq Hussain for typing the whole manuscript, Mr. Abdus Salam for putting in the diacritical marks, and Mr. Javid Altaf, a brilliant young scholar, for checking capitalization.

In the end I have to note with great regret that two of the contributors to the work, Dr. Khalifah Abdul Hakim of Pakistan who was also a member of the Committee of Directors and Dr. Mochut Mansuroglu of Turkey, have passed away. May their souls rest in peace!

Lahore: August 1, 1961

M. M. Sharif

CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction by the Editor, M.M. Sharif, M.A., Director, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore (Pakistan)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VOLUME I

Book One

PRE-ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

Part 1

I Pre-Islamic Indian Thought by C.A. Qadir, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, Government College, Lahore (Pakistan) | 15

II Pre-Islamic Chinese Thought by Howard F. Dickson, Jr., M.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor of History, Newark State College, Union, New Jersey, and Adjunct Professor at the American University, Washington, D.C. (U.S.A.) | 45

III Pre-Islamic Iranian Thought by Alessandro Bausani, Ph.D., Professor of Persian Language and Literature, University of Naples (Italy) | 56

IV Greek Thought by M.M. Sharif | 75

V Alexandriano-Syracusan Thought by C.A. Qadir | 111

Part 2

VI Pre-Islamic Arabian Thought by Shaikh Isyqatullah, M.A., Ph.D., Formerly, Professor of Arabic, University of the Punjab, Lahore (Pakistan) | 136

Book Two

ADVENT OF ISLAM

FUNDAMENTAL TEACHINGS OF THE QUR'AN

VII Philosophical Teachings of the Qur'an by M.M. Sharif | 136

VIII Ethical Teachings of the Qur'an by B.A. Dar, M.A., Fellow, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore (Pakistan) | 155

IX Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur'an by Abdul A. Maydod, Editor, Tarjama al-Qur'an, Lahore (Pakistan) | 178
## Book Three

### EARLY CENTURIES
(From the First-Seventh Century to the Fall of Bagdad)

#### Part I. THEOLOGICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Mu'tazilism by Mir Valiuddin, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Jamia Millia Islamia (Delhi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>Ash'ariism by M. Abdul Hyn, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, Government College, Rajshahi (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Talbism by A.K.M. Ayyub Ali, M.A., Ph.D., Principal, Government Rajshahi Madrasa, Rajshahi (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII</td>
<td>Maturidism by A.K.M. Ayyub Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV</td>
<td>Jahizism by A.K M. A. F. Ali, Member of the Arab Academy, Damascus (Syria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV</td>
<td>Ikhwan al-Safa by A. M. A. Faruq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Part 2. THE SUFIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XVI</td>
<td>Early Sufis: Doctrine by M. Hamiduddin, M.A., Ph.D., Senior Professor and Chairman, Department of Philosophy and Psychology, Government College, Lahore (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII</td>
<td>Early Sufis (Continued)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Sufis Before al-Hadji by B.A. Dar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Al-Islam by Louis Massignon, Litt. D., Hon. Professor, Collège de France and Hanoi Institute, Havana (France)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII</td>
<td>Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani and Suhrawardi by B.A. Dar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX</td>
<td>Suhrawardi by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, M.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor, Kaiser University, Tehran University, Tehran (Iran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX</td>
<td>Ibn Arabi by A. E. Affi, Ph.D., Member of the Higher Council of Art and Social Sciences in Cairo, Professor Emeritus at the Faculty of Arts, Alexandria University (U.A.R.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Part 3. THE "PHILOSOPHERS"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XXI</td>
<td>Al-Qanuni by Ahmed Foud El-Ehwany, Ph.D., Professor of Islamic Philosophy, University of Arts, Cairo University (U.A.R.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII</td>
<td>Mohammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi by Adburrahman Badawi, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Min-Shams University, Cairo (U.A.R.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIII</td>
<td>Al-Firdusi by Ibrahim Makkouk, Ph.D., Member of the Arabic Academy, Cairo, Formerly, Professor of Philosophy, Cairo University (U.A.R.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXIV</td>
<td>Miskawayh by Adburrahman Badawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXV</td>
<td>Ibn Sina by Faisal Radwan, M.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University (Canada)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Chapter 36.** Ibn Bajjaj by Muhammad Baghiri, M.A., Ph.D., Senior Lecturer in Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Damas (Pakistan) | 506 |

**Chapter 37.** Ibn Tasti by Bakhtyayr Humayn Siddiqui, M.A., LL.B., Lecturer in Philosophy, Government College, Lahore (Pakistan) | 526 |

**Chapter 38.** Ibn Rashed by Ahmad Foud El-Ehwany | 549 |

**Chapter 39.** Nasir al-Din Tusi by Bakhtyayr Humayn Siddiqui | 564 |

**Chapter 40.** THE MIDDLE-ROADERS

**Chapter 41.** Al-Ghazali: Metaphysics by M. Saeed Sheikh, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, Government College, Lahore (Pakistan) | 581 |

**Chapter 42.** Al-Ghazali (Continued)

A. Mysticism by M. Saeed Sheikh | 617 |
B. Ethics by Abdul Khalic, M.A., Professor of Philosophy, Islamia College, Lahore (Pakistan) | 624 |
C. Influence by M. Saeed Sheikh | 637 |

**Chapter 43.** Faiz al-Din Razi by Seyyed Hossein Nasr | 642 |

**Chapter 44.** POLITICAL THINKERS

**Chapter 45.** Political Thought in Early Islam by Abul Ala Maqbool | 657 |

**Chapter 46.** Abu Hasanib and Abu Yusuf by Abul Ala Maqbool | 674 |

**Chapter 47.** Al-Farabi by Mohammad Baghiri Hossein al-Maqbool | 704 |

**Chapter 48.** Al-Mawardi by Mohammad Qamaruddin Khan, M.A., Lecturer in Islamica, University of the Punjab, Lahore (Pakistan) | 717 |

**Chapter 49.** Political Theory of the Shi'ites by Syed Abid Ali Abid, M.A., Formerly, Principal, Dyal Singh College, Lahore (Pakistan) | 732 |

**Chapter 50.** Nihat al-Mulk Tusi by M. Fakruddin Hasani, M.A., Chairman, Department of Political Science, Urdu College, Karachi (Pakistan) | 747 |

**Chapter 51.** Al-Ghazali by Leonard Binder, Ph.D., Institute for Administrative Affairs, Faculty of Law, Tehran University, Tehran (Iran) | 774 |
INTRODUCTION

A

Histories of philosophy have been invariably written in the light of the philosophies of history presupposed by their authors. The result of this has been that errors vitiating their philosophies of history have crept into and marred their histories of philosophy. In the present work our effort has been to steer clear of these errors.

Instead of reading history in the mirrors of presupposed philosophies which may give distorted images, it is the study of history itself through which the dynamics of history can be clearly seen and its laws discovered. We hope this study of Muslim philosophy and the empirical survey of its course will spotlight at least some of the misconceptions current among philosophers and historians about the nature of history and the laws governing it.

It will perhaps be generally agreed that human nature is fundamentally the same the world over. All human beings and the cultures they develop have the same fundamental needs, customs, impulses, and desires which, organized as personalities, determine their march towards their personal and social goals. The fundamental nature of men being the same, the basic laws of cultural development and decay always remain the same. But owing to different environmental conditions cultural groups evolve differently in different parts of the world and thousands of years of indigenous experience give those groups their own social and psychological character; and their character in response to environmental stimuli creates all the differences that appear in their respective life-histories. Muslim society forms a single cultural group. It has been subject to the same laws of growth and decay as any other cultural group, but it has also developed some peculiar features of its own.

B

Philosophers of social history individually differ in their views about the universal laws of history. There is a group of fourteenth/twentieth-century philosophers of history who believe that social history is like a wave, it has a rise and then it falls never to rise again, and view a society or a culture as an organism which has only one cycle of life. Like the life of any individual organism, the life of a culture has its childhood, maturity, old age, and death, its spring, summer, winter, and autumn. Just as a living organism cannot be revived after its death, even so a culture or a society can see no revival once it is
dead. Biological, geographical, and racial causes can to a limited extent influence its life-course but cannot change its inevitable cycle. To this group belong Danilevsky, Spengler, and Toynbee. Our study of Muslim culture and thought supports their view that in certain respects the dynamism of society is like the dynamism of a wave; but are the two other doctrines expounded by these philosophers equally true? First, is it true that a given society is a living organism? And, second, is it true that it has only one unrepeated life-course? Let us first take the first. Is a society or a culture an organism? Long ago Plato took a State to be an individual writ large. Not the same, but a similar mistake is being made now. All analogies are true only up to a point and not beyond that point. To view a society on the analogy of an individual organism is definitely wrong. As Sorokin has brilliantly shown, no society is so completely unified into an organic whole that it should be viewed as an organism. An individual organism is born, it grows and dies, and its species is perpetuated by reproduction, but a culture cannot repeat itself in species by reproduction. Revival of individual organism is impossible, but the revival of a culture is possible. It is achieved by the activation of its dormant vitality, by responses aroused by free infusions through the social system of new elements. The first revival of Muslim culture—its revival after the Mongol onslaughters which began when hardly half a century had passed and reached its full fruition in two centuries and a half—was partly due to its inherent vitality which could not be sapped completely even by those unprecedented events. They seemed to affect total devastation of Muslim lands, but in fact could produce only a depression. Soon rain-bearing clouds gathered and these lands were again green and teeming with life. Though the challenge itself was the strongest the world has ever seen was strong enough to destroy all response. This revival of the Muslim culture was partly due to the infusions into it earlier of the fresh blood of the Turkish slaves and mercenaries and later of that of the Mongol conquerors, for they themselves came into the fold of Islam bringing with them the vigour and vitality of their nomadic ancestors. Each individual organism is a completely integrated whole or a complete Gosail, but though such an integration is an ideal of each culture it has never been fully achieved by any culture. Each culture is a super-system consisting of some large systems such as religion, language, law, philosophy, science, fine arts, ethics, economics, technology, politics, territorial sway, associations, customs, and mores. Each of these consists of smaller systems as science includes physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, etc., and each of these smaller systems is comprised of yet smaller systems as mathematics is comprised of geometry, algebra, arithmetic, and so on. Besides these systems there are partly connected or wholly isolated heaps within these systems and super-systems. Thus, "a total culture of any organized group consists not of one cultural system but of a multitude of such small cultural systems that are partly in harmony, partly out of harmony, with one another, and in addition many congeries of various kinds." No past empire was so well-knit as the Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus and yet groups like the Kharijites and the Shi'ites fell apart from its total structure. After the fall of the Umayyads in the religious field there appeared some isolated groups like the Qarmatians and the Isma'ilites, and in the political sphere Muslim Spain became not only independent of but also hostile to the 'Abbásid Caliphate of Baghdad under which Muslim culture and thought may be said to have reached their golden prime.

So much about the organicistic side of the theory of Danilevsky, Spengler, and Toynbee when examined in the light of the history of Muslim culture and thought. What about its cyclical side? Is the life of a people like a meteor, beginning, rising, falling, and then disappearing for ever? Does the history of a society or a culture see only one spring, one summer, and one autumn and then, in its winter, completely die? The philosophers of history mentioned above, except Spengler, concede that the length of each period may be different with different peoples and cultures, but, according to them, the cycle is just one moving curve or one wave that rises and falls only once. This position also seems to be wrong. As the researches of Kroebner and Sorokin have conclusively shown, "many great cultural or social systems or civilizations have many cycles, many social, intellectual, and political ups and downs in their virtually indefinitely long span of life, instead of just one life-cycle, one period of blossoming, and one of decline." In the dynamics of intellectual and aesthetic creativity, Egyptian civilization rose and fell at least four times and Graeco-Roman-Byzantine culture, several times. Similarly, China and India had two big creative impulses and the third has now surely begun. The Muslim civilization rose from the first/seventh to the fifth/eighth century. Then it gradually declined till it received a deadly blow in the form of the Mongol onslaughters. Its chief monuments of political and cultural greatness were almost completely destroyed. And yet it did not die. It rose again and saw its second rise from the last decade of the seventh/thirteenth century to the end of the eleventh/seventeenth century during which period its domain covered three of the biggest empires of the world—Turkish, Persian, and Indian—only to fall again from the beginning of the twelfth/eighteenth to the middle of the thirteenth/nineteenth century; and as this study will clearly indicate there are now signs of a third rise in almost all Muslim lands (Book Eight).

This shows that there is "no universal law decreeing that every culture having once flowered must wither without any chance of flowering again." A culture may rise in one field at one time, in another field at another, and, thus, as a whole see many rises and falls. In both periods of its rise Muslim culture was marked by its religio-political and architectural ascendency; but while in the first period its glory lay also in its commercial, industrial, scientific, and philosophical fields, in the second it distinguished itself chiefly in the fields of poetry, painting; secular history, travels, mysticism, and minor arts. If by the birth of a civilization these writers mean a sudden appearance of a total unit.
Introduction

like that of an organism, and by death a total disintegration, then a total culture is never born nor does it ever die. At its so-called birth each culture takes over living systems or parts of a preceding culture and integrates them with newly-born items. As the reader of this work will find, Muslim culture integrated within itself what it regarded as the intrinsically or pragmatically valuable parts of Arab Paganism, Hellenism, Judaism, Christianity, Hindu mathematics and medicine, and Chinese mysticism and alchemy with its own contributions to human life and thought. Again, to talk about the death or disappearance of a culture or civilization is meaningless. A part of a total culture, its art or its religion, may disappear, but a considerable part of it is always taken over by other groups by which it is often developed further and expanded. The Muslims did not only annex certain areas of other cultures but they expanded their horizons much further before annexing them as integral parts of their own culture. Here it is important to remove a misconception. If some thought of earlier speculation runs through the fabric of Muslim thought even as a golden thread, it does not mean that, like many Western Orientalists, we should take the thread for the fabric. No culture, no individual, makes an absolutely new start. New structures are raised with the materials already produced. The past always rolls into the present of every culture and supplies some elements for its emergent edifice.

States are born and they die, but cultures like the mingled waters of different waves are never born as organisms nor die as organisms. Ancient Greece as a State died, but after its death a great deal of Greek culture spread far and wide and is still living as an important element in the cultures of Europe. Jewish States ceased to exist, but much of Jewish culture was taken over by Christianity and Islam. No culture dies in toto, though all die in parts. In respect of those parts of culture which live, each culture is immortal. Each culture or civilization emerges gradually from pre-existing cultures. As a whole it may have several peaks, may see many ups and downs and thus flourish for millennia, decline into a latent existence, re-emerge and again become dominant for a certain period and then decline once more to appear again. Even when dominated by other cultures a considerable part of it may live as an element fully or partly integrated in those cultures. Again, the cycle of birth, maturity, decline, and death can be determined only by the price determination of the life-span of a civilization, but there is no agreement among these writers on this point. What according to Danilevsky is one civilization, say, the ancient Semitic civilization, is treated by Toynbee as three civilizations, the Babylonian, Hittite and Sumerian, and by Spengler as two, the Magian and Babylonian. In the life-history of a people one notices one birth-and-death sequence, the other two, and the third three. The births and deaths of cultures observed by one writer are not noticed at all by the others. When the beginning and end of a culture cannot be determined, it is extravagant to talk about its birth and death and its unrepeatable cycle. A civilization can see many ups and downs and there is nothing against the possibility of its regeneration. No culture dies completely. Some elements of each die out and others merge as living factors into other cultures.

There is a group of fourteenth/twentieth-century philosophers of history who confine themselves to the study of art phenomena and draw conclusions about the dynamics of culture in general. Peter Paul Ligeti, Frank Chambers, and Charles Lalo belong to this group. We may not quarrel with them about some of their conclusions, but should like to make an observation about one of their hypotheses—a hypothesis on which the study of Muslim thought throws considerable light. According to most of them, it is always the same art and the same type or style of art which rises at one stage in the life-history of each culture: one art or art form at its dawn, another at its maturity, and yet another at its decline, and then gradually both art and the corresponding culture die. We do not accept this conclusion. The life-history of Greek art is not identical with that of European art or Hindu or Muslim art. In some cultures, like the Egyptian, Chinese, Hindu, and Muslim, literature; in some others such as the French, German, and English, architecture; and in the culture of the Greeks, music blossomed before any other art. The art of the Paleolithic people reached the maturity and artistic perfection which did not correspond to their stage of culture. In some cultures, as the Egyptian, art shows several waves, several ups and downs, rather than one cycle of birth, maturity, and decline. Unlike most other cultures, Muslim culture has given no place to sculpture and its music has risen simultaneously with its architecture. Its painting is not an art that developed before all other arts. It was in fact the last of all the artistic developments. Thus, it is not true that the sequence of the rise of different arts is the same in all cultures. Nor is it true that the same sequence appears in the style of each art in every culture. Facts do not support this thesis, for the earliest style of art in some cultures is symbolic, in others naturalistic, formal, impressionistic, or expressionistic. Another group of the fourteenth/twentieth-century philosophers of history avoid these pitfalls and give an integral interpretation of history. To this group belong Northrop, Kroeber, Shubart, Berdyayev, Schweitzer, and Sorokin. Northrop, however, weakens his position by basing cultural systems on philosophies and philosophies on science. He ignores the fact that many cultural beliefs are based on revelations or intuitive apprehensions. Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu cultures have philosophies based on revelation as much as on reason. The sources of some social beliefs may even be irrational and non-rational, often contradicting scientific theories. Kroeber's weakness consists in making the number of gurus rather than the number of achievements the criterion of cultural maturity. Schweitzer rightly contends that each nourishing civilization has a minimum of ethical values vigorously functioning, and that the decay of ethical values is the decay of civilizations. Neither the collapse of the Caliphate of Baghdad was caused entirely by the Mongol invasions nor was the ruin of the Umayyad Caliphate of Spain effected by the attacks of Christian monarchs of the north; nor indeed was the second decline of the Muslim world
due merely to the imperialistic designs of Western powers. These were only contributory factors to these downfall. The basic rise and fall of nations invariably arise from within. In each case the real cause was the lowering of moral standards brought about by centuries of luxury and over-indulgence in worldly pleasures, resulting in disunity, social injustice, jealousies, rivalries, intrigues, idiocy, and sloth—all the progency of fabulous wealth, and in the case of the second decline from about 1111/1700 to 1206/1850, all-round moral degeneration combined with conformism of the worst type deadening all original thought. Without this moral downfall there would have been no cultural decline in Islam.

As it has been said before a culture may rise in one field at one time, in another field at another, but while it may be rising in one field it may yet be declining on the whole. The politico-social rise or fall of a culture necessarily goes with its moral rise or fall. But this change is not always different with intellectual development. A people may decline in the politico-social sphere and yet its decline may itself under suitable circumstances become a stimulus for its intellectual advance. The political and moral decline of the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad began in about the mid-third/ninth century, and the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate of Spain and decadence of the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt in the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century. Yet the deep-rooted tradition of the patronage of learning in the Muslim world kept its intellectual achievements rising from peak to peak right up to the time of the Mongol devastation. Thus, despite its downfall in other fields, in the field of learning Muslim culture saw its ascendancy right up to the middle of the seventh/thirteenth century. In fact this period of political and moral fall—the period during which Muslims everywhere lost their political vitality and the three Caliphates broke into petty States or sudy dynasties—was exactly the period when the Muslim intellect reached its full flowering. It was during this period of political and moral decline that flourished such illustrious philosophers as al-Farabi, ibn Sina, Miskawiah, ibn Ham, al-Kindi, ibn Bajjah, ibn Tufail, ibn Rushd, and Fakhr al-Din Razi; the famous mystic Shihab al-Din Suhrwardi; great political philosophers like al-Mawardi and Nishan al-Mulk Tusi; renowned scientists and mathematicians like al-Majriti, ibn Yumni, ibn Haqqan, ibn al-Nafs, al-Indini, al-Bakri, al-Zarqali, Umar Khayyam, ibn Zohr, and al-Idrizi; and such celebrated literary figures as al-Tusi, al-Mas'udi, al-Mutanabbi, Firdausi, Biriillai, Sanai, al-Mawardi, Nasir Khurasan, al-Zamakhshari, Khaihii, Nizami, A'thir, and ibn al-Athir. Though these three celebratures, Rumi, 'Umar, and Nasir al-Din Tusi, died long after the sack of Baghdad, they were actually the products of this very period and much of their work had been produced within it. When moral degeneration sets in, a culture's intellectual achievements may stay but cannot avert the evil day.

* As Rumi's most important work, the Ma'navi, was written between 659/1261 and 670/1272, we have included him among writers of the centuries following the sack of Baghdad.
Introduction

Every civilization has a history of its own and each has its own ancient, medieval, and modern periods. In most cases these periods are not identical from the ancient, medieval, and modern periods of Western culture starting some time earlier. Many earlier civilizations preceded the Western culture and some starting earlier are still contemporaneous with it. They cannot be thrown into oblivion because they cannot be placed in the three periods of the cultures of the West, ancient, medieval, and modern. Western culture is not the measure or civilization or the whole of human history by the three-knotted yardstick of progress in the West. Mankind consists of a number of great and small countries each having its own drama, its own language, its own ideas, its own passions, its own customs and habits, its own possibilities, its own goals, and its own life-course. If it must be represented linearly, it would not be by one line but several lines or rather bands of variegated and constantly changing colours, reflecting one another and merging into one another.

While the learned editors of the History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, have endeavored to remove confusion in the treatment of ancient history, they have failed to remove similar flaws in the treatment of what the Western writers designate as the "medieval" period of history. A very large part of this period is covered by the phenomenal rise and development of Muslim thought which carried human achievement in the intellectual field, as in many other fields, to one of its highest peaks. For this the most glorious part of medieval history, not more than four out of forty-eight chapters have been assigned in the History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western. Nor, indeed, has even a word been said about the well-recognized role of Muslim philosophy in transmitting Greek thought to the West, in advancing human knowledge, in supplying a mold for the shaping of Western scholasticism, in developing empirical sciences, in bringing about the Italian Renaissance, and in providing stimulus to the speculation of Western thinkers from Descartes to Kant. Moreover, in the account given of the "modern" period of history, the philosophical developments of the East, except those in India, have been completely omitted. The reader of this historical work gets the impression that from the time of Descartes to that of Sartre, i.e., the present day, the East, outside India, intellectually ceased to exist.

It is true that the History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, is not alone characterized by these omissions. The same gaps, even more yawning, are found in the histories of philosophy written by Western scholars; but while in the works of the Westerners they are understandable, in those of the Eastern scholars they are unpardonable. Nevertheless, this is a particular case; they became unavoidable for the able editors did intend to have some more chapters on Muslim philosophy, but the writer to whom these chapters were assigned was also a minister of the State holding an important portfolio and his heavy official duties left him no time to write them.
Introduction

ment has vitiated the thought of several of his successors, Rickert, Wundt,
band, and Spengler, and even of Bergson. If electrons, amoebas, fishes, and
apes were to speak, they could reasonably ask why, born of the same cosmic
energy, determined by the same laws, having the same limited freedoms, they
should be supposed to be mere nature having no history. To divide the world-
stuff into nature and history is unwarranted. History consists of sequences of
groups of events, and we have learnt since Einstein that objects in nature
are also groups of events. There is no essential difference between the two. The
only difference is that up to a certain stage there is no learning by experience;
beyond that there is. According to Hegel, the linear progress of the Idea or
Intelligence, in winning rational freedom, culminates in the State, the best
example of which is the German State. Such a line of thought justifies internal
tyranny, external aggression, and wars between States. It finds no place in
the historical process for world organizations like the United Nations or the
World Bank and is falsified by the actual existence of such institutions in the
present stage of world history. Intelligence is really only one aspect of the
human mind, and there seems to be no ground for regarding this one aspect,
the knowing aspect, of only one kind of the world-stuff, i.e., mankind as the
essence of the world-stuff.

The mind of one who rejects Hegel’s idealism at once turns to Marx. Marxian
dialectic is exactly the same as Hegel’s. But, according to Marx, the world-stuff
is not the idea, but matter. He uses this word, matter, in the sense in which
it was used by the eighteenth/nineteenth-century French materialists. But the
idea of matter as inert mass has been discarded even by present-day physics.
World-stuff is now regarded as energy which can take the form of mass.
Dialectical materialism, however, is not disproved by this change of meaning of
the word “matter.” It can still be held in terms of a realistic dialectic—the
processes in which the present-day Marxists hold it. With the new terminology,
then, the Marxist dialectic takes this form: Something real (a thesis) emerges
from within itself as an antithesis, which both, instead of warring perpetually
with each other, get united into a synthesis (a third real) which then becomes
the thesis of another trial, and thus from trial to trial till, in the
social sphere, this dialectic of real entities leads to the actualization of a classless
society. Our objection to Hegel’s position that he does not find any place for
international organizations in the historical process does no: apply to Marx,
but the objection that Hegel considers war a necessary part of the historical
process applies equally to him. Hegel’s system encourages wars between nations;
Marx’s between classes. Besides, Marxism is self-contradictory, for while it
recognizes the inevitability or necessity of the causal law, it also recognizes
initiative and free creativity of classes in changing the world. Both Marx and
Hegel make history complete, but Hegel completely ignore the most
universal law of human nature, the law that people, becoming dissatisfied
with their situation at all moments of their lives except when they are in sound
sleep, are in the pursuit of ideals and values (which before their realization are
more ideas); and thus if efficient causes push them on (which both Hegel and
Marx recognize), final causes are constantly exerting their pull (which both
of them ignore).

Our recognition of final causes as determinants of the course of history leads
us to the formulation of a new hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, human
beings and their ideals are logical contraries or discrepancies in so far as the
former are real and the latter ideal, and real and ideal cannot be attributed to
the same subject in the same context. Nor can a person and his ideal be
thought of in the relation of subject and predicate. For, an ideal of a person
is what the person is not. There is no essential opposition between two ideals
or between two real, but there is a genuine incompatibility between a real
and an ideal. What is real is not ideal and whatever is ideal is not real. Both
are opposed in their essence. Hegelian ideas and Marxist real are not of oppo-
site nature. They are in conflict in their function. They are mutually warring
ideas or warring real and are separated by hostility and hatred. The incom-
patibilities of our hypothesis are so in their nature, but not in their function, and
are bound by love and affection and, though irrational discrepancies, are volitional-
ly and emotionally in harmony. In the movement of history real selves are
attracted by ideals, and then, in realizing them, are synthesized with them.
This movement is dialectical, but it is totally different from the Hegelian or
Marxist dialectic. Their thesis and antithesis are struggling against each other.
Here, one is struggling not against but “for” the other. The formula of the
dynamic of history, according to this conception, will be: A real (thesis)
creates from within itself an Ideal (antithesis) which both by mutual harmony
get united into another real (synthesis) that becomes the thesis of another
trial and thus from trial to trial. The dialectic of human society, according
to this formula, is not a struggle of warring classes or warring nations, but a
struggle against limitations to realize goals and ideals, which goals and ideals
are willed and loved rather than fought against. This is a dialectic of love
rather than of hatred. It leads individuals, masses, classes, nations, and civil-
izations from lower to higher and from higher to yet higher reaches of achieve-
ment. It is a dialectic which recognizes an overall necessity of a transcen-
dentially determined process (a divine order), takes notice of the partial free-
dom of social entities and of the place of mechanical determination as a tool
in divine and human hands.

This hypothesis is not linear because it envisages society as a vast number
of interacting individuals and intermingling, interacting classes, societies, cul-
tures, and humanity as a whole, moving towards infinite ideals, now rising,
now falling, but on the whole developing by their realization, like the clouds
constantly rising from the foot-hills of a mountain range, now mingling, now
separating, now flying over the peaks, now sinking into the valleys, and yet
ascending from hill to hill in search of the highest peak.

This hypothesis avoids the Spencerian idea of steady progress, because it
recognizes ups and downs in human affairs and rises and falls of different
Introduction
civilizations and their thought at different stages of world history. It avoids measuring the dynamics of history by the three-knotted rod of Western culture and does not shelve the question of change in human society as a whole. It leaves the door of future achievement open to all and does not condemn certain living cultures to death.

Briefly stated, the hypothesis to which the study of Muslim thought, as the study of Muslim culture as a whole, lends support has a negative as well as a positive aspect. Negatively, it is non-organismic, non-cyclic, and non-linear; and, positively, it involves belief in social dynamics, in progress in human society through the ages by rises and falls, in the importance of the role of ethical values in social advance, in the possibility of cultural regeneration, and in the environmental obstacles as stimuli to human action, in freedom and purpose as the ultimate sources of change, and in mechanical determinism as an instrument in divine and human hands.

The chief aim of this work is to give an account net of Muslim culture as a whole, nor of Muslim thought in general, but only of one aspect of Muslim thought, i.e., Muslim philosophy. But since this philosophy had its beginning in a religion based on philosophical fundamentals and it developed in close association with other spheres of thought, science, humanities, and arts, we have thought it desirable to give brief accounts of these other disciplines as well (Book Five). Book Five has become necessary because in many cases the same thinkers were not only the main subjects, also on astrology, chemistry, optics, and music; al-Farabi on music, psychology, politics, economics, and mathematics; ibn Sina on medicine, chemistry, geometry, astronomy, theology, poetry, and music; Zakariya al-Razi on medicine and alchemy; al-Ghazali on theology, law, physics, and music; and the Khawan al-Safa on mathematics, astronomy, geography, music, and ethics. Likewise ibn Hauzam lefts works not only on philosophy but also on optics, music, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, and Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī on mathematics, astronomy, physics, medicine, mineralogy, music, history, and ethics. In Muslim Spain, ibn al-Rajah wrote on philosophy, medicine, music, and astronomy; ibn Tufail on philosophy and medicine; and ibn Rushd on philosophy, theology, medicine, and astronomy. And what is true of these thinkers is true of a host of others.

In the Introduction to the History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, to which reference has already been made it has been rightly observed that the histories of philosophy written before the nineteenth century might be aptly described as the histories of philosophers rather than the histories of philosophy. But it seems to us that when a history aims at giving an account of theories and movements, it cannot do without dealing with philosophers, for the relation between them and the movements they start or the theories they propose is too intimate to allow their complete severance. Therefore, in our endeavour to give a historical account of the movements, systems, and disciplines in Muslim thought we have made no effort to eliminate the treatment of individual philosophers where it has been called for. In this procedure we have followed the excellent example of T. J. de Boer who can be justly regarded as a pioneer in this most neglected field.

We have begun our treatment of the subject by giving in Book One a brief account of the whole field of philosophy in the pre-Islamic world in general and Arabia in particular. We have devoted Book Two to philosophical teachings of the Qur'an. This we have done with the express hope that these two books together will give the reader a correct idea of the real source of Muslim philosophy and enable him to view this philosophy in its true perspective.

Muslim philosophy like Muslim history in general has passed through five different stages. The first stage covers the period from the first/seventh century to the fall of Baghdad. We have dealt with this period under the heading "Early Centuries." This is followed by a shock-absorbing period of about half a century. Its third stage is that of its second flowering treated under the heading "Later Centuries." It covers the period from the beginning of the eighth/nineteenth to the beginning of the twelfth/eighteenth century. The fourth stage is that of the most deplorable decline covering a century and a half. This is in the true sense the Dark Age of Islam. With the middle of the thirteenth/nineteenth century begins its fifth stage covering the period of the modern renaissance. Thus, in the curve of its history, Muslim philosophy has had two rises and two falls and is now showing clear signs of a third rise.

We have said very little about the periods of decline, for these have little to do with philosophical developments. During the first period of its greatness Muslim philosophy shows four distinct lines of thought. The first is the theologo-philosophical line, the second is mystical, the third philosophical and scientific, and the fourth is that taken by those whom we have called the "middle-readers." These have been treated respectively in Book Three, Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4. In Book Four we have traced the same lines of thought running through the second rise of Islam in order to bring it in clear contrast with the first.

During both of these periods of Islamic rise, considerable activity is noticeable in other disciplines. We have dealt with all these in Book Five.

The period of modern renaissance in Islam, a brief account of which is given in Book Eight, is marked by political struggle for emancipation from foreign domination and freedom from conformity in both life and thought. The philosophers of this period are not mere philosophers. They are more political leaders, social reformers, and men of action. Therefore, although chapters LXXI, LXXII, LXXIV, LXXVII, LXXX, and LXXXII contribute little to academic philosophy, yet they throw a flood of light on the philosophies of life and history, and for that reason have been considered indispensable for our work.
Introduction

So much about the past. But what about the present and how about the future? The position of philosophy amongst the Muslim peoples today is no worse than it is in the rest of the world. What type of philosophical thought the future has in store for them we shall try to forecast in our concluding remarks.

BOOK ONE

PRE-ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

Part 1

Chapter 1

PRE-ISLAMIC INDIAN THOUGHT

Maurice Bloomfield says paradoxically in The Religion of the Rig-Veda that "Indian religion begins before its arrival in India." By this he means to imply that Indian religion is a continuation of the primitive faith of the Indo-European race to which the Aryans that came to India belonged. "The Sanskrit word deeva (to shine) for God is similar to the Latin word deus; yaj a Sanskrit word for worship is common to more than one Indo-European language; while the Vedic god Mitra has his counterpart in the Iranian god Mithra."

From a comparative study of the beliefs and practices of the Teutonic, Hellenic, Celtic, Slavonic, Italian, Armenian, and Persian peoples which all sprang from the Indo-European race, it has been established beyond the slightest doubt that the basis of their religion was an animistic belief in a very large number of petty gods, each of which had a special function. They were worshipped with sacrifices, accompanied with potent formulas and prayers. Magic was highly regarded and much used.

It is greatly regretted that there is neither any formal history nor any archaeological remain to throw light on the early home of this ancient race or on the time when the great historical people hived off from it. Our principal source for the history, religion, and philosophy of the Indian branch is the Vedas besides the Epics and the Purāṇas.

The Vedas.—Among the Vedas, the oldest is Rg-Veda which consists of more than a thousand hymns composed by successive generations of poets during a period of many centuries. The hymns are connected in various ways with the sacrifices, the domestic ceremonies, and the religious speculation of the time, and are concerned chiefly with the worship of gods, who represent personification of natural forces, and the propitiation of demoniac beings.

In the Indo-Iranian period the refreshing drink prepared from the soma-plant was offered to gods in a special ritual and the singing of a hymn was a

1 Maurice Bloomfield, The Religion of the Rig-Veda, Putnam, N.Y., 1908, p. 16.
necessary part of the ritual. The Aryans brought this custom with them and
to compose verses for the soma-rite and for the occasions of annual
sacrifices in their new homeland. As the hymns were to be sung, a class of
priests arose whose duty it was to recite poems of praise in honour of gods.
The priests who could sing better hymns and were in possession of a secret
lore, which enabled them by conducting sacrifices in the right way to win the
favour of gods for their patrons, were in great demand. Consequently, a number of
priestly families vied with one another in composing hymns in the best
language and metre then available. The Rig-Veda gives evidence of seven such
families each bearing the name of a patriarch to whom the hymns are ascribed.
At first the hymn collections of six families were brought together and then
of nine. At a much later stage some scholars collected one hundred and ninety-
one poems which were taught as the last section of the oral curriculum of
hymns. Thus, there became ten books of the Rig-Veda.

The mantras of the Atharva-Veda consist largely of spells for magical pur-
poses and advocate pure and unalloyed polytheism. The other Vedas are
entirely sacrificial in purpose. The Sama-Veda consists of verses borrowed from
the Rig-Veda to be applied to soma-sacrifice. The Yajur-Veda consists of ritual
formulas of the magical type.

For a long time the number of the Vedas was limited to three, the Atharva-
Veda being totally excluded from the group of the Vedas. In support of this
contention the following verse from Manu can be cited: “From Agni, Vayu,
and Ravi, He drew forth for the accomplishment of sacrifice the eternal triple
Veda, distinguished as Rik, Yajush and Saman.” Similarly, in Satapatha
 Brahmanas it is said, “The Rik-Yajush-Saman verses are the threefold
science.”

A probable reason for the exclusion of the Atharva-Veda from the Vedas is
that ‘it consists mostly of magic spell, sorcery, and incubations which
were used by the non-Aryans and the lower classes to achieve worldly goods
such as wealth, riches, children, health, freedom from disease. . . . The Atharva-
Veda was recognized later on when hymns relating to sacrifices seem to have
been added to it to gain recognition from the orthodoxy.”

Vedic Conception of God.—The religion of the Vedas is polytheism. It has
not the charm and grace of the pantheon of the Homeric poems; but it cer-
tainly stands nearer the origin of the gods. All gods whether great or small
are deified natural phenomena. The interesting thing about them is that they
are identified with the glorious things whose deifications they are and are also
distinguished from them. They are still thought of as being sun, moon, rain,
wind, etc., yet each god is conceived as a glorious being who has his home in
heaven, and who comes sailing in his far-shining car to the sacrifice and site.

Pre-Islamic Indian Thought

down on the grass to hear his own praise recited and sung and to receive the
offerings. The hymns sung by the priests were mainly invocations of the gods
meant to accompany the oblation of soma-juice and the fire-sacrifice of the
melted butter.

The Vedas are not consistent in their account of the gods. In one myth the
sun is a male, in another a female. The sun and the moon are mentioned in
one place as rivals, elsewhere as husband and wife. The dog is exalted in one
place as a deity and in another mentioned as a vile creature. Again the sun,
the sky, and the earth are looked upon sometimes as natural objects governed
by particular gods and sometimes as themselves gods who generate and control
other beings.

In the Rig-Veda, heaven and earth are ordinarily regarded as the parents
of gods, pitra or matri. In other passages heaven (deus) is separately styled
as father and the earth (prithivi) as mother. Although people are spoken of as
having been created, though it is said, that he who produced heaven and earth
must have been the most skilful artisan of all the gods. Again, Indra is described as having formed them, to follow him as chariot
wheels do a horse. At other places the creation of the earth and the heaven
is ascribed to Soma and Pushan.

Thus, while the gods are regarded in some passages of the Rig-Veda as the
offsprings of heaven and earth, they are at other places considered independ-
ent of these deities and even their creators.

In various texts of the Rig-Veda the gods are spoken of as being thirty-three
in number. Thus it is said in the Rig-Veda: “Come hither Nasattya, Asvins,
together with the thrice eleven gods, to drink our nectar.” Again, “Agni,
the wise gods lend an ear to their worshippers. God with the ruddy steeds,
who bestows peace, bring hither those three and thirty.” In the Satapatha
Brahmanas this number of thirty-three gods is explained as made up of eight
vasus, eleven rudras, and twelve adityas, together with heaven and earth, or,
according to another passage, together with Indra and Prajapati instead of
heaven and earth.

The enumeration of gods as thirty-three is not adhered to throughout the
Vedas. In the Rig-Veda, the gods are mentioned as being much more numerous:
“Three thousand, three hundred, thirty and nine gods have worshipped
Agni.” This verse which is one of the many shows that the Vedic Indian

5 Fazlurrahman, An Outline of the Religious Literature of India, Oxford University
6 Rig-Veda, i: 150, 2; iii: 3, 11.
7 Ibid., i: 85, 12; iii: 35, 3.
8 Ibid., ii: 89, 4.
9 Ibid., ii: 199, 2.
10 Ibid., ii: 34, 11.
11 Ibid., iii: 45, 2.
12 Ibid., iii: 39.
16
believed in the existence of a much larger number of supernatural beings than thirty-three.

The gods were believed to have had a beginning; they were stated to be mortal, but capable of overcoming death by the practice of austerity. The *Rg-Veda* says that the gods acquired immortality by drinking soma. Still the gods are not self-existent or unbegotten beings. It has been seen that they are described in various passages of the *Rg-Veda* as offsprings of heaven and earth. In various texts of the *Rg-Veda* the birth of Indra is mentioned, and his father and mother are also alluded to.\(^\text{13}\)

The Vedic gods can be classified as deities of heaven, air, and earth:

1. **Celestial Gods.**—The oldest god is Dyaus, generally coupled with Prithivi when the two are regarded as universal parents. Another is Varuṇa, the greatest of the Vedic gods besides Indra. It is he who sustains and upholds physical and moral order. In the later *Vedas*, when Prajāpati became creator and supreme god, the importance of Varuṇa waned, and in the post-Vedic period Varuṇa retained only the dominion of waters as god of the sky. Various aspects of the solar activity are represented by five gods, namely, Mitra, a personification of the sun’s beneficent power; Sūrya, the proper name of the sun, regarded as the husband of dawn; Sāvitrī, the life-giving activity of the sun; Puṣana, a pastoral deity personifying the bountiful power of the sun; and Viṣṇu occupying the central place in this pantheon.

2. **Atmospheric Gods.**—The most important of these gods is Indra, a favourite national deity of the Aryan Indians. He is not an uncreated being. It is said of him, “Thy father was the parent of a most heroic son; the maker of Indra, he also produced the celestial and unconquerable thunder . . . was a most skilful workman.”\(^\text{14}\) Again, “A vigorous (god) begot him, a vigorous (son), for the battle; a heroic female (nāri) brought him forth, a heroic soul.”\(^\text{15}\) His whole appearance is golden; his arms are golden; he carries a golden whip in his hands; and he is borne on a shining golden car with a thousand supports. His car is drawn by two golden steeds with flowing golden manes. He is famous for slaying VṛṢṇa after a terrible battle, as a result of which water is released for man and light is restored to him. Certain immoral acts are also attributed to him. He occasionally indulges in acts of violence such as slaying his father or destroying the car of Dawn. Less important gods of this group are Tīrtha, Apiḥnāpāt and Matarpīt. The sons of Rudra, the malignant deities of the Vedas, are the Maruts (the storm-gods) who help Indra in his conflicts. The god of wind is Vaiṣṇu while that of water is Apiḥ.

3. **Terrestrial Gods.**—Rivers are deified. Thus Sindu (Indus), Vipas (Bias), and Satudri (Sutlej) are invoked in the *Rg-Veda*. The most important god is Sarasvati, often regarded as the wife of Brahmā. Another very important god is Agni, the god of fire. The number of hymns addressed to him far exceed those addressed to any other divinity with the exception of Indra. In the *Rg-Veda* he is frequently spoken of as a goblin-slayer. Another god is Soma, the divine drink which makes those who drink it immortal. A priest says in the *Rg-Veda*: “We have drunk Soma, we have become immortal, we have entered into light, we have known gods.”

In addition to these, there is a host of abstract deities and also deities of less importance which cannot be described here for want of space. Suffice it to say that an attempt was made by the sages (*prāśa*) to introduce order in the bewildering multiplicity of gods. As several gods had similar functions, they were in some cases bracketed together, so that it might be said that when Indra and Agni performed identical functions, Agni was Indra or Indra was Agni. Hence arose many dual gods. A further effort in the direction of systematization was made through what Max Müller has called henotheism—a tendency to address any of the gods, say, Agni, Indra, Varuṇa, or any other deity, “as for the time being the only god in existence with an entire forgetfulness of all other gods.” Macdonell has a different theory to explain the so-called henotheism by ascribing to it exaggeration, thus retaining the charge of polytheism against the Vedas. Some modern Hindus under the influence of Swami Dayananda repudiate both these theories as inconsistent with the true spirit of the Vedas.\(^\text{16}\) “He is One, sages call Him by different names, e.g., Agni, Yama, Maariśvan.”\(^\text{17}\) No doubt, a few verses of this nature can be found in the Vedas; but the consensus of scholars is that monotheistic versus are a product of the later Vedic period and that they do not express the dominant strain of the Vedic thought. Shri Krishna Saksena in his chapter “Indian Philosophy” in *A History of Philosophical Systems* edited by V. Fern says that the early mantras contain a religion of nature-worship in which powers of nature like fire (agni) and wind (vīyu) are personified. In later hymns and the *Brāhmaṇas*, monotheistic tendencies begin to crop up a little. Swami Dayananda was a product of Hindu-Muslim culture and his insistence on monotheism shows the extent to which Muslim thought has influenced Indian religious beliefs.

**Vedic Eschatology.**—The *Rg-Veda* makes no distinct reference to a future life except in its ninth and tenth books. Yama, the god of death, was the first of the mortals to die. He discovers the way to the other world; guides other men there, assembles them in a home, which is secured for them for ever. He grants luminous abodes to the pious and is an object of terror for the wicked. Yama is said to have two insatiable dogs with four eyes and wide nostrils who act as his messengers and convey the spirits of men to the abode of their forefathers. After a person’s dead body has been burnt, his spirit soars to the realm of eternal light in a car or on wings and enters upon a more perfect

\(^{13}\) *Ibid.*, iv: 17, 4, 12.


\(^{17}\) *Rg-Veda*, i: 164, 46.
life which fulfills all of his desires and grants him unending happiness. Since the Vedic gods did not have purely spiritual pleasures but were often subject to sensual appetites, it can be said that the pleasures promised to the pious in the world to come were not altogether spiritual. Yama is described as carousing with the gods, and Gāndharvas, a class of gods who are described as hairy like dogs and monkeys, often assume handsome appearance to seduce the earthly females. Indra is said to have had a married life.

Brähmanas.—Each of the four Vedas has three sub-divisions: the Sānkhītās (sacred texts), the Brāhmaṇas (commentaries), and the Aranyakas (forest books). The Brāhmaṇas are, therefore, an integral part of the Vedas. Sayana, a great scholar of the Vedas, says, “Veda is the denomination of the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas.” (Swami Dayananda differs on this point.) By the Mantras are meant hymns and prayers; and the Brāhmaṇas are intended to elucidate objects which are only generally adverted to in the hymns. The Brāhmaṇas comprise precepts which inculcate religious duties, maxims which explain thes precepts, and arguments which relate to theology.

Considering the fact that the Brāhmaṇas often quote from the Vedas and devote themselves to the clarification of the ritualistic and the philosophical portions of the Vedas, it may be concluded that the Sānkhītās must have existed in their present form before the compilation of the Brāhmaṇas was undertaken. In fact in the Brāhmaṇas, we find fully developed the whole Brāhmaṇical system, of which we have but faint indications in the Vedas. We have the whole body of religious and social institutions far more complicated than the simple ritual of the Sānkhītās; four castes with the Brāhmins at the top and the Śudras at the bottom have been recognized both in theory and in practice—all this shows that the Brāhmaṇas must have been composed a long time after the Vedas. It is, however, obvious that the Brāhmaṇas were a kind of a scriptural authority for the Brāhmaṇical form of worship and social institutions.

Upaniṣads.—The third integral part of the Vedas, namely, the Aranyakas, intended for the study of the ascetics in the forests in the third stage of their life, led ultimately to the Upaniṣads or Vedāntas as the concluding portion of the Vedas. These were meant for the ascetics in the fourth stage of their lives called the Sannyāsa Āśrama. Literally, the word Upaniṣad means “a sitting besides,” i.e., a lesson taught by the teacher to the pupils sitting by his side. These discourses expounded in esoteric formulae a series of esoteric doctrines to the selected few students, mainly Brāhmins, who were deemed fit to receive such a course of instruction.

Considering the age which gave birth to the Upaniṣads for understanding some of the major problems of life, one marvels at the depth and insight of the early Hindu seers. Their attitude towards the Vedas was not one of venera-

---

18 Ibid., x : 135, 1.
19 Atharva Veda, v : 37, 11 f
20 M. Müller, Ed., Br-Veda

thought met together and paved the way to monism of an idealistic type which has remained till now the hallmark of Indian philosophy. By combining subjective and objective principles into one, the ultimate principle partook of the characteristics of both—it became infinite as well as spiritual. All this is very well expressed in Chāndogya-Upaniṣad in a dialogue between a father and a son. The sum and substance of the story is that the primal spiritual principle is all-comprehensive and that the principle is no other than the self of the person then engaged in the discussion. With regard to the nature of Brahmā (the Absolute) there is a great divergence of opinion. At some places He is conceived as cosmic, i.e., all-comprehensive, at others acosmic, i.e., all-exclusive. Further, at some places Brahmā is imagined as the impersonal Absolute without attributes; at other places He is recognized as the highest spiritual Being that unites all forms of perfection in Himself. Hence it would be no exaggeration to say that though the Upaniṣads contain flashes of insight, yet they are not a self-contained homogeneous system and that they also lack completeness. It is for this reason that Sarvākara believes that there are two types of doctrines in the Upaniṣads: exoteric, understanding God as the impersonal, unknowable Absolute without attributes, and the other exoteric, regarding God as a Person who manifests Himself in the various divinities.

The second interpretation of the Absolute as a Person led to the development of a theology largely theistic in spirit yet polytheistic in practice, since it sanctioned symbol-worship which expressed itself in various forms of idol-worship. The Upaniṣads are not, however, responsible for the excesses of later theology. In them breathes a spirit of monism. They preach a cult of mystical union with the Absolute, and suggest practical methods for its realization. In the main the stress is laid upon complete detachment from all that is mundane and belongs to the world of phenomena. Accordingly, one finds in the Upaniṣads a whole series of sayings in which complete renunciation is recommended. “When all desires which are in his heart disappear, then man becomes immortal. Here he has already reached Brahmā. As the old slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, so now does the body lie there.” According to the Upaniṣads, the highest merit called Shergas, which consists in the realization of one’s true self, can be reached through knowledge alone. The purpose of ethics, on the other hand, is quite distinct, namely, mundane good called Pregas which is reached by moral actions. The two ends are consequently poles apart, one concerned with the timeless good and the other with the temporal and evanescent good. It is said in Katha-Upaniṣad that the ethical and the spiritual goals are opposed to each other as light and darkness and cannot co-exist. A man has to renounce all activity for worldly goods if he wants to achieve spiritual unity with the Supreme Being. One cannot, therefore, select

both knowledge and action as two ends of life, since the highest end must be one and not many.

The ideal of detachment was emphasized by the Indian thinkers not only for the reason that it was necessitated by their theory of human deliverance, but also because they regarded the whole phenomenal world of names, forms, and plurality as māyā or a mere unreality, an illusion having only a temporary reality which is transcended ultimately in the being of the Supreme Self. The Upaniṣads demand the votaries of Brahmā to ponder over the illusoriness and unreality of the world of senses and to extricate themselves from its temptations and enthrallments by contemplation of a transcendental reality within the soul of each person. Thus can a person get to spiritual heights and achieve mukti or salvation. Hence along with the renunciation of the phenomenal world another thing required is the concentration of the spirit on the super-sensible reality. The Upaniṣads contain detailed instructions on this subject. The aim is to reach a stage of ecstacy in which a person has the psychical experience of feeling one with the Ultimate Reality.

The ethics-negating tendencies, however, could not be maintained consistently in face of the demands and concrete realities of life. The ideal of human salvation as outlined by the Upaniṣads cannot be achieved easily and so many are destined to fail. This is realized by the Indian sages. “What is hard for many even to hear, what many fail to understand even though they hear: a marvel is the one that can teach it and lucky is its obtain; a marvel is he that knows it when taught by the wise.” The majority are born again after death and can win release from the cycle of births and deaths through the performance of good deeds. Thus ethics rejected by Brāhmaṇic mysticism enters through the doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls—a doctrine unknown to the Vedas.

The doctrine referred to above appears in connection with a myth. “All who depart from this world go to the moon. The waxing half fills itself with their lives; in the waning half it is effecting their rebirth. The moon is the gate of the heaven. He who knows how to reply to it, him it allows to pass by. He who cannot reply, it sends him as rain down to the earth; he is reborn here and there according to his deeds and knowledge as worm, moth, fish, bird, lion, wild bear, jackal, tiger, man, or whatever it may be. For when a man comes to the moon, the moon asks: ‘Who art thou? Then he ought to answer: I am thou. . . .’ If he speaks thus, then the moon lets him get away, out above itself.” One finds no reference to the myth in the Vedas. From this it is concluded that it is not Aryan in origin but belonged to the religious world of the aboriginal inhabitants of India.

The law which governs the kind of birth a soul is destined to have after each death is the law of karma, which signifies that nothing can happen in the

\[24\] Katha-Upaniṣad, 2: 1-5.
moral world without a cause. But the recognition of the fact that moral events are caused by antecedent factors cannot explain the palpably indemonstrable and poetic way in which the moral causes are believed to operate. That moral causes can work in saṃsāra, that is to say, in a series of births and deaths, all of which do not necessarily pertain to human beings, is a hypothesis of a very doubtful nature and utility. That the doctrine of reincarnation is inconsistent with the Brāhmaṇḍa mysticism of the identity of the individual with the Universal Soul goes without saying. Instead of the doctrine that every individual soul returns to the Universal Soul after inhabiting the body once, we are required to believe in a theory which starts from new premises altogether. This theory is based on the supposition that souls are prisoners in the world of sense and can return to their Prāmānt Source not at once after their first death, as required by the theory of mystical absorption of the Brāhmīns, but after undergoing a long process of reincarnation necessitating a series of births in the animate and inanimate realms. Schweitzer thinks\(^\text{27}\) that the acceptance of this doctrine created insuperable difficulties for Hindu thought. On the older hypothesis of mystical reunion with the Divine Source it was easy to explain world redemption on the assumption that all souls returned to their Source after their death. But if the theory of reincarnation is accepted, world redemption becomes possible only if all souls reach the level of human existence and become capable of acquiring that knowledge and conduct which is required for liberation and of which human beings alone are capable.

The Epic Period.—Two great events belong to this period. The first is the expedition of Rāma from Oudh to Ceylon to recover his wife Sīta who had been carried off by Rāvana, the king of that island, and the second is the struggle for supremacy between two rival Kṣatriya groups, the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas, in which Lord Kṛṣṇa played a significant part.

Rāma is an avatār, i.e., a divine incarnation of Viṣṇu, who being the preserver of the universe had to leave his celestial abode very often and to assume different forms in order to destroy evil and establish truth. The purpose of this avatār was to kill the ten-headed Rāvana, who had pleased the mighty gods through his austerities and as a result had received a boon from them which was that he could not be killed by any god. Feeling secure, he started a campaign of terror against both gods and men. The gods approached Brahmā who had granted immunity to Rāvana. He remarked that Rāvana could be killed by a god assuming the form of a man since Rāvana had not been granted immunity from mankind. Viṣṇu undertook to be born as a man to rid the world of evil. He was accordingly born in the house of a king, Dāsaratha by name, who ruled over Ayodhya and bore the name of Rāmas. As he came of age he married Sīta, who “was an incarnation of Laksṇī,

\(^\text{27}\) Albert Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 51.

Pre-Islamic Indian Thought

Viṣṇu’s wife, and was born of no woman but of mother earth herself, and was picked up by Janaka from a paddy field.”\(^\text{28}\)

Rāma became the victim of court intrigues, and for fourteen years had to suffer exile in jungles from where Sīta was carried off by Rāvana. To rescue Sīta from the clutches of Rāvana, Rāma contracted military alliance with Hanumān, the king of monkeys, with whose active support he reached Ceylon and learnt the secrets of Rāvana’s power from a brother of Rāvana. Then ensued a fierce battle in which the armies suffered losses. At last Rāvana came out and met Rāma in a single combat. “Each like a flaming lion fought with the other; head after head of the ten-necked one did Rāma cut away with his deadly arrows, but new heads ever rose in place of those cut off, and Rāvana’s death seemed no wise nearer than before. The arrows that had slain Maricha and Khara and Bali could not take the king of Lanka’s life away. Then Rāma took up the Brahmā weapon given to him by Agasty, the Wind lay in its (weapon’s) wings, the Sun and Fire in its head, in its mass the weight of Meru and Mandara. Blessing that shaft with Vedic Mantras, Rāma set it with his mighty bow and loosed it and it sped to its appointed place and cleft the breast of Rāvana and, bathed in blood, returned and entered Rāma’s quiver.”\(^\text{29}\)

The most popular avatār of Viṣṇu is Lord Kṛṣṇa, whose main object was to kill Kansa, a demon born of a woman, and who was well known for his childish tricks and many practical jokes on milkmaids. He was, however, a great warrior and a strategist. He killed many demons and kings.

Bhagavad-Gītā. It was Lord Kṛṣṇa who sang the Bhagavad-Gītā (the song celestial) to Arjuna, giving the most widely accepted view of life among the Hindus. Says Mahātma Gandhi, “I find a solace in the Bhagavad-Gītā that I miss even in the sermon on the Mount. When disappointment stares me in the face and all alone I see not a ray of light, I go back to the Bhagavad-Gītā. I feel a verse here and there and I immediately begin to smile in the midst of overwhelming tragedies, and if they have left no scar on me I owe it all to the teachings of the Bhagavad-Gītā.”

According to Śatīkaracharya, a great scholar, the main function of the Gītā is to epitomize the essentials of the whole Vedic teachings. A knowledge of its teachings leads to the realization of all aspirations. The real purpose of this great song, as Zimmer thinks,\(^\text{30}\) is to harmonize the non-Brāhmaṇical pre-Aryan thought of aboriginal India with the Vedic ideas of the Aryan invaders. The Gītā, therefore, “displays a kaleidoscopic interworking of the two traditions that for some ten centuries had been contending for the control and mastery of the Indian mind. Its teachings are founded upon the Upaniṣadic principle of an all-unifying, transcendental reality, but they also accommodate not only the gods of the earlier Vedic

\(^\text{28}\) P. Thomas, Epic Myths and Legends of India, Bombay, p. 14.
\(^\text{29}\) Ibid., p. 17.
A natural consequence of this theory is that even what is judged as evil from human standards can be approved of, if the agent feels that the task selected by him is one which must be fulfilled. “Even if a thorough scoundrel loves me and nothing else, he must be deemed good; for he has well resolved.”

“Even if thou wert the most sinful of all sinners, yet thou wouldst pass over all guilt with the boat of knowledge alone.” With these words Arjuna is urged to fight against his relations, for his killing would not be an evil: it would be a necessary consequence of the duty he has to discharge.

The ethics of detachment as preached by the Gita is laudable no doubt, but, as Schweitzer says, “It grants recognition to activity, only after activity has renounced natural motives and its natural meaning.” An action loses its significance when it ceases to be purposive. The Gita raises a voice of protest against the soul-killing and life-negating cult of renunciation, but it has not gone far enough. Renunciation remains when the end of an activity is no concern of a person. “The Bhagavad-Gita has a sphinx-like character. It contains such marvellous phrases about inner detachment from the world, about the attitude of the mind which knows no hatred and is kind, and about loving self-devotion to God, that we are wont to overlook its non-ethical contents.”

The Heterodox Systems.—Among the systems which defy the authority of the Vedas may be mentioned the Carvaka, Jainism, and Buddhism:

1. The Carvaka.—This system seems to be fairly old. It is mentioned in the Nyaya, the Epics, and the Bhagavad-Gita. The main work on the system, the Brahmasutras (800 B.C.), is lost and its teachings have to be reconstructed from criticism of it in other works.

The Carvaka is a non-Vedic, materialistic, and anti-supernaturalistic doctrine which holds that only this world exists and there is nothing beyond. There is no future life. Madhava Acharya says in Sarvadarshanasangraha, “The efforts of Carvaka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the refrain:

While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death’s searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e’er again return?”

“The mass of men, in accordance with the Sthastras of policy and enjoyment, are found to follow only the doctrine of Carvaka. Hence another name for that school is Lokayata—a name well accordant with the thing signified.”

---

22 Gita, xviii: 48.
23 Ibid., iv: 36.
24 Albert Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 191.
25 Ibid., p. 196.
27 Ibid.

Hopkins, quoted by Desai in the Gita according to Gandhi, Ahmedabad, p. 13.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

The four elements alone are the ultimate principles and these are earth, water, fire, and air. Only the perceived exists; the unperceived does not exist, simply for the reason of its never having been perceived. The only source of knowledge and the criterion of validity is perception. Every other source including that of inference is rejected. Inferential knowledge involves inductive relations and can never be demonstrably certain. Empirical generalizations may possess a high degree of probability, but their operation in unknown cases can never be guaranteed. To avoid this difficulty, if it is maintained that the empirical laws connect the common features of the particular instances observed by a person, the Cārvāka objects to it by saying that such a course would leave the particulars unrelated and that it is the particulars alone which matter.

As against the Upaniṣads which postulated five elements, the Cārvāka admits of only four discarding the fifth one, viz., space. The whole universe including souls is interpreted strictly in terms of these elements. The self is nothing but the physical body as characterized by sentence. “The soul is but the body characterized by the attributes signified in the expressions, I am stout, I am youthful, I am grown up, I am old, etc. It is not something other than that (body).”38

The Cārvāka rejects outright all types of spiritual values and has faith in the present world only. “There is no world other than this; there is no heaven and no hell; the realm of Śiva and like regions are invented by stupid impostors of other schools of thought. . . . The wise should enjoy the pleasures of this world through the proper visible means of agriculture, keeping cattle, trade, political administration, etc.”39 The authority of the Vedas is repudiated not only on the ground that their teachings are irrational, but also because of the inconsistencies which render it impossible to know what they really teach.

The Cārvāka is a protest against the excessive spirituality of the early Brāhmaṇa thought. It recognizes neither god nor conscience. It cares not for a belief in the life to come. Hence the ethical ideal is pleasure in this life and that too of the individual.

Since the main trend of Hindu thought has been idealistic, the Cārvāka system has contributed very little to the sum of Indian thought,40 and this is rather unfortunate. In view of the fact that the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, and the Gītā reject the evidence of the senses as illusory, the Cārvāka contention might have served as a corrective.

2. Jainism.—Jainism, according to Tomlin,41 is the most perplexing of all religions, for it is not only incredible but also impracticable. It denies life to the extent of recommending suicide as the most sacred act of which man is capable, and yet it has survived for two thousand years.

Pre-Islamic Indian Thought

The founder of Jainism, Mahāvīra, was born in a Kṣatriya family. His father was a wealthy person belonging to a religious sect which was opposed to the Vedas. This school of thought had materialistic tendencies and sceptical attitude very much akin to that of Cārvāka. But it was not a thoroughgoing materialism. It shared with the masses the horror of rebirth and advocated slow suicide through starvation as a remedy against transmigration. Mahāvīra's father got his wife converted to his viewpoint and in due course shared with her the martyrdom they desired.

Before following the example of his parents, Mahāvīra embarked upon a quest of wisdom and adopted an ascetic life. After two years of abstinence and self-denial he withdrew himself from civilized life and dispersed with all the amenities of life including those of clothing. During the first six years of his peregrination, he observed frequent fasts of several months' duration. He voluntarily exposed himself to be maltreated by the Mlechcha tribes of Vajrabhumī and Lat who abused and beat him, and shot arrows at him, and baited him with dogs, to all of which he offered no resistance. At the end of the ninth year, Mahāvīra relinquished his silence, but continued the practice of self-mortification. The whole of the time spent by him in these preparatory exercises was twelve years and six months, and of this he fasted nearly eleven years.

The Jains have a tradition that saviours are sent to the world whenever mankind is plunged in corruption and sin. Mahāvīra was twenty-fourth in the line.

Mahāvīra denied the divine origin and infallible authority of the Vedas. His religion is, therefore, reckoned as a heterodox religion. Its cosmology and anthropology is non-Aryan. While Brāhmaṇism is the representative of Vedic-Aryan thought and beliefs, Buddhism, Jainism, and a host of other doctrines relate themselves to the native genius and expose the pessimistic dualism which underlies so much of Indian philosophy. Jainism is a philosophy of the profoundest pessimism. It visualizes the world as a round of endless rebirths, full of sufferings and entirely useless. One shall have to pass through periods of inconsequential pleasures and unbearable pains unless one obtains a release through austerities and self-abnegation. In the Jaina-Sūtras, suicide is called "the incomparable religious death," requiring in some cases a whole life-time to cultivate a proper frame of mind for its performance. It is essential that all types of longings including those of death be completely eradicated from one's consciousness. Hence one has to bring about one's extinction in a mood beyond both desire and aversion.

As regards the philosophy of Jainism, it may be said that an eternal and presiding First Cause forms no part of this system, nor do the Jains admit of soul or spirit as distinct from the living principle. They do believe in the independent and eternal existence of spirit and matter, but by spirit they do not mean universal spirit as they have no faith in the Supreme Soul.

The spirits called jīvas are eternal but limited and variable because of which

36 Ibid.
they can adjust themselves to the size of the body they happen to inhabit. Their essence is knowledge which is not empirical or sensory. As a matter of fact, perception is a check upon the absolute sight of the soul. In order that the soul may regain its true nature, it is necessary that limitations imposed by the senses be done away with.

The Jains believe in both transmigration and karma. The latter operates by itself. Being a subtle particle of matter, it enters the soul and soils it. Hence no supreme being in the form of God is required to allot rewards and punishments. Mahāvīra says, “The world is without bounds like a formidable ocean; its cause is action (karma) which is as the seed of the tree. The being (jīva) invested with body, but devoid of judgment, goes like a well-sinker ever downwards by the acts it performs, whilst the disembodied being which has atained purity goes ever upwards by its own acts like the builder of a palace.”

Ajīta, the second predicate of existence, comprises objects or properties devoid of consciousness and life. It is regarded as five-fold. Out of these, matter is atomic in the final analysis. It possesses the qualities of colour, taste, odour, and touch. All the atoms are supposed to possess souls so that the whole universe seems to be pulsating with life. Time, another ajīta, is eternal. The world has neither an origin nor an end.

As already observed, the karmic particles are mingled with the life-moments. It is held that they communicate colours to them which may be white, yellow, flaming-red, dove-grey, dark-blue, or black. These colours are perceived by the Jaina Thāthākāras by virtue of their boundless intuition or omniscience. Ordinarily, black is the characteristic colour of the cruel and the merciless, dark-blue that of the greedy and the sensual, dove-grey of the reckless and the hot-tempered, red of the prudent, yellow of the compassionate, and the white of the dispassionate and the impartial.

In the ethics of Mahāvīra, social life has no place. It is perfect non-activity in thought, speech, and deed that is recommended. One should be dead to pain and enjoyment and also to all other interests including the intellectual, social, and political to achieve liberation from the bondage of physical existence. Cessation of activity is a stepping-stone to the super-human sphere—a sphere which is not only above human beings but also beyond gods.

The doctrine of ahimśā which means renunciation of the will to kill and to damage is an article of faith with the Jains. In the Aṣṭaṁgaṇīsūta, a Jaina text, it is written, “All saints and Lords . . . declare thus: One may not kill, nor ill-use, nor insult, nor torment, nor persecute any kind of living beings, any kind of creature, any kind of thing having a soul, any kind of beings.”

The Jains do not offer bloody sacrifices, do not eat meat, never hunt, and take care that they do not trample on creeping things and insects. The laying down of this commandment is a great thing in the spiritual history of mankind; but it has to be said that the principle is altogether impracticable. It has been assumed that non-killing and non-harming are possible of fulfilment in this world of ours. Even on purely biological grounds, if on no others, it becomes necessary sometimes to kill as well as to damage both intentionally and unintentionally. “It is more cruel to let domestic animals which one cannot longer feed die a painful death by starvation than to give them a quick and painless end by violence. Again and again we see ourselves placed under the necessity of saving one living creature by destroying or damaging another.”

3. Buddhism.—As a prince, Buddha’s name was Siddhārtha and his family name Gautama; his father’s name Sudhodana, and his mother’s Māyā. It is interesting to note that all these names have meanings from which it is conjectured that Buddha might not have been a historical person. Sudhodana means “he whose food is pure,” Māyā means “an illusion,” Siddhārtha means “he by whom the end is accomplished,” while Buddha signifies “he by whom all is known.” These meanings suggest an allegorical signification, very much in the style of the Pilgrim’s Progress. The city of Buddha’s birth, Kapilavastu, which has no place in the geography of the Hindus, lends weight to this supposition. But, in spite of the allegorical interpretation as suggested by the etymology of the names, the historians are pretty well agreed in regarding Buddha as a historical person who lived six centuries before Christ and who was so much disturbed by the transience and miseries of the earthly existence that he renounced his power and wealth and devoted himself to solitary meditation. He engaged himself in sacred study under different Brahmmins, but dissatisfied with their teaching he retired into solitude. For six years he practised rigorous austerities. Finding their effect upon the body unfavourable to intellectual energy, he desisted from it and adopted a more genial course of life. At last knowledge dawned upon him, and he was in possession of the object of his search, which he communicated to others.

Buddha had no doubt that the mundane existence is replete with sorrows, afflictions, and tribulations. Not only this; he also believed that the misery of life is unending. All fulfilment of desires is attended by pain. The causes of pain, according to Buddha, are not economical, social, or political. They are rooted in the very nature of human life because of the fact that like everything else it is ephemeral and transitory. Even souls are impermanent and our ignorance on this point is the major reason of our suffering. Everything is in a flux. We deceive ourselves into thinking that there is a permanent base for change. It is the Law of Causality which binds together the continuous vibration and infinite growth which characterize this world. Buddha did not believe in any ontological reality which is permanent and which endures beneath the shifting appearances of the visible world. He also repudiated the

---

43 Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Calcutta University, Calcutta 8, p. 440.
44 Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 44.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Upaniṣadic view of a permanent Ātman and held that search for a permanent soul inside the body is in vain.

Buddha supposed that the law of karma worked into our very nature and that there was no escape from it, the present and the future being the result of the past. Karma is overcome through nīrūpana which puts an end to the cycle of births and deaths. Nīrūpana literally means blowing out; hence it suggests extinction. It is sometimes contended that nīrūpana is not a negative goal; it has a positive aspect as well. It is not simply extinction but also a state of blessedness or perfection. It is a kind of existence, devoid of egoity and full of peace, calm, and bliss.

To achieve nīrūpana, Buddha recommended a path of self-discipline which is eight-fold: right faith, right resolve, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right thought, and right concentration. The emphasis is on right living which is different in the case of a layman and a monk. The first four are applicable to all, while the remaining four are applicable especially to the priestly class.

The practical part of Buddha’s system has the same duality. Five negative injunctions, namely, not to kill, not to steal, not to commit adultery, not to lie, and not to use strong drinks, are binding on all, while not to take repasts at improper times, not to witness dances and plays, not to have costly raiments and perfumes, not to have a large bed or quilt, and not to receive gold or silver, are meant for priests only. Similarly, the virtues of charity, purity, patience, courage, contemplation, and silence have to be cultivated by all, but there are twelve observances binding on recluses only. They have to use clothes made of rags picked up from burning grounds, to have only three such suits all sewn by the weaver’s own hand, to have a cloak of yellow wool prepared in the same manner, to live only on food given in charity, to take only one meal daily, never to eat or drink after midday, to live in forests, to have no roof but the foliage of trees, to sit with the back supported by the trunk of a tree, to sleep sitting and not lying, never to change the position of the carpet when it has once been spread, and to go once a month to burning grounds to meditate on the vanity of life on the earth.

Thus, there is a complete distinction between the religion for the masses and the discipline for priesthood. The former is quite human while the latter is cold-hearted and unnatural. Ultimate release from transmigration can be attained, in the opinion of Buddha, only after one becomes a monk. The religion of the masses is good for human relationship, but not for the liberation of the soul from the cycle of births and deaths. For Buddha a Bṛahmin is one who cares not for others, who has no relations, who controls himself, who is firmly fixed in the heart of truth, in whom the fundamental evils are extinguished, and who has thrown hatred away from him. No doubt, one finds here an emphasis on the cultivation of ethical virtues but renunciation and condemnation of worldly ties are also evident. Buddha wants men to be occupied with their own redemption and not with that of their fellow-beings.

Pre-Islamic Indian Thought

Buddha attaches no importance to such knowledge as entangles a man in the net of life. There are no doubt practical and theoretical systems of knowledge which enable people to acquire skills and crafts, but ultimately they have no value. Says Buddha, “Such knowledge and opinions, if thoroughly mastered, will lead inevitably to certain ends and produce certain results in one’s life. The enlightened one is aware of all these consequences and also of what lies behind them. But he does not attach much importance to this knowledge. For within himself he fosters another knowledge—the knowledge of cessation, of the discontinuance of worldly existence, of utter repossession. He has perfect insight into the manner of the springing into existence of our sensations and feelings and their vanishing again with all their sweetness and bitterness, into the way of escape from them altogether, and into the manner in which by non-attachment to them through right knowledge of their character he has himself won the release.”

The Religious Schools of Buddhism.—Religiously, Buddhism is divided into two great schools, the orthodox, known as the Hinayāna, and the progressive, known as the Mahāyāna. The former, representing Buddhism, faithfully believes in the relentless working of the law of karma and refuses to assign any place to God in the scheme of things. The individual has to win his liberation through his own efforts by treading the path of rightness as delineated by Buddha. The responsibility of achieving salvation falls squarely on the shoulders of the individual. Before Buddha breathed his last, he advised his followers to work out their salvation with diligence. Philosophically, the Hinayāna Buddhism advocates pure phenomenalism, maintaining the non-existence of substances or individuals. What exists is merely passing entities, there being feelings but no feelers, thoughts but no thinker.

The Hinayāna school could not satisfy the masses because of its abstract, dry, and arid approach to the problems of life and also because of its denial of God. Its ethics smacked of egoism, since the Hinayāna Buddhist was exclusively concerned with his own emancipation, having nothing to do with the moral needs of others. The Mahāyāna school sought to rectify these mistakes by taking a more realistic view of religion. Instead of the ideal of personal liberation it recommended the “liberation of all sentient beings” as the sammāyuddha of human life. It also rehabilitated God, by identifying Buddha with a transcendent reality behind the world of phenomena, Gautama being an incarnation of the Buddha. The Hinayāna school denied reality to the Self; but the Mahāyāna school resurrected the Self too, by holding that it was the little individual self that was false and not the Self of all beings, the one transcendent self (Mahātmān).

The Philosophical Schools of Buddhism.—Though Buddha had an abhorrence for metaphysical jargon, his religion being an ethical system with no supernaturalism. Yet his followers failed to keep themselves away from
ontological and epistemological questions of abstruse nature. Consequently, there emerged four schools, two under the Hinayana and two under the Mahayana sect, on the basis of their metaphysical predilections.

1. The Madhyamika School of Singareda.—According to this school, everything is void and the universe is totally void of reality. In support of their contention they argue that the knower, the known, and knowledge are interdependent and if any one in the series is proved false it will entail the falsity of the other two. It is maintained by the proponents of this theory that cases of illusion demonstrate the falsity of knowledge; consequently, the truth of the other two factors in this epistemological trinity cannot be guaranteed.

2. The Yogacara School of Subjective Idealism.—This school was one with the Madhyamika in dismissing all external reality as illusion, but could not see eye to eye with it in respect of mind. It was urged that if mind was pronounced unreal along with matter, then all reasoning and thinking would be false. It would be as impossible to establish your own position as to demolish the position of your adversary, once mind is dismissed as māya. To this school, mind is the only reality; the external objects exist simply as ideas. No object can be known without consciousness of it; hence the objects cannot be proved to have an existence independent of consciousness.

3. The Sautrantika School of Representationism.—This school believes in the existence of mind and also of the external world. The Sautrantikas maintain that illusions cannot be explained in the absence of external objects. Moreover the objects do not exist as ideas; rather our ideas are copies of objects which exist by their own nature.

4. The Vaibhavika School.—This school recognizes the reality of mind as well as of matter and further holds that the neo-realists of the West that unless the object is perceived, there is no means of certifying that the so-called copy is a faithful representation of the original. The only plausible position in that case would be subjective idealism of the Yogacara school; and if for some reason the theory of subjective idealism is untenable, then it should be conceded that objects are capable of being perceived directly.

 Systems of Indian Philosophy.—There are six systems which are recognized as orthodox. Each is called a darśana or a view because it embodies a way of looking at the world. They are generally treated together, in pairs. The first pair includes the Nyaya or the school of Logic founded by Gautama and the Atomic school founded by Kapāla. There are, however, reasons to believe that the two systems were organized into one in the fourth/tenth century long after the Muslims had settled down in India and had made their mark on Indian thought and culture. The analysis of the ideas incorporated into the systems after their unification will amply bear this out. Accordingly, these two systems will receive separate treatment after the other systems. The remaining four systems were organized into two pairs before the advent of the Muslims and will be discussed together. While discussing these systems we shall have to ignore such thinkers as were born after the second/eighth century and whose contribu-

butions show unmistakable signs of Muslim influence. Their thinking is not purely Indian; it is at least not on conservative lines. There are radical departures both in the understanding of problems and their solutions, and these departures can be accounted for on no other hypothesis than the impact of Muslim thought on the Indian mind.

The first pair to be mentioned will include the Sāṅkhya or Numeral system, said to be founded by Kapila and the Yoga or the Mystic system founded by Patañjali; the second pair will include the Pārśa-Mimāṃsā, the original decider, founded by Jaimini, and the Uttara-Mimāṃsā, the second decider, said to be founded by Vyāsa.

The authors of the various schools as given above are generally accepted by the Hindus as real, but there is a great deal of doubt about their authenticity. René Guenon writing about Gautama, the author of Nyaya, says, "This name should not be taken as referring to any single individual and it is not accompanied in this case by any biographical details of the vanguard kind... the name denotes what is really an 'intellectual aggregate' made up of all those who over a period... devoted themselves to one and the same study... The same could be said of the proper names that we find associated in a similar way with each of the other darśanas." 44

1 & 2. Sāṅkhya and Yoga.—These two systems are the outer and the inner aspects of a single discipline. In the Bhagavad-Gītā there is written, "Puerile and unlearned people speak of 'enumerating knowledge' (Sāṅkhya) and the 'practice of introvert concentration' (Yoga) as distinct from each other, yet anyone firmly established in either gains the fruit of both. The state attained by the followers of the path of enumerating knowledge is attained also through the exercises of introvert concentration. He truly sees who regards as one the intellectual attitude of enumerating knowledge and the practice of concentration."45 Sāṅkhya is a theoretical system describing the elements of human nature, its bondage and release, while Yoga is a practical discipline to gain the same end through the practice of yogic exercises.

According to Zimmer, "The main conceptions of this dual system are: (i) that the universe is founded on an irreducible dichotomy of 'life-monads' (purusa) and lifeless matter (prakrti), (ii) that 'matter,' though fundamentally simple and uncompounded, nevertheless exfoliates, or manifests itself, under three distinctly differentiated aspects (the so-called guṇas) which are comparable to the three strands of a rope, and (iii) that each one of the 'life-monads' (purusa) associated with matter is involved in the bondage of an endless 'round of transmigration' (samsāra)."46

Prakṛti is a primal entity, out of which the physical universe with all its infinite diversity has evolved. It is all-pervasive and complex. Its complexity

45 Gītā, 5: 4-5.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

is due to the fact that it is constituted of three guṇas, namely, sattva, rajas, and tamaś, which, though different, nevertheless work harmoniously to produce an ordered world. Sattva means what is pure, rajas signifies what is active, while tamaś stands for what offers resistance. These three guṇas are present in every object since the effect cannot be other than its material cause. This doctrine, according to which nothing new can originate and the effects should be entirely determined by their antecedent factors, goes by the name of "the doctrine of pre-existent effect." The guṇas do not combine in the same ratio in every object and that accounts for the multiplicity and the infinite diversity of things.

The first thing to evolve from the prakṛti was the intellect, which in turn produced egoism or individuality. From the sattva aspect of egoism there proceeded five sense-organs, while from the tamaś aspect there emerged five motor organs. Thus, the first to emerge in the course of evolution were those objects which puruṣa needed. Out of the simple and subtle elements arose gross elements, e.g., space emerged from elemental sound, air from space and elemental touch, fire from these two and elemental colour, so on and so forth.

So far we have naturalism in its most aggressive form, but it is diluted by its recognition of puruṣa alongside prakṛti as an equally important principle in the constitution of the world. Puruṣa is manifest and simple in contradistinction to prakṛti which is single and complex. How can two principles of contradictory attributes come to work together, is a difficult point in this theory.

Puruṣa is often defined as a pure spirit by virtue of the fact that it is non-matter, and yet it has no spirituality about itself. It can be defined only negatively: it is without attributes, without motion—"imperishable, inactive, and impassive." After a person acquires full knowledge of the puruṣa, he becomes indifferent to both the subtle and the gross elements of his material existence. When death comes finally, the subtle and the gross elements dissolve, but the puruṣa continues to exist having now been released once for all from the clutches of the guṇas. This is "final aloofness," or isolation, the samsāra boon of yogic practices.

"Yoga consists in the (intentional) stoppage of the spontaneous activities of the life-stuff." As the mind is in constant commotion, it assumes the shapes of the objects it cognizes. In order to understand its true nature all impurities from within and without have to be stopped. The life-monad is so to say in the bondage of life and consciousness; it has to reveal all the processes of the subtle and gross body. In its own nature it is propertyless, without beginning and end, infinite, and all-pervading. The only problem with man is to realize his actual freedom by separating the life-monad from all distractions and turbulent conditions. To achieve this objective the Sāṁkhya-Yoga philosophy prescribes the suppression of right notions arising from correct

Pre-Islamic Indian Thought

cceptions, and wrong notions due to misapprehensions, fantasy, sleep, and memory. When this is accomplished, the mind is stilled. The goal is isolation which becomes possible when the purity of contemplation equals the purity of the life-monad. This is explained by a commentator of Patañjali in the words, "When the contemplative power (sattva) of the thinking substance is freed from the fineness of the active power (rajas) and the force of inertia (tamaś) and has no further task than that involved in transcending the presented idea of difference between itself (sattva) and the life-monad (puruṣa) and when the interior seeds of hindrances (kleśa) have all been burned, then the contemplative power (sattva) enters into a state of purity equal to that of the life-monad. This purity is neither more nor less than the cessation of the false attribution of experience to the life-monad. That is the life-monad's isolation. Then the puruṣa having its light within itself becomes undeferred and isolated." 34

According to the Yoga philosophy, hindrances to the manifestation of the true nature of the puruṣa are ignorance, I am I, attachment or sympathy, repugnance or hatred, and the will to live. Moreover, the interplay of the guṇas is a source of confusion. All these can be eradicated through asceticism, learning, and devotion, or complete surrender to the will of God. Asceticism rids a yogi of passions and spiritual inertia; recitation of holy prayers initiates him in the art of religious detachment; while complete surrender to the will of God develops him spiritually, by making him regard God as the real cause of his achievements. Through this programme, the kleśa, i.e., hindrances and impediments, are reduced to nothingness, the rajas and tamaś are destroyed, and sattva alone remains to recognize the life-monad in its pristine glory. The yogic exercises of starving and torturing the body are calculated to eradicate not only the conscious but also the unconscious tendencies of our biological existence and so to attune the personality to a supersensible type of experience.

Through meditation and self-torturing practices one reaches knowledge of the Truth, "Neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist." Having gained this knowledge the puruṣa in peace and inaction contemplates nature which is of no interest to him, and at death attains its true life of isolation.

3 & 4. Mimāṃsā-Pūrva and Uttara.—The object of the Pūrva-Mimāṃsā, also called the Krama-Mimāṃsā, i.e., Action-Investigation, is to reach certainty on the subject of dharma or the religious duty of the Hindus, chiefly about the sacrifices and the methods of offering them. In course of time there came into vogue variant opinions and customs for the performance of every kind of ceremony. The Brāhmaṇas had laid down very detailed instructions with regard to sacrificial duties but alongside them there had emerged local and family customs and conventions. These two were often hard to reconcile. Hence the problem was to bring the Brāhmaṇic instructions into harmony with one another and also with the existing family and local customs. A further

---

18 Patañjali, Yoga-Sūtras, I. 1 2

24 Zimmer, op. cit., p. 293.
problem was to discover in these customs a meaning that should satisfy every new generation.

The Pārva-Mimāṃsā consists of twelve books, all full of positive and negative injunctions about principal and subordinate rites concerning sacrifices. A cursory perusal of the Mimāṃsā clearly shows that the work is principally concerned with the interpretation of those Vedic texts as are required for sacrificial purposes and that it raises only incidentally, if at all, genuine metaphysical questions. It does raise the question of the absolute authority of the Vedas together with the doctrine of their eternity, and discusses in this connection the problem of the eternity of sound and the relation between the sound of a word and its meaning.

The Pārva-Mimāṃsā is not a treatise on philosophy. Nevertheless, certain metaphysical ideas are implied, or find incidental expression in it. A charge of atheism is often brought against this system. The advocates of the Pārva-Mimāṃsā say, “There is no God, or Maker of the world; nor has the world any sustainer or destroyer, for every man obtains a recompense in conformity with his own work. Nor indeed is there any maker of the Vedas, for their words are eternal. Their authoritativeness is self-demonstrated; since it has been established from all eternity, how can it be dependent upon anything but itself?" But in Max Müller’s view this charge is based upon a misconception. The system does not attribute the fruit of sacrificial acts to any divine agency, nor does it make God responsible for the injustice that seems to prevail in the world. Further, it gives evidence of a firm faith in the operation of the law of cause and effect and, consequently, sacrifices the inequalities of the world to the working of good and bad deeds. But all this would not make the system atheistic. It simply proves that the Mimāṃsā has an unorthodox conception of God. Max Müller’s contention seems to conflict with the Mimāṃsā itself, for the latter says, “Wherefore God? The world itself suffices for itself."

Uttara-Mimāṃsā or Vedānta.—The term Vedānta literally means the end of the Vedas or the doctrines set forth in the closing chapters of the Vedas which are the Upaniṣads. The Uttara-Mimāṃsā or Later Investigations against Pārva-Mimāṃsā which are Prior Investigations is usually called Vedānta-sūtras or Brahman-sūtras. The latter name is given to indicate that Brahman is the spirit embodied in the universe. The work is attributed to Bādārakyaṇa, but in reality many writers of different times appear to have made their contributions towards its compilation. In five hundred and five sūtras which consist mostly of two or three words each, the whole system is developed. The sūtras are, however, unintelligible by themselves and leave everything to the interpreters.

The Vedānta-sūtras discuss the whole theory of the Brahman in four chapters. The first chapter deals with the nature of the Brahman and his relation to the world and the individual souls; the second is polemical; the third deals with the ways and means of attaining Brahman-vidya; and the fourth treats of the fruit of Brahman-vidya and after-life.

Bādārakyaṇa believes both in the eternity and infallibility of the Vedas. He recognizes two sources of knowledge: śrutī and smṛti or perception and inference, and maintains that śrutī is the basis for smṛti. Similarly, he draws a hard and fast line between the two realms: one amenable to reason and the other lying beyond it. The area where reason is competent is that of prakṛti together with its manifestations, while the realm of Brahman lies beyond the reach of discursive reasoning. Reason can flourish among properties, relations, and characteristics, while Brahman is devoid of all these things and, therefore, cannot be reached through inferential knowledge. The only way to reach the Brahman is to cultivate intuition through meditation and devotion. It will reveal that the Brahman is the basis of reality: the material as well as the final cause of the universe. In creating the world God had no purpose to fulfill; what seems to be his activity is nothing but sport. God is omnipresent, formless, and one, in whom prakṛti and the puruṣa of the Sāṅkhya system combine, both being manifestations or modes of the same Ultimate Reality.

After creating the elements, Brahman entered into them and determined the characteristic manner of their development and production of other things. The Brahman, as it were, transforms Himself into everything that is caused by Him since cause and effect must have similar natures. Two illustrations are given to prove the identity of cause and effect; one is drawn from an inanimate object and the other from an animate object. It is said that when a piece of cloth is rolled up its real nature remains hidden, but when it is spread out it can be known truly. Likewise a person is paralyzed if his breath is held but becomes active the moment his breath is released. In both these cases the qualities of the antecedent are different from those of the consequent although the object is the same, which shows that despite differences the cause and the effect remain identical. Brahman and the world are not disparate in spite of differences. The wooden table is not different from the wood in its essential nature; similarly, Brahman is not different from the multiformal objects of the universe.

The world is a sport or illi of the Brahman, which means that it is without purpose and without significance. It is hard to assign any meaning to the universe, since Vedāntism declares, “Brahman is true, the world is false, the soul is Brahman and nothing else.” And again, “There is nothing worth gaining there is nothing worth enjoying, there is nothing worth knowing but Brahman alone, for he who knows Brahman is Brahman.”

In calling the world a sport there is however no implication that God created sufferings for mankind to take pleasure out of them. This would be a very uncharitable view and altogether cynical. Sufferings, woes, and ills of men as
well as of other objects, both animate and inanimate, are the result of their own karma—a law of moral causation which works inexorably and leaves no scope for the interference of divine or non-divine agencies. Likewise all evils and sins are due to karma; they are not caused by Brahman.

The self is concealed within five sheaths, that is to say, five superimposed psycho-somatic layers which should be torn away through ethical discipline and self-denial. Avidyā (nescience) is lack of insight into the nature of reality and is a major hindrance in the path of mokṣa or release. It is an article of faith with Vedantism that liberation can be obtained through knowledge. Since the Self is with us, though concealed and hidden behind five sheaths, when true knowledge is gained it will be seen that one realizes one’s own true nature. This realization can be effected through yogic practices, critical thought, or any other orthodox way. Ethical discipline is also directed to the same end. Its object is to cleanse the soul through rigorous self-discipline and impeccable conduct, in a spirit of non-attachment.

The highest knowledge is Brahman-vidyā or vision of God which is attained through the realization of the Self. After an individual soul has reached Brahman there is no return for the liberated soul. This goal is expressed through the oft-quoted verse from the Upaniṣads, “He who realizes Brahman through knowing becomes Brahman.”

5. The Nyāya System.—As already observed, because of the singular absence or deficiency of historical data, little is known of Gautama, the author of Nyāya. He is as much a subject of fanciful legend as Kapila, the author of the Śāṅkhyā system.

The word nyāya means “propriety” or “fitness.” The system undertakes to declare the method of arriving at that knowledge of truth the fruit of which, it promises, is the chief end of man. The name is also used in a more limited application to denominate the proper method of setting forth an argument. This has led to the practice of calling the Nyāya the Hindu logic, which by the way does not adequately describe the scope of the system. According to the author of the system, “Supreme felicity is attained through knowledge about the true nature of the sixteen categories (Paddāthas).”

The first work of the Nyāya system consists of sixty aphorisms, and the first sūtra gives a list of the subjects to be discussed. These are sixteen in number: (1) pramāṇa or the means by which right knowledge may be gained; (2) prameya or the object of thought; (3) doubt; (4) motive; (5) instance or example; (6) dogma or determinate truth; (7) argument or syllagism; (8) confusion; (9) ascertained; (10) controversy; (11) jangling; (12) objection or cavilling; (13) fallacy; (14) perversion; (15) futility; (16) conclusion or the confounding of an adversary.

Of the sixteen categories the first two are important; others are only

54 Mundaka-Upaniṣad, 3. 2. 9. 55 Nyāya-Sūtra, Book I, Chapter IV, Sūtra I

subsidiary indicating the course which a discussion may take from the start to the finish, i.e., from the enunciation of the doubt to the confounding of the doubter.

The first category by the name of pramāṇa signifies proof or evidence, and denotes the legitimate means of knowledge within the rational order. It enumerates four kinds of proofs, namely, perception by the senses (pratijñā); inference (anumāṇa); comparison (upamāṇa); and verbal authority (śabda) including revelation and tradition. Inference, it says, is of three kinds: from cause to effect, from effect to cause, and by analogy.

The argument which is also called nyāya consists of five constituent members. These are: (1) the proposition to be proved (pratijñā), (2) the reason justifying this proposition (hetu), (3) the example cited in support of the reason (udāh- rana), (4) the application of the first proposition to the particular case in question (upamāṇa), and (5) the result (nigamana), which is a statement of the fact that the proposition has been proved.

A typical Indian syllogism would be as follows:
1. Yonder mountain has fire.
2. For it has smoke.
3. Whatever has smoke has fire.
4. Yonder mountain has smoke such as is invariably accompanied by fire.
5. Therefore, yonder mountain has fire.

The linguistic form is not considered necessary to syllogism. This is common to all forms of Indian logic.

According to the Nyāya, a notion or a concept can be either right or wrong. In the first case it is obtained through perception or inference or comparison or revelation. A wrong notion is one which is not derived from proof and originates either from doubt or from false premises or from error. A wise man avoids these as well as passions and aversions and is profoundly indifferent to all action.

Bleseness is deliverance from pain. The primary evil is pain. There are twenty-one varieties of evil which spring from the organs of sense, from the objects of sense, from mental apprehensions, and even from pleasure. “The soul attains to this deliverance by knowledge, by meditation on itself, by not earning fresh merit or demerit through actions sprung from desire, and by becoming free from passions through knowledge of the evil inherent in objects. It is knowledge . . . and not virtue which obtains final deliverance from the body.”

The Nyāya is predominantly intellectual and analytical. Its value lies in its methodology or the theory of knowledge on which it builds its philosophy. This theory it applies not only to one system but to all systems with modifications here and there. Chatterjee and Datta observe that “the Nyāya theory

of pluralistic realism is not so satisfying as its logic. Here we have a common-
sense view of the world as a system of independent realities ... It does not
give us a systematic philosophy of the world in the light of one universa-
absolute principle.”

The Indian syllogism bears a close resemblance to Aristotelian syllogism
especially when it is simplified or abridged, consisting either of the last three
or the first three terms only. It is, therefore, suggested by a good many his-
torians that either Aristotle or the builders of the Nyāya system drew inspiration
from the other. It is also possible that the obligation is mutual.

6. The Vaiśeṣika System.—Vaiśeṣika is derived from viśeṣa which means
difference, signifying thereby that multiplicity and not unity lies at the basis
of the universe. It is expounded by Kapāla in the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra which
contains about five hundred and fifty aphorisms. Book 1 discusses the five
categories—substance, quality, action, community or genus, and particularity;
Book 2 deals with the substances—earth, water, air, ether, space, and time;
Book 3 is concerned with the problems of mind and self and also touches the
theory of inference; Book 4 is about the atomic theory and discusses the nature
of body and the visibility of quality; Book 5 deals with motion; Book 6 contains
duties of the four stages of life; Book 7 treats of quality, the atomic theory,
the self, and inference together; Books 8 and 9 deal with perception and inference;
while Book 10 is concerned with causality and other related questions.

A fundamental assumption of this system is that objects are independent of
the perceiving mind and also of one another. Philosophically, the doctrine
may be called pluralistic realism. The entire world of experience can be
divided into nine dravya or substances together with their properties and
relations. These substances are earth, water, fire, air, ākāśa, time, space,
self, and manas. Besides substances which simply provide a framework for the
whole universe there are padārtha, or categories, seven in number, namely,
guna, karma, viśeṣa, samavāya, samānyā, abhāva, and dravya, which can be
translated as quality, action, individuality, necessary relation, universals,
notion, and substance. Qualities depend upon substances, but they can be
independently conceived and so exist by their own nature. No distinction is
recognized between mental and material qualities or between the primary
and secondary qualities. Quite consistent with its pluralistic standpoint, the
doctrine holds that the substances reveal their nature through the qualities in
which they differ and not in which they agree.

In regarding earth, air, water, and fire as substances, what is implied is
that the entire structure of the universe can be interpreted in terms of material
causes which are supersensible. The ultimate stuff of which this universe is
made is the mass of atoms that are round, extremely minute, invisible, insepar-
able of division, eternal in themselves but not in their aggregate form. Even

---

77 An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Calcutta University, Calcutta, 1944, p. 247
salient features of Muslim culture and making them a part and parcel of the culture of India. What Saṅkara and Rāmānuja did in the sphere of philosophy was done by others in the fields of religion, ethics, and social politics. The result was a great upheaval in the world of Hindu thought. A re-evaluation and a re-appraisal of old values and thoughts took place on a gigantic scale. Monotheism was stressed and so was universal brotherhood of mankind and a positive approach to life. Casteless society became the goal of social reforms and the Sūdras, the accursed and the condemned, were accorded the right to live like others. All this was the product of the impact of Islam on Hinduism.

There is evidence to show that the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika were organized into one system after Islam had firmly entrenched itself in India. Not only were the two systems welded into one, they also became monotheistic and advanced for the first time in the history of Hindu thought what are known as the Hindu proofs for the existence of God.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter II

PRE-ISLAMIC CHINESE THOUGHT

In the present chapter we shall attempt to survey some of the salient features of Chinese philosophy avoiding any specialized or detailed discussion of the individual schools or of the philosophical technicalities involved. Our purpose is to present, in brief compass, an account of Chinese philosophical thought indicating a number of its peculiar characteristics and its apparent major limitations. This, then, will be a summary of the outstanding peculiarities of Chinese philosophy prior to the arrival of any significant foreign influence.

First, a few words with respect to the period of Chinese philosophy we are covering, that of the Chou Dynasty (1122–256 B.C.). The last centuries of the Chou were marked by political and social turmoil associated with the disintegration of feudalism. The Chinese world was torn by internece warfare, old political powers were overturned and old values challenged or discarded. During this "time of troubles," to use Toynbee's term, China produced a great variety of original schools of philosophical thought, such as Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism, and Legalism as well as a Chinese version of Epicureanism, the so-called Logicians, and the Yin Yang school. Because of the creative freshness and richness of the later Chou, it may be regarded as the classical period of Chinese philosophy. Our discussion is, therefore, limited to these classical philosophies and their spirit; Chinese medieval and modern philosophies are not delineated, nor is Buddhism in China, nor Chinese Buddhism. The primary reason for this concentration on the Chou philosophies is that they represent the indigenous Chinese schools of philosophy before they...
A History of Muslim Philosophy

were affected by the advent of other philosophical or religious ideas, for example, Buddhism and its attendant Indian metaphysics. Moreover, though some of these schools did not exercise a lasting influence on subsequent Chinese intellectual life, as was the case with Legalism which passed into oblivion with the collapse of the shortlived Ch'in Dynasty (221–207 B.C.), and with Mohism which died out a few centuries after the death of Mo Tzu, its founder, other schools, such as Confucianism, Taoism, and elements of the Yin Yang school, persisted throughout the history of Chinese philosophy. Confucianism, though eclipsed at times, slowly gained a predominant position and became a powerful force in the moulding and direction of Chinese civilization. While these latter schools survived, the others passed into insignificance. For instance, the school of the Logicians never exercised any great influence on the development of later Chinese philosophy. Also, Yang Chu’s thought, somewhat similar to the philosophy of Epicurus, was never a threat to the other schools since it consisted more of an attitude toward life than a philosophy of existence. It was too individualistic, too self-centred for wide acceptance by the Chinese.

To appreciate adequately the peculiar features of Chinese philosophical thought, it is important that one be cognizant of certain facts of Chinese geography, economics, and sociology with regard to its emergence and development. The distinguished contemporary Chinese philosopher and historian of Chinese philosophy, Fung Yu-lan, discusses all three topics at considerable length.1 From the earliest times the Chinese considered the world and their land, *tiien hsia* (all under heaven), to be one and the same. Because of its unique geographical position—a vast continental land mass bounded by a great mountain range, desert, and the ocean—the early culture of China appears to have developed in comparative isolation from that of other great centres of civilization. At any rate, it seems fairly certain that the Chinese thinkers of the later Chou were not in a position comparable to that of their Greek philosophical contemporaries vis à vis the intellectual, philosophical, religious, and scientific thought of the Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilizations.

In developing their philosophies, the Greeks were undoubtedly stimulated by other highly civilized peoples. An ancient Greek historian once noted that the Greeks were children compared to the Egyptians. In contrast, in the development of ancient Chinese philosophical thought, there does not seem to have been any significant cross-fertilization from other centres of civilization outside the Chou world.

The Greeks and the Chinese differed considerably in their respective economic conditions. The Greeks were a commercial people to a great extent and were, therefore, brought into contact with a wide variety of ideas, customs, lands and peoples. Their conception of the world recognized the existence of other

---

Pre-Islamic Chinese Thought

great civilizations. The Chinese, however, were mainly an agricultural people. None of the Chinese philosophers ventured beyond Chou China. There was, in consequence, a definite insularity attached to Chinese philosophical thought. In addition to this insularity of thought, there was close affinity between the Chinese thinker and the Chinese peasant; both were attached to the land. The Chinese scholar-philosopher was usually a landowner, while the peasant cultivated the land. “Hence, throughout Chinese history, social and economic thinking and policy have centred around the utilization and distribution of land.”2 In a sense, ancient Chinese philosophy may be said to have had an intimate association with, if not absolutely conditioned by, the peasant mentality. The Chinese thinkers’ “reactions to the universe and their outlook on life were essentially those of the farmer.”3 With the aid of their learning, and genius, the Chinese sages were able “to express what an actual farmer felt but was incapable of expressing himself.”4 Realization of this fact may go long way towards explaining the predominantly practical tone of Chinese philosophical thought. The peculiar problems connected with Chinese economic life tended to limit the spectrum of values in philosophy. Though Confucianism and Taoism are “poles apart from one another, yet they are also the two poles of one and the same axis. They both express, in one way or another, the aspirations and inspirations of the farmer.”5 Confucianism stressed family obligations, while Taoism emphasized the power, beauty, and mystery of nature.

Just as geographical conditions and agricultural life have exerted an influence on the formation and character of Chinese philosophy, so also has done the Chinese social system, particularly the family. A striking feature of Chinese philosophical thought is its preoccupation with problems relating to the ethics of the family and the Chinese social system. The most outstanding example of this preoccupation is to be found in Confucianism. “A great deal of Confucianism,” Fung Yu-lan asserts, “is the rational justification or theoretical expression of this social system.”6 The mental outlook of the Chinese farmer as well as his values tended to limit the range of philosophical speculation. “The way of life of the farmers is to follow nature. They admire nature and condemn the artificial, and in their primitivity and innocence, they are easily made content. They desire no change, nor can they conceive of any change.”7 Here one may discern the source of strength of much of Chinese classical philosophy as well as its weakness. It reflected the attitudes, interests, prejudices, and values of the Chinese peasant.

A study of classical Chinese philosophy discloses that it possesses at least

---


2 Ibid., p. 17.
3 Ibid., p. 18.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 19.
6 Ibid., p. 21.
7 Ibid., p. 26.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

four highly distinctive features which may be a reflection of the dominance of this peasant mentality: lack of metaphysics, dearth of logical sophistication, preoccupation with ethics, and a regressive theory of history.

We shall comment on the last feature first. The traditional Chinese theory of history is regressive. According to the Chinese, the Golden Age of mankind was in the dim remoteness of the past and all subsequent history has been a tragic degeneration from the ancient ideal age. The Chinese sages sought to find the proper path which would enable mankind to recapture the peace, justice, and harmony of that Golden Age. Associated with this regressive conception of history was the tendency of many of the classical schools to antedate the founder of a rival school of thought. Apparently, in order to make a school or a point of view more attractive and authoritative, it was felt necessary to increase its antiquity. The Confucians, for example, referred to the mythological rulers, Yao and Shun; the Mohists, in support of their philosophical position, went back beyond Yao and Shun to the legendary Yu; and the Taoists, for their part, went beyond Yu to the mythical Yellow Emperor. The more ancient the beginning of a school, the more was it to be trusted.

The classical Chinese philosophers, for the most part, manifested an aversion to metaphysical speculation. The Confucians, Confucius (551–479 B.C.), Mencius (371–289 B.C.), and Hsiin Tzu (288–c. 238 B.C.), showed little interest in or even awareness of metaphysical questions. Confucius was not concerned with understanding the character of Ultimate Reality nor with epistemological problems; his concern was with social and political philosophy. Mencius lacks an interest in metaphysics as such, as does Hsiin Tzu. At the risk of over-simplification, one could say that Confucianism was primarily an educational philosophy. Though Confucius was silent on whether or not human nature was good or evil, and, though Mencius and Hsiin Tzu differ greatly on this point—the former maintaining that human nature is good, and the latter, that it is evil—all three agree on the need and efficacy of education for inculcating or developing ethical conduct. Subtle metaphysical disquisitions are lacking in all three.

Taoism, as set forth in the Tao Te Ching and the works of Chuang Tzu (399–c. 295 B.C.), frequently approaches a metaphysical analysis of reality, but, more characteristically, ends in a hazy mysticism or appears to be fascinated with the enunciation of paradoxes. The Taoist saying that he who knows cannot say and that he who says does not know the Tao (the Way, or Ultimate Reality) is not particularly conducive to metaphysical discourse.

Mo Tzu (c. 479–c. 438 B.C.), founder of Mohism, does not show any interest in metaphysical matters as such. His philosophy stressed an "all-embracing love" based upon utility. He condemned aggressive war and urged an altruism based upon mutual self-interest because the results were more pleasant and useful to society. His reasons were practical and devoid of any metaphysical justification.

Pre-Islamic Chinese Thought

As for the Logicians, for example, Hui Shih (c. 380–305 B.C.) and Kung-sun Lung (380–250 B.C.), their interest comes nearer to being metaphysical than any other school with the possible exception of the Yin Yang. The Logicians, frequently referred to as the School of Names (Ming Chia), were chiefly concerned with problems relating to the relativity and changeableness of all phenomena, as was Hui Shih, or with the concept of universals—the "names" of things—which, according to Kung-sun Lung, were absolute and unchangeable. Hui Shih contended that concrete things were undergoing constant change and were, therefore, different from one instant to the next. Kung-sun Lung insisted that the "names" of things, similar to Platonic ideas, were absolute and unchangeable. In order to substantiate his position, he employed epistemological arguments. One of his most famous arguments is contained in his discussion concerning "a white horse is not a horse." Many of the Logicians' arguments posed paradoxes and logical conundrums and, for this reason, were disparaged by the Confucianists. For example, the great Chinese historian of the Han, Su-ku T'ang, himself a Confucianist, described the work of the Logicians as "minute examinations of trifling points in complicated and elaborate statements, which made it impossible for others to refute their ideas." Because of the lack of interest in metaphysical questions peculiar to Chinese classical philosophers in general, the influence of the Logicians was not especially significant in the development of later Chinese thought.

The Legalists, whose most important representative is Han Fei Tzu (died 233 B.C.), were not concerned with problems of metaphysics, logic, or epistemology. Their fundamental concern was political: What happens when a ruler is weak, wicked, or incompetent? How is a State to be unified and governed? For the Legalists, the answer was impersonal in the place of personal ethics or moral principles. The Legalists, though at odds with the Confucianists, show a similarly overriding interest in the practical aspects of political and social philosophy. Metaphysical speculation is a pastime which neither of these classical schools pursued.

Tsou Yen (305–240 B.C.) of the Yin Yang school probably represents the extent to which the Chinese were willing to pursue metaphysical speculation without the pressure of foreign ideas. Certainly the Taoist and Yin Yang represent indigenous Chinese metaphysical thinking prior to the advent of Buddhism. The Yin Yang school, however, lacks genuine metaphysical profundity and, in essence, appears to be based on a dualistic theory of the interaction of the female and male principles of the universe, the Yin and the Yang respectively. Neither the Yin Yang school nor Taoism possesses a metaphysical presentation approaching the works of Plato or Aristotle. One has the feeling that the thinkers of these two schools endowed one or two ideas and then used them uncritically and mechanically to explain various phenomena.

* Quoted in Fung Yu-lan's A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 81.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

In general, Chinese philosophers either ignored metaphysics or showed only a spasmodic interest in understanding, logically and systematically, the nature and character of the Ultimate Reality. Only after the introduction of Buddhism did the Chinese philosophers concern themselves seriously with metaphysics. "Even the basic metaphysical problems, such as God, universals, space and time, matter and spirit, were either not discussed, except in Buddhism, or discussed only occasionally, and then always for the sake of ethics." Chinese thinkers confined themselves to social and political thought; they had always in mind the capability of their respective philosophies for practical implementation. As metaphysics was, in the main, slighted or ignored, so were epistemological problems.

An examination of the history of Chinese philosophy illustrates plentifully that Chinese philosophers occupied themselves with questions of human adjustment to nature or the individual's adjustment to society. The Taoists stressed the former, the Confucianists the latter. The Taoists regarded society as unnatural and unnecessary for Good Life. In this respect it resembles Romanticism. Confucianism maintains that society is natural and necessary for the life of a human being. Society permits a man to satisfy his ethical obligations and also affords him an opportunity to enrich his life with learning, art, music, and moral example. Society is not only a structure of ethical and social relationships but also a product of man's cultural heritage. Man as a member of society is able to appreciate tradition, literature, ceremonies—all those things which are not absolutely necessary for physical survival but which are nevertheless the very essence of civilized, cultured existence. As Taoism lauds the state of nature, it is akin to Romanticism; Confucianism is allied to Classicism.

In addition to a lack of metaphysical interest or regard for epistemological problems, Chinese philosophical thought, both classical and medieval, is distinguished by its patent deficiency of logical refinement. Chinese philosophical discourses are usually unsystematic and infrequently based upon rigid logical argumentation. The classical philosopher's approach was simple; his use of an elaborate philosophical method was almost non-existent. The Chinese philosopher was primarily engrossed in questions of ethics and with practical matters relating to the ordering of society according to proper moral principles or, as in the case of Taoism, with the way of nature and naturalness. The arguments employed by the philosophers were eminently practical in the sense that they made no appeal to complicated logical analysis, theory, or hypothesis, but appealed to man's common sense. It would be helpful to illustrate the type of "logical" argumentation frequently encountered in the works of Chinese classical philosophers.


Pre-Islamic Chinese Thought

The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.

"Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made tranquil and happy."10

That an over-emphasis upon logical analysis may inhibit novel ideas and conceptions of reality, few will deny. Too great a reliance upon logical clarity precision, and consistency may lead to sterile thought. The later medieval period in Europe, which was dominated by Scholastic logic, illustrates sufficiently the perils involved in an over-estimation of the power and validity of logical analysis. The Scholastics appear to have regretfully misunderstood the value of logic. The medieval Schoolmen erred in the direction of too much emphasis upon logical acuteness whereas, in contradistinction, the Chinese appear to have been blind to the importance of logical refinement. Whether through disinterest or because of the intrinsic difficulties involved in their own written language (pictographs and ideographs), Chinese philosophers do not seem to have understood the proper role of logic in the acquisition of new knowledge. In one of his works, Alfred North Whitehead states succinctly the crucial part logic may play in the advancement of the frontiers of human knowledge. "Logic, properly used," he writes, "does not shackle thought. It gives freedom, and above all, boldness. Illogical thought hesitates to draw conclusions, because it never knows either what it means, or what it assumes, or how far it trusts its own assumptions, or what will be the effect of any modification of assumptions."11 Continuing, he remarks, "Also the mind untrained in that part of constructive logic which is relevant to the subject in hand will be ignorant of the sort of conclusions which follow from various sorts of assumptions, and will be correspondingly dull in divining the inductive laws."12 One can hardly fail to agree with Whitehead's observation when studying Chinese classical philosophy as well as much of the philosophy of the later schools in China.

10 James Legge, Tr., Great Learning (Ta Hsu,), Volumes 4 and 5.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

By confining their attention to the world of everyday affairs and common sense, the Chinese savants felt no need to engage in metaphysical speculation in a systematic manner, nor did they feel any desire to indulge in the luxury of logical subtlety. "Therefore," a well-known Japanese philosopher comments, "when their philosophy did not vanish in the mist of vague mysticism, as in the case of Taoism, it tenaciously clung to the agnosticism of everyday experience." As we study the Taoist classic, Tao Te Ching, we can readily understand what is meant by a philosophy losing itself "in the mist of vague mysticism," for example:

The Tao that can be told of
Is not the Absolute Tao;
The Names that can be given
Are not Absolute Names.

The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth;
The Named is the Mother of All Things.

Therefore:
Oftentimes, one strips oneself of passion
In order to see the Secret of Life;
Oftentimes, one regards life with passion,
In order to see its manifest results.

These two (the Secret and its manifestations)
Are (in their nature) the same;
They are given different names
When they become manifest.

They may both be called the Cosmic Mystery:
Reaching from the Mystery into the Deeper Mystery
Is the Gate to the Secret of All Life.12

This may be an example of "pure speculation" on the part of a Chinese philosopher. If so, one is inclined again to agree with Whitehead who also observed: "Pure speculation, undisciplined by the scholarship of detailed fact or the scholarship of exact logic, is on the whole more useless than pure scholarship, unrelieved by speculation."13 The Taoists seem to have engaged in "pure speculation" fairly consistently. For their part, the Confucianists emphasized learning and traditional scholarship and the "business" of social existence and its obligations.


Pre-Islamic Chinese Thought

Unfortunately, the excessive engrossment in the realm of the commonplace was as detrimental as the marked tendency to mysticism. Both of these extremes tended to stultify the adventure of thought toward new possibilities of achievement. When Chinese thought did not float away in the clouds, it remained earth-bound.

Granted that the confluence of the regressive theory of history, the lack of metaphysical speculation, and a pronounced deficiency of logical refinement are distinctive features of classical Chinese philosophy, in general, probably the most significant characteristic—the one which may help explain why metaphysics and logic languished—is the dominant concern with ethics, for, indeed, there is little doubt that ethics was the main concern of Chinese philosophers. There were but few exceptions during the classical period and even thereafter. Ethics played a major role in Chinese philosophy. "The moral life," Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki writes, "can be said to have been the only philosophical subject which...has seriously interested the Chinese, and which has been considered worthy of their earnest speculation."14 By focussing their attention on ethical problems—man and his life in society or in harmony with nature—the Chinese seriously restricted the content of philosophy in their culture. The special facts of geography, economics, and sociology exercised a strong influence on the Chinese climate of philosophical opinion and may account, as we have noted, for their almost exclusive concentration on ethics.

In the final analysis, the classical Chinese philosopher's ideal was the attainment of the Good Life here and now on earth. Most classical thinkers assented to Confucius' observation: "While you do not know life, how can you know about death?" The world of the present requires man's full attention, courage, and ingenuity. To the great majority of Chinese philosophers, righteousness, family, economic security, and a stable social order were the main objects of study. During the later period of Chinese philosophy, though there were occasional lapses from these objectives, they remained permanent features in the Chinese philosophical tradition.

Tung Chung-shu (c. 179–104 B.C.) was the thinker who contributed most to the ultimate triumph of Confucianism over all the other schools of the Chou in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–200 A.D.). Later, it is true that Confucianism was overshadowed by Buddhism during the period of Division (221–589 A.D.) following the break-up of the Han Empire, but, to survive in China as an effective, popular force, Buddhism had to accommodate itself to the peculiarities of the Chinese philosophical temper which we have endeavoured to sketch in the preceding pages. Those schools of Buddhism which tried to preserve their original philosophical purity failed to achieve currency in China and, hence, remained ineffectual in Chinese intellectual life. Chinese Buddhism enjoyed immense support because it was Buddhism à la chinoise.

15 Ibid., p. 47.
In short, the cardinal limitation of Chinese philosophy stems from its inordinate attention to what Whitehead calls “practical reason.” Chinese thought was too closely associated with practical matters, with social adjustment. It was blinded, so to speak, by the affairs of the present. In concentrating on the “practical reason,” it neglected “speculative reason” which is allied with logic and systematic discourse. Here we must stress that flights of fancy or sheer contemplation are not to be construed as speculative reason or speculative philosophy. Speculative philosophy seeks a comprehensive understanding of the nature of reality, of God, of man, and of the universe; it strives for a synoptic vision; while, in contrast, practical reason of practical philosophy is concerned with the empirical approach to concrete problems of living and action.

The speculative philosopher, as here described, often regards his opposite as a victim of spurious knowledge, lost in the hustle and bustle of the marketplace. Though the speculative philosopher may frequently be at odds with the practical philosopher, each needs the other. Unfortunately, the practical thinker may be oblivious of what his counterpart is about and may regard his pursuits as quite extraneous to the business of living. The speculative thinker does not deny the importance of practical reason; he presupposes it and moves along on a plane above the details of the everyday world. It should be noted that the practical activities of the mind produce data which the speculative thinker may utilize in the formulation of new theoretical possibilities, and these in turn may stimulate the activities of the practical philosopher in his desire to implement them in new social programmes and in new technologies. This interplay between these two types of reason or philosophical endeavour constitutes a kind of creative cultural symbiosis. If a civilization neglects either the practical or the speculative type of reason, it will be affected adversely.

China, until the impact of the modern world was felt, was an example of the harmful effects of a pragmatic, utilitarian philosophical orientation. Though authorities differ on the precise amount of weight to be given to its philosophical orientation as a cause of the sonomence of Chinese society, there appears to be agreement that the stress on practicality and social ethics, especially of Confucianism, played a most important role. Science and technology were retarded; there was no speculative thought to challenge the mind towards new heights of achievement; the scholar class, reared on mundane philosophy, was dominant. This is not to say that Confucian civilization was not a creative and remarkable civilization in many areas; it is merely an endeavour to point out why a certain type of mind did not flourish. Philosophies which concentrate too completely on social adjustment and utility paralyse, if they do not actually destroy, individual creativity and spontaneity in other avenues of human development. Just as civilizations have cramped the individual by a preponderant religious or materialistic orientation, so the same cramping may occur when social

---

PRE-ISLAMIC IRANIAN THOUGHT

A summary sketch of the philosophical thought of pre-Islamic Iran is both a difficult and an easy task—difficult in the sense that the texts on which this study must be based are not philosophical in the proper sense of the word, but rather theological or sometimes even mythological, and we have to abstract from them their philosophical gist, translating their ideas into modern philosophical terminology, through a rather personal work of interpretation; easy in the sense that, in this work of reinterpretation, we have to renounce completely a solution of the extremely complicated historical problems put by Iranian philology. An attempt at a philosophical reinterpretation of the Mazdaean outlook can be based, in our opinion, exclusively on the only concrete and systematic form of Mazdaism we know: the late Mazdaism of the Pahlavi books of the Sassanian period and the early times of Islam.

The almost insoluble problems raised by the pre-Islamic religion (or, according to others, religions) of Iran depend chiefly on the extreme confusion of different types of religiosity—local religion, religion of the élite, etc.

Concerning the sources of Mazdaism the only comparatively sure points are: (a) that the Gāthās of the Avesta are very old and probably date back to Zarathustra himself (c. 700–600 B.C.); and (b) that the most systematic and the richest Pahlavi texts were written in the third/ninth century, i.e., two centuries after the Islamic conquest of Iran.

An accurate dating of the materials between these two chronological limits (the seventh century B.C. and the ninth century A.D.) seems still impossible and all the learned conclusions of the scholars (who often change their minds from year to year) appear to be no more than conjectures. Moreover, the materials chronologically placed between these two dates are sometimes typologically so incongruous that it is very easy to abstract from them a certain type of religion and attribute it to the founder, making of him, e.g., either an idealistic philosopher or a shaman, and then explain the development of Mazdaism that followed either as the decay or a repaganization of a highly philosophical religion, or as a successive theologization of originally mystical perceptions.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the only comprehensive approach to the enormous and extremely varied religio-philosophical materials contained in the corpus of Mazdaic texts is to consider them synchronistically as a whole. Though one may not agree with many details of Professor Corbin’s theories, one cannot but agree with him when he writes, “A spiritual morphology that attempts a reconstruction and revaluation of the actually living devotion impels us to consider the canonical Avesta, or at least what we possess of it, its ritual, as preserving at its centre the Psalms (Gāthās) of Zarathustra and the middle-Iranic (Pahlavi) and Parsi translations and commentaries as a whole. Also in this case, it seems that when the believer recites his Bible or when the Liturgy is celebrated, all objections taking historical stratification as a pretext fail to reach their aim. If we always ask: ‘Whence does it come?’ we practically do nothing more than wander here and there, formulating hypotheses vainly following one another. We should rather ask: ‘At what does it aim?’ Then the soul would answer, accounting for what has been its purpose.’”

We shall, therefore, make as the basis of the present chapter the latest form of pre-Islamic Iranian religiosity, the form represented by the whole corpus of the Avestic and Pahlavi Scriptures possessed and venerated by the Parses (not in the sense, of course, that we shall follow necessarily their interpretation of them). For it is safer for a philosopher to interpret an actual and concrete corpus of religious scriptures, than to interpret the ever-changing reinterpretation of them made by the historians.

It will be useful, however, to reproduce, as an introduction, the most widely accepted diachronic explanation of the numerous so-called “contradictions”1 of the present Mazdaic corpus, even though it does not seem to be completely satisfactory. The difficulty is that much of the materials generally considered to be very old are much later, or at least they “function” in a much later theological organism.

The branch of the Aryans who in about the eleventh century B.C. detached themselves from their brethren, penetrating afterwards into the jungles of India (a natural place for magic and richest mytho-poetical phantasy) and made the yellow and dry plateau of Iran their country, had obviously brought with them their naturalistic religion, clearly delineated in the Vedas and rather similar to that of old Rome and Greece. The sacrifices of animals (e.g., the ox) and the ceremonial libation of the fermented juice of a plant, kāṣā (Skr. soma), were frequent and taken as sacred rites. At a certain moment, not yet determined with sufficient clearness, though the majority of scholars seem now to fix it at the sixth century B.C., the remarkable personality of a religious reformer, Zarathustra, appeared in the oriental zone of the Iranian plateau. His name still resists all attempts at etymological interpretation. “The man with the

old camels” seems to be the most accepted one. Zarathustra, possibly utilizing a pre-existing naturalistic sky-god (Varuna), created a new monotheism, so strong that the name of the old gods (devas) came to signify “demons.” This was, up to some time ago, a “classical” theory of the historians of Mazdaism, but now it seems to cede to new hypotheses maintaining that the demonization of the devas was prior to Zarathustra. Henning even asserted that Zarathustra’s reform was a “protest against monotheism.” The seventeen hymns (Gāthās), written in a rather archaic language and forming the central part of the Avesta are generally considered to be the work of Zarathustra himself. The Gāthās uphold veneration for a single supreme God, Ahura Mazda, the “Wise Lord” (according to some like Pagliaro, “the Thinking Lord”). He is accompanied by a coritēge of abstract quasi-personified powers or attributes, the six Amesha Spentās (Holy Immortals): Asha (the Cosmic Law or Righteousness), Vohu Manah (Good Thought or Benevolence), Khshathra (Sovereignty), Ārmaītī (Piety, Doxility), Haurvatāt (Integrity), Ameretat (Immortality). The Gāthās reject rites and sacrifices, especially the ritual killing of cattle and the Haoma cult, preach a very high personal ethic, and enforce wise social laws, foremost of which is the fostering of agriculture against nomadism. In order to explain evil in the world, the idea of the influence of the Evil Spirit (Aŋra Mainyu) is introduced, in front of it stands Spenta Mainyu (the Holy Spirit), not identical (at least in this oldest stage) with the Wise Lord (Ahura Mazda). This monotheism, tendentially dualistic but, in any case, clearly prophetic and anti-naturalistic, “crossed the spiritual sky of Iran as a meteor” (Duchesnay-Guillemin). The religion which will be now called Mazdaitc—mazdgayana means “one who worships the Wise (Lord)—was reabsorbed in course of time to some of the older “heathen” rites and cults, e.g., Haoma’s cult, and also accepted the naturalistic gods of the ancient pantheon, some of them like Mithra, the god of sunlight and, then, of the Covenant and Oath being just adopted, while others being inescapably transformed into deva’s. According to some scholars, however, the religion of Mithra existed as a distinct creed in old Iran. At the same time dualism, not so strong and systematized in the beginning, was becoming deeper: it became a cosmologic-metaphysical contrast between a good God, Ahura Mazda, and an evil God, Aŋra Mainyu, both having their own “creations,” the former being accompanied by his Amesha Spentās (ever more clearly personified in course of time) and Yazatas (Venerable Beings, “gods,” like Mithra, the goddess Anahita probably introduced from Babylon, etc.), and the latter by the band of the devils and drujs (literally “lies”). Lying seems to have been the worst sin for Zarathustra.

This religion was at a certain moment monopolized by the Magi. Who the Magi were, is another crux of the historians of Mazdaism. Herodotus speaks of the Magi as a tribe of Media and attributes to them a religion rather different from that of the old Persians. Father G. Messina tried to demonstrate that they formed a closed caste with such characteristic features as those of a “tribe.” According to him, their name (magi-gar) means “bearers of the gift” of Zarathustra’s doctrine. Their power increased rapidly and it seems that already during the Achaemenid period (558–330 B.C.) the education of the future kings was entrusted to them. They succeeded in spreading among the people certain ethical principles and rites of their founder’s religion. But this success was not complete, and this is one of the many possible explanations of the discrepancies between the visible and popular religion of the Persians and the quasi-esoteric religion of the Magi. According to the same view, the Magi became afterwards the “philosophers” of their doctrine, and tried to develop it especially to explain its dualism. Christian sources of the fourth century A.D. (Theodore of Mopsuestia) speak of the birth, in the milieu of the Magi, of the doctrine or heresy called Zurvanism that explained away dualism through the acceptance of a supreme god Zurvan (time) as father of both Ahura Mazda and Angra Mainyu. But some scholars now speak of Zurvanism as an actually autonomous religion; and others, turning the preceding theory upside down, consider the Magi to be the bearers of the less philosophical, most magical, and punctiliously ritualistic aspect of Zoroastrianism.

In the meanwhile ritual and cult, with complicated precepts of legal purity, were gradually prevailing and when, after a dark period of incubation under the Arsacid Dynasty (250 B.C.–224 A.D.) the caste of the Magi obtained unparalleled power, with the advent of the Sassanians (224–651 A.D.), Mazdaism, now a State religion, became an intolerant faith, persecutor of every form of heresy. Heresy (as it happened first with Manicheism supported at its beginnings by King Shapur, 241–272 A.D., and then with communitistic Mazdakism, favoured by King Kawat, 488–531) was sometimes a useful pretext for the warrior caste of the kings—a caste that seemed to possess its own religious tradition different from that of the priestly caste—to escape the excessive power of the Magi. The discontentment hidden under the outwardly uniform orthodoxy, the unbearable poverty of the peasants, never totally imbued with the religion of the dēde, and no doubt possessing their own religious customs and traditions practically unknown to us, and the struggle between Throne and Altar, were some of the causes that rendered the conquest of Iran by the Arabs so astonishingly easy.

B

The Mazdaic religion is commonly defined as “the religion of dualism.” A deeper analysis shows that dualism is not the only basic feature of Mazdaism. The account of Mazdaic philosophy that follows is divided in a rather unorthodox way, necessitated by the fact that Mazdaism is not a philosophy, into the following four sections: (1) The Concept of Myth, (2) Mazdaic Angelism, (3) The Double Dualism, (4) The Idea of Time.
1. The Concept of Myth

One of the most interesting features of Mazdaic thought is its being at the same time mythical and theologico-philosophical. The Mazdaic texts are very rich in myths, but these are never narrated ex professo; they are rather hinted at in the texts the chief purpose of which is not that of telling myths. Sufficient attention has not been paid to this "style" of Mazdaic Scriptures. This is true not only of the later Pahlavi books but also of Avesta itself. In it myths are inlaid in liturgical hymns or legal and canonical texts in the form of explanations and comments. Avesta shows thus a rather "recent" type of myth-telling. The myth has never in Avesta—even in the case of myths having a naturalistic origin—the freshness of the Vedic myth; it is always in a phase of rational or theological explanation, and is used as a hint or example in texts that remain fundamentally theological.

We have just mentioned "myths having an ancient naturalistic origin." A sufficiently clear instance of a Mazdaic myth of this type is that of the killed dragon. In the Aban Yashī a hymn to the angel of Waters, Ardvi Sūrā Anahīta, containing a list of all those who in ancient times made sacrifices to that angel-goddess, we read among other stories this passage, clearly explaining and confirming the efficacy of prayer and sacrifice to that angel: "To her did Thrašaṭō̄na, the hair of the valiant Athwa yan, offer up a sacrifice in the four-cornered Varena, with a hundred male horses, a thousand oxen, ten thousand lambs. He begged of her a boon, saying: 'Grant me this, O Good, most beneficent Ardvi Sūrā Anahīta! that I may overcome Azhi Dahaka, the three-mouthed, the three-headed, the six-eyed one who has a thousand senses, that most powerful, fiendish Druj, that demon, baleful to the world, the strongest Druj that Angra Mainyu created against the material world, to destroy the world of the good principle; and that I may deliver his two wives, Savanghavāch and Erenavāch, who are the fairest of body amongst women, and the most wonderful creatures in the world.' Ardvi Sūrā Anahīta granted him that boon, as he was offering libations, giving gifts, sacrificing, and entreating that she would grant him that boon."

Comparison with other cultures allows us to reconstruct an ancient myth originally connected with the New Year Feast and with the rites aiming at defeating drought. A divine, Thrašaṭō̄na (the Faridūn of Ferdowsi's Shāhnameh), conquers the fortress of the Dragon and defeats and kills him. The Waters that were prisoners in his castle are now freed and are the women held by the monster as slaves in his harem. Now rain falls fertilizing the earth and the young hero-liberator celebrates the hieres gamos with the liberated women. But this is simply a reconstruction and the readers or hearers of the Avesta probably had no idea of the original, authentically mythico-ritual, meaning of this tale; it probably sounded to them simply as a nice example of pietas towards the angel and of national heroism by Thrašaṭō̄na.

Pre-Islamic Iranian Thought

But there are also other myths, utilized exactly like this and in similar contexts, of a purely theologic-symbolical origin. For instance, there is the myth of Vishtāspa who frees the chained Daēna, told always with the same emblematical conciseness in the Farārdin Yashī. This Yashī is chiefly a list of fravashis (see below) or holy men, to whom the believer offers sacrifices. The enterprises of some of these holy men are narrated here in order to encourage the worshipper to offer sacrifice to their respective fravashi. Concerning the fravashi of Vishtāspa, the king who protected Zarathustra, accepted his religion (Daēna), and spread it, the hymn says:

"We worship the fravashi of the holy king Vishtāspa; the gallant one, who was the incarnate Word, the mighty-spear-ed and lordly one; who, driving the Druj before him, sought wide room for the holy Daēna . . . ; who made himself the arm and support of this law of Ahura, the law of Zarathustra. We took her (i.e., the Daēna, or Religion) standing bound from the hands of the Fomaus, and established her to sit in the middle (of the world), high ruling, never falling back, holy, nourished with plenty of cattle and pastures, blessed with plenty of cattle and pastures."

Here we see, contrary to the former instance, a myth germinating from history. The process of mythicization has reached a very advanced stage, but not so advanced as to render it impossible to recognize the historical materials that lie at the basis of a myth. First of all, a Daēna means "Religion," in a quasi-personified sense; secondly, the fact-myth is connected with the work of the Prophet Zarathustra and that of the holy King Vishtāspa. But it is highly interesting to note that the attributes attached to his name are the same as those of the angel Saraḵša of which Vishtāspa is, in a sense, the terrestrial emblem, in the same way as Zarathustra is the terrestrial symbol of Ahura Mazda. We notice here an important moment of the passage from history to myth in Mazdaism and also, at the same time, an important aspect of the Mazdaic approach to myth and reality. Mazdaic thought, while denaturalizing and ethicizing naturalistic myths, embodies historical events, in semi-mythical persons, and in so doing "angelizes" history. We are in the presence of a "visionary" theology-philosophy, in which intellectual entities assume personal forms, moving in an intermediate world of vision (probably a heritage of the mystical experiences of the Founder) so organized as to give a characteristic unitarian savour to the whole Mazdaic thought.

2. Angelism

Once the mythical logic of Mazdaism has been understood, we can proceed to the study of some of the most significant details of the Mazdaic Weltanschauung. The first key to open its shrines is that, in Mazdaic thought, the Absolute is a personal God, the Wise Lord Ahura Mazda, a God that reminds

---

2 Yst., 5. 33 ff.
3 Ibid., 13. 99-100.
4 Ibid., 11. 23.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

us of the Biblical and Qur’ānic God. But His attributes are not (be they eternal or created) intelligible concepts; rather they are themselves “persons” or “angels.” Professor Corbin rightly remarks that the Mazdean, instead of putting to himself the questions: “What is Time? What is Earth? What is Water?”, asks: “Who is Time? Who is Earth? Who is Water?” And so we find in Mazdaic texts that Time is a Youth of fifteen, Earth is the Archangel Spenta Armaítī (the Holy Piety), Water is the beautiful goddess-angel Ardvī Sūra Anāhita. The problem lies in rightly interpreting the verb is: in which sense are these images of vision what they represent? Certainly they are not angels in the Biblical and the Qur’ānic sense of mere messengers or servants of God; Corbin compares them rightly with the dī-angeli of Proclus.

The Zāmpīd Yāshaḥ, speaking of the six Amēsha Spentās, sings thus:4 “...the Amēsha Spentās, the bright ones, whose looks perform their wish, tall, quickly coming to do, strong, and lordly, who are undecaying and holy; who are all seven (their seventh is Ahūra Mazda himself) of one thought; who are all seven of one speech, who are all seven of one deed; whose thought is the same, whose speech is the same, whose father and commander is the same, namely the Maker, Ahūra Mazda; who see one another’s soul thinking of good thoughts, thinking of good words, thinking of good deeds, thinking of Garōmāna (the supreme paradise, ‘house of the hymns’), and whose ways are shining as they go down to the libations; who are the makers and governors, the shapers and overseers, the keepers and preservers of these creations of Ahūra Mazda. It is they who shall restore the world, which will thenceforth never grow old and never die, will become never decaying, never rotting, ever living, ever increasing, and master of its wish, when the dead will rise, when life and immortality will come, and the world will be restored at its wish...”

Here it seems that the Amēsha Spentās play a role not very dissimilar to that of the “persons” of the Christian Trinity. It is remarkable that they are six, but are called seven. Ahūra Mazda himself being the seventh. This concept of Ahūra Mazda adding himself as the last to every hierarchical series of beings is often found in Mazdaic books. In order to understand it we must remember a sentence in the first chapter of Bundahishn:5 “For Ohrmazd is both spiritual and material,” or, according to other translations: “For Ohrmazd both creations are celestial”; in other words, everything is, for him, in transcendent, celestial stage. God can descend into all the stages of Being, eternally First and Last of every embodied or disembodied hierarchy, because, sub specie Dei, everything is transcendent and celestial and this descent can in no way “contaminate” Him.

But these six Amēsha Spentās are also the archangelic emblem-personification of the primordial elements: Earth (Spenta Ārmaítī), Cattle (Vohu Manah), Fire (Asha), Metals (Khshathra), Water (Haurvatāt), Plants (Ameratāt).

Pre-Islamic Iranian Thought

They are the elements not as allegories of them, but as living personal symbols, as “Lords of the Species.” The concept of Ratu, Lord of the Species, is present everywhere in Mazdaic books. The Lord of the Species “Woman” is, for instance, the mythico-historical Daēna, “religion”; the Lord of the Species “Bird” is the mythical bird Saēna meregha, or in modern Persian siyahr. The theological abstractions that presented themselves to the philosophico-ecstatic mind of the Prophet Zarathustra in a period in which a transformation of the mythico-theological concepts into pure philosophy was premature, assumed the plastic life of the gods of the former naturalistic pantheon. Holy Piousness, for example, came to be the Earth instead of remaining an abstractly pure intellectual form. Or, better, it did not come to be in the historical sense of the expression, but was probably already so double-faced in the mind of the Prophet, the historical Zarathustra or some other prophet, whose personal mystical experience is fundamental to the understanding of this as of all other concepts. The connection of the Amēsha Spentās with their natural kingdoms is already retraceable in the Gāthās. In 71.31.9 Ārmaiti is seen as specially favouring the earth’s tiller. A verse after, the thrifty tiller in the fields is called one “who nourisheth Vohu Manah (“the Good Thought”—the Cattle), while in v. 21 Ahūra Mazda will give “the fat of Good Thought (Cattle)” to him who is His friend. But in the same Gāthās we often hear that Ahūra Mazda created the world through Good Thought, which in these contexts seems to have nothing to do with cattle. Whatever the historical origins of these angelic-symboical identifications may have been, the fact remains that they had the highly important function of transfiguring the elements of nature into ethical values. Or, to put it better, there is an exchange of functions: natural elements are coloured with ethos, and ethical values live a cosmic life. This is one of the most typical features of Mazdeism.

The Supreme God of Mazdeism has further interesting aspects that make him rather different from the God of classical monotheisms. He is, for instance, situated in a sort of transcendent Time and Space,8 Boundless Time and Space-Light, or Uncreated Light (but the word for Space, gas, could be also mythologically interpreted as “throne”). There is, in other words, a time-tension in God. But the student of Mazdeism becomes even more astonished when he comes to know that Ahūra Mazda has got a soul, or better a fravashti. As the idea of soul is a specially interesting aspect of Mazdean thought, we shall treat it here as a particular case of Mazdean “angelism.”

In Mazdaic anthropology, according to Bundahishn,9 man was “fashioned in five parts—body (tan), soul (jān), spirit (ruvān), prototype (adhavēnāk) and fravashti. Body is the material part; soul, that which is connected with the wind—the inhaling and exhaling of breath; spirit, that which with consciousness in the body hears, sees, speaks and knows; the prototype is that which is

---

5 Corbin, op. cit., p. 99.
6 Yt., 19. 15–20.
7 Bundahishn, I. 32.
8 Cf. Bundahishn, I. 2.
9 Ibid., III. 11.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

situated in the station of the Sun; the *fravashi* is that which is in the presence of Ohrmazd, the Lord. He was created in this fashion because, during the period of the assault of the Aggressor, men die, their bodies rejoin the earth, their souls the wind, their prototypes the Sun, their spirits the *fravashi*, so that the demons could not destroy the spirit.* This is what happens during the period of the “Assault” or of the Mixture (*gumāčīškast*) of the good and evil creations. At the end of this world, however, a real resurrection of the body will take place: the dead will be “reconstructed” (*rist vīrāst*). The Saviour (born from Zarathustra’s miraculously preserved sperm) will perform a sacrifice (*gāzish*) in which the bull Hatāyēh will be killed, and from his fat and the white Hāūma the ambrosia (*anōsh*) will be prepared. All men will drink it and become immortal.

A pure concept of the “immortality of the soul,” in the Greek sense of the term, seems extraneous to Mazdaic thought. Every (good) man is already an angel, *fravashi*, eternally in the presence of Ahura Mazda; resurrection of the body too is not exactly identical with the same idea in Christian and Muslim tradition, for it happens in a moment which is not, properly speaking, a historical moment, but the epoch of *frashō-kereti* (Phl. *frashkart*) which is no more in Finite Time but in Boundless Time. The metaphysical peculiarity of this epoch is also clearly shown by the immolation of the Bull, otherwise in “normal time, a horrible sin for Mazdaism.”

While the first three parts of the human compound do not need any explanation, we have to consider here the two concepts of prototype (*adēvēnak*) and *fravashi*. The former is the heritage of an older astro-biological idea, common also in India, according to which the prototypical soul of the different categories of beings is preserved in the heavenly bodies. The race-type of Cattle is preserved, for instance, in the moon (*minuhrō*, “having the form of Kine,” is an Avestic name for the moon), and that of Plants in the stars.¹⁰ Deeper and more easily interpretable in an ethical and philosophical way is the concept of *fravashi*. This term does not appear in the Gāthās (which also ignore *adēvēnak*, Mazdaized afterwards), but in the so-called “more recent” parts of the Avesta it has already become the aspect that will remain fixed in the Pahlavi tradition. It is clearly kept distinct from “soul” in passages like Yt. 26.7, and it seems that, at least in the beginning, only heroes had been considered to be having a *fravashi*. Bailey’s researches have demonstrated that the idea of *fravashi* is associated with “the defensive power emanating from a hero, even after his death.” This originally aristocratic idea suffered a process of democratization in the course of time: every (righteous) man thus got his *fravashi*, whose protective and defensive force is exerted not only in his favour, but in favour of all those who invoke her. The “*fravashi* of the Righteous” are seen as protectors of specially sacred places, of the mythical lake or sea (*Vouru-kashā*, of the white Hāūma, which we saw as an important ingredient of future ambrosia, of Zarathustra’s semen from which the future Saviours will be born, etc. In their function as welcomers of the righteous souls after death they remind us of the Germanic *Volkyrs*. But the *fravashis* are also something more. In a passage of Avesta we read: “And these we present hereby to the *fravashi* of Zarathustra Spītama, the saint, for sacrifice, propitiation, and praise, and to those of the people who love Righteousness, with all the holy *fravashis* of the saints who are dead and who are living, and to those of men who are yet unborn, and to those of the prophets who will serve us, and will labour to complete the progress and renovation of the world.”

*Fravashis* are, *already now*, real angelic doublets of the pious and good men, past, present, and future. Also the living seem to have already a *fravashi* in a sense slightly similar to but not at all identical with the “Guardian Angel” of the Christian tradition. But there is even more: we saw that Zarathustra, the Prophet, the “terrestrial God” as he is called in some parts of Avesta, has his *fravashi*, and this is obvious. However, it may seem strange to a rationalistic mind that the Archangels and even Ahura Mazda Himself have their *fravashis*. In Vendidad 19.46–48 Zarathustra is invited to invoke the *fravashi* of Ahura Mazda. This fascinating idea seems to assume a doublet of God Himself in a further hyper-transcendent dimension of Being; but, as is often the case with many original and highly interesting Mazdaic terms and concepts, this idea is mentioned as if by chance and is soon dropped, without any interpretation or comment.

These angelic doublets of the Good are also symbols of Free Choice (see also below). According to a typically Mazdaic myth—*theologoumenon* preserved in Bundahishn,¹² at the beginning of the millennia of the period of “Mixture” (*gumāčīškast*), Ahura Mazda asked the *fravashis* whether they preferred to remain untouched by and protected from every danger in the invisible, transcendent world or whether they were ready to descend and incarnate themselves in the visible material world in order to struggle with Evil. The *fravashis* accepted the second alternative. In this way a sort of de-doubling happened: *now*, in this material world the real man is his *fravashi*, his angelic ego, that is at the same time his destiny and his true transcendent self; the moral responsibility of man is, in a sense, “transcendentized.” Sin becomes equivalent to the treason of an angel. Metaphysically, every discussion on the existence of soul, etc., is rendered useless by this acceptance of the experienced fact of apriority of angel over man.

We said that the Gāthās do not mention the term *fravashi*. But they contain another idea that certainly contributed to give a new and ethical meaning to the (probably pre-Zarathustrian) heroic myth of the *Volkyr-fravashi*. We mean the idea of Dānā (*Phl. dēn*). This term has been etymologically analyzed in the most discordant ways by philologists, looking for a semantic explanation.

---

¹⁰ Cf. Yt., 12.

¹² Bund., 3. 5–6.
which may give reason for the double meaning of the word: “religion” a a “deep soul,” or better angelic personification of human deeds. Here are some interesting Gāthic passages containing the term Daēnā:

“He who renders the Saint deceived, for him shall later be destruction: long life shall be his lot in the darkness; soul shall be his food; his speech shall be of the lowest. This is the life, O ye vile! to which your deeds and your Daēnā will bring you!”

“Yea, I will declare the world’s two first spirits, of whom the more bountiful thus spake to the harmful: Neither our thoughts, nor our commands, nor our understandings, nor our beliefs, nor our deeds, nor our Daēnās, nor our souls are at one.”

“But their (of the Evil ones) souls and their daēnās will groan when they will approach the Chinvat Bridge. . . .”

“Declare to me, O Ahura, that path of the Good Thought where the Daēnā of the Saviours, i.e., their good works (ya kurestā), will taste the joys of Righteousness. . . .”

A later text of Avesta, the Hadekh Naskā tells of the righteous soul meeting, after death, his Daēnā in the form of a beautiful girl of fifteen; here we see again the mytho-poetic tendency of Mazdaic thought, making of every intelligible entity an angel.

If we examine the above-quoted passages we shall see that in all of them we could freely translate Daēnā as “religious works,” ethical acts metaphysically considered. The fact that these acts “groan” is not at all astonishing, if we remember the easiness with which Mazdaeans personify ideas. This explains also how a fravaeshi has been attributed to Ahura Mazdāh himself. Ahura Mazdāh has indeed a Daēnā in the Gāthās; in Bundahishn19 “omniscience and goodness,” i.e., supreme religious actions, are called Ahura Mazdāh’s den (Daēnā, “religion”). The primary sense of Daēnā seems to be ethics-religious. It is “religious acting” that (as is the case in quite a different mental environment with the Hindu karma) creates a body, is representable visibly, and for Ahura Mazdāh is His light20 and for man his angel of light. As pointed out by Pagliano, it was this Zoroastrian Daēnā that modified the warrior fravashis (Dumezil) into ethical angels. And it is in our opinion especially the myth of choice that gave also Ahura Mazdāh a fravashi. In which sense is Ahura Mazdāh so similar to the righteous man as to have Himself a fravashi? Chiefly in the sense that Ahura Mazdāh also made a choice. Of the two primordial Spirits—say the Gāthās—“the most holy Spirit chose the Truth.”

This sense of angelic ethos has thus produced one of the deepest ideas of Mazdāism, the image of the “soul-angel-soul-yer-religious work.”

3. The Double Dualism

Choice, the central ethical concept of Mazdāism, is a choice between two. This leads us to examine the radical dualism that, according to many, is the basic idea of this religious philosophy. According to a Gāthic passage,22 “the two primordial Spirits that, in deep sleep, were heard as Twins, are the Excellent and the Evil, in thoughts, words, and deeds; and between these two the wise, not the foolish, have made their choice. . . . And when these two Spirits met, they first established Life and Non-Life and (they decided) that, at the end, the worst existence would be that of the followers of Lie, and the best spiritual force (Manah) would be that of the followers of Truth. Between these two Spirits the followers of the Druj chose the acting of the Worst One, but the Most Holy Spirit, who covers himself with the firm stones of heaven as his robes, chose the Truth, and those who desired to satisfy Ahura Mazdāh through righteous actions did the same.”

Good and evil are thus connected with an ethical choice, even if it seems that in the ancient parts of Avesta, the Holy Spirit is not exactly identical with Ahura Mazdāh but is probably Ahura Mazdāh in His choosing, “acting” aspect. Another point that shows the typical ethicalism of Zarathushtrian dualism is the name, “Lie,” attributed to the evil principle. But in Gāthic thought the evil beings and the Evil Spirit are not “fallen creatures” of God, as in the classical monotheism. They are beings of a purely negative and destructive nature, which it would be absurd to think of as having been created by a good God, and the final destiny of which seems to be that of being reduced to nothing. Ahriman, in a later Pahlavi catechism (Pandnāmak-i Zartosht), is—if the translation is correct—“a being who does not exist, who received nothing in himself,” and the same is endowed in Bundahishn with the strange quality pao-bauvishen (“post-existence,” as opposed to the positive “pre-existence” of Ahura Mazdāh).

This ethos is, however—and here is again the typical feature of Mazdaic thought—strongly “cosmicized”: Goodness means, above all, promotion of Being, Life, and agriculture. It means “growth” (a word often used in the Mazdaic texts) of good material existence too. “Righteousness, the Bundahishn says openly, obeys the same rules as (cosmic) Creation.”23 Ethos means also material positiveness. The evil people (we often hear, in Mazdaic texts, curses against the nomads, the non-producers, and the killers of cattle) are, above all, the destroyers of existence.

13 Yt., 31. 20.
14 Ibid., 46. 11.
15 Ibid., 46. 11.
16 Ibid., 34. 13.
17 Ibid., 229.
18 Ibid., 46. 11.
19 Bund., I. 2.
20 Ibid.
21 Yt., 30. 5.
22 Ibid., 30. 3 f.
23 Bund., I. 22.
We can now better understand the second type of dualism, a dualism now not of choice but of transcendence between the invisible (or celestial) mênôk, and the visible (or terrestrial) gêlik; for God creates the terrestrial world to protect, foster, or help (adhyârâ) the celestial world, which is, in a way, its prototype, its root (bun). This dualism is, however, radically different from the Platonic dualism. A very instructive passage of one of the most philosophical treatises of Mazdaism, the Shikand Gâmânîk Vîchâr, written in the third/ninth century, 24 will show this difference in a very clear way.

"The gêlik is the fruit (bar) of mênôk; mênôk is its root (bun). . . . The fact that gêlik is the fruit and mênôk its root becomes clear when one realizes that every visible and tangible thing passes from invisibility to visibility. It is already well known that man and the other visible and tangible creatures come from the invisible and intangible mênôk; in the same way, the form, the species, and the height and the breadth of a being are the same as those of the being that generated it; the body of man and other creatures, which is now manifested, was hidden and invisible in the semen that came from his parents; the semen itself, that was in the loins of the parents, passed to the stage of manifestation, visibility, and tangibility. We can therefore know by certainty that this visible and tangible gêlik has been created from an invisible and intangible mênôk, and there is no doubt that it will come back from visibility and tangibility to the invisibility and intangibility of the same mênôk.

We see from this passage that this Mazdaean dualism differs from the Platonic and Gnostic dualism chiefly in the sense that for it matter and the world are in no way an "inferior" stage of Being. On the contrary, Matter is, in a sense, the most mature and perfect aspect (the fruit) of Spirit. It differs, however, also from the views implied by too simple a creationistic monotheism inasmuch as it seems to admit not only "one" personal God and His immediate creation, but various stages of Being.

Regarding the first point we refer the reader to a text 25 in which it is clearly stated that the terrestrial world (gêlik) is higher in dignity than paradise (vakhsht), because it is in this terrestrial, embodied, visible, and tangible world only that the battle against the powers of Evil can be fought and won—a struggle that makes it possible for the soul “to strive with his thought (âhang-mênôsh) towards Beatitute.” One of the most important miraculous deeds accomplished by the Prophet Zarathustra was that of breaking the bodily forms (shikastan-i kâlpât) of the Devils. Without their bodies the Devils are less perfect and less dangerous in their struggle. And here we find again the fundamentally ethical or rather cosmic-ethical function of the gêlik-mênôk dualism. Matter is useful in the struggle against Evil.

Regarding the second point, let us remember that in the first chapter of Bundahishn, which contains one of the most detailed accounts of the double

creation of the world, the Mazdaean vision seems to involve various stages of creation, the highest of which are prototypical, emblematical. Even from some passages of the Gâthas it may appear that God created first the prototypes of things, the Primordial Ox, the Protoanthropos, the Plant, etc.

Coming back to the last sentence of the above-quoted passages of Shikand-Gâmânîk Vîchâr, we see how this life of positive struggle in the material world blossomed forth from the celestial world in a cycle that is at the end destined to be reabsorbed into the celestial and invisible stage, once its ethical task has been fulfilled. Thus it seems that even the first dualism, that between Good and Evil, will become a monism again at the consummation of Time. Here we come to the idea of Time and Cycle as the instrument of a victorious struggle.

4. Time and Cycle

With regard to the question of Time also the Mazdaean thought shows an originality of conception that distinguishes it both from the Indiaen outlook assuming "flight from Time" as supreme salvation and beatitude, and from the classical Semitic forms of monotheism by which Time seems to be conceived as an irreversible "line." In order never to forget the peculiar "angelical" character of Mazdaism, the reader is reminded that in Bundahishn 26 Time is an angelic person, a youth of fifteen, "bright, with white eyes, tall and mighty, whose might is from valour, not from robbery and violence." In other words, the Mazdaean, in order to understand Time, did not intellectually "discuss" it as we do (that is why European scholars rather anachronistically find so many "contradictions" in the Mazdaic texts referring to Time) but rather experimented with it in vision. And this vision shows them what is told in the first chapter of the same theological book 27

"Thus it is revealed in the Good Religion. Ohmrazd was on high in omniscience and goodness: for Infinite Time He was ever in the Light. Omniscience and Light are the robes of Ohmrazd: some call them "religion" (dên, see above). . . . The Time of the robes is infinite like Ohmrazd, and Goodness and Religion, during all the time of Ohmrazd, were, are and will be—Ahriman, slow in knowledge, whose will is to smite, was deep down in the darkness: (he was) and is, yet will not be. The will to smite is his robe, and darkness is his place: some call it the Endless Darkness." 28

The cosmic drama unfolds itself in a Time and in a Space, but Ahrimanic time is composed of only two moments, past and present. Time and Space have also a transcendent aspect. Transcendent Time is the so-called "Boundless Time" (zamân-i abandarâk) or "Time of the Long Dominion" (zamân-i dêrang-khvatât). Time (not of course our "serial" time) exists even in the heart of the Absolute. There is not, in Mazdaean thought, too simple a contrast between

24 P. J. de Menasse, Ed., p. 92-94.
26 Bund., III. 3.
27 Ibid., I. 2 ff.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Time and Eternity. But let us continue our reading and see the “aim” of our serial time. Ohrmazd creates first a purely transcendent prototypical creation. Ahraman rises from the depths, sees it, and rushes forward to smite and destroy it. When Ohrmazd sees that struggle is unavoidable, He says to Himself: “If I do not fix a time for battle against him, then Ahraman could do to my creation even as he threatened, and the struggle and the mixture will be everlasting; and Ahraman could settle in the mixed state of creation and take it to himself.” And “Ohrmazd said to the Destructive Spirit: ‘Fix a time, so that by this pace we may extend the battle for nine thousand years.’ For He knows that by fixing a time in this way the Destructive Spirit would be made powerless. Then the Destructive Spirit, not seeing the end, agreed to that treaty, just as two men who fight a duel fix a term saying: ‘Let us on such a day do battle till night falls.’ This too did Ohrmazd know in His omniscience that within these nine thousand years, three thousand would pass entirely according to the will of Ohrmazd, three thousand years in mixture would pass according to the will of both Ohrmazd and Ahraman, and that in the last battle the Destructive Spirit would be made powerless and that He Himself would save creation from aggression.”

Limited time, i.e., serial time (during 9,000 years), is then conceived in an ethical light, just like the material world in which it is manifested. Serial time is something like a great detour, an ample digression from Infinite Time, but a substantially positive detour, because its aim is to render the battle against Evil possible and successful. Hence come some important consequences.

(a) Destiny.—If Time is a “youth” and if, as it is said in another text, the creator Ohrmazd dyed Time with colour, “time cannot be an a priori form in the Kantian sense. Time is objectively coloured; it can be practically identified with “destiny” (bakhš, assigned lot). Some Mazdaic texts as, for example, the beautiful myth of the choice of the fravashis already mentioned, seem favourable to free-will, some others seem in favour of predestination. Apart from the problems connected with the historical formation of these ideas, we must say that Mazdaic theology solves the problem in a rather consequential way. Pahlavi Vendidad (5. 9. 33) maintains that “in the material world everything happens according to destiny (pat bakhš), whereas in the celestial world everything is according to free action (pat kumishn).” This solution of the problem of time is indeed a consequence of the angelic, emblems, and outcome of Mazdaism. Destiny is no more than the visible, terrestrial, āstān aspect of Mazdaism. Destiny is more than the visible, terrestrial, āstān aspect. Moreover, in all this a part is also played by the Ohrmazd-Ahraman duality, in the sense that Ahraman, through the creation of the seven accursed planets (these are for Mazdaic evil entities, while the fixed stars, and especially the Zodiacal signs are good, and called “the generals of Ohrmazd”), inserts him-

Pre-Islamic Iranian Thought

self into the play, trying to change the temporal destinies of men and of the world. In this he succeeds, however, only temporarily. And there is still another interesting concept, that of baghš-bakhš or portion allotted by the gods (divine destiny), a “supplement,” as it were, of destiny, added to that initially established (or, to put it better, added to the terrestrial emblem of transcendent human freedom) in order to recompense specially meritorious actions. “But the gods, we read in the above-mentioned texts, rarely concede that supplement of destiny, and they manifest it only in the celestial world,” in order to avoid a possible destruction of it by Ahraman’s forces, if it is manifested visibly in the āstān. We must never forget that transcendent entities can struggle, and win and lose, only through their incarnation in the visible world.

It is, however, obvious that such an approach to the problem of destiny and free-will results in a fatalism even more radical than that reproach by some in the classical monotheistic religions. This is true especially when we think that some theological schools of Mazdaism, e.g., Zorvanism, maintain that both gods, Ohrmazd and Ahraman, are subject to Time’s power of destiny. Time (Zurvan) is regarded as supreme God; and even Ohrmazd is taken to have created the world “with the approval of Infinite Time” (pat āfrin-i zamān-i akhraw).

(b) The Apocatastasis.—When we consider limited Time to be a detour, a digression from transcendent Infinite Time, we are able to understand better the idea of the “cosmic cycle” typical of Mazdaism. Reading theological Mazdaic texts, one is impressed by a tendency to connect the facts and happenings of the proto-history with those of the end of the world. The Heroes who will contribute to the creation of the “Future Body” (tan-i pazīn) are the same Heroes as, at the dawn of existence, were the protagonists of the myth of the Beginning. The Saviour, or, better, the three eschatological Saviours are sons of the first Reveler of the Faith, Zarathustra. They are practically Zarathustra himself. To justify the enormous distance in time, there is the myth of Zarathustra’s sperm miraculously preserved in a lake, protected by the fravashis. The beginning is the end. There is, in the limited, serial time, a circle leading it fatally towards Infinite Time. Gayomart, the first Man, the Protoanthepe, will also be the first Resurrected man; the ancient hero Yamshīt (Mod. Pers. Jamshīd) has already prepared, at the beginnings of history, the mythical Ark (var) to save men from the terrible trials of the End. Past and Future seem united in an eternal Present, if seen sub specie mēnōk. The Apocaustasis is, transcendentally (mēnōkikā), happening already (and sometimes we find in these theological texts future events told by verbs in the past). Serial time is like an immense “delay” from metaphysical Time, but there is in it a positive curving towards the Origin. All events of this period of “delay” are eschatologically justified. The ancient victory of Sahm, the
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Hero, on certain demonic monsters is explained as necessary, because, without it, "it would have been impossible to fulfil Resurrection and Future Life." It is, however, interesting to remark that the tan-i pašên, the "Future Body" or Future Life, is, though in a transcendent form, a real body, and—at least judging by some texts—the renewed world will not be a mere re-identification with the first stage of the prototypical mënûk creation, when it was "without thought, without touch, without movement in a moist stage like the semen." On the contrary, the idea of the positivity of time, and that of the semen, presence of an "Infinite Time" even in Eternity, seems to confer a colour of novelty and true Life to the new world, prepared by the struggling experience of the embodied creatures. It would be, however, too risky to proceed in these considerations further; for, as mentioned before, the Mazdaic texts too often leave the reader in the expectation of something that never comes. A really leave the reader in the expectation of something that never comes. A really

(c) Ethics.—We have not to fix our ideas on the chivalrous ethics of the struggle situated in Time. This struggle, like that of "two men who fight a duel," is a free one, one in which man can always succumb; but just because Time is also an angel, the struggle is coloured with a metaphysical, supreme, engagement. It transcends everyday's secular ethics. The metaphysico-ethical responsibility of the Mazdean is such that he can pray in the words of the Gathas: "May we be such as those who will bring about the Transfiguration of the World." At the same time, however, and for the same reasons, Mazdean ethics, rooted as it is in an objective Time, is a greatly heteronomous one. This causes it to be different not only from our modern autonomous ethics, but also from the purely theonomous ethics of the classical forms of monotheism. Mazdean ethics is still strictly connected with semi-mythical realities and with a moral dualism always in danger of transforming itself into a cosmological dualism. In other words, Good and Evil mean to the Mazdean something more than what they mean to us. There is an entire series of situations and objects (Time is dyed with colour) intrinsically evil, Ahrimanic. We deduce from passages in Mazdean Scriptures that not only the nomad is naturally evil, but also the non-Iranian (anérân) is something objectively evil in comparison with the Iranian; insects and snakes are evil and so on. The idea that the natural essence (pökr) of certain given beings is radically and metaphysically diabolical is very clear from the texts, and even some characters of history, diabolical is very clear from the texts, and even some characters of history, such as Alexander the Great and Frasiyak the Turanian are no more than such as Alexander the Great and Frasiyak the Turanian are no more than

Pre-Islamic Iranian Thought

the creation of Ahura Mazda during the period of "Mixture" has been solved by Mazdeans in a rather heavy, objective, classificatory way.

There have been, however, acute minds that started to meditate on the origina of that Evil which the traditional Mazdeic texts gave as an unexplained presupposition, or rather considered it a fact not needing any explanation. So was born Zurvanism, a theologico-philosophical school, that is considered by some European Orientalists to be a real autonomous religion. To solve the problem of the origin of Evil, Mazdean mind again created a myth: that of the primordial "doubt" of the Time-God (Zurvan), a doubt from which Ahriman was born, as a wicked "twin" of Ohrmazd. This school seems also to have shown a tendency, at least according to recent studies, to unify and symmetrize the two dualisms already mentioned, in the sense that the material world, the realm of the flesh, begins to be identified with the Ahrimanic creation. This remained only a very vague tendency in Zurvanism, but the identification, quite in the spirit of Gnosticism, was totally accomplished by Manichaism, in the Iranian texts in which Zurvan is the name of the Supreme God, while Ohrmazd passes to the stage of Protoanthropos. But such an identification completely breaks the frame and organism of Mazdean thought, that has always considered Manichaism to be the most dangerous and most Ahrimanic heresy.

5. Conclusion

We have studied in too rapid and perhaps too unphilosophical a way, the mythical logic, the dualistic and angelical metaphysics, the chivalrous and fatalistic ethics of Mazdaisms. It is now necessary to say a word on the importance of this thought for the development of the subsequent phases of the philosophical history of Iran and Islam. Those who know the strange and highly interesting world of Muslim "heresies" cannot deny that some features of their theological systems strongly remind us of the Mazdeic Weltanschauung. We mean, above all, their curious angelical approach to metaphysics, their tendency to recreate a purely "mental" mythology, identifying, e.g., the first intellect or Logos with this or that historical person, or telling, as the Quaipres do, that 'Ali is the Ma'na (Supreme Meaning) and Muhammad is the Ism (Transcendent Name), etc.

Professor Corbin demonstrated in his remarkable essays the influence of Pre-Islamic Iranian thought on Muslim thinkers like Suhrawardi Maqûl and on Isma'îlism, but his contempt of history and historical method seems rather exaggerated. It is indeed very difficult to identify the historical channels through which these influences may have penetrated Islam. Many seem, however, to forget that the most important Pahlavi theological texts were written in Muslim Persia in the most flourishing period of Islam and that discussions among Muslims, Christians, Manichaens, and Mazdeans are documented in the third/ninth century at the Court of the Caliph al-Mamün. The influences

32 Ibid., Ch. XXVII.
33 Bund., I.
34 Z., 30. 9.
35 History, as it is obvious from the Mazdean's point of view, becomes the emblematical prelude to Apocalypsis and at the same time the symbol of a transcendent pugilistic prototype.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

seem to have been mutual, for it has been shown that some Pahlavi texts contain quotations from the Qur’an and mention contemporary Muslim currents of thought such as that of the Mu'tazilah.25

But apart from this direct influence, we could surely admit another kind of indirect convergence. The late systematic Mazdaic thought was no doubt influenced by late Hellenism and Gnosticism, in the same way as the first Islamic thought was influenced by Hellenism, Sabaeanism, and Gnosticism during the second and third/eighth and ninth centuries. Hence there resulted, in both the spiritual worlds, a similar functioning that can give the illusion of direct influence, especially when similar languages, Pahlavi and modern Persian, are used.

If these considerations may seem to discourage the exaggerated enthusiasm of some pan-Iranianists (it is sufficiently known that even ancient Iran had been rather strongly "semitized" by Babylonian and old Syrian influences), they also point to the fact that the organic thought of Mazdaism assumed its truer and deeper historical value just because it did not retain the heritage of a single race or a single people, but, being in itself historically a composite product, synthesized itself with the seeds of the extremely original and rich philosophico-theological value, Islam, that was destined in its turn to spread them in their most mature form throughout the entire civilized world.

Note.—The quotations from Avesta and Pahlavi texts are given, modifying here and there some rather contradictory European versions, after comparing them with the original texts. The writer is fully aware of the fact that some of them remain personal and rather conjectural interpretations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

It would be useless to reproduce here a more or less complete bibliography of studies and essays related to Mazdaism. A sufficiently large and recent list of reference works is contained in J. Duchesne-Guillemin, The Western Responses to Zoroaster (Ratanbali Katran Lectures, 1950), Oxford, 1958.


25 Their name and their idea of the aslaq are mentioned and criticized in Shidak-Gumānīk Vichār, ed. Menasce, pp. 146–47.

Chapter IV

GREEK THOUGHT

A

THE EARLY BEGINNINGS

The thinking of the early Greeks, like that of all ancient peoples, Egyptians, Babylonians, Hittites, Phoenicians, and Indians, was more mythological and speculative, more poetical and theogonial than physical or metaphysical. It exhibited more the play of imagination than the working of reason. It is true that the basic effort of the Greeks, as of those other peoples, was to understand the origin and nature of things, but, like children, what they understood was a world of their own make-believe rather than the real world around them. They personified all elements of nature into powerful and immortal divinities, having the same desires, passions, and relationships as themselves, and endowed them with powers more or less proportionate to their magnitude. The sky, the earth, and the indeterminate space between them, the darkness under the earth, the ocean, river, or water supposed to encircle the earth, thunder and lightning, day and night, air and ether, love and soul, were all divinities respectively named as Ouranos, Gaia, Caos, Erebos, Oceanos, Zens, Day, Night, Air, Aether, Eros, and Psyche. Similarly, the lowest region below the earth was named Tartaros, the god of punishment, and the region above that, Hades, the god of the dead.

For Homer, all gods originated from Oceanos (water) and his sister and wife, Tethys. For Hesiod, in the beginning there was shapeless indeterminate space (Caos) containing the seeds of all things. From him sprang Night, the mother of sleep and subduer of all gods, and the darkness under Mother Earth (Erebos); and the couple produced Day and the upper reaches of space (Aether). Next came into being Mother Earth (Gaia) and love (Eros) the latter of which
rules the hearts of gods and men. Mother Earth then gave birth to Heaven (Ooranos) and then by mating with this son, she produced water (Okeanos). For the Orphics, Night was the first and from her came Heaven and Mother Earth.

Though Eros was produced at a very early stage, reproduction was not always the result of mating. For example, in Hesiodic cosmogony Caos produced Night and Erebus, and these two produced Ether and Day, and Gaia gave birth to Portos, either without mating or without sleeping with their mates. Similarly, in the Orphic account Kronos, the son of Sky (Ooranos), by a deceit as directed by his mother Earth (Gaia) hid himself in a place of ambush and when his father came along with Night and in desiring love spreaded himself over her, he sheared his genitals. The drops of blood that fell fertilized Gaia and generated the Furies, Giants, and the Melian Nymphs, and the blood that fell into the sea produced Aphrodite (Venus). This element like many other contents of Greek cosmogony is of pre-Greek origin for its variants are found in the cultures of the Hittites and the Hindus as well. From Kronos all other gods sprang. Zeus (Jupiter), the god of thunder and lightning, was one of his sons from his sister and consort Rhea. Apollo the sun-god, who with his horses and chariot sailed in the golden bowl round the streams of Okeanos, was the son of Zeus from Leto. Apollo’s sister Artemis, the hunting goddess, was the mistress of all wild things.

This rough account of the earliest Greek speculation from the dawn of Greek civilization, about 1200 B.C. down to the seventh century B.C., clearly indicates that it concerned itself with (i) the nature of things in the universe, (ii) the nature of gods, and (iii) the origin of the world and the gods. Therefore it can be described to be cosmological, theological, and cosmogonical. Its language was poetry.

B

GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN THE MAINLAND AND THE ISLANDS OF ASIA MINOR

Ionic Philosophy

It goes to the credit of the philosophers of Miletus, the metropolis of Ionia, a Greek colony in Asia Minor ruled by Persia, to have divested Greek thought of theogony and cosmogony and made the phenomena of nature and their origin their chief concern. Their thought was, however, more physical and cosmological than metaphysical. Each of them attempted to discover a single basic material from which everything sprung.

Thales.—The first of this group of thinkers was Thales (b. c. 640 B.C.) of Miletus, in Ionia which was a commercially developed Greek colony in Asia Minor and had close contacts with the relatively advanced peoples of Egypt and Babylon. He was a man of great practical wisdom and was one of the seven sages of antiquity. He is said to have visited Egypt and brought geometry from there; foretold solstices and an eclipse, presumably by studying the Babylonian records; measured the height of a pyramid by its shadow; turned the course of a river; and discovered the constellation Little Bear. According to him, the earth floated on water, magnet had life because it could move iron, water is the origin of all things, and all things are full of gods. How he came to these last two conclusions is not known now, nor was it known in antiquity, but the connection of his doctrine of water with Homeric Okeanos is evident. No one knows if he set down these ideas in writing, but if he did, no writing of his has survived.

Anaximander.—The second of these Milesean philosophers was Anaximander, a younger contemporary and disciple of Thales. He and a non-Milesean Pherecydes were the first two Greeks who wrote in prose. For him the first principle from which arose by eternal motion the heavens, the worlds, the divinities that encompass the earth—a cylindrically shaped centre of all these worlds—and all other things indeed, is an infinite, indeterminate, eternal, all-enfolding, and all-controlling stuff. From this indeterminate something are separated off the opposites, dry and moist, warm and cold, and these form nature with its separate elements (air, water, fire, and earth) and opposite qualities which are held in just balance by time.

A sphere of flame formed round the air surrounding the earth, like a bark round a tree, broke off into certain balls, thus forming the sun, the moon, and the stars. All living beings arose on the earth by gradual development out of the elementary moisture under the drying influence of heat. The first living being that appeared thus was a fish.

Anaximenes.—The third Ionian physician of Miletus was Anaximander’s disciple Anaximenes. He wrote just one book of which only one complete sentence has survived. The originary substance, according to him, is one, infinite, and not indefinite but definite. It is air which changes by condensation and rarefaction. In its finest form it is fire; in being made thicker, it becomes wind, then cloud, then water, then earth, and then stones; and the rest, things and gods, come into being from these. Hot and cold are also due to the same processes, the rarefied being hot and the condensed cold. The earth which is flat and round like a plate rides on air. The heaven is a vault that moves round the earth as a cap round the head. The heavenly bodies are fire raised on high, some fixed like nails in the crystalline vault, others moving like “fiery leaves.”

Heraclitus.—With another Ionian philosopher, Heraclitus, the problem of philosophy shifted from the nature of substance to that of change. His home was at Ephesus, one of the twelve cities of Ionia famous for their temples. He was in his prime in about 500 B.C. He is said to have written one book covering all knowledge, metaphysical, scientific, and political, and that in a style unparalleled in its brevity and difficulty of interpretation. This difficulty is embodied in a story that Euripides lent this book to Socrates who, when
A History of Muslim Philosophy

asked what he thought of it, replied, “Splendid what I have understood; also, I believe, what I have not understood—except that it needs a Delian diver.” Of this book only 139 fragments have survived out of which 13 are said to be doubtful and spurious. His influence in the history of philosophy cannot be over-estimated.

According to him, while things remain the same, they are yet not the same; they constantly change. In the same river we both step and do not step, for those who step in the same river have different waters flowing ever upon them. Thus, it is not possible to step twice in the same river or touch the same material substance twice. There is a perpetual change, a perpetual becoming in which being and not-being are harmonized. Even God changes.

The universe of change is eternal and everlasting. It is made by no man or god. Its basic substance is fire, which also steers all the changes according to law. There is an exchange—all things for fire and fire for all things, like goods for gold and gold for goods.

There is a Law of the universe that is common to all. It is the Law divine and nourishes all other laws. Though all things come into being according to this Law, most men are always incapable of understanding it. The soul has its own law which consists in growing according to the nature of its own seed. Everything issues from and goes back to the basic substance, fire, according to the law of necessity.

Fire kindles in measure and is quenched in measure. The sun will not transgress its measure; otherwise the Furies, ministers of Justice, will find him out.

Everything comes about also by way of strife, strife between opposites, between cold and hot, dry and wet. We are fundamentally the same whether we are alive or dead, awake or asleep, for the latter of each pair of opposites, having changed by strife, becomes the former and this again having changed becomes the latter. To souls it is death to become water, to water it is death to become earth. From earth comes water and from water soul. Water lives the death of air, air the death of fire, fire the death of earth, and earth the death of water.

That which differs with itself is in agreement; whatever is in opposition is in concert. From opposing tensions like that of the bow and the lyre arises the most beautiful harmony. God (Zeus) is day-night, winter-summer, warfare, satisfaction, famine. He changes like fire which when mingled with smoke of incense is named according to each man’s pleasure. He alone is wise.

Our knowledge is relative. Everything is known by its opposite. Disease makes health pleasant and good, hunger satisfaction, weariness rest. People would not know right if they did not know wrong. Moderation is the greatest virtue and wisdom is to speak the truth and to act according to nature. A dry soul is the wisest and best. Character, for man, is destiny. Absolute truth is known only to God for whom all things are beautiful, good, and just.

Heraclitus’ physics follows from his metaphysics. Fire is the basic material substance from which all things come and into which all things go, and this

cycle of creation and destruction goes on forever. Earth rarefied becomes water and water rarefied partly remains moist and partly gets akin to fire, and by this process the bright fiery parts become the stars, sun, and moon, and the darker parts, being near earth, form the fiery bodies that shine less brightly. The size of the sun is equal to the breadth of a man’s foot.

Greek Thought

In about 530 B.C. another centre of Greek speculation arose, and the problem of philosophy shifted from the nature of substance and change to the form and relation of things and permanence. Pythagoras of Samos, an Ionian island in the Aegean Sea off the west coast of Asia Minor, settled down in South Italy at Crotona, a Greek colony, where he formed a society with aims at once political, philosophical, and religious. Xenophanes, an Ionian thinker, who was in the prime of life in 530 B.C., migrated to Elea, a Greek settlement in South Italy. He and his pupil, Parmenides, and grand pupil, Zeno, formed what is generally known as the Eleatic school.

1. Pythagoras

Pythagoras was in the prime of life in 530 B.C. No written work was left by him, but there are references to him in Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Plato, and others. All teaching was done by him by word of mouth, because one of the rules imposed upon the members of the brotherhood founded by him—a rule equally binding on the master and the disciples—was that of secrecy, betrayal being punishable by excommunication.

He is said to have visited Egypt and Babylon—where he learnt the mathematical and religio-mystical elements of his philosophy. One of his chief doctrines was transmigration of the soul. His system had an element of asceticism based on taboos prohibiting the eating of beans, killing some kinds of animals for sacrifice and food, and wearing of woolen clothes at religious ceremonies. The school did a mass of work in mathematics, the mechanics of sound, and geometrical theorems, but it is difficult to say how much of this work went to Pythagoras himself. According to him, number was the First Principle and numbers and their relationships were the essence of all things. This idea made the Pythagoreans base their philosophy on mathematics. The original number was Monad, the Principle of Oneness, which was equated to Limit. They developed a dualistic cosmology founded on the pairs of opposites. These are: One-Two (Monad-Dyad), One being the principle of Limit imposing itself upon Two, the principle of the Unlimited ever-existing Void (empty space made of air or vapour), Odd-Even, One-Many, Right-Left, Male-Female, Rest-Motion, Straight-Curved, Light-Darkness, Good-Bad, and Square-Oblong. Things came into existence by the opposition of the Limiting and the
Unlimited and their harmony. From the Monad, the One or the Limiting, and the Dyad, the Unlimited, came the numbers and their relations, from the numbers came the points, from the points lines, from lines planes, from planes solids, and from solids the perceptible elements, fire, water, earth, air, each consisting of particles or atoms of different shapes. The One by working from within outward created all shapes and by the reverse process of drawing the Unlimited inward created the earth, the counter-earth, a body revolving once a day between the earth and the central fire, the planets, the sun, the moon, the stars, and everything they contained. Everything has a number, the central fire one, the earth two, the sun seven, and so on. Even immaterial substance like the soul and abstract qualities such as justice, courage, right, motion, etc., were assigned numbers.

The school very early saw the relations between the notes of the Octave and the length of the string and designated them as symphonies. The heavens are in harmony and in their motion they make music which Pythagoras alone was said to be able to hear.

2. The Eleatic School

Xenophanes.—The founder of the Eleatic school, Xenophanes, was a contemporary of Pythagoras. He was in the prime of his life in about 530 B.C. He condemned Homer and Hesiod for attributing to the gods all things that are shameful and a reproach to mankind: theft, adultery, and mutual deception. There is, according to him, one God among gods and men, the greatest, and He is not at all like mortals in body and mind. He remains permanently the same, not moving and undergoing change; and without toil He sets everything in motion, by the power of His thought.

Complete knowledge of gods, men, and things is impossible. No man has ever seen certain truth, nor will anyone ever see it. Whatever we can know, we know after long seeking.

Everything comes from earth and goes back to earth at last. Water also contributes to the being and growth of things. The sea is the source of clouds, winds, and rivers, and the sun moves about the earth and gives it warmth.

Parmenides.—Parmenides of Elea was a contemporary of Heraclitus and about twenty-five years his junior in age. He was Xenophanes’ disciple and also a Pythagorean as his teacher. His philosophy like that of his pupil Zeno’s was a reaction against the philosophy of Heraclitus. He took up Xenophanes’ idea of permanence and developed it by the help of rigorous logic. He gave expression to his thought in a poem addressed to his disciple, Zeno, who was his junior by about twenty-five years. In the prologue of this poem he allegorically relates how in the chariot of the senses, of which the wheels were the ears and steeds the eyes, he was carried to the place of the goddess Night and she revealed to him the way of truth and the way of opinion.

In the way of truth, he is told what reason (Logos) can think, exists; what it cannot think, does not exist. It is not thinkable that what-is-not is. Not-Being, therefore, does not exist and Being alone exists. If Being alone is, it follows that it does not come into being, for if it did, it would have to come from something which is Not-Being; but from Not-Being it could not come, for Not-Being does not exist. There being nothing besides it, nothing could bring it into being at one time rather than at another. It is therefore ever present. For it, there is no before and after. It is permanent and eternally continuous. As there is nothing besides it to bring it into being, there is nothing besides it to destroy it. It is one indivisible whole, for there is no Non-Being to lie between its parts. It is all alike. It is also motionless, for there is nothing besides it to move it and there is nothing in which it can move. It is limited, but why it is so is not explained. There being no Not-Being to stop it, it cannot be more or less in any direction. It is therefore a well-rounded sphere, complete on all sides.

The way of opinion is the way of untruth and false belief. The goddess shows it to him to enable him to guard himself against it. The beliefs mentioned in this connection as false are: the opposites of Light and Darkness are the First Causes; to be and not to be are the same; for everything there is a way of opposing stress; the moon shines with light borrowed from the sun; the sun and the moon were separated from the milky way; the earth is rooted in water—beliefs which were held by some of his predecessors and contemporaries.

Parmenides’ speculation involved four basic canons: (1) that Being not having sprung from Not-Being was itself ultimate, (2) that Void, being nonexistent, could not be, (3) that plurality could not come out of the primal Unity, (4) nor could motion and change. These canons were generally regarded as the last word on philosophy till the time of Plato who was the first to expose their fallacies.

Zeno.—Zeno of Elea wrote a book called Attack in defence of Parmenides’ theory of Being as One, indivisible, and permanent. His method was to take the opposite view and reduce it to absurdity by showing that it led to contradictory conclusions. This method, of which he himself was the originator, is called Reductio ad Absurdum. He first took up the proposition: Things are many, and then showed that they must be both finite and infinite. If they are many, they must be of a number; they are neither more nor less. If they are neither more nor less, they are finite. Again, if they are many, they must, on the other hand, be infinite, for there are always other things in between them, and again others between these and so on at infinity.

If things are many, they must be either without magnitude or with magnitude. If without magnitude, then if a thing is added to another thing there would be no addition in magnitude. The unit added is, therefore, infinitely small, as small as nothing. If anything has magnitude, it follows that part of it must also have magnitude and so the part preceding it, and the part that precedes the preceding one and so on at infinity. Therefore, it must be in finitely large.

80

Greek Thought

It cannot think, does not exist. It is not thinkable that what-is-not is. Not-Being, therefore, does not exist and Being alone exists. If Being alone is, it follows that it does not come into being, for if it did, it would have to come from something which is Not-Being; but from Not-Being it could not come, for Not-Being does not exist. There being nothing besides it, nothing could bring it into being at one time rather than at another. It is therefore ever present. For it, there is no before and after. It is permanent and eternally continuous. As there is nothing besides it to bring it into being, there is nothing besides it to destroy it. It is one indivisible whole, for there is no Non-Being to lie between its parts. It is all alike. It is also motionless, for there is nothing besides it to move it and there is nothing in which it can move. It is limited, but why it is so is not explained. There being no Not-Being to stop it, it cannot be more or less in any direction. It is therefore a well-rounded sphere, complete on all sides.

The way of opinion is the way of untruth and false belief. The goddess shows it to him to enable him to guard himself against it. The beliefs mentioned in this connection as false are: the opposites of Light and Darkness are the First Causes; to be and not to be are the same; for everything there is a way of opposing stress; the moon shines with light borrowed from the sun; the sun and the moon were separated from the milky way; the earth is rooted in water—beliefs which were held by some of his predecessors and contemporaries.

Parmenides’ speculation involved four basic canons: (1) that Being not having sprung from Not-Being was itself ultimate, (2) that Void, being nonexistent, could not be, (3) that plurality could not come out of the primal Unity, (4) nor could motion and change. These canons were generally regarded as the last word on philosophy till the time of Plato who was the first to expose their fallacies.

Zeno.—Zeno of Elea wrote a book called Attack in defence of Parmenides’ theory of Being as One, indivisible, and permanent. His method was to take the opposite view and reduce it to absurdity by showing that it led to contradictory conclusions. This method, of which he himself was the originator, is called Reductio ad Absurdum. He first took up the proposition: Things are many, and then showed that they must be both finite and infinite. If they are many, they must be of a number; they are neither more nor less. If they are neither more nor less, they are finite. Again, if they are many, they must, on the other hand, be infinite, for there are always other things in between them, and again others between these and so on at infinity.

If things are many, they must be either without magnitude or with magnitude. If without magnitude, then if a thing is added to another thing there would be no addition in magnitude. The unit added is, therefore, infinitely small, as small as nothing. If anything has magnitude, it follows that part of it must also have magnitude and so the part preceding it, and the part that precedes the preceding one and so on at infinity. Therefore, it must be in finitely large.

81
If a thing moves, it is neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not, but either alternative is impossible. If a thing is in a place, it is at rest. Nor can anything happen to a thing in a place where it is not.

If everything is in space, space is either something or nothing. If space is something, then space is itself in something and that something in something else and so on ad infinitum.

Zeno argued similarly against motion. In this connection he advanced four arguments: (1) You cannot traverse a given length, for to traverse it you must reach the half-way position and then the half-way position of the remaining half, and so on ad infinitum. Again, motion is impossible because it is impossible to pass through infinite positions in finite time. (2) If the tortoise is given a start, Achilles cannot catch up with it, for while he runs that distance, the tortoise will have got further, and so on ad infinitum. (3) If you shoot an arrow at a target, it cannot reach the target, because it has to pass through an infinite number of positions and that cannot be done in finite time. (4) Suppose there are three sets of solids A, B, and C: A at rest, B moving in one direction, and C moving in the opposite direction at equal speeds. Solids in B and C would pass one another twice as quickly as they pass those in A. Therefore equal speeds are at unequal speeds which is absurd.

These dilemmas of Zeno have puzzled the philosophers all through the ages, but the real solution has been found only in the physico-mathematical developments of modern times.

Melissus—Melissus of Samos was younger than Zeno by about ten years. He did not actually live in Elea or any other Greek part of South Italy, yet he belonged to the Eleatic school, because he accepted most of the views of Parmenides. He wrote a poem On Being some fragments of which have survived. According to him, Being or the One cannot come into being, and change, move, have pain or any multiplicity or divisibility. If Being had a beginning, it would have been from Not-Being, but nothing can come out of Not-Being. If Not-Being had an end, it cannot have an end, for if nothing can come out of Not-Being, nothing can go into Not-Being. Therefore, Being has been from eternity and is everlasting. There is no creation and no destruction. Being is also infinite in magnitude, for if limited, it must be limited by Not-Being which is impossible. In Being there is no change, for if Being altered, then what was before must have passed away or become Not-Being and what was not before, i.e., Not-Being, must have come into being which both are impossible. Therefore there is no rarefaction and no condensation. Being cannot move, for there is no Void for it to move into. Being cannot feel pain, for pain is felt through the addition or subtraction of something, i.e., by not remaining the same, but Being always remains the same.

3. Empedocles

Empedocles of Acragas, a town in Sicily and capital of the south-western province of Italy, was a contemporary of Zeno and of the same age as he. He wrote two poems entitled On Nature and Purifications. Like Melissus, he was deeply influenced by Parmenides. Agreeing with Parmenides that Being could not come out of Not-Being, that plurality, divisibility, change, and motion could not spring from Absolute Unity, and that there was no Void, he explained plurality, divisibility, change, and motion by denying the Original Absolute Unity. The original undifferentiated whole, according to him, consisted of four eternally existing elements—fire, air, earth, and water—leaving no Void. Each of the elements is undivided and indestructible and of a specific nature. From these elements come all things that were, are, and will be. Change is a mere rearrangement and reshuffling of these elements. It arises from motion and motion cannot arise from Absolute Being. To explain motion he postulated two motive powers, Love and Strife, existing from eternity along with the four elements and having infinite power. He held that there is no absolute generation or absolute decay. What are called creation and destruction are really commingling and separation of the elements, the former being the work of Love and the latter of Strife.

Existence passes through three stages. In the first stage Love alone was active and the elements were mingled together forming one all-inclusive Whole—a Whole which had no feet, no knees, and no genitals, but was a sphere equal to himself from all sides. The middle stage was the one in which Love and Strife were both active, but Strife gradually gained the upper hand. In this stage the elements became separated from the Whole. The first to separate was air that flowed around in a circle and took up the position surrounding the world, and its outermost margin solidified itself to form the firmament. It was followed by fire which ran upwards under the solidified periphery round the air and displaced the air of the upper half. Fire was followed by earth and earth by water. By further commingling appeared solitary limbs, foreheads, eyes, breasts, arms, feet, etc., wandering about and seeking for union. When Love and Strife more or less mingled together, by their action there was a mingling of these limbs into chance combinations forming monsters and deformed organisms, like creatures having faces and breasts on both sides, cattle with the fronts of men, and men with the heads of cattle. Later, those things which were accidentally well fitted to one another survived; the rest disappeared. Those things are most suitable for coming together which are made like one another. It is these which are united by Love. Those things which differ most from one another in their origin, mixture, and form are made so by Strife and are very evil. At the next stage gradually appeared “whole-natured forms”—first plants, then gradually fish, birds, wild animals, men, and even gods who are the highest in honour—and people said things had come into being. As the process of separation under the influence of Strife continued, the sexes were distinguished. When Love is completely inactive and Strife alone is operative, the last stage of extreme separation is reached and individual things disappear, and men not knowing the truth call this their death.
Greek Thought

GREEK PHILOSOPHY BACK TO ASIA MINOR

i. Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia

Anaxagoras.—Anaxagoras was a contemporary of Zeno and Empedocles, about ten years older than both. At the age of twenty he migrated to Athens and stayed there for thirty years and, being prosecuted for impiety because he maintained that the sun was a red-hot mass of metal, he withdrew to Lampscus in Asia Minor where he died in about 428 B.C. He was an associate of Anaximenes and Protagoras and teacher of Euripides and Pericles by the latter of whom he was defended in his prosecution which resulted, according to some, to a fine and his exile and, according to others, to condemnation to death in his absence. He wrote only one book some fragments of which are still extant.

Anaxagoras could not see how Empedocles drew an infinite variety of things from only four elements and two motive forces, Love and Strife. He, therefore, postulated that the first undifferentiated whole contained mixed together all the opposites of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and the Pythagoreans, all the four elements of Empedocles, and, besides, seeds, infinite in number and smallness and in every respect different from one another, of all things that were ultimately to emerge. For explaining the separation of things and their growth from their seeds he substituted Empedocles’ motive forces of Love and Strife by the single intellectual motive force of Mind. Mind is infinite, all alike, self-rulled, and all alone by itself. Though it is mixed with nothing, it is none the less present where everything else is, whether mixed or separated off. If it were mixed with things, they would have limited it from controlling everything the way it does. Mind has knowledge of all things, mixed and separated, past, present, and future; it has the greatest power; controls everything that has life; and sets everything in order, including the rotation of the air, aether, the sun, and the moon. It is the finest and the purest of all that is.

He agreed with Parmenides and Empedocles that nothing can come out of nothing. As the seeds of all things are present in the Original Whole, nothing new comes into existence. Nor is anything destroyed. Change means only mixture and separation.

He held that all things are infinitely great and infinitely small—infinitely great because they contain an infinite number of parts, and infinitely small because even the smallest of parts is infinitely divisible into smaller and still smaller parts.

His cosmogonical findings were as follows. The Mind imparted at first a rotary movement to the mixed Whole (Chaos) and this movement caused the separation of all bodies in the Cosmos. The first things to emerge were air and aether the latter of which he identified with fire. The dense was then separated...
off from the rare, the hot from the cold, the bright from the dark, and the dry from the moist, the light, hot, and dry bodies occupying the upper position and the dense, moist, cold, and dark taking the lower position where the earth is. But nothing was completely separated off from the other except Mind. Air is solidified into cloud, cloud into water, water into earth, and earth into stones under the agency of cold. The sun, the moon, and all the stars are red-hot stones which the rotation of the aether carried round it. The heat of the stars is not felt by us because they are far from us. The moon is beneath the sun and nearer to us. She has no light of her own but derives it from the sun. The stars in their revolution pass beneath the earth. The eclipse of the moon is due to its being screened by the earth, and that of the sun to its being screened by the moon when it is new. The moon is made of earth and has plains and ravines on it.

The earth is flat and stays suspended where it is because of its size, because there is no void, and because the air keeps it afloat. Rivers owe their origin partly to rain and partly to the waters under the earth which is hollow and in its hollow contains water. The reflection of the sun in the clouds forms the rainbow. The moisture of the cloud either creates a wind or spills forth rain.

First after separation air contained the seeds of all things and those seeds, when carried down by the rain, gave rise to plants. Animals first arose from moisture and then from one another. All living things, plants at the bottom and man at the top, have a portion of Mind. Anaxagoras formulated two principles which enabled him to propound his theory of nourishment and growth. These principles are: (1) that a portion of everything is in everything and (2) that things alike attract one another. Things that are eaten already contain the ingredients which are produced in an organism, e.g., blood, sinews, bones, flesh, and so on. These ingredients reason alone can know. Those seeds in which blood predominates proceed, by the attraction of like to like, to join the blood of the body, and those in which flesh predominates proceed by the same principle to join the bodily flesh. The same holds true of all other parts.

Diogenes of Apollonia.—Diogenes of Apollonia, a town in Asia Minor or Crete, lived in the later half of the fifth century B.C. He was an eclectic thinker chiefly influenced by Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Heraclitus. He first laid down two principles, one with regard to energy, the other to the language used. He said, one must begin one's investigation with something incontrovertible and one's expression should be simple and dignified. Well within the Milesian tradition he held that all things must be modifications of one basic substance, for if they were different in nature and were not fundamentally the same, they could neither mix with one another, nor influence one another favourably or adversely, nor could one thing grow out of another. This basic substance for him as for Anaximenes is air which is infinite and eternal and generative of the worlds. From its condensation and rarefaction—guided by its purposeful intelligence—all things come into being and become of different kinds at different times, and to it they return. Air is, in short, God who has power over, steers, inhere in, and disposes all things. It is the soul of all living things, for when they cease breathing, they die. It is air that creates all sensations. When air is mixed with blood, it lightens it and, penetrating the body through and through, produces pleasure. When it does not mix with blood, the blood gets thicker and coagulates, then pain results. Diogenes also gave quite an acute account of the anatomy of veins.

Greek Thought

2. The Atomists

Lucippus.—Lucippus who belonged to Miletus in Asia Minor was in his prime of life in 430 B.C. He was a pupil of Zeno and is said to have associated with Parmenides, though their philosophies were poles apart. He evolved the theory of atoms which was accepted and further refined by Democritus, who belonged either to Miletus, or according to some accounts to Abdera, and was in the prime of his life in 420 B.C. Democritus had met Lucippus and perhaps also Anaxagoras to whom he was junior by about forty years. He visited Egypt, Chaldaea, Persia, some say even India and Ethiopia. He was a prolific writer, though nothing of his works has survived except about 290 fragments mostly from his ethical writings.

Democritus.—In Democritus the scientific spirit of Ionia found its culmination. His theory became the basis of all subsequent materialism right down to the present day. The Atomists made their theory explain our experience of the coming-into-being, perishing, and motion of things and their multiplicity; and this they did by postulating, against the Eleatics, the existence of Void, a Not-Being which nevertheless exists as much as Being. Both Being and Void or Not-Being are the material causes of all existing things. Being is not one, but consists of invisible, small atoms of infinite number and shapes. The atoms are to be regarded of infinite shapes, because there is no reason why an atom should be of one shape rather than another. They are indissoluble because they are very small. They are compact and full, because there is no Void within them. They move in the Void, and by coming together they effect coming-into-being, and by their separation, perishing. They differ from one another not in quality but in shape, arrangement, and position and, according to Aristotle's reading, also in weight. These differences are responsible for all the qualitative differences in objects.

The whole of existence is infinite; a part of it is filled with atoms and a part is Void. A large number of atoms of different shapes move in the infinite Void. They come together there like to like and produce, in the same way as the Mind of Anaxagoras, a whirl in which colliding with one another and revolving in all manner of ways, they begin to separate, like to like. But when
their multitude prevents them from rotating any longer in equilibrium, those that are fine go out towards the surrounding Void, while the rest get entangled, abide together, unite their motions, and make the first spherical structure. Thus the earth came into being when the bulkier atoms stayed together. It is flat but tilted downward towards the sooth. Some of these bodies that get entangled form a structure that is first moist and muddy but as they revolve with the whirl of the whole they dry out and then ignite to form the substance of the heavenly bodies. Thus arise innumerable worlds which differ in size and are resolved again into atoms.

In some worlds there are no sun and moon, in some they are larger than those in our world and in others more numerous. The intervals between the worlds are unequal, in some parts there are more worlds, in others fewer, some are increasing, some at their height, some decreasing, in some parts they are arising, in others falling. They are destroyed by collision with one another. Some worlds are devoid of living creatures or plants or any moisture.

In compound bodies the lighter is one that contains more Void, the heavier that which contains less. The soul consists of spherical atoms spread through the body. We inhale and exhale soul-atoms, and life continues so long as this process goes on.

All objects animate or inanimate flock together with their kind, dove with dove, crane with crane, and pebbles with pebbles on the seashore.

The process by which the worlds come into existence and everything moves is not random. Nothing occurs at random; every change in existence is for a reason and only by necessity.

According to the Atomistes, knowledge is of two forms, genuine and obscure, sensuous knowledge being of the latter type. They explain sensation by a kind of effluence that is said to proceed from everything. In the case of sight it proceeds both from the object seen and the observer’s eye and produces an impression on the air, the solid part of which remains outside but the finer and lighter part, the image, enters the pupil of the eye if the eye also throws out a like image. Other sensations are explained by the size and shape of the atoms. Sensible qualities being the result of this process show how things affect us, not what they are. As later on held by Locke, shape, arrangement, size, and weight are the qualities of things, and are therefore objective, but colour, sound, taste, smell, etc., are subjective.

The ethical fragments of Democritus which have come down to us in the form of aphorisms are mostly sparkling jewels of wisdom and common sense. According to him, happiness is the highest good. In theology he believed in the existence of gods, but the gods, he holds, are made of atoms and are as material and mortal as men. Only they live longer and have greater power and higher reason. They do not interfere in men’s affairs and, therefore, need not be feared.

Greek Thought

1. Early Record

So far all philosophical development took place in Greek settlements in the islands and the mainland of Asia Minor which were under the imperial rule of Persia and in Magna Graecia (the Greek cities of South Italy and Sicily). Before the beginning of the fifth century B.C. Athens had not produced a single great man in the spheres of art, science, literature, and philosophy except the lawgiver Solon. Archelaus (c. 450 B.C.) did belong to Athens but he was a minor thinker who followed the principles of Anaxagoras with some modifications based on Anaximander’s primacy of hot and cold, Anaximenes’ condensation and rarefaction of air, and Empedocles’ four elements. His chief claim to a place in the history of Greek philosophy is that he was a pupil of Anaxagoras and teacher of Socrates.

However, the victory of Athens against the Persian King Darius in 490 B.C. and of the combined Greek navies under Athenian leadership against his son Xerxes in 480 B.C. brought Athens politically to the forefront. Political predominance brought with it flourishing trade and commerce which resulted in great prosperity. During Pericles’ wise rule of thirty years from 460 to 430 B.C. Athens was at the height of her glory. It was during this period that Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides produced their tragedies. Aristophanes his comedies, and Pheidias his statues—all masterpieces of unsurpassed beauty. Herodotus by writing the history of the Persian wars became the father of history and Thucydides by producing his History of the Peloponnesian War secured for himself the rank of the greatest historian of antiquity.

In philosophy, however, the record of Athens up to the end of the fifth century was far from brilliant. She produced only one great philosopher, Socrates, and suffered another from Asia Minor, Anaxagoras, to live and teach there. But her people by bringing up the charge of impiety and corruption of the Athenian youth against them condemned the former to death and the latter, despite Pericles’ defence to banishment for life. Besides, it was here that the sceptical movement started by the Sophists brought philosophy, partly justly and partly unjustly, under the shadow of disrepute.

2. The Sophists

The Problem of Knowledge and the Study of Man

While great but conflicting philosophical systems were being developed with almost equal force by the Asian Greeks in the islands and the mainland of Asia Minor, and the Western Greeks in South Italy and Sicily, by about 450 B.C. dissatisfaction began to appear with system-building in a certain section of talented men. The paradoxical conclusion of these systems made this
A History of Muslim Philosophy

group of thinkers sceptical about philosophy as a truth-finding discipline. The
leader of this group was Protagoras of Abdera in Thrace who was at the prime
of his life in the later half of the fifth century B.C. He was a friend of Pericles
and used to teach in Athens. He doubted the existence of gods and, therefore,
like Anaxagoras, was banished from Athens on a charge of impiety. In addition,
his books were burnt in the market-place.

According to Protagoras, we experience neither the ultimate principles
of the schools of Ionia or the First Cause of the school of Elea, nor the “atoms”
of Democritus or the “seeds” of Anaxagoras. At best they are unverifiable
hypotheses. Therefore, all talk about them is idle. Instead of wasting energy
on discussion regarding the nature of the objective world a man should occupy
himself with himself. All knowledge, for what it is worth, depends upon the
senses. But our sense-experience is deceptive. It reveals only what passes away
and yields no universal truth. Nor can we rely on reason, for reason is also
based on sense-experience and is a mere continuation of it. As all knowledge is
based on a man’s sensations, it is true only for him, and not for all. A pro-
position may at the same time be both true and false, true for one, false for
others. There being no absolute truth, each “man” as an individual “is the
measure of all things.”

Ethical truths are equally relative. What is of benefit to me may harm
another, and thus what is good for one may be bad for others. The individual’s
good is only what he considers good for himself. With everyone personal
benefit alone should count. Although one opinion cannot be truer than another,
it can yet be better than another. As sensuous knowledge, however uncertain,
is alone possible for us, it should be acquired for use in practical life. Similarly,
it is not known whether the gods exist or not; they should nevertheless be
worshipped.

Protagoras only doubted the possibility of certain knowledge, but his
contemporary Gorgias went to the extent of maintaining that nothing whatever
exists, and if anything exists, it is not knowable and if it is knowable, it is not
communicable.

Following these leaders all Sophists became sceptical about the universality
and objectivity of truth itself and began to concern themselves mainly with
teaching the practical arts of arguing and speaking with effect for success in
public life, and receiving payment in return. The subjects they taught with
this end in view were logic, rhetoric and grammar. As there was no regular
system of education only the sons of aristocracy could afford to take lessons
from them. They were hated by the masses because of their relations with
aristocracy and their radicalism in matters of religious beliefs, and by the
philosophers of other schools because, against the prevailing practice, they
charged fees for giving instruction. They were called by their opponents the
Sophists. Though the word “sophist” means a wise or learned man, it was used
for them as a term of reproach to mean a quibbler who used fallacious arguments
to make truth appear falsehood and falsehood truth, and argued not to find

the truth but only to win a point against a disputant. This reproach was
definitely justified, at least in the case of the later Sophists.

From the purely philosophical point of view, the sceptical movement of
the Sophists was not an unmixed evil. It was quite a natural movement and
of positive gain in two ways. A period of feverish intellectual activity resulting
in great systems is naturally followed by a period of criticism—a criticism
which paves the way for further developments. The critical scepticism of the
Sophists led to the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle which
represented the highest point that Greek speculation could reach.

There was another gain. The main problems to which the system-builders
paid attention were the problems of Being and Not-Being, substance and
number, permanence and change, One and many; and man did not figure in
the picture at all. The Sophists made the study of man, as an individual and
as a member of the State, their chief concern. This turn in Greek speculation
widened the horizon and partly determined the course of subsequent Greek
thought.

3. Socrates

Socrates was born at Athens in 469 or 470 B.C. and was condemned to death
in 399 B.C. He spent most of his time in high philosophical discussions in
public places.

“In the case of Socrates,” says Bertrand Russell, “the uncertainty is as to
whether we know very little or a great deal.” The reason is that for his
teaching he used the method of conversation and wrote no book. All our
knowledge of him is based on the writings of his pupils, Xenophon, a soldier
whose philosophical equipment was not high enough to enable him fully to
appreciate his teacher’s ideas, and Plato who idealized him and made him the
chief character of his Dialogues, but left no hint to the extent to which the
contents of the Dialogues relate to his own ideas and to what extent to those
of Socrates. Socrates was the greatest thinker of his generation. He was high-
minded, eminently pious, frank to a fault, amazingly indifferent to worldly
success and comforts of life, and remarkably high in the estimation of youth.
Physically, he was extremely ugly and went about shabbily dressed and
barefoot.

Although he never took any fees for his teaching and was opposed to the
Sophistic way of thinking, he was sometimes mistaken for a Sophist. This was
due to the fact that, like the Sophists, he discarded metaphysics, natural
science, and mathematics, made the study of man as a citizen his main
concern, and regarded the individual’s culture as the goal of education,
irrespective of its effect on State, religion, and traditional beliefs.

Socrates believed in God, immortality of the soul, and, for the noble and
the great, a happy life after death. He was religious to the extent of being

---

90

91

Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p. 102.
superstitious, for he went to the Delphic Oracle to find out who was the wisest man in Athens. The Oracle’s reply that it was he himself came to him as a complete surprise, for, he thought, a god could not be wrong, and yet he who knew nothing had been declared to be the wisest man. To see that there was no error he visited all the men reputed for great wisdom, engaged them in discussion only to be disappointed and to discover that the Oracle was right, because those who claimed knowledge actually knew nothing, while he who claimed no knowledge knew at least one truth, the truth that he knew nothing. He also claimed that ever since his childhood he had heard a divine voice that always told him what not to do and that he was commissioned by God to fulfill the philosopher’s mission by searching into himself and other men.

In spite of his religious-mindedness and his ennobling influence on the youth, he was prosecuted for denying the gods of the State, worshipping new divinities, and corrupting the young, and was in the end condemned to death by poison.

Socrates used and developed the Dialectical Method invented by Zeno. It is the method of seeking knowledge through the clarification of ideas by questions and answers. It is a useful method for discovering logical inconsistencies in order to reach what is logically consistent. It is suited to the clarification and definition of non-empirical ideas and the right usage of words, but, as Bertrand Russell says, is of no use in the discovery of new facts.²

He was interested neither in physical nor in mathematical or metaphysical speculation. His interest lay mainly in ethics, of which he is rightly said to be the founder.

Opinions greatly differ in moral matters, but for Socrates it is the philosopher’s duty to dig out the eternal and universal truths hidden beneath the confused mass of opinion. Beginning with real or professed ignorance (his irony) and making self-consistency as the criterion of truth, he brought under discussion opinions about such matters as good, beauty, ugliness, nobility, wisdom, justice, courage, friendship, State, and citizenship, in order to know their real moral significance and to arrive at their precise definitions.

He was convinced that all evil-doing is due to ignorance. If people knew what was right, they would do no wrong. As knowledge alone is needed to make people virtuous, he declared that knowledge is virtue. It is the highest good and the sole end of life and its pursuit is the only source of abiding happiness.

By over-emphasizing one aspect or another of Socrates’ system, his followers developed divergent lines of thought. The school of the Cynics, founded by Antistephus of Cynere, laid hold of his idea of happiness and joy in the pursuit of knowledge, and made the greatest amount of pleasure the highest good for man, a view later on taken and modified by the Epicureans. His emphasis on knowledge as virtue, as the supreme good worthy of being sought for its own sake, irrespective of the joy that it brings, made the school of the Cynics, established by Antisthenes, couple their doctrine of virtue and duty with asceticism, i.e., with extreme self-restraint, self-renunciation, and freedom from want—a doctrine later on developed by the Stoics. Euclides and Plato combined his idea of the highest good with the Eleatic conception of the unity of Being and developed the doctrine that matter and change and motion are unreal, and the one ultimate Being—the Good—is the essence of all things.

4. Plato

Plato (427–347 B.C.) was a descendant of Solon from his mother’s side and, if his father’s claim is accepted, of the last kings of Athens from the father’s side. He was a disciple of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle. He remained attached to the Socratic circle from his own age of twenty to the death of Socrates. His works were exceedingly well preserved. Out of these, twenty-six authentic Dialogues have come down to us. At the age of forty or forty-one he founded an educational institution known as the Academy, where he taught till his death at the age of eighty. The Academy flourished till 529 A.D. when, 926 years after its inception, Justinian, Emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire, which had been converted to Christianity nearly two centuries before, closed it “because of his religious bigotry” and brought Greek philosophy officially to an end “and the Dark Ages descended upon Europe.”

After more than half a century of sceptical criticism, Greek thought went back to system-building and produced two of the most comprehensive and integrated systems the world has ever seen. Of these Plato’s was one and the other was that of his disciple, Aristotle. The fundamentals of Plato’s system are the same in all his dialogues, but, owing to development of his thought, the details differ from Dialogue to Dialogue. An exceedingly well-written passage in Frank Thilly’s History of Philosophy brings out very clearly Plato’s relations to his predecessors. It runs as follows:

“Within the framework of the Platonic system, we have a combination and transformation of the teachings of the leaders of Greek thought. With the Sophists, Plato agrees that knowledge—if knowledge be restricted to appearances—is impossible; with Socrates, that genuine knowledge is always by concept; with Heraclitus, that the world is in constant change (sensible appearances are characterized by change); with the Eleatics, that the real world—for Plato the world of ideas—is unchangeable; with the atomists, that being is manifold (Plato admits a plurality of ideas); with the Eleatics, that it is one (the form of the Good is a unity); with nearly all the Greek thinkers, that it is basically rational; with Anaxagoras, that mind rules it and that mind is distinct from matter. His system is the mature fruit of the history of Greek philosophy down to his time.”³

Knowledge, according to Plato, is grasping the true being of a thing. As

² Ibid., p. 115.
³ Frank Thilly. A History of Philosophy, p. 73.

Ibid., p. 80.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

...the Sophists have conclusively shown, the true nature of a thing cannot be known through sense-perception. The true being of a thing is its idea, its eternal, unchangeable, and universal nature and it can be known only by a special method of inquiry.

The method he employs for acquiring the knowledge of true beings is the Dialectical Method of Socrates; but not only that; he also developed the theory of this method. Dialectic is not discussion for the sake of discussion. Its procedure of questions and answers is aimed at examining opinions based upon the apprehension of particulars in sense-perception in order to discover, by the help of reason, their true nature, the universal idea that is true of all such particulars. It is a gradual process by the aid of which we pass from the sensible to the ideal. After these universal ideas have been discovered, their subdivisions (species) are ascertained. Thus, by a process of synthesis and analysis we pass upward and downward from idea to idea and view the whole range of ideas.

Theory of Ideas.—Ordinarily, it is thought that the idea or concept of a horse is formed by abstracting the common qualities shared by all particular horses. This idea or concept is regarded as a piece of knowledge existing in the mind of the knower. This is not Plato's view. He holds that this universal idea which is true of all horses is not a piece of knowledge but a piece of reality. It transcends particular horses and lives in a separate world, the world of ideas. It is present in its transient, changing appearances in sense-perception only in so far as they participate in it. What is true of the idea of a horse is true of all other ideas. They all exist in the world of ideas and, by viewing the world of ideas in this way, we apprehend the whole of reality, the whole of rational cosmos. In this rational cosmos, there are ideas of all things (even such things as tables and chairs), qualities, relations, virtues, and values. The highest idea is the Idea of the Good which is identical with the Beautiful and the highest knowledge is to apprehend the Idea of the Good.

Plato illustrates the relation between the rational cosmos, the world of ideas, and the world of sensuous experience by his famous allegory of the cave. Imagine a cave with an opening at one end outside which there is burning a bright fire. At the other end there is a screen and between the fire and the screen there are men facing the screen so chained from childhood that they cannot move without tabes of legs and necks, but can see only what is in front of them on the screen. As those men cannot turn their heads round, they will see only the shadows of one another and of the things they carry, which the fire throws on the screen, and will consider them real objects. But suppose one of them is released and goes out of the cave; first he will be dazzled by the glare of light, but soon his eyes will get adjusted to light and enable him to see, then he will see the shadows of objects on water, then the objects themselves, then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven by night, and last of all he will be able to see the sun by day and will contemplate it as it is. And when he remembers his condition when he was

imprisoned in the cave and the condition of his fellow-prisoners, he will felicitate himself on the change and pity them. The cave is the world of sight, the light of fire is the sun, and the man's journey is like the upward ascent of the soul into the intellectual world, the world of ideas. "The Idea of the Good," like the sun, "appears last of all" and, "when seen, is inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light in the visible world and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellect; and this is the power upon which he who would act rightly either in public or private life must have his eyes fixed."

If eternal ideas are the only pure beings and the world of ideas is the only real world, from where has appeared the changing world of sense? To explain this Plato postulates another principle—the principle of Not-Being which means what is other than Being. Not-Being is the same thing as matter. It is unreal and yet exists as a formless substratum of the phenomenal world. When this formless Not-Being receives the impression of ideas, the world of sense-perception appears. It has reality only in so far as it has the impress of ideas. In so far as it is material, it is unreal. It is, therefore, wrong to call it the real world. It is merely a world of shadows.

Cosmology.—In the sphere of cosmology Plato does not find himself on solid ground and, therefore, claims only probability for his cosmological views.

God, the maker of the world, fashioned its body out of the four elements leaving no part of them outside, after the pattern of the world of ideas. In order to make it as perfect as possible, He put intelligence into it and placed in its centre the world-soul, which had been created earlier to be its ruler and mistress. Thus, the world became a veritable living creature endowed with intelligence and soul. As there could be only one best possible copy of the original, there is only one world and it is in the best of all forms, the spherical form.

Then by some mathematical manipulation of the parts of the world, the Creator made the orbits of the seven heavens. He sought to make the world eternal so far as it might be. Now, to bestow eternity, an attribute of the ideal world, in its fullness upon a creature was impossible. Therefore He created time as the moving image of eternity. He then made the sun to measure the movement of the planets, and thus brought about day and night. This was followed by the creation of the heavenly race of the gods (the stars and planets) and the species in air and water and the wild animals on land. This having been done, the Creator Himself, made the divine part of man, reason, mixed it with the four elements, divided the mixture into souls equal in number to the stars, and assigned each soul to a star. He then ordered the gods, His children, to do the rest to complete the universe by interweaving the mortal

---

4 Republic, VII, 514-16.
5 Ibid., 517.
6 Sophist, 238.
with the immortal. These children of the Creator, obeying the Father's order, made each separate body by welding the portions of the four elements, temporarily borrowed and to be restored in due course, and fastened the immortal souls to these mortal bodies which are perpetually in flux.

It is remarkable that this mythical account of the creation of the universe, about which Plato himself was uncertain, exerted an extraordinary influence on medieval thought.

Psychology.—The soul is immaterial and prior to the body. The body is intended by nature to be its servant and to listen to its commands. Once the soul lived with God in the world of ideas. Owing to its desire for the sensuous world, it was brought down and engaged in a material body and condemned to pass through a stage of purification. On release from the body it has to give an account of itself before the judgment-seat. Those who have been virtuous in this world are sent after death to the Isles of the Blessed, to their respective stars, and the wicked to Tartarus to suffer punishment. A few great sinners like potentates are, however, kept in Hades as a salutary terror to others. If after undergoing full punishment a soul becomes wiser, it has a better lot; but if it still persists in folly and does not see the truth, it goes down lower and lower transmigrating from the body of one animal to that of another, never passing into human form. The middling souls may pass from human to animal form and vice versa, from animal to human form.

As the soul can know pure and eternal ideas and only like can know like, it must also be pure and eternal, at least in part. Its pre-existence in the world of ideas is proved by the fact that it is originally endowed with certain principles and axioms which are not given by sense-experience and therefore can only be explained as recollections from the previous life of the soul occasioned by sense-experience. The soul is also immortal. Its immortality has to be accepted on these grounds: (1) The soul is simple and indivisible; therefore, it can neither be produced by composition nor destroyed by decomposition. (2) The soul is a principle of life; it, therefore, cannot become contradictory, death. (3) Everything is destroyed by its peculiar evil. Ignorance, injustice, and impertinence are the peculiar evils of the soul, but they do not destroy the vicious soul; the soul is therefore indestructible and immortal. (4) The soul is self-moving and ever in motion and that which is ever in motion is immortal. (5) The soul is rational and moral. It must have an after-life in which by rewards and punishments the injustices and imperfections of this life may be rectified. (6) In yearning for the eternal ideas of beauty and truth.

Greeek Thought
the soul is yearning for immortality, since what is passionately desired and cannot be fully achieved in this life must be attainable in the life hereafter.

The soul has three parts: reason, spirit, and appetite. The spirited part sometimes sides with reason and obeys its commands. Spirit includes such impulses as ambition, anger, and righteous indignation, and appetite includes desire for sensuous pleasure, wealth, and all forms of bodily satisfaction. Sometimes appetite gets the better of it and the two conspire and rebel against reason. The harmonious soul is that in which all the three parts work harmoniously, each discharging its own function, the rational part commanding and the spirited and appetitive parts obeying its commands.

Ethics.—The soul is in essence rational and immortal. The world of true beings, the world of ideas, is the source of all its goodness. The body is material and Not-Being and is the ground of all evil. It is only a temporary prison-house. Release from the body and contemplation of the beautiful realm of ideas is the ultimate goal of life. The embodied soul is wise if reason rules all its impulses. It is brave if its spirited part aids and obeys the rational part, temperate, if both spirit and appetite obey the dictates of reason, and just if all the three parts perform their respective functions in unison. The ideal of this life is achieved when a man is wise, brave, temperate, and just. The highest good of life is the harmony of the soul which is attained by the exercise of all the four virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, under the guidance of reason. The greatest happiness attends the life that achieves the highest good and contemplates the highest ideas.

Aesthetics.—All art is functional. Its function is to imitate, but not to imitate the objects of experience, but ideal realities. The artist, therefore, must learn to contemplate the ideal world. Sensible objects only participate in the ideas. They are only shadows of reality. If art were to imitate these objects, it would produce nothing better than the shadows of shadows, and if it created illusions and distortions it would be thrice removed from reality.

All art, intellectual or useful, must be subordinated to the good of the State and the moral life of its citizens. Only those art-forms should be encouraged in every art which express the simplicity of a rightly and nobly-ordered mind. On their simplicity depend their style, harmony, grace, and rhythm, which qualities elevate the soul and instill true and noble ideas into it. Our artists should be only those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful. In poetry only hymns to the gods and praise of famous men should be permitted. Excessive devotion to art is not desirable. It creates effeminacy. Exhibition of vice, impertinence, meanness, and indecency and all that is base and impure should be banished from the State. Sorrowful tunes and tales create weakness in the soul and the comic art turns men into buffoons. Some painting creates illusions and some sculpture and architecture exhibit false proportion. The former creates falsehood and the latter disorder in the soul. All art which shows these tendencies should be banned. To effect this all art-productions should be brought under strict censorship.

9 Phaedo, 113 E; Gorgias, 525.
10 Phaedrus, 249.
11 Meno, 86; Phaedo, 73.
12 Phaedo, 78.
13 Ibid., 80.
14 Republic, X, 609.
15 Phaedrus, 245.
History of Muslim Philosophy

Theory of Education.—The Platonic theory of education aims at making the individuals belonging to the two higher classes truly cultured and well equipped for discharging their respective functions in the State by drawing out what is already dimly known to them because of their having lived before birth in the real world, the world of ideas. It envisages a careful selection of the most promising children and their training under a rigorous discipline backed by careful censorship in (1) music, covering everything within the province of the Muses including poetry and literature, and (2) gymnastics, meaning physical culture. The teaching of music forbids stories without moral significance in Homer and Hesiod, because they depict gods as doing evil deeds, and anything that does not inculcate sobriety, temperance, control over laughter, willingness to die for the State, and the belief that slavery is worse than death. Drama should depict only faultless characters of high birth, and any play in which an actor is made to take the part of a villain, a criminal, a woman, or a slave should not be permitted. That music which is expressive of courage and harmony is to be encouraged, and the songs which express sorrow or induce relaxation are to be prohibited. Up to a certain age the young should get no chance of seeing what is bad, ugly, or terrifying. The study of music and gymnastics is to be followed by that of mathematics and dialectics right up to the age of thirty-five. Then come fifteen years of practical experience in subordinate offices leading at the age of fifty to the pure study of philosophy. When this study is completed, only then is a person accomplished enough to hold the highest office of the State and become a philosopher-king.

Theory of the State.—According to Plato, there are five types of political organisations: aristocracy, the rule of the best; timocracy, in which the rulers are motivated by honour; oligarchy, in which the rulers seek wealth; democracy, the rule of the masses; and tyranny, the rule of one man advancing solely his own selfish interests.

In the Republic Plato gives an outline of what he regards as the Ideal State. It is a form of intellectual aristocracy. The State is the individual writ large. On the analogy of the tripartite division of the soul, society is stratified into three classes: the rulers, the auxiliaries, and the artisans, each class having its own specific virtue: the rulers wisdom, the auxiliary, the natural relations and the artisans self-restraint and willing obedience. To keep people contented in their respective classes the State would have to propagate “a royal lie” that God has created human beings of three kinds: the best are made of gold, the second best made of silver, and the common herd of brass or iron, the first fit to be administrators, the second warriors, and the rest manual workers — a myth which would become a common belief in about two generations. The function of the rulers is to mould the State in the likeness of the State “of which the pattern is laid up in heaven,” in the realm of ideas, of the auxiliaries to help the rulers by military service and protect the State in times of war or revolt, and of the artisans to carry on trade, manual labour, and craftsmanship. Since it is only the philosopher who has knowledge of reality, he alone deserves to be a king. He should be persuaded to accept the office, though he would be generally unwilling to do so. As selfishness is the root of all social evil, the guardians, i.e., the rulers and warriors, are to live a common life with a common mess as one family without any private property, wives, or children. Men between 25 and 35 and women between 20 and 40 (i.e., when they are in the prime of life) are to be brought together on ceremonial occasions specially arranged for intercourse, in numbers suitable for the required population. The pairing on these occasions is to be determined apparently by lots, but actually by secret manipulation in such a way that the braver get the fairer. As in a society of communism of property, wives, and children, no child would know his parents and no parents their children, all those belonging to an older generation would be called fathers and mothers by the younger generation and all those belonging to a younger generation would be addressed as sons and daughters by those of the older generation. Those children who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called by one another brothers and sisters. The children born will be brought up by nurses in quarters specially provided for them. They should get only the necessities of life, and be brought up as to be able to bear the roughness and hardships of life. The State on the whole should not be allowed to become too rich or too poor, for both riches and poverty lead to social evils. Nor is the State to be allowed to be too large or too small. Its size “shall not be larger or smaller than is consistent with its unity” which indeed is its greatest good. Women are to take equal part in education and State services as administrators or warriors.

This is an outline of Plato’s Ideal State. But he himself acknowledges that it is not fully realizable. Therefore in a later work, the Laws, he modifies it in several important ways and gives a more practicable plan of what he regards as the second best State. In this State he places freedom and friendship side by side with reason. All citizens should be free and given a share in government. Of course, slaves who should be only foreigners are not counted among the citizens. The administration he now recommends is a mixture of aristocracy and democracy. Women are now included in the community meals of the guardians. Marriage is also permitted and family life and private property restored.

5. Aristotle

Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) was born at Stagira in Macedon, where his father who belonged to a family of physicians was employed as Court physician to the King. At the age of seventeen he became Plato’s pupil at the Academy at Athens which he left twenty years later at Plato’s death. In 334 B.C. King Philip of Macedon engaged him as his son Alexander’s teacher and he worked in that capacity for seven years. Thereafter he came back to Athens and opened a new educational institution at the Lyceum. Because of Aristotle’s habit of walking while teaching, this institution came to be known as the
Peripatetic school. Aristotle remained the head of this school for twelve years during which he wrote most of his works. At the close of this period he was indicted for impiety and compelled to flee to Chalcis in the Greek island Euboea where he died a year later.

Aristotle wrote on every subject then known in the world and most of his writings have come down to us. The collection of his logical works is entitled the Organon. His writings on what he called First Principles were collected by a compiler and named Metaphysics, for they were placed after the writings on physics. He wrote several works on physics, including the one called Anechelion Physicae, and several on the natural history of animals. On psychology he wrote many treatises, including three on the soul. His chief ethical writing is the Nicomachean Ethics, and his works on literary arts are named the Rhetoric and the Poetics.

According to Aristotle, there are three divisions of philosophy: (1) theoretical studies in which the attempt is made to know the existent, (2) practical, which relate to conduct and the rules of conduct, and (3) poetic, relating to the creative works of art. The first is again divided into mathematics, physics, and the "first philosophy." There is, however, a study which precedes all these as a precondition. That is the study of logic.

Logic.—Aristotle has been justly said to be the founder of logic. The principles of correct reasoning were employed in practice by his predecessors in their search for knowledge, but it was he alone who made their theoretical study, clarified them, and organized them into a well-rounded system which had an amazing influence on subsequent thought both in the East and the West. But for a few spasmodic revolts, the Organon ruled supreme for over two thousand years.

In the Organon, Aristotle shows that a simple or compound word expresses a meaning or a mental representation of a thing. This meaning or mental representation is called a term. A proposition consists of a subject word expressing the mental representation of an existent, a predicate word expressing the mental representation of something that is asserted (or denied) of that existent, and the mark of assertion, is (or of denial, is not). A true proposition is the verbal expression of a true judgment which is a combination or separation of two terms (expressed by the subject and the predicate) which corresponds with the combination or separation of two real things. A false proposition is the expression of a false judgment which is a combination or separation of two terms which have no such correspondence.

The mental representations of subjects are combined in several ways. These ways are determined by the categories, the ten ultimate modes of being. These categories are substance, quality, quantity, relation, where, when, position, action, and passion. Nothing can be predicated of any existent which does not fall in one of these categories. Some substances, e.g., first essences and individuals, can be expressed only as subjects of propositions, never as predicates.

Two propositions in one of which a predicate is affirmed of a subject (A is B) and the other in which it is denied (A is not B) are called contradictories. Of such propositions one must be false and the other must be true. This law is called by Aristotle the Law of Contradiction. Again, "one can either deny or affirm every predicate of every subject." Between its denial and affirmation there is no middle course. This principle is called by him the Law of Excluded Middle. Both of these laws are based on the metaphysical principle that "the same thing cannot at the same time and in the same respect belong and not belong to the same thing." This principle is known to us immediately and intuitively and, therefore, requires no demonstration. All demonstration and all certain knowledge depend on this principle.

The mental representations of the essential attributes common to all the individuals in a class constitute a class-concept. The contents of this concept form the definition of the class. The essential attributes of man, rationality and animality, form the concept and constitute the definition of man.

Logic for Aristotle is a necessary process. It is a process of reasoning which consists in proving a proposition by showing that it is such and such and it cannot be otherwise. This proof is provided in the following two ways.

The first way in which a proposition is proved or demonstrated is that of deduction the unit of which is a syllogism, a name given by Aristotle himself to a process by which the truth of a proposition is established by showing that it necessarily follows from its presuppositions called the major and the minor premises, by virtue of their possession a common term. John's mortality is established by showing that John is a man (minor premise) and man is mortal (major premise), man being a common or middle term by the help of which a connection is established between John and mortality. Thus, by syllogism it is shown that what is true of a whole class (i.e., the universal truth expressed by "all") is true of each individual or a smaller group, on the ground that the individual or the small group belongs to that class. So the fundamental principle of syllogism is "whatever is affirmed (or denied) of an entire class or kind may be affirmed (or denied) of any part" thereof—the principle called the Dictum de omni et nullo. This principle, like the basic principles of all sciences, is known intuitively. Its application enables us to derive the particular from the universal. How the conclusions of syllogisms are affected by the differences in quality (affirmation or negation) or quantity (extension to all, some, or only one) of the premises, is worked out with remarkable precision.

All scientific conclusions are ultimately drawn by syllogistic reasoning from premises which are themselves known immediately and intuitively to be absolutely certain, requiring no proof.

The second way of proving a proposition is that of induction, a process by which universal principles are derived from particular experiences by their complete enumeration. In experience, sequent particulars are prior and more knowable to us, but absolutely prior and more knowable are the concepts which are the most general and the most remote from sensations. Therefore,
A History of Muslim Philosophy

deduction which takes us from the universal to the particular is more scienti
cie, prior in nature, and more rigorously demonstrative. Those who cannot
follow the deductive way may, however, employ induction. Thus, syllogistic
deduction was over-emphasized by Aristotle and induction was given only a
secondary place and its details were not worked out by him.

Metaphysics.—Every object of experience consists of two factors, a sub-
stratum (matter) and a universal element common to all objects of the same
type (its form or essence), the mental representation of which is its concept.
Plato does not deny the existence of this form or essence in individual objects,
but there it is only as a copy of the form or essence existing in the world of
ideas. Aristotle argues that if, to explain the form of man, it is necessary to
postulate the ideal form in the world of ideas, it would be necessary also to
postulate a third form of which both of these forms are copies. Besides, these
independent essences are not of any help to things in their existence, motion,
or change. Again, if the ideas are the essences of things, how can essences
exist apart from the things of which they are the essences? He concludes that
Plato's world of ideas is an unnecessary duplication of the world of sensible
things. It is a mere poetic fiction. The essences or forms of things exist only
in those things; they are immanent in them. The world of sensible things is,
therefore, the only real world.

There are four fundamental principles which run through all spheres of the
real world. These are (1) Matter or Substratum, (2) Form or Essence, (3)
Efficient cause, and (4) the End or the Final cause. These principles are
according to Aristotle, the causes of everything that exists in the world.

Matter is the principle of imperfection and indivation of things. It is
not non-existent as Plato had thought, but exists as a potentiality. Form
consists of essential elements common to all individual objects of the same
type and is the actualization of material potentiality. As forms are eternal and
unchanging, they are the most knowable and the most worthy subjects of
knowledge. All movement is change from potentiality to actuality, and for
everything in existence there is a moving or efficient cause. In organic things,
the essence, the efficient cause, and the end are one. The essence is shape; it
shapes, and its own completion is its end. The soul is the form of the body and
is also its moving and final cause.

There are things in existence that both move and are unmoved. There are
things also which are only moved. Therefore, there is a third something (ter-
tium quid) which moves, but is not itself moved. This something, this unmoved
mover is God Himself. He is the Pure Eternal Form without any alloy of
matter, the absolutely perfect actuality. He is the Absolute Spirit identical
with Reason, loved by everything, and sought as the perfect ideal by every-
thing. He produces all motion by being loved, and so is the final cause of all
activity. In Him the distinction of the individual and the universal completely
disappears.

God is the unmoved mover, but Aristotle is not certain that there is only

one unmoved mover. At another place astronomical considerations lead him
to conclude that every sphere has an unmoved moving spirit and there are
forty-seven or fifty-two such spirits in all.

Physics.—The earth is the centre of the universe. Around this centre are
the concentric layers of water, air, fire, and ether. In the ethereal layer are
the celestial spheres, carrying planets, the sun, and the moon. Some of the
spheres are backward-moving. The outermost sphere is that of the fixed stars
which God touches without being touched, and to which He gives the best of
motions, the uniform circular rotation, and that with a purpose, for the motion
is not mechanical but teleological. The motion of the outermost sphere deter-
mines the motion of all other spheres, which is imperfect in a descending
scale. Rather inconsistently Aristotle also assigns a spirit—an unmoved
mover—to every sphere.

Motion exists in three categories, quantity (increase or decrease), quality
(transformation), and space (change of place). The motion of the universe is
not linear but circular. There are two conditions of motion—space and time.
Space is the limit by which a body is bound, the boundary by which it is
enclosed. From this definition it follows that there is no Void and that space
is not unlimited but limited. Beyond the sphere of the stars there is no space.
Time is the number and measure of motion according to before and after. It
is infinite. The universe which moves in time is also eternal. It has always
been and shall always be.

Biology and Psychology.—The soul is the form of the living body as well as
the principle of its motion and its end. It determines the structure and move-
ments of its specific body and uses it as an instrument for itself. As each soul
develops its own specific body, there is no transmigration of a soul from one
body to another. There are different grades of souls as there are different grades
of life. The souls of plants determine their functions, of lower animals theirs',
and of men theirs'. The functions of plants are assimilation, growth, and re-
production, those of lower animals are, in addition to these, sensitivity, appetite,
and locomotion, while those of men are all these together with their specific
function, reason. The human soul combines within itself the function of
all animale existence, it is a veritable microcosm. There is development within
each species, but there is no evolution from species to species. Each organ has
its own end and this end is its specific activity. The heart is the seat of sensa-
tions; from sensations arise memory, imagination, and pleasure, and pain,
and from pleasure and pain, desire. Reason is either passive or active. In passive
reason concepts are potentially present; in active reason they are actualized.
All lower functions and whatever arises in consequence, being connected with
the body, cease with the death of the body. Even passive reason which deals
with images that create potentiality for the arousal of concepts, perishes with
the body. Only active reason, for it is universal, not individual and personal,
remains untouched by death. It alone is imperishable and immortal. How it is
related to the individual and to God, is not made quite clear.
**Ethics.**—In the theory of morality Aristotle raises the question of the good for man—the good which is the end of all human ends. His reply is as follows: As in all living beings, the essence, the principle of activity, and end are identical, the ultimate end or the good of an organism must consist in its essence, in its highest actualization. The highest realization of the essence of man consists in active exercise of the faculty distinctive of him, the faculty of reason. The supreme excellence of man or the good for him, therefore, consists in the proper performance of his functions as a rational being throughout the whole of his life.

The ultimate end of man so defined is called by Aristotle happiness. From this definition of happiness it follows that it is not the same thing as pleasure. Pleasure is only an accompaniment of happiness, as beauty is the accompaniment of the perfect physical development of youth. The highest pleasure attends the highest happiness. While happiness in all its degrees is good, pleasure may be good or bad according as it accompanies good or bad activities. While there is nothing more valuable than happiness, there are things which are more valuable than pleasure. Virtue, for example, is one, truth another.

The ethical goal of happiness cannot be attained without some non-ethical prerequisites, such as the proper discharge of mental and bodily functions and the satisfaction of economic needs. No child or slave or poverty-stricken person can achieve this goal.

Human excellence expresses itself in virtue. By virtue is meant the habitual direction of the will to the guarding of the golden mean, the balance between excess and defect. For example, the virtue of courage is a mean between fool-hardiness and cowardice and that of liberality between prodigality and meanness.

Human happiness or excellence manifests itself in two ways: first, in the habitual subordination of the animal side of man's nature, his appetites, desires, and passions, to rational rule; secondly, in the exercise of reason in the search for knowledge and contemplation of truth. In the former case, happiness expresses itself in moral virtues (courage, temperance, liberality, magnanimity, love of honour, mildness, truthfulness, friendship, and, the highest of them all, justice). In the latter case, it manifests itself in intellectual virtues which are of two types: (1) those of theoretical reason which we use in our inquiry in the nature of what is necessary and in the intuitive apprehension of truth (science and reason), and (2) those of practical reason by which we exercise deliberation in such matters as are possible for us to change (art and practical wisdom). Science is used in demonstration, and reason in the immediate apprehension of principles. The highest virtue consists in the exercise of theoretical reason. For virtuous life some non-ethical goods are also needed. Art is productive of something beyond itself and its value lies in the product. Practical wisdom relates to conduct which is an end in itself and the worth of which lies in intention; it finds the right means for the end in view and is deliberative, critical, imperative, and formative of judgment by the use of intelligence.

Aristotle's attitude towards some human relations is rather odd. He regards the son as the property of his father and the slave the property of his master. The father may repudiate his son, but the son cannot repudiate his father. The master cannot be a friend to his slave in so far as he is a slave, but he can be so in so far as he is a man. Sympathy for the suffering of mankind, except when it is the suffering of a friend, leaves Aristotle emotionally unmoved.

**Politics.**—The first natural community for him is the family, which, when complete, consists of father, wife, children, and slaves. The family is based on two relations, the relation between man and woman and that between master and slave, both of which are considered to be natural. To all members of the family the father is an absolute ruler, but he should rule the slaves with mildness, the wife as a free member of the community, and children by right of affection and seniority. The most comprehensive human society is the State. The aim of the State is to produce good citizens, individuals living a virtuous and happy life. As the highest virtues are intellectual, it is the duty of the State not to create warriors, but men capable of making the right use of peace which is conducive to intellectual activity. Yet the State should be strong enough to protect itself. Its size should neither be too large nor too small for its existence as an articulate whole. Its whole territory should be surveyable from a hill-top (which is, of course, possible only in a City-State). The State should wage no wars except in self-defence or to subjugate "natural slaves"—i.e., inferior people. The Greeks combine courage with culture and are, therefore, superior people; and the superior people are alone justified in extending their rule over those who are inferior. The State should be self-sufficient and yet have import and export trade—an apparent inconsistency.

The aim of education is virtue, not utility. It should be provided for free children, but not in any skill that might enable them to earn money or give them professional efficiency or deform their bodies, for citizens should neither lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, which is ignoble and inimical to virtue, nor the life of professional athletes, which is detrimental to health. The slaves may, however, be trained in useful arts such as cooking and farming. The citizens should own land, but the tilling of it should be left to the slaves for it leaves no leisure and the citizens need leisure for their development. They

---

14 Nicomachean Ethics, I, 2.
15 Ibid., X, 4.
16 Ibid., 1134b.
17 Ibid., 1163b.
18 Ibid., 1161b.
20 Ibid., VII, 7.
should be made to learn drawing so as to be able to appreciate the beauty of form and of painting and sculpture expressive of moral truth; and to learn music no more than just enough for critical enjoyment. The treatment given to citizens should be determined by the differences of capability, property, birth, and freedom. Equality should be treated as equal and unequal as unequal. Although the individual citizen is prior to the State in point of time, the State is prior to the individual in significance, for the whole is prior to its parts. As man is a social animal, the natural aim of the individual is to live in society. The rational aim of society is the happiness of man. So in a rational society the interests of the individual and the State are harmonized.

The worth of the individual citizens depends on the kind of government under which they are brought up. Governments are good or bad according as they seek the interest of all or only their own interest. Judged by this criterion, there are three forms of good government (monarchy, aristocracy, and polity), and three forms of bad government (tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy), according as the rule is of one man, of a few, or of many. The best form of government is a monarchy in which the ruler is a man of intellectual eminence and moral worth. Next best is aristocracy in which there are a few persons possessed of such qualities. Aristocracy is better than polity in which the citizens are politically, intellectually, and morally nearly equal. The worst form of government is tyranny, for the corruption of the best is worst; next is oligarchy which is the rule of the rich few. Democracy is the least bad of all bad governments.

Art.—Goodness and beauty are different, for the former is found only in conduct and the latter also in things that are not moved. Beauty is created by art. Art is the imparting of formal elements to a material. The formal elements so imparted correspond to two primary impulses of man: (1) imitation, and (2) harmony, rhythm, and melody. Imitation is pleasing to us even when it mirrors the most horrid of objects, for it involves learning and knowing by recognition, and knowing is always pleasant. By harmony, rhythm, and melodies even new-born babies are attracted, because these are natural movements, and natural movements like those of actions are always pleasing. Nature has made man capable of all varieties of artistic skill.

The object of art is imitation, but not merely so. It is the imitation of the universal aspects of things, and an imitation in which the artist can go even as far as to make the copy of the handsome "handsomer" by combining scattered elements and, thus, partly imitating and partly completing what is left by nature incomplete.

The pleasure of art is due to relief by catharsis or release of pent-up emotions. For example, tragedy, which is the imitation of serious action, morally significant and of some magnitude, affords such relief by the catharsis of pity and

---

---

---
Diogenes was about twenty-seven years older than Aristotle and died a year after him. While still very young, he went to Antisthenes in search of wisdom and followed him like a dog. The old cynic did not like him and even beat him with a stick to drive him away, but the lad would not move. His father was a money-changer who had been sent to prison for defacing coins. Diogenes' aim was "to deface all the coinage current in the world. Every conventional stamp was false. The men stamped as generals and kings, the things stamped as honour and wisdom and happiness and riches: all were base metals with lying superscriptions." He discarded all conventions regarding dress and behaviour, procured food by begging, and lived in a tub. He declared brotherhood not only with all human beings but also with animals. It is said that "he once went through the streets holding up a lantern looking for an honest man"; and when Alexander the Great visited him at Corinth and asked him if he could do anything for him he replied, "Yes, stand from between me and the sun."

The Sceptics.—The sceptics were under the influence of the pre-Socratic philosophers of nature. The founder of the school, Pyrrho, was about twenty-three years younger than Aristotle. All our knowledge of him comes from his pupil, Timon, for he himself never wrote any book. He maintained that from the senses we know only what a thing appears and not what it actually is. Nor can we know anything through philosophy, for no two schools agree on any major problem and in every case an affirmation and its denial can be proved with equal force. Philosophy is fruitless because it can create no certainty, and impossible because it leads to endless contradictions. It is equally impossible to know any ethical truth and, therefore, there is no rational ground for the preference of one action to another. Hence in all matters, moral or metaphysical, we should have an attitude of complete indifference.

Timon denied even the possibility of logical reasoning. In order to avoid an endless chain of pro-syllogism to establish a conclusion, we must start from self-evident principles, but there are no self-evident principles and all starting points of reasoning are merely hypothetical. All speculation should, therefore, be suspended.

The school of Pyrrho ended with Timon, but strangely enough his doctrines found their way to the very heart of Plato's institution, the Academy, for they deeply influenced its head, Arcesilaus (316–241 B.C.) and his successor, Carneades (214–129 B.C.). The Academy under the former came to be known as the Middle Academy and under the latter the New Academy. According to Arcesilaus, nothing should be assumed unconditionally. Socrates had said before him that one thing alone he knew and that was that he knew nothing. Arcesilaus went further and declared that he did not even know that with certainty.

(Citation: A. W. Benn, *Philosophy of Greece*, Vol. II, p. 117; Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.,* p. 254)

Greek Thought

His successor, Carneades, admitted that although there is no certainty in knowledge, some judgments have a degree of probability and can be made to guide practice. According to him, the idea of God is full of contradictions and the argument that God exists because the world is rational, beautiful, and good is fallacious. He fully mirrored the moral decadence of Attica in maintaining that unjust aggression against a weak neighbour was the right course of action and that it would be foolish if in a dangerous situation the stronger did not save themselves by sacrificing the weak.

The Stoics.—The Stoic school was founded at Athens nineteen years after the death of Aristotle by Zeno of Citium (in Cyprus) who at the time was twenty-eight years of age. His followers were Cleanthes (third century B.C.), Chrysippus (c. 282–209 B.C.), and Diogenes of Babylonia (second century B.C.). It was Chrysippus who perfected the Stoic system on all sides. After Diogenes the Stoic doctrines moved from Athens to Rome. The school acquired its name from *Stoa Poikile* (the Painted Porch) where it used to assemble. Zeno, like Heraclitus, was a pantheist. He maintained that the universe is a perfect sphere floating in empty space and is animated by its own soul, the Logos or Cosmic Reason. Form or the force that moves and matter that is moved are both corporeal; only the former has finer corporeality than the latter. Both are combined in the individual. The soul is material—a spark of divine fire. It is a *tabula rasa*, a blank tablet, which receives impressions from things. It retains these impressions as memory-images, and from these memory-images forms ideas by abstraction. Thus, while things are objective, concepts are subjective. All our knowledge of objects depends upon percepts and the concepts derived from these percepts. Its criterion is the compelling force of impressions.

The range of Stoic interest was rather narrow. It lay chiefly in ethics. Other studies were taken only as ancillary. According to Stoicism, man's highest duty is to regulate life in accordance with the laws of nature, which manifest the rational purpose of the universe, and thereby reach the highest measure of perfection. Neither pleasure nor self-interest should determine any of his personal or social actions. Reason should rule him and everything in him as the Logos rules the world and all its laws. The laws of his life are virtues. He should master all his passions and emotions and lead the life of perfect virtue. Virtue is the only good and vice the only evil, and the life of virtue alone is the life of happiness.

The Epicureans.—The term "epicureans" is nowadays used to mean those who are seekers of sensuous pleasures. There is no such implication when it is used in connection with the school opened by Epicurus at Athens seventeen years after the death of Aristotle. There is no doubt that Epicurus identified happiness with pleasure and regarded it as the natural and rational goal of life, but he maintained that it consists in the pleasures of the mind, the pleasures of rational living or the pleasures which only men of culture can enjoy. These comprise virtuous conduct, aesthetic appreciation, and friendship of the
A History of Muslim Philosophy

gifted and the noble. The pleasures consistent with reason bear the marks of
moderation, calm, and repose. An intelligent and prudent man can easily see
that pleasures of a life-time are preferable to pleasures of the moment, and
pleasures of the mind, which include, beside the present ones, those of
the past as recollections and those of the future as anticipations, are better
than those of the body. Momentary pleasures have to be sacrificed for the abiding
ones. The function of society is to secure the self-interest or personal happiness
of individuals. The value of all laws and all institutions is to be judged by this
criterion.

Epicurus, like the Stoics, subordinated philosophy to ethics. The aim of
philosophy, according to him, is to enable men to lead a happy life. To lead
a happy life, free from all fear and worry, people must know the criterion of
truth (sense-perception) given by philosophy, and the causes of things
discovered by physics. In metaphysics the Epicureans followed Democritus in
every respect except that they gave the atoms the power to deviate from their
determined path, and so introduced an element of contingency in an otherwise
mechanically-determined world. They shattered many of the religious beliefs
prevalent in their times. According to them, the gods did not create the world
for, being supremely happy, they were not in need of it. Nor is there any
reason to believe that they trouble themselves about the affairs of men. The
soul is not immortal; it perishes with the body.

To the Epicurean school belonged Metrodorus of Lampesacus (d. before
Epicurus), Hermarchus (fl. 270? B.C.), Apollodorus (?) and Zeno of Sidon
(about 150-78 B.C.). None of them added anything to the teachings of the
master. In the first century B.C., Epicureanism, like other philosophical
systems, passed down to Alexandria and Rome, Athens lost its position as
the intellectual centre of the world, and Greek philosophy in Greece virtually
came to an end.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

F. Ueberweg, A History of Philosophy, tr. G. S. Morris and Noah Porter, 2 Vols.,
1872; T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, 4 Vols., tr. Magnus and Berry, 1912; W. Windel
band, History of Ancient Philosophy, tr. H. E. Cushman, 1899; A. W. Benn
baum, History of Greek Philosophy of Greece, 2 Vols., 1898; W. T. Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philo-

Alexandrian and Rome, Athens lost its position as
the intellectual centre of the world, and Greek philosophy in Greece virtually
came to an end.

Chapter V

ALEXANDRIAN-SYRIAC THOUGHT

A

THE NEO-PYTHAGOREANS

The great conquering sweep of Alexander the Great eastwards not only
destroyed the old, intense and narrow life of the self-contained Greek City-
States but also marked a decisive change in the intellectual and spiritual life
of Greece. With the spread of Greek civilisation over the Near East, the hori-
zons of the individual Greeks were greatly enlarged; but the break-up of
the old City-States engendered a sense of isolation and rootlessness which made
people look inward for stability and security, rather than outward as hitherto
done. Another and a more potent reason for this shift in Greek thinking can
be discovered in widespread scepticism after the death of Aristotle. True
scepticism also prevailed when Socrates was born, but the metaphysical specu-
lations of pre-Socratic thinkers led them into the inextricable confusion of
doubt. Socrates asked people to look at man instead of nature, for in the
domain of human problems the competence of reason could be demonstrated
more easily than in that of the physical or the metaphysical. But the protest
which scepticism made after Aristotle was more devastating. It was declared
by the sceptics that the entire philosophical venture of their predecessors was
hopelessly wrong and also that their error was without a remedy.

This was indeed very saddening. It amounted to the confession that not only
were the solutions of the so-called perennial problems of philosophy nonsensical
but also that no satisfactory solution was possible, at least with
the techniques and methods hitherto pursued.

Reason thus assailed could find refuge only in faith. In the period that
follows we find philosophy renouncing its independence and becoming merely

111
A History of Muslim Philosophy

an instrument of theology. Ritter says, "The feeling of alienation and the yearning after a higher revelation are characteristics of the last centuries of the ancient world; this yearning was, in the first place, but an expression of consciousness of the decline of the classical nations and their cultures, the presentation of the approach of a new era, and it called into life not only Christianity but also before it pagan and Jewish Alexandrianism and other related developments."

No longer finding Greece a cordial home for philosophy, the philosophers went over to Egypt and Rome, carrying their doctrines with them. They delivered courses of lectures which were attended with great zeal and enthusiasm by the populace. But the venture did not succeed so well in Rome as it did in Alexandria. In Rome philosophy could lend its weight to poetry, oratory, jurisprudence, and some topics of conversation, but it was in Alexandria that it produced men who gave it originality, vigour, and drive. Alexandria was not simply a centre of Greek culture and scholarship, but also and more significantly a meeting-place for Greek and Eastern thought. It took a cosmopolitan character and showed a marked leaning towards Oriental thought. The result of this interpretation of Greek and Semitic cultures was the synthetic civilization known as Hellenism in contradistinction to the Hellenic or purely Greek civilization. Hellenism rose to supremacy not only in Alexandria and Syria but throughout Western Asia.

It would be incorrect to identify the present geographical boundaries of Syria with its old ones. In Roman days, at the beginning of the Christian era, Syria denoted the country west of the Euphrates and north of the Arabian Desert, including Palestine and Palmyra and extending north to the Taurus. The usual language of Syria was Aramaic, a language akin to Hebrew. The Hebrew word "Arama" is rendered as "Syria" and originally the words Aramaean and Syrian were synonymous. After the Hellenization of the country, the Greek language was used by the ruling class and the officials with very little influence on the masses who continued using their dialect. This state of affairs continued till the first/seventh century when after the Muslim conquest Syria gradually gave way vernacularly and to some extent liturgically to Arabic, though it had great influence on the vocabulary, pronunciation, and even the grammatical forms of Arabic which supplanted it.

For purposes of studying Alexandrian and Syriac philosophy, for the two run together and interpenetrate, we can divide our subject into: —

(1) Neo-Pythagoreanism,
(2) The Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy,
(3) Neo-Platonism, and
(4) Early Christianity.

To all these speculations what is common is "the dualistic opposition of the divine nature; contempt for the world of sense, on the ground of the Platonic doctrines of matter and the descent of the soul of man from a superior world into the body; the theory of intermediate potencies or beings through whom God acts upon the world of phenomena; the requirements of an ascetic self-emancipation from the bondage of sense; and faith in a higher revelation to man when in a state called Enthusiasm."1

Both Neo-Pythagoreanism and the Judaic-Alexandrian philosophy are found together in the beginning of the Christian era. The Neo-Pythagoreans who were fundamentally religious in their outlook and practices were represented by F. Nigerius Figius, Sotion, and particularly Apollonius of Tyana, Moderatus of Gades, and, in later times, Nicomachus of Gerasa and Numenius of Apamea.

The Neo-Pythagoreans were highly eclectic in character. They were greatly influenced by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, not to speak of ancient Pythagoreans whose doctrines they attempted to revive.

Neo-Pythagorean doctrines could not flourish in Rome, where, Senea says they could not find a professor to teach them, but gained a stronghold in Alexandria. The Neo-Pythagoreans combined monotheism with the fatalistic cult of gods and demons but transformed it at the same time with the help of Platonic-Aristotelian teachings into a reverence for God as a pure spirit who is to be served not by outward sacrifices but by silent prayers and with wisdom and virtue. Like Plato and Aristotle, the Neo-Pythagoreans distinguished between unity and plurality and also between the divine and the earthly. Several attempts were made to get rid of this dualism. There arose consequently a great diversity of opinion with regard to the nature of God and the relation He bears to the world. Some identified God with the world-soul of Plato, others thought of Him as an ineffable "Monad" from which flowed both unity and plurality. Still others considered Him immanent but free from all contacts with matter which might pollute Him. It was, therefore, imperative for the Neo-Pythagoreans, especially the last ones, to introduce a Demiurge as a mediator between God and matter.

The metaphysics of the Neo-Pythagorean school required four principles viz., God, the world-reason, the world-soul, and matter, out of which the first three helped in formulating the Christian conception of triune God, while the fourth one paved the way for the doctrine of emanation.

The Neo-Pythagoreans gave a deeper metaphysical meaning to Number. The ultimate ground of all good as well as the order of the universe was provided by the Monad while the Dyad was held responsible for all disorder and imperfection. The Monad became the symbol for Godhead and the Dyad for matter. The gulf between the two, viz., the Monad and the Dyad, was bridged by the introduction of the idea of a world-soul which was built upon the Stoic, Aristotelian, and Platonic conceptions.


Platonic ideas. He traced the philosophy of the Greeks back to the Orientals and called Plato an "Attic-speaking Mosee."

Numenius, however, was not simply a camp-follower of Plato. He differed from him too, since he distinguished the world-builder as a second god from the highest Deity. The basis of this distinction is to be found in his metaphysics where God who is identified sometimes with the Reason of Aristotle, sometimes with the Monad of Pythagoras, and sometimes with both, stands against the creation which because of its imperfections is far inferior to Him. The universe is created by a second god, the Demiurge, who is good by participation in the essence of the first. He acquires knowledge by gazing at the surpassingly archetypes and brings the world into being. The universe which is created by the second god is regarded as the third god by Numenius. Thus considered, God becomes a cosmic triunity comprising three divinities:

Father,
Creator, and
Creature

which Numenius termed father, son, and grandson.

The psychology of Numenius is as dualistic as his metaphysics. Man, being both spiritual and corporeal, participates in both the world-souls. Numenius was wise enough not to condemn body outright. It had to be condemned only when it stood in the way of reason and served as a man's pair in the hands of the evil world-soul. But in spite of his better thinking Numenius could not completely shake off the influence of the prevailing mode of thinking. He held that the enmascorship of the rational part of the soul in the human body did indicate a fall for the soul and that the liberation of the soul could be effected through a long series of reincarnations. Hence the present life should be one of self-denial and renunciation, that is to say, a life of reason devoid of passions. In his stress upon transmigration as a means of liberation, Numenius betrays, like his teacher, Pythagoras, the influence of Hindu thought.

A passing reference may be made to P. Nigidius Figulus for his interest in the Pythagorean philosophy and also to Apollonius of Tyana who distinguished the one God from other gods. The first being ineffable and absolutely pure could not come into contact with earthly things on account of their material constitution. Apollonius did not like offerings to be made to the one God; these he reserved for the lesser gods. We may also briefly mention Modestus of Gadara who incorporated Platonism and non-theological doctrines into Pythagoreanism. Number one he regarded as the symbol of unity and two as that of difference and inequality.

B

The Jewish-Alexandrian Philosophy

Among the precursors of Neo-Platonism are to be counted Neo-Pythagoreanism and Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy in addition to a host of other
tendencies which cannot be discussed here for want of space. Even out of the Jewish thinkers we shall pick out Philo, leaving other luminaries altogether, again for want of space.

Philo, a Jew, was born at Alexandria a few years before Christ. His philosophy is an attempt to find an adjustment between the traditions of Israel and those of the Greeks. Philo felt that the aesthetic elements in Greek culture were repugnant to some of the elements involved in Jewish religion. To smooth out differences and to show the concordance between the two systems of thought and practice, Philo adopted the allegorical method of interpreting the Scriptures already in use among the Alexandrian Jews. On this interpretation, circumcision, for example, would signify and hence serve as a symbol for the cutting off of passions and ungodly opinions. Philo often criticized the literalists for their word-picking habits. But Philo was not a thorough-going symbolist. He knew that if once you defend an external practice on the ground that it is useful as a symbol, it is very hard to assert that it is obligatory for all times to come. Philo, therefore, recognized that the literal sense is often accompanied by a more profound sense and that both the senses have to be accepted since both go together. "Although circumcision properly symbolizes the removal of all passions and sensibility and impious thoughts, yet we may not, therefore, set aside the practice enjoined, for in that case, we should be obliged to give up the public worship of God in the temple and a thousand other solemnities," says he in De Migratione Abrahami.4

Philo was primarily a religious preacher rather than a philosopher. He had no desire to propound a theory of the universe which could stand the scrutiny of logical reason. He was essentially concerned with the life of soul and its attaining the beatific vision. Keeping this objective in view he demarcated the mystical experience from all other psychical experiences on the ground that while the former lifts you out of the ordinary plane of life and brings you in direct contact with some tremendous reality, the latter keeps you earth-bound and sense-bound. In this Philo was following in the footsteps of Plato who exhibits a religio-mystic vein in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, with the difference that Philo being a Jew first and last could not identify God with the impersonal divine reason of Plato. However, in suggesting methods for "soul-cultivation," he again turned his attention to the Greeks, borrowed their psychology, and on its basis framed rules for the systematic training of the soul to receive the vision of God.

The theology of Philo is a blending of Platonism and Judaism. The Jewish doctrine shows God as intimately concerned with the world; the Platonic, though insisting upon the divine governance and divine formation of the world, does not hold that the relation which God has to the world is necessary or automatic. The Middle Platonism recognized a hierarchy of divine beings, insisted upon the transcendence of God, and regarded the visible world as being governed and made by lower intermediary divine powers. Philo had to reconcile these two conceptions.

Philo believed in one God, eternal, unchanging, passionless, far removed above the world of phenomena as the First Cause of all that exists. Causation, however, implies change and so God could not be regarded as directly creating the universe. Intermediary powers are, therefore, needed to explain the governance and formation of the world and what it contains. These powers Philo described very confusedly. Sometimes he talked of powers, sometimes of two powers, sometimes of one.

The problem before Philo was that of the development of multiplicity from absolute unity. The solution was sought in the inability of the contemplating mind to reproduce the absolute unity in itself. Philo gives an account of the "multiple" apparition of God to human intellect in the De Migratione Abrahami. When the soul is illumined by God, it sees Him triple, one with a double shadow; but at the highest point, the shadow vanishes and God is seen as One. In the Quaestiones in Genesim, Philo says that the mind "sees God triple" due to the weakness of its vision. "Just as the bodily eye sees a double appearance from one light, so the eye of the soul, since it cannot apprehend the one as one, makes a triple perception, according to the appearance of the chief serving powers which stand beside the One."4

The highest of all the divine forces is the Logos (Word). Sometimes Philo, in common with Aristobulus and other earlier commentators, gave it the name of Sophia, but the more commonly used word by him is the Logos. In some of his writings he gives to Sophia the highest of the parts into which the Logos is divided. Logos has a dual nature. In man it is reason and also the spoken word. In the All it divides itself into the incorporeal and archetypal ideas of which the intelligible world consists, and the copies of these incorporeal ideas constitute the world of perception.

In other passages Philo has called Sophia the mother of the Logos—ordinarily he calls it divine Logos without qualification or distinction—the mediator between God and man. It is so to say the instrument by which God makes the world and the intermediary by which the human intelligence after being purified ascends to heaven. Philo is not clear on the independent existence of the Logos. On all accounts it seems that in Philo's mind the powers had little or no existence apart from their function. "His conception of them is affected by contemporary Greek ideas, but perhaps they really belong to that mysterious class of instrumental and subordinate quasi-beings which accompany the Divinity in Semitic and Persian thought, the Angel, the Wisdom, the Breath of God in the Jewish Scriptures, the Uncreated Law


of the Rabbis and the quasi-personified Divine Virtues or the attributes of Persian (Zoroastrian) theology, the Amesha Spentas."

Anyhow Philo was not clear on this subject. As Ueberweg says in his History of Philosophy, Philo wavered between the attributive and the substantive conception of the Logos. He both hypothesized the Logos into a person and reduced it to a mere attribute or function of the first person. What is, however, important for subsequent thinking is not the nature of the Logos as such but the identification of the Logos with the Platonic world of forms and the use of this conception in explaining the creation of this world. This led to a very great development in the thought of the medieval theologians. Philosophically speaking, the Philonian Logos is nothing but the principle of unity in diversity, of the separating and uniting of contraries in the material world. But perhaps Philo would not like to be judged philosophically. The idea of Logos was not a metaphysical necessity for him; it was psychologically needed for coming in contact with God.

Philo’s doctrines of “pneuma” and mystical union are equally important. The former is a free creative in-breathing by God, becoming the image of God in man and constituting thereby the highest part of man’s soul, superior to the “psyche.”

Other schools outside Jewish circles were also emphasizing one God, eternal and invariable, as the Source and the First Cause of the universe. The Gnostic sects which were of philosophic origin accepted God as the First Cause, above the imperfections and variations of the mundane world and, therefore, requiring an intermediary or an emanation to explain the production of an imperfect and variable world.

C

NEO-PLATONISM

Plotinus.—The ancestry of Neo-Platonism can be traced to Neo-Pythagoreanism, Jewish Gnosticism, and other tendencies including Christianity, which so to say had become the Weltanschauung of most of those who had any living religion in the world of Greek culture: cruder and more superstitious forms of it in the lower strata of society, more refined and Hellenized forms among the educated.

The founder of Neo-Platonicism was Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus. Saccas means the sack-bearer and as a surname indicates the occupation by which Ammonius earned his living. Nothing definite can be asserted with regard to his philosophic convictions. Some have asserted that he proclaimed the identity of Aristotelian and Platonic doctrines and also the immortality of the soul. But there is no historical evidence to decide one way or the other. Nor is there any justification for holding that Ammonius was the first to formulate the doctrine that the One is exterior to the world of ideas—a doctrine of fundamental importance in the system of Plotinus.

Plotinus was an Egyptian of Greek speech and culture, born probably in 205 A.D. About his race and parentage nothing is certain, for he was, as Porphyry says,

“like a man ashamed of being in the body.”

At the age of twenty-eight he went to Alexandria to receive philosophical training. He was surely disappointed till at last he came to Ammonius whose teachings satisfied him completely. With Ammonius he remained for eleven long years and left him only to accompany the Emperor Gordian in the hope of studying Persian and Indian philosophy. The mission proved unsuccessful and Plotinus had to flee for his life to Antioch. At the age of forty, he went to Rome where he succeeded in winning the king and queen over to his doctrines. With the approval of the king he wanted to found a Philosopher’s City, where the inhabitants should live according to the teachings of Plato. The timely intervention of the nobles dissuaded the king from accepting such a silly proposal. In Rome he established his own school and taught there for the rest of his life. A painful death, probably cancer of the throat, marked in 270 A.D. the end of his illustrious career.

It is certain that Plotinus was conversant with the principal doctrines of all the philosophical schools of the Greeks, particularly Aristotelian and Platonie. He had read very assiduously the works of Numenius and came under his influence. This probably accounts for the complexities and tensions that one finds in his writings. It was not an easy task to synthesize the extremely complicated traditions that Plotinus had inherited. There is a double purpose in his philosophy, the cosmic and the religious. He purports to give a complete account of reality which should also serve as a guide to spiritual life. These two strains go together and can be kept apart for theoretical purposes only. However, there is no denying the fact that the double task put a great strain on Plotinus’ philosophical endeavour and led him to say much that sounds bizarre to the modern ear.

Reality, for Plotinus, is an ordered hierarchic whole comprising two movements, one of descent and the other of ascent. The first is an automatic creativitv by which the higher generates the lower, while the second is a movement of return by which the soul attains reabsorption in the Divine Source. The first is a movement from unity to multiplicity, the second is a reverse movement, that is to say, from multiplicity to unity. Plotinus sometimes emphasizes the one and sometimes the other and says things which are hard to reconcile. It is evident from his writings that he imposed upon himself a task which by its very nature was impossible to accomplish.

At the head of his system stands a transcendent First Principle, the One

which is ineffable and incomprehensible to the discursive as well as the intuitive reason. Below the One lie the two hypostases which are the universal correlatives of the whole range of human life, physical and intellectual. These are Nous, Aristotle’s active intellect, and the world-soul whose function is to contemplate as well as to direct the material world. The hypostases are united with each other and with the One, first, by emanation which is the radiation of the lower from the higher and, second, by return in contemplation by the lower upon the higher.

Plotinus’ conception of the One is very complicated and has been variously interpreted. The One may be regarded as the Neo-Pythagorean Absolute Unity from which all plurality proceeds. The One cannot be said to have a being, for this way of thinking introduces a duality between subject and object and there can be no duality in Pure Unity. In the absolute state, in its first and highest hypostasis, the One is neither existence nor thought, neither moved, nor movable; it is simple unity or, as Hegel would say, the Absolute Nothing, the Immanent Negative. There is a tendency in Plotinus derived from the Platonists and Middle Stoics to deny all predications to the One for fear of compromising its unity. This tendency is, however, corrected by another much more positive approach. If the One is called God, then God is God not because He is nothing but because He embraces everything. He is, however, better than the reality of which He is the source. The ideas no doubt form the content of His mind but they are nevertheless imperfect images as compared to the one Good, and receive radiance, “as grace playing upon their beauty” from the Primal Source. The positive aspect of the One is stressed so much at places that it seems to contradict Plotinus’ basic assumptions. The One, he says, is pure will, loves itself and is the cause of itself. This characterization conflicts with his earlier stand and justifies the use of human language for the basic reality.

In Plotinus, the negative and positive aspects go together. The positive aspect is, however, more pronounced. The One may be transcendent, but if It is a reality, It should not simply be a Great Denial about which nothing positive can be asserted.

This point can receive further clarification from an examination of the religious life of Plotinus. There is no doubt that he had a genuine mystical experience. Porphyry bears testimony to it and the whole spirit and the tenor of the Enneads lends weight to it. But what is the nature of this experience and what is its goal? Some make Plotinus a pantheist and an anti-rationalist, for whom the goal is a dissolution of the self into nothingness. Some think that he was trying to realize his pre-existing identity with the One through his own efforts, while others think that his experience was genuinely mystical, akin to that of the great Christian and Muslim mystics. The first interpretation is absurd, the second is partially true. It is, however, the third one which truly explains his viewpoint.

Plotinus was torn so to say by the conflicting traditions he had inherited.

---

A History of Muslim Philosophy

Alexandrio-Syracuse Thought

The One was both transcendental and the Unity-Absolute. Again, the One was both inaccessible and also the goal of our own self-realization. Plotinus’ contradictions and tensions are the product of these irreconcilable strains in his Weltanschauung. In both cases the positive aspect predominates. But it should not be ignored that the tension is real and fundamental.

How did the world originate from the One? Thinkers before Plotinus had assumed dualism; they had distinguished the world from its creator. But dualism was no answer to the problem. If the creator and the created differ in essence the question whence came the world remains as unsolved as ever Plotinus answered the question by saying that the world is distinct from God in act rather than in essence. The world is God but God is not the world. To explain it Plotinus had the theory of emanation.

Plotinus found it very hard to explain emanation except through metaphors. Both Nous and soul are produced by a spontaneous and necessary efflux of life from the One. They leave their source undiminished. The relation between the One and the other hypostases is described as being like that of the sun and its light or “in similes from the radiative effect of fire, snow or perfume.” Can any philosophical meaning be given to this conception? It is difficult to see what meaning can be attached to emanation or radiation when attached to spiritual beings. Again, why, if the process is eternal, can one emanation be inferior to another? These are points which pass comprehension.

Plotinus has another way to explain his theory of emanation. He represents the One as a root or seed, the potentiality from which all things evolve into actuality. This comparison is used to describe the relation of the lower hypostases to the higher. About the soul, he says, it has potentialities which can only be actualized in the material world. Plotinus writes, “If then it is necessary that not only the One should exist... in the same way it is also necessary that not only souls should exist in the absence of those things which come into being through them; that is supposed that every nature has this inherent quality of making that which comes after it and of unrolling itself as if proceeding from a sort of partless seed as a beginning to the perceptible end. The prior being remains always in its proper place and that which comes after is as it were generated from an ineffable power (or potency).” This will show that the comparison to a seed is applied to all the hypostases including the One itself. But it will be evident to every student of Plotinus that the comparison sets up an impossible contradiction to the rest of the Enneads. The One may be the beginning of everything, but it cannot be the spasmatic beginning. The system of Plotinus is teleological rather than evolutionary: the main thrust of the universal forces is upwards and not downwards.

The second hypostasis, the first emanation of the One, the Nous, is a very complicated notion. It is an image of the former and turns towards It to grasp

---

A History of Muslim Philosophy

and comprehend it. Through turning, it becomes Nous (reason) — sensory perception when the object of comprehension is sensible, and rational apprehension when the object of comprehension is supersensible. The Nous includes in itself the world of ideas. Consequently, the ideas are immanent in the Nous and do not exist as external to it.

It is clear that Plotinus needed an emanation in order that the First Cause should remain unchanged. It is the Nous which is the reality behind the world of phenomena; the things perceived are only the shadows of the real ones.

From the Nous proceeds the third hypostasis, viz., Psyche, the principle of life and motion, the world-soul, which is in the universe and is shared by every living creature. The whole world is alive, he held, and seems to participate in a life similar to our own. Further, life requires a cause which must be found in intelligence, for everywhere one finds intelligent activities. Plotinus maintains that the intelligent activity is nothing but a soul.

Porphyry.—The most important of the disciples of Plotinus was Porphyry, born in 232 A.D., probably at Sardis in Lydia. He was altogether a lesser man but all the same a very loyal disciple and a devout follower, who by his pleasing diction brought within the range of understanding of all men the doctrines of Plotinus, which in the language of its author had seemed difficult and obscure. Porphyry was more practical and religious than his master. He declared the end of philosophizing to be the salvation of the soul. The cause of evil is the desire for the low and the base, and the means of deliverance are self-purification, asceticism, and philosophic cognition of God. While in Sicily, he wrote a book in which he criticized the doctrines of Christianity, especially the divinity of Christ. He is the first among the successors of Plotinus to defend Hellenic paganism against Christianity. His interest in demons as intermediaries between God and man is very much pronounced and he has a great deal to say about them.

Iamblichus.—Iamblichus was a native of Chalcis in Coele-Syria, and a pupil of Porphyry. Like his master he taught at Rome after the death of Plotinus but retired in later life to Syria where he died in 330 A.D.

The philosophy of Iamblichus is marked by an invasiveness of Syrian theology with its grosser conceptions, its wild and nonsensical trick of playing with numbers, and its craving for the baser forms of the supernatural. Iamblichus put faith above history and revelation, denounced the later Greek philosophy, and asserted that God could do everything.

After Plotinus, the Neo-Platonists were up against the mighty surge of Christianity. To stem it, they worked to bring about a complete and thorough theology based on the Dialogues of Plato, Chaldean oracles, and the ancient myths: Greek, Egyptian, or Near Eastern. They were also concerned with elaborating the system of Plotinus and making it absolutely complete.

Iamblichus assumes still another absolutely indefinable and indeterminate first One above the One of Plotinus. The latter has produced the intelligible world, out of which the intellectual world has emanated. The objects of thought belong to the intelligible world while thinking belongs to the intellectual world. Then there is further splitting up, sub-division, or classification which makes the whole system nonsensically abstract and hopelessly unreal. Plotinus had distinguished Being, Life, and Intelligence, but had never gone so far as to break the complex unity into three hypostases. This was done by Iamblichus and his followers. Hence complications arose not because their philosophical principles were fantastic — which indeed they were — but because they tried to accommodate every god, demon, and hero of the pagan mythology into their system. The motive behind this attempt was a genuine desire to explain the emergence of multiplicity from unity which was accomplished by the interpolation of the intermediate terms. It was, however, forgotten that no such attempt was destined to succeed as there can be nothing intermediate between the Absolute and other things. Increase in the number of deities, demons, and spirits cannot, philosophically speaking, solve the old riddle of the One and the many.

In the hands of Iamblichus and his followers philosophy became a conglomerate of mythological beings, an amazing metaphysical museum with entities labelled and classified, leaving no room for any free intellectual and spiritual quest.

The philosophy of Iamblichus and his followers was the last Neo-Platonic attempt to provide an alternative scheme of thought and life to Christianity which was emerging ahead among the masses and the intellectuals. After a brief success Neo-Platonism failed to capture the imagination of the common man, with the result that the centres of its teaching in Syria, Alexandria, and Athens were closed by a royal edict in 529 A.D.

D

EARLY CHRISTIANITY

A great part of the Christian belief was formed of notions current in the Hellenic world. When the early preachers of Christianity explained the position of Jesus in the totality of things, they did so in terms which bore a close resemblance to conceptions already current in the pagan and the Jewish worlds. Christianity had to assimilate elements from its Hellenistic environment. Its theology was influenced by gnosticism, which has been aptly termed as Hellenistic theology.

It was common to all forms of Hellenistic theology that the material world accessible to senses is evil and consequently very much inferior to the transcendental world; further, that the soul which has divine origin could win its way back through self-renunciation and purification. While talking of evil the gnostics primarily thought of the material world and evils connected with sensual passions and not the injustice of the actual state of things or the inequality in the distribution of economic goods or the pains of poverty, disease, and oppression which are ordinarily associated with evil by the modern man.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

With regard to the person of Jesus, there is a difference of opinion in the Hellenistic theology. It is argued that in Jesus a pre-existing heavenly being was present upon earth, but as to the manner of his corporeal manifestation, there is a variety of speculations. All alike regard Jesus Christ as a compound; they differ, however, with regard to the nature and mode of the combination of the human and divine elements in his person.

All these beliefs and controversies were taken over to the Christian Church and formed a basis for their understanding of the Testament. The Christians had their own philosophers too who endeavoured to reconcile philosophy and Christian theology. The prominent among them at Alexandria were Clement and Origen. The former was a Platonist of the older type who shows in his *Stromateis* how the general body of the Christian doctrine is adapted to the theories of Platonic philosophy. The latter also undertook a defence of the Christian faith against the objections of a Platonist. He was first among the Christian theologians to set forth the doctrines of the Christian faith in a systematic form.

Both Clement and Origen founded the Christian school of philosophical theology. But the attempt did not find favour with the people. The same Justinian who closed the school of the Neo-Platonists in 529 A.D. condemned Origenism in nine anathemas in about 540 A.D.

Having been made to quit Alexandria, Origen returned to Palestine and founded a school at Caesarea, on the model of that in Alexandria. It did not succeed like the original one but nevertheless exercised a potent influence on the Syrian Church. A rival school was set up at Antioch by Malchion. Fifty years later another school was established at Nisibis, right in the heart of the Syrian-speaking community. It was here that the text-books studied at Antioch were rendered into Syriac.

The Church had no philosophy of its own. It had to adapt itself to the Alexandrian philosophy, particularly to Neo-Platonism and Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology. This led to senseless controversies as the Arian doctrine shows. Both the Alexandrian and the Syrian Churches agreed that Christ was an emanation, eternal like God, but differed in their interpretation of eternity. The school of Antioch thought that God being the cause, there was a time when God existed but not the Son. This was denied by the Alexandrians who maintained that eternity does not admit of before and after. If God is Father He is so from eternity and the Son should for ever be issuing from the Father as the source.

The Arian controversy died by the fifth century A.D. giving place to another which concerned the person of the incarnate Christ. It was largely a question of psychology. In *De Anima* Aristotle had defined soul as the first actuality of a natural body having in it the capacity of life "and described its four faculties as the nutritive, the sensible, the locomotive, and the intellectual. The first three are common to men and animals, being concerned with the intake of food and with knowledge through sense and desire. The fourth one which is the intellect, *Nous*, or the rational soul is peculiar to man. It is independent of the body and the presumption is that it has its source not in the body."

Man is therefore a compound of psyche and the rational soul, the first signifying the first three functions of the soul, the second, the fourth one which later philosophy regarded as the emanation of Logos or the Agent Intellect. Difficulty arose about the co-presence of these elements in the personality of Christ. What would be the relationship between the Logos and psyche, its own emanation, when they come together in the same person? The question was discussed by the gnostics too. They regarded human nature, that is, the psyche of Jesus Christ, either as a mere illusion or so detached from the divine that we have really two persons. On the second view the man Jesus is regarded as having been originally distinct from the heavenly Christ. The latter descended into him at his baptism and the compound Jesus Christ came to be. Some people put the coalescence of the two at an early date.

Both these positions were taken by the Church. The Alexandrians thought that the psyche and Logos fused in the person of Christ, while the school of Antioch headed by Nestorius rejected the hypothesis outright. Nestorius conceived of Christ as uniting in himself two persons, the Logos and a man. Although the two persons were so united that they might in a sense be deemed one.

As the controversy became acute a council was held at Ephesus in 431 A.D. where the Alexandrians succeeded in getting Nestorius and his followers condemned as heretics. They were persecuted and forced to migrate from Egypt. Accordingly, they founded a school in Edessa, a Syriac-speaking district. The school became the resort of the Nestorians and centre of the vernacular-speaking Syriac Church. This school was also banned and the scholars had to take refuge in Persia.

The Nestorians had to support their theories by the prevailing philosophy and so every Nestorian missionary was to some extent a propagandist of Greek philosophy. They translated into Syriac the works of Aristotle and his commentators, and also the works of the theologians.

The Nestorians had no sympathy with the government which had persecuted them. Consequently they spurned its language and celebrated the sacrament only in Syriac. They promoted a distinctly native theology and philosophy by means of translated material and Syriac commentaries.

The advocates of the fusion theory, the Monophysites or Jacobites as they were called, the rivals of the Nestorians, fared no better at the hands of the government. They were also persecuted and expelled. Consequently, they too bycotted the Greek language and began using Coptic and Syriac. In philosophy they were inclined more towards Neo-Platonism and mysticism than the Nestorians.

Ibas who led the Nestorian migration to Persia translated Porphyry's *Isagoge*, a manual of logic, into Syriac, while Probus produced commentaries
A History of Muslim Philosophy

on this book as well as on Aristotle's *Hermeneutica*, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, and *Analytica Priora*. Sergius, a Jacobite, wrote about the *Isagoge*, the “Table of Porphyry,” Aristotle’s “Categories” and *De Mundo*. He also wrote treatises on logic in seven volumes. Abudemneh composed treatises on the definition of logic, on free-will, on the soul, on man considered to be a microcosm, and on man as a composition of soul and body. Paul the Persian produced a treatise on logic which he dedicated to a Persian king.

The Jacobites produced works no less than the Nestorians. Their productions are enormous no doubt but, all the same, they lack originality. For the most part they are only the transmission of received texts with their translations, commentaries, and explanatory treatises. But it cannot be denied that they fulfilled a genuine need and became a means of spreading Greek philosophy and culture far beyond its original home.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**Part 2**

**Chapter VI**

**PRE-ISLAMIC ARABIAN THOUGHT**

In the present chapter, we are concerned only with the people of Arabia who lived in the age immediately preceding the rise of Islam. The ancient civilized inhabitants of southern Arabia, the Sabaens and Himyarites, have been left out of account, not only because the relevant materials at our disposal are scanty and fragmentary, but also because they are far removed from the Islamic times, with which the present volume is primarily and directly concerned.

We cannot hope to understand properly the religious or philosophical ideas of a people without comprehending their economic and social background. A few words about the social structure of pre-Islamic Arabs should, therefore, form a suitable and helpful prelude to a description of their religious outlook.

The land of Arabia is mainly a sandy plain, which is partly steppe-land and partly desert. Except in the oases which are few and far between, the land is bare and monotonous, unfit for cultivation and unable to support settled communities. From times immemorial, its inhabitants have been of necessity nomadic, living on the produce of their camels and sheep. The majority of the ancient Arabs were, therefore, pastoralists who were constantly on the move in search of grass and water for their herds and flocks. Restless and rootless, without permanent habitations, they stood at a low level of culture and were innocent of those arts and sciences which are associated in our minds with civilized life. The art of reading and writing was confined only to a few individuals in certain commercial centres, while illiteracy was almost universal among the sons of the desert. Their mental horizon was narrow, and the struggle for existence in their inhospitable environment was so severe that their energies were exhausted in satisfying the practical and material needs of daily life, and they had little time or inclination for religious or philosophic speculation. Their religion was a vague polytheism and their philosophy was summed up in a number of pithy sayings.

Although the ancient Arabs had no written literature, they possessed a language which was distinguished for its extraordinary rich vocabulary. In the absence of painting and sculpture, they had cultivated their language as a fine art and were justly proud of its enormous power of expression. Accordingly, the poets and orators who could make an effective and aesthetic use of its wonderful resources were held in especially high esteem among them.

Judging by the evidence furnished by the pre-Islamic poets, polemical passages in the Qur’ān, and the later Islamic literature, idolatry based on polytheism prevailed throughout ancient Arabia. Almost every tribe had its own god, which was the centre of its religious life and the immediate object of its devotion. The ancient Arabs, however, at the same time believed in the existence of a Supreme God, whom they called Allah. But this belief was rather vague and their faith in Him was correspondingly weak. They might invoke Allah in time of danger, but as soon as the danger was over they forgot all about Him. They also recognized and worshipped a large number of other subordinate gods along with Him, or at least thought that they would intercede for them with Him. Three deities in particular, viz., al-Uzza, al-Manāt, and al-Lāt, were accorded special veneration as the daughters of Allah. It was this association of subordinate deities with Allah which is technically known as *shšír (association of gods with Allah) and which was condemned by the Prophet as an unpardonable sin. Shšír was held in special abhorrence, as it obscured belief in the oneness of God.

The innumerable deities, which the pagan Arabs worshipped, form a long
A History of Muslim Philosophy

series and are the subject of a monograph, written by Ibn al-Kalbi, who flourished in the second century of the Islamic era and is counted among the leading authorities on Arabian antiquity. A few of them have been incidentally mentioned in the Qur’ān also.

These Arabian deities, which were of diverse nature, fell into different categories. Some of them were personifications of abstract ideas, such as ābd (lucky), sād (fortunate, auspicious), riḍā (good-will, favour), wādū (friendship, affection), and manāfīr (height, high place). Though originally abstract in character, they were conceived in a thoroughly concrete fashion. Some deities derived their names from the places where they were venerated. Dhu al-Khalasah and Dhu al-Shara may be cited as examples of this kind.

The heavenly bodies and other powers of nature, venerated as deities, occupied an important place in the Arabian pantheon. The sun (gīhās, regarded as feminine) was worshipped by several Arab tribes, and was honoured with a sanctuary and an idol. The name ‘Abd Shams, “Servant of the Sun,” was found in many parts of the country. The sun was referred to by descriptive titles also, such as shārīq, “the brilliant one.” The constellation of the Pleiades (al-Thurayya), which was believed to bestow rain, also appears as a deity in the name ‘Abd al-Thurayya. The planet Venus, which shines with remarkable brilliance in the clear skies of Arabia, was revered as a great goddess under the name of al-Uzza, which may be translated as “the Most Mighty.” It had a sanctuary at Nakhlah near Mecca. The name ‘Abd al-Uzza was very common among the pre-Islamic Arabs. The Arabian cult of the planet Venus has been mentioned by several classical and Syriac authors.

There were certain Arabian deities whose titles in themselves indicate that they occupied a position of supreme importance in the eyes of their votaries. Such deities were: al-Malik, “the King” (compare the personal name, ‘Abd al-Malik); and Ba‘l or Ba‘al, “the Lord,” which was very common among the northern Semites.

The deities of heathen Arabia were represented by idols, sacred stones, and other objects of worship. Sacred stones served at the same time as altars; the blood of the victims was poured over them or smeared over them. At the period with which we are dealing, the Arabs sacrificed camels, sheep, goats, and, less often, kine. The flesh of the sacrifice was usually eaten by the worshippers, the god considering himself with the blood alone. Originally, every sacrifice was regarded as food to be consumed by the god concerned or at least as a means of pacifying him. The sacrifice was, thus, believed to bring the worshipper into close connection with the deity. Hence the Arabic terms, qurbā and qurbān (derived from the root, QRB, to be near), which are used for a sacrifice.

The Arabs, like the Hebrews, were in the habit of sacrificing the firstlings of their flocks and herds (fara‘). Soon after the birth of an infant, his head

1 Ibn al-Kalbi, Kitāb al-Aṣmā‘, ed. Ahmad Zaki Pāsha, Cairo, 1914.

Pre-Islamic Arabian Thought

as shaven and a sheep was sacrificed on his behalf. This practice has survived among the Arabs and other Muslim peoples to the present day under the name of ʿaqiqah. Perhaps, this was originally a ransom, offered as a substitute for the child himself.

The gods of heathen Arabia were represented not only by rude blocks of stone (nusūb, pl. anṣāb), but also by statues, made with more or less skill. The usual word for a divine statue, whether of stone or wood, was samām. The other word used for this purpose was waṣīf, which seems primarily to mean nothing more than a stone.

Examples of tree-worship are also found among the ancient Arabs. The tree known as dhūt al-anwāt, “that on which things are hung,” received divine honours; weapons and other objects were suspended from it. At Nakhlah, the goddess ‘Uzza is said to have been worshipped in the form of three trees.

The gods of the heathen Arabs were mostly represented by idols, which were placed in temples. These temples served as places of worship, where offerings and sacrifices were made by their votaries. The temples were by no means imposing buildings like those of the Egyptians or the Greeks. They were simple structures, sometimes mere walls or enclosures marked by stones. Not only the temples were venerated as holy places, but sometimes the surrounding areas were also treated as sacred and inviolable (himā), and were supposed to be under the special protection of their respective gods.

In connection with several temples, we read of priests who served as their custodians (sādās, pl. sādām). They received the worshippers and gave them admission to the shrine. The office was generally hereditary, since we read of priestly families which were attached to particular temples. Another word used for a priest was kāhin, a term which was employed for a soothsayer as well. The priests were believed to be under the influence of the gods and to possess the power of foretelling future events and of performing other superhuman feats. In this way, their pronouncements resembled the ancient Greek oracles and were likewise vague and equivocal. In course of time, the priest who was in the beginning simply the custodian of the temple developed the character of a soothsayer as well, and thus the term kāhin came to acquire the sense of a soothsayer and seer. There were female soothsayers as well.

Arabic literature has preserved many stories about kāhinā and many utterances are attributed to them. These utterances were usually made in a rhymer prose, and are interesting not only in respect of their content but also with regard to their style. Their pronouncements consisted of a few concise sentences, which ended in words having the same rhyme. This mode of expression was known as sa‘. The same style is found in the earliest revelations received by the Prophet which now constitute the last chapters of the Qur’ān. It is, therefore, not surprising that the contemporaries of the Prophet called him a kāhin, a position which he firmly repudiated. While in the beginning, the Qur’ān adopted the style peculiar to sa‘, it raised the conception to a level far beyond the imagination of the soothsayers. There is another point of
similarity which should be noted here. The utterances of the kohins were prefaced by oaths, swearing by the earth and sky, the sun, moon, and stars, light and darkness, and plants and animals of all kinds. These oaths offer an interesting point of comparison with the oaths used in the Qur’an.

The temples of the heathen Arabs were for them not only places of worship but also places of pilgrimage. They assembled there periodically at certain times of the year, when these assemblies assumed the character of fairs and festivals.

An important sanctuary of this kind was located at Mecca, a town in western Arabia which was situated at a distance of about fifty miles inland from the Red Sea. The town lay on the trade-route which led along the sea from the Yemen to Syria, and its situation may have been partly determined by the presence of a well, called Zamzam, which has a considerable and fairly constant supply of water. The sanctuary consisted of a simple stone structure of cube-like appearance, which was called the Ka‘bah by the Arabs. One of the walls contained a black stone (al-hajar al-aswad). Inside the Ka‘bah was the statue of the god, Hubal. At its feet, there was a small pit in which offerings to the temple were deposited. Besides Hubal, al-Lat, al-‘Uzza, and al-Manat were also worshipped at Mecca and are mentioned in the Qur’an. At the rise of Islam, the temple is said to have contained as many as three hundred and sixty idols. It seems that in course of time the various Arab tribes had brought in their gods and placed them in the Ka‘bah, which had consequently acquired the character of the national pantheon for the whole of Arabia.

From times immemorial, the Ka‘bah at Mecca had been the centre of a great pilgrimage, in which the most diverse tribes from all over Arabia took part. But this was possible only when peace reigned in the land. For this purpose, the month of Dhu al-Hijjah in which the rites and ceremonies connected with the pilgrimage were performed and the preceding and succeeding months of Dhu al-Qa‘dah and Muharram — altogether three consecutive months — were regarded as sacred months, during which tribal warfare was prohibited. This period was sufficiently long to enable the tribes from the remotest corners of Arabia to visit the Ka‘bah and return to their homes in peace. The territory around Mecca was also treated as sacred (baram); and the pilgrims laid aside their weapons when they reached this holy territory. The pilgrimage was called hajj.

During the pilgrimage, the pilgrims had to perform a number of rites and ceremonies, which lasted for several days and which can be described here only with the utmost brevity.

As soon as the pilgrims entered the sacred territory, the baram, they had to practise self-denial by observing a number of prohibitions: they had to abstain from hunting, fighting, sexual intercourse, and certain other things. They circumambulated the Ka‘bah, and also kissed the Black Stone which was fixed in one of its walls. An essential rite of the hajj was a visit to the hill of ‘Arafat on the ninth of Dhu al-Hijjah, when the pilgrims assembled in the adjoining

plain and stayed there till sunset for the prescribed wuqfi (the stays or halts). The hill of ‘Arafat is said to have borne another name, Nebi, which may have been the name of the shrine or rather of the deity worshipped there in ancient times. The pilgrims then went to Muzdalifah, which was consecrated to Quzah, the thunder-god. Here they spent the night, when a fire was kindled on the sacred hill. At sunrise the pilgrims left for Mina, an open plain, where they sacrificed the animals, camels, goats, and sheep, which they had brought with them for the purpose. The animals meant for sacrifice were distinguished by special coverings or other marks. During their stay at Mina, the pilgrims also used to throw stones at three prescribed sites as a part of the pilgrimage ceremonial. After staying at Mina for three days, the pilgrims left for their homes. Women took part in the pilgrimage along with men.

The hajj as described above was retained by the Prophet as a major religious institution of Islam, with certain modifications of its ceremonies which were intended to break the link with their pagan associations. While the position of the Ka‘bah was emphasized as the house built by the Patriarch Abraham for the service of Allah, the halts (wuqfi) at ‘Arafat (along with the one at Muzdalifah) was retained as an essential feature of the Islamic hajj.

In addition to the innumerable gods, the heathen Arabs also believed in the existence of demons, shadowy beings, which they called the jinn (variant: janna). The word probably means covered or hidden. Hence the jinn meant beings invisible to the eye. They were regarded as crafty and mischievous, almost malevolent, and were consequently held in fear. They were supposed to haunt places dreaded either for their loneliness or for their unhealthy climate. The fear of the jinn, therefore, gave rise to various stories, in which they are said to have killed or carried off human beings. Like many other primitive peoples, the heathen Arabs believed in demoniacal possession. The jinn were supposed to enter human beings and even animals, rendering them “possessed” or mad. According to the testimony of the Qur’an, the Meccans believed that there was a kinship between Allah and the jinn, and that they were His partners. Accordingly they made offerings to them and sought aid from them.

In spite of the bewildering multiplicity of the subordinate gods whom the pre-Islamic Arabs venerated, they believed in the existence of a Supreme God whom they called Allah. The word Allah is found in the inscriptions of northern Arabia and also enters into the composition of the numerous personal names among them. There are a large number of passages in the poetry of the heathen Arabs in which Allah is mentioned as a great deity. Allah also occurs in many idiomatic phrases which were in constant use among them. The Qur’an itself testifies that the heathens themselves regarded Allah as the Supreme Being. Their sin, however, consisted in the fact that they worshipped other gods besides Him. It was against this shirk that the Prophet waged an unrelenting war. In any case, it is important to note that the Qur’anic monotheism did

---

not find it necessary to introduce an altogether new name for the Supreme Being and, therefore, adopted Allah, the name already in use.

Even before the advent of Islam, old polytheism was losing its force in Arabia, since the Arabs' notion of their gods had always been vague. With the decline of old paganism, a number of men had appeared in various parts of the country who had become convinced of the folly of idolatry, and were seeking another more satisfying faith. They were fairly numerous and were called Hanifs. The Qur'ān uses this term in the sense of a monotheist, and describes Abraham the Patriarch as the first Ḥanīf. But none of these Hanifs had the vision and force of conviction and the proselytizing zeal which distinguished the mission of Muhammad.

The ancient Arabs believed that the human soul was an ethereal or air-like substance quite distinct from the human body. As such, they considered it identical with breath. This identification was so complete in their view that the word for breath, ʿanfī, came to mean human personality itself. They were confirmed in this belief by their experience that death resulted when a human being ceased to breathe. At the time of death, breath along with life itself escaped through its natural passage, the mouth or the nostrils. When a person passed away on his death-bed, his soul was said to escape through his nostrils (māḥa ṣīfah ʿanfī), and in the case of a violent death, e.g., on a battle-field, through the gaping wound.

When a person was murdered, he was supposed to long for vengeance and to thirst for the blood of the murderer. If the vengeance was not taken, the soul of the murdered man was believed to appear above his grave in the shape of an owl continually crying out, “Give me to drink” (iqātī), until the murder was avenged. The restless soul in the form of a screeching owl was supposed to escape from the skull, the skull being the most characteristic part of the dead body. Certain rites of burial, prevalent among the pre-Islamic Arabs, show that they believed in some sort of future existence of the soul. In order to show honour to a dead chief, for instance, a camel which had been previously hamstrung was tethered near the grave and was left to starve. This usage can be explained only on the hypothesis that the animal was to be at the service of the dead man. The custom of slaughtering animals at the graves of elders has been kept up in Arabia to the present day. Ancient poets often express the wish that the graves of those whom they love may be refreshed with abundant rain. Similarly, they sometimes address greetings to the dead. It may be that expressions of this kind are not merely rhetorical figures of speech; they probably indicate their belief in the survival of those who have departed from this world.

Although there are indications that the ancient Arabs had some notion, however hazy, of the survival of the human soul after death, they had no clear notion of life after death. As stated in the Qur'ān, they could not understand how a human being, after his bones had been reduced to dust, could be called to life once again. Since life after death was something beyond their compre-
needy and the poor, hospitality to the guest and the wayfarer, and persistence in revenge. Courage in battle and fortitude in warfare were particularly required in a land where might was generally right and tribes were constantly engaged in attacking one another. It is, therefore, not a mere chance that in the famous anthology of Arabian verse, called the Ǧamāils, poems relating to inter-tribal warfare occupy more than half of the book. These poems applauded the virtues most highly prized by the Arabs—bravery in battle, patience in hardship, defiance of the strong, and persistence in revenge.

The tribal organization of the Arabs was then, as now, based on the principle of kinship or common blood, which served as the bond of union and social solidarity. To defend the family and the tribe, individually and collectively, was, therefore, regarded as a sacred duty; and honour required that a man should stand by his people through thick and thin. If kinsmen sought help, it was to be given promptly, without considering the merits of the case. Chivalrous devotion and disinterested self-sacrifice on behalf of their kinsmen and friends were, therefore, held up as a high ideal of life.

Generosity and hospitality were other virtues which were greatly extolled by the Arab poets. They were personified in Ǧātim of the tribe of Tāyy, of whom many anecdotes are told to this day. Generosity was specially called into play in the frequent famines, with which Arabia is often afflicted through lack of rain. The Arabian sense of honour also called blood for blood. Vengeance for the slain was an obligation which lay heavy on the conscience of the pagan Arabs. It was taken upon the murderer or upon one of his fellow-tribesmen. Usually this ended the matter, but sometimes it led to a regular blood-feud, which lasted for a long period and in which many persons lost their lives. The fear of retribution had a salutary effect in restraining the lawless instincts of the Bedouin; but the vendetta in some cases was carried to extreme limits and involved a great loss of human life.

In the century before Muhammad, Arabia was not wholly abandoned to paganism. Both Judaism and Christianity claimed a considerable following among its inhabitants. Almost every calamity that befell the land of Palestine sent a fresh wave of Jewish refugees into Arabia, sometimes as far as the Yemen. They had probably taken refuge there after the conquest of Palestine by Titus in 70 A.D. Jewish colonists flourished in Medina and several other towns of northern Hijāz. In the time of the Prophet, three large Jewish tribes, viz., Naḍhr, Qua’ajah, and Qainuqa’, dwelt in the outskirts of Medina, and the fact that the Prophet made an offensive and defensive alliance with them for the safety of the town shows that they were an important factor in the political life of those times. These colonies had their own teachers and centres of religious study. Judging by the few extant specimens of their poetry, these refugees, through contact with a people nearly akin to themselves, had become fully Arabized both in language and sentiment. They, however, remained Jews in the most vital particular, religion, and it is probable that they exerted a strong influence over the Arabs in favour of monotheism.

Pre-Islamic Arabian Thought

Another religious factor which was strongly opposed to Arabian paganism was the Christian faith. How early and from what direction Christianity first entered Arabia is a question which it is difficult to answer with certainty; but there is no doubt that Christianity was widely diffused in the southern and northern parts of Arabia at the time of the Prophet. Christianity is said to have been introduced in the valley of Najrān in northern Yemen from Syria, and it remained entrenched in spite of the terrible persecution it suffered at the hands of the Ḥimyarite king, Dhu Na’wās, who had adopted the Jewish faith. The Prophet received at Medina a deputation of the Christians of Najrān and held discussions with them on religious questions. Christianity in the south-west of Arabia received a fresh stimulus by the invasion of the Christian Abyssinians, who put an end to the rule of Dhu Na’wās. There were Christians in Mecca itself; Wāraqū ibn Naufal, a cousin of Khadijah, the first wife of the Prophet, was one of them. Christianity was also found among certain tribes of the Euphrates and the Ḥassānīon who lived on the borders of Syria. Their conversion was due to their contact with the Christian population of the Byzantine Empire. The Ḥassānīon, who were Monophysites, not only defended their Church against its rivals but also fought against the Muslims as the allies of the Byzantine emperors. The Christians were also found at Ḥirab, a town in the north-east of Arabia, where Arab princes of the house of Lakhm ruled under the suzerainty of the Persian kings. These Christians, who were called ʿIblī or the “Servants of the Lord,” belonged to the Nestorian Church, and contributed to the diffusion of Christian ideas among the Arabs of the peninsula.

By the sixth century, Judaism and Christianity had made considerable headway in Arabia, and were extending their sphere of influence, leasing the pagan masses, and thus gradually preparing the way for Islam.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOK TWO

ADVENT OF ISLAM

FUNDAMENTAL TEACHINGS OF THE QUR'AN

Chapter VII

PHILOSOPHICAL TEACHINGS OF THE QUR'AN

The Qur'an.—Although the Scriptures revealed to the earlier prophets, especially those of the Christians and the Jews, are regarded by the Muslims as holy, yet the Book (al-Qur'an) revealed to the last Prophet, Muhammad, is their chief sacred Book. The doctrine propounded by the Qur'an is not a new doctrine, for it is similar to the Scriptures of the earlier apostles. It lays down the same way of faith as was enjoined on Noah and Abraham. It confirms in the Arabic tongue what went before it—the Book of Moses and the Gospel of Jesus—in being a guide to mankind, admonishing the unjust and giving glad tidings to the righteous. God never abrogates or causes to be forgotten any of His revelations, but according to the needs and exigencies of the times, He confirms them or substitutes for them something similar or better.

The Qur'an is a book essentially religious, not philosophical, but it deals with all those problems which religion and philosophy have in common. Both have to say something about problems related to the significance of such expressions as God, the world, the individual soul, and the inter-relations of these; good and evil, free-will, and life after death. While dealing with these problems it also throws light on such conceptions as appearance and reality, existence and attributes, human origin and destiny, truth and error, space and time, permanence and change, eternity and immortality. The Qur'an claims to give an exposition of universal truths with regard to these problems—an exposition couched in a language (and a terminology) which the people immediately addressed, the Arab, with the intellectual background they had at the time of its revelation, could easily understand, and which the people of other lands, and other times, speaking other languages, with their own intellectual background could easily interpret. It makes free use of similitude to give a workable idea of what is incomprehensible in its essence. It is a book of wisdom, parts of which relate to its basic principles (umm al-kitab) and explain and illustrate them in detail, others relate to matters explained allegorically. It would be a folly to ignore the fundamentals and wrangle about the allegorical, for none knows their hidden meanings, except God. In what follows, a brief account is given of the Qur'anic teaching with regard to the religio-philosophical problems mentioned above.

Ultimate Reality: God and His Attributes.—The Ultimate Being or Reality is God. God, as described by the Qur'an for the understanding of man, is the sole self-subsisting, all-pervading, eternal, and Absolute Reality. He is the first and the last, the seen and the unseen. He is transcendent in the sense that He is in His full glory cannot be known or experienced by us finite beings—beings that can know only what can be experienced through the senses or otherwise and what is inherent in the nature of thought or is implied by it. No vision can grasp Him. He is above all comprehension. He is transcendent also because He is beyond the limitations of time, space, and sense-content. He was before time, space, and the world of sense came into existence. He is also immanent both in the souls (anfus) and in the spatio-temporal order (di'atq). Of the exact nature of God we can know nothing. But, in order that we may apprehend what we cannot comprehend, He uses similitudes from our experience. He is the light of the heavens and the earth. The parable of His light is as if there were a niche and within it a lamp, the lamp enclosed in glass; the glass as if it were a brilliant star lit from a blessed tree, an olive, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil is well-nigh luminous, though fire scarce touched it: light upon light!” Likewise for our understanding, He describes through revelation His attributes by similitude from what is lowest in the heavens and the earth and in our own experience (our highest ideals). This He does in a language and an idiom which the people addressed to may easily understand. These attributes are many and are enumerated by

(Abdullah Yusuf Ali's translation of the Qur'an has been mainly used for the purposes of this chapter. For references the same work may be consulted.)

1 Qur'an, xlvi, 9-10.
2 Ibid., xiii, 13.
3 Ibid., v, 40; xlvi, 12.
4 Ibid., ii, 106; xiii, 39; xvi, 101.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

His names, but they can all be summarized under a few essential heads: Life, Eternity, Unity, Power, Truth, Beauty, Justice, Love, and Goodness. As compared to the essence of God, these attributes are only finite approaches, symbols or pointers to Reality and serve as the ultimate human idears, but though signs and symbols, they are not arbitrary symbols. God has Himself implanted them in our being. For that reason they must, in some sense, be faithful representations of the divine essence. They must at least be in tune with it, so that in pursuing them we human beings are truly in pursuit of what is at least in harmony with the essence of God, for they are grounded in that essence.

God is, thus, a living, self-subsisting, eternal, and absolutely free creative reality which is one, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-beauty, most just, most loving, and all good.

As a living reality God desires intercourse with His creatures and makes it possible for them to enter into fellowship with Him through prayer, contemplation, and mystic gnosis, and lights with His light the houses of those who do not divert from His remembrance, nor from prayer, nor from the practice of regular charity. His life expresses itself also through His eternal activity and creativeness.

God is one and there is no god but He. He is the only one and there is none like Him. He is too high to have any partners. If there were other gods besides Him, some of them would have lorded over others. He is the

Philosophical Teachings of the Qur’an

One and not one in a trinity. Those who attribute sons and daughters to Him and those who say Christ is the son of God and is himself God only blaspheme God. He has begotten neither sons nor daughters nor is He Himself begotten. And how could He be said to have sons and daughters when He has no consort? And yet the unbelievers have taken besides Him gods that create nothing, but are themselves created, who have no power to hurt or do good to themselves and can control neither death, nor life, nor resurrection.

Therefore no god should be associated with God. Setting up of gods is nothing but anthropomorphism. The gods that people set up are nothing but names of conjectures and what their own souls desire. They do blaspheme who say, “God is Christ the son of Mary”; for said Christ, “O children of Israel, worship God my Lord and your Lord.” They regard the angels as females, as if they had witnessed their creation.

God the World.—God is omnipotent. To Him is due the primal origin of everything. It is He, the Creator, who began the process of creation and adds to creation as He pleases. To begin with He created the heavens and the earth, joined them together as one unit of smoky or nebulous substance, and then clove them asunder. The heavens and the earth, as separate existents with all their produce, were created by Him in six days (six great epochs of evolution). Serially considered, a divine day signifies a very long period, say, one thousand years of our reckoning or even fifty thousand years. Non-serially considered, His decisions are executed in the twinkling of an eye or even quicker, for there is nothing to oppose His will. When He says, “Be,” behold it is. His decree is absolute; no one
can change it. He draws the night as a veil over the day, each seeking the other in rapid succession. He created the sun, the moon, and the stars, all governed by the laws ordained by Him and under His command. Every creature in the heavens and the earth willingly submits to His laws. The sun runs its course for a determined period; so does the moon. The growth of a seed into a plant bearing flowers and fruit, the constellations in the sky, the succession of day and night—these and all other things show proportion, measure, order, and law. He is who is the creator, evolver, and restorer of all forms. He is who sends down water from the sky in due measure, causes it to soak in the soil, raises the land that is dead, and then drains it off with ease.

God is the Lord of all the worlds, and of all mysteries. He has power over all things, and to Him belong all forces of the heavens and the earth. He is the Lord of the Throne of Honour and the Throne of Glory Supreme, the Lord of the dawn and all the ways of ascent. It is He who spreads out the earth like a carpet, sends down water from the sky in due measure to revive it with fruit, corn, and plants, and has created pairs of plants, each separate from the others, and pairs of all other things. He gives the heavens' canopy its order and perfection and night its darkness and splendour, the expanse of the earth its moisture, pastures, and mountains.

- springs, streams, seas, ships and cattle, pearls and coral, sun and shadow, wind and rain, night and day, and things we humans do not know. It is He who gives life to dead land and makes the thirst of His creatures and causes the trees to grow into orchards full of beauty and delight.

To God belong the dominions of the heavens and the earth and everything between them. To Him belong the east and the west. Wheresoever you turn, there is His presence, for He is all-pervading. Neither slumber can seize Him, nor sleep. His Throne extends over the heavens and the earth, and He feels no fatigue in guarding and preserving His creatures, for He is the most high and supreme in glory, exalted in might, and wise.

It is He who gives life and death and has power over all things. God is not only the creator, but also the cherisher, the sustainer, the helper, the guide, and the reliever of distress and suffering of all His creatures, and is most merciful, most kind, and most forgiving.

God has not created the world for idle sport. It is created with a purpose, for an appointed term, and according to a plan, however hidden these may be from us humans. "God is the best of planners.

1 He who ordains laws and grants guidance creates everything and ordains for it a proportion and measure, and gives it guidance. There is not a thing but with Him are the treasures of it, but He sends them down in a known measure.

81 Ibid., xxxvi, 34.
82 Ibid., xxxvi, 30.
83 Ibid., xvi, 14; xxv, 53; iv, 24.
84 Ibid., xvi, 14; iv, 24.
85 Ibid., xvi, 5; xxv, 49; xliii, 12.
86 Ibid., lv, 22.
87 Ibid., xxv, 45-46.
88 Ibid., xxv, 49-50.
89 Ibid., xxv, 47.
90 Ibid., xxv, 49.
91 Ibid., xxvii, 60.
92 Ibid., ii, 255; iii, 2; xl, 65; xliii, 85.
93 Ibid., ii, 115; lv, 17; lxiii, 9.
94 Ibid., ii, 255.
95 Ibid., iii, 6.
96 Ibid., i, 2; vi, 164; x, 32.
97 Ibid., vii, 54; x, 6; xxvii, 64; xxix, 60; li, 38.
98 Ibid., i, 257; iii, 150; lxv, 2; xii, 6.
99 Ibid., iii, 150; lv, 45; xl, 51.
100 Ibid., vi, 71; 88; xxvi, 63; xci, 12; xcii, 7.
101 Ibid., xxviii, 62.
102 Ibid., xxvi, 16.
103 Ibid., xvi, 3.
104 Ibid., iii, 64.
105 Ibid., lxvii, 3.
106 Ibid., xxv, 2; lv, 49.
107 Ibid., xx, 50.
108 Ibid., xv, 21.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

The world is not without a purpose or a goal; it is throughout teleological and to this universal teleology human beings are exception. To everyone of them there is a goal and that goal is God Himself.

God is all knowledge. He is the Truth. With Him are the keys of the unseen, the treasures that none knows but He. He witnesses all things for every single thing is before His sight in due proportion. Verily, nothing on the earth or in the heavens is hidden from Him, not even as much as the weight of an atom. Neither the smallest nor the greatest of things are but recorded in a clear record. On the earth and in the sea not even a leaf does fall without His knowledge. Should not He that created everything know His own handiwork? He is full of wisdom. He understands the finest of mysteries. He knows what enters the earth and what comes forth out of it; what comes down from heaven and all that ascends to it. He knows every word spoken. No secrets of the heart are hidden from Him, for He has full knowledge of all things, open or secret. He knows and would call us to account for what is in our minds, whether we reveal it or conceal it.

Two other attributes of God and our basic values are always mentioned together in the Qur’an. These are justice and love, the latter including among other attributes the attributes of munificence, mercy, and forgiveness.

God is the best to judge and is never unjust. He does not deal unjustly with man; it is man who wrongs his own soul. On the Day of Judgment, He will set up the scales of justice and even the smallest action will be taken into account. He is swift in taking account, and punishes with exemplary punishment. He commands people to be just and loves those who are just.

Philosophical Teachings of the Qur’an

For those who refrain from wrong and do what is right there is great reward, and God suffers no reward to be lost. People’s good deeds are inscribed to their credit so that they may be required with the best possible award.

Divine punishment is equal to the evil done. It may be less, for, besides being most just, God is most loving, most merciful, and forgiver of all sins, but it is never more. Such is not, however, the case with His reward. He is most munificent and bountiful and, therefore, multiplies rewards for good deeds manifold. These rewards are both of this life and the life hereafter.

Islam, no less than Christianity, lays emphasis on the basic value of love. Whenever the Qur’an speaks of good Christians, it recalls their love and mercy. God is loving, and He exercises His love in creating, sustaining, nourishing, sheltering, helping, and guiding His creatures; in attending to their needs, in showing them grace, kindness, compassion, mercy, and forgiveness, when having done some wrong, they turn to Him for that; and in extending the benefits of His unlimited bounty to the sinners no less than to the virtuous. It is, therefore, befitting for man to be overflowing in his love for God and be thankful to Him for His loving care.

God is all good, free from all evil (qaddis). He is also the source of all good and worthy of all praise.

The Qur’an uses synonymous words for beauty and goodness (buna wa lhuwa). The word radiance or light (nur) is also used to signify beauty. God is the beauty (nur) of the heavens and the earth and His names (attributes) are also most beautiful (asma al-husna). He is the creator possessed of the highest excellence. He creates all forms and evolves them stage by stage.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

(al-liirî al-musawwar). Everything created by Him is harmonious and of great beauty. Notice the beauty of trees and fields and the starry heaven. He is the best bestower of divine colour to man who has been made in the best of mould and has been given the most beautiful shape. How lovables the beauty of animals whom you take out for grazing at dawn and bring home at eventime.

Throughout history God has sent messages of great excellence, and given the best of explanations in His revealed books. Therefore, people must follow the best revealed book (al-kutub). How beautiful is the story of Joseph given in the Scripture.

God’s judgment is of the highest excellence, and belief in the Day of Judgment of extreme beauty. Of great excellence is the speech of the righteous that call to God, for they invite people to Him by beautiful preaching and say only those things which are of supreme excellence.

The Qur’an lays the greatest stress on the beauty of action. It exhorts mankind to do the deeds of high value for God loves those who do excellent deeds. It wants men to return greetings with greetings of great excellence and repel evil with what is best, for in so doing they enhance the excellence of their own souls.

Patience is graceful (sabr jamil) and so is forgiveness. Excellence of conduct shall not be wasted. Those whose deeds are beautiful shall be given the highest reward in this world and better still in the next. They shall

Philosophical Teachings of the Qur’an

be given in paradise the most beautiful abodes and places for repose, and excellent provisions shall be made for them.

God’s Relation to Man.—God created man’s spirit out of nothing and created mankind from this single spirit. He created his mate of the same kind and from the twain produced men and women in large numbers. From the point of view of personal history and perhaps also from the point of view of the evolutionary process, man is created for an appointed term as a being growing gradually from the earth, from an extract of certain elements of the earth, then by receiving nourishment from the objects of sustenance, and being endowed with life, like all other living beings, taking the form of water or watery clay or adhesive mud moulded into shape in due proportions as a life-germ, a leech-like clot of congealed blood, growing into a lump of flesh, further developing into bones clothed with flesh, and finally emerging as a new creation, a human being in two sexes, gifted with hearing and sight, intelligence, and affection, destined to become God’s vicegerent on earth, decreed to die one day and destined to be raised again on the Day of Resurrection. The form in which he will be raised again he does not know. The whole of mankind is one family, because it is the progeny of a single pair. In reality, man is the highest of all that is created, for God has created him in the most beautiful of moulds. He is born with the divine spirit breathed into him, even as for the Hindu, Greek, and Christian sages he is made in the image of God. Human perfection, therefore, consists in being dyed in divine colour—in the fullest achievement and

\[144\] Ibid., lix, 24.
\[145\] Ibid., xxxii, 7.
\[146\] Ibid., xxxvii, 6.
\[147\] Ibid., ii, 138.
\[148\] Ibid., xl, 64.
\[149\] Ibid., xvi, 5-6.
\[150\] Ibid., xxix, 23.
\[151\] Ibid., xxv, 33.
\[152\] Ibid., xxxix, 55.
\[153\] Ibid., xii, 3.
\[154\] Ibid., v, 53.
\[155\] Ibid., xii, 33.
\[156\] Ibid., xvi, 123.
\[157\] Ibid., xvii, 53.
\[158\] Ibid., ii, 195; v, 96.
\[159\] Ibid., iv, 86.
\[160\] Ibid., xxiii, 90.
\[161\] Ibid., xvii, 7.
\[162\] Ibid., xii, 18; xxxiii, 10.
\[163\] Ibid., xv, 85.
\[164\] Ibid., xviii, 30.
\[165\] Ibid., iii, 172; ix, 121: v, 26; xvi, 96-97; xxiv, 38; xxix, 7; xxxix, 35, 70; xlvi, 16; lxi, 31.
\[166\] Ibid., xvi, 30.
assimilation of divine attributes, for God desires nothing but the perfection of His light, the perfection of these attributes in man. The sole aim of man, therefore, is a progressive achievement of all divine attributes—all intrinsic values. God encompasses and cherishes mankind. He is always near man nearer than his jugular vein. He is with him wheresoever he may be and sees all that he does. Whithersoever he turns, there is the presence of God, for He is all-pervading. He listens to the prayer of every suppliant when he calls on Him.

Soul.—The soul of man is of divine origin, for God has breathed a bit of His own spirit into him. It is an unfathomable mystery—a command of God, of the knowledge of which only a little has been communicated to man. The conscious self or mind is of three degrees. In the first degree it is the impulsive mind (nafs ammârah) which man shares with animals; in the second degree it is the conscientious or morally conscious mind (nafs lâwâmah) struggling between good and evil and repenting for the evil done; in the third degree it is the mind perfectly in tune with the divine will, the mind in peace (nafs muwmâ’innah).

Theory of Knowledge.—Man alone has been given the capacity to use names for things and so has been given the knowledge which even the angels do not possess. Among men who are granted wisdom are indeed granted great good.

Understanding raises a man’s dignity. Those who do not use the intellect are like a herd of goats, deaf, dumb, and blind—no better than the lowest of beasts. The ideal of the intellect is to know truth from error. As an ideal or basic value for man wisdom means the knowledge of facts, ideals, and values.

There are three degrees of knowledge in the ascending scale of certitude: (i) knowledge by inference (‘ilm al-yaqîn) and (ii) knowledge by perception and reported perception or observation (‘ain al-yaqîn), and (iii) knowledge by personal experience or intuition (haqq al-yaqîn)—a distinction which may be exemplified by my certitude of (i) fire always burns, (ii) it has burnt John’s fingers, and (iii) it has burnt my fingers. Likewise, there are three types of errors: (i) the errors of reasoning, (ii) the errors of observation, and (iii) the errors of intuition.

The first type of knowledge depends either on the truth of its presupposition as in deduction, or it is only probable as in induction. There is greater certainty about our knowledge based on actual experience (observation or experiment) of phenomena.

The second type of knowledge is either scientific knowledge based on experience (observation and experiment) or historical knowledge based on reports and descriptions of actual experiences. Not all reports are trustworthy. Therefore, special attention should be paid to the character of the reporter. If he is a man of shabby character, his report should be carefully checked.

Scientific knowledge comes from the study of natural phenomena. These natural phenomena are the signs of God, symbols of the Ultimate Reality or expressions of the Truth, as human behaviour is the expression of the human mind. Natural laws are the set ways of God in which there is no change. The study of nature, of the heavens and the earth, is enlightening for the men of understanding. The alternation of day and night enables them to measure serial time. They can know the ways of God, the laws of nature, by observing all things of varying colours—mountains, rivers, fields of corn, or other forms of vegetation, gardens of olives, date-palms, grapes, and fruit of all kinds, though watered with the same water, yet varying in quality; by studying the birds poised under the sky and thinking how they are so held up; and likewise by observing the clouds and wondering how they are made.

Those who think can know God and can conquer all that is in the heavens and the earth, night and day, and the sun, the moon, and the stars. Knowledge of the phenomenal world which the senses yield is not an illusion, but a blessing for which we must be thankful.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

No less important for individuals and nations is the study of history. There is a measure and law in human society as much as in the whole cosmos. The life of every nation as a collective body moves in time and passes through rises and falls, successes and reverses, till its appointed period comes to an end. For every living nation there are lessons in the history of the peoples that have lived in the past. It should, therefore, study the "days of God," the momentous periods of history, the periods of divine favour and punishment, the periods of nations' glory and decline. People should traverse the earth to see what had been the end of those who neglected the laws of nature, the signs of God. Those who do not guide others with truth and so do not act rightly, even though their days are lengthened, are gradually brought down by such means as they do not know.

God never changes the condition of a people until they change it themselves, but once He wills it, there can be no turning it back. Therefore, it is all the more important to take lessons from the past. In the stories about the past there are instructions for men of understanding. Even the bare outlines of the rise and fall of nations, of great events of history, and their consequences provide object lessons for their guidance and warning. Let them remember momentous events of the lives of such peoples and societies as the Israelites, the Magi, the Sabians, the Romans, the Christians, the people of Saba, the people of Madyan, of Ad, of Thamud, of Lot, Companions of the Cave, the Seven Sleepers, the Companions of the Rocky Tract, and those of the Inscription, and Gog and Magog, prophets like Noah, Abraham, Isma'il, Isaac, Jacob, David, Solomon, Joseph, Moses, Aaron, Eli, and Jonah, Jesus, and other personages great for their piety, power or wisdom, e.g., Mary, the Queen of Saba, Dhu al-Qarnain (probably Cyrus of Iran), and the Pharaoh (Thothmes I of Egypt), and Moses.

So much importance has been given to history that fifteen chapters of the Qur'an have been given the titles bearing historical significance. Now, indeed, has the study of contemporary history been ignored. The Qur'an refers to contemporaneous events such as the battle of Badr, the battle of Tabuk, the trade and commerce of the Quraysh, the hypocrisy of those who were enemies pretending to have embraced Islam, and the animosity of persons like Abu Lahab and his wife.

---

239 Ibid., xxv, 2; liv, 49.
240 Ibid., iii, 137.
241 Ibid., vii, 34.
242 Ibid., iv, 5.
243 Ibid., iii, 137.
244 Ibid., vii, 182-83.
245 Ibid., xiii, 11.
246 Ibid., xii, 111; xiv, 5, 15; xxx, 9; xxxii, 62; xxxv, 44.
247 Ibid., ii, 40-46, 93, 102, 122, 246-51; v, 13-14, 73-74; vii, 138-41, 161-71; xx, 80-82; xxiv, 27; xxxvi, 23-25; xi, 53-54; xiv, 16-17.
248 Ibid., xiii, 17.
249 Ibid., vi, 62; v, 72; xxi, 17.
250 Ibid., xxx, 2.
251 Ibid., ii, 138; v, 70-88.
252 Ibid., xxvii, 22; xxxiv, 16-21.
253 Ibid., vii, 85-95; xii, 9-55; xxix, 36-37.
254 Ibid., vii, 65-72; xii, 50-60; xxv, 38; xxvi, 120-40; xxix, 38; xi, 16-16; xlv, 21-26; li, 41-42; liv, 18-21; lixiv, 4-8; lxxxvii, 6-8.
255 Ibid., vii, 73-79; xii, 61-68; xxv, 38; xxvi, 141-159; xxvii, 45-53; xxix, 38; xlii, 7; li, 43-45; liv, 23-31; lixiv, 4-5; lxxxvii, 17-20; lxxxix, 9-14; xci, 11-15.
256 Ibid., viii, 80-84; xi, 77-83; xv, 57-77; xxi, 74-75; xxvi, 160-75; xxvii, 54-55; xxix, 26-35; xxxvi, 123-38; li, 31-37; liv, 33-38.
257 Ibid., xviii, 9-22.
258 Ibid., xxv, 38; 1, 12.
God reveals His signs not only in the experience of the outer world (āfāq) and its historical vistas, but also through the inner experience of minds (anfus). Thus, the inner or personal experience is the third source of knowledge. Experience from this source gives the highest degree of certitude. Divine guidance comes to His creatures in the first instance from this source. The forms of knowledge that come through this source are (1) divinely-determined movement—movement determined by natural causes, as in the earth, and the heavens; (2) instinct, e.g., in the bee to build its cell; (3) intuition or knowledge by the heart; (4) inspiration in the case of Moses' mother when she cast her tenderly suckled child into the river; and (5) revelation in the case of all true prophets, God's messengers.

**Man's Power.**—God has subjected for the use of man, His vicegerent on the earth, everything in the heavens and the earth—the sun and the moon; day and night; winds and rain; the rivers and the seas and the ships that sail; pearls and corals; springs and streams, mountains, moisture, and pastures; and animals to ride and grain and fruit to eat.

**Free-will.**—God has given man the will to choose, decide, and resolve to do good or evil. He has endowed him with reason and various impulses so that by his own efforts he may strive and explore possibilities. He has also given him a just bias, a natural bias towards good. Besides this He has given him guidance through revelation and inspiration, and has advised him to return evil with good, to repel it with what is best (ahkam). Hence if a man chooses to do good, it is because in giving him these benefits God has willed him to do so. He never changes the gracious benefits which He has bestowed on a people until they change themselves. Therefore, whatever good comes from man or to man is ultimately from God. On the other hand, his nature has a bias against evil, his reason is opposed to it, and he has been given a warning against it through the revealed books; therefore, whatever evil comes from him or to him is from his own soul. If God had willed He would have destroyed evil or would not have allowed it to exist, and if it were His will, the whole of mankind would have had faith, but that is not His plan. His plan envisages man's free use of the divine attribute of power or freedom to choose and take all judicious and precautionary measures to suit different situations. In the providential scheme man's role is not that of a blind, deaf, dumb and driven herd of goats. So even his free choice of evil is a part of the scheme of things and no one will choose a way unto God, unless it fits into that scheme or is willed by God.

There is no compulsion in faith. God's guidance is open to all who have the will to profit by it. Whosoever wills, let him take the straight path to his Lord. Truth is from God, then whosoever wills, let him believe it; and whosoever wills, let him reject it. The prophets are sent to every nation for guiding the whole of mankind. Their duty is to preach, guide, and inspire by persuasion and not to drive or force people to anything, nor to watch over their doings or dispose of their affairs. They cannot compel mankind against their will to believe.

**Death.**—Death of the body has been decreed by God to be the common lot of mankind. Wherever a man is, death will overtake him even if he is in a tower strong and high. No soul can die except by God's leave, the term being fixed as if by writing, but every soul shall be given a taste of death and in the end brought back to God and duly judged on the Day of Judgment, and only he who is saved from fire will be admitted to paradise; it is then that he will have attained the goal of his life. As compared to that life, the life of this world is only a life of vainglory.
created out of nothing; first as dust, then a sperm, then a leech-like clot, then a piece of flesh, partly formed and partly unformed, kept in a womb for an appointed term, then brought out as babes and then fostered so that they reached an age of full strength; and further, let them ponder over the fact that the earth is first barren and lifeless but when God pours down rain, it is stirred to life, it swells, and puts forth every kind of beautiful growth in pairs.289 Let them understand that He who created the heavens and the earth is able to give life to the dead, for He has power over all things.290

God created man from the earth, into it shall he return and from it shall he be brought out again.291 For everyone after death there shall be an interval (Bara'kh) lasting till the Day of Resurrection.292 On that day all the dead shall be raised up again.293 Even as God produced the first creation, so shall He produce this new one.294 We do not know in what form we shall be raised,295 but as a parable296 the Qur'an describes the Day of Resurrection as follows:

On that day there shall be a dreadful commotion.297 The heaven shall be rent asunder298 and melted like molten brass.299 The sun folded up and the moon darkened shall be joined together,300 and the stars shall fall, losing their lustre.301 In terrible repeated convulsions,302 the earth shall be shaken to its depths and pounded into powder.303 The mountains shall crumble to atoms flying hither and thither304 like wool,305 the oceans shall boil over, there shall be a deafening noise, and the graves shall be turned upside down.306

A trumpet shall be blown,307 no more than a single mighty blast,308 and there shall come forth every individual soul309 and rush forth to the Lord—

311 *Ibid.,* xxiii, 100.
318 *Ibid.,* lxxv, 7–9; lxxxi, 1.
322 *Ibid.,* xcvii, 88; lxi, 9–10; lvi, 4–6; lxxvii 10.
324 *Ibid.,* lxxvii, 4; xcix, 2.

Philosophical Teachings of the Qur'an

sinners as blackened,331 blinded,332 terror-smitten333 with eyes cast down334 and hearts come right up to their throats to choke,335 and the virtuous, happy and rejoicing.336 Then all except such as it will please God to exempt shall fall into a swoon.337 Then a second trumpet shall be sounded, when, behold! they will all be standing and looking on. The earth will shine with the glory of the Lord and the record of deeds shall be opened.338

All shall fully remember their past deeds.339 Anyone who will have done an atom of good shall see it and anyone who will have done an atom of evil shall see it.340 They shall also recognize one another,341 though each will have too much concern of his own to be able to be of help to others.342 They will have neither a protector, nor an intercessor except God343 or those whom permission is granted by Him and whose word is acceptable to Him.344 They shall all now meet their Lord.345 The scale of justice shall be set up, and not a soul shall be dealt with unjustly in the least; and if there be no more than the weight of a mustard seed, it will be brought to account,346 and all shall be repaid for their past deeds.347 There will be a sorting out of the sinners and the righteous.348 The sinners will meet a grievous penalty but it shall not be more than the retribution of the evil they will have wrought.349 All in proportion to their respective deeds and for a period longer and shorter shall go through a state of pain and remorse,350 designated in the Qur'an as hell, and the righteous saved from hell shall enter a state of perpetual peace, designated as paradise. Paradise has been described in the Qur'an by similitude351 in terms of what average human beings value most: dignity, honour, virtue, beauty, luxury, sensual pleasures, and social discourse—and hell in terms of what they all detest.

335 *Ibid.,* xi, 18.
337 *Ibid.,* xxxix, 68.
338 *Ibid.,* xxxiv, 68.
339 *Ibid.,* vi, 28; lxxxix, 23.
341 *Ibid.,* x, 45.
346 *Ibid.,* xxii, 47.
351 *Ibid.,* xiii, 35; xlvii, 15.
People shall be sorted out into three classes.\(^{352}\) (1) Those who will be foremost and nearest to God, with whom God is well-pleased and who are well-pleased with God. They shall have no fear, no grief, no toil, no fatigue, no sense of injury,\(^{353}\) no vanity, and no untruth.\(^{354}\) They shall enjoy honour and dignity, and, dressed in fine silks and brocade and adorned with bracelets of gold and pearls,\(^{355}\) shall live for ever in carpeted places. They will recline on thrones encrusted with gold and jewels facing one another for discourse. They will be served by youths of perpetual freshness, handsome as pearls,\(^{356}\) with goblets, beakers, and cups filled out of clear fountains of crystal white and delicious drinks free from intoxication and after-aches, which they will exchange with one another free of frivolity and evil taint.\(^{357}\) They shall be given fruit and flesh of their own choice in dishes of gold to eat, and shall get more than all they desire.\(^{358}\) Their faces shall be beaming with the brightness of bliss.\(^{359}\) They shall have as companions chaste women, their wives,\(^{360}\) beautiful like pearls and corals.\(^{361}\) Those who believe and whose families follow them in faith, to them God shall join their families, their ancestors, their spouses, and their offsprings.\(^{362}\) Rest, satisfaction, and peace will reign all round. This will be their great salvation;\(^{363}\) but their greatest reward, their supreme felicity, will consist in being in the presence of God.\(^{364}\)

(2) Companions of the right hand who shall have their abode in another garden. They will sit on thrones on high in the midst of trees, having flowers, pile upon pile, in cool, long-extending shades by the side of constantly flowing water. They will recline on rich cushions and carpets of beauty,\(^{365}\) and so will their pretty and chaste companions,\(^{366}\) belonging to a special creation, pure and undefiled. They will greet one another with peace. They will also have all kinds of fruits, the supply of which will not be limited to seasons.\(^{367}\)

These are parables of what the righteous shall receive.\(^{368}\)

(3) Companions of the left hand who shall be in the midst of a fierce blast

---

\(^{352}\) Ibid., lvi, 7-56.

\(^{353}\) Ibid., vii, 43; xxxv, 33-35; lxv, 46-48.

\(^{354}\) Ibid., lxxxviii, 35.

\(^{355}\) Ibid., xvii, 31; xxii, 11.

\(^{356}\) Ibid., lii, 24.

\(^{357}\) Ibid., xix, 61-63; lii, 23.

\(^{358}\) Ibid., xlii, 22; i, 35.

\(^{359}\) Ibid., lxxxiii, 24.

\(^{360}\) Ibid., xliii, 70.

\(^{361}\) Ibid., lv, 56-58.

\(^{362}\) Ibid., xliii, 23.

\(^{363}\) Ibid., v, 132.

\(^{364}\) Ibid., i, 35; liv, 55.

\(^{365}\) Ibid., iv, 54.

\(^{366}\) Ibid., lv, 70-77.

\(^{367}\) Ibid., v, 122; ix, 26-21, 72; xv, 45-48; xxxvii, 40-49; xxxix, 20; lii, 17-24; lv, 40-78; lvi, 10-39, 88-91.

\(^{368}\) Ibid., xlvii, 15.

Chapter VIII

**ETHICAL TEACHINGS OF THE QUR’AN**

**A VALUES**

As it has been explained in the preceding chapter, the real goal of man, according to the Qur’an, is the assimilation of divine attributes. These attributes, as also shown in the same chapter, can be summarized as life, eternity, unity, power, truth, beauty, justice, love, and goodness.

Life.—God is the living one Himself\(^1\) and gives life to others.\(^2\) The moral laws enunciated in the Qur’an are life-giving and life-enriching\(^3\) and, therefore, by living in this world in accordance with these laws man is able to realize one of God’s attributes. If anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the

---

\(^1\) Qur’an, ii, 255; xl, 65.

\(^2\) Ibid., ii, 260; iii, 156; vii, 158; ix, 116; x, 56; xl, 68.

\(^3\) Ibid., viii, 24; xvi, 97.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

life of the whole people. On the social plane, the importance of life on this earth is duly emphasized. The ideal of the Qur'an is to develop a healthy social organization which traverses the middle path of rectitude avoiding all forms of extreme. People are to partake of the good things of the world and wear beautiful apparel, to eat and drink without going to excess, and for this reason monasticism which implies denial of life on this earth is condemned as being incompatible with human nature. Man is advised not to forget his portion in the life of this world. Wealth and property are good things to be enjoyed and appreciated and are blessings of God which make life smooth and comfortable.

The life of the present world is no doubt significant and purposeful, but its purposes are directed towards the good of future life for the real abode of life is in the hereafter. God created life and death to test which of the people are best in point of deed. The present world is a place of sojourn and a place of departure; its enjoyments are short and comforts are few, while as compared with these the life in the hereafter is better and more enduring. It is best for the righteous and will last for ever. The present life and the future life, however, are to be viewed as a unity, for man's creation here and his resurrection later on are events related to an individual soul. In fact, life on this earth is a preparation for the life hereafter. The good works that we do here in this life will run before us to illumine our path in the hereafter where we shall have full opportunity to develop our spiritual light to ever greater perfection.

Eternity.—This attribute in its fullness is exclusively God's and man is created within time for a stated term; yet he has within himself a deep craving for eternity and for a kingdom that never fails or ends. Though finite and temporal, man does not and cannot rest content with that. The way is open for the finite and temporal man to attain life everlasting.

Unity.—The greatest emphasis in the Qur'an is on the unity of God which implies belief in the divine causality and the presence of moral order in the universe where people are judged according to the merit of their deeds and not arbitrarily. This moral order works without any favour not only in the case of individuals but also in the case of societies and peoples. God has entered into covenant with men within the limits of this moral order—with men as such and not with particular nations or races.

Unity, as one of the ideals of man, implies unity in the internal life of man, a co-ordination of reason, will, and action. It requires complete control of one's passions and lust. It also stands for the unity of profession and practice. Faith in God is the necessary prerequisite of moral life, but it should not be mere verbal acceptance; it must be accompanied by good deeds, implying an attitude of mind which is motivated by a complete submission to God's will. Poets generally say what they do not practise, and hypocrites say with their tongues what is not in their hearts, but all believing men and women are truthful in their words and deeds.

Externally, the ideal of unity demands that men should develop a healthy social organization which traverses the middle path of rectitude avoiding all forms of extreme. The righteous are advised to get together and strive, so that tumult, oppression, and mischief are removed from the face of the earth. This ideal of unity also implies peace and harmony among members of a family. A woman is a mate for man so that both may dwell in tranquillity with an attitude of mutual love and kindness; each is like a garment for the other for mutual support, mutual comfort, and mutual protection. It is the duty of man to live with woman on a footing of kindness and equity. Unity also implies that members of a national or ideological group should develop ties

Ibid., xx, 120.
Ibid., xxii, 23; xxxix, 73–75; lxvi, 12; xcviii, 8.
Ibid., xcix, 7–8.
Ibid., viii, 53.
Ibid., vi, 19.
Ibid., iii, 81, 187; v, 8, 13, 15; vii, 172.
Ibid., v, 44.
Ibid., vii, 42; x, 4; xiii, 29.
Ibid., ii, 131; ix, 112.
Ibid., xcvii, 224–226.
Ibid., iii, 107; iv, 81; xlvii, 11.
Ibid., ix, 119.
Ibid., ii, 143.
Ibid., vii, 73.
Ibid., xxx, 21.
Ibid., ii, 187.
Ibid., iv, 19.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

of intimate relationship among themselves so that the ideal of an organic whole may be realized in a broader context. The Qur'an says that all Muslims are brothers and have great love and affection among themselves. No excuse should be allowed to stand in the way of doing good or making peace between different persons. Every effort should be made to bring about conciliation between men, yet we should co-operate in righteousness and piety, not in sin and rancour. We should be kind to those in need, to neighbours, and to the wayfarers.

This attitude of kindness and fairness is to be maintained and upheld even in the case of enemies and opponents. We should try to forgive those who plot against us and overlook their deeds, cover evil with pardon, and turn off evil with good.

This attitude of toleration is to be cultivated in our relation to people of other faiths. The Qur'an aims at establishing a peaceful social atmosphere where people belonging to other faiths can enjoy freedom of conscience and worship for which purpose the believers are urged to rise and fight against the oppressors so that monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of God is commemorated in abundant measure may not be pulled down. It unreservedly praises some of the people of the Book for their faith. It is as a consequence of this attitude of tolerance that according to the Qur'an all those who believe in God and the Last Day and practise righteousness, whether they are Muslims, Jews, Christians, or Sabaeans, shall get their reward from their Lord. The Qur'an gives an open invitation to the people of the Book to come together and work conjointly for the establishment of peace and social harmony based on the idea of the unity of God.

Above all, this ideal of unity leads to the conception of unity of the whole of humanity. Mankind was created from a single pair of a male and a female and from a single breath of life. All people are equal members of the human community; the only distinction recognized by the Qur'an is based on the degree of righteousness possessed by people.

Power.—Power as a human ideal implies that man has the potentiality of assuming responsibility undertaken by him of his own accord. God breathed His Spirit into him and, therefore, made him His viceroy on the earth. Everything in the universe was created subservient to him—even the angels were ordered to bow down to him. He was given a position of great honour in the universe and was elevated far above most of God's creation. He has all the faculties that are necessary for his physical and spiritual development and can pass beyond the limits of the heavens and the earth with the power given to him by God. He is given the power to distinguish between good and evil and, therefore, he alone is responsible for what he does. He is endowed with freedom of action, but his freedom is limited by the free causality of God. His responsibility is proportionate to his powers; he has been shown the path of righteousness and it is up to him to accept its lead or reject it.

Being created after the pattern of God's nature man is capable of developing from one stage to the next higher stage. But this development involves struggle against the immoral forces of the external world which he is able to meet successfully with the co-operation and help of God. This effort of man is, however, viewed not in any exclusive spirit of otherworldliness. It is the primary duty of the believers to participate actively in the struggle for the establishment of a social order based on peace, harmony, and justice in which...
A History of Muslim Philosophy

everybody is equal before the law, and people in authority work out their policies after ascertaining the views of the people. 79

In this endeavour to realize the moral law in his individual and social life, man has often to contend against evil forces represented in the person of Satan. 80 But it is within his power to resist and overcome them. 81 Though man is always prone to weakness and susceptible to seduction by the forces of evil, yet his weakness is rectifiable under the guidance of revelation, 82 and such men as follow the law of righteousness shall be immune from these lapses. 83 They shall never be afraid of anything 84 or be cowardly in their behaviour. 85

The ideal of power demands that in order to establish a State on the basis of peace, freedom of thought, worship, belief, and expression, the morally-oriented individuals will have to strive hard. Jihi'da or utmost striving 86 with might and main, 87 with wealth and their person, 88 as they ought to strive, 89 becomes their foremost duty so that tumult, oppression, and mischief should be totally eliminated from the world 90 and there should be left no possibility for the aggressors to kindle the fire of war, 91 to hinder men from the path of God, 92 and to oppress people for professing a faith different from their own. 93

This struggle against the forces of evil and oppression demands that its participants must be characterized by perseverance, courage, fearlessness, and trust in God—the moral qualities which are described by the Qur'an as characteristic of the righteous in the social context. 94 Those who patiently persevere in the path of righteousness will be in possession of a determining factor in all the affairs of this life 95 and will be above trivial weaknesses. 96 Those who are firm and steadfast will never lose heart, nor weaken in will, nor give in before the enemy. 97 A small band of steadfastly persevering people often

Ethical Teachings of the Qur'an

vanquish a big force. 98 Similarly, trust in God is the moral quality of all believers. 99 This quality does not involve any negation of planning in advance as is evident from the attitude of Jacob while advising his sons who were going to Egypt. 100 After you have taken all possibilities into consideration and taken a decision, put your trust in God. 101

Truth or Wisdom.—Wisdom as a human ideal stands for man's search for knowledge or truth. It is something which is distinguished from conjecture or imperfect knowledge 102 and mere fancy. 103 Different stories are related in the Qur'an, 104 several similitudes 105 and signs pointing to reality are detailed 106 and explained, 107 so that people may reflect and ponder over things. It is the characteristic of the righteous that they not only celebrate the praises of God, standing, sitting, and lying down on their sides, but also contemplate and ponder over the different phenomena of nature. 108 The people are, therefore, advised repeatedly to look at and observe the phenomena of nature, pondering over everything in creation to arrive at the truth. 109

None can grasp the message of revelation except men of understanding and those firmly grounded in knowledge. 110 Lack of tcrt knowledge leads people to revile the true God, 111 invent lies against Him, and worship other gods besides Him. 112 The only safety lies in following the revelation which is replete with the knowledge of God. 113 Whosoever has been given knowledge has indeed been given abundant good. 114 Those who dispute wrongly about God are the ones who are without knowledge, without guidance, and without a book of enlightenment. 115 Only those people will be suitable ranks and degrees who have faith and are possessed of knowledge, 116 and only those who have knowledge really fear God and tread the path of righteousness. 117

When Solomon asked the people of his Court who would be able to bring

78 Ibid., xiii, 38.
79 Ibid., xv, 59.
80 Ibid., xvi, 99.
81 Ibid., xxii, 86.
82 Ibid., xvi, 99.
83 Ibid., ii, 175.
84 Ibid., iii, 123.
85 Ibid., viii, 74-75.
86 Ibid., v, 38.
87 Ibid., ix, 20, 31, 88.
88 Ibid., xxii, 78.
89 Ibid., viii, 73.
90 Ibid., v, 67.
91 Ibid., xvi, 88.
92 Ibid., ii, 190-93.
93 Ibid., xi, 115; xvi, 127; xlv, 55; xlviii, 35; li, 39; lxxiv, 10.
94 Ibid., iii, 186.
95 Ibid., vi, 10-11.
96 Ibid., iii, 146.
97 Ibid., xii, 249.
98 Ibid., vii, 51; xiv, 11.
99 Ibid., xxii, 67-68.
100 Ibid., iii, 159.
101 Ibid., iv, 157; vi, 116, 148; x, 30; liii, 28.
102 Ibid., x, 30, 68.
103 Ibid., vii, 176.
104 Ibid., lix, 21.
105 Ibid., vi, 98.
106 Ibid., x, 24.
107 Ibid., iii, 191.
108 Ibid., xii, 185.
109 Ibid., iii, 18, vi, 105; xxii, 54, xxxv, 6.
110 Ibid., vi, 108.
111 Ibid., xxii, 71.
112 Ibid., xi, 14.
113 Ibid., ii, 209.
114 Ibid., xxii, 8; xxxii, 20.
115 Ibid., ivii, 11.
116 Ibid., xxxv, 28.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

the throne of the Queen of Sheba, it was only the one possessed of knowledge who offered himself to bring it and later actually did bring it.¹¹⁸

The Qur’ān advises the Holy Prophet to pray for advance in knowledge.¹¹⁹ The mysterious teacher of Moses who tried to help him to see a glimpse of the working of the unseen had knowledge proceeding from God, i.e., ‘ilm al-tadānni.¹²⁰ Saul (Jālūt) was appointed king of the Israelites because he was gifted by God abundantly with knowledge and bodily prowess.¹²¹ Noah, David, and Solomon possessed knowledge¹²² and judgment.¹²³ Jacob had a lot of knowledge and experience;¹²⁴ Joseph possessed abundant power and knowledge,¹²⁵ and so also was Moses given wisdom and knowledge.¹²⁶ It was through knowledge and reflection on the phenomena of nature, the heaven and the earth, that Abraham was able to arrive at the ultimate truth.¹²⁷ It was through his personal experience and knowledge that Joseph refused to follow the path of the unbelievers and adopted the path of Abraham.¹²⁸

Justice.—Justice is a divine attribute and the Qur’ān emphasizes that we should adopt it as a moral ideal. God commands people to be just towards one another¹²⁹ and, in judging between man and man, to judge justly.¹³⁰ for He loves those who judge equitably.¹³¹ All believers stand firmly for justice even if it goes against themselves, their parents, their kin and kin, without any distinction of rich and poor.¹³² God’s Revelation itself is an embodiment of truth and justice;¹³³ it is revealed with the Balance (of right and wrong) so that people may stand forth for justice.¹³⁴ The value of justice is absolute and morally binding and the believers are, therefore, warned that they should not let the hatred of some people lead them to transgress the limits of justice¹³⁵ or make them depart from the ideal of justice, for justice is very near to piety and righteousness.¹³⁶

Justice demands that people should be true in word and deed,¹³⁷ faithfully

Ethical Teachings of the Qur’ān

observe the contracts which they have made¹³⁸ and fulfill all obligations.¹³⁹ When Muslims enter into treaties with people of other faiths, they must fulfill their engagements to the end and be true to them, for that is the demand of righteousness.¹⁴⁰ They are also advised to establish the system of weights with justice and not to skimp in the balance¹⁴¹ and cause thereby a loss to others by fraud, and unjustly withhold from others what is due to them,¹⁴² for that would lead to the spread of evil and mischief on the earth.¹⁴³

Love.—Love as a human ideal demands that man should love God as the complete embodiment of all moral values above everything else.¹⁴⁴ It demands that man should be kind and loving to parents,¹⁴⁵ especially to the mother who bore him in pain and gave birth to him in travail.¹⁴⁶ This obligation of loving kindness is further broadened to include kindred, orphans, those in need, neighbours who are near and neighbours who are strangers, and the wayfarers.¹⁴⁷ Righteousness is to spend a part of our substance out of love for God, for kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer,¹⁴⁸ and for the indigent.¹⁴⁹ The Holy Prophet who is a mercy to believers¹⁵⁰ and mercy to all creatures¹⁵¹ always dealt gently with people.¹⁵² Moses was advised by God to speak to Pharaoh mildly and gently.¹⁵³ It is one of the characteristics of the believers that they are compassionate and loving to one another;¹⁵⁴ they walk on the earth in humility, and hold to forgiveness;¹⁵⁵ they are friendly to others,¹⁵⁶ and forgive and overlook their faults,¹⁵⁷ even though they are in anger.¹⁵⁸

Goodness.—Goodness is an attribute of God¹⁵⁹ and, therefore, it becomes the duty of every person to obey his own impulse to good.¹⁶⁰ He should do

¹¹⁸ Ibid., ii, 177; xxiii, 8; lxv, 32.
¹¹⁹ Ibid., v, 1.
¹²⁰ Ibid., ix, 4, 7.
¹²¹ Ibid., vi, 152; iv, 9.
¹²² Ibid., xxvii, 181–83.
¹²³ Ibid., xi, 85.
¹²⁴ Ibid., ii, 165.
¹²⁵ Ibid., vi, 151; xxix, 8.
¹²⁶ Ibid., xvi, 14; xvi, 15.
¹²⁷ Ibid., ii, 83, 215; iv, 36; xvii, 26.
¹²⁸ Ibid., ii, 177.
¹²⁹ Ibid., xc, 16.
¹³⁰ Ibid., ix, 61.
¹³¹ Ibid., xxi, 107.
¹³² Ibid., iii, 159.
¹³³ Ibid., xx, 44.
¹³⁴ Ibid., xxviii, 29.
¹³⁵ Ibid., vii, 199.
¹³⁶ Ibid., ii, 28; iv, 144; v, 60.
¹³⁷ Ibid., ii, 109.
¹³⁸ Ibid., xlii, 37.
¹³⁹ Ibid., xvi, 53; lix, 23.
¹⁴⁰ Ibid., ii, 138.
good as God has been good to all\textsuperscript{142} and love those who do good.\textsuperscript{143} Believers hasten in every good work.\textsuperscript{144} As all prophets were quick in emulating good works,\textsuperscript{145} so all people are advised to strive together (as in a race) towards all that is good\textsuperscript{146} and virtuous.\textsuperscript{147} Truly did Solomon love the love of good with a view to glorifying the Lord.\textsuperscript{148} All good things are for the believers,\textsuperscript{149} goodly reward in the hereafter\textsuperscript{150} and highest grace of God awaits those who are foremost in good deeds.\textsuperscript{151} Believers are advised to repel evil with what is better, for thereby enmity will change into warm friendship.\textsuperscript{152}

*Beauty.*—God possesses most beautiful names\textsuperscript{153} and highest excellence,\textsuperscript{154} and creates everything of great beauty.\textsuperscript{155} Man is created in the best of moulds\textsuperscript{156} and is given a most beautiful shape.\textsuperscript{157} God has revealed the most beautiful message in the form of a book\textsuperscript{158} and given the best of explanations in the revealed books.\textsuperscript{159} We are, therefore, advised to follow the best of revelations from God.\textsuperscript{160} This relates most beautiful stories.\textsuperscript{161} The association of believers, prophets, sincere lovers of truth, witnesses (to the truths of religion in word and deed), and the righteous is a beautiful fellowship.\textsuperscript{162}

Who is better in speech than those who invite people to the ways of the good with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious\textsuperscript{163} and say only those things that are of supreme excellence?\textsuperscript{164} The Qur’an exhorts people to adopt ways of the highest value, for God loves those who perform deeds of excellence,\textsuperscript{165} good-will, and conciliation.\textsuperscript{166} It advises people to return greetings with greetings of greater excellence\textsuperscript{167} and repel evil with that which is best,\textsuperscript{168} for thereby they will be adding to the beauty of their own souls.\textsuperscript{169} Patience is graceful\textsuperscript{170} and so are forgiveness and overlooking others’ faults.\textsuperscript{171} Those who perform beautiful deeds shall have the highest rewards in this world\textsuperscript{172} and their reward in the hereafter shall be still better\textsuperscript{173} when they shall enjoy the fairest of places for repose\textsuperscript{174} and be provided with excellent provisions.\textsuperscript{175}

**B**

**DISVALUES**

Corresponding to these values there are some disvalues which are symbolized in the Qur’an as Satan or Iblis. He is described as a persistent rebel\textsuperscript{176} who is constantly engaged in deceiving\textsuperscript{177} people and misleading them from the path of righteousness.\textsuperscript{178} He sows the seeds of enmity and hatred,\textsuperscript{179} creates false desires,\textsuperscript{180} commands what is shameful and wrong,\textsuperscript{181} and defaces the fair nature created by God.\textsuperscript{182} He is in short an enemy of mankind;\textsuperscript{183} and believers are, therefore, advised that they should beware of his machinations.

**Destruction of Life.**—Opposed to the value of life is weakness of man to make mischief in the earth and shed blood—symbolized by the first unlawful and unjustified murder in the history of mankind by the first issue of Adam.\textsuperscript{184} All life being sacred,\textsuperscript{185} it is forbidden to commit suicide or to kill anybody without a just cause.\textsuperscript{186} It is equally sinful to murder one’s children for fear of want or poverty.\textsuperscript{187} Killing a person without reason, in the view of the Qur’an, is tantamount to slaying the human race.\textsuperscript{188} Fight for the cause of
righteousness is permitted only because tumult and oppression, which necessitate resort to armed resistance, are worse than killing. All those tendencies which weaken a man’s hold on life are condemned in the Qur’an. People are warned of falling into fear, grief, and despair or of being unmindful of the ultimate mercy of God. But any unjust clinging to life which involves sacrifice of other values is to be avoided at all cost. It does not become a man to be cowardly in the face of difficulties or to turn back and run away for life from the battle-field. Similarly, covetousness, niggardliness, and the hoarding of wealth are condemned, for they betray man’s unjustified clinging to values as means, as if they were ends in themselves.

There are certain disvalues which imply disrespect of life in oneself as well as in others. Begging importantly from all and sundry, which leads to killing one’s self-respect, is looked upon by the Qur’an as unbecoming a true believer. It forbids slandering, throwing fault or sin on somebody who is innocent of it, and swelling one’s cheek out of pride at men. Scandal-mongering and backbiting are hateful deeds. The Qur’an advises men and women not to laugh at, defame, be sarcastic to one another or call one another by offensive nicknames, and not to be suspicious, not to spy on others or speak ill of them behind their backs. It deprecates the man who is ready with oaths, is a slanderer going about with calumnies, is a transgressor beyond bounds, or is deep in sin, violence, and cruelty.

Things Momentary.—Opposed to his natural urge for eternity, man sometimes through ignorance seems to be enamoured of the life of the moment, which tends to vanish and is mere play and amusement. It is no good to be pleased and remain satisfied with the transitory things of this world and the fleeting and temporal life that has a span of but an hour of a day. The true goal of man is eternity which is the home of peace, satisfaction, security, and supreme achievement for which man must, according to his nature, ever toil and struggle.

Lack of Unity.—Against the value of unity there is the disvalue of the denial of the unity of the Ultimate Reality (khuft) and the association of partners with God (shirk) and likewise the disvalues of disunity, discord, and disharmony in the life of the individual and society. Those who turn back and disobey God and His Apostle deny God’s creative power, His purpose, and design. They accept some prophets and deny others, are all deniers of the true unity of God. Hair-splitting in religious matters, failure to judge by the light of divine revelation, indulgence in magic in order to sow seeds of disunity among people, are all acts which tantamount to disbelief in God.

God’s unity implies that He alone deserves worship, a worship which demands exclusive submission to His will, tinged and informed with the highest emotional attachment. Association of partners with God does not mean that people deny God’s power of creation and control of world’s affairs; where they err is the belief that these partners may bring them nearer to God, wrongly and foolishly ascribe to them a share in bestowing gifts, as for example, the gifts of a goodly child, thus leading to lack of consistency in their moral conduct and lack of exclusive loyalty towards the highest ideal, which indeed is a form of most heinous sin and the highest wrong-doing.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

A form of associating partners with God is ancestor-worship. If people are invited to the path of righteousness, they refuse by saying: "Nay! we shall follow the way of our fathers," even if their fathers were devoid of knowledge and guidance. Sometimes people succumb to their personal ambitions and self-importance which signifies their lack of faith in the ultimate causality of God, implied in the belief in the unity of God. When some trouble or affliction comes to man he turns to God, but when it is removed he forgets that he ever turned to Him, and ascribes its removal to others besides God. Sets up rivals unto Him—a great blasphemy; and sometimes thinks that it was his own skill and knowledge which helped him in removing his difficulties.

The disvalues of discord and disunity are the result of the denial of the unity of God. The unbelievers and those who associate partners with God are always subject to fear and lack a sense of unity and harmony. It is the devil that incites people to discord and, therefore, the Qur'an very forcefully forbids people to be divided among themselves and looks upon disunity as the result of lack of wisdom. It denounces divisions and splits in religion and disagreements among different sects and schisms through insolent envy. Similarly, all those acts which tend to spread mischief and tumult after there have been peace and order are condemned because they tend to create disorder, disunity, and disharmony in life.

Inertia.—Opposed to power, weakness is a disvalue. It is wrong to show weakness in face of difficulties, to lose heart, to be weak in word, to be weary and faint-hearted, to despair or boast, to be impatient and fretful. It is forbidden to be afraid of men or of Satan and his votaries.

There are certain disvalues which arise out of misuse of power. Warning is given to those people who oppress men with wrong-doing and insolently transgress beyond bounds through the land, defying right and justice. It is forbidden to indulge in vain talk, to exhibit fierceness, to be arrogant against God, for arrogance blinds people to the truth, to swell one's cheek with pride, or walk in insolence through the earth, for one cannot rend the earth asunder or reach the mountains in height. Arrogant and obstinate transgressors, vainglorious people, those fond of self-glory, rebellious and wicked, and vying with one another in pomp and gross rivalry, are held out as examples of those who misuse their power. Satan is condemned to everlasting punishment for abusing power and becoming haughty. Moses was sent to Pharaoh because the latter had become proud and arrogant. The people of 'Ad were punished because they behaved arrogantly and thought themselves very powerful. The Israelites slew their apostles because of pride. The hypocrites turn away from truth out of arrogance. The Christians are described as nearest in love to the Muslims because they are not arrogant.

Some people try to cover their misuse of power under the cloak of determinism, but the Qur'an repudiates this stand as totally unrealistic. Man has the power to shape his destiny in the light of the truth of revelation.

Error.—Opposed to truth or wisdom, error, conjecture, and fancy are all disvalues which the Qur'an at several places denounces as equivalent to untruth or lies and which do not lend support to an individual in his moral life. Fancy and conjecture can avail nobody against truth. It is forbidden to accept a report without ascertaining its truth, to utter

---

Ethical Teachings of the Qur'an

Ibid., xiii, 42.

Ibid., ix, 62; xxxii, 3; xxvii, 55.

Ibid., xliv, 26.

Ibid., xlv, 19.

Ibid., xxvii, 14; xxxv, 4.

Ibid., xxxii, 18.

Ibid., xxxii, 46.

Ibid., xl, 35.

Ibid., iv, 36; xvi, 23.

Ibid., xxxviii, 2.

Ibid., xlv, 7.

Ibid., lvi, 20.

Ibid., vii, 12; xxxvii, 74-76.

Ibid., xx, 24, 43.

Ibid., xli, 15.

Ibid., li, 87.

Ibid., liii, 5.

Ibid., vi, 85.

Ibid., vi, 148; xvi, 33.

Ibid., vi, 149.

Ibid., ii, 38.

Ibid., vi, 148; x, 66.

Ibid., iv, 157; vi, 116; liii, 23.

Ibid., x, 56; liii, 28.

Ibid., xlix, 6.
slander, intentionally forging falsehood, and to throw fault or sin on somebody who is innocent of it. These are all against the value of truth. Indulgence in dissipation, vain discourses, and susceptibility to superstitions are disvalues opposed to wisdom. Those who do not try to save themselves from these are liable to be always afraid of others, to be unable to distinguish truth from falsehood, and right from wrong; their hearts always turn away from the light of truth and wisdom towards depths of darkness. Such are the people who have hearts wherewith they understand not, eyes wherewith they see not, and ears wherewith they hear not; in short, like cattle they lack truth and wisdom.

Hypocrisy is another disvalue. A hypocrite is one who says with his tongue what is not in his heart, who is distracted in mind, being sincerely neither for one group nor for another. Hypocrites are liars. They expect people to praise them for what they never do, compete with one another in sin and rancour, and hold secret counsel among themselves for iniquity, hostility, and disobedience. Hypocrites—men and women—enjoin evil and forbid what is just, and if by chance they come into possession of a position of authority, they make mischief in the land, break ties of kinship, and yet claim to be peace-makers.

Showing off (rijâl) is also a disvalue. God does not love those who give away even money in order to be seen doing so by others, for such men have no faith in God and the Last Day. Such showing off cancels the spirit of their charity. It is like sowing seeds on a hard, barren rock on which there is little soil, and where heavy rain has left nothing but a bare stone.

Injustice—Opposed to the value of justice is the disvalue of injustice and violation of the principle of the mean. It is forbidden by the Qur’an to be influenced by people’s vain desires and to deviate from the truth while judging between them. It is also forbidden to distort justice or declare to do injustice or to withhold justice from people merely because they are your enemies. It would be perfectly unjust to oneself and to others to pile up wealth, to bury gold and silver, and not to spend them in the cause of God and righteousness. The Qur’an equally forbids as violation of the principle of justice the squandering of wealth like a spendthrift and recommends the middle way of prudence which is neither extravagance nor niggardliness. It advises one neither to make one’s hand tied to one’s neck nor stretch it forth to its utmost reach so that one becomes blameworthy and destitute. One should eat and drink but not waste by excess for that would be violating the principle of justice. Excess in any form is forbidden whether in food or in religion.

Usury is forbidden, for it means devouring other people’s substance wrongfully and involves injustice on both sides. Against the value of love is the disvalue of hatred, harshness, or unkindness to others. People are advised not to speak any word of contempt to their parents, to orphans, and to beggars. Believers are not to revile even those whom the unbelievers call upon besides God. The Holy Prophet is described as safe from severity and hard-heartedness towards others. Vice—Against goodness the Qur’an denounces the disvalue of vice, i.e., doing wrong and shameful deeds. It is Satan who commands people to do what is evil and shameful. People are forbidden to come near adultery, for it is a shameful deed and an evil, opening the road to other evils. Similarly,
wine and gambling involve great sin,340 for they are the work of Satan.341 The Qur'an forbids all shameful and evil deeds and uses a very comprehensive term *zalim* to cover them all.342 Hypocrites and unbelievers enjoin343 and plot evil344 and hold secret counsel for iniquity, evil, and rebellion344 and wrongfully eat up other people’s property.344 The believers are advised, therefore, not to help one another in sin and rancour.347

The Qur'an refers to several Satanic tendencies in man,348 such as ungratefulness,349 hastiness,350 impatience,351 despair, and unbelief in times of adversity, and pride and conceit in times of prosperity;352 quarrelsome,353 arrogance,354 greed of ever more and yet more,355 niggardliness,356 transgression of the bounds of propriety,357 and false sense of self-sufficiency.358 These tendencies often lead to different forms of wrong-doing and, therefore, must be counteracted by all right-thinking people.

**Moral Discipline.**—To produce the attitude of moral righteousness (*taqwa*), the discipline of prayer, fasting, *zakat*, and pilgrimage is enforced. People are commanded to guard strictly their habit of prayers and stand before God in a devout frame of mind.359 Pay the *zakat*,360 spend in charity secretly and

---

* The term *zakat* is used for the State tax earmarked for the poor, the needy, the wayfarer, the administrative staff employed for its collection, those whose hearts are to be won over, for freeing slaves and the heavily indebted, and for use in the path of God (Qur'an, ix, 60). Even if a State does not levy this tax or there is no State to levy it, its payment direct to the classes mentioned above still remains obligatory for every Muslim. *Sadaqat* is a term wider than *zakat*. It covers both *zakat* and whatever is voluntarily given for charitable purposes over and above *zakat*. Some people translate the word *zakat* as compulsory charity, and other forms of *sadaqat* as voluntary charity.

---

347. *Ibid.,* v, 93.
348. *Ibid.,* vii, 28; xvi, 90.
352. *Ibid.,* ii, 188.
354. Once the Holy Prophet said that every man has his Satan with him. Someone asked him if there was one with him as well. He replied: Yes, but I have made him a Muslim, i.e., made him submit to my control.
355. Qur'an, vii, 10; xxxvi, 45–47; lxxiv, 15–25; e, 1–8.
358. *Ibid.,* xi, 9–10; xvii, 83.
373. *Ibid.,* xxxi, 5; lxxvi, 5.
386. *Ibid.,* vii, 23; xi, 21, 101; xvi, 35.
grief and sorrow. The Lord accepts repentance from His servants and forgives the sins of those who do evil in ignorance but repent soon afterwards and are never obstinate in persisting in the wrong intentionally. Even the thieves and those who had waged wars against God are covered by the universal mercy and loving kindness of God provided they repent and amend their conduct earnestly bring God to mind, hold fast to God, purify their religion solely for God, and openly declare the Truth. There is no scope for pessimism and despair arising from the natural weaknesses of men in doing wrong to their souls, for God turns to them that they might repent. Turning to God in repentance and seeking of forgiveness from Him lead to the grant by God to man of good and true enjoyment and abounding grace in this life. He will rain bounties from the sky and add to people’s strength. To turn continually to God in repentance is the sign of the true believer and this attitude of mind is strengthened by remembrance of God (dhikr), for it enables a man in most difficult and odd situations to keep firm and steadfast and find in it a source of deep satisfaction and mental equipoise.

Taqwa.—It is the whole pursuit of virtue and avoidance of disadventure in general that is designated by the Qur’ān as righteousness (taqwa). It is dependent on and is the result of faith in God and adoration of Him. The Qur’ān is revealed solely to produce this attitude of taqwa among people. It is the presence of this moral attitude which saves people from destruction and it is this which helps them maintain God’s commands in their conjugal life.

---

Ethical Teachings of the Qur’ān

in sacrifice, in different aspects of social life, and in fulfilling faithfully their social obligations.

The motive which prompts people to adopt this moral attitude of taqwa is the desire to win the pleasure of God, to gain nearness to Him, implying that their motive is not self-interest but the seeking of good for the sake of good, which benefits their own souls and which they seek even at the sacrifice of life. The aim of such people is mainly a desire for increase in self-purification without any idea of winning favour from anyone or expecting any reward whatsoever. They will get a reward of the highest value and attain complete satisfaction and prosperity—the final attainment of the Eternal Home, well-pleasing unto God. These people resemble a garden high and fertile, heavy rain falls on it and makes it yield a double increase of harvest, and if it receives not heavy rain, light moisture suffices it. For such people are the gardens in nearness to their Lord, a result of the pleasure of God.

To be righteous (muttaqi) is to believe in God, and the Last Day, and the angels, and the Books, and the messengers; to spend out of one’s substance, out of love for God, for kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask, for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayers, and to pay the zakāt; to fulfil the contracts which have been made; and to be firm and patient in pain (or suffering), adversity, and periods of danger. Such people as follow these are possessed of true taqwa, i.e., righteousness. And of the servants of God the most gracious are those who walk on the earth in humility, and when the ignorant address them, they say, “Peace!”. Those who spend the night in adoration of their Lord prostrating and standing; those who, when they spend, are not extravagant nor niggardly, but hold a just balance between these two extremes; those who invoke not, with God, any
A History of Muslim Philosophy

other god, nor slay such life as God has made sacred, except for just cause, nor commit fornication; those who witness no falsehood, and, if they pass by futility, they pass by it with honourable avoidance; those who, when they are admonished with the signs of their Lord, do not show indifference to them like the deaf or the blind; and those who pray, "Our Lord! give us the grace to lead the righteous." The better and more lasting reward of the Lord is for those who believe and put their trust in Him; those who avoid the greater crimes and shameful deeds, and, even when they are angry, they forgive; those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular prayer, who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation; who spend out of what God bestows on them for sustenance; who, when an oppressive wrong is inflicted on them, (are not cowed but) help and defend themselves; and those who recompense injury with injury in degree equal thereto and, better still, forgive and make reconciliation. But indeed if any do help and defend themselves after a wrong is done to them, against such there is no cause of blame. The blame is only against those who oppress men with wrong-doing and insolently transgress beyond bounds through the land, defying right and justice; for such there will be a grievous penalty. But indeed showing patience and forgiveness is an exercise of courageous will and resolution in the conduct of affairs.

There is yet a higher stage of moral achievement described as ṭabān which signifies performance of moral action in conformity with the moral ideal with the added sense of deep loyalty to the cause of God, done in the most graceful way that is motivated by a unique love for God. Performance of righteous actions accompanied by a true faith is only a stage in the moral life of man which, after several stages, gradually matures into ṭabān. God is with those who perform good deeds and perform them with added grace and beauty. Those who sacrifice animals with a spirit of dedication have piety (taqwa) no doubt, but those who thereby glorify God for His guidance, acknowledging fully the extent of His bounties provided in abundance, are the people who are characterized by ṭabān. In the life hereafter the morally upright will be in the midst of gardens and springs wherein they will take spiritual enjoyment in the things which their Lord gives as a reward for leading a life of graceful righteousness. The sincerely devoted people (muḥsinin) are those who willingly suffer thirst, fatigue, or hunger in the cause of God, or tread paths which may raise the ire of the unbelievers, or receive injury from an enemy, who despite all that do not conduct themselves in life as to cause mischief on the earth but call on Him with fear and longing; who spend of their substance in the cause of God, refrain from evil, and are engaged in doing truly good deeds; who spend freely whether in prosperity or in adversity; who restrain anger and pardon all men; who are steadfast in patience and exercise restraint; who establish regular prayer and pay the zakāt and have in their hearts the assurance of the hereafter and who are always ready to forgive people and overlook their misdeeds. Almost all the prophets are included in this category which signifies that the muḥsinin are those who are not only on the right path themselves but in addition by their good example and magnetic personality lead others to the way of righteousness and help in establishing a social order based on peace, harmony, and security. Complete power, wisdom and knowledge, true guidance from the Lord, prosperity, rise in worldly position, power, and knowledge are the by-products of their life of graceful righteousness (ṭabān). Their reward shall never be lost; for God is always with them and loves them and will bestow on them the rank of friendship as He did on Abraham. He who submits his whole self to the will of God and moreover does it gracefully and with a spirit of dedication (muḥsin) has grasped indeed the most trustworthy handhold and enjoys the most beautiful position in religion for he is following Abraham who was true in faith. He will get his reward from his Lord.

431 Ibid., ii, 16.
432 Ibid., xxv, 83-64; 67-68, 72-74.
433 Ibid., xlii, 36-43.
434 In the Mughāt, there is a tradition which relates that a stranger one day came to the Holy Prophet and asked him, among other things, what ṭabān is. The Holy Prophet replied, "Serve the cause of God as if you are in His presence. If it is not possible to achieve this stage, then think as if He is watching you do your duty." This tradition clearly emphasizes the attitude of deep loyalty tinged with an emotional response of love towards God.
435 Qur'ān, v, 96.
436 Ibid., xvi, 128.
437 Ibid., xxii, 37.
438 Ibid., ii, 15.
and shall experience neither fear nor grief.455 God is well pleased with those who followed in the footsteps of the vanguard of Islam—the first of those who forsook their houses and of those who gave them aid—in a spirit of devotion and graceful loyalty as well as those who followed them, as they are all with Him. For them God has prepared the garden of paradise, as their eternal home of supreme felicity.456

Chapter IX

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TEACHINGS
OF THE QUR'AN

A ECONOMIC TEACHINGS

1. The first economic principle emphasized by the Qur'an with repeated stress is that all natural means of production and resources which subscribe to man's living, have been created by God. It is He who made them as they are and set them to follow the laws of nature that make them useful for man. It is He who allowed man to exploit them and placed them at his disposal.1

2. On the basis of the aforesaid truth the Qur'an lays down the principle that an individual has neither the right to be free in acquiring and exploiting these resources according to his own sweet will, nor is he entitled to draw a line independently to decide between the lawful and the unlawful. It is for God to draw this line; for none else. The Qur'an condemns the Midians, an Arabian tribe of old, because its people claimed to possess a right to acquire and expend wealth in any way they liked without restriction of any kind.2 It calls it a “lie” if a man describes a certain thing as lawful and another unlawful on his own account.3 The right to pronounce this rests with God and (as God’s deputy) His Prophet.4

3. Under the sovereign command of God and within the limits imposed by Him, the Qur'an recognizes the right of holding private property as implied in several verses.5 The economic scheme presented in the Qur'an is based entirely on the idea of individual ownership in every field. There is nothing in it to suggest that a distinction is to be made between consumption goods and production goods (or means of production) and that only the former may be held in private ownership, while the latter must be nationalized. Nor is there anything in the Qur'an suggesting or implying that the above-mentioned scheme is of a temporary nature to be replaced later by a permanent arrangement in which collectivization of all means of production may be desired to be made the rule. Had that been the ultimate object of the Qur'an, it would have certainly stated it unequivocally and given us instructions with regard to that future permanent order. The mere fact that it mentions in one place that “the earth belongs to God”6 is not enough to conclude that it either denies or forbids private ownership of land and sanctions nationalization. Elsewhere it says, “Whatever is in the heavens and the earth belongs to God,”7 but nobody has ever concluded from this verse that none of the things in the heavens or the earth can be held in individual possession or that all these things should be State property. If a thing which belongs to God ceases to belong to human beings, certainly it ceases to belong to individuals and States alike.

It is equally erroneous to draw from verse xii, 10 the inference that the Qur'an desires to distribute all the means of livelihood in the earth equally among all men, and conclude that since this can be achieved only under nationalization, the Qur'an advocates or favours the introduction of that system. For the purpose of this interpretation the verse is wrongly rendered to mean that “God has put in the earth its means of sustenance proportionately in four days, alike for those who seek.”8 But even this wrong translation does not serve the purpose. It would be incorrect to apply the words “alike for those who seek” to human beings alone. All kinds of animals, too, are among “those who seek,” and there is little doubt that their means of sustenance have also been placed by God in the earth. If this verse, then, denotes an equal share to all who seek, there is no justification for restricting this equality of share to members of the human species alone.

455 Ibid., ii, 112.
456 Ibid., ix, 100.

1 Qur'an, ii, 29; viii, 10; xiii, 3; xiv, 32-34; lvi, 63-64; lxvii, 15.
2 Ibid., xvi, 118. “This verse strictly prohibits that people should decide according to their own views or wishes what is lawful and what is unlawful” (Baidawi, Anwar al-Tafhim, Vol. III, p. 193). The purport of this verse is, as ‘Askari explains, that you should not call a thing lawful or unlawful unless you have learnt of its being so from God or His Prophet, otherwise you would be telling a lie on God; for nothing makes a thing lawful or unlawful save a commandment of God” (Alusi, Ruh al-Ma'ani, Vol. XIV, p. 226, Idarat al-Fab'at al-Muniryyah, Egypt, 1345/1926).
3 Qur'an, vii, 157.

5 Ibid., ii, 275, 279, 282, 285, 291; iv, 2, 4, 7, 20, 24, 29; v, 38; vi, 141; ix, 103; xxiv, 27; xxxvi, 71; ii, 19; lxi, 11.
6 Ibid., vii, 128.
7 Ibid., ii, 284.
8 The words of the text are: fi arba'atayn ayyamin sawa' al-lishd'illin. Zamekhbadi, Baidawi, Razi, Alusi and other commentators have taken sawa' to go with ayyamin and interpreted it to mean “in full four days.” No commentator of distinction has taken sawa' to go with ahd'illin. However, even if it is allowed to go with it, it would mean “provided for the sake of all who seek,” and not “for all who seek in equal measure.” This latter interpretation is just untenable.
Similarly, it would be wrong to stretch those verses of the Qur’ān which emphasize providing for the weak or the have-nots to extract from them the theory of nationalization. It should be seen that wherever it stresses this need of providing for the poor, it also prescribes the only way of meeting it, namely, that the rich and the well-to-do of a society should spend their wealth generously for the welfare of their poor kin, the orphans, and the needy for the pleasure of God; in addition to this, the State should collect a fixed portion of it and spend it for the same purpose. There is no hint in the Qur’ān of any other scheme proposed to be put in practice to meet this end.

No doubt, there is nothing in the Qur’ān to prevent a certain thing from being taken over from individual control and placed under collective control, if necessary; but to deny individual ownership altogether and adopt nationalization as an economic system does not go with the Qur’ān’s approach to man’s economic problems.

4. The fact that, as in other things, all men do not enjoy equality in sustenance and means of earning, is described in the Qur’ān as a feature of God’s providence. Extravagant disparities devised by various social systems aside, natural inequality, as it goes, is described as the outcome of His wise apportionment, issuing from His own dispensation. The idea that this inequality is to be levelled up and substituted by dead equality is alien to the Book of God.1

The Qur’ān advises people not to covet that by which Allah has made some of you excel others; men shall have the benefit of what they earn and women shall have the benefit of what they earn, and ask Allah of His grace.12

It is sometimes tried to conclude from verses xvi, 71 and xxx, 28 that the Qur’ān desires equality of provision for everybody. But both the words and the context of these verses tell that they do not attempt to dispense inequality and urge equality to take its place, but press this fact (of inequality among men) as an argument against taking some of God’s creatures as His partners. They argue that when men are not prepared to share their wealth (given by God) with their slaves as equal partners, what on earth leads them to think that God will share His powers with His servants and have partners with Him from amongst His creation.

5. The Qur’ān also asserts with full and repeated emphasis that God has created His honours for men so that they use them for their benefit. It is not His intent that men should have nothing to do with them and live a life of renunciation. However, He desires that they should distinguish between things pure and impure, lawful and unlawful. They should use and exploit only what is pure and lawful, and there too should observe moderation.13

6. To achieve this end the Qur’ān ordains that wealth should be acquired by lawful means only and that unlawful ways and means should be discarded altogether: “O you who believe, take not your wealth among yourselves in wrongful ways, but let there be trade among you by mutual agreement.”14

These “wrongful ways” have been detailed at length by the Holy Prophet and the great jurists of Islam have elucidated them in books of law. Some of them, however, have been described in the Qur’ān as under:

(a) “And do not eat one another’s property among yourselves in wrongful ways, nor seek by it to gain the nearness of the judges that you may sinfully consume a portion of other men’s goods and that knowingly.”15

(b) “If you one deposits a trust on another, let him who is trusted (faithfully) deliver his trust, and let him fear God, his Lord.”16

(c) “He who misappropriates (the public money) will come on the Day of Judgment with what he has misappropriated; then shall everyone be given in full what he earned.”17

(d) “The thief, male or female, cut off his or her hands.”18

(e) “Those who devour the property of orphans unjustly, devour fire in their bellies, and will soon endure a blazing fire.”19

(f) “Woe to the defrauders who, when they take the measure from men, exact full measure, but when they measure or weigh for them, give less than is due.”20

(g) “Those who love that indecent things should spread among the believers, for them is a painful chastisement, in the life of this world and the hereafter.”21

(h) “Force not your slave-girls to prostitution that you may enjoy (some) gain of the present life, if they desire to live in chastity.”22


The condition of “by mutual agreement” explains that there should be no coercion, fraud, or trick about it to which the other party would not agree if it came to its notice.

14 Qur’ān, ii, 188. Seeking to gain the nearness of the judges includes resorting to law-courts to lay a false claim to other people’s property, or offering bribes to the judges to obtain a favourable decree. (Āfāsi, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 60.)

15 Qur’ān, ii, 283.

16 Ibid., iii, 161.

17 Ibid., v, 41.

18 Ibid., iv, 10.

19 Ibid., xxxii, 1–3.

20 Ibid., xxiv, 18.

A History of Muslim Philosophy

not fornication, surely it is a shameful deed and an evil way.” 22 “The adulterer and the adulteress, flog each of them with a hundred stripes.” 23

(i) “O ye believers, wine and gambling and idols and divining arrows are an abomination—of Satan’s handiwork; so avoid them that you may prosper.” 24

(ii) “God has permitted trade and forbidden usury.” 25 “O ye believers, fear God and give up what remains (due to you) of usury if you are believers (indeed). If you do not do so, take notice of war from God and His Messenger. But if you repent you shall have your principal. Neither you wrong, nor shall you be wronged. If the debtor is in straitened circumstances, give him time till it is easy (for him to pay), and that you remit (the debt), by way of charity, that is the best thing for you, if you only knew.” 26

Thus we see that the Qur’an has prohibited the following ways of acquiring wealth: (i) Taking another’s property without his consent or remuneration, or with consent and with or without remuneration in such a way that the consent is forced or obtained by guile. (ii) Bribe. (iii) Forfeiture acquisitions. (iv) Fraud, whether with private or public wealth. (v) Theft. (vi) Misappropriation of orphans’ property. (vii) Taking or giving wrong measure. (viii) Businesses which help to spread indecency. (ix) Prostitution and its earnings. (x) Manufacture, buying and selling, and carriage of wines. (xi) Gambling, including all such ways in which the transfer of wealth from one person to another depends on mere chance. (xii) Manufacture, buying, and selling of idols, and service of temples where idols are kept or worshipped. (xiii) Earnings from businesses like astrology, foretelling of fate, divination, etc. (xiv) Usury.

Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur’an

7. After prohibiting these wrong ways of acquiring wealth the Qur’an also strongly condemns the amassing of wealth in a covetous and niggardly way. 27

Along with this we are warned that love of wealth or a hankering after riches and pride of fortune have always been among the causes that have led men astray and ultimately sent them to ruin. 28

8. On the other hand, the Qur’an condemns it in equally strong terms that one should squander one’s properly acquired wealth in wasteful pursuits, spend it for one’s own lust or luxury, and put it to no use save raising one’s own standard of living. 29

9. The proper course for man, according to the Qur’an, is to spend moderately on his own needs and those of his family. He and his dependants have rights to his wealth which must be granted without stint, but he cannot be allowed to squander everything on himself and his family, for there are other obligations, too, which must be recognized. 30

10. After he has satisfied his own needs with moderation, a man should spend what is left over of his well-earned wealth in the following ways:

“They ask you what they should spend (in charity). Say: ‘Whatever exceeds your needs.’” 31

“It is not piety that you turn your faces towards east or west. Piety is that a man should believe in God and the Last Day and the angels and the Book and the Prophets, and give his wealth for the love of God to his kinsfolk and the orphans and the needy and the traveller and to those who ask, and for setting the slaves free.” 32

“You will never attain piety until you spend what you love (of your wealth). And whatever you spend, God knows it well.” 33

“Serve God, and associate no partner with Him, and be kind to parents and kinmen and orphans and the needy, and the neighbour who is of kin, and the neighbour who is a stranger, and the companion by your side, and the traveller, and the slaves that your right hands own. Surely God does not love the proud and the boastful.” 34

“(Charity) is for those poor people who are so restrained in the way of God that they cannot travel in the land to earn their living.” 35

The ignorant

22 Qur’an, xvi, 32.
23 Ibid., xxiv, 2. Along with making adultery a criminal offence, the earnings of adultery are also declared forbidden. The Prophet of God (May peace be upon him) called it the most abominable of earnings. (Bukhārī, Book 34, Ch. 115; Book 37, Ch. 20; Book 68, Ch. 50; Book 76, Ch. 48; Book 77, Ch. 96; Muslim, Book 22, Tr. No. 39, 41; Abu Dawd, Book 35, Ch. 30, 63; Tirmidhī, Book 9, Ch. 37; Book 12, Ch. 46; Book 26, Ch. 28; Nasā’ī, Book 42, Ch. 5; Book 44, Ch. 90; Ibn Mājah, Book 12, Ch. 9.)
24 Qur’an, v, 83. The manufacture of and trading in all things prohibited in the Qur’an are also prohibited. Full prohibition calls for complete ban on profiting by anything connected with what is prohibited. (Al-Jassās, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 212.)
25 Qur’an, ii, 275. This makes it clear that in the case of trade the profit which a person makes over his invested capital, or in the event of a partnership in trade the profit which the partners of an enterprise divide according to their shares in it, is lawful and allowed, but whatever a creditor charges from his debtor over his principal is unlawful and God does not allow it as truly earned income like the profit earned in trade.
26 Ibid., ii, 278–80. It is evident from the words used here that this injunction is related to transactions of debt and in such transactions if a creditor charges anything more than what he has advanced it would be usury (excess usury, interest). The rate of interest to be charged, high or low, makes no difference in it. It is also immaterial for what purpose the sum is borrowed.
27 Ibid., iii, 189; ix, 34; xlvi, 38; lvi, 24; lxiv, 16; lxxi, 34; lxx, 21; lxxiv, 45; lxxxix, 15–20; xlvii, 11; civ, 3; evii, 1, 2, 3, 7.
28 Ibid., xxviii, 58; xvi, 34, 35; civ, 1–3.
29 Ibid., vi, 141; vii, 31; xvii, 23.
30 Ibid., xvii, 29; xvi, 67; xxviii, 77.
31 Ibid., ii, 219.
32 Ibid., ii, 177.
33 Ibid., iii, 92.
34 Ibid., iv, 36.
35 In the days of the Holy Prophet these were the four hundred volunteers who had come from the four corners of Arabia and settled at Madinah. They had dedicated their lives to the pursuit of the knowledge of Islam and were prepared to go with any expedition of propagation or war when and wherever the Holy
man regards them as wealthy because of their self-possession. You shall know them by their mark, they do not beg of men impartially. Whatever (wealth) you spend (on them) God surely knows it."

"They (the righteous) feed the needy, the orphan, and the captive, for the love of God, saying: We feed you for the sake of God alone. We desire no reward from you nor any thanks." 37

"(Excepted from the fire of hell are) those in whose wealth there is a fixed portion for the beggar and the destitute." 38

The Qur’an not only tells that this kind of spending is the essence of piety but also warns that its absence in a society must mean its decay and ruination:

"Expend in the way of God, and cast not yourself with your own hands into ruin." 39

11. Besides this general and voluntary spending in the way of God the Qur’an enjoins expending of wealth as expiation of omissions and sins. For instance, if a man takes an oath and then forewears it, "the expiation for it is to feed ten poor persons with the average of food which you serve to your own folk, or to clothe them, or to give a slave his freedom; or if anyone does not find (the wererithal to do so) let him fast three days." 40

Similarly, if anyone makes his wife unlawful for him by declaring her to be his mother or sister by ḥiwr 41 and later seeks to retract and take her again, it is ordained that "he should free a slave before the two touch each other, and he who has not (the wererithal for that) should fast for two months consecutively... and he who is unable to do so let him feed sixty poor persons." 42

Like expiations have also been ordained to make up for omissions in the performance of pilgrimage 43 and proper observance of the month of fasting. 44

Prophet sent them. Having devoted their whole time to these services they could do little to earn their livelihood. (Zanahbharti, al-Kaṣākāf, Vol. 1, p. 126, al-Maṣba‘at al-Bahiyah, Egypt, 1343/1924.) Similarly, this verse will now apply to those persons who devote their whole time to study, or propagation of faith or other works of social welfare and do not find opportunity to attend to their own business.

Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur’an.

12. But all such expense will count as expense in God’s way only if it is really free from selfishness, guile, and display, and there is no attempt to hurt or lay anyone under obligation. One must also make no attempt to sort out the worse of one’s goods to disburse in charity. One must give the choice of them, and bear nothing in mind except the love and pleasure of God. 45

13. This expending of wealth which the Qur’an variously terms as "spending in God’s way" or charity or zakāt, is not a mere act of piety, an almsgiving; rather it is the third among the five pillars of Islam, viz., (1) the witness of faith (ʾimān), (2) prayer (salāt), (3) charity (zakāt), (4) fasting (ṣaum) and (5) pilgrimage (ḥajj). It has been mentioned constantly with prayer (ṣalāt) some thirty-seven times in the Qur’an and both of them have been described with full emphasis as essentials of Islam, without which there can be no salvation. 46 Zakāt, it says, has been a pillar of true religion preached by all the prophets of God. 47

And so this zakāt is a pillar of Islam now in the religion of the last Prophet of God. It is as essential for one who joins the fold of Islam as bearing witness to the truth of faith (ʾimān) or prayer (ṣalāt). 48

Zakāt is not only for the good of society; it is also necessary for the moral development and edification of the giver himself. It is for his own purification and salvation. It is not only a tax, but also an act of worship just like prayer. It is an essential part of that programme which the Qur’an prescribes for the amelioration of man’s soul. 49

14. But the Qur’an was not content to infuse a general spirit of voluntary benevolence and philanthropy among people. It instructed the Prophet as the Head of the Islamic State to fix an obligatory minimum for it, and arrange for its regular receipt and disbursement.

"Take a charity from their wealth." 50

The words "a charity" pointed out that a certain fixed measure determined by the Prophet was to be enjoined on people, besides the usual charity they practised of their own accord. Accordingly, the Prophet fixed a maximum allowable limit in respect of different kinds of wealth, and the following rates were fixed for their holdings that stood above that limit. 51
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur'an

(1) On gold, silver, and cash hoardings 2% annually
(2) On agricultural produce from unirrigated land 10% annually
(3) On agricultural produce from artificially irrigated land 5% annually
(4) On livestock kept for breeding and trade—the rates are
different for sheep, goats, cows, camels, etc.
(5) On mines in private ownership and treasure-troves 20% annually

The Prophet of God imposed these rates of zakāt as a duty on Muslims like the five daily prayers. As duties, and in being incumbent, there is no difference between the two. According to the Qur’ān, it is one of the basic objects of an Islamic State that it should institute prayer (ṣalāt) and manage regular receipt and distribution of zakāt.

It should be noted that although, as seen above, the collection and disbursement of zakāt is a duty of an Islamic State, the believers will not be absolved from paying it (privately), just as they are not absolved from prayer, in case the Islamic State ceases to exist or is neglectful of its duty.

15. To the funds collected under zakāt the Qur’ān adds another item—a part of the spoils of war. The rule prescribed by the Book is that the soldiers fighting in a battle should not loot the spoils which fall into their hands after a victory, but bring everything before the commander who should distribute four-fifths of the whole booty amongst soldiers who participated in the engagement and hand over the remaining fifth to the State for the following purposes:

“Know that whatever booty you take, the fifth of it is for God and the Prophet and the kinsmen and the orphans and the needy and the traveller.”

16. The income from these two sources, according to the Qur’ān, is not a part of the general exchequer maintained to furnish comfort and provide for essential services for all including those who contribute to the zakāt fund. On the contrary, it is reserved for use on the following items:

“Alms are meant for the poor and the needy and those who work for the poor”

17. The Qur’ānic rule with regard to the property which a person leaves behind him after his or her death is that it should be distributed among his parents, children, and wife (or husband, as the case may be) according to a specified ratio. If he leaves neither parents nor children, his brothers and sisters (real, step, or uterine) should divide it. Detailed instructions relating to this may be seen in chapter iv of the Qur’ān. We omit to reproduce them here to avoid prolixity.

The guiding principle here is that property accumulated by a person during his life-time should not remain accumulated there after his death but scatter among his kinsfolk. This is opposed to the principle underlying primogeniture, the joint family, and other like systems which aim at keeping accumulated wealth accumulated even after the death of its holder.

The Qur’ān also rejects the system of adopting children to make them heirs, and lays down that inheritance should go to those who are actually related, not to those fictitiously adopted as sons and daughters to pass on property.

Vol. III, p. 161.) According to this definition, all those helpless children who are not yet able to earn, and the cripple, and the old who are no longer able to make a living, and the unemployed, and the invalids who are temporarily rendered unfit to earn livelihood, are masākīn.

Three kinds of men were given money for ‘reconciling of hearts,’ among the Prophet’s life:

1. Some opponents of Islam who persecuted weak Muslims or set themselves hard against the faith were given something and persuaded to adopt a lenient attitude. 2. Those who forcibly prevented the people of their tribes or clans from embracing Islam were persuaded to give up this obstruction. 3. The new entrants in faith were given monetary help to get over their financial difficulties, so that they should live in their new environments among Muslims with equanimity.

Refers to the Muslims who were captured in war by the enemies as well as the non-Muslims who came as war captives to the Muslims and wanted to be set free on payment of ransom; reference is also to the slaves who lived in bondage from old.

The cause of God includes iḥād (war) and ḥajj (pilgrimage), One who proceeds on war can avail oneself of zakāt even if one is well-to-do so far as personal effects go, because one’s personal effects are often inadequate to enable one to prepare for war and provide for the expenses of the way. Similarly, one who runs short of money on pilgrimage deserves to be helped with zakāt.

A traveller, even though he is rich at home, deserves to be helped with zakāt if he runs short of money on the way.

Refers to the Holy Prophet’s elucidation, in the absence of the nearest relations the inheritance will go to the nearer, and in their absence, as a last resort, to those who have at least some relation with the deceased in comparison with mere strangers.

Verses 7–12 and 176. According to the Holy Prophet’s elucidation in the absence of the nearest relations the inheritance will go to the nearer, and in their absence, as a last resort, to those who have at least some relation with the deceased in comparison with mere strangers. But if the deceased leave no relation of any kind, the property will be added to the general exchequer of the Islamic State.

Later it was decided by ījma’ (consensus of opinion) that zakāt on merchandise goods would also be charged at the rate of 2½% per annum. (Al-Shaukānī, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 117.) This principle of zakāt on commerce will likewise apply to factories which manufacture different kinds of goods for sale.

With the death of the Prophet the task of the believers was to be the Head of the State and thus after his death it should go to the Caliph and his kinsfolk. Others thought that it should still belong to the kinfolk of the Prophet. At last it was agreed that it should be set aside for the military requirements of the Islamic State.

Arabic ḥuqār, singular ḥuqr. Literally, ḥuqr is want, and ḥuqār is those who earn less than they need and thus deserve help. (Liḍān al-‘Arab, Vol. V, pp. 60, 61, Beirut, 1956.)

Arabic maṣākin, singular miṣākīn. The Caliph ‘Umar says that miṣākīn is he who cannot earn his living or does not find opportunity to do so. (Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, op. cit., xxiii, 4, 6.)
A History of Muslim Philosophy

However, after ensuring blood relations their rights, the Qur’ān advises them to be generous to the other relations who are not going to inherit but are present on the occasion of the division of property. They also may be given something out of kindness.  

18. In prescribing the law of inheritance the Qur’ān allows a person’s right to make a will before he dies in respect of the property he is leaving behind him.  

This ordinance instructs a man who is passing away to urge his offspring to be kind to his parents—the young being often inclined to neglect the proper care of their aged grand-parents; and to bequeath some of his property to those of his kinsfolk who deserve help but are not entitled to inherit anything under the law. Besides this if a person is leaving much wealth he may bequeath a part of it for charitable purposes or works of social welfare, for the above-quoted verse does not ask him to restrict his will to his parents and relatives alone.

It is evident from these laws of inheritance that the rule in respect of the heritage of private property is that two-thirds of it must be divided among legal heirs and the remaining one-third left to the discretion of the dying person to dispose of as he wills, provided, however, the purpose for which he means to bequeath it is just and lawful, and no one is robbed of his right.

19. As for those people who cannot husband their property well on account of idiocy or want of intelligence and are wasting it away or, it is genuinely feared, are likely to do so, the instruction is that they may not be allowed to hold it in their care. Such property should lie in the care of their guardians or responsible judicial officers and may be restored to them only when there is satisfaction that they are able to manage their affairs properly. An important point described in this verse about private possessions is that although they are the property of their owners according to law, yet they do not wholly belong to them, because the interest of society is also involved in them. That is why the Qur’ān calls them “your property” instead of “their property.” That is also why, where unintelligent use of private property is causing, or is likely to cause, harm to the collective interest of society, it allows guardians or magistrates to take it over in their own hands, without, however, disturbing the owner’s right of owning it or benefiting by it.

20. The Qur’ānic directive in respect of properties, wealth, and incomes that belong to the State is that they should not be used for the welfare of rich classes only but of all alike and particularly the poor whose interest deserves more looking after than that of any other class.

“Whatever God has bestowed on His Messenger, (taking it) from the people of these towns, is for God and the Messenger and the kinsfolk and the orphans and the needy and the traveller, in order that it may not circulate among the rich of you (only). . . . (It is also) for the poor emigrants who have been expelled from their homes and possessions.”

21. In the matter of levying taxes the Qur’ān teaches the principle that their incidence should lie on those who possess more than they need, and on that part of their wealth which is surplus after all legitimate needs have been met.

“They ask you what they should spend. Say: ‘What is spare after meeting your needs.’”

The characteristic features and basic principles of the economic scheme drawn by the Qur’ān for man and described in the above twenty-one paragraphs may be summed up as follows:

(i) It works a happy co-ordination between economic and moral values. Instead of being treated as distinctly separate things, the two are drawn together into a harmonious blend. The economic problem has been tackled not from the purely “economic” point of view; it has been solved after being appropriately placed in the overall scheme of life based on ethical concepts of Islam. (Paras 1, 2, 4, 5.)

(ii) All resources and means of living are regarded as God’s magnanimous gift to mankind; this implies that all kinds of monopolization, individual, collective, or national, should be discouraged and all men should be provided with free opportunities of earning on God’s earth to the maximum limit possible. (Para. 5.)

(iii) It allows individual right of ownership but not to an unlimited extent. Besides putting restrictions on it in the interest of other individuals and society as a whole, it admits on a person’s property the rights of his relatives, nei-

45 By this is meant the expenditure on the administration and defence of the Islamic State. The Holy Prophet (on whom be peace) and his successors, the Caliphs drew their own subsistence and paid their officials (except those of the zakād department) from this source.
46 For explanation, see note 54.
47 Qur’ān, lx, 7-8.
48 Ibid., ii, 219.
bours, friends, the needy, the unfortunate, and, so to speak, of all members of society. Some of these are made enforceable by law; as for others, arrangement has been made to educate people morally and intellectually enabling them to understand these rights and prepare themselves to honour them of their own free will. (Paras 3, 5, 7-14, 16, 18, 19.)

iv. The natural way for the economic system to operate according to this scheme is that individuals should work it and try to improve it with free endeavour. However, they are not left to do as they may without checks and restraints of any kind. For their own cultural and economic welfare and for that of their society this freedom has been curtailed within limits. (Paras 6, 14, 21.)

v. Man and woman are alike declared owners of the wealth they earn, inherit, or acquire by other lawful means, and allowed to derive benefit from their possessions. (Paras 3, 4, 17.)

vi. To preserve economic balance people have been urged to give up miserliness and renunciation, and take to putting the gifts of God to good use. But at the same time they have been strongly warned not to indulge in extravagance of any kind. (Paras 5, 7, 8.)

vii. To secure economic justice it has been assured that unjust means are not employed to force the flow of wealth in particular channels. Nor should wealth acquired by just means remain stored at a place and fall out of circulation. Arrangement is also made to ensure that wealth remains in constant use and circulation, particularly for the benefit of those classes which are deprived of their due and reasonable share for one reason or another. (Paras 6-8, 10, 11, 14, 16-18, 20.)

viii. The scheme does not depend much upon the interference of law or the State to ensure economic justice. After declaring a few unavoidable things to be the responsibility of the State for this purpose, it seeks to enforce the other items in its plan through the intellectual and moral uplift of the individuals comprising a society and its general amelioration. Economic justice is thus secured in perfect concord with the principle of allowing the exercise of individual freedom in the economic field. (Paras 5-21.)

ix. Instead of producing class-conflict it puts an end to the causes of such conflicts and produces a spirit of co-operation and comradeship among the different classes of society. (Paras 4, 6-10, 12, 14-16, 20, 21.)

When these principles were worked out and put into practice in governmental and social spheres during the time of the Holy Prophet and his "Guided Successors," many more injunctions and precedents came into existence. But our present study precludes that discussion. Books of history, biography, traditions, and jurisprudence abound in such matters and may be consulted for details.

190

Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur’ān

B

POLITICAL TEACHINGS

1. The political philosophy of the Qur’ān is essentially based on its fundamental concept of the universe which should be clearly kept in mind for its proper appreciation and right appraisal. If we study this concept of the universe from the political point of view, the following four points vividly come into prominence:

(a) That God is the creator of the whole of this universe including man and all those things which He exploits and harnesses into His service.74
(b) That God Himself is the sole master, ruler, director, and administrator of His creation.75
(c) That sovereignty in this universe does not and cannot vest in anyone except God. Nor has anyone else any right to share this sovereignty with Him.76
(d) That all attributes and powers of sovereignty are solely His prerogatives. He is living, self-existent, self-sufficient, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and exalted above all flaw, defect, or weakness. His is the supreme authority; everything submits to Him willingly or unwillingly; to Him belong all powers. He can dictate whatever He likes and none has the power to interfere in or review His commands. No one can interfere with Him save by His leave. Nobody has the power to harm those whom He intends to benefit and none can prevent whom He intends to harm. He is accountable to none; everyone else is accountable to Him. He is the guardian of one and all. He can protect against all, but none can give quarters against Him. His are the powers of inflicting punishment or granting forgiveness. He is the supreme Lord over all other rulers. He grants an opportunity to rule on His earth to whomsoever He desires and withdraws this privilege whenever He so wills.

These essential powers and attributes of a sovereign being vest solely in God.77

2. On the basis of this concept of the universe the Qur’ān asserts that the real sovereign of mankind too is the same as the sovereign of the whole universe. His is the only rightful authority in human affairs just as in all other affairs of creation. No one else, be he human or non-human, has any right to give orders or decide matters independently.

There is, however, one vital difference.

In the physical sphere of the universe the sovereignty of God is established

74 Ibid., ii, 29; iv, 1; vi, 73; xiii, 16; xxxv, 3; lxi, 58-72.
75 Ibid., vii, 54; xx, 8; xxx, 26; xxxii, 5.
76 Ibid., ii, 107; iii, 154; vi, 57; xiii, 16; xvi, 17; xviii, 26; xxv, 2; xxvii, 70; xxx, 4; xxxv, 40-41; lxi, 5.
77 Ibid., ii, 255, 284; iii, 26, 83; v, 1; vi, 18; vii, 128; x, 65, 107; xiii, 9, 41; xviii, 11, 26, 27; xxi, 23; xxii, 88; xxxvi, 83; lx, 23; lxvii, 1; lxviii, 22; lxxv, 13-16; xcv, 8.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

by itself regardless of whether one willingly submits to it or not. In that sector of his life even man has no option to do otherwise. He too finds himself totally regulated by the inexorable laws of nature like any other object from the tiniest speck of an atom to the magnificent galaxies in space. But in the volitional sphere of his life man has been allowed a certain amount of free-will and God has not coerced him to an unwilling submission. Herein He has chosen only to invite and persuade mankind through His revealed Books (the last of which is the Holy Qur'an) to surrender themselves before His Lordship and acknowledge His sovereignty with deliberate willingness. The Qur'an has discussed the different aspects of this subject at great length. For instance:

(a) The Lord of the universe is indeed the Lord of man, and this position must be fully recognized by him.78
(b) God alone has the right to decide and order. Mankind should submit to none save Him. This is the only right course.79
(c) The right to rule belongs to God alone because He is the creator.80
(d) The right to order and decide belongs to God because He is the ruler of the universe.81
(e) His rule is right and just, because He alone comprehends reality and none else is in a position to give unerring guidance.82

3. On these grounds the Qur'an lays down that an unadulterated obedience is the due of God alone; that it is His Law that should rule supreme; and that to obey others or to follow one's own wishes against the Law of God, is not the right way.83

The Qur'an also asserts that no one has the right to transgress the limits that have been laid down by God for the regulation of human affairs.84

It also points out that all orders and decisions in contravention of the Law of God are not only wrong and unlawful but also unjust and blasphemous. It condemns all such orders as anti-Islamic and the attempt to abide by them as negation of faith.85

4. Then the Qur'an says that prophets are the only source of our knowing the Law of God. They alone are the bearers of revelation and are in a position to convey to mankind the commandments and directions of their Lord. They again are the persons divinely authorized to explain those commandments by their word and deed. Thus, the prophets are embodiments of the legal sovereignty of God. That is why obedience to them has been considered to

be obedience to God Himself and faith in them has been made a necessary condition for demarcating belief from disbelief.86

5. According to the Qur'an, the commandments of God and the Prophet of Islam constitute the Supreme Law and the Muslims as such cannot adopt any attitude other than that of complete submission to it. A Muslim is not allowed to follow his own independent decisions in matters which have been finally and unequivocally decided by God and His Apostle. To do that is a negation of faith.87

6. The right form of government for mankind according to the Qur'an is one in which the State relinquishes its claim to sovereignty in favour of God and, after recognizing the legal supremacy of God and His Apostle, accepts the position of Caliphate (vicegerency) under the suzerainty of the Rightful Ruler. In this capacity all the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the State will necessarily be circumscribed by the limits which have been described in Parās 3, 4, and 5 above.88

7. The conception of Caliphate as it has been put forth by the Qur'an, can be summed up in the following terms:

(a) All the powers that man possesses in this world are in fact not his own, but have been endowed to him by God Almighty. The Lord Himself has assigned to man the position in which he may exercise these delegated powers within the limits prescribed by Him. Man is thus not an independent master but a vicegerent of the real Sovereign.89

(b) Every nation that acquires the power and authority to rule over any part of the world is in reality a vicegerent of God in its domain.90

(c) This vicegerency, however, cannot be right and lawful unless it is subservient to the commandments of the real Sovereign. Any State independent of Him and not subservient to His commands is not a vicegerency. It is really a revolt against the Lord.91

8. The powers of a true Caliphate do not vest in any individual nor in any clan, class or community, but in those who believe and do good. The text of xxiv, 55 that "God has promised to those of you who believe and do good that He will most certainly make them His vicegerents on the earth..." is quite clear on this point. According to this verse, every good Muslim is fit to hold the position of a Caliph. It is this aspect of Islamic Caliphate that distinguishes it from a kingship, an oligarchy, and a theocracy. It is different even from modern democracy. There is a basic difference between the two. The edifice of democracy is raised on the principle of popular sovereignty; while in Islamic Caliphate the people themselves surrender their independence to

78 Ibid., vi, 164; vii, 54; x, 31; xxiv, 1–3.
79 Ibid., lvi, 154; xii, 40; xlii, 10.
80 Ibid., vii, 54.
81 Ibid., 38–40.
82 Ibid., ii, 216, 220, 255, 232; iv, 11, 176; viii, 75; ix, 60; xxiv, 58–59; lx, 10.
83 Ibid., vii, 3; xiii, 37; xvi, 36; xxxix, 2, 11–12; xl, 18; xciv.
84 Ibid., ii, 229; lviii, 4; lxv, 1.
85 Ibid., iv, 90; v, 44, 45, 46, 50.
86 Ibid., iv, 64, 65, 80, 115; lix, 7.
87 Ibid., iv, 61; xxiv, 47–48; xxxiii, 36.
88 Ibid., v, 48; xxxviii, 26.
89 Ibid., ii, 31; vii, 10; xxii, 65.
90 Ibid., vii, 69, 74, 129; x, 14.
91 Ibid., xxiv, 65; xxxv, 39; lxxxi, 17–24; lxxxix, 6–11.

192

193
A History of Muslim Philosophy

the sovereignty of God and of their own accord limit their powers within the four corners of the divine Law and the promise of vicegerency has been held out to them only if they are morally good.

9. The government of a State established with a view to running an Islamic Caliphate cannot claim an absolute or unlimited obedience from the people. They are bound to obey it only so far as it exercises its powers in accordance with the divine Law revealed in nature and the Sacred Book. There can be neither obedience nor co-operation in sin and aggression.22

10. In all affairs of the State, right from its constitution to the election of its Head and members of its parliament, and the matters of legislation and administration, the Muslims should make it a rule to take counsel among themselves.23

11. The following qualifications must be kept in view in choosing the people responsible to run the State:

(a) They must have faith in the principles according to which they have to manage the affairs of the Caliphate. Evidently, an ideological system cannot work in the hands of those who do not subscribe to its principles.24

(b) They should not be unjust, licentious, forgetful of God, or transgressors of divine limits. They should be, on the other hand, honest, trustworthy, God-fearing, and virtuous.25

(c) They should not be unwise and ignorant. They must be rather educated, wise, intelligent, and both bodily and intellectually fit to pilot the State.26

(d) They should be men of integrity so that they may be safely entrusted with public responsibilities.27

12. The constitution of such a State shall be based on the following principles:

(a) "O ye who believe! obey Allah, and obey the Apostle and those of you who are in authority; and if you have a dispute concerning any matter, refer it to Allah and the Apostle if ye are (in truth) believers in Allah and the Last Day. That is better and more seemly in the end."28

This verse elucidates five constitutional points: —

(i) That obedience to God and His Apostle must be given priority to every other obedience.

(ii) That obedience to those who are in authority is subject to the obedience to God and His Apostle.

(iii) That the Head of the State must be from amongst the believers.

Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur'ān

(iv) That it is possible for the people to differ with the government and its rulers.

(v) That in case of dispute the final authority to decide between them is the Law of God and His Apostle.

(b) The Qur'ān does not give us any hard and fast rules about the method of election and consultation. It lays down only broad-based principles and leaves the problem of their practical implementation to be decided in accordance with the exigencies of time and the requirements of society.

(c) In those matters about which clear injunctions have been given or definite principles laid down or limits prescribed by God and His Apostle, the legislature has only the right to interpret them, or to frame bye-laws and rules of procedure to bring them into practice. As for those matters about which the Supreme Law is silent, the legislature is allowed to legislate for all purposes and needs of the society keeping in view the spirit and the general principles of Islam. The very fact that no clear injunction exists about them in the Qur'ān and Sunnah is sufficient to show that the Lawgiver has Himself left it to the good sense of the believers.

(d) The judiciary must be free from every pressure and influence to adjudicate impartially without being carried away by the public or the people in authority. Its foremost duty is to give verdict strictly in accordance with the law and requirements of justice without being swayed either by the passions or prejudices of its own members or those of others.29

13. This State comes into being for two main purposes. First, that justice and equity should be established in human affairs,30 and, secondly, that the powers and resources of the State should be harnessed for the welfare of the people, i.e., for promotion, for them, of all that is good and eradication of all that is evil.31

14. All citizens of the State, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, must be guaranteed the following fundamental rights, and it is the bounden duty of the State to safeguard them against all types of encroachment: —

(a) Security of person.32

(b) Security of property.33

(c) Protection of honour.34

(d) Right of privacy.35

(e) The right to protest against injustice.36

30 Ibid., iv, 58; vi, 48; xxxviii, 26.
31 Ibid., lvii, 25.
32 Ibid., xxii, 41.
33 Ibid., xxxii, 23.
34 Ibid., ii, 188; iv, 29.
35 Ibid., xlix, 11-12.
36 Ibid., xxv, 27; xlix, 12.
37 Ibid., iv, 148.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

(f) The right to enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil. This includes the right of criticism.\(^{107}\)

(g) Freedom of association, provided it is used for good ends and does not become an instrument for spreading dissensions and creating fundamental differences in the society.\(^{108}\)

(h) Freedom of faith and conscience.\(^{109}\)

(i) Protection against wrongfully hurting one’s religious susceptibilities.\(^{110}\)

The Qur’an has clearly laid down in this connection that in matters of religious differences an academic discussion can be held, but it must be conducted in a fair and decent manner.\(^{111}\)

(j) Limiting the responsibility of every person only to his or her own deeds.\(^{112}\)

(k) Security from action being taken against anyone on false reports about his or her crime.\(^{113}\)

(l) The right of the destitute and the needy to be provided with basic necessities of life by the State.\(^{114}\)

(m) Equal treatment of all its subjects by the State without discrimination.\(^{113}\)

15. An Islamic State has the following rights against its citizens: —

(a) That they must submit to its authority.\(^{118}\)

(b) That they must be law-abiding and should not disturb the public order and tranquility.\(^{117}\)

(c) They must give unstinted support to the State in its rightful activities.\(^{118}\)

(d) They must be prepared to sacrifice their life and property for the defence of the State.\(^{118}\)

16. The Qur’an gives the following important directions about the foreign policy of the Islamic State: —

(a) Sanctity of treaties and pledges.\(^{118}\)

(b) Honesty and integrity in all transactions.\(^{121}\)

(c) International justice.\(^{122}\)

(d) Respect for the rights of neutrals in war.\(^{123}\)

---

Economic and Political Teachings of the Qur’ān

(e) Love of peace.\(^{124}\)

(f) Non-participation in the efforts directed to self-aggrandizement and oppression in the world.\(^{125}\)

(g) Friendly treatment to all non-hostile powers.\(^{124}\)

(h) Fair deal with all those who are good and honest in their dealings.\(^{127}\)

(i) Retaliation in proportion to the high-handedness of others and no more.\(^{128}\)

The salient features of the State envisaged in these sixteen points laid down by the Holy Qur’an are as follows:

(i) This State is brought into existence by a conscious resolve on the part of a politically free nation to renounce all claims to sovereignty in favour of God Almighty, to surrender its autonomy accepting the position of viceroyalty under Him, and to work according to precepts and directions given by the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Apostle.

(ii) It is theocratic in so far as it is based on the doctrine of sovereignty of God but, in actual and practical realization of this doctrine, it is vitally different from theocracy. Instead of delegating the viceroyalty of God to a particular order of priests and vesting them with the full powers to rule, it vests the believers whose deeds are good with the right of Caliphate.

(iii) It is democratic in the sense that the formation of government, change in its administrative set-up, and its working wholly depend upon the general will. But the rights of the people in this system are not so unlimited that they may change the law of the State, its ideology, its internal and external policy, and its resources according to their own sweet will. On the other hand, the Supreme Law of God and His Apostle with its legal and moral code provides a permanent and inviolable check which always keeps the life of the community on the right keel and on a broad pattern which can be changed neither by the executive, nor by the legislature, nor by the judiciary, nor even by the whole nation unless it decides to renounce the religion of God and break its pledge with Him.

(iv) It is an ideological State which must be run only by those who accept its basic ideology and principles wholeheartedly. As for those who do not subscribe to its ideology but live within its territorial bounds, the State guarantees them the same civil rights as are enjoyed by the other inhabitants provided they pledge to behave as law-abiding citizens.

(v) It is a State which makes no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of race or colour and is not bound by any linguistic or geographical barriers. It is a purely ideological State. All peoples, no matter to whatever race, nation, or country they belong, can accept this ideology and become equal partners in all the affairs of the State. Such an ideological State bids fair to become a world State. But even if more than one such States are established

---

\(^{107}\) Ibid., iii, 110; v, 78–79; vii, 165.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., i, 11.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., ii, 191, 256; x, 99.

\(^{110}\) Ibid., iv, 108.

\(^{111}\) Ibid., xxvx, 46.

\(^{112}\) Ibid., vi, 164; xvii, 15; xxxix, 18; xxxix, 7; liii, 38.

\(^{113}\) Ibid., iv, 58; xvii, 36; xlix, 6.

\(^{114}\) Ibid., ii, 19.

\(^{115}\) Ibid., xxviii, 4.

\(^{116}\) Ibid., iv, 59.

\(^{117}\) Ibid., v, 33; vii, 85.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., v, 2.

\(^{119}\) Ibid., ix, 38–41.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., viii, 42, 58; ix, 7; xvi, 91–92; xvii, 34.

\(^{121}\) Ibid., xvi, 94.

\(^{122}\) Ibid., v, 8.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., iv, 90.

\(^{124}\) Ibid., viii, 61.

\(^{125}\) Ibid., xxviii, 83.

\(^{126}\) Ibid., ix, 8.

\(^{127}\) Ibid., iv, 60.

\(^{128}\) Ibid., ii, 194; xvi, 126; xlii, 40–42.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

in different parts of the world, all of them will be equally Islamic. And instead of there being any nationalistic conflicts among them, they will extend fraternal support and co-operation to one another. Not only that, there is every possibility of their joining together in a world confederation of their own.

(vi) The real spirit of this State lies in subordinating politics to morality and conducting affairs conscientiously and God-fearingly. Honour and eminence must come through moral excellence alone. Paramount importance should be given to character besides ability in selecting men of authority. Honesty, fairness, and justice are to prevail in every sphere of domestic administration. And the whole foreign policy is to devolve upon truth, faithfulness, love of peace, fair dealing, and international justice.

(vii) Policing is not the only function of this State. It does not come into existence merely to maintain law and order and to defend its territory against external attacks. It is a State with a purpose and a mission. It must positively strive for the achievement of social justice, promotion of good, and eradication of evil.

(viii) Equality of rights, status and opportunities, supremacy of Law, cooperation in virtue and non-co-operation in vice, sense of accountability to God Almighty, sense of duties more than that of rights, unity of purpose between the individuals, society, and the State, guarantee of the basic necessities of life to everyone in need, are the fundamental values of this State.

(ix) The relations between State and individual are so balanced in this system that neither the State has been vested with absolute authority reducing individuals to virtual slavery, nor has individual freedom been allowed to turn itself into licence threatening the interest of society. On the one hand, by guaranteeing fundamental rights to its citizens and by making the State authority subject to the Supreme Law of God and the democratic process of shura, it provides ample opportunities for the development of individual personality and protection from undue interference by others. And, on the other hand, it binds the individual to a definite code of morality, makes it obligatory for him faithfully to obey the orders of the State working in accordance with the Law of God, to co-operate wholeheartedly with it in the cause of virtue, to avoid disturbing its tranquillity, and to sacrifice even his life and property in its defence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


BOOK THREE

EARLY CENTURIES

(From the First/Seventh Century to the Fall of Baghdad)

Part I. Theologico-Philosophical Movements

Chapter X

MU'TAZILISM

A

THE GENERAL MU'TAZILITE POSITION

Subsequent to the times of the Companions of the Prophet of Islam, the Mu'tazili school made its appearance. It had its inception nearly two centuries after the migration (Hijrah) of the Holy Prophet to Madina. The Mu'tazilites were thoroughgoing rationalists. They believed that the arbiter of whatever is revealed has to be the theoretical reason.

Let us, for a moment, consider why the Mu'tazilites were so named. The story goes that one day Imam al-Ḥasan al-Baṣri was imparting instruction to his pupils in a mosque. Before the lessons were finished someone turned up and addressed him thus:

"Now, in our own times a sect1 of people has made its appearance, the members of which regard the perpetrator of a grave sin as an unbeliever and consider him outside the fold of Islam. Yet another group of people2 have appeared who give hope of salvation to the perpetrator of a grave sin. They lay down that such a sin can do no harm to a true believer. They do not in the least regard action as a part of faith and hold that as worship is of no use to one who is an unbeliever, so also sin can do no harm to one who is a believer in God. What, in your opinion, is the truth and what creed should we adopt?"

Imam al-Ḥasan al-Baṣri was on the point of giving a reply to this query when a long-necked pupil of his got up and said: "The perpetrator of grave sins is neither a complete unbeliever nor a perfect believer; he is placed midway between unbelief and faith—an intermediate state (munashah bain

1 The name of this sect is ash-al-wa'id.
2 This group is called the Murji'ites. The same was the belief of Jähm bin Ṣafwī also.
Having spoken he strode to another corner of the mosque and began to explain this belief of his to others. This man was Wāṣîl ibn ‘Aṭā. The Imam shot a swift glance at him and said, “‘Iṣâla ‘amma,” i.e., “He has withdrawn from us.” From that very day Wāṣîl and his followers were called al-Mu’tazilah, the Withdrawers or Sectarians.

Ibn Munabbih says that the title of al-Mu’tazilah came into vogue after the death of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. According to his statement, when al-Ḥasan passed away, Qatādah succeeded him and continued his work. ‘Amr ibn ‘Ubaïd and his followers avoided the company of Qatādah; therefore, they were given the name of al-Mu’tazilah. In brief, the word ‘itaql means to withdraw or secede, and the Mu’tazilites are the people who in some of their beliefs were diametrically opposed to the unanimous consent of the early theologians or the People of the Approved Way (ahl al-sunnah). The leader of all of them was Wāṣîl b. ‘Aṭa who was born in 80/699 at Kadhima and died in 131/748. Muslims generally speak of Wāṣîl’s party as the Mu’tazilites, but the latter call themselves People of Unity and Justice (ahl al-tauhid w-al-‘add). By justice they imply that it is incumbent on God to require the obedient for their good deeds and punish the sinners for their misdeeds. By unity they imply the denial of the divine attributes. Undoubtedly, they admit that God is knowing, powerful, and seeing, but their intellect does not allow them to admit that these divine attributes are separate and different from the divine essence. The reason for this view of theirs is that if the attributes of God are not considered to be identical with the essence of God, “plurality of eternals” would necessarily result and the belief in unity would have to be given up. This, in their opinion, is clear unbelief (kufr). Unity and justice are the basic principles of the beliefs of the Mu’tazilites and this is the reason why they call themselves “People of Unity and Justice.”

Now, from the basic beliefs of unity and justice a few more beliefs necessarily follow as corollaries:

1. God Almighty’s justice necessitates that man should be the author of his own acts; then alone can he be said to be free and responsible for his deeds. The same was claimed by the Qadarites. The Mu’tazilites accepted totally the theory of indeterminism and became true successors of the Qadarites. If man is not the author of his own acts and if these acts are the creation of God, how can be held responsible for his acts and deserve punishment for his sins? Would it not be injustice on the part of God that, after creating a man helpless, He should call him to account for his sins and send him to hell? Thus, all the Mu’tazilites agree in the matter of man’s being the creator of his volitional acts. He creates some acts by way of muhâṣârah and some by way of tauld. By the term tauld is implied the necessary occurrence of another act from an act of the doer, e.g., the movement of Zaid’s finger necessi-

Matthew 05:32-33

2. The justice of God makes it incumbent upon Him not to do anything contrary to justice and equity. It is the unanimous verdict of the Mu’tazilites that the wise can only do what is salutary (al-salih) and good, and that God’s wisdom always keeps in view what is salutary for His servants; there fore, He cannot be cruel to them. He cannot bring into effect evil deeds. He cannot renounce that which is salutary. He cannot ask His servants to do that which is impossible. Further, reason also suggests that God does not place a burden on any creature greater than it can bear.

According to the Mu’tazilites, things are not good or evil because God declares them to be so. No, God makes the distinction between good and evil on account of their being good and evil. Goodness or evil are innate in the essence of things themselves. This very goodness or evil of things is the cause of the commands and prohibitions of the Law. The human intellect is capable of perceiving the goodness and evil of a few things and no laws are required to express their goodness and evil, e.g., it is commendable to speak the truth and desplicable to commit oneself to untruth. This shows that the evil and goodness of things are obvious and require no proof from the Shari‘ah. Shamer-

3 His companion, ‘Amr ibn ‘Ubaïd, from the beginning, shared this view of his. The Khawārij come under the same category.

ful and unjust deeds are evil-in-themselves; therefore, God has banned indulgence in them. It does not imply that His putting a ban on them made them shameful and unjust deeds. The thoroughgoing rationalism of the Mu’tazilites is thus expressed by al-Shahristānī in these words: “The adherents of justice say: All objects of knowledge fall under the supervision of reason and receive their obligatory power from rational insight. Consequently, obligatory gratitude for divine bounty precedes the orders given by (divine) Law; and beauty and ugliness are qualities belonging intrinsically to what is beautiful and ugly.”

From the second principle of the Mu’tazilites, the unity of God, the following beliefs necessarily result as corollaries:

1. Denial of the beatific vision. The Mu’tazilites hold that vision is not possible without place and direction. As God is exempt from place and direction, therefore, a vision of Him is possible neither in this world nor in the hereafter.

2. Belief that the Qur’ān is a created speech of Allah. It was held by them that the Qur’ān is an originated work of God and it came into existence together with the prophethood of the Prophet of Islam.

3. God’s pleasure and anger, not attributes, but states. According to the Mu’tazilites, God’s pleasure and anger should not be regarded as His attributes, because anger and pleasure are states and states are mutable ... as the essence of God is immutable. They should be taken as heaven and hell.

The following is the summary of some more beliefs of the Mu’tazilites:

1. Denial of punishment and reward meted out to the dead in the grave and the questioning by the angels Munkar and Nakir.

2. Denial of the indications of the Day of Judgment, of Gog and Magog (Ṭājūj and Maṣṣūj), and of the appearance of the Antichrist (al-Dajjal).

3. Some Mu’tazilites believe in the concrete reality of the Balance (al-Mizn) for weighing actions on the Day of Judgment. Some say that it is impossible for it to be a reality and think that the mention made in the Qur’ān of weight and balance means only this much that full justice will be done on the Day of Judgment. It is clearly impossible to elicit the meanings of the words weight and balance literally, for deeds, which have been said to be weighed, are accidents and it is not possible to weigh accidents. Theoretical reason is incapable of comprehending this. Substances alone can possess weight. Further, when nothing is hidden from God, what is the use of weighing the deeds? It has been mentioned in the Qur’ān that the books of bad or good deeds will be handed over to us. This too is merely a metaphor. It means only our being gifted with knowledge.

4. The Mu’tazilites also deny the existence of the Recording Angels (Kirāman Kātabīn). The reason they give for this is that God is well aware of all the deeds done by His servants. The presence of the Recording Angels would have been indispensable if God were not acquainted directly with the doings of His servants.

5. The Mu’tazilites also deny the physical existence of the “Tank” (al-Ḥaṣaf), and the “Bridge” (al-Sirāt). Further, they do not admit that heaven and hell exist now, but believe that they will come into existence on the Day of Judgment.

6. They deny the Covenant (al-Miṣrāq). It is their firm belief that God neither spoke to any prophet, angel, or supporter of the Divine Throne, nor will He cast a glance towards them.

7. For the Mu’tazilites, deeds together with verification (taṣdiq) are included in faith. They hold that a great sinner will always stay in hell.

8. They deny the miracles (al-kārāmāt) of saints (wāliyya), for, if admitted, they would be mixed up with the evidentiary miracles of the prophets and cause confusion. The same was the belief of the Jahmites too.

9. The Mu’tazilites also deny the Ascension (al-Mi’rāj) of the Prophet of Islam, because its proof is based on the testimony of individual traditions, which necessitates neither act nor belief; but they do not deny the Holy Prophet’s journey as far as Jerusalem.

10. According to them, the one who prays is alone entitled to reap the reward of a prayer; whatever its form, its benefit goes to no one else.

11. As the divine decree cannot be altered, prayers serve no purpose at all. One gains nothing by them, because if the object, for which prayers are offered, is in conformity with destiny, it is needless to ask for it, and if the object conflicts with destiny, it is impossible to secure it.

12. They generally lay down that the angels who are message-bearers of God to prophets are superior in rank to the human messengers of God to mankind, i.e., the prophets themselves.

13. According to them, reason demands that an Imām should necessarily be appointed over the ummah (Muslim community).

14. For them, the mujahid (the authorized interpreter of the religious Law) can never be wrong in his view, as against the opinion of the Ash’arite scholars that “the mujahid sometimes errs and sometimes hits the mark.”

The Mu’tazilites and the Sunnites differ mostly from one another in five important matters:

(1) The problem of attributes.
(2) The problem of the beatific vision.
(3) The problem of promise and threat.
(4) The problem of creation of the actions of man.
(5) The problem of the will of God.

Ibn Ḥazm says in his Mīla‘ al-Nihāyāt that whosoever believes (1) that the Qur’ān is uncreated, (2) that all the actions of man are due to divine decree, and (3) that man will be blessed with the vision of God on the Day of Judgment, and (4) admits the divine attributes mentioned in the Qur’ān and the Tradition, and (5) does not regard the perpetrator of a grave sin as an
unbeliever, will not be styled as one of the Mu'tazilites, though in all other matters he may agree with them.

This statement of ibn Hazm shows that the Mu'tazilites were a group of rationalists who judged all Islamic beliefs by theoretical reason and renounced those that relate to all that lies beyond the reach of reason. They hardly realized the fact that reason, like any other faculty with which man is gifted, has its limitations and cannot be expected to comprehend reality in all its details. The point does not need elaboration. As Shakespeare puts it, "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy." Some modern thinkers have recognized that there is a place for intuition in the field of comprehension and, as a corollary to this, have admitted the claim of revelation or waḥi as a source of knowledge. That is why Iqbal exclaimed:

"At the dawn of Life the Angel said to me:
'Do not make thy heart a mere slave to reason.'"

And probably on a similar ground Iqbal's guide, Rumi, offered the following meaningful advice:

"Surrender thy intellect to the Prophet!
God sufficeth. Say, He sufficeth.
Beware of wilful reasoning,
And boldly welcome madness!
He alone is mad who madness scoffs,
And heeds not the agent of Law!"

B

SOME LEADING MU'TAZILITES

In presenting a bird's-eye view of the beliefs of the Mu'tazilites in the above paragraphs, it has not been suggested that these views were in their totality shared by all the leading Mu'tazilites. There were differences of opinion within themselves. For instance, Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf differed from his companions in respect of ten problems; Ibrāhīm ibn Sayyigar al-Nażgām in thirteen; Biğr ibn al-Mu'tamir in six; Mu'ammar ibn Khayyāt 'Abbād al-Sulami in four; and 'Amr ibn Bahr al-Jabīb in five. Abu al-Husain and his followers are called the "Mu'tazilites of Baghdād" and Abu al-Jubbār, his son Abu Hāṣim, and their followers were known as the "Mu'tazilites of Basra.

Below is given a brief account of the lives and ideas of some of the leading Mu'tazilites.

1. Wāsīl ibn 'Aṭa

Wāsīl was born at Madīnah in 80/699 and was brought up in Basra. "Ṣūq-i Ghazzāl," a bazaar in Basra, used to be his familiar haunt and on that account people associated its name with him. He died in 151/768. Wāsīl had a very long neck. Amr ibn 'Ubayd, who was a celebrated Mu'tazilite, on looking at him once remarked: "There will be no good in a man who has such a neck." Wāsīl was al-thaqaff, i.e., he could not pronounce the letter r correctly, but he was a very fluent and accomplished speaker and in his talk totally avoided this letter. He never allowed it to escape his lips, despite the great difficulty in avoiding it in conversation. He compiled a voluminous treatise in which not a single r is to be found. He would often maintain silence which led people to believe that he was mute.

Wāsīl was a pupil of Abu Hāṣim 'Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyyah, but in the matter of Imāmate, as in some other matters, he opposed his master. Before becoming a Mu'tazilite he used to live in the company of Imām Ḥasan al-Baṣrī.

His works are: Kitāb al-Manzilsah bain al-Manzilatayn, Kitāb al-Futah, and Kitāb al-Taṣāḥād. The first books on the science of al-Kalām were written by him. Ibn Khallikān has recounted a number of his works.

In his illustrious work al-Misāl wa-al-Nihāl, al-Shahrastānī says that the essential teachings of Wāsīl consisted of the following: (1) Denial of the attributes of God. (2) Man's possession of free-will to choose good deeds. (3) The belief that one who commits a grave sin is neither a believer nor an unbeliever but occupies an intermediate position, and that one who commits a grave sin goes to hell. (4) The belief that out of the opposing parties that fought in the battle of the Camel and from among the assassins of 'Uthmān and his allies one party was in error, though it cannot be established which.

(1) Denial of Attributes.—Wāsīl denies that knowledge, power, will, and life belong to the essence of God. According to him, if any attribute is admitted as eternal, it would necessitate "plurality of eternals" and the belief in the unity of God will thus become false. But this idea of Wāsīl was not readily accepted. Generally, the Mu'tazilites first reduced all the divine attributes to two—knowledge and power—and called them the "essential attributes." Afterwards they reduced both of these to one attribute—unity.

(2) Belief in Free-will.—In this problem Wāsīl adopted the creed of Ma'bad al-Juhani and Ghalīn al-Dinmāshqī and said that since God is wise and just, evil and injustice cannot be attributed to him. How is it justifiable for Him that He should will contrary to what He commands His servants to do? Consequently, good and evil, belief and unbelief, obedience and sin are the acts of His servant himself, i.e., the servant alone is their author or creator and is to be rewarded or punished for his deeds. It is impossible that the servant may be ordered to "do" a thing which he is not able to do. Man is ordered to do an act because he has the power to do that act. Whosoever denies this power and authority rejects a self-evident datum of consciousness.

7 Ibid.
As ibn Ḥazm frankly said, the excellent work of the Mu'tazilites can be seen in the doctrine of free-will and that of promise and threat. If man were to be regarded as absolutely determined in his actions, the whole edifice of Shari'ah and ethics would tumble down.

(3) **Intermediary Position of the Grave Sinners.**—On account of his belief that one who commits a grave sin is neither a believer nor an unbeliever but occupies an intermediate position, Wāsīl withdrew himself from the company of Imām Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and earned the title Mu'tazilite. Wāsīl thought that the expression "true believer" is one which means praise. The person who commits grave sins can never deserve praise; therefore, he cannot be called a true believer. Such a person has, nevertheless, belief in the Islamic faith and admits that God alone is worthy of being worshipped; therefore, he cannot be regarded as an unbeliever either. If such a person dies without penitence, he will ever stay in hell, but as he is right in his belief, the punishment meted out to him will be moderate.

As Imām al-Qazzālī has pointed out in his *Ibād ‘Ulām al-Dīn,* interpretation of the following verses of the Qur'ān was the cause of the Mu'tazilites' misunderstanding:

"By (the token of) Time (through the ages), verily mankind is in loss, except such as have faith and do righteous deeds and (join together) in the mutual teaching of truth, patience, and constancy."19

"For any that disobey God and His Apostle—for them is hell; they shall dwell therein for ever."20

In the light of these and similar other verses, the Mu'tazilites argue that all the perpetrators of grave sins will always stay in hell, but they do not think over the fact that God also says:

"But, without doubt, I am (also) He that forgiveth again and again those who repent, believe, and do right, who, in fine, are ready to receive true guidance."21

"God forgiveth not that equals should be set up with Him; but He forgiveth anything else, to whom He pleaseth."22

The last quoted verse shows that in the case of all sins, except polytheism, God will act according to His pleasure. In support of this the clear saying of the Holy Prophet of Islam can be cited, viz., "that person too will finally come out of hell who has even an iota of faith in his heart." Further, some words of God, e.g., "Verily We shall not suffer to perish the reward of anyone who does (a single) righteous deed,"23 and "Verily God will not suffer the reward of the righteous to perish,"24 clearly show that for the commission of one sin, He will not ignore a man's basic faith and deprive him of all the reward for his good deeds. Therefore, the general belief is that as the perpetrator of grave sins is by all means a true believer, even if he dies without repentance, after being punished for his sins in hell and thereby purified of them, he will eventually enter heaven.

(4) **Unestablished Errors.**—Wāsīl had firm conviction that out of those who fought in "the battle of the Camel" and "the battle of the Shi'īn" and the killers of 'Uthmān, the third Caliph, and his allies, one party was definitely in error, though it cannot be established which.25

2. **Abū al-Hudhayl 'Allāf**

'Allāf was born in 131/748 and died in c. 226/840. He received instruction from 'Uthmān bin Khālid Tawīl, a pupil of Wāsīl. He was a fluent speaker and vigorous in his arguments. He often made use of dialectical arguments in his discussions. He had a keen insight in philosophy. He wrote about sixty books on the science of Kalām but all of them have long been extinct.

'Allāf was an accomplished dialectician. The story goes that by his dialectics three thousand persons embraced Islam at his hand. We shall here speak of two of his debates. In those days there lived a Magian Sālih by name who believed that the ultimate principles of the universe are two realities, Light and Darkness, that both of these are opposed to each other, and that the universe is created by the mixture of these two. This belief led to a discussion between Sālih, the Magian, and 'Allāf. 'Allāf inquired of him whether the mixture was distinct and different from Light and Darkness or identical with them. Sālih replied that it was one and the same thing. 'Allāf then said, "How could two things mix together which are opposed to each other? There ought to be someone who got them mixed, and the mixer alone is the Necessary Existent or God." On another occasion, while Sālih was engaged in a discussion with 'Allāf, the latter said, "What do you now desire?" Sālih replied, "I asked a blessing of God and still stick to the belief that there are two Gods." 'Allāf then asked, "Of which God did you ask a blessing? The God of whom you asked for it would not have suggested the name of the other God (who is His rival)."

Wāsīl was not able to clarify the problem of divine attributes. In this respect his ideas were still crude. 'Allāf is opposed to the view that the essence of God has no quality and is absolutely one and by no means plural. The divine qualities are none other than the divine essence and cannot be separated from it. 'Allāf accepts such attributes as are one with the essence of God, or one may say, accepts such an essence as is identical with the attributes. He does not differentiate between the two, but regards both as one. When one says

---

9 Qur'ān, iii, 1–3.
11 *Ibid.,* xx, 82.
that God is the knower, one cannot mean that knowledge is found in the essence of God, but that knowledge is His essence. In brief, God is knowing, powerful, and living with such knowledge, power, and life as are His very essence (essential nature).

Al-Shahrastānī has interpreted the identity of divine essence and attributes thus: God knows with His knowledge and knowledge is His very essence. In the same way, He is powerful with His power and power is His very essence; and lives with His life and life is His very essence. Another interpretation of divine knowledge is that God knows with His essence and not with His knowledge, i.e., He knows through His essence only and not through knowledge. The difference in these two positions is that, in the latter, the attributes are denied altogether, while in the former, which ʿAllāf accepts, they are admitted but are identified with God’s essence. This conforms to the statements of the philosophers who hold that the essence of God, without quality and quantity, is absolutely one, and by no means admits of plurality, and that the divine attributes are none other than the essence of God. Whatever qualities of Him may be established, they are either “negation” or “essentials.” Those things are termed “negation” which, without the relation of negation, cannot be attributed to God, as, for instance, body, substance, and accidents. When the relation of negation is turned towards them and its sign, i.e., the word of negation, is applied, these can become the attributes of God, e.g., it would be said that God is neither a body, nor a substance, nor an accident. What is meant by “essential” is that the existence of the Necessary Existent is Its very essence and thus Its unity is real.

ʿAllāf did not admit the attributes of God as separate from His essence in any sense. For he sensed the danger that, by doing so, attributes, too, like essence, would have to be taken as eternal, and by their plurality the “plurality of eternals” or “the plurality of the necessary existents” would become inevitable, and thus the doctrine of unity would be completely nullified. It was for this reason that the Christians who developed the theory of the Trinity of Godhead had to forsake the doctrine of unity.

Among the “heresies” of ʿAllāf was his view that after the discontinuation of the movement of the inmates of heaven and hell, a state of lethargy would supervene. During this period calm pleasure for the inmates of heaven and pain and misery for the inmates of hell will begin, and this is what is really meant by eternal pleasure and perpetual pain. Since the same was the religious belief of Jahm, according to whom heaven and hell would be annihilated, the Muʿtazilites used to call ʿAllāf a Jahmite in his belief in the hereafter.

ʿAllāf has termed justice, unity, promise, threat, and the middle position as the “Five Principles” of the Muʿtazilites.

3. Al-Naẓẓām

Abū ʿIshāq Ibrāhīm ibn Saʿyār, called al-Naẓẓām, was younger than ʿAllāf and it is generally known that he was ʿAllāf’s pupil. He lived during the reign of Caliph al-Māmūn and al-Muṭaṣīm and died in 231/845. He was a peerless littérateur and poet. He studied Greek philosophy well and made full use of it in his works. His main ideas are as follows.

(1) Denial of God’s Power over Evil.—God has no power at all over sin and evil. Other Muʿtazilites do not deny the power of God over evil, but deny the act of His creating evil. In their opinion, God has power over evil, but He does not use it for the creation of evil. Al-Naẓẓām, in opposition to them, says that when evil or sin is the attribute or essence of a thing, then the possibility of the occurrence of evil or the power to create it will itself be evil. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to God who is the doer of justice and good. Similarly, al-Naẓẓām holds that in the life hereafter too, God can neither mitigate nor add to the punishment and reward of the inmates of heaven and hell; nor indeed can He expel them from heaven or hell. As to the accusation that the denial of God’s power over evil necessitates the affirmation that He is impotent against evil, al-Naẓẓām replies that this equally follows from the denial of divine action to create evil. He says: “You, too, deny Him the wrong act, so there is no fundamental difference between the two positions.”

God, who is Absolute Good and Absolute Justice, cannot be the author of evil. Besides, if God has power over evil, it will necessarily follow that He is ignorant and indigent. But this is impossible; therefore, its necessary consequence is also impossible. The sequence of the argument may be explained thus:

If God has power over evil, then the occurrence of evil is possible, and as the supposition of the occurrence of a possible thing entails no impossibility, let us suppose that evil did occur. Now, God might or might not have had knowledge of the evil which occurred. If we say that He did not have the knowledge of it, it would necessarily follow that He was ignorant; and if we say that He did have it, it would necessarily follow that He was in need of this evil; for had He not been in need of it, He would not have created it. When a person is not in need of a thing and knows its inherent evils, he will have nothing to do with it, if he is wise.

It is definitely true that God is all-wise; so when any evil is caused by Him, it necessarily follows that He needed it, otherwise He would have never produced it.

But since it is impossible to think that God needs evil, it is impossible to think that He creates it.

(2) Denial of the Will of God.—Apart from the power of action and action, al-Naẓẓām does not admit that God has will, which has priority over both power and action. He holds that when we attribute will to God we only mean that God creates things according to His knowledge. His willing is identical with His acting, and when it is said that God wills the actions of men, what is meant is that He enjoins them to act in a certain way.

Ibid., p. 24.
Why does al-Naṣṣām deny the will of God? He does so, because, according to him, will implies want. He who wills lacks or needs the thing which he wills, and since God is altogether independent of His creatures, He does not lack or need anything. Consequently, will cannot be ascribed to Him. Therefore, the will of God really connotes His acts or His commands that are conveyed to man.17

(3) Divisibility of Every Particle ad infinitum.—Al-Naṣṣām believes in the divisibility of every particle ad infinitum. By this he means that each body is composed of such particles as are divisible to an unlimited extent, i.e., every half of a half goes on becoming half of the other half. During the process of divisions, we never reach a limit after which we may be able to say that it cannot be further divided into halves.

Now, to traverse a distance, which is composed of infinite points, an infinite period of time would necessarily be required. Is, then, the traversing of a distance impossible? Does it not necessitate the denial of the existence of the movement itself? Among the Greek philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno had denied movement itself. They could not declare untrue the movement which is observable and is a fact, so they claimed that perception cannot reveal reality. They maintained that senses are not the instruments of real knowledge and are deceptive; and the phenomenal world is illusory, a mirage. The real world is the rational world, the knowledge of which is gained by reason alone in which there is neither plurality nor multiplicity, neither movement nor change. It is an immutable and immovable reality. But they could not explain how this illusory and deceptive world was born out of the real world. Thus, their system of philosophy, in spite of their claiming it to be monism, ended in dualism.

Al-Naṣṣām did not accept the solution of these Greek philosophers, but to tide over this difficulty he offered the theory of faṣrah. The word faṣrah means to leap; it means that the moving thing traverses from one point of distance to another in such a manner that between these two points a number of points are traversed. Obviously, it happens when the moving thing does not cross all the points of a distance, but leaps over them. This indeed is an anticipation of the present-day doctrine of the "quantum jump."

(4) Latency and Manifestation (Kūmūn wa Būtūz).—According to al-Naṣṣām, creation is to be regarded as a single act of God by which all things were brought into being simultaneously and kept in a state of latency (kūmūn). It was from their original state of latency that all existing things—minerals, plants, animals, and men, have evolved in the process of time. This also implies that the whole of mankind was potentially in Adam. Whatever priority or posteriority there may be, it is not in birth but in appearance. All things came into existence at the same time, but were kept hidden till the time of their becoming operative arrived, and when it did arrive, they were brought from the state of latency to the state of manifestation. This doctrine stands in direct opposition to the Ash'arite view that God is creating things at all moments of time.18

(5) Materialism of al-Naṣṣām.—For al-Naṣṣām, as for many before and after him, the real being of man is the soul, and body is merely its instrument. But the soul is, according to him, a rarefied body permeating the physical body, the same way as fragrance permeates flowers, butter milk, or oil sesame.19 Abu Maṣūd 'Abd al-Qāhir ibn Tāhir, in his work al-Farq bain al-Farq, has discussed this theory critically and has attempted to refute it.

Besides these philosophical ideas, there are what the orthodox called the "heresies" of al-Naṣṣām. For example, he did not believe in miracles, was not convinced of the inimitability of the Qur'ān, considered a statute necessary for the determination of an Imām, and thought that the statute establishing the Imāmat of 'Ali was concealed by 'Umar, that the qulūd al-tarawīk was unauthorized, that the actual vision of the jinn was a physical impossibility, and that attributed performance of missed prayers was unnecessary.

Among al-Naṣṣām's followers, the following are well known: Muḥammad ibn Shabib, Abu Shūmar, Yūnus ibn Ṭūrān, Ahmad ibn Ḥayāt, Bīghr ibn Mu'tamīr, and Thamāmah ibn Āqīs. Ahmad ibn Ḥayāt who lived in the company of al-Naṣṣām held that there are two deities: one, the creator and eternal deity, and the other, the created one which is Jesus Christ son of Mary. He regarded Christ as the Son of God. On account of this belief he was considered to have renounced Islam. According to his faith, Christ in the hereafter will ask the created beings to account for their deeds in this world, and in support of his claim Ahmad ibn Ḥayāt quoted the verse: "Will they wait until God comes to them in canopies of clouds?"20 There is a tradition that, looking towards the moon on the fourteenth day of the lunar month, the Holy Prophet of Islam said, "Ye will behold your Lord just as ye behold this moon."21 Ahmad ibn Ḥayāt twisted the meaning of this tradition and said that the word Lord referred to Jesus Christ. He also believed in incarnation for, according to him, the spirit of God is incarnated into the bodies of the Imāms.

Fadl al-Ḥadathī, who was another pupil of al-Naṣṣām, had faith similar to that of ibn Ḥayāt. He and his followers believed in transmigration. According to them, in another world God created animals mature and wise, bestowed on them innumerable blessings, and conferred on them many sciences too. God then desired to put them to a test and so commanded them to offer thanks to Him for His gifts. Some obeyed His command and some did not. He rewarded His thankful creatures by giving them heaven and condemned the ungrateful ones to hell. There were some among them who had partly

17 Ibid.


21 The tradition: Innakum satarauna rabbakum kama tarāuna ḥād al-qamar.
obeyed the divine command and partly not obeyed it. They were sent to the world, were given filthy bodies, and, according to the magnitude of their sins, sorrow and pain, joy and pleasure. Those who had not sinned much and had obeyed most of God's commands were given lovely faces and mild punishment. But those who did only a few good deeds and committed a large number of sins were given ugly faces, and were subjected to severe tribulations. So long as an animal is not purified of all its sins, it will be always changing its forms.

4. Bīghr ibn al-Mu’tamir

One of the celebrated personalities of al-Naẓẓām’s circle is Bīghr ibn al-Mu’tamir. The exact date of his birth is not known, but his date of death is 210/825.

Bīghr made the “Theory of Generated Acts” (tawālid) current among the Mu’tazilites. The Mu’tazilites believe in free-will. They admit that man is the author of his voluntary actions. Some actions arise by way of mubāshrah, i.e., they are created directly by man, but some actions arise by way of tawālid, i.e., they necessarily result from the acts done by way of mubāshrah. Throwing of a stone in water, for example, necessitates the appearance of ripples. Even if the movement of the ripples is not intended by the stonethrower, yet he is rightly regarded as its agent. Similarly, man is the creator of his deeds and misdeeds by way of mubāshrah, and all the consequential actions necessarily result by way of tawālid. Neither type of actions is due to divine activity.

Bīghr regards the will of God as His grace and divides it into two attributes: the attribute of essence and the attribute of action. Through the attribute of essence He wills all His actions as well as men’s good deeds. He is absolutely wise, and in consequence His will is necessarily concerned with that which is suitable and salutary. The attribute of action also is of two kinds. If actions are concerned with God, they would imply creation, and if concerned with men, they would mean command.

According to Bīghr, God could have made a different world, better than the present one, in which all might have attained salvation. But in opposition to the common Mu’tazilite belief, Bīghr held that God was not bound to create such a world. All that was necessary for God to do was that He should have bestowed upon man free-will and choice, and after that it was sufficient to bestow reason for his guidance to discover divine revelation and the laws of nature, and combining reason with choice, attain salvation.

Mu’tamir’s pupil abū Mūsā b. ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿAbbād al-Sulami, nicknamed Miṣkār, was a very pious man and was given the title of the hermit of the Mu’tazilites. He held some very peculiar views. God, he thought, could act tyrannically and lie, and this would not make His lordship imperfect. The style of the Qurʾān is not inimitable; a work like it or even better than it can be produced. A person who admits that God can be seen by the eye, though without form, is an unbeliever, and he who is doubtful about the unbelief of such a person is also an unbeliever.

5. Mu’īmmar

Mu’īmmar’s full name was Mu’īmmar ibn ‘Abbād al-Sulami. Neither the date of his birth nor that of his death can be determined precisely. According to some, he died in 228/842.

To a great extent Mu’īmmar’s ideas tally with those of the other Mu’tazilites, but he resorts to great exaggeration in the denial of the divine attributes and in the Theory of Predestination.

The following is the gist of his ideas.

(1) Denial of Divine Knowledge.—Mu’īmmar maintains that the essence of God is free from every aspect of plurality. He is of the view that if we believe in the attributes of God, then God’s essence becomes plural; therefore, he denies all the attributes, and in this denial he is so vehement that he says that God knows neither Himself nor anyone else, for knowing (or knowledge) is something either within or without God. In the first case, it necessarily follows that the knower and the known are one and the same, which is impossible, for it is necessary that the known should be other than and distinct from the knower. If knowledge is not something within God, and the known is separate from the knower, it means that God’s essence is dual. Further, it follows also that God’s knowledge is dependent on and is in need of an “other.” Consequently, His absoluteness is entirely denied.

By Mu’īmmar’s times, more and more people were taking interest in philosophy and Neo-Platonism was gaining ground. In denying the attributes Mu’īmmar was following in the footsteps of Plotinus. According to the basic assumptions of Plotinus, the essence of God is one and absolute. God is so transcendent that whatever we say of Him merely limits Him. Hence we cannot attribute to Him beauty, goodness, thought, or will, for all such attributes are limitations and imperfections. We cannot say what He is, but what He is not. As a poet has said, He is

“The One whom the reason does not know,  
The Eternal, the Absolute whom neither senses know nor fancy.  
He is such a One, who cannot be counted  
He is such a Pure Being!”

It is universally believed in Islam that human reason, understanding, senses, or fancy cannot fathom the essence of God or the reality of His attributes or His origin. Says ʿAṭṭār:

“Why exert to probe the essence of God?  
Why strain thyself by stretching thy limitations?  
When thou canst not catch even the essence of an atom,  
How canst thou claim to know the essence of God Himself?”

213
A History of Muslim Philosophy

To reflect on the essence of God has been regarded as "illegitimate thinking." The Prophet of Islam is reported to have said: "We are all fools in the matter of the gnosia of the essence of God." Therefore, he has warned the thinkers thus: "Don't indulge in speculating on the nature of God lest ye may be destroyed." He has said about himself: "I have not known Thee to the extent that Thy knowledge demands!" Hz. Haфиз has expressed the same idea in his own words thus:

"Take off thy net; thou cannot catch 'anqal'. For that is like attempting to catch the air!"

(2) Denial of Divine Will.—Mu'ammar says that, like knowledge, will too cannot be attributed to the essence of God. Nor can His will be regarded as eternal, because eternity expresses temporal priority and sequence and God transcends time. When we say that the will of God is eternal, we mean only that the aspects of the essence of God, like His essence, transcend time.

(3) God as the Creator of Substances and not of Accidents.—According to Mu'ammar, God is the creator of the world, but He did not create anything except bodies. Accidents are the innovations of bodies created either (i) by nature, e.g., burning from fire, heat from the sun, or (ii) by free choice, such as the actions of men and animals. In brief, God creates matter and then keeps Himself aloof from it. Afterwards He is not concerned at all with the changes that are produced through matter, whether they may be natural or voluntary. God is the creator of bodies, not of accidents which flow out of the bodies as their effects.

(4) Mu'ammar regards man as something other than the sensible body. Man is living, knowing, able to act, and possesses free-will. It is not man himself who moves or keeps quiet, or is coloured, or sees, or touches, or changes from place to place; nor does one place contain him to the exclusion of another, because he has neither length nor breadth, neither weight nor depth; in short, he is something other than the body.

6. Thamāmah

Thamāmah ibn Anšrās al-Numairi lived during the reign of Caliphs Hārūn al-Raṣīl and al-Māmmūn. He was in those days the leader of the Qaradites. Hārūn al-Raṣīl imprisoned him on the charge of heresy, but he was in the good books of al-Māmmūn and was released by him. He died in 213/828. The following is the substance of his ideas.

---

214

Mu'tazilism

(1) As good and evil are necessarily known through the intellect and God is good, the gnomia of God is an intellectual necessity. Had there been no Gharī'ah, that is, had we not acquired the gnomia of God through the prophets, even then it would have been necessitated by the intellect.

(2) The world being necessitated by the nature of God, it has, like God, existed from eternity and will last till eternity. Following in the footsteps of Aristotle, he thinks that the world is eternal (qadīm) and not originated (badī'īth) and regards God as creating things by the necessity of His nature and not by will and choice.

(3) Bīghr ibn al-Mu'tamir, who had put into usage the theory of generated acts among the Mu'tazilites, was wrong in thinking that men are not directly but only indirectly the authors of such acts. Neither God nor man is the author of generated acts; they just happen without any author. Man is not their author, for otherwise when a deed has been generated after a man's death, he, as a dead man, will have to be taken as its author. God cannot be regarded as the author of these acts, for some generated acts are evil and evil cannot be attributed to God.

(4) Christians, Jews, and Magians, after they are dead, will all become dust. They will neither go to heaven nor to hell. Lower animals and children also will be treated in the same manner. The unbeliever, who does not possess and is not keen to possess the gnomia of his Creator, is not under the obligation to know Him. He is quite helpless and resembles the lower animals.

7. Al-Jāhibī

'Amr ibn Bahr al-Jāhibī, a contemporary of Mu'ammar, was a pupil of al-Naṣṣām and was himself one of the Imāms of the Mu'tazilites. Both the master and the disciple, it was held, were almost of one mind. Al-Jāhibī had drunk deep of Greek philosophy. He had a keen sense of humour and was a good anecdotist. He usually lived in the company of the Caliphs of Baghādād. His permanent residence was the palace of Ibn Zayyāt, the Prime Minister of the Caliph Mutawakkil. When Ibn Zayyāt was put to death by the orders of the Caliph, Jāhibī too was imprisoned. He was released after some time. He was the ugliest of men; his eyes protruded out, and children were frightened at his very sight. In his last years he had a stroke of paralysis. He died in his nineteenth year at Baṣra in 255/869. During his illness he would often recite the following couplets:

"Dost thou hope in old age
To look like what you were in youth?
Thy heart believeth thee: an old garment never
turns into a new one."

He was the author of a number of books out of which the following are noteworthy: Kitāb al-Bayān, Kitāb al-Rayān, and Kitāb al-Qālīm. He also wrote a book dealing with Muslim sects.

215
History of Muslim Philosophy

It was the belief of al-Jahiz that all knowledge comes by nature, and it is an activity of man in which he has no choice. He was a scientist-philosopher. In the introduction to his Kitab al-Hayawan, he writes that he is inspired sense-experience and reason. It employs observation, comparison, and experiment as methods of investigation. He experimented on different species of animals, sometimes by cutting their organs, sometimes even by poisoning them, in order to see what effects were thus produced on animal organisms.

In this respect he was the precursor of Bacon whom he anticipated seven and a half centuries earlier. Al-Jahiz did not, however, base knowledge on sense-experience alone. Since sense-experience is sometimes likely to give false reports, it needs the help of reason. In fact, in knowledge reason has to play the decisive role. He says, "You should not accept whatever your eyes tell you; follow the lead of reason. Every fact is determined by two factors: one apparent, and that is sensory; the other hidden, and that is reason; and in reality reason is the final determinant."

According to al-Jahiz, the will is not an attribute of man, for attributes are continually subject to change, but the will is non-changing and non-temporal.

He holds that the will of God is not subject to change, but the fire of hell by its very nature will draw the sinners towards itself. Al-Jahiz denies that God can commit a mistake or that an error can be imputed to Him. Al-Jahiz also denies the vision of God.

8. Al-Jubbai

Abu 'Ali al-Jubbai was born in 235/849 at Jubba, a town in Khuzistan. His patronymic name is Abu Ali and his descent is traced to Haman, a slave of Uthman. Al-Jubbai belonged to the later Mu'tazilites. He was the teacher of Imam al-Asghari and a pupil of Abu Ya'qub bin 'Abd Allah al-Shabab who was the leader of the Mu'tazilites in Basrah.

Once there was a discussion between him and Imam al-Asghari in respect of the Theory of the Salutary to which reference has already been made in the foregoing pages. The story goes that one day he asked Imam al-Asghari: "What do you mean by obedience?" The Imam replied, "Assent to a command," and then asked for al-Jubbai's own opinion in this matter. Al-Jubbai said, "The essence of obedience, according to me, is agreement to the will, and the essence of obedience, according to him, is agreement to the will. The Imam answered, "According to this, one must conclude that God is obedient to His servant if He fulfills his will." Al-Jubbai granted this. The Imam said, "You differ from the community of Muslims and you blaspheme the Lord of the worlds. For if God is obedient to His servant, then He must be subject to him, but God is above this."

Al-Jubbai further claimed that the names of God are subject to the regular rules of grammar. He, therefore, considered it possible to derive a name for Him from every deed which He performs. On this Imam al-Asghari said that, according to this view, God should be named "the producer of pregnancy among women," because he creates pregnancy in them. Al-Jubbai could not escape this conclusion. The Imam added: "This heresy of yours is worse than that of the Christians in calling God the father of Jesus, although even they do not hold that He produced pregnancy in Mary." The following are other notable views of al-Jubbai:

(1) Unlike other Mu'tazilites, he denies the divine attributes. He holds that the very essence of God is knowing; no attribute of knowledge can be attributed to Him so as to exist besides His essence. Nor is there any "state" which enables Him to acquire the "state of knowing." Unlike al-Jubbai, his son Abu Nasir al-Asghar believed in "states." To say that God is all-hearing and all-seeing really means that God is alive and there is no defect of any kind in Him. The attributes of hearing and seeing in God originate at the time of the origination of what is seen and what is heard.

(2) Al-Jubbai and the other Mu'tazilites regard the world as originated and the will of God as the cause of its being originated; they also think that the will of God too is something originated, for if the temporal will is regarded as subsisting in God, He will have to be regarded as the "locus of temporal events." This view he held against the Karmites who claimed that the will subsists in God Himself, is eternal and instrumental in creating the world which is originated, and, therefore, not eternal.

Against al-Jubbai it has been held that independent subsistence of the will is entirely incomprehensible, for it tantamounts to saying that an attribute exists without its subject or an accident exists without some substance. Besides, it means that God who has the will is devoid of it, i.e., does not have it—a clear contradiction.

(3) For al-Jubbai the speech of God is compounded of letters and sounds and God creates it in somebody. The speaker is He Himself and not the body in which it subsists. Such speech will necessarily be a thing originated. Therefore, the speech of God is a thing originated and not eternal.

(4) Like other Mu'tazilites, al-Jubbai denies the physical vision of God in the hereafter, for that, according to him, is impossible. It is impossible because whatever is not physical cannot fulfill the conditions of vision.

(5) He equally agrees with other Mu'tazilites regarding the gnosis of God, the knowledge of good and evil, and the destiny of those who commit grave sins. With them he holds that man is the author of his own actions and that it lies in his power to produce good or evil or commit sins and wrongs, and that it is compulsory for God to punish the sinner and reward the obedient.

(6) In the matter of Islamite, al-Jubbai supports the belief of the Sunnite, viz., the appointment of an Imam is to be founded on catholic consent.

---

Mu'tazilism

rules of grammar. He, therefore, considered it possible to derive a name for Him from every deed which He performs. On this Imam al-Asghari said that, according to this view, God should be named "the producer of pregnancy among women," because he creates pregnancy in them. Al-Jubbai could not escape this conclusion. The Imam added: "This heresy of yours is worse than that of the Christians in calling God the father of Jesus, although even they do not hold that He produced pregnancy in Mary." The following are other notable views of al-Jubbai:

(1) Unlike other Mu'tazilites, he denies the divine attributes. He holds that the very essence of God is knowing; no attribute of knowledge can be attributed to Him so as to exist besides His essence. Nor is there any "state" which enables Him to acquire the "state of knowing." Unlike al-Jubbai, his son Abu Nasir al-Asghar believed in "states." To say that God is all-hearing and all-seeing really means that God is alive and there is no defect of any kind in Him. The attributes of hearing and seeing in God originate at the time of the origination of what is seen and what is heard.

(2) Al-Jubbai and the other Mu'tazilites regard the world as originated and the will of God as the cause of its being originated; they also think that the will of God too is something originated, for if the temporal will is regarded as subsisting in God, He will have to be regarded as the "locus of temporal events." This view he held against the Karmites who claimed that the will subsists in God Himself, is eternal and instrumental in creating the world which is originated, and, therefore, not eternal.

Against al-Jubbai it has been held that independent subsistence of the will is entirely incomprehensible, for it tantamounts to saying that an attribute exists without its subject or an accident exists without some substance. Besides, it means that God who has the will is devoid of it, i.e., does not have it—a clear contradiction.

(3) For al-Jubbai the speech of God is compounded of letters and sounds and God creates it in somebody. The speaker is He Himself and not the body in which it subsists. Such speech will necessarily be a thing originated. Therefore, the speech of God is a thing originated and not eternal.

(4) Like other Mu'tazilites, al-Jubbai denies the physical vision of God in the hereafter, for that, according to him, is impossible. It is impossible because whatever is not physical cannot fulfill the conditions of vision.

(5) He equally agrees with other Mu'tazilites regarding the gnosis of God, the knowledge of good and evil, and the destiny of those who commit grave sins. With them he holds that man is the author of his own actions and that it lies in his power to produce good or evil or commit sins and wrongs, and that it is compulsory for God to punish the sinner and reward the obedient.

(6) In the matter of Islamite, al-Jubbai supports the belief of the Sunnite, viz., the appointment of an Imam is to be founded on catholic consent.

---

27 Al-Baghda, op. cit., pp. 188–89.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

9. Abu Ħāshim

Al-Jubbā’ī’s son, Abu Ħāshim ʿAbd al-Salām, was born in Baṣrah in 247/861 and died in 321/933. In literature he eclipsed al-Jubbā’ī. Both of them undertook new researches in the problems of Ḥallām. In general, Abu Ħāshim agreed with his father, but in the matter of divine attributes he more widely differed from him. Many Muslim philosophers of the time believed that the attributes of God are eternal and inherent in His essence. Contrary to this belief, the Shiʿites and the followers of the Greek philosophers held that it is by virtue of His essence that God has knowledge. He does not know by virtue of His knowledge. The divine essence, which is without quality and quantity, is one and in no way does it admit of plurality. According to the Muʿtazilites, attributes constitute the essence of God, i.e., God possesses knowledge due to the attribute of knowledge, but this attribute is identical with His essence. God knows by virtue of His knowledge and knowledge is His essence; similarly, He is omnipotent by virtue of His power, etc. Al-Jubbā’ī’s theory is that though God knows according to His essence, yet knowing is neither an attribute nor a state, owing to which God may be called a knower.

As a solution to this problem, Abu Ħāshim presents the conception of “state.” He says that we know essence and know it in different states. The states go on changing, but the essence remains the same. These states are in themselves inconceivable; they are known through their relation to essence. They are different from the essence, but are not found apart from the essence. To quote his own words, “A state-in-itself is neither existent nor non-existent, neither unknown nor known, neither eternal nor contingent; it cannot be known separately, but only together with the essence.”

Abu Ħāshim supports his conception of states by this argument: Reason evidently distinguishes between knowing a thing absolutely and knowing it together with some attribute. When we know an essence, we do not know that it is knowing. Similarly, when we know a substance, we do not know whether it is bounded or whether the accidents subsist in it. Certainly, man perceives the common qualities of things in one thing and the differentiating qualities in another, and necessarily gains knowledge of the fact that the quality which is common is different from the quality which is not common. These are rational propositions that no sane man would deny. Their locus is essence and not an accident, for otherwise it would necessarily follow that an accident subsists in another accident. In this way, states are necessarily determined. Therefore, to be a knower of the world refers to a state, which is an attribute besides the essence and has not the same sense as the essence. In like manner Abu Ħāshim proves the states for God; these states are not found apart but with the essence.

Al-Jubbā’ī and the other deniers of states refute this theory of Abu Ħāshim. Al-Jubbā’ī says that these states are really mental aspects that are not contained in the divine essence but are found in the percipient, i.e., in the per-

Muʿtazilism

ceiver of the essence. In other words, they are such generalizations or relations as do not exist externally but are found only in the percipient’s mind. Ibn Taimiyah also denies states. In this respect one of his couplets has gained much fame:

“Abu Ħāshim believes in State, al-Ashʿari in Acquisition and al-Naẓẓām in Leap.
These three things have verbal and no real existence.”

After a little hesitation, Imām Bāqilānī supported Abu Ħāshim’s views. Imām al-Ashʿari and the majority of his followers disputed them and Imām al-Ḥaramain first supported but later opposed them.

C

THE END

Besides the Muʿtazilites an account of whose views has been given above in some detail, there were some others the details of whose beliefs are given in the Mīlād ut-al-Niḥāl of Shahrastānī and al-Farg bain al-Firaq of al-Baghdādī. They were ʿAmr ibn ʿUbad; ʿAbbā’i Amr bin Ḥāji al-Awārī who had almost the same position as al-Naẓẓām, but differed from him in the view that God has no power over what He knows He does not do, or what He says He would not do, and man has the power to do that; ʿAbd ʿAbd Allah who shared al-Naẓẓām’s views but believed that to God can be attributed the power to oppress children and madmen, but not those who are in their full senses; ʿAbbā’i Amr ibn Ḥabīr and ʿAbbā’i Amr ibn ʿHabīr who held that among the corrupt of the Muslim community there were some who were worse than the Jews, Christians, and Magians, and that those who committed trivial sins would also be condemned to eternal hell; ʿAbbā’i ibn ʿAmr al-Buṣfāṭi who had very exaggerated views on the problem of predestination and did not ascribe any act to God; and ʿAbbā’i Abū ʿAbbā’i Ahmad ibn Ahmad ibn Māḥmūd al-Baṣbī, a Muʿtazilite of Baghdad known as al-Kaʿbī, who used to say that the deed of God is accomplished without His will. When it is said that God wills deeds, it is implied that He is their creator and there is wisdom in His doing so; and when it is said that He of Himself wills the deeds of others, all that is meant is that He commands these deeds. Al-Kaʿbī believed that God neither sees Himself nor others. His seeing and hearing mean nothing other than His knowledge. Al-Kaʿbī wrote a commentary on the Qurʾān which consisted of twelve volumes. No one till then had written such a voluminous commentary. He died in 309/921.

26 Muhammad Najm al-Ghāni Ḥāšan, Muṣḥāb al-Islām, Lucknow, 1924, p. 132.
Chapter XI

ASH'ARIISM

A

AL-ASH'ARI'S LIFE AND WORKS

Ash'arism is the name of a philosophico-religious school of thought in Islam that developed during the fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh centuries. This movement was "an attempt not only to purge Islam of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into it but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the religious thought of Islam." It laid the foundation of an orthodox Islamic theology or orthodox Kalām, as opposed to the rationalist Kalām of the Mu'tazilites; and in opposition to the extreme orthodox class, it made use of the dialectical method for the defense of the authority of divine revelation as applied to theological subjects.

The position at the end of the third/ninth century was such that the development of such a movement as orthodox Kalām was inevitable. The rationalization of faith, which developed, at the beginning of the second century of the Hijrah as a systematic movement of thought, in the name of rationalism in Islam or Mu’tazilite movement, was, in its original stage, simply an attempt to put Islam and its basic principles on a rational foundation, by giving a consistent rational interpretation to the different dogmas and doctrines of Islam. But when the Mu’tazilite rationalists began to study the Arabic trans-

lations of the works of Greek physicists and philosophers, made available to them by the early ‘Abbasid Caliphs, particularly by al-Manṣūr and al-Māmūn, they began to apply the Greek philosophical methods and ideas to the interpretation of the basic principles of Islam as well.

Some of the early ‘Abbasid Caliphs, particularly al-Māmūn, began to patronize the rationalism of the Mu’tazilites in public. The Mu’tazilite speculation, in the hands of the later Mu’tazilites, those of the second and third generations, under the influence of Greek philosophy and with the active support and patronage of the Caliphs, tended to be purely speculative and “absolutely unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of thought.” They made reason the sole basis of truth and reality and thus identified the sphere of philosophy with that of religion. They tried to interpret faith in terms of pure thought. They ignored the fact that the basic principles of religion are, by their very nature, incapable of logical demonstration or rational proof. The basic principles of Islam deal with supersensible realities and, as such, must first be accepted on the authority of revelation. The Mu’tazilites, in their zeal to judge everything by reason alone, destroyed the personality of God and reduced Him to a bare indefinable universality or to an abstract unity. This idea of an abstract, impersonal, absolute God could not appeal to the ordinary Muslims. The orthodox section of the people reacted strongly against the Mu’tazilite rationalism and began to consider the Mu’tazilites to be heretics.

The extreme rationalistic attitude of the later Mu’tazilites was followed by a powerful reaction from the orthodox section of the people. This reaction was greatly aggravated by the unfortunate attempt of the Caliph al-Māmūn to force Mu’tazilist (rationalist Kalām) on his subjects by introducing miḥnah (a compulsory test of faith) in the Mu’tazilite doctrines, particularly in their doctrine of the creation of the Qur’ān. The whole of the third/ninth century was a time of reaction. The orthodox Muslims (and among them were the Traditionists [the Muḥaddithūn], the Zāhirites (the followers of Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali), and the Muslim jurists (fugahā’) adhered strictly to Tradition and literal interpretation of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, and refused to admit any “innovation” (bid’ah) in the Sharī’ah (the Islamic Code). Any theological discussion was considered an “innovation” and was as such a cause of displeasure to them. The reactionary influence of Ḥāfiz Ahmad bin Ḥanbal and his Zāhirite followers was very strong at that period and the orthodox Muslims kept themselves safely aloof from the Mu’tazilites and the philosophers. The reaction against the rationalist Kalām went to such an extreme that even the anthropomorphic verses of the Qur’ān were interpreted by them in a purely literal sense. Malik bin Anas said: “God’s settling Himself firmly upon His Throne is known, the how of it is unknown; belief in it is obligatory;
ASH'ARISM

AL-ASH'ARI'S LIFE AND WORKS

Ash'arism is the name of a philosophico-religious school of thought in Islam that developed during the fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh centuries. This movement was "an attempt not only to purge Islam of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into it but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the religious thought of Islam." It laid the foundation of an orthodox Islamic theology or orthodox Kalâm, as opposed to the rationalist Kalâm of the Mu'tazilites; and in opposition to the extreme orthodox class, it made use of the dialectical method for the defence of the authority of divine revelation as applied to theological subjects.

The position at the end of the third/ninth century was such that the development of such a movement as orthodox Kalâm was inevitable. The rationalization of faith, which developed, at the beginning of the second century of the Hijrah as a systematic movement of thought, in the name of rationalism in Islam or Mu'tazilite movement, was, in its original stage, simply an attempt to purify Islam and its basic principles on a rational foundation, by giving a consistent rational interpretation to the different dogmas and doctrines of Islam. But when the Mu'tazilite rationalists began to study the Arabic trans-

lations of the works of Greek physicists and philosophers, made available to them by the early 'Abbasid Caliphs, particularly by al-Manṣūr and al-Mâmûn, they began to apply the Greek philosophical methods and ideas to the interpretation of the basic principles of Islam as well.

Some of the early 'Abbasid Caliphs, particularly al-Mâmûn, began to patronize the rationalism of the Mu'tazilites in public. The Mu'tazilite speculation, in the hands of the later Mu'tazilites, those of the second and third generations, under the influence of Greek philosophy and with the active support and patronage of the Caliphs, tended to be purely speculative and "absolutely unfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of thought." They made reason the sole basis of truth and reality and thus identified the sphere of philosophy with that of religion. They tried to interpret faith in terms of pure thought. They ignored the fact that the basic principles of religion are, by their very nature, incapable of logical demonstration or rational proof. The basic principles of Islam deal with supersensible realities and, as such, they must first be accepted on the authority of revelation. The Mu'tazilites, in their zeal to judge everything by reason alone, destroyed the personality of God and reduced Him to a bare indefinable universality or to an abstract unity. This idea of an abstract, impersonal, absolute God could not appeal to the ordinary Muslims. The orthodox section of the people reacted strongly against the Mu'tazilite rationalism and began to consider the Mu'tazilites to be heretics.

The extreme rationalistic attitude of the later Mu'tazilites was followed by powerful reaction from the orthodox section of the people. This reaction was greatly aggravated by the unfortunate attempt of the Caliph al-Mâmûn to force Mu'tazilism (rationalist Kalâm) on his subjects by introducing mihkâb (a compulsory test of faith) in the Mu'tazilite doctrines, particularly in their doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'ân. The whole of the third/ninth century was a time of reaction. The orthodox Muslims (among them were the Traditionalists [the Mu'addithûn], the Zâhirîtes (the followers of Dâwûd ibn 'Ali), and the Muslim jurists [jurâbâh]) adhered strictly to Tradition and literal interpretation of the Qur'ân and the Sunnah,1 and refused to admit any "innovation" (bid'âh) in the Sharî'ah (the Islamic Code). Any theological discussion was considered an "innovation" and was as such a cause of displeasure to them.2 The reactionary influence of 'Imâm Ahmad bî Hânbal and his Zâhirîte followers was very strong at that period and the orthodox Muslims kept themselves safely aloof from the Mu'tazilites and the philosophers. The reaction against the rationalist Kalâm went to such an extreme that even the anthropomorphic verses of the Qur'ân were interpreted by them in a purely literal sense. Mâlik bî Anas said: "God's settling Himself firmly upon His Throne is known, the how of it is unknown; belief in it is obligatory;

1 Iqâb, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, p. 53.
2 Al-Ash'ârî, Isâbûn al-Khawûf, p. 4.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

and questioning about it is an innovation." Any speculation about sacred things was considered an innovation. Every dogma was to be believed in without raising the question how or why (bi'la kāfaya).

But such an attitude of blind faith could not be maintained for any length of time. Islam, as a universal religion and as a living force, had to adapt itself to new thoughts and to new surroundings. So, as time went on, there arose gradually a party, from amongst the orthodox section of the Muslims, who realized the necessity of putting Islam on a solid ground by advancing "reasons" for the traditional beliefs, of defending these beliefs against all sorts of attacks—internal and external—and thus purging their faith of all the non-Islamic elements that had crept into it. They founded the orthodox theology of Islam by using Kalām or the philosophical method in order to meet the dialectical reasoning of the Mu'tazilites. These theologians who employed Kalām for the defence of their faith were, therefore, known as the Mutakallimūn (orthodox theologians). But, although these thinkers used philosophical method in their discussions, they obtained the primary materials from revelation. They developed a rival science of reasoning to meet the Mu'tazilites on their own ground. In the beginning this new orthodox theological movement developed privately and secretly. It was at first a gradual unconscious drift. It could not come to the open for fear of public criticism. Al-Junayd, for instance, had to discuss the unity of God behind closed doors. Al-Shāfi'i held that some trained people might defend and purify the faith but that should not be done in public. Al-Muhābībī and other contemporaries of Imām Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal incurred his displeasure for defending the faith with arguments or reason. But gradually the movement gathered strength and began to be openly preached almost at the same time in different places of the Muslim world—in Mesopotamia by Abu al-Ḥasan 'Ali bin Ismā'īl al-Ash'ari (d. 330 or 334/941 or 945), in Egypt by al-Taḥāwī (d. 331/942), and in Samarkand by Abu Manṣūr al-Māturūdī (d. 333/944). But of these three, al-Ash'ari became the most popular hero, before whom the Mu'tazilite system (the rationalist Kalām) went down, and he came to be known as the founder of the orthodox philosophical theology, and the school founded by him was named after him as Ash'arism.

Al-Ash'ari was born at Baṣrah. Regarding his date of birth there is difference of opinion. Ibn Khallīkān, in his discussion of the life of al-Ash'ari, mentions that he was born in 260 or 270/873 or 883 and died at Baghdād in 330/941 or some time after that. According to Shībīlī Nu'mānī and Ibn 'Asākir (the author of Taḥdīth Kāḥib al-Muṭi'ī, on the life and teachings of al-Ash'ari), he was born in 270/883 and died in 330/941. He was buried between Karkh and Bāb al-Baṣrah (the gate of Baṣrah). He was a descendant of Abu Mūsa al-Ash'ari, one of the famous Companions of the Prophet. Al-Ash'ari, in his early youth, came under the care of the great Mu'tazilite scholar of the Baṣrite school, Abu 'Ali Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Jubbi, and, as a disciple of his, became an adherent of the Mu'tazilite school and continued to support its doctrines up to the age of forty. After that there happened a sudden change in his mind and one day he went to the Mosque of Baṣrah and declared: "He who knows me, knows who I am, and he who does not know me, let him know that I am Abu al-Ḥasan 'Ali al-Ash'ari, that I used to maintain that the Qur'ān is created, that eyes of men shall not see God, and that the creatures create their actions. Lo! I repent that I have been a Mu'tazilite. I renounce these opinions and I take the engagement to refute the Mu'tazilites and expose their infamy and turpitude." What brought about this sudden change in al-Ash'ari is not definitely known to us. Shībīlī in his Iḥām al-Kalām says that "the change came to him due to some directions which he had obtained in a dream." Ibn Khallīkān mentions in this connection the story of a public discussion in which al-Ash'ari met his old Mu'tazilite teacher, al-Jubbi, on the problem of ἁλατ ῥοπ ῦ αἰπα, i.e., the problem whether God's actions are to be based on rational consideration and whether He is bound to do what is best for His creatures. Al-Ash'ari came to al-Jubbi and presented the case of three brothers, one being God-fearing, another godless, and a third having died as a child, and asked him as to what would be their positions in the next world. Al-Jubbi's could not give a satisfactory and consistent reply to that question and, on his having failed to justify rationally the Mu'tazilite doctrine of ἁλατ ῥοπ ῦ αἰπα, al-Ash'ari abandoned the Mu'tazilite camp. But whatever might have been the cause of this change, when he changed he was terribly in earnest. After the change he wrote a number of books and ibn Fārāl says that the number amounted to three hundred. Ibn 'Asākir Dimāqīlī has given the titles of ninety-three of them, but only a few have been preserved and are enumerated by Broekelmann. His work al-İbānah 'an Usūl al-Dīyanāh was printed at Hyderabad, Deccan (India), in 1321/1903 and a small treatise Risālah fī Istiḥāṣ al-Khawāṣ fī al-Kalām was printed in 1323/1905 and reprinted at Hyderabad in 1344/1925. Al-Ash'ari's other famous works are al-Maqālāt al-Islāmīyyān (published in Istanbul in 1348/1929), Kitāb al-Sharāb wāl-Taqafil, Luma', Muṣ'aj, T'ādād al-Buhārūn, and Tābīn. Of these the Maqālāt al-Islāmīyyān wa Ḳibālid al-Muṣālīyyān is the most authentic book on the views of different schools about religious dogmas and doctrines. Al-Maqālāt was written much earlier than the other books on the same subject, such as Shahristānī's Kitāb al-Muṣāl wāl-Nīḥal, or ibn Ḥāzm's al-Fāṣī fī al-Muṣāl wāl-Aḥwāl wāl-Nīḥal. Ibn Taimiyyah said in his Minḥāj al-Sunnah that the most comprehensive of the books he went through on the views of different people on the basic principles of Islam was al-Ash'ari's al-Maqālāt al-Islāmīyyān and that
A History of Muslim Philosophy

he (al-Ash'ari) discussed many of such views in details as were not even mentioned by others. Ibn al-Qayyim also spoke very highly of this work. In his Hidż al-Araﬁ and Ijtima' al-Juyuṣ al-Islāmiyyah, he said, "Shahrastānī, 'Abd al-Qāhir Baghdādī, and other later writers on the subject simply copied from al-Ash'ari's book and did not discuss the views in details." Al-Ash'ari's other famous book al-Ibarahīm 'an ʿUṣūl al-Diyānīh seems to have been written by him just after his abandoning the Mu'azzalite views. In this book we find he is almost a Zāhirī. The reaction against the Mu'azzalite speculation might have been very strong in his mind at that period. Al-Maqalāt seems to be a later work. The Rasa'il fi I'tibār al-Khawāṣṣ, deals with the objections raised by the extremely orthodox against the use of Kalām, and the replies given by al-Ash'ari, justifying its use in matters of faith. Al-Ash'ari's theology has been discussed mainly in these books. He had a good number of pupils who passed as famous theologians and who spread and developed his doctrines and dogmas. Some of those older Aṣḥāb'is were Abu Sahl Sa'diq, Abu Quffal, Abu Zaid Maruz, Zāhir bin Ahmad, Ḥāfiz Abu Bakr Juyjānī, Shaikh Abu Muhammad Ṭabari, and Abu al-Ḥasan Bāhili. Some of the pupils of these older Aṣḥāb'is became still more famous and the best known among them are Qadi Abu Bakr Bāqilānī, Abu Bakr bin Fārak, Abu al-Qasim al-Qushāri and Abu Ishaq Iṣra'īl and his pupil Abu al-Ma'āli al-Juwanī, known as Imam al-Ḥaramain.10

B

AṣḥārīTE THEOLOGY

Al-Ash'ari maintains an intermediary position between the two diametrically opposed schools of thought prevailing at the time. He had to fight against both the opposing parties. At the one extreme were the Mu'azzalites who made reason in preference to revelation the sole criterion of truth and reality and, thus, passed slowly into comparatively innocuous heretics. At the other extreme were the orthodox groups, particularly the Zāhirīs, the Muḥaddithūn (Anthropomorphists), the Muḥaddithīn (Traditionists), and the Jurists, all of which were wholly opposed to the use of reason or Kalām in defending or explaining religious dogmas and condemned any discussion about them as innovation. Al-Ash'ari wrote his Iṣbahān al-Khawāṣṣ mainly to meet the objections raised by the orthodox school against the use of reason in matters of faith. In that treatise he says: "A section of the people (i.e., the Zāhirīs and other orthodox people) made capital out of their own ignorance; discussions and rational thinking about matters of faith became a heavy burden for them, and, therefore, they became inclined to blind faith and blind following (taqlīd). They condemned those who tried to rationalize the principles of religion as 'innovators.' They considered discussion about motion, rest, body, accident, colour, space, atom, the leaping of atoms, and attributes of God, to be an innovation and a sin. They said that had such discussions been the right thing, the Prophet and his Companions would have definitely done so; they further pointed out that the Prophet, before his death, discussed and fully explained all those matters which were necessary from the religious point of view, leaving none of them to be discussed by his followers; and since he did not discuss the problems mentioned above, it was evident that to discuss them must be regarded as an innovation."

They further held that these so-called theological problems were either unknown to the Prophet and his Companions and yet they kept silent and did not discuss them or they were not known to them. If they knew them and yet did not discuss them, we are also to follow them in keeping silent, and if they could remain unaware of them we can also do so. In both cases discussion about them would be an "innovation." These were, in brief, their objections against the use of Kalām in matters of faith.

Al-Ash'ari, then, proceeds to justify theological discussions about matters of faith. He tries to meet these objections in three ways. First, by turning the objections of the orthodox against themselves by pointing out to them that the Prophet had not said that those who would discuss these problems were to be condemned and charged as innovators. Hence, their charging or condemning others as innovators was itself an innovation, for it amounted to discussion about matters which the Prophet did not discuss, and condemn the action of those whom the Prophet did not condemn.

Secondly, "the Prophet was not unaware of all these problems of body, accident, motion, rest, atoms, etc., though he did not discuss each of them separately. The general principles (taṣālí) underlying these problems are present in general, not in details, in the Qur‘ān and the Sunnah." Al-Ash'ari then proceeds to prove his contention by citing verses from the Qur‘ān and the sayings of the Prophet, and thereby showing that the principles underlying the problems of barakah, sukūn, taḥkīd, etc., are, as a matter of fact, present in the Qur‘ān and the Sunnah.11

Thirdly, "the Prophet was not unaware of these matters and knew them in detail, but as problems about them did not arise during his life-time, there was no question of his discussing or not discussing them." The Companions of the Prophet discussed and argued about many religious matters which appeared during their life-time, although there was no direct and explicit "saying" of the Prophet about them, and because of the absence of any explicit injunction from the Prophet they differed in their judgments about them. Had the question, for instance, of the creation of the Qur‘ān, or of atoms or substance, been raised in so many words in the life of the Prophet, he would have definitely discussed and explained it as he did in the case of all those problems which were then raised. "There is no direct verdict (nass) from the Prophet, for

---

2 Shihi, op. cit., pp. 56, 57.

11 Al-Ash'ari, op. cit., pp. 4–9
instance, as to whether the Qur'an is created or uncreated. If to call the Qur'an created is an 'innovation,' then, on the same ground, to call it uncreated must also be an 'innovation.'” Al-Ash'ari then concludes that Islam is not opposed to the use of reason; on the other hand, rationalization of faith is a necessity in Islam.

Al-Ash'ari discussed the main theological problems in his Masāliḥ Al-Islāmiyya and al-Tibā' al-Usūl al-Dīnīn. In these books al-Ash'ari selects a few principles which distinguish the Ash'arites from the Mu'tazilites school of thought. Later on al-Ghazālī put them in a consolidated form in his Iḥyā' as the “Principles of Faith” or Qaṣṣa'id al-'Agā' id, and Imām Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī explained them more elaborately. The main problems about which the Ash'arites differed from the Mu'tazilites are: (1) The conception of God and the nature of His attributes. (2) Freedom of the human will. (3) The criterion of truth and the standard of good and evil. (4) The vision (rūyah) of God. (5) Createdness of the Qur'an. (6) Possibility of the creatures with impossible tasks. (7) Promise of reward and threat of punishment. (8) The rational or non-rational basis of God’s actions. (9) Whether God is bound to do what is best for His creatures.

The problems discussed by the Ash'arites in their system may be broadly classified into two categories: (i) theological, and (ii) metaphysical.

C

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ASH'ARITE THEOLOGY

1. Conception of God and the Nature of His Attributes.—According to the Ash'arites, God is one, unique, eternal, existent Being; He is not a substance, not a body, not an accident, not limited to any direction, and not in any space. He possesses attributes such as knowledge, power, life, will; He is hearing and seeing and has speech.

About the nature of divine attributes two extreme views were held before the Ash'arites. On one hand, there were the extreme Attributionists (Shī'afīs), the Anthropomorphists (Mujassamīn), and the Comparers (Muhkhabhīn), who maintained that God possesses all the attributes mentioned in the Qur'an and that all such attributes as God's having hands, legs, ears, eyes, and His sitting firmly (istiwā') on His Throne must be taken in their literal sense. Such a view of the attributes of God is pure anthropomorphism, implying God's bodily presence. On the other hand, there were the Mu'tazilites who held that God is one, eternal, unique, Absolute Being, having no touch of dualism in Him. His essence is self-contained. He does not possess any attributes apart from His essence. His essence is, for instance, knowing, knowing, powerful, seeing, willing, etc. They denied the attributes of God as anything other than an addition to His essence.

The Ash'arites maintained a view which was, so to say, a reconciliation between the two extreme views. In agreement with the Shi'afīs and in opposition to the Mu'tazilites and the “philosophers” (those who were under Greek influence), the Ash'arites held that God possesses attributes in general. They classified the attributes of God into two main groups: (i) fitāt-i salībīyāh, or negative attributes, and (ii) fitāt-i waštīqāyāh or existential or positive attributes. According to them, the fitāt-i waštīqāyāh, which they also called fitāt-i waštīqāyāh or rational attributes, were seven: knowledge, power, will, life, hearing, seeing, and speech.

The extreme Shi'afīs asserted that even those attributes of God which imply His bodily existence are also to be taken in their true literal sense. As against them, the Ash'arites maintained that God possesses the apparently anthropomorphic attributes no doubt, but these should be understood not in their literal sense. They are to be believed in bīla kaif, without asking “how,” and bīla tashbih, without drawing any comparison.

The Ash'arites here introduced a principle that the attributes of God are unique and fundamentally different from those of the created beings and as such should not be compared to them. This is known as the doctrine of muḥkālijah, or absolute difference. This doctrine signifies that if any quality or term is applied to God, it must be understood in a unique sense and never taken in the sense in which it is normally used when applied to created beings. Because of the doctrine of muḥkālijah, the Ash'arites held that we are not allowed to ascribe any attribute to God unless it is expressly so applied in the Qur'an. God's attributes differ from those of the creatures, not in degree but in kind, i.e., in their whole nature.

The Ash'arites, as against the Mu'tazilites, held that “God has attributes which inhere eternally in Him and are in addition to His essence.” These attributes are eternal, but they are neither identical with His essence, nor are they quite different from or other than His essence. God is knowing, for instance, means that God possesses knowledge as an attribute, which is inherent in God, and although it is not exactly the same as His essence, yet it is not something quite different from and other than His essence. The Ash'arites, here, maintained a very difficult position. They were between the two horns of a dilemma. They could neither assert the eternal attributes of God to be identical with nor wholly different from the essence of God.

They could not agree to the Mu'tazilite view and assert the identity of the attributes with the essence of God, because that would be a virtual denial of the attributes. They could not also assert that these eternal attributes are something absolutely different, or other than and separate, from God.

14 Al-Ash'ari, al-'Ibānah, p. 47.
is that would lead to multiplicity of eternals, and go against divine unity. They, therefore, maintained that these attributes are, in one sense, included in and, in another sense, excluded from, the essence of God. It is common knowledge that the Ash’arites contended that essence (maḥṣūṣah), and attributes (ṣīḥāt) are two different things and they cannot be otherwise in the case of God, the Supreme Being. The Ash’arites made a distinction between the meaning or connotation (maḥfīz) of a thing and its reality (baṣqāsh). So far as their meaning is concerned, the attributes and the essence of God are not the same and as such the attributes are in addition to the essence of God, i.e., they have different meanings. The meaning of ṣīḥāt (essence) is different from the meanings of different attributes. God’s essence, for instance, is not knowing or powerful or wise, but as far as their ultimate baṣqāsh (reality or application) is concerned, the attributes are inherent in the divine essence, and hence are not something quite different from or other than the essence of God.

In support of the above view of theirs, the Ash’arites advanced the following arguments. The analogical argument of the Ash’arites of the older generation: God’s actions prove that He is knowing, powerful, and willing; so they also prove that He possesses knowledge, power, will, etc., because the ground of inference cannot differ in different things. What is true in the case of a created being must also be true in the case of the Divine Being. In the case of a human being, by “knowing” we mean one who possesses knowledge and even common sense and draws a line of demarcation between an essence and its attributes. On the same analogy, distinction must be drawn between the essence of God and His attributes. The essence and the attributes should not be supposed to be blended in the Divine Being. Hence the attributes of God cannot be identical with His essence, as the Mu’tazilites held. But this analogical reasoning is very weak, for what is true of a finite being need not necessarily be true of an infinite being. But, according to the doctrine of muḥkālātah, God’s knowledge or power or will and, as a matter of fact, all His rational attributes signify quite different meanings when applied to created beings.

Secondly, they argued that if all the attributes of God are identical with His essence, the divine essence must be a homogeneous combination of contradictory qualities. For instance, God is merciful (raḥīm) and also revengeful (gahhar); both the contradictory attributes would constitute the essence of God, which is one, unique, and indivisible (aḥad), and that is absurd.

Further, if the attributes are identical with God’s essence, and if, for instance, His being knowing, powerful, and living is His essence itself, no useful purpose will be served by ascribing them to Him, for that would ultimately be the virtual application of His essence to itself, which is useless. Hence the divine attributes cannot be identical with the divine essence.

Thirdly, if the attributes of God are not distinct from His essence, the meanings of the different attributes will be exactly the same, for God’s essence is a simple and indivisible unity. The meanings of knowing, willing, and living, for instance, will be exactly the same, and thus knowledge will mean power, or power will mean life, and so on. This also is an absurdity. These different attributes imply different meanings and hence they cannot be identical with God’s essence. His essence is one and He possesses many attributes which eternally inhere in Him and, though not identical with His essence, yet they are not absolutely different from His essence.

2. Free-will.—On the question of free-will or on the ability of man to choose and produce actions, the Ash’arites took up again an intermediary position between the libertarian and fatalistic views, held by the Mu’tazilites and the Jabrites respectively. The orthodox people and the Jabrites maintained a pure fatalistic view. They held that human actions are predetermined and predetermined by God. Man has no power to produce any action. “Everything,” they contended, “is from God.” God has absolute power over everything including human will and human actions. The Mu’tazilites and the Qadrites, on the other hand, held that man has full power to produce an action and has complete freedom in his choice, though the power was created in him by God.

The Ash’arites struck a middle path. They made a distinction between creation (khalq) and acquisition (kawn) of an action. God, according to the Ash’arites, is the creator (khalq) of human actions and man is the acquisitor (mukāsh). “Actions of human beings are created (mukāsh) by God, the creatures are not capable of creating any action.” There is no creator except God and the actions of man are, therefore, His creation. Power (qudrāh), according to them, is either (i) original (qu’dūmah) or (ii) derived (qu’dīthah). The original power alone is effective. Derived power can create nothing. The power possessed by man is given by God and as such it is derived. Al-Ash’ari said, “The true meaning of acquisition is the occurrence of a thing or event due to derived power, and it is an acquisition for the person by whose derived power it takes place.” God is, thus, the creator of human actions and man is the acquisitor. Man cannot create anything; he cannot initiate action. God alone can create, because absolute creation is His prerogative. God creates in man the power and the ability to perform an act. He also creates in him the power to make a free choice (ikhtiyār) between two alternatives—between right and wrong. This free choice of man is not effective in producing the action. It is the habit or nature of God to create the action.

14 Al-Ash’ari, al-Maqālaṭa, p. 484.
15 Ibid., p. 291.
16 Al-Ash’ari, al-Ibānān, p. 9.
17 Idem, al-Maqālaṭa, pp. 539-54.
18 Ibid., p. 542.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

corresponding to the choice and power created by Himself in man. Thus, the
action of man is created by God, both as to initiative and as to production
or completion. Man is free only in making the choice between alternatives
and also in intending to do the particular action freely chosen. Man, in making
this choice and intending to do the act, acquires (ikhtilāf) either the merit
of appreciation and reward from God if he makes the right choice, or the
demerit of condemnation and punishment if he makes the wrong choice. The
Aṣḥārites, thus, in order to avoid the fatalistic position, introduced the doc-
trine of acquisition by which, they thought, they could account for man's
free-will and lay responsibility upon him. Man has no free-will in the Mu'tazilite
sense; he has no real and effective power, but has some derived power
by which he acquires a share in the production of the act. In the case of voluntary
actions of human beings, there are, so to say, two causes. The action is the
combined effect of the real cause, God, and the choice and intention of man,
the acquirer, the possessor of ineffective power because of its being derived
power. God creates in two ways: either with a locus (mabāl) or without a
locus. Human actions are His creation with a locus.24 "God creates, in man,
the power, ability, choice, and will to perform an act, and man, endowed with
this derived power, chooses freely one of the alternatives and intends or wills
to do the action, and, corresponding to this intention, God creates and com-
pletes the action."25 It is this intention on the part of man which makes him
responsible for his deeds. Man cannot take the initiative in any matter, nor
can he originate any action. But the completion of the act is partially due to his
intention. He, thus, acquires the merit or demerit of the act because of his intending to do a good or bad action. Man's free choice is, so to say,
an occasion for God's causing the action corresponding to that choice. In this the
Aṣḥārites come very close to the occasionalism of Malebranche which was
expounded in the eight centuries and a half later. This correspondence and
harmony between the choice of man and God's creation, according to the
Aṣḥārites, is not due to a harmony established by God previously, but because
of His habit or nature to create the harmony whenever human action is done.

This, in short, is the solution of the problem of free-will offered by the
Aṣḥārites. The Aṣḥārite view on this problem is not free from logical and
ethical difficulties. It was really very difficult for them to reconcile the absolute
determination of all events by God with man's accountability and respon-
sibility for his deeds. Some of the later Aṣḥārites, particularly Imam Fakhr
al-Din al-Razi, discarded the veil of acquisition in order to escape the charge
of fatalism, and advocated naked determinism.26

3. The Problem of Reason and Revelation and the Criterion of Good and Evil.—
The Aṣḥārites differ from the Mu'tazilites on the question whether reason or

24 Abu al-Āla, op. cit., p. 625.
25 Al-Shahbazi, op. cit., p. 53.
26 Shibli, op. cit., p. 72.

Aṣḥārism

revelation should be the basis or source of truth and reality. Both the schools
admit the necessity of reason for the rational understanding of faith, but they
differ with regard to the question whether revelation or reason is more funda-
damental and, in case of a conflict, whether reason or revelation is to get
preference. The Mu'tazilites held that reason is more fundamental than revela-
tion and is to be preferred to revelation. Revelation merely confirms what is
accepted by reason and, if there be a conflict between the two, reason is to be
preferred and revelation must be so interpreted as to be in conformity with
the dictates of reason.

The Aṣḥārites, on the other hand, held that revelation is more funda-
mental as the source of ultimate truth and reality, and reason should merely
confirm what is given by revelation. The Aṣḥārites prefer revelation to reason in
case of a conflict between the two. As a matter of fact, this is one of the funda-
mental principles in which the rational Kātāma of the Mu'tazilites differs from
the orthodox Kātāma of the Aṣḥārites. If pure reason is made the sole basis or
source of truth and reality, including the truth and reality of the most funda-
mental principles or concepts on which Islam is based, it would be a pure
speculative philosophy or at best a rational theology in general and not a
doctrinal theology of a particular historic religion, i.e., that of Islam in par-

230

231


dicular. Islam is based on certain fundamental principles or concepts which,
being supra-sensible in nature, are incapable of rational proof. These principles,
first, must be believed in on the basis of revelation. Revelation, thus, is the
real basis of the truth and reality of these basic doctrines of Islam. This faith,
based on revelation, must be rationalized. Islam as a religion, no doubt,
admits the necessity of rationalizing its faith. But to admit the necessity of
rationalizing faith is not to admit pure reason or analytic thought to be the
sole source or basis of Islam as a religion. Reason, no doubt, has the right to
judge Islam and its basic principles, but what is to be judged is of such a

nature that it cannot submit to the judgment of reason except on its own
terms. Reason must, therefore, be subordinated to revelation. Its function is
to rationalize faith in the basic principles of Islam and not to question
the validity or truth of the principles established on the basis of revelation
as embodied in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The problem of the criterion of
good and evil follows as a corollary to the problem of reason and revelation.
The problem of good and evil is one of the most controversial problems of
Islamic theology. The Mu'tazilites held that reason, and not revelation, is
the criterion or standard of moral judgment, i.e., of the goodness and badness
of an action. The truth and moral value of things and human actions must
be determined by reason. They contended that moral qualities of good and
evil are objective; they are inherent in the very nature of things or actions
and as such can be known by reason and decided to be good or bad.

The Aṣḥārites, as against the Mu'tazilites, held that revelation and not
reason is the real authority or criterion to determine what is good and what
is bad. Goodness and badness of actions (haya' wa qubl) are not qualities
A History of Muslim Philosophy

inhering in them; these are mere accidents (‘a’rād). Actions-in-themselves are neither good nor bad. Divine Law makes them good or bad. In order to make the ground of controversy between the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites clearer, we may explain here the three different senses in which these two terms, good and evil, are used.\(^7\)

(i) Good and evil are sometimes used in the sense of perfection and defect respectively. When we say that a certain thing or action is good or bad (for instance, knowledge is good and ignorance is bad), we mean that it is a quality which makes its possessor perfect or implies a defect in him.

(ii) These terms are also used in a utilitarian sense meaning gain and loss in worldly affairs. Whatever is useful or has utility in our experience is good, and the opposite of it is bad. So whatever is neither useful nor harmful is neither good nor bad.

Both the Ash’arites and the Mu’tazilites agree that in the two senses, mentioned above, reason is the criterion or standard of good and evil. There is no difference of opinion in the above two senses. But good and bad in the second sense may vary from time to time, from individual to individual, and from place to place. In this sense there will be nothing permanently or universally good or bad; what is good to one may be bad to others and vice versa. This implies that good and evil are subjective and not objective and real. Hence actions are neither good nor bad, but experience or workability would make them so and, therefore, they can be known by reason without the help of revelation.

(iii) Good and evil are also used in a third sense of commendable and praiseworthy or condemnable in this world and rewardable or punishable, as the case may be, in the other world.

The Ash’arites maintained that good and evil in their third sense must be known through revelation, not by reason as the Mu’tazilites had held. According to the Ash’arites, revelation alone decides whether an action is good or bad. What is commanded by Šāhār is good, and what is prohibited is bad. Šāhār can convert previously-declared-good into bad and vice versa. As actions by themselves are neither good nor bad, there is nothing in them which would make them rewardable (good) or punishable (bad). They are made rewardable or punishable by revelation or Šāhār. As there is no quality of good or evil seated in the very nature of an act, there can be no question of knowing it by reason.

4. The Problem of the Eternity of the Qur’ān.—There was a great controversy over the question whether the Qur’ān is created or uncreated. This question is bound up with another question whether speech is one of God’s attributes or not. The orthodox section of the Muslims, including the Ash’arites, held that God has it as one of His seven rational attributes, and as His attributes are eternal, divine speech, i.e., the Qur’ān, is also eternal.

\(^7\) Qādi ‘Aḍd and Sayyid Šarīf, Mawdūq, Vol. IV, p. 182; Muṣāfam al-Thubāt, p. 114.

Ash’arism

As regards the eternity of the Qur’ān, the Ash’arites adopted again an intermediary position between the extreme views of the Zāhirites and the Mu’tazilites. The Ḥanbalites and other Zāhirites (extreme orthodox schools) held that the speech of God, i.e., the Qur’ān, is composed of letters, words, and sounds which inhere in the essence of God and is, therefore, eternal. Some of the Ḥanbalites went to the extreme and asserted that even the cover and the binding of the Qur’ān are eternal.\(^20\) The Mu’tazilites and a section of the Rāfīdīs went to the other extreme and maintained that the Qur’ān was created. They denied all attributes of God, including the attribute of speech, on the ground that if it be an eternal attribute of God, there would be multiplicity of eternals, to believe which is polytheism and contrary to the basic principles of Islam. They further argued that “the Qur’ān is composed of parts, successively arranged parts, and whatever is composed of such parts must be temporal.”\(^22\) Hence the Qur’ān must be created. The Ash’arites maintained that the Qur’ān is composed of words and sounds, but those do not inhere in the essence of God. They made a distinction between the outward and concrete expression of the Qur’ān in language, and the real, self-subsisting meaning of it, and held that the Qur’ān, as expressed in words and sounds, is, no doubt, temporal (qādīl); but against the Mu’tazilites they asserted that the Qur’ān in its meanings is uncreated and eternal. The “self-subsisting meaning” eternally inheres in the essence of God. These meanings are expressed; their expression in language is temporal and created. It is so because the same meaning, while remaining the same, might be expressed differently at different times, in different places by different persons or nations. They further maintained that this meaning is an attribute other than knowledge and will and, as such, inheres eternally in the essence of God and is, therefore, eternal.\(^20\)

In support of this contention the Ash’arites advanced the following arguments:

(i) The Qur’ān is “knowledge from God”; it is, therefore, inseparable from God’s attribute of knowledge which is eternal and uncreated. Hence it is also eternal and uncreated.

(ii) God created everything by His word kus (be) and this word, which is in the Qur’ān, could not have been a created one, otherwise a created word would be a creator, which is absurd. Hence God’s word is uncreated, i.e., eternal.

(iii) The Qur’ān makes a distinction between creation (khuḥ) and command (amr) when it says, “Are not the creation and command His alone?” Hence God’s command, His word or kāfān, which is definitely something other than created things (ma’ākhāf), must be uncreated and eternal.

(iv) Further, God says to Moses, “I have chosen thee over mankind with
A History of Muslim Philosophy

My apostolate and My word." This verse signifies that God has speech. Again, Moses is addressed by God with the words: "Lo, I am thy Lord." Now, if the word which addresses Moses is a created thing, it would mean that a created thing asserts that it is Moses’ Lord (God), which is absurd. God’s word, therefore, must be eternal. The Ash’arites further pointed out that all the different arguments advanced by the Mu’tazilites (and in Sharh-i Muqâfîqî as many as eight such arguments have been mentioned), in support of their view that the Qur’an is created, would apply only to the expressed Qur’an and not to the real Qur’an, the latter being the “meanings of the Qur’an.”

5. The Problem of the Beatitude Vision.—On the question of the beatific vision, the Ash’arites, true to their attitude of reconciliation, again tried to adopt a course lying midway between the extreme anthropomorphic view of the Zâhidîtes and other orthodox Muslims on the one hand and the view of the Mu’tazilites and the “philosophers” on the other. The extreme orthodox Muslims and the Zâhidîtes, in particular, held that it is possible to see God and the righteous persons would actually have His vision as the chief reward for their good actions. They further held that God is settled firmly on His Throne, He exists in different directions, and is capable of being pointed out. The Mu’tazilites and the “philosophers” denied the possibility of seeing God with eyes, as that would imply His bodily existence, which is absurd. The Ash’arites, as against the Mu’tazilites and the “philosophers,” and in agreement with the orthodox class, held that it is possible to see God;[23] but they could not agree to their view that God is extended and can be shown by pointing out. They accepted the philosophical principle that whatever is extended or spatial must be contingent and temporal, and God is not an extended and temporal being. This admission landed them into a difficulty, for if God is not extended and only extended things can be seen, God cannot be seen;[24] but this conclusion conflicts with their position that beatific vision is possible. So, in order to get out of this difficulty, they asserted the possibility of seeing an object even if it is not present before the perceived.[25] This was a very peculiar and untenable position, for it repudiated all the principles of optics.

It is possible to see God even though our sense of vision does not receive the corresponding “impression” of the object on it. Besides, it is possible for God to create in human beings the capacity to see Him without the necessary conditions of vision, such as the presence, in concrete form, of the object itself in space and time, normal condition of the appropriate sense-organ, absence of hindrance or obstruction to perception, and so on; and though God is unextended and does not exist in space and time, “yet He may make Himself visible to His creature like the full moon.” They further contended that the vision of God is possible without any impression on our sense-organ for another reason. There is practically no difference between a “sensation” and an “after-image” except that the sensation possesses an additional quality over and above the common qualities present in both, and this additional quality, i.e., impression on the sense-organ produced by the external object, does not make any difference in the perception of an object. Hence, though this impression is missing in the case of seeing God, it may still be called “seeing.” The weakness of this argument is apparent to any student of psychology, because an after-image is possible only when it is preceded by an actual impression of the object on the sense-organ. The actual impression of the object is, therefore, a precondition of an after-image in the case of beatific vision too.

The Ash’arites were faced with another difficulty. The Mu’tazilites had pointed out that if seeing of God is possible, it must be possible under all circumstances and at all times, for this possibility is due either to His essence or to an inseparable attribute in Him. In either case, it should be possible at all times. And if it is possible at all times, it must be possible now; and if it is possible to see Him now, we must see Him now, for when all the conditions of “vision” are present, the actual seeing must take place. The Ash’arites met this objection in a very naive manner by saying, “We do not admit the necessity of actual seeing taking place, even when all its eight conditions are present.”

The Ash’arites supported their views on the basis of revelation. According to the Qur’an, Moses asked of God, “O, my Lord, show Yourself to me so that I can see Thee.” Had seeing been impossible, Moses would not have said so, for, otherwise, it must be assumed that either he knew its impossibility or did not, and both the alternatives are absurd, because an intelligent person like him could not have been ignorant of this impossibility and could not have asked for what he knew was impossible.

Again, according to the Qur’an, God said to Moses, “If the mountain remains fixed in its place, you can see Me,” and if the antecedent is possible the consequent must be possible. Here, evidently, the antecedent, fixity of the mountain, is in itself a possible thing. Therefore, the consequent, the vision of God, must also be possible. Some other verses also support the conclusion.

There are a few more controversial problems of secondary importance, in which the Ash’arites differed from the Mu’tazilites. These are, for example, promise of reward and threat of punishment by God; whether God can make His creatures responsible for the actions for which they have no ability; whether God’s actions are bound to be based on rational considerations and on purpose; whether He is bound to do what is best for His creatures; and whether the knowledge of God or recognition of His existence is based on reason or revelation.

These theological problems of secondary importance are more or less the corollaries of the main principles in which the Ash’arites and Mu’tazilites differed.

---


---

234

235

Al-Dâbârah, pp. 13-20.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

The Ash'arites held that God is the only real cause of everything; He alone possesses real and effective power and this power is unlimited; His will is absolutely free—not determined by anything. Whatever power human beings apparently possess is given by God. Man does not possess any real and effective power. God, being absolutely free in His action, is not bound to act on rational purpose. He does not act teleologically for, otherwise, His actions would be determined by something external to and other than Himself and He would not remain absolutely free. External purpose would put a limit to God’s omnipotence. Like Spinoza, al-Ash’ari held that there is no purpose in the mind of God which would determine His activity. From this anti-teleological view it follows that as God’s action is not teleological, He is not bound to do what is best for His creatures. He does whatever He wills. But as He is an absolutely intelligent and just being, His actions, as a matter of fact, are all full of wisdom. 37

As against the Mu'tazilites, the Ash'arites held that God can make us responsible for the actions which we have no power to do. The Mu'tazilites held that God cannot do so, because that would be an irrational and unjust act on His part. It is admitted by all schools of thought in Islam that power or ability of men to do a thing is given by God. But opinions differ on the question whether this power or ability is really effective in producing any action. The Mu'tazilites and the Qadarites held that man's power is fully effective and can produce an action. But the Ash'arites maintained that, being derivative, it can have no effective force. Similar are their respective positions with regard to the ability to act. This ability is no doubt given by God as an accident, but the Mu'tazilites, particularly Abu al-Hujjaj 'Allâ, held that this ability is given to man simultaneously with the performance of the act. But the Ash'arites maintained that it is given before the actual performance of the act; 38 but being a mere accident in man, it has only a momentary existence and is of no practical use to man in performing the act. As a matter of fact, it ceases to exist when the actual action takes place. Man, therefore, does the act, practically without having the power and the ability to do so. He is held responsible for his actions because of his choosing freely one of the two alternative actions and intending to do the action so chosen. But neither his choice nor his intention can produce the action. It is God who creates the action and is thus its effective and real cause. 39

There is an almost similar controversy over the question of God’s promise of reward to the virtuous and His threat of punishment to the wrong-doer. This was one of the five main problems with which the Mu'tazilite movement started. 40 The Mu'tazilites held that God is bound to fulfill His promises of reward and punishment. Every action, good or bad, must take its own course and be followed by its logical and normal consequence. A right action, therefore, must be followed by its reward and a wrong one by punishment. God has made promises in the Qur'an and He, being a just being, cannot do otherwise, i.e., He cannot punish the virtuous and forgive the wrong-doer.

On the other hand, the Ash'arites maintained that, being all-powerful and absolutely free in His will, God can punish His creatures even if they have not committed any sins or reward His creatures even though they have done no virtuous deeds. There is nothing binding on God; His will is not subject to teleological considerations. It is by the inner necessity of His own nature that He fulfills His promises of reward to the virtuous and does not do otherwise. And it is in His infinite mercy that He may forgive any wrong-doer or vicious person, in spite of the threats of punishment for his vicious acts. This act of forgiveness will also be in accordance with His nature as the most generous and gracious being.

D

ASH'ARITE METAPHYSICS

Al-Ash'ari’s interest was purely theological and his discussions did not contain much metaphysics. 41 But the subsequent Ash'arites found it impossible to achieve their main object of defending the faith and harmonizing reason with revelation without making reference to the ultimate nature of reality. Al-Ash'ari’s theological system was, thus, considered to be incomplete without a support from metaphysics. The system was fully developed by the later Ash'arites, particularly by Qadi Abu Bakr Muhammad bin Tayyib al-Baqillani who was one of the greatest among them. He was a Basrite, but he made Baghdad his permanent residence and died there in 403/1013. He was a great original thinker and wrote many valuable books on theology and various other subjects. He made use of some purely metaphysical propositions in his theological investigations, such as substance is an individual unity, accident has only a momentary existence and cannot exist in quality, and perfect vacuum is possible, and thus gave the school a metaphysical foundation. About him a Western scholar has remarked: “It is his glory to have contributed most important elements to, and put into fixed form what is, perhaps, the most daring metaphysical scheme, and almost certainly the most thorough theological scheme, ever thought out. On the one hand, the Lucretian atoms raining down through the empty void, the self-developing monads and pre-established harmony of Leibniz, and all the Kantian “things-in-themselves” are lame and impotent in their consistency beside the parallel Ash'arite doctrines; and, on the other, not even the rigours of Calvin, as developed in Dutch confessions, can compete with the unflinching exactitude of the Muslim conclusions.” 42

37 Al-Maqâlî, p. 252; Shibli, 'Ilm al-Kalam, p. 59.
38 Al-Maqâlî, p. 43.
39 Al-Shahrastâni, op. cit., p. 53.
40 Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab.
41 Shibli, op. cit., p. 57; Iqâbî, op. cit., p. 55.
42 Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory, pp. 200-01.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

The Ash'arites, being primarily interested in theological problems, kept their philosophical discussions mainly confined only to those questions which they thought had a direct or indirect bearing on these problems. Willingly or unwillingly, they had to philosophize "in order to meet the contemporary philosophers on their own ground." But when they began philosophizing, they were very earnest and became great metaphysicians.

In dealing with the most important basic principles of Islam: (i) the existence of God, as the creator of the universe, and His unity and oneness, and (ii) the belief in the prophethood of Muhammad, they had to use certain proofs which necessitated some metaphysical and epistemological discussions. Hence they had to develop a theory of knowledge and a theory of reality, which were peculiarly their own. God, the ultimate principle, is, according to the Ash'arites, a necessary existent; His existence is identical with His essence. In proving God's existence the Ash'arites used three arguments. Their argument from the contingent nature of motion is of no much importance to our discussion. The other two are:

(i) All bodies, they argued, are ultimately one in so far as their essence is concerned. But, in spite of this basic unity, their characteristics are different. Hence there must be an ultimate cause for these divergent characteristics, and that ultimate cause is God.

(ii) The world is contingent. Every contingent thing must have a cause; therefore, the world must have a cause, and as no contingent thing can be the cause, that cause must be God. The major premise (i.e., every event must have a cause) does not require a proof. The minor premise—the world is contingent—they proved in the following manner: Everything that exists in the world is either a substance or a quality. The contingent character of a quality is evident, and the contingency of substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart from qualities. The contingency of quality necessitates the contingency of substance; otherwise, the eternity of substance would necessitate the eternity of quality.

The Ash'arites believed in miracles which were considered to be the basis of the proof of prophethood and, in order to defend this view, they had to deny the laws of nature. They also denied causality in nature and made God the only cause of everything.

Now, in order to explain the full implication of the above arguments, it was necessary for them to develop a theory of knowledge and a metaphysics.

The world consists of things. Now, the question arises: What is meant by a thing, what is its nature, and how far do we know it?

Al-Baqillānī defined knowledge as the cognition of a thing as it is in itself. A thing is defined by the Ash'arites as "that which is existent." Everything is an existent and every existent is a thing. So, according to the Ash'arites, existence, whether necessary or contingent, is the thing or the essence of the thing-in-itself and not a quality in addition to it, as the Mu'tazilites held. Al-Jahiz, al-Jubba'i, and some other Mu'tazilites of the Bāṣrīte school defined a "thing" as that which is known, and held that existence is a quality of it, added to its essence. The Ash'arites, as against these Mu'tazilites, contended that if existence is an additional quality, the essence-in-itself would be a non-existent and hence a non-entity and the subsequent addition of the quality of "existence" to it would involve a clear contradiction in so far as it would make the non-existent exist. This is an absurdity. The thing-in-itself which is the object of knowledge according to the Ash'arites, is, therefore, an existent thing or a body. Everything that exists in the world has a contingent existence and is either substance or quality. In this sense God is not a thing.

The Aristotelian categories of thought were subjected by the Ash'arites to a searching criticism. Only two of those categories, substance and quality, were retained by them. The other categories, quality, place, time, etc., are nothing but relative characteristics (tibārāt) that exist subjectively in the mind of the knower, having no corresponding objective reality. Like Berkeley, the Irish philosopher, they also did not make any distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of objects. The world, therefore, consists of substance, on which the mind reflects, and qualities, which are not in the thing-in-itself but only in the mind of the knower. The qualities are mere accidents which are fleeting, transitory, and subjective relations, having only a momentary existence. A quality or accident cannot exist in another accident but only in a substance. No substance could ever exist apart from a quality. The substance, being inseparable from its accidents, must also be transitory, having only a moment's duration, just as the accidents are. Everything that exists, therefore, consists of mere transitory units (subjective), having only a moment's duration. The Ash'arites, thus, rejected the Aristotelian view of matter as "a permanent potentiality (hayāla) of suffering the impress of form (ṣūrah)," because a possibility is neither an entity nor a non-entity but purely a subjectivity. With inert matter, the active form and all causes must also go. They, too, are mere subjectivities. This led them straight to the atomists and, as a matter of fact, they did become atomists after their own fashion.

In this connection we may observe that the object of the Ash'arites was, like that of Kant, to fix the relation of knowledge to the thing-in-itself, and they showed here a great originality in their thought. On this question they not only anticipated Kant but, in reaching the thing-in-itself, they were much more thorough than Kant. "In his examination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a process, Kant stopped at the idea of 'Ding an

—- 238 —-

43 Ṣcharh-i Mawdūfī, p. 15.
44 Shibli, op. cit., pp. 87, 88.
45 Ṣcharh-i Mawdūfī, p. 15.
46 Ibid., p. 128.
47 Al-Maqṣūdat, p. 520.
48 Ṣcharh-i Mawdūfī, p. 109.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

sich’ [thing-in-itself], but the Ash’arite endeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the contemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so-called underlying essence existed only so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing subject.”

Ash’arite Atomism.—The substances perceived by us are atoms which come into existence from vacuity and drop out of existence again. The world is made up of such atoms. The Ash’arite atoms are fundamentally different from those of Democritus and Lucretius. The Ash’arite atoms are not material; they are not permanent; they have only a momentary existence; they are not eternal but every moment brought into being, and then allowed to go out of existence by the Supreme Being, God, the only cause of everything in the universe. These atoms are not only of space but of time also. They are non-material or ideal in character. They resemble the monads of Leibniz. But the Ash’arite monads differ from those of Leibniz in having no possibility of self-development along certain lines. Each monad has certain qualities but has extension neither in space nor in time. They have simply position, not bulk, and are isolated from and independent of one another. There is absolute void between any two monads. Space and time are subjective. All changes in the world are produced by their entering into existence and dropping out again, but not by any change in themselves. The Ash’arite ontology necessitated the existence of God. Their monads must have a cause, without which they could not have come into being, nor could there be any harmony or connection between them. This cause must be a causa sui; otherwise there would be an infinite regress of the causal nexus. The Ash’arites found this cause in the free-will of God. It creates and annihilates the atoms and their qualities and, thus, brings to pass all motion and change in the world.

The Ash’arites were, thus, thoroughgoing metaphysicians. Being was all-important in their ontology. The will of that Being or God must, therefore, be the ground of all things. Hence they did not find any difficulty, as Leibniz did, in explaining the harmony and coherence among the isolated, windowless, and independent monads, constituting the one orderly world. Leibniz had to bring in, in his monadology, a Monad of monads or God, and fall back upon the Theory of Pre-established Harmony to bring his monads into harmonious and orderly relations with one another, and this he could do only at the cost of his monadology, and by abandoning his pluralistic and individualistic metaphysics. But the Ash’arites, consistently with their ontology, fell straight back upon God, and found in His will the ground of orderliness and harmony in the universe. They were, thus, more thorough and consistent than Leibniz in their theory of monads. The Ash’arite atomism approaches that of Lotze’s, who in spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its complete reduction to ideality. But, like Lotze, they could not believe their atoms to be the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being.

Ash’arism

The necessary consequence of their analysis is a thoroughgoing idealism like that of Berkeley. Their theory of knowledge reduced the universe to a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like Berkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the will of God. Their interest, as we have already pointed out, was mainly theological. Interest in pure monotheism was very strong with them. Their metaphysical and epistemological discussions were actuated by a pious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, to drive men back to God and His revelation and compel them to see in Him the one grand fact of the universe.

The Ash’arites are here more consistent than Berkeley. God, according to them, is the only cause in the true sense of the term. No created thing, having created power, could be the cause of anything.

The attitude of the Ash’arites towards the law of causation was sceptical. They denied objective validity of causality in nature. No created thing or being can be the cause of anything. Things or beings in nature do not possess any power or quality which could produce any effect. The so-called power which men and objects of nature seem to possess is not an effective power, for it is a derived power, not an original power which alone can produce effect. Whatever power the creatures might possess must have been given by God, who alone possesses all real power. Being (God) is the only Ultimate Reality. The things of the world are composed of indivisible unites (monads) which, every moment, are created and annihilated; and it is God who creates and annihilates them and their qualities, thereby bringing about all the motion and change in the world. There is, thus, no such thing as a law of nature and the world is sustained by a constant, ever-repeated activity of God. There is no such thing as a secondary cause; when there is the appearance of such a cause, it is only illusionary. God produces the appearance of the effect as well as the effect. Things of the world do not possess any permanent nature. Fire, for instance, does not possess the nature or quality of burning; it does not burn. God creates in a substance “a being burned” when fire touches it.

The Ash’arites thus denied power in the cause as well as the necessary connection between the so-called cause and effect. Shibli mentions that the Ash’arites rejected the idea of causation with a view to defending the possibility of miracles on the manifestation of which, according to them, prophethood depended. The orthodox school believed in miracles as well as in the universal law of causation; but they also maintained that, at the time of manifesting a miracle, God suspends the operation of this law and thus brings about an exception. Al-Ash’ari, however, maintained that a cause must have always the same effect (i.e., the effect of one and the same cause could not be different at different times). Having accepted this principle as formulated by their leader, the Ash’arites could not agree to the orthodox view and, therefore, to prove the possibility of miracles they rejected the law of causation.

---

49 Iqbal, op. cit., p. 57.

50 Sharh-i Maleqil, p. 262; al-Maqalah, p. 539.
altogether. According to them, there is no power in the antecedent to produce the consequent. "We know nothing but floating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is determined by God." 81

Objection might be raised against the Ash'arite metaphysics that it establishes in effect a relationship between God and the atoms, but relationships, according to the Ash'arites, are subjective illusions. In reply to this objection it may be pointed out that all relationship applies only to contingent beings or things perceived by the senses. It would not hold in the case of the Necessary Being, God, who is suprasensible. And according to their principle of muqaddasah, nothing which is applied to created things or beings can be applied to God in the same sense. God is not a natural cause but a free cause.

This is the Ash'arite system as completed by Qadi Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It faced a strong opposition from the orthodox, particularly from the followers of Ahmad bin Hanbal.

Al-Ash'ari's opinions did not get much recognition outside the Shafi'iite group to which he belonged. The Hanafites preferred the doctrines of his contemporary al-Maturidi who differed from al-Ash'ari in certain minor controversial points. Shibli has mentioned nine such points. 82 In Spain, ibn Hazm (d. 466/1073) opposed the Ash'arite doctrines. The Saljuq Sultan Tughril Beg, who was an adherent of the Hanbalite school, treated the Ash'arites very badly, but his successor Sultan Alp Arsalan and especially his famous vizier, Nic'am al-Mulk, supported the Ash'arites and put an end to the persecution to which they had been exposed. Nic'am al-Mulk founded the Ni'zamiye Academy at Baghdad in 458/1066 for the defence of Ash'arite doctrines. It is under his patronage that Abu al-Ma'siLi 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaini got the chance of preaching the Ash'arite doctrine freely.

The Ash'arite system could not obtain widespread acceptance until it was popularized by al-Juwaini and al-Qazwini in the East and by ibn Tumart in the West. It was al-Juwaini who could legitimately claim the credit of making the Ash'arite doctrines popular. His vast learning and erudite scholarship brought him the title of Dhi' al-Din (the light of religion). Al-Juwaini received his early education from his father, Shabiikh Abu Muhammad 'Abd Allah, and after the death of his father, he got further education from his teacher, abu Isbaq al-Safara'ani, a great Ash'arite scholar. Al-Juwaini, in course of time, was recognized by the scholars of the time to be Shaikh al-Islam (the chief leader of Islam) and Imam al-Haramain (the religious leader of Makkah and Madinah). For thirty years, he continued teaching and preaching the Ash'arite doctrines. Al-Juwaini was the teacher of al-Qazwini. He wrote many books on various subjects. Some of these are: al-Shami, on the principles of religion; al-Burhan, on the principles of jurisprudence; al-Aqidat al-Nisamiyah; and Irshad, on theology. He was born in 419/1028 and died at Nishapur in 478/1085. 83

Being the Shaikh al-Islam and the Imam of Makkah and Madinah, al-Juwaini's Faqawa (judgments on religious matters) used to be respected by people in general throughout the Muslim world; and for this reason, his writings got the widest circulation and, through these writings, Ash'arite doctrines became known everywhere.

One great theological result of the Ash'arite system was that it checked the growth of free thought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the Islamic Shari'a. The Ash'arite mode of thought had its intellectual results also.

It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy and prepared the ground for philosophies propounded by men like al-Ghazali and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi. Al-Ghazali is generally included among the Ash'arites and it is he who may be said to have completed the Ash'arite metaphysics. It was he who, by giving a systematic refutation of Greek philosophy in his famous work, Tahafut al-Falasifah, completely annihilated the dread of intellectualism which had characterized the minds of the orthodox. It was chiefly through his influence that people began to study dogmas and metaphysics together. 84 Strictly speaking, al-Ghazali was not an Ash'arite, though he admitted that the Ash'arite mode of thought was excellent for the masses. "He held that the secret of faith could not be revealed to the masses; for this reason he encouraged exposition of the Ash'arite theology, and took care in persuading his disciples not to publish the results of his private reflection." 85

Al-Ghazali made the Ash'arite theology so popular that it became practically the theology of the Muslim community in general and has continued to remain so up to the present time.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


81 Shibli, op. cit., p. 64.
82 Ibid., p. 92.
83 Ibid., p. 312.
84 Ibid., op. cit., p. 59.
85 Shibli, op. cit., p. 66.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Chapter XII

TAHAWISM

A

TAHAWI'S LIFE AND WORKS

Abu Ja'far Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Salāmah al-Azdi, al-Ḥajri, al-Ṭahāwī, was born in Taḥā, a village in upper Egypt. His forefathers came from the Yemen to Egypt and settled there after it had come under the Muslim rule. There is a considerable difference of opinion as to the year of his birth. The years 229/843, 230/844, 238/852 and 239/853 are mentioned by different biographers. Al-Sam'āni asserts that he was born in 229/843 and this is correct. He died in Egypt in 321/933.1

Al-Ṭahāwī was mainly interested in Ḥadīth and Fiqh, and was regarded as one of the greatest Muhaddithin and Ḥujjāh of his time. According to Abu ʿIsāb al-Shirāzī, he was the last leader of Ḥanafi Fiqh in Egypt.2 He began to study Shafiʿi Law under his maternal uncle Abu Ibrāhīm ʿIṣām b. al-Muzaini (d. 264/878), the most celebrated pupil of Imām al-Ṣaḥḥārī, and then teaching in the study of Ḥanafi Law under al-Ṣaḥḥārī Abu Ja'far Ahmad b. abī ʿImrān (d. 285/898), who became the Chief Qadhi of Egypt in 270/883. Different versions are given by his biographers of his conversion to Ḥanafi school, but the most probable reason seems to be that the system of Imām Abu Ḥanifah appealed to his critical insight more than that of Imām Shafi'i.

Al-Ṭahāwī went to Syria in 268/882 for further studies in Ḥanafi Law and became a pupil of Qadhi abu Khāzin 'Abd al-Ḥamid b. Ja'far, the then Chief Justice of Syria.3 He learnt Ḥadīth from a large number of Shafiʿis especially from those who visited Egypt at his time, and had also many pupils of distinction.4 He is a distinguished author of many important works of which the following may be mentioned here: 1. Sharh Ma'āni al-ʿAthir, 2. Musnad al-ʿĀthir, 3. Akhān al-Qur'ān, 4. Iḥāṣāt al-ʿUlamāʾ, 5. Naṣīḥāt al-Fiqhīyyah, 6. Kāfār al-Shurṭāl al-Kabir, 7. al-Shurṭāl al-Awsat, 8. Sharḥ al-ʿĀthir al-Ṣaḥbānī.

3 Cf. authorities cited above.
dialectician and his main endeavour was to find out a philosophical basis for the views of the leader and to support these views by scholastic reasoning, and thereby bring them closer to the views of the rationalists. Al-Taḥāwī, as a true traditionist, did not favour, as will be seen, any rational discussion or speculative thinking on the articles of faith, but preferred to believe and accept them without questioning. There is no reference in his creed to the critical examination of the method, sources, and means of knowledge, or the foundation on which his theological system is built. So his system may be termed as dogmatic, while that of Al-Māturīdī as critical. The critical method followed by al-Taḥāwī in Ḥadīth is quite lacking in theology. Thus, though both of them belong to the same school and uphold faithfully the doctrines of their master, they differ from each other in temperament, attitude, and trends of thought.

In order to indicate the characteristics of the system of al-Taḥāwī and to make an estimate of his contributions to theology, we propose to give in the following pages an outline of the views of Imām abu Ḥanīfah along with the views of both al-Taḥāwī and al-Māturīdī on some of the most important theological problems that arose in Muslim theology.

Imām abu Ḥanīfah directed his movement against the Khārijites, Qadarites, Muʿtazilites, Shīʿites, Jabrites, the extreme Murjiʿītes, and the Ḥashwiyah, the last being a group of the orthodox people who under the influence of the converted Jews, Christians, and Magians fell into gross anthropomorphism, and ascribed to God all the characteristics of a created being. He was the first theologian among the Ḥanafis who adopted the principles and method of reasoning and applied them to a critical examination of the articles of faith and the laws of the Shariʿah. That is why he and his followers were called by the Traditionists the People of Reason and Opinion (aṣḥāb al-raʿī w-al-qiyās). This rational spirit and philosophical attitude were more consistently maintained by al-Māturīdī than by al-Taḥāwī. Their views on the nature of faith, attributes of God, beatific vision, divine decree, and human freedom may be mentioned here to indicate the distinctive features of their methods.

**B**

**NATURE OF FAITH**

Faith, according to the well-known view of Imām abu Ḥanīfah, consists of three elements: knowledge, belief, and confession; knowledge alone or con-

---


guilty of mortal sins, will not remain in hell for ever. Allah may grant him forgiveness or punish him in accordance with his sins.15

Pointing out the differences between himself and the Murjî'ites, Imâm Abu Hanîfah says: "We do not say that sins do not harm the faithful, nor do we say that he who does not enter hell, nor do we say that he will remain there for ever, although he should be a man of evil practice (fâsiq), after having departed from this world as a man of faith. And we do not say that our good actions are accepted and our sins are forgiven, as the Murjî'ites say. But we say that no one who performs a good action, fulfilling all its conditions and keeping it free of all defects, without nullifying it by infidelity, apostasy, or bad conduct during any part of his life, shall be neglected by God. God may punish in hell or grant complete forgiveness to a person who commits an evil deed (polytheism and infidelity excluded) and dies without repenting.16

The Khârijîtes and Mu'tazîlîtes laid so much emphasis on the doctrine of threats (wa'd) that they led the believers to despair and take a depressing view of life; while the Murjî'ites emphasized the doctrine of promise (wa'îd) so much that they quite endangered the ethical basis of Islam. Imâm Abu Hanîfah endeavoured to strike a middle course between these two extremes. Sins, according to him, are not without consequences; a sinner is always liable to blame or punishment, but to drive him out of the fold of Islam, to declare him an infidel, or to condemn him to eternal punishment is quite inconsistent with divine justice. His broad outlook and tolerant attitude were consistently continued by al-Ma'turidî and al-Taḥawî. The latter has summarized the views of his master on these questions in the following words:

"We do not declare anyone of the people of qiblah an infidel on account of a sin, so long as he does not deem it lawful. And we do not say that sin with faith does no harm to him who commits it. We entertain hope for the righteous among the faithful, but we have no certainty about them, and we do not certify that they will be in paradise. We ask forgiveness for their evil actions and we have fear for them, but we do not drive them into despair. Sense of security and despair both turn a man away from religion. The true way for the people of qiblah lies midway between these two. A faithful servant does not go out of the field of faith except by renouncing what had brought him into it."17

Al-Taḥawî substituted the phrase ahl al-qiblah for mî'mûn and Muslim, evidently to avoid the theological controversies regarding their identification, and to make the circle of the believers wider and at the same time to give the question a practical bias. He also avoided the theoretical definition of a Muslim or mî'mûn, and instead described how one could be regarded as such. He says: "We give those who follow our qiblah the name Muslim or mî'mûn, so

---

15 Mu'ad al-Imâm al-A'zam, pp. 11 et seq.
16 Abu Hanîfah, al-Fâti'h al-Akkâr.
17 Al-Taḥawî, al-'Aqîdah, p. 7.

Tabâwism

long as they acknowledge what the Prophet brought with him and believe in what he said and what he narrated."18

Knowledge of God and belief in Him may save those who are guilty of mortal sins from eternal punishment, and they may entertain hope of deliverance from hell through divine mercy and the intercession of the righteous. Those who are guilty of grievous sins will not remain eternally in hell, if they died as unitarians, even if they were not repentant. They are left to God's will and judgment; if He wills He will forgive them out of His kindness, as He has said: 'Surely Allah will not forgive the setting up of other gods with Himself; other sins He may forgive if He pleases;'19 and if He wishes He will punish them in hell in proportion to their sins as demanded by His justice. Then He will bring them out of it through His mercy and the intercession of His obedient people, and finally He will send them to paradise. This is because Allah is the Lord of those who know Him well, and He has not destined them in either world to be like those who denied Him, went astray from His guidance, and did not obtain His help and favour."20

It may be noticed here that, although al-Taḥawî did not include knowledge in his definition of faith, he was fully conscious of the cognitive aspect of it.

As regards intercession, Imâm Abu Hanîfah seems to restrict it to the prophets in general and particularly to Prophet Muhammad,21 but al-Taḥawî extends this privilege to the righteous and the pious among the faithful.

As regards the independent character of faith and equality of the faithful, al-Taḥawî says: "Faith is one and the faithful are equal; their comparative eminence lies in fear (of Allah), in righteousness, in disobeying lust, and in pursuing what is best. All the believers are friends of the Merciful. The most honourable among them before God are those who are the most obedient and the best followers of the Holy Qur'ân."22

On the question whether it is obligatory for a man to know God before the advent of His messenger, and whether to follow prececedence (taqlîd) is allowed in matters of faith, al-Taḥawî does not express his opinion explicitly, though his master was quite outspoken on these questions. These questions pertain to the Mu'tazîlîtes' doctrine of promise and threat (al-wâqî'â w-al-wâqî'd) which gave rise to the discussion of the nature and value of reason and revelation. They held that as God has endowed men with reason and they can easily perceive by proper use of this faculty that the world has a creator, it is obligatory on their part to know God even if the call of the Prophet does
A History of Muslim Philosophy

not reach them. But they were divided as to whether knowledge of God is acquired and a posteriori (kasabi) or necessary and a priori (faruri). Imām abu Ḥanifah agreed with the Mu'tazilites on the original question and maintained that "no one can have any excuse for ignorance about his creator, as he sees the creation of the heaven and the earth of his own as well as of others. So even if Allah should not have sent any messenger to the people, it was obligatory on them to know Him by means of their intellect."

C

GOD'S ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES

As to the relation between God's essence and attributes Imām abu Ḥanifah is stated to have advised his pupils not to enter into discussion on this question, but to be content with ascribing to God the qualities which He Himself ascribed to Himself. He even once declined to discuss this problem with Jāhān. In order to avoid the difficulties involved in affirming attributes, he simply declared that "they are neither He, nor other than He" (la hubūs ū la ghairahu). According to the explanation of al-Māturīdī, this phrase means that the attributes of God are neither identical with nor separate from His essence.

Al-Ṭahāwī made no reference to the philosophical problem of the relation between God and His essence, nor did he make a clear distinction between the attributes of essence and those of actions. But he emphatically asserts the eternity of the attributes and says: "Allah has eternally been with His attributes before He created the world and nothing has been added to His qualities after the creation, and as He has been from eternity with His qualities, He will remain with these to eternity."

Expressing his vigorous attitude against the Anthropomorphists he declared: "Whosoever attributes to Allah any of the human senses (ma'ani), he becomes an infidel." The true path lies, he asserts, between tashbih and ta'til. "He who does not guard against denial (of attributes) and assimilation slips and does not attain tanzih. Verily our Lord the High and Exalted has been attributed-

ed with the attribute of oneness and has been qualified with the quality of uniqueness. No one of the creation possesses His qualities. Allah is most high and praise be to Him. He is without limits, ends, elements, limbs, and instruments. The six directions do not encompass Him as they do the created things." It may be inferred from the above statement and the similar one in the 'Aqīdah, that al-Ṭahāwī is against the literal interpretations of the anthropomorphic expressions of the Qur'ān, such as the face of Allah, His eyes and hands, etc. But he does not indicate what these terms signify. Abn Ḥanifah clearly states that these terms denote His qualities. Even then he also is not in favour of giving any rational interpretation of them, as he fears that this may lead to the denial of His qualities. He says: "He has hand, face, and soul as mentioned in the Qur'ān, and whatever Allah mentioned in the Qur'ān as face, hand, or soul is unquestionably His quality. It should not be said with the Qadarites and the Mu'tazilites that by His hand is meant His power or His bounty, because this leads to the rejection of certain attributes. Nay. His hand is His attribute without description." The Imām had also adopted the principle of leaving the judgment to God (ta'judd) regarding the interpretation of the ambiguous verses of the Qur'ān; al-Ṭahāwī stuck to this principle very consistently. He says: "The foot of Islam does not stand firm but on the back of submission and surrender. Whoever wishes to attain that knowledge which was forbidden for him and whose intelligence does not remain content with submission, his desire certainly hinder him from access to pure concept of unity (tashbih), clear knowledge, and correct faith, and he then wavers between faith and infidelity, belief and disbelief, confession and denial as a sceptic, distracted, eccentric, and fugitive person without being a faithful believer or a faithless disbeliever.

The attitude of al-Māturīdī on this question is more rational and liberal than that of al-Ṭahāwī. According to the former, leaving judgment to God and passing an interpretative judgment for oneself are both allowed; and he is in favour of interpreting them in the light of explicit verses of the Qur'ān. The Throne of Allah.—Regarding the Throne of Allah ('arsh) as mentioned in the Qur'ān, abn Ḥanifah maintains that the expression should not be taken in the literal sense to mean a particular place. God being the creator of place cannot be thought of to be limited by place. He is where He has been before the creation of place. Abu Muṣṭ al-Balkhi, one of the disciples of the Imām, asked him, "What will you say if anyone asks: 'Where is Allah the Exalted?" He replied: "He should be told that Allah has been existing while there was no place before He created the universe; He has been existing while there was...

24 At the view of the Mu'tazilites, especially of 'Allāf and al-Naṣṣām, in al-Badghādi's al-Farq and Uṣul ad-Din and al-Shahrastānī's Mūlih.
25 This question was discussed by the Mu'tazilites, by Ghālān al-Dimashqī (prosecuted by Ḥāfīẓ b. 'Abd al-Malik [d. 1255/743]), who taught that knowledge of God is of two kinds: natural or instinctive (fitrī) and acquired (muktaṣab). Faith, according to him, is the rational knowledge, not the instinctive knowledge. (Mūlih, Vol. I, p. 274; al-Farq, p. 125; Maṣā'īl, Vol. I, p. 200.)
26 Al-Bīyādī, Iskāk, p. 149.
28 Al-Waqfayyāh, p. 4; al-Bīyādī, op. cit., p. 118.
29 Al-Ishbārī, p. 118; Sharh al-Fiqh al-Ākbar, ascribed to al-Māturīdī, Hyderabad, p. 18.
30 al-'Aqīdah, p. 4.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

no ‘where (aiwa), no created being, nor anything else. He is the creator of everything.’27 Refuting the idea of the Anthropomorphists that God is in a particular place, he declared: ‘We confess that Allah has seated Himself on the Throne without any necessity on His part, and without being fixed on it. If He had been under any necessity, He would not have been able to create the world and would have governed it like the created beings; and if He should feel any necessity to sit down and remain seated, where then was He before the creation of the Throne? God is exalted and high far above such ideas.’28

It is evident that, according to abu Hanifah, God, being eternal and incorporeal, cannot be conceived as being encompassed by direction and place. Al-Taḥāwī, as has been quoted above, firmly holds this view. ‘God is without limits, ends, elements, limbs, and instruments. The six directions do not encompass Him as they encompass the created things.’29 Referring to the Throne and the Chair, he states: ‘The Throne and the Chair are realities as Allah described them in His honoured Book. But He is not in need of the Throne nor of what is besides the Throne. He encompasses everything and is above everything.’30

Al-Māturīdī went a step further to allow rational interpretation of those verses, the apparent sense of which created an impression of His being in a place. He refuted the view of those who thought that the Throne was a particular place and God was on it, in it, or encompassed by it, as well as the views of those who thought that He was in every place. According to him, God being eternal, infinite, and incorporeal is free of time and space which imply rest, change, motion, and movement. Explaining the verses31 which were interpreted to prove His being in a particular place or in every place by the champions of these views, he asserts that these verses refer to His creative function, controlling power, absolute authority, sovereignty, eternity, and infinitude and indirectly prove that He is above the limitations of time and space.32

Beautific Vision.—This question was discussed with much fervour by the Companions of the Prophet. Besides their intense love of God and an ardent desire to enjoy the happiness of seeing their Lord in the next world, the accounts of Ascension (miʿrāj), and the prayer of Moses to have a vision of his Lord as referred to in the Qurʾān,33 aroused in them fervent zeal for a discussion of this topic. It seems quite certain that as a result of this discussion they arrived at the following conclusions: (a) God is invisible in this

—

27 Al-Fīqīh al-Abnā‘, p. 57.
28 Al-Waṣīyyah, pp. 3–4; Sharḥ al-Waṣīyyah, p. 81; Ishārāt, p. 196.
29 ‘Aqidah, p. 5.
30 This translation is according to the text given in the Sharḥ al-Taḥāwīyyah, p. 313.
31 Such verses of the Qurʾān as vii, 54; xx, 5; xlili, 84; lxx, 17; l, 16; lvi, 58; lviii, 7.
32 Kitāb al-Taḥābīd, pp. 32–37; Tawwīlāt, Sūrah vii, 54; xx, 5.
33 Qurʾān, vii, 143.

world; no human being saw Him or will ever see Him in this world44 except the Prophet Muhammad who, according to some of them, saw Him on the night of miʿrāj; (b) God will be seen by the faithful in paradise.45 The eager inquiries of the Companions of the Prophet whether he saw his Lord46 or whether believers will see Him in the next world47 and the vehement opposition of a group of leading Companions, including ʿĀishah, to the common belief that the Prophet saw his Lord,48 all clearly indicate that the Companions were fully conscious of the difficulties involved in answering these questions. Their standpoint on this question, like that on the problem of essence and attributes was just to believe and refrain from a detailed discussion of such matters as cannot be comprehended by human reason. The seeing of God in paradise was regarded by them as the highest blessing and happiness for the believers and the summum bonum of their life. They believed in it without description (wassāf) or rational explanation (la’w ‘utūl).

The Anthropomorphists, in the subsequent period, found in this belief a strong basis for their gross and crude anthropomorphic conception of God. As God will be seen in paradise He must have body and form and may be seen in this world, nay, He may even assume the form of a beautiful man.49

It was Jahm who, in order to oppose taṣḥīb, laid great emphasis on tanṣīh and quite consistently with his idea of abstract God denied for the first time, according to our present information, the vision of God in paradise.50 The Mu‘tazilites adopted this view and interpreted the beatific vision allegorically. Imām abu Hanifah upheld the view of the Companions and discarded both anthropomorphic and allegorical interpretation of “seeing God.”51 God will be seen by the faithful in paradise, he maintains, with their bodily eyes, but without any idea of place, direction, distance, comparison, or modality and without any description.52 Al-Taḥāwī maintains the same position and emphasizes that beatific vision is an article of faith and it must be accepted without any doubt, without any rational interpretation, and without any idea of anthropomorphism. Any attempt to interpret it by reason will amount, according to him, to the denial of this tenet.53 Al-Māturīdī also supported

44 “None among you will ever see his Lord till he dies” is a saying of the Prophet, Ishārāt, p. 65.
45 Traditions on this point have been narrated by more or less thirty Companions:
47 Al-Nawawī, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 17 et seq.
51 Al-Fīqīh al-Abnā‘, p. 10; al-Waṣīyyah, p. 7; Sharḥ al-Waṣīyyah, p. 97; Ishārāt, p. 201.
52 ‘Aqidah, p. 4.

252

253
believed it to be truly as such, and they knew for certain that it was in reality the kalām of Allah, the Exalted, not created like the speech of the created beings. So whoever supposes it to be human speech is an infidel.\(^{58}\)

The main point of controversy, it may be mentioned here, between the Jahniyyah and Mu'tazilah, on the one hand, and the orthodox, on the other, was on the nature of the divine word and its relation to the Qur'ān, after they had all agreed that the Qur'ān was the revealed book of Allah. So al-Taḥāwī, in fact, bypassed the main point at issue. He also made no reference to the relation of the speeches of created beings or that of Allah's word addressed to them such as to the Prophet Moses, as mentioned in the Qur'ān, with the eternal speech—a problem, which evidently bewildered the minds of Ja'd, Jahm, and their followers. Abu Ḥanafīah sought to remove this doubt with reference to the eternal divine attributes of knowing and creating. "Allah had indeed been speaking before He spoke to Moses, as Allah had indeed been creating from eternity before creating any creatures. So, when He spoke to Moses, He spoke to him with His speech which is one of His eternal attributes." Similarly, "whatever Allah mentions in the Qur'ān, quoting from Moses and other prophets and from Pharaoh and Iblīs, is the eternal speech of Allah about them. The speech of Allah is uncreated, but the speech of Moses and other created beings is created. The Qur'ān is the speech of Allah and not their speech; therefore, it is eternal."\(^{59}\)

Divine Will and Human Freedom.—The all-pervading will of God, His eternal decree (qadar) and infinite power, on the one hand, and freedom of the human will and action, on the other, are equally stressed in the Qur'ān.\(^{60}\) According to the Qur'ān, divine will, decree, and power are not inconsistent with human freedom. These problems were discussed by the Prophet and his Companions. Belief in qadar was declared by the Prophet as an article of faith, but at the same time he asserted that qadar does not deprive a man of his freedom in his limited sphere.

Thus, according to the Qur'ān and the Tradition, God is the creator of all things including their nature, and nothing can go against this nature. He is the creator of the human soul and its nature and He has created it in free-will and bestowed upon it the faculty of knowing, thinking, and distinguishing and the power of judging, choosing, and selecting. God, being the omniscient creator, knows from eternity what His creatures will do in future—this is the "writing of the destiny" and "the eternal divine decree."\(^{61}\)

That the Prophet laid stress both on qadar and human freedom and on the
A History of Muslim Philosophy

possibility of human action side by side with divine action, is also evident from his famous saying on natural religion (din al-firah): "Every child at birth is born in the firah, then it is his parents who make him a Jew, a Christian, or a Magian." This is testified by the Qur'anic verse, "The firah of Allah in which He hath created mankind, there is no change." The sayings of the Prophet that divine decree comprises all human care and precautions for life, that prayer can change destiny, and that God has provided remedy for every disease, and similar other traditions also clearly indicate that the divine decree is not despotic or tyrannical in its nature and that it does not imply any compulsion, nor is it inconsistent with freedom and responsibility.

The Companions of the Prophet also believed both in qadar and human freedom and emphatically denied the idea of compulsion (jabr). Some prominent Companions explained qadar as foreknowledge. Abu Mūsā al-Āsh'ārī said: "God decreed as He knew." 'Abd Allah b. 'Amr (d. 63/682) used to say: "The Pen has dried up according to the knowledge of God." Ali (d. 40/661) gave a clear exposition of his view on the problem and said: "Perhaps you think that the judgment (qadā) is binding and the decree (qadar) is final. Had it been so, then reward and punishment would be meaningless and the promise and threat null and void, and no reproach then should have come from Allah against a sinner and no promise for a righteous person. This is the view of the brethren of Satan... Verily Allah has enjoined discretion, issued prohibitions, and given warnings. He has not burdened (men) with compulsion, nor has He sent the prophets in vain..." 46

Imām abu Hanīfah made a bold attempt to harmonize the contradictory views of the self-determinists and the determinists by explaining the nature of divine power, will, and decree and enunciating the doctrines of natural religion (din al-firah), divine help, and guidance (kaufiq), abandoning (khiddālān) and acquisition (kašh). God had knowledge concerning things before they existed from eternity, and His will, decree, decision, and writing on the Preserved Tablet are in accordance with this foreknowledge. So the eternal decree is of a descriptive nature and not of a decisive nature. God created men with natural dispositions (fīrah), endowed them with intellect, then addressed them and commanded them through His messenger to believe and abstain from unbelief. Thereupon some people deviated from this natural religion, disavowed truth, and turned to unbelief. This unbelief is their own act, their own acquisition, preferred by their free-will, which God created in them, and is not due to any compulsion from Him, but due to His leaving them to them-

42 Bukhārī and Muslim, "Kitāb al-Qadar"; also Qur'ān, xxx, 30.
43 Tirmiḏī, "Kitāb al-Qadar."
44 Mūsāb, "Kitāb al-Ṭibb."
45 Al-Buyāḍ, op. cit., p. 33. This sentence has been chosen by Bukhārī as the heading of a section of "Kitāb al-Qadar" in his Sāhkī.
46 Wali al-Dīn, Mūsāb al-Manābī, Delhi, Ch. "Qadār," p. 22.

5.1 CONCLUSION

It will be noticed from what has been said in the foregoing pages that al-Ṭabāwī did not introduce any new doctrine or system in theology, but summarized faithfully and honestly the views of his master on important theological questions, in his own language. So "Ṭabāwīism," in fact, does not imply a new school of thought in Islamic theology; it is only another version of Imām abu Ḥanīfah's theological system. The importance of al-Ṭabāwī's creed mainly consists in the fact that it makes the position of his master quite clear. Imām abu Ḥanīfah occupied so important a place in theology and law and his system exerted so much influence on the educated mind that the Muṭṭāẓītes, the Murjiʿītes, and the orthodox equally claimed him for themselves. The Muṭṭāẓītes for this reason even denied his authorship of any book in theology.

Prominent pupils of Imām abu Ḥanīfah and his followers mainly engaged themselves in a close study of the problems of practical life, and generally it was they who occupied the posts of judges and legal advisers during the reign of the 'Abbāsid and even afterwards. By virtue of their work they could get little time for a detailed study of speculative theology.

---

47 Al-ʿAqīdah, p. 5.
48 Ibid., p. 11.
50 Some books on theology were written by Muhammad al-Shābānī, al-Ḥasan b. Ziyād and Zufar b. Hudhayl—all pupils of abu Ḥanīfah.
History of Muslim Philosophy

Their trends of mind also, it appears, were not in favour of pure speculation. Their time, energy, and genius were devoted to legal studies, and theological speculation was left for others. Thus, their contribution to theology is negligible in contrast to their contributions to law and jurisprudence. A few of them, like Ḥammād and Ismā‘īl, the son and grandson of Abu Ḥanīfah, Bishr al-Masri, Ḥafṣ al-Fard, Bishr b.Walid, Muhammad b. Ṣuhayl, and others who took some interest in theology, could not quite consistently explain and explain the views of their leader. During the reign of al-Mamūn and his immediate successors, the Ḥanāfī judges openly supported the Muʿtazilites' stand on some of the controversial questions and co-operated with the rulers in suppressing the views of the extreme orthodox. Besides the Muʿtazilites and the Murjī‘ites, the followers of Imām Abu Ḥanīfah themselves were divided in interpreting his views. Al-Ṭabwī, like al-Māturīdī, rendered valuable services in removing the doubts and confusions and making the position of the Imām quite clear. The influence of al-Ṭabwī on theology can easily be estimated from the numerous commentaries written on his creed. In short, al-Ṭabwī’s credit lies in the fact that he very nicely and elegantly presented the summaries of the views of Imām Abu Ḥanīfah, the first founder of the theological school of ahl al-sunnah—summaries for which he must have relied, besides the latter’s works, on other reliable sources which had already received recognition from a large number of orthodox people.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


**MĀTURĪDĪM**

Chapter XIII

MĀTURĪDISM

A detailed discussion of the fundamental principles of Islam led Muslim scholars in the second and third/eighth and ninth centuries of Hijrah to philosophical reasonings on the nature and attributes of God and His relation to man and the universe. As a result, a new science of Muslim scholasticism called 'Ilm al-Kalām came into being.

As a matter of fact, it was the Muʿtazilites who laid the foundation of this new science and made lasting contributions for its development. They started their movement by adopting a rational attitude in respect of some theological questions, but when they reached the height of their power, they adopted an aggressive attitude towards their opponents. The orthodox Muslims opposed the Muʿtazilite movement from the very beginning and tried to refute their doctrines by the traditional method. A section of the orthodox people took recourse even to violent methods.

Conflicting ideas and antagonistic attitudes created chaos and confusion in Muslim thought and shook the foundation of old ideas and traditional beliefs. The need for reconciliation and solving the crisis by adopting a middle course and a tolerant attitude was keenly felt. At this critical period of the history of Muslim theology there appeared, in three parts of the Muslim world, three eminent scholars: al-Māturīdī in Central Asia, al-Āqhārī in Iraq, and al-Ṭabwī in Egypt. They all endeavoured to reconcile conflicting ideas and settle the theological problems of the time by adopting a system that would satisfy reason and conform to the general tenets of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah. They exercised profound and lasting influence on the subsequent development of Muslim philosophy and theology and were considered to be the fathers of the three schools of thought named after them.

Aṣh’ārīsm and Taḥawwīsm have been dealt with in separate chapters; here we are concerned with Māturīdism.

**A**

**LIFE AND WORKS OF MĀTURĪDĪ**

Abu Maṣār Mūhammad b. Mūhammad b. Māhmūd, al-Māturīdī, al-Anṣārī, al-Ḥanāfī, was born at Māturīdī,1 a village or quarter in the neighbourhood of Samarqand, one of the great cities of Central Asia. According to some writers, he was the grandson of Abu Ayyūb al-Anṣārī of Madinah.2

1 The word is also pronounced as Māturīd and Māturīt. Cf. al-Sam‘ānī, al-Anṣāb, p. 496b; ibn al-Āqīl, al-Lubāb, Vol. III, p. 76; Ahmad ‘Abd al-Salār, al-‘Āqīl, al-‘Āqīl, Vol. I, pp. 305. It was wrongly transcribed by some writers as Māturīd.

A History of Muslim Philosophy

This statement is also corroborated by the fact that some other Arab families of Madinah also settled in Samarqand and that al-Maturidi’s daughter was married to al-Hasan al-Asghari, the father of Imam Abu al-Hasan ‘Ali al-Asghari and a descendant of Abu Ayyub al-Ansari of Madinah.

Almost all the biographers who give only short sketches of al-Maturidi’s life in their works agree that he died in the year 333/944, but none of them mentions the date of his birth. One of the teachers of al-Maturidi, namely, Muqaddis al-Razi is stated to have died in 248/862, which proves that al-Maturidi was born before that year and possibly about the year 238/853. According to this assumption, al-Maturidi was born during the reign of the Abbasiid Caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-247/847-861) who combated the Mu'tazilite doctrines and supported the traditional faith.

Al-Maturidi flourished under the powerful rule of the Samanids, who ruled practically the whole of Persia from 261/874 to 389/999 actively patronized science and literature, and gathered around their Court a number of renowned scholars. He was brought up in the peaceful academic atmosphere and cultural milieu of his native land and received good education in different Islamic sciences under four eminent scholars of his time: Shitah Abu Bakr Ahmad b. Isbaq, Abu Nasr Ahmad b. al-Abbas known as al-Faqqi al-Samarqandi, Nasir b. Yahya al-Balkhi (d. 268/881), and Muhammad b. Muqaddis al-Razi (d. 248/862), Qadi of Rayy. All of them were students of Imam Abu Hanifah (d. 150/767).

In recognition of his scholarship and profound knowledge in theology (and his invaluable services to the cause of ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama‘ah), people conferred on him the title of Imam al-Huda and Imam al-Mutakallimun. Mahmud al-Kifawi mentioned him as “leader of guidance, the model of the Sunnite and the guided, the bearer of the standard of ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama‘ah, the upholder of misguidance arising from disorder and heresies, leader of the scholastics, and rectifier of the faith of the Muslims.”

Works.—Al-Maturidi wrote a number of important books on Tafsir, Kalami, and Uṣuli, a list of which is given below:

1. Kitab Tawilat al-Qur’an or Tawilat Ahl al-Sunnah.
2. Kitab Ma’riful al-Shari‘ah.

Unfortunately, not a single work of al-Maturidi has so far been published. His Tawilat al-Qur’an, Kitab al-Tauhid, and Kitab al-Ma‘qalat which are by far the most important and valuable of all his works, exist only in manuscripts. The Tawilat al-Qur’an is a commentary on the Qur’an in the scholastic method in which he endeavoured to establish the liberal orthodox theology, both traditionally and rationally, and to provide for it a sound basis. Commenting on this momentous work, Shitah ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Qarisi says, “A unique book with which no book of the earlier authors on this subject can have any comparison.”

In his Kitab al-Tauhid, al-Maturidi gave an elaborate exposition of his system and sought to harmonize the extreme views of both the traditionists and the rationalists. The book bears testimony to his broad outlook, deep insight, and intimate acquaintance with the philosophical systems of his time. The evidence at our disposal at present shows that al-Maturidi was the first Mutakallim to introduce the doctrine of the sources of human knowledge in a book on theology such as Kitab al-Tauhid and thereby made a thorough attempt to build up his system on a sound philosophical basis. This method was followed by other theologians and the subject was later on elaborately treated by the Shihri scholars, al-Baghdadi (d. 403/1013), and al-Baghdadi (d. 429/1037).

Al-Maturidi is one of the pioneers amongst the Hanafi scholars who wrote on the principles of jurisprudence and his two works Ma’riful al-Shari‘ah and Kitab al-Jadal are considered to be authoritative on the subject.

2 Imam Abu Nasr al-Ayadi, al-Samarqandi, one of al-Maturidi’s teachers, was a descendant of Su’d b. ’Ubdah, vide ‘Abd al-Hayy Lakhamwi, al-Fadi’id al-Bikiyah (1918), Cairo, 1324/1906, p. 23.
3 Al-Sam’ani, op. cit., fol. 498.
7 Kitab al-A’lam al-Akhbar, p. 199.

9 Three other works, viz., Shaikh Fiqih al-Abbar of Imam Abu Hanifah, ‘Aqidah abi Mansur and Shaikh al-Ibnah of Imam al-Ashari are erroneously ascribed to him.
10 MS’s of this book are found at the Cairo, Jerusalem, and Berlin Libraries. Shaikh ‘Ali al-Din Abu Bekr Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Samarqandi wrote a commentary on this book in eight volumes, an incomplete copy of which can be found at the Patna Library.
11 al-Jawahir al-Muqifiyah, MS. Cairo, p. 251.

260
A History of Muslim Philosophy

It is evident from the list of works written by al-Māturidi that he took great care to refute the views and ideas of the Qarānjīṣ, the Shi'ītes, and especially those of the Mu'tazilites. His contemporary Abu al-Qāsim 'Abd Allāh al-Ka'bī (d. 317/929) was the leader of the Mu'tazilite school of Baghdađ. Al-Māturidi combated the doctrines of al-Ka'bī in his Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl and wrote three books on criticism of al-Ka'bī's three books. It may be observed here that while al-Māturidi in the East engaged himself in fighting the Mu'tazilites in general and particularly the Baghdađ group, his contemporary al-Ash'arī in Iraq took a prominent part in resisting the Mu'tazilites of Bašrah. But it appears to us that al-Māturidi began his movement long before al-Ash'arī appeared on the scene and most probably while the latter was still in the Mu'tazilite camp.

B METHOD

Al-Māturidi in his Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl gave a short critical account of the different views regarding the matter and sources of human knowledge and the best method to be followed in order to acquire knowledge. Means of acquiring knowledge, according to him, are three: (1) Sense-organs (al-ā'yīn); (2) Reports (al-aḥkām); (3) Reason (al-nasṭīr).

He severely criticized the conflicting views of different groups who thought that knowledge is not attainable at all, or that senses cannot supply true knowledge, or that reason alone is sufficient to give us all knowledge. Refuting the views of those who deny or doubt the possibility of knowledge altogether or the possibility of acquiring knowledge through sense-organs, al-Māturidi says that even animals perceive by their senses what may preserve or destroy them and what may be useful or harmful to them. So theoretical arguments with those who pretend to deny the objective reality of things is useless. Yet he says, they may be humorously asked: "Do you know what you deny?" If they say "No," their denial stands cancelled, but if they answer affirmatively, they admit the reality of their denial and thereby become opposers of their opposing. A more effective way than this is to make them subject to physical torture so that they may be compelled to admit what they deny of the reality of sensible knowledge.

Reports are the means of acquiring knowledge concerning genealogy, past occurrences, remote countries, useful and harmful things, foodstuffs, medicine, etc. These are of two kinds, historical reports (khabar al-mutawallī) and reports of the prophets (khabar al-mansūb), possessing sure signs to prove their honesty. Though both kinds of reports are proved to be sources of knowledge, we should be very critical in accepting reports of the prophets, because they are handed down through chains of narrators who are not infallible and who may commit mistakes in reporting. Those who reject report as a source of knowledge are, al-Māturidi asserts, like those who reject sensuous knowledge. In order to convince them, they should be physically tortured and if they complain of pain, they should be told: Your words of complaint are nothing but reports which cannot give us any real knowledge.

Reason, according to al-Māturidi, is the most important of all other sources of knowledge, because without its assistance sense and report can give no real knowledge. Knowledge of metaphysical realities and moral principles is derived through this source. It is reason which distinguishes men from animals. Al-Māturidi has pointed out many cases where nothing but reason can reveal the truth. This is why the Qur'ān repeatedly enjoins man to think, to ponder, and to judge by reason in order to find out the truth. Refuting the ideas of those who think that reason cannot give true knowledge, he says that they cannot prove their doctrine without employing reason.

Reason, no doubt, occupies a very eminent place in the system of al-Māturidi, but it cannot give, he holds, true knowledge concerning everything that we require to know. Like senses, it has a limit beyond which it cannot go. Sometimes the true nature of the human intellect is obscured and influenced by internal and external factors such as desire, motive, habit, environment, and association, and, as a result, it even fails to give us true knowledge of things that are within its own sphere. Divergent views and conflicting ideas of the learned concerning many a problem are mentioned by al-Māturidi as one of the proofs in support of his statement. Hence, reason often requires, he asserts, the service of a guide and helper who will protect it from straying, lead it to the right path, help it understand delicate and mysterious affairs, and know the truth. This guide, according to him, is the divine revelation received by a prophet. If anyone will deny the necessity of this divine guidance through revelation and claim that reason alone is capable of giving us all the knowledge we need, then he will certainly overburden his reason and oppress it quite unreasonably.

The necessity of the divine revelation is not restricted, according to al-Māturidi, to religious affairs only, but its guidance is required in many worldly affairs too. The discovery of the different kinds of foodstuffs, medicine, invention of arts and crafts, etc., are the results of this divine guidance. Human intellect cannot give any knowledge in respect of many of these matters, and

---

14 Al-Ash'arī was born in 260/873 or 270/883 and remained in the Mu'tazilites' camp up to the forty-third year of his age, so he must have begun his movement after the end of the third century of Hijrāh. Al-Māturidi was born before 248/862, and supposing that he spent about thirty years in acquiring knowledge, then his movement seems to have begun before the end of the third century A.H.

262

---

16 Ibid., pp. 4-5, 68-69.
17 Ibid., pp. 92-95; Tānīlāt, Sūrah vii, 54.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

if man had to rely solely on individual experience for the knowledge of all these things, then human civilization could not have made such rapid progress.\textsuperscript{18}

Al-Māturidis refutes the idea of those who think that the individual mind is the basis of knowledge and criterion of truth. He also does not regard inspiration (\textit{tablīm}) as a source of knowledge. Inspiration, he argues, creates chaos and conflicts in the domain of knowledge, makes true knowledge impossible, and is ultimately liable to lead humanity to disir 'gradation and destruction for want of a common standard of judgment and universal basis for agreement.\textsuperscript{19}

It is evident from this brief account that reason and revelation both occupy a prominent place in the system of al-Māturidis. The articles of religious belief are derived, according to him, from revelation, and the function of reason is to understand them correctly. There can be no conflict between reason and revelation if the real purport of the latter be correctly understood. His method of interpreting the Scriptures may be outlined in the following words: The passages of the Holy Qur'ān which appear to be ambiguous or the meanings of which are obscure or uncertain (\textit{mubāham} and \textit{muḥkhāb}) must be taken in the light of the verses that are self-explaining and precise (\textit{muḥkam}). Where the apparent sense of a verse contradicts what has been established by the "precise" (\textit{muḥkam}) verses, it must then be believed that the apparent sense was never intended, because there cannot be contradiction in the verses of the Holy Qur'ān, as God has repeatedly declared. In such cases, it is permissible to interpret the particular verse in the light of the established truth (\textit{tāwālī}) or to leave its true meaning to the knowledge of God (\textit{taṣawwīf}).\textsuperscript{20}

The difference between the attitude of al-Māturidis and that of the Mu'tazilites in this respect is quite fundamental. The latter formulated certain doctrines on rational grounds and then tried to support their views by the verses of the Holy Qur'ān, interpreting them in the light of their doctrines. As regards the traditions of the Prophet, their attitude was to accept those which supported their views and to reject those which opposed them.\textsuperscript{21}

C

CRITICISM OF THE MU'TAZILITES

Al-Māturidis always tried to adopt a middle course between the extreme Rationalists and the Traditionists. He would agree with the Mu'tazilites on many points, but would never accept the Aristotelian philosophy as a basis

\begin{footnotes}
\item[18] Ibid., pp. 91 et seq.
\item[19] Ibid., pp. 2-4.
\end{footnotes}

\textbf{MĀTURIDISM}

of religious doctrines. Similarly, he is in accord with the Traditionists on fundamentals, but is not ready to take the Qur'ān and the Ḥadīth always in their literal sense and thereby to fall into gross anthropomorphism. He agrees with the Mu'tazilites that it is obligatory on the part of every rational being to acquire knowledge of the existence of God through his reason even if no messenger were sent by Him for this purpose; that things are intrinsically good or bad and the \textit{Ṣārih} (God) takes into consideration these values in His \textit{amr} (command) and \textit{nahi} (prohibition); that God has endowed man with reason through which he can often distinguish right from wrong. But, contrary to the Mu'tazilites, he maintains that reason cannot be the final authority for human obligation and religious law. The basis of religious obligation, according to him, is revelation, not reason.\textsuperscript{22} It seems that al-Māturidis view on this question and on the authorship of human action, as will be seen, is mainly guided by the Qur'ānic verses such as "To Him belong creation and command."\textsuperscript{23}

Al-Māturidis bitterly criticized the Mu'tazilite doctrine of divine justice and unity. Their interpretation of divine justice led them to deny the all-pervading will and power of God, His authorship of human action, and made Him quite helpless and subject to external compulsion. Divine grace and mercy find no place in their system as is evident from their view on grave sins. Their doctrine of \textit{udbā}s (salutary) cannot explain satisfactorily the existence of evil, natural calamities, and sufferings of innocent children and animals. According to their doctrine, man enjoys more power and freedom than the Creator of the universe. They did not follow, al-Māturidis tried to prove, the explicit decisions of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah, nor the dictates of sound reason.\textsuperscript{24} Their interpretation of \textit{taubh} reduced God to an unknown and unknowable non-entity (\textit{taṣīl}).\textsuperscript{25}

Their view that Non-Being is a thing (\textit{al-ma'dām shā'īn}) only supports the atheists' doctrine of the eternity of the world, makes an eternal partner with God, and thereby contradicts the Qur'ānic doctrines of creation and \textit{taubh}. They made God quite imperfect and subject to changes by denying His eternally creative function.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{MĀTURIDIS' SYSTEM}

Al-Māturidis built up his own system mainly on two principles: freedom from similitude (\textit{tanahl}) and divine wisdom (\textit{biḳnah}). On the principle of freedom from similitude he opposes similitude (\textit{taṣawwīf}) and anthropo-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[23] Qur'ān, vii, 50.
\item[25] \textit{Kitāb al-Taubh}, pp. 13, 21, 46.
\item[26] Ibid., p. 99; \textit{Tāwālī}, Sūrah xxxix, 62.
\end{footnotes}
morphism (tajísim) in all their forms, without denying divine attributes. The anthropomorphic expressions used in the Qur'an like the hands, the face, the eyes of God, and His sitting on the Throne should not be taken in their apparent sense, because the literal interpretation of these expressions contradicts the explicit verses of the Qur'an. These passages, therefore, should be interpreted in the light of the clear passages of tanzih in a manner consistent with the doctrine of tawhid, and permissible according to the usage and idiom of the Arabic language, or their true meanings should be left to the knowledge of God.  

On the principle of divine wisdom (hi'mah) al-Mâturidî tried to reconcile the conflicting views of the Determinists (Jabrites) and the Mu'tazilites and prove for man certain amount of freedom, without denying the all-pervading divine will, power, and decree. Wisdom means placing a thing in its own place; so divine wisdom comprises both justice ('adl) and grace and kindness ('afli). God possesses absolute power and His absoluteness is not subject to any external laws but His own wisdom. Al-Mâturidî applied this principle also to combat the Mu'tazilites' doctrine of al-aqlah (best) on the one hand, and the orthodox view that God may overburden his servants (tabî'il ma la yu'diq) on the other. It is inconsistent with divine wisdom, which includes both justice and kindness, to demand from man performance of an act which is beyond his power, such as to command a blind man: "See," or to command one who has no hands: "Stretch your hands."  

Similarly, it would be an act of injustice if God would punish the believers in hell for ever or reward the infidels in paradise for ever. He agreed with the Mu'tazilites on these questions in opposition to the orthodox, but he strongly opposed the former's doctrine that God must do what is best for man. This Mu'tazilite doctrine, he argues, places God under compulsion to do a particular act at a fixed time for the benefit of an individual and denies His freedom of action. It only proves the right of a man on Him and not the intrinsic value and merit of an action which the divine wisdom keeps in view. Moreover, this doctrine cannot solve the problem of evil. Al-Mâturidî, therefore, maintains that divine justice consists not in doing what is salutary to an individual, but in doing an action on its own merit and in giving a thing its own place.  

After this brief outline, we give below a somewhat detailed account of al-Mâturidî's view on the most important theological problems of his time, viz., the relation between God and human action, divine attributes, and beatific vision.  

Al-Mâturidî in his Kitâb al-Tauhid and Tawâlid al-Qur'an has dealt at length with different aspects of this broad problem—the will, the power, the eternal decree, and the creative function of God; His wisdom and existence of evil in this world; freedom of man; and the basis of religious obligation and responsibility, etc. Al-Mâturidî combated the views of the Jabrites and the Mu'tazilites on the above questions and he also disagreed with al-Ash'ârî on certain points. Refuting the absolute determinism of the Jabrites, he says that the relation between God and man should not be considered to be the same as that between God and the physical world. God has endowed man with reason, with the power of distinguishing between right and wrong, and with the faculties of thinking, feeling, willing, and judging, and has sent messengers and revealed books for his guidance. Man inclines and directs his mind towards something which he thinks may benefit him, restrains himself from what he thinks will harm him, chooses one of the alternative courses of action by the exercise of his own reason, and thinks himself responsible for the merits or demerits of his actions. Now, while he thinks, desires, inclines, chooses, and acts, he always considers himself quite free, and never thinks or feels that any outside agency compels him to do any of his actions. This consciousness of freedom, al-Mâturidî asserts, is a reality, the denial of which will lead to the denial of all human knowledge and sciences. Quoting passages from the Qur'an he also shows that the actions enjoined or prohibited by God are ascribed to men, and that they will be accountable for their "own" actions. All this clearly proves that God has granted men freedom of choice and necessary power to perform an action. The denial of this freedom will mean that God is wholly responsible for all human actions and is liable to blame or punishment for sins committed by men, yet on the Day of Judgment He will punish them for His own actions. This is quite absurd, as God has described Himself in the Qur'an as the most wise, just, and compassionate.  

But how can human freedom be reconciled with the Qur'an's conception of the all-embracing divine will, power, eternal decree, and God's authorship of all human actions? Al-Mâturidî's explanations may be summed up as follows.  

Creation belongs to God alone and all human actions, good or bad, are willed, decreed, and created by Him. Creation means bringing forth of an action from non-existence into existence by one who possesses absolute power and complete knowledge in respect of that action. As man does not know all the circumstances, causes, conditions, or the results of his action, and does not possess within himself the requisite power for producing an action, he cannot be regarded as the creator (khalq) of his action. Now, when it is proved that

---

27 Tawâlid, Sûrah vii, 54; v, 64; iv, 27; xi, 37; Kitâb al-Tauhid, pp. 12, 32.  
29 Ibid., pp. 134-135; Tawâlid, Sûrah ii, 286.  
30 Ibid., pp. 186 et sqq.  
31 For al-Ash'ârî's views on these questions, see his Kitâb al-Luma', Cairo, 1955, pp. 113 et sqq.; al-Ibânah, Hyderabad, 1948, p. 59.  
32 Kitâb al-Tauhid, pp. 48, 61, 112.  
33 Qur'an, ii, 77, 167; xxxviii, 17; xli, 40; xcix, 7, etc.  
34 Kitâb al-Tauhid, pp. 115 et sqq., 165.
God is the creator of all human actions, it will necessarily follow that He also wills these actions, because divine action must be preceded by divine will. So nothing can happen in the world against or without the will of God. But, though God wills and creates human actions, He is not liable to blame or accountable for their actions, because divine will is determined by divine knowledge and He creates the action when a man in the free exercise of his reason chooses and intends to perform an action. Thus, God wills an action good or evil, which He knows a man will choose, and when ultimately he chooses and intends to acquire it God creates that act as a good or evil act for him. From this, it will be clear that God’s willing or creating an evil action is not inconsistent with His wisdom and goodness. Because, God wills the happening of the evil because He desires the individual to exercise free choice, but being wise and just He always prohibits the choice of evil. So, though sins are in accordance with His will, they are never in accordance with His command, pleasure, desire, or guidance. Sin, then, according to al-Māturīdi, consists not in going against the divine will, but in violating the divine law, command, guidance, pleasure, or desire.

The basis of man’s obligation and responsibility (taḥdīd), al-Māturīdi maintains, does not consist in his possessing the power to create an action, but it is the freedom to choose (ikhtiyār) and the freedom to acquire an action (iktiṣāb), conferred on man as a rational being, which make him responsible and accountable.53

As regards eternal divine decree (gāḍā and qudur) al-Māturīdi holds that it is not inconsistent with human freedom, nor does it imply any compulsion on the part of man, because it is an eternal record based on foreknowledge. God decrees the act He knows from eternity that a man will choose and acquire freely. Man cannot deny his own responsibilities on the ground of the divine decree, al-Māturīdi adds; he cannot do so on account of time and space within which actions must be done. So, though man is not absolutely free, God has granted him necessary freedom consistent with his obligation and, therefore, the divine decree relating to human actions should not be regarded the same as in relation to the physical world.54

It may not be out of place to note here the points of difference between al-Māturīdi and al-Āsh’āri on this question. In order to make a man responsible for his action al-Māturīdi laid great stress, as we have just noticed, on the freedom of choice (ikhtiyār) and freedom of acquisition (iktiṣāb). Divine will, decree, and foreknowledge do not deprive a man of this freedom. An action is a man’s own action, though created by God, because it is the result of his own choice and it has been acquired by him without any compulsion. God provided for him all the means and facilities for acquiring an action, endowed him with the power of judgment and self-control, and granted him freedom to choose whatever means and course he prefers to adopt. Al-Āsh’āri also used the term acquisition (iktiṣāb)55 but interpreted it differently. It seems that he did not favour the idea of the freedom of choice. According to him, God being omnipotent, all objects of power fall under His power, as God being omniscient all objects of knowledge fall under His knowledge. So a man’s will has no effect or influence at all on his action; it is always determined by the divine will. Even the desire and power of acquisition fall under divine power and are the creation of God.56 Acquisition then, according to al-Āsh’āri, means only a general coincidence of the divine power and human actions. It is God who in reality creates as well as acquires the action through man. This view, as is evident, does not differ in essence from that of the Determinists and hence he was regarded by some writers as being one of them.57 Even most of the prominent Ash’arites like Qādi ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Qazwīnī and ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Juwaynī (d. 770/1368) could not agree with him on this question and gave different interpretations of the term iktiṣāb.58

Divine Attributes.—Human languages do not possess any term, al-Māturīdi says, to explain the nature and attributes of God in a way that will not imply any idea of resemblance or comparison. Yet it is a necessity for human understanding to ascribe some names and attributes to the Creator of the world. Giving a critical account of the views of the philosophers, the pluralists, the dualists, and the atheists, al-Māturīdi asserts that the belief in one Supreme Power and Ultimate Reality is universal, but the people differ greatly from one another in giving names and attributing qualities to this Supreme Being. Among the people of taḥdīd, it is only the Muʿtazilites, he says, who deny by the divine attributes and their eternity endangered this universal belief in the existence of one God. Refuting the views of the Muʿtazilites on this question, he says that it is agreed that God has beautiful names and it will be quite futile to apply these names to Him divested of the meanings and contents which they imply; for otherwise it will not be unreasonable to ascribe to Him any name whatsoever. So, when, for example, it is said that God is wise, it must mean that He possesses the quality of wisdom. The denial of the divine

53 Ibid., pp. 117 et seq.
54 Ibid., p. 161.
55 Ibid., pp. 117 et seq.
56 Al-Āsh’āri, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, Cairo, 1955, pp. 72 et seq.
attributes (ta'wil) only creates confusions, makes the knowledge of God impossible, and ultimately reduces Him to an unknown and unknowable Non-Being. The denial of the eternity of the attributes makes God imperfect in the beginning and subject to changes, and, thus, it shakes the very basis of tashīd. The idea of pluralism or anthropomorphism that may arise due to affirmation of the eternal attributes can easily be eradicated by firm belief in the absolute unity of God together with the idea of tashīd (denial of likeness and similitude) and mushka'afah (difference from the created being). Thus when we say that “God is knowing,” we also add to this (as a safeguard against any blasphemous idea concerning Him), “but not like the learned, and His knowledge is not like our knowledge.” The consequences of the denial of the divine attributes or their eternity are far more dangerous than those of their affirmation.

As regards the relation between divine essence and attributes, al-Māturidi says that the problem is so complicated that no human reason can hope to solve it satisfactorily. So we should believe that God is one, has attributes which He ascribes to Himself, without similitude, comparison, and asking how. We should not go further than asserting that “the attributes are not identical with nor separated from His essence” (la huwa wa la ghairuhu).41

Al-Māturidi also maintains that all the attributes of God, whether belonging to His essence or action are eternal. The word takwīn has been used to denote all the attributes pertaining to action such as creating, sustaining, etc. Takwīn, according to al-Māturidi, is an eternal attribute distinct from power (qudrah). So God is the creator before and after the creation. This does not indicate in any way the eternity of the world, because as knowledge and power are eternal attributes, though the objects of knowledge and power are created, takwīn is an eternal attribute, though the object of takwīn (mukawwam) is created. The non-existence of the world at the beginning does not imply God’s inability, as He created it at the appropriate time in accordance with His eternal knowledge and will.42

Al-Aghā’i on this question is in agreement with the Mu’tazilites and holds that the attributes of action are originated.43 It seems to us that he agreed with them in order to evade the Aristotelian argument which aims at proving the eternity of the world by the eternal, creative power of God. Al-Māturidi’s main argument is that the idea of the createdness of any of the divine attributes is fundamentally opposed to the conception of God as a perfect, self-subsistent, eternal Ultimate Reality and is, therefore, in conflict with the doctrine of tashīd.

As regards the Word of God (kalâm Allah), al-Māturidi maintains that like all other attributes His attribute of speaking as well as His speech is eternal without similitude and comparison. The exact nature of this eternal speech or the attribute of speaking is not known, but it is certain that the divine speech cannot be composed of sounds and letters like human speech, because sounds and letters are created. So, in reality, he asserts, only the “meaning” of which the words are an expression can be termed as the kalâm of Allah. This “meaning” which existed with God from eternity can be heard and understood only through the medium of created sound. Accordingly, Moses did not hear the eternal speech, but God made him hear and understand the eternal speech through created words and sounds. Now, what is heard by or revealed to the prophets is called the kalâm of Allah figuratively (najāzām) for three reasons: (1) They heard (understood) the purport (al-ma‘na) of the kalâm, that is, divine command, prohibition, forbidding, sanctioning, et c., which belong to God alone. (2) God Himself composed it (kull wa na‘zama); hence it was inimitable by any human being. (3) It explains the eternal speech and proves His attribute of speech.44

It is evident from the above account that al-Māturidi refutes the idea of the orthodox section who identified the revealed Qur’ān with the eternal speech, and he agrees in principle with the Mu’tazilites who held it to be a creation of God. So the subject of contention between him and the Mu’tazilites is not whether the recited Qur’ān is created, but whether God has eternal speech and the attribute of speaking.

Al-Aghā’i, like al-Māturidi, maintains that God has eternal speech and the attribute of speaking.45 but it is not clear from his lengthy discourses in Kitāb al-Lum‘ and al-Ibādah what he exactly meant by kalâm of Allah and what, according to him, was eternal in the Qur’ān—words or meanings? He maintained that the eternal speech could be heard directly without the medium of created sound.46 This statement, together with general trends of his ideas and his mode of reasoning as reflected in his printed books, corroborates a statement according to which both words and meanings were regarded by him as eternal.47 But al-Shahrastānī asserts that, according to al-Aghā’i, the words are created and the “mental” meaning (al-ma‘na al-nafs) is eternal;48 this last is the view of all the eminent Ash‘arites.49 So, there is not much difference on this question between the Mu’tazilites and the Ash‘arites.

Beatific Vision.—It has been noticed that al-Māturidi, like the Mu’tazilites, strongly opposed the anthropomorphic idea of God and interpreted metaphysically those passages of the Qur’ān which appear to create such an impression.

42 Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, p. 29 et seq.; Tawḥīd, Sūrah i, 3, ii, 117.
43 The three schools differ from one another in defining the attribute of an action. Cf. abī al-Qāri, Ṣāhar Fiqh al-Akbar, Cairo, 1323/1905, p. 19.
of his system, nor was either of them a pioneer in this field. Imam Abu Hanifah (d. 150/776) was the first renowned scholar among the ahn al-sunnah wa-al-jama‘ah, who studied theology for long before he had taken up the study of Fiqh, combated the heretical sects of his time, and founded the first orthodox school in theology.\textsuperscript{44} Al-Maturidi followed his system, explained it in the light of the philosophy of his time, tried to defend it by argument and reason, and this provided for it a firm foundation. Hence this school is ascribed to its founder as well as to its interpreter who fixed its ultimate form and brought victory to it.

The difference between the attitude of Al-Maturidi and of Al-Asq‘ari may be judged from this: If Al-Asq‘ari’s attempt during the later period was to strike a middle path between rationalism and traditionalism, Al-Maturidi certainly took a position between what may be called Asq‘arism and Mut‘azilism. The important points of difference between these two leaders of orthodox Kalâm, more strictly, between the two schools, have been reckoned by some writers as fifty in number.\textsuperscript{45} (References have already been made in the foregoing pages to some of the most important of them and we need not enter here into a discussion of the rest.) As a result of these differences, there was once a tendency of bitter rivalry between the followers of these two schools but happily in course of time this tendency subsided and both the schools were regarded as orthodox. But how profoundly the educated Muslims of today are influenced by the system of Al-Maturidi may be easily realized from the fact that the ‘Aqûd of al-Nasafî (d. 537/1142), which gives the substance of the former’s Kitâb al-Tauhîd, has been recognized as an authority and prescribed as a text-book on theology in many educational institutions of the Muslim world.

A comparative study of the arguments employed by Al-Maturidi and by the great Asq‘arite scholars like ‘Abd al-Qâhir al-Baghdadi (d. 429/1031) and Imam al-Haramain al-Juwaini (d. 478/1085) to prove the non-eternity of the world, the existence of God, His unity and attributes, the value of human reason, the necessity of the divine revelation, and the prophethood of Muhammad, will show how deep and enormous his influence was on the orthodox dialecticians who came after him, and what a lasting contribution he made towards the development of orthodox Kalâm. That Shâhî Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1323/1905), one of the leaders of the modern reform movement in Islam, in his endeavours to reconstruct Islamic theology, closely followed the system

\textsuperscript{44} Al-Baghdadi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 220; Ughâl al-Din, \textit{op.}, I, p. 308; Al-Makki and Bazzâz, al-Maqrîzî; Al-Biyâdî, \textit{op. cit.}, op. cit., pp. 19–23. There are five books on theology ascribed to Imam Abu Hanifah: al-Fiqh al-Akbar, al-Fiqh al-Ahsan, al-Risalah, al-A‘im wa-al-Mutala‘im wa-al-Wafiyah. These books, we are convinced, represent the correct views of the Imam.

A History of Muslim Philosophy

al-Māturīdī, is evident from his Risālat al-Tauḥīd and his observations on several controversial questions in his note on the Ṣharḥ 'Agā'īd al-ʿAṣḥābiyyah.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter XIV

ZĀHIRISM

BACKGROUND

Since the second/eighth century, an interminable dispute dragged on for a long time between those who upheld the authority of Tradition (ḥab al-hadīth) in all matters of theology and jurisprudence, and those who advocated opinion (aṣḥāb al-rāʾī).

It was expected, as pointed out by ibn Ḥāṭimīn in his Muqaddimah (p. 805), that the people of the Hijāz, particularly those of Madīnah, should be versed in the science of Tradition (the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad). With the rise of the ʿAbbāsīd Caliphate and the shifting of the political power and the religious leadership completely to Iraq, where the people had less access to the sayings of the Prophet, and where the aspects of life, the agrarian problems, for instance, were more diverse and complicated through the intermingling of the successive civilizations since times immemorial. a new school.

that of opinion, made its inevitable appearance. The upholders of opinion, however, did not neglect Tradition, but they found it necessary to supplement Tradition with additions drawn from older codes and prevalent usages or framed by considerations of the actual situation in their new environment.

At the same time an esoteric movement also began among the Shiʿites under a variety of names, the most current of which was the Bāṭinīyyah (seekers after the inner or spiritual interpretation of revelation). The forming of this sect is attributed to a certain Māmūn of whose descent we are completely in the dark.

The Bāṭinīyyah movement took its name from the belief of its followers that every zāhir (apparent state of things) has a bāṭin (an inner, allegorical, hidden, or secret meaning), especially in connection with revelation. Since this movement adopted some aspects of Greek philosophy, such as emanationism, its followers were considered by Sunni authors to be heretics and outside the pale of faith. During the Caliphate of al-Māmūn (198/813-833) the Bāṭinīyyah movement was quite strong; some half a century later it was widely spread in Iraq, Persia, Sind (western India), and Oman (south-east Arabia), as well as in North Africa, but it did not enjoy an enduring influence.

It is to be remarked, however, that while a number of individuals in Muslim Spain had shared ideas with the Bāṭinīyyah, no sectarian or heretical doctrine ever struck roots or succeeded in winning over communities of any dimensions there.

So, the second/eighth century had witnessed a heavy atmosphere of esoterism weighing on some fundamentals of Islam such as the essence of God, the understanding of the Qurʾān, and the attitude towards the Caliphate. Added to this, there was a trend of upholding opinion as a valid source of jurisprudence at the same level with the Qurʾān and the sayings of the Prophet. At the same time there was also the Muʿtaṣīlī school which assumed reason as a more deciding factor than revelation in all matters of religion.

Since all these movements had chosen Iraq as their principal battle-field, another school—contrary to all of them and as extremist as any of them—appeared in Iraq itself and insisted on the verbal understanding of the Qurʾān and of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad as the sole guiding line to their real meanings clothed in the words of God and of His Apostle. This school was founded by a jurist Dāwūd ibn ʿAli, and it received its name the Literalists (Zāhirīyyah) school from the clinging of its followers to the wording of the revelation and not to the interpretation of it.

1 Shahrastānī, Vol. II, p. 28; cf. p. 5.
2 Ibid., p. 29; cf. pp. 31f.
3 Ibid., pp. 29f.
5 Nubadh, Introd., p. 4.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

DAWŪD IBN ‘ALI, HIS DOCTRINE AND HIS SCHOOL

The family of Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali belonged to Kāshān, a town in the neighbourhood of Isfahān. His father was a secretary (kātib) to ‘Abd Allah ibn Khālid, judge of Isfahān, in the days of the Caliph al-Māmūn.7 Dāwūd himself8 was born in Kūfah in 202/817. His family moved later to Bağdād where he was brought up, educated, and afterwards laid the foundation of his school of jurisprudence which bore his name al-madīhh al-Dāwūdī,9 but which was better known as the Zāhirite school (al-madīhh al-Zāhirī).

In Bağdād, Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali attended the lectures of many eminent jurists, the most prominent of whom was abū Thaur (d. 246/860), a friend and follower of Shāfi‘i. The trend of education he received from them made him shift from the Hanafite rite to that to which his father belonged,10 the Shāfi‘ite, apparently because most of his professors (shuyūkh) were more inclined to the Traditionists (ahī al-hadīth) school to which Shāfi‘i is belonged than to the school of the upholders of opinion (aṣbaḥ al-rā‘i) who were the followers of abū Ḥanīfah par excellence. Dāwūd perfected his education by an academic trip to Nishāpūr to meet Isbāq ibn Rāhawalh (d. 237/851 or 238/852),11 who also was a friend and follower of Shāfi‘i. Afterwards, he returned to Bağdād where he wrote his books.

Perhaps it is not very strange that a close and profound study of the Shāfi‘ite school of jurisprudence led Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali finally to be dissatisfied with it. He forsook it and founded a new school, the Zāhirite school, which recognized the Qur‘ān and the Hadīth as the only sources of jurisprudence. He accepted, at any rate, consensus (i*jmā‘) of the Companions of the Prophet, but he rejected analogy (giyāla), opinion (rā‘i), personal approval (istikbān), and decisions on the authority of older generations (taqīdī) altogether.12

Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali was accomplished, trustworthy, learned, God-fearing, pious, and ascetic; he was also versed in logic and proficient in the art of disputation.13 It was said that he believed that the Qur‘ān was created and not eternal, but it seems that this was only an accusation.14 He died in 270/884 in Bağdād.

Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali was a prolific writer. Ibn al-Nadīm enumerates about one hundred and fifty titles from him.15 It seems that many of these titles were only chapters of some of his books. But there are also titles which represent bulky

works of two thousand, three thousand, and even four thousand folios each. A few of these books touched the fundamentals of religion, e.g., “On the Usul,” “On the Caliphate,” “Consensus and the Refutation of Qiyās,” and “On the Refutation of Taqīd.”16 Most of his other books treated of branches (fu‘ūl) or minor aspects of Fiqh concerning worship and legal transactions. Unfortunately, no book has reached us from him. Ibn Ḥazm, nevertheless refers to him frequently. Muḥammad al-Shaṭṭī (d. Damascus 1307/1889) made a collection of Dāwūd’s Fiqh gleaned from the various works of his followers.17

It was related that Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali admitted analogy where the cases in question were obvious,18 but it is more probable that he rejected analogy wholly, whether the cases were ambiguous or obvious.19 As for consensus (i*jmā‘), his position was totally different: he admitted the ijma‘ of the Companions of the Prophet only,20 on the ground that these Companions were in constant contact with the Prophet and fully aware of his intentions. In his theology in particular he maintains, for example, that God is hearing, seeing, etc. But he says: “I do not say that He is seeing with the agency of sight...”21

Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali re-examined all aspects of Fiqh on the basis of his Zāhirite attitude. The following are three examples illustrating his trend of thought and argumentation in this respect.

1. Prayer on a Journey.—God has said in the Qur‘ān: “And when you journey in the earth, there is no blame on you if you shorten the prayer.”22 This led the Muslims to reduce prayer on a journey from four rak‘ahs to only two.23 Muslim jurists generally assert that this verse envisages cutting the prayer short on a journey of some duration.24 Dāwūd, on the other hand, maintained that since there is no mention of the duration of the journey in the Qur‘ān,25 prayer should be cut short on any journey whatever, even though it is a journey from one encampment to another.

2. Fasting on a Journey.—Muslims fast in Ramāḍān, the ninth month of

18 A folio comprise about twenty lines (cf. Führist, p. 159).
16 Rifa‘ah fi Manzil ‘al-Imam Dāwūd al-Zāhirī—an epistle (containing) the questions decided by Dāwūd the Zāhirite (publ. Damascus 1330/1912), erroneously thought by Brockelmann (G.A.L. Suppl., I, p. 312) to be by Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali himself. He states the date of his publication as 1330 which is also a mistake, perhaps a misprint for 1330 A.H.
23 Qur‘ān, ii, 184, 185.
24 Muslims perform five prayers per day: one of two rak‘ahs (units of movements), one of three rak‘ahs and three of four rak‘ahs each. To cut a prayer short is to reduce a prayer of four rak‘ahs to only two.
25 Cf. Mālik, pp. 146-48, etc.
the lunar year. In this connection we read in the Qur’ān: “But he among you who shall be sick, or on a journey, shall (not observe the days on which he travels but he shall) fast the same number of other days (when he returns home).” It is agreed upon by all Sunni jurists that a Muslim may not observe Ramaḍān fasts on a journey which involves certain hardship, either on account of its long duration or its difficult nature, on hot days for example. Dāwūd and his followers assert that a Muslim should not observe fasts on a journey because the wording of the verse does not stipulate any condition. If a Muslim, according to Dāwūd, did observe fasts for some days on a journey, even then he should keep fast for the same number of days when he returns home, for his fasting while journeying was not valid.

3. The Question of Usury (Riba).—Usury is forbidden in Islam. But a difficulty arose from a tradition concerning it. It is related that the Prophet Muhammad said: “(You may barter) gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, and salt for salt, only in equivalent quantities and on the spot. In all other commodities you may deal as you like, provided (the barter is transacted) on the spot.” Early Muslim jurists concluded from this tradition that a quantity of any commodity should not be bartered for a larger quantity of the same commodity; otherwise, the surplus taken would be usury (riba). But if, for instance, a quantity of wrought gold was bartered for a larger quantity of unwrought gold, the surplus would be a gain or, better, a wage for craftsmanship. Furthermore, they considered the six commodities named by the Prophet to be examples only; thus bartering copper, coffee, leather, apples, or wool for a larger quantity of these commodities respectively is also regarded—by analogy—as a form of usury. Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali, on the other hand, believed that the Prophet Muhammad had named these commodities on purpose. Had he intended to prolong the list, nothing would have prevented him from doing so. Accordingly, if a man bartered a quantity, say, of iron, maize, apples, or pepper for a larger quantity of the same commodity, the surplus would not be usury but gain.

The jurists contemporary with Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali took a very critical attitude regarding him and his school. The Shāfi‘ites in general criticized him severely and considered the Žāhiri school to be worthless. Al-Iṣfārānī (d. 418/1027) maintained that no account should be taken of the Žāhirites. Since they rejected analogy (qiṣṣa), he asserted, they could not have been able to exercise judgment and, therefore, no one of them should be elevated to the position of a judge. Some others presumed that Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali was ignorant; others considered him to be a disbeliever. Ahmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), the famous Žāhirism founder of the Ūnabulite school, did not hold him in estimation. Abu ‘Abd Allah Muḥammad ibn Zaid al-Wasiti (d. 306/918–919), an eminent Mu’tazilite of Baghdiṣ, looked down upon the Žāhirite school as ridiculous. The followers of Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali, nevertheless, were not only numerous but some of them were also prominent.

Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali was succeeded, as the head of the Žāhirite school, by his son, Abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd (c. 255/869–297/910). But the latter was more of a poet, littérature, and historian than an enthusiastic scholar of jurisprudence. At any rate, he propagated the tenets of his father’s school and bestowed on it so much prestige that the Žāhirite rite was in his own days the fourth of the four rites prevailing in the East, the other three being the Šāfi‘ī, Mālikī, and Ḥanafī rites. Abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd owes his real fame, however, to an anthology of love-poetry known as Kiṭāb al-Zaḥrah. The first and only extant half of this anthology was edited by A. R. Nyki and Ibrāhīm Taka. Abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd had some inclination towards philosophy, but philosophy did not constitute a component part of Žāhirism before Ibn Ḥazm.

In the fourth/tenth century the Žāhirite school had enjoyed its widest expansion and the climax of its prestige. The ‘Aḥsāʾī poet ibn al-Rūmī (d. 320/930) praised Abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd in a poem which opens with the words: “O son of Dāwūd! O jurist of Iraq!” The famous historian, Ṣaḥiṣ (d. 310/922), though not a Žāhirite, paid close attention to Žāhirī jurisprudence and studied it with Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali himself. The foremost jurist of the Žāhirite school in the fourth/tenth century was ‘Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn al-Mughaṣṣilī (d. 324/936), through whom the Fiqh of Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali became popular in the Muslim world. In the following century the Žāhirite school was already losing ground in the East; and before the middle of the century, in the days of the Ūnabulite judge Abu Ya’la (d. 459/1066), the Ūnabulite rite took its place. The Žāhirite 33. Iblc., p. 43. Cf. ibn Khallikān, Cairo, Bulāq, 1299 A.H., Vol. I, p. 4; GAL, Suppl., i, 66; Nubāṣkā, Intro. p. 4.

34. Fihris, p. 172.
36. Fihris, p. 216.
38. An Arabist Orientalist, born in Bohemia 1303/1885 whose academic activities since 1340/1921 belong to his sojourn in the United States. He is versed in very many languages, old and new, eastern and western. He is the representative of the Arabic theory in the rise of troubadour poetry in southern France.
40. Fihris, p. 234.
41. Samāni, p. 227.
42. Nubāṣkā loc. cit.
school, at any rate, continued to enjoy in Syria some prestige until 788/1386. In Egypt the school lived longer and had deeper roots. Al-Maqrizi (d. 845/1442), the famous historian of the Mamluk age in Egypt, was not a follower of the Zahirite school, but he had a favourable attitude towards Zahirism.

C

THE ZAHIRITE SCHOOL IN MUSLIM SPAIN

1. Al-Ballūṭī

The first representative of Zahirism in Spain was Mūdhir ibn Sa’īd al-Ballūṭī who was born at al-Nashharin, a suburb of Cordova, in 273/886. After completing his studies at Cordova, he travelled to Egypt and the Hijāz for a little over three years. On his return, he was appointed as judge (Qāḍī) in the city of Merida, then transferred to the Northern Frontiers and finally made the Chief Justice of Cordova, which post he held until his death towards the end of 355/965. He upheld Dāwūd’s doctrines and defended his views, though, in practice, he administered justice according to the established law of the country based on the Mālikī school of jurisprudence. He was also a man of letters, poet, theologian, physiographer, and eloquent speaker. In fact, he was the real forerunner of ibn Ḥazm.

2. Ibn Ḥazm

Life and Works.—Ibn Ḥazm was the real founder of the Zahirite school in Muslim Spain and the most famous and prominent of the Zahirī jurists. With him the school reached its zenith, and with his death it died away. In reality, the Zahirite rite never recruited a community in Muslim Spain. It came on the stage as a philosophy supported by a single man who failed to use his genius in the right way.

Ibn Ḥazm was the descendant of a non-Arab, an Iberian in all probability, but he preferred to link his genealogy with a Persian freedman of Yāzdī ibn Sufyān, a brother of Muʿāwiyyah, the founder of the Umayyad Caliphate in the East.

The family did not attain any fame before Ahmad ibn Sa’īd, the father of ibn Ḥazm, who became a minister to the Hājib al-Manṣūr ibn Abī ʿAmīr, the Prime Minister of Hāshm II, in 381/991.

Ibn Ḥazm, who was born in 384/994 during the long ministerial term of his father, was brought up in luxurious environment. He was fortunate enough to have been given a good education. The teacher who had the greatest influence on him was ibn Muṭṭī (d. 426/1035), a Zahirite and a follower of Dāwūd ibn ʿAlī; he chose to be eclectic in matters of worship and jurisprudence and did not agree that one should confine oneself to a particular school.

Ibn Ḥazm did not continue to enjoy prosperity and peace for long. With the outburst of the disturbances in 400/1009 and the death of his father only two years later, misfortunes began to overtake him and his family; and when he preferred, on this account, to withdraw from public life, his life became very obscure. A few years later, however, he decided to enter public life again. As a result, he experienced all ups and downs of life, from forming the cabinet to frequent imprisonments.

Six years after the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate in Cordova (422/1031) and the assassination of the fugitive Hāshm III, life became unbearable for ibn Ḥazm in the whole peninsula, not only because he was a client and partisan of the falling dynasty, but because he entertained also a religious doctrine which the rulers and the ruled in the peninsula did not share.

The only respite which ibn Ḥazm had was during his stay on the island of Majorca from 430/1039 to 440/1049. The local Governor of Majorca was Abu al-ʿAbbas Ahmad ibn Raṣḥīq, an able statesman and a man of letters. For reasons inexplicable, he invited ibn Ḥazm for a sojourn on the island. Ibn Ḥazm took refuge there and began, as soon as he could breathe freely, to propagate Zahirism. Since he was supported by the Governor, some Majorecans followed him—perhaps out of conviction, perhaps out of political tactics—but it seems certain that the majority of the islanders were not in favour of the intruding doctrine. In 439/1047, the famous Mālikī jurist, Abu al-Walid al-Bāji (403/1013-474/1081) returned from a journey in the East. He held debates with ibn Ḥazm and caused his disgrace. In the following year, ibn Ḥazm was obliged to leave the island and go back on the mainland, but he was chased out of every town and village in which he tried to secure a footing. Finally, after fifteen years of complete oblivion, he found asylum on the estate of his own family in Manta Ḥīmā where he passed away in 456/1063.

Ibn Ḥazm was a very prolific writer on different subjects ranging from genealogical tables to epistemology. It is believed that his books were four hundred comprising 80,000 folios of some twenty million words. The most important of these books are ʿAwaq al-Ḥamūmah (the Dove’s Neck-Ring—on confidence and confidents), al-Mīkāl w-al-Nīḥāl (Religions and Sects), al-Ikān fi Ulūl al-ʿAḵām (Precision Concerning the Principles of Religious Matters) and al-Muḥallā bi al-ʿAṯār (the Gilded or Ornamented with Revelation and Tradition). This last is a comprehensive book on the aspects of worship and jurisprudence in Islam. Ibn Ḥazm was also a man of letters, poet, and statesman, but he is more famous as a rationalist and theologian.

Ibn Ḥazm’s Rationalism.—In his book al-Mīkāl w-al-Nīḥāl, ibn Ḥazm appears to be a rationalist. The problems of a priori, of time and space which confronted Kant (d. 1804) so often in his Critique of Pure Reason, had busied ibn

280

281
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Hazm in the same way. It is really astonishing that the Muslim theologian had tackled these problems in the same spirit of objectivity seven and a half centuries before the German philosopher. Let us take up the theory of knowledge as discussed by ibn Hazm. Knowledge arises, according to him, from the following:

(a) Sensory perception (shahādat al-hawa‘), that is, observation or sensory evidence.

(b) Primary reason (badhāhat al-aql or awsāal al-aql), that is, a priori reason without the use of the five senses.

(c) Proof (burhān), which goes back, either closely or remotely, to the evidence of the senses or to primary reason.

Ibn Hazm holds definitely that man has six senses, and that the soul grasps perceptible objects (material objects) by the five senses; thus a pleasant odour is accepted by reason... thus also the soul is aware that red is different from green, yellow, etc., or that there is a distinction between rough and smooth, hot and cold, etc.

The sixth sense, ibn Hazm holds, is the soul’s knowledge of primary things; that is, there are some things which man can know through his reason as being axiomatic, without requiring any proof for them. “Such is the soul’s knowledge that the part is less than the whole; thus the young child, who is only just able to discriminate, cries when he is given only two dates, but is satisfied when you give him another. This is because the whole is greater than a part, even though the child cannot define the limits of his knowledge... The same sense gives the child the knowledge that two things cannot occupy the same spot; you will see him fight for a place where he wants to sit, knowing that that place is not big enough for another person, and that so long as another person occupies the place there is no room for him also... This is a form of primary intelligence which is common to all except those whose reason is distorted... or whose bodies are diseased or impotent in certain respects... These truths of primary reason are truly axiomatic; they are beyond doubt and stand in no need of proof except to a madman... or to a scornful sophist.” Ibn Hazm’s argument for the view that these things require no proof is this: “To demand proof of anything requires time; primary reason cannot possibly avoid that fact... Yet between the soul’s first learning to discriminate phenomena and its knowing the complete truth of all that we have mentioned, there is not a single minute, nor can there be.” But ibn Hazm did not deny absolutely the necessity of proof to these things; rather, he held that such proof is a matter for personal acquisition which one may achieve, while another may not, and that it may carry weight only for such as have reached a high level of intellectual training.

Other means of acquiring knowledge, according to ibn Hazm, are God’s naming of things and men’s convention as represented by the languages of the different nations. These two means, however, belong to theology and are discussed under that topic.

Philosophy and Science.—Like all Muslim thinkers prior to his days, ibn Hazm had no access to Greek originals. He had a predisposition towards argumentation, and was versed in the science of dialectics (Kalām). He claimed to have read (evidently through translations) the works of the Milesian and Eleatic schools, of Euclid and Ptolemy, of Plato and Aristotle, and of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and to have had a general knowledge of astronomy, astrology, and medicine. He also stated that he was well versed in mathematics in general and geometry in particular.

Ibn Hazm does not agree with Heraclitus that the world is in constant flow nor with the Eleatics that motion is non-existent. On Being and Non-Being, he agrees with the Eleatics: Non-Being is not. In keeping with his general trend of thought, he affirms that space and time are limited and that they are, like all other things, created by God. In the same way he maintains that atoms are divisible because it is in the power of God to do everything, and to this power of His, infinite divisibility of an atom is no exception.

In physiology, he holds that the world is limited and the earth is spherical and that the sun is larger than the earth, but he agrees with Anaximenes that the sky is like a vault over the earth. He disagrees, however, with Pythagoras that there is a sister earth which helps the earth keep itself in the correct position. The world, at any rate, is created, but it has existed for a very long time.

In ethics, he touches lightly on Greek philosophy and maintains with Proclus of Ceos that death has no pain and that it should not be feared. He also holds with Epicurus and his contemporaries that the desire for pleasure and the repulsion from care are the criteria of happiness. But building up and improvement of character cannot be achieved by philosophy alone; the help of the prophets is necessary.

In his theory of knowledge, ibn Hazm emphasizes, in addition to sensory perception and primary reason, three means of acquiring religious knowledge which are particularly fundamental in Islam. These are: the literal sense of the Qur‘ān, the sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad, and consensus (ijma‘).

The first and foremost source of knowledge is the literal sense of the text of the Qur‘ān. This must follow from the context of the fifty-ninth verse of the fourth Sūrah, “O ye who believe! obey Allāh and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority, and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter refer it to Allāh and to the Messenger...” The text of the Qur‘ān must be understood literally unless the words in question are used metaphorically and in a way current among the early Arabs. No divergence is allowed from the text of the Qur‘ān except where one verse is modified or abrogated.

A History of Muslim Philosophy

by another. A total dependence on the Qur'an is made possible by the fact that every aspect of life and every need of man, material or spiritual, is treated in the Qur'an or provided for in it. God says, "We have neglected nothing in the Book." This implicit meaning was reiterated explicitly in this verse: "This day have I perfected for you your religion and completed My favour to you and chosen for you Islam as a religion."

The second source of knowledge is the Tradition, the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad. Ibn Hazm accepts the true Hadith or the Sunnah when related in a sure way and by reliable men in a connected chain which reaches the Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet is certainly trustworthy, and Ibn Hazm quotes in this connection from the Qur'an: "Nor does he speak out of desire. It is naught but revelation that is revealed." 448

Ibn Hazm accepts, as a third source of knowledge, consensus (ijma') or general agreement of the Companions of the Prophet but on a further condition that all of them should have been aware of the matter agreed upon and that no one of them should have shown any disagreement or hesitation about it.

In contradistinction to the other schools of jurisprudence in Islam, the Hanafite school in particular, Ibn Hazm rejects all other sources of jurisprudence such as intuition (istihsan), hearsay (khobar), interpretation (tawil), deduction (istinbail), personal approval (istihsan), refraining from the unseemly (istihdaj), legitimating a matter passed over in silence (dadh al-khidamat), looking for a reason in matters other than mentioned in the Qur'an (ta'allul), and holding a belief on the ground that it has been held by one's predecessors or some prominent contemporaries (ta'addad). Only the Prophet Muhammad must be taken as a model in all matters of belief and behaviour. He equally rejected, and more noticeably, analogy (tadi'al) and opinion (dai're) or that which a man conceives as true but without a proof, or that which a man chooses out of mere desire. The Muslims should not abide by the beliefs and laws preached by prophets prior to Muhammad unless they are accepted by Islam as well.

Ibn Hazm's views about God, His essence and His attributes, are: God is one and unique; He is incorporeal; so nothing resembles Him nor does He take the shape of anything He has created. He is the creator of everything, of time, of space, and even of His own Throne. He is eternal, all-powerful and all-knowing. His power and knowledge as well as all His other names are eternal.

God cannot be conceived of as ruled by space and time, since He existed before there were space and time, for these were also created by Him. The verses in which God says of Himself: "The God of mercy sitteth on His Throne" 449 and "Then He directed Himself to the heaven," 450 Ibn Hazm affirms

with the Ash'arites that God's sitting or settling Himself on the Throne is known; but how it is done is unknown.

God has no attributes which modify His essence: His qualities are names and not adjectives, nor are they derived from adjectives. He says of Himself: "God's are the fairest names. Invoke Him by them." 451 Thus, only these names, ninety-nine in number, by which God has named Himself, may be said to be His; we are not allowed to call Him by names which He has not mentioned as His, for example, the happy, the healthy, the beloved, the noble, or the brave, although these titles are, in themselves, true of Him and cherished by us. We are also not allowed to call Him by names, derived from the verbs with which He predicated Himself. God says: "And when they (the disbelievers) meet the faithful they say, 'We believe'; but when they are apart with their satans (comrades), they say, 'Verily we hold with you and at them we only mock.' God shall mock at them." 452 God says further: "And they (the Jews) plotted, and God plotted: but of those who plot, God is the best." 453 He also says: "And the heaven—with our hands have We built it up." 454 In spite of all that, says ibn Hazm, we cannot call God the mock or plotter, or builder, simply because He did not call Himself by these names. Moreover, we do not interpret His names to know how or why He is called thus: He called Himself, for instance, the hearer, the One who sees, but we cannot say that He has the sense of hearing or of sight.

Furthermore, God speaks in the Qur'an of His (one) hand, of His two hands, and of His hands: so we may ascribe to Him one hand, two hands, or many hands. In the Qur'an He speaks also of His eye and of His eyes, but not of two eyes of His. According to ibn Hazm, we may ascribe to God either one eye or ascribe to Him eyes, but not two eyes. When we speak of God's eye, hand, or face, we do not mean, at any rate, that He has members similar to ours. On the contrary, the words: face, eye, and hand are used as free metaphors to mean simply God.

And though God is incorporeal, ibn Hazm asserts that the Muslims would see Him on the Day of Judgment. 455 They cannot see Him, for certain, with the power of sight in their eyes but perhaps with the power which is called by some thinkers "the sixth sense."

Regarding our knowledge of God, ibn Hazm says, we do not maintain that we come to know Him by primary reason, for we do not want to run the risk of being refuted by somebody asserting that his primary reason does not lead him to the knowledge of God. Nor may we allow that the knowledge of God can be acquired by the art of reasoning, by argumentation or proof; since the masses are not capable of such dialecticism. Failing to attain knowledge

449 Al-Ikhman, Vol. IV, p. 147
450 Qur'an, vii, 53; x, 3; xiii, 2; xxv, 59; xxxii, 4; lvii, 4.
451 Ibid., xli, 11.
452 Ibid., vii, 180.
453 Ibid., li, 15.
454 Ibid., iii, 54.
455 Ibid., li, 47.
456 Ibid., lxv, 23.
of God through these channels, some come to the conclusion that He does not exist. Nor may we allow authority or hearsay to be the criteria of the knowledge of God, because these cannot lead to real conviction. We know God only through revelation to the Prophet who is trustworthy and whose word should be accepted on its face value.

Ibn Ḥazm does not believe in the absolute free-will of man. Predestination, according to him, is nothing but the command of God that a thing should follow a definite course. Allah has created in man aptitudes, and every man behaves in compliance with his aptitudes. Accordingly, we may say that all actions of men, good and bad, are ultimately created by God.

Ibn Ḥazm was a polemist by nature, and often right in his contentions. As Hitti says, “In this work [al-Mīlāl w-al-Nīhāl] he pointed out difficulties in the biblical narratives which disturbed no other minds till the rise of higher criticism in the sixteenth century.” Yet he is to blame for the harsh language he used in his attacks on all religions and sects indiscriminately. On some occasions he attacked even some of those who shared with him the same doctrine.

Faith and Islam, says ibn Ḥazm, are one and the same thing. Islam had abrogated all anterior religions. Therefore, no religion precedent to Islam should be followed, because every religion except Islam is obsolete and, consequently, annulled. Muhammad is the Prophet to all nations; he preached religion according to the prescription of God to him; and when he died revelation ceased. Islam was made complete; it is impossible either to add anything to it, or deduct anything from it, or make any change in it in any way.

The best people are the messengers of God; next are the prophets not entrusted with any mission to any people. After them are the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. These last differ in their prestige in accordance with their efforts in the service of Islam and their personal character and behaviour, determined by the truth and ideals established by the Qur’ān and the sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad.

ZĀHIRISM AFTER IBN ḤAZM

For a certain period Zāhirism constituted in the East a school of jurisprudence, but in Muslim Spain it never grew beyond a persecuted philosophy. Even as a philosophy it began to decline there after the death of ibn Ḥazm. It is true that ibn Ḥazm built a Zāhirite system of dogma and revised Muslim law from that standpoint, but his views enjoyed only a restricted acceptance in the Muslim West. In the East they found practically no echo. This is due to the uncompromising attitude he had taken in all matters of creed, worship, and legal transactions as well as to the harsh language he used while speaking of all those who did not share with him the views he entertained. The Zāhirites in the East, and the Ḥanbalites too, have always preferred to follow Dāwūd ibn ‘Ali, though very little Fiqh has reached us from him. The few attempts to introduce Zāhirism into North Africa were due largely to political considerations.

On the Andalusian soil Zāhirism found support or acceptance with individuals there and then. Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (368–463/978–1071), the famous traditionist and biographer, had some leaning towards it.

A young contemporary of ibn Ḥazm and of ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, al-Humaidi was a historian and biographer of established fame. He was a declared Zāhirite. When the persecution of the followers of the Zāhirite school reached a high pitch in Muslim Spain, he left his native land, went to the East, and settled down in Baghdad where he died forty years later. Al-Humaidi was the first man to introduce ibn Ḥazm’s works into the East, but there they made no impression.

One would expect, despite all persecution, that Zāhirism should have had numerous followers for a certain period at least, as has been the case with most other movements. Ibn al-Aḥṭār says:44 “There was in the Muslim West a multitude of them (of the Zāhirites) called the Ḥazmiyyah or followers of ibn Ḥazm.” Ashīn Palacios tried to draw a complete list of them.45 Some of these were, to be sure, Zāhirites or with Zāhirite leanings. But a number of those who were considered by him to be such were certainly not. That al-Ghazālī was antagonistic to the Bāṭinīs46 and was one who advocated a strict religious behaviour and showed a dislike for all innovations, as we see clearly in all his works, does not make him a Zāhirite, and less so a follower of ibn Ḥazm, as Ashīn Palacios tried to show.47 Nor can we agree with Ashīn Palacios that ibn Rushd (Averroes) was a Zāhirite on the mere fact that he quoted ibn Ḥazm three times in his Tahāfūt al-Tahāfūt. Ibn Rushd mentioned also the Zāhirites once with disdain and twice with indifference.48 Moreover, his theme in his two small but worthy epistles, Faṣl al-Magāl and Manāḥij al-Adillah, is that the masses cannot rise or be raised above the literal meaning of the Law, while the thinkers are called upon to ponder on the intentions of religion.

With the advance of the sixth/seventh century Zāhirism became a problem in the Muslim West, in Spain, and in North Africa: while the masses behaved on the narrowest Zāhirite lines, Zāhirism itself was being fought on every side. Philosophy was equally combated. The rationalist thinker ibn Ṭufail49

---

45 Asim, pp. 280-329.
48 Ibid., pp. 208, 542, 580.
49 Tahāfūt al-Tahāfūt, pp. 361f.
50 Ibid., pp. 12, 429.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

furnishes us with a very clear picture of the situation there; a few enlightened individuals were living in the midst of a multitude of common people unwilling and incapable of thinking for themselves.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Ikhwān al-Safa


Chapter XV

Ikhwān al-Safa

A INTRODUCTION

The name Ikhwān al-Safa was assumed by a group of libres penseurs who cultivated science and philosophy not for the sake of science and philosophy, but in the hope of forming a kind of an ethical-spiritual community in which the élites of the heterogeneous Muslim Empire could find a refuge from the struggle that was raging among religious congregations, national societies, and Muslim sects themselves.

External evidence concerning the Ikhwān al-Safa is so scanty that no clear historical picture of them is in any way possible. Were it not for Abu Ḥāyān al-Tūbī (d. after 400/1000), a famous author and a friend of some members of the group, no facts about them would have come down to us.

The group of the Ikhwān al-Safa originated in Bāṣra. In about 373/983, the group was already famous and its "Epistles," which contain its spiritual doctrines and philosophical system, were in wide circulation.1

The complete name of the group was Ikhwān al-Safa wa Khullān al-Waṭa wa ʿAbī al-Hammad wa Abī`d al-Majd,2 a name which was suggested to them by the chapter of the "Ring-Necked Dove" in Kitāb al-Dimām, a book which they very highly esteemed.3

The Ikhwān al-Safa succeeded in keeping complete secrecy about their names. But when Abu Ḥāyān was asked, in about 373/983, about them, he named, perhaps at random, five of them: abu Sulaimān Muhammad b. Muḥammad al-Bustī, known as al-Muqaḍdisī, abu al-Ḥasan 'Ali b. Ḥārūn al-Zanjānī, abu Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Mihrajānī, a certain al-Auī, and the famous Zayd b. Riḍāh.4

---

1. Imtās, ii, pp. 4 ff.
2. The true friends, the faithful comrades, the people deserving praise, and the sons of glory (cf. Jāmiʿ, i, p. 141).
4. Imtās, ii, pp. 4 ff.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

The Ikhwan al-Safa produced numerous works the most famous and important of which is the encyclopedic compilation entitled Rasûl'il Ikhwan al-Safa (Epistles of the Ikhwan al-Safa), which will henceforth be referred to as Rasûl'il or "Epistles." These "Epistles" are definitely the result of a collaboration of various writers many of whom may not have been members of the group. The compilation must have dragged over a long period, but by 373/983 the "Epistles" must have been already complete in the first recession at least. It is, moreover, practically certain that the Ikhwan al-Safa embarked upon the compilation of the "Epistles" with the number fifty in their mind. The current edition, however, have fifty-three epistles.

Closely connected with the "Epistles" is al-Risâlât al-Jami'ah (the Comprehensive Epistle) which was a summation and summa of the original "Epistles." It was also intended for private circulation among the more advanced members of the group. The Jami'ah discards much of the scientific information, originally the backbone of the "Epistles," and expounds more fully and frankly the ideas which the Ikhwan al-Safa intended to inculcate into their followers.

The Jami'ah was further summarized in Risâlât al-Jami'at al-Jami'ah au-Zubdah min Rasûl'il Ikhwan al-Safa (the Condensation of the Comprehensive Epistle or the Cream of the Epistles of Ikhwan al-Safa), called also al-Risâlât al-Jami'ah.4 The scientific information as well as chapters of the "Epistles" are eliminated, while the symbolic and esoteric interpretation of the verses of the Qur'an are brought out vigorously.

The Ikhwan al-Safa made arrangements for holding meetings everywhere they had followers. In these meetings, which were held once every twelve days and were restricted to the members and followers of the group, subjects of metaphysical and esoteric nature were discussed.7 There were also occasional meetings for the initiation of young people.8 Apparently, some of the followers were given, during these meetings, to singing, drinking, and other indulgences for which the Ikhwan al-Safa rebuked them indirectly.5

The Ikhwan al-Safa were a secret group. They were recruited through personal and confidential contacts. The emissaries were advised to work among the youth, as old people are usually rigid and unift for any movement.10 The group had four grades in which its members were placed generally according to their age. The first and most inferior grade was that of those who had attained their fifteenth year; the second of those between thirty and forty years of age; the third of those between forty and fifty. The fourth, last and highest grade, was that of those who were already fifty years of age.11

---

Ikhwan al-Safa

The Ikhwan al-Safa were Muslims. But they had a special interpretation of religion in general, and of Islam in particular. The Shi'i colouring, which is very conspicuous in their missionary work, is only dramatic because it helped them to play cleverly upon the emotions of the masses. In the strict historical sense, the Ikhwan al-Safa did not belong to any sect. In fact, they sought, with the aid of Islam and Greek philosophy, to work out a spiritual doctrine which would take the place of the historical religions and which would, at the same time, suit everyone and insult nobody.

As far as we can gather from the "Epistles," the Ikhwan al-Safa had no political programme. It seems, however, that some of their followers had pressed for political action to take the reins of government into their hands. The Ikhwan al-Safa themselves, the magnates among them, were not of this opinion; they reiterated in this connection that their sole aim was to uphold the faith and attain the bliss in the hereafter. In the meantime they tried to acquire knowledge and be versed in theoretical sciences.13 They declared, further, that they intended to build up a spiritual city, a Utopia, which was not of this world, neither on the continent, nor on the high seas, nor in the air.14

The sections, in the "Epistles," referring to daulatu ahl al-khari and daulatu ahl al-shari (literally, the State of the people of good and the State of the people of evil) contain only a brief and general discussion on the terms of governments or dynasties and on their succession.14 The Ikhwan al-Safa referred once15 to the coming of daulatu ahl al-khari; but they meant simply "the time when the adherents to their group would form the bulk of the nation."

B

SYSTEM AND THEORIES

1. Classification of the Sciences

Sciences may be classified in different ways. The Ikhwan al-Safa mentioned a few classifications and adopted that which divided all branches of knowledge roughly into three major classes:16 mathematics, physics, and metaphysics, a classification which was current since Aristotle's days. Mathematics included, in the "Epistle," the theory of numbers, geometry, astronomy, geography, music, theoretical and practical arts, ethics, and logic.17 Physics included...
matter, form, motion, time, space, the sky, generation, corruption, minerals, the essence of nature, plants, animals, the human body, the senses, life and death, microcosm, pleasure, pain, and language. Metaphysics was subdivided, as should be expected, into psycho-rationalism and theology. The first subdivision included psychics, rationalists, being, macrocosm, mind, great years, love, resurrection, and causality. Theology included the beliefs of the Ikhwan al-Asfa, friendship, faith, divine Law, prophecy, call unto God, the incorporeals, polities, the structure of the world, and magic.

2. Theory of Knowledge

The Ikhwan al-Asfa were very much interested in epistemology or the theory of knowledge. General knowledge, they said, may be acquired in three ways.18

(1) The way of the five senses is the natural and the most common way of acquiring knowledge. But through our senses we acquire only the material changes immediately apprehended by us and occurring in space and time.22

(2) Man acquires knowledge also by means of primary reason, by pure or mere thinking. But reason, if unaided by sound senses, cannot acquire knowledge. Moreover, concepts having no connection with our senses, like those of God and the First Matter, cannot be acquired thus.23 Akin to the two previous ways is the way of proof,26 the way of the trained dialecticians.

(3) The way of acquiring knowledge which agrees best with the esoteric doctrine of the Ikhwan al-Asfa is the way of initiation and authority, i.e., receiving knowledge personally from an authorized elder, a teacher in the broadest and deepest sense. This teacher receives his knowledge from the Imam (religious leader) who, in turn, receives it, through other Imams, from the Prophet whose ultimate source of knowledge is God.27 Philosophy, wisdom or philosophical wisdom, according to the Ikhwan al-Asfa, is to behave Godlike as best as a human being can.28 A more detailed definition would be “love for science added to knowledge of the essence of all beings, gained” as best as one can, together with profession and public behaviour in harmony with that.”

In the “Epistles” of the Ikhwan al-Asfa metaphysics proper is quite meagre.

Ikhwan al-Asfa

3. Metaphysics

If metaphysics did not include theology, it would have interested them very little.

(1) Form and Matter. The views of the Ikhwan al-Asfa regarding form and matter are Aristotelian: every body consists of matter and form which are inseparable, since pure forms are only concepts like the soul and the intellect. Matter and form are both simple essences. The form is more important, since bodies are different because of their forms, their matter being in many cases the same; but matter is theoretically older.29 In keeping with their disposition towards compilation, they show some leaning to Plato when they say30 that the images, figures, frames, and characteristics which we see in the world of (sublunary) bodies and in the essences of the heavenly bodies are examples, likenesses, and colourings of those forms which are in the world of spirits.

(2) Space and Time. As regards space and time, their view was that both are not realities; space is more objective, since it is related to bodies which have dimensions: it is the vessel which holds the contained.31 Time has no independent existence. It cannot be conceived of except in connection with moving bodies. Now, if space is the outer surface of the world and time is the reckoning of the rotations of the spheres, space and time would be unthinkable prior to the spheres themselves.32 These views led some to think that they believed in the eternity of the world. They were aware of this accusation and tried to defend themselves against it.33

(3) Motion. There are six general kinds of motion grouped in three pairs: generation and corruption, increase and decrease, change and displacement. The particular kinds are numerous. The continuous and perfect motion is spherical; the straight motion is also continuous but not perfect. The arrow when passing through the air forms, from the bowstring to its falling place, one continuous course.34 Here they disagree, in the example of the arrow, with Zeno of Elea (d. 430 B.C.) who argued that if a line were made up of points, there must be always space among these points. And so, an arrow in any given moment of its flight must be at rest in some particular point.35

(4) Causality. In the field of causality the Ikhwan al-Asfa depended on Aristotle. ‘Ilal (pl. of ‘ilah, fem.) or major causes are four:36 the hasyuliyyah

---

18 Ibid., ii, pp. 3-388; iii, pp. 3-181.
19 Ibid., iii, pp. 182-371.
20 Ibid., iii, pp. 373-432; iv, 3-478.
21 Ibid., iii, p. 228; cf. ii, p. 551.
23 Ibid., iii, pp. 41f.
25 Ibid., iii, pp. 42, 322.
26 Ibid., iii, pp. 48, 58, 152; Jami’ah, i, pp. 107, 123, 189, 288.
28 Ra’aid, i, p. 226; ii, pp. 4, 325; iii, p. 186; cf. Jami’ah, i, p. 298; ii, p. 74.
29 Ra’aid, i, p. 332; ii, pp. 4, 5f.; iii, pp. 198, 390.
31 Ibid., ii, pp. 9, 10, 330; iii, p. 361.
32 Ibid., ii, pp. 10, 13; iii, pp. 334f., 361.
33 Ibid., iii, p. 236.
34 Ibid., ii, pp. 10, 11, 13, 238-47; iii, p. 306; Jami’ah, ii, p. 237.
(material, the matter or substance of which a thing is made), šārīyyah (formal, the form which is given to a certain substance to produce that thing), fā'īlyah (active, the agent which gives that substance its form) and tāmāmiyyah (fulfilling, the end which that produced thing serves).

The answer to a question concerning any of the causes, and especially the fourth cause, is always difficult because it is a question about the essence of things. These four causes should act together, otherwise the intended thing would not come into existence; and they should hold on, so that the produced thing might persist. It is needless to say that God is the ultimate cause of all beings.  

(5) Number.—Numbers are the vehicle of the doctrine of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafa. The Pythagorean theory of numbers (their properties: proportion, progression, etc.) and their linking mystically to the life and after-life of man captured their imagination.

The Ikhwān al-Ṣafa divided the numbers into two classes: a factor which is the "one" and a "series from two ad infinitum." The one is an absolute unity, indivisible, undiminishing, and uncreateable. All the numbers originate from the one: the two by the repetition of the "one" twice; the other numbers by adding the "one"; whence its character as a factor to every subsequent number. This dexterous acrobatics was necessary to arrive at the following, half-theological and half-metaphysical statement: Just as "the one is of a different nature from the numbers which originate from it, so the One (God) is unlike all the beings emanating from Him."  

(6) Being and Emanation.—This leads us to Being and Emanation, the coming of the universe into existence, or its creation.

The universe is not eternal but created by God through emanation. Emanation was a compromise between the strict religious notion of creation and the Aristotelian view of the eternity of the world. Theoretically, creation was accomplished in two steps: first, God willed, in one thought, that the universe should come into existence ex nihilo; then, immediately emanation began and proceeded gradually, until the universe took its present shape. The order and character of emanation were as follows:

(i) Al-Bārī (The Maker, Creator, or God).—Al-Bārī is the First and only Eternal Being, the One, Unique, and One in every respect. He has no partner and no peer. No anthropomorphic attribute or action should be ascribed to Him. Only the will to create pertains to Him.  

(ii) Al-'Āqil (Intellect or Gr. Nous).—Al-'Āqil was the first being to emanate from Al-Bārī. God created it directly, necessarily, without break, and

with no need for movement or effort. From God's eternity it acquires its own eternity; and through His perpeutance it receives its continuity and perfection. It is one in number as God Himself is One. But since God does not condescend to deal with material bodies, He created in the intellect all the forms of subsequent beings and instituted in it the office of re-emanation: from it emanated the world-soul and the first matter. It is clear, then, that the office attributed usually to God belongs, in the opinion of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafa, to the intellect, a counterpart, duplicate, or image of God.  

(iii) Al-Nafs al-Kullīyyah (The Absolute Soul, the World-Soul).—The world-soul is the soul of the whole universe, a simple essence which emanated from the intellect. It receives its energy from the intellect. It manifests itself in the sun through which it animates the whole sublunary (material) world. What we call creation, in our world, pertains actually to the world-soul.

(iv) Al-Hayāl (Arabicized from Gr. hyle: substance, matter, stuff), First Matter.—First matter is a simple and spiritual essence already substance without bulk, and yet without conceivable dimensions. Because the first matter was passive, having no proper energy; it could not emanate by itself. It was caused by the intellect to proceed from the world-soul which had to exert effort and show great care to facilitate for it to rush forth and become subsequently susceptible to accepting different forms.

(v) Al-Tāhbit (Nature).—Nature is one of the powers of the world-soul, the energy diffused throughout the sublunary world and effecting all bodies therein, organic and inorganic. It is the cause of motion, life, and change. It works wisely and uniformly. In this sense, it is the philosophical term for the religious concepts of divine will and Providence.

Here, with nature, ceases the influence of the intellect, since all subsequent emanations will tend to be more and more material, defective, and, consequently, unworthy of its care.

(vi) Al-Jism al-Muţlaq (The Absolute Body).—When the world-soul began, with the help of the intellect, to move the first matter in three directions, the first matter acquired the three dimensions (length, width, and depth) and became the absolute body or second matter. The second matter is no more a concept, an essence, or a quality denoting pure existence, as was the first matter, but a quantum, spherical in shape. This absolute body, or second matter, is the substance of which our world, as such, is made.

---

37 Rasd`l, i, pp. 201, 354; iii, pp. 185, 233, 325, 327; iv, pp. 8f., 178; Jami`ah, ii, pp. 79, 278.
38 Sarton, Astronomy, p. 217.
39 Rasd`l, i, pp. 24(f.), 26(f.), 31f.; cf. Jami`ah, i, p. 43.
40 Rasd`l, i, pp. 25f.; iii, pp. 184f., 200f.; Jami`ah, i, pp. 27f.; ii, pp. 284f.
41 Rasd`l, i, p. 180; ii, pp. 107, 108ff.; Jami`ah, i, p. 593; ii, p. 83.
42 Rasd`l, ii, pp. 4, 9, 33, 244, 293, 392; iii, pp. 187, 189, 197, 228f., 328, 332, 260f.; Jami`ah, ii, pp. 35, 36.
43 Rasd`l, i, p. 28; ii, pp. 55f., 112ff.; iii, pp. 10, 191, 192, 193, 203, 214f., 235, 301; Jami`ah, i, p. 529.
44 Rasd`l, i, pp. 5, 187ff., 230; iv, pp. 4f.; Jami`ah, ii, pp. 4f., 37.
45 Rasd`l, i, p. 331; ii, pp. 55f., 112f.; iii, pp. 124ff.; Jami`ah, i, pp. 331ff.; ii, p. 36.
46 Rasd`l, ii, p. 36; iii, p. 198.
47 Ibid., ii, p. 4, 5; iii, pp. 8, 189, 198, 203, 204; iv, p. 4; Jami`ah, i, p. 276; ii, p. 6, 37.
(vii) The Spheres or the World of the Spheres.—In the seventh stage of emanation appeared the spheres which are not imaginary but spiritual, spherical, hollow, transparent, and concentric bodies. These spheres, which are eleven in number, vary in the thickness of their shells, in proportion to the magnitude of the planets with which they are inlaid. These spheres are: the spheres of the fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon. All the heavenly bodies are made up of a fifth element, ether, and are not liable to generation and corruption.49

(viii) The Four Elements.—With the emanation of the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth, we come to the beings immediately under the sphere of the moon (within its orbit), to the sublunar world where the process of generation and corruption begins to take place.

Fire, air, water, and earth—supposed to be elements by the Ikhwan al-Safa like many Greek thinkers—exist, free in nature, in minor spheres about the centre of the earth. Further, they espoused the view of the Ionians, and Thales (d. c. 545 B.C.) in particular, as against the Eleatics, that the four "elements"—hange into one another: water becomes air and fire; fire becomes air, water, earth, etc.50

(ix) The Three Kingdoms.—In the closing stage of emanation appeared the three kingdoms: mineral, plant, and animal, which originated from the absolute interchange and proportional intermixture of the four elements.51

(7) Macrocosm and Microcosm.—The early Greek thinkers conceived of the universe as one living being in which the phenomena and powers are correlated and governed hierarchically by a single general law. Democritus of Abdera (d. c. 370 B.C.) developed from that concept the Theory of Macrocosm and Microcosm which treated of man as a reduced model of the universe, and of the universe as the enlarged copy of man.52 His theory was accepted by the Ikhwan al-Safa.

(8) The Individual Soul (al-Nafs al-Jawiyyah) and Its Fall.—As soon as the world-soul was called upon to care for individual beings, beginning with the spheres, its innumerable powers became distinct and independent but not detached, since detachability is a property of matter. In this sense individual souls, representing the infinite powers of the world-soul, began to form. During a very long time these souls filled the world of the spheres and constituted the angels who animated the heavenly bodies. At first, they were aware of the grace which is bestowed by the intellect upon the world-soul, of which they

48 Cf. infra viii.
49 Rashid, ii, pp. 22, 25ff., 29ff., 39–42, 123; iii, pp. 190, 219, 221, 361; Jami, i, p. 306.
50 Rashid, ii, pp. 5, 22, 45–50, 77, 78, 200, 337, 403; iii, pp. 79, 183, 190; Jami, i, pp. 306, 311; ii, 77, 37, 382; iv, pp. 268ff., 313.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

who were around him but were unworthy of this secret before the time assigned for such disclosure. This was Adam’s crime—curiosity and lust for power. 48

Now, it was no more possible for Adam to stay with the angels who disavowed him because he showed a knowledge inconsistent with his physical appearance and which was even new and startling to them as spiritual beings, were supposed to know more than he. Even the animals and the other inhabitants of paradise were scared by his behaviour and abhorred him. Therefore, he was caused to fall to earth to lead on it the life of flesh, deprived of all the supernatural faculties accorded to him in the heavenly abode. With him also fell his wife and Ilhâs, so that the struggle may continue and be decided openly, and in a fair manner. 49

The fall of Adam represents, in the metaphysical system of the Ikhwan al-‘Asa, the union of the individual souls with sublunary bodies. When an individual soul is caused to fall, it may be lucky enough to realize its mistake and repent readily. In this case its downward journey is interrupted and it is caused to turn back and regain its former place. 50 The unlucky souls continue their fall towards the centre of the earth to be tied to an inorganic body, plant, beast, or man. We are concerned with the soul assigned to a man which is the least unlucky of all the falling souls.

When a soul falls, it enters the ovum which happens to be impregnated at the time of its fall. This soul in the ovum comes soon under the regimen of the planets. All planets, beginning with the farthest one, Saturn, influence the incubation of the soul turn by turn for a whole lunar month. After the completion of the third month the foetus comes under the influence of the sun, the king of the planets, and life is breathed into it. The period of pregnancy is accepted by the Ikhwan al-‘Asa to be at least seven complete lunar months, the number of the spheres of the then known planets. 51

The soul is prepared in this world through the medium of the body for the hereafter. Life in this world is only a means to an end: here the soul is enabled to attain perfection in order to be allowed to regain its former celestial life. The body is only the workshop of the soul, a temporary house, a shell, a mount necessary for a journey. Once the body is forsaken by the soul it becomes again a heap of solid matter akin to the constituent elements of the earth. But the body is as necessary for the soul as is the womb for the development of the foetus. 52

Death is welcome to the purified soul, since death means to it nothing more than that it has stopped using the body. With the death of the body the real

life of the soul begins. Moreover, the soul cannot benefit by the knowledge acquired during its terrestrial life except after the death of the body. 44

Lesser and Greater Resurrections, Paradise and Hell.—With the death of

the body occurs the first or lesser resurrection of the soul. All human souls are immortal: those which have attained perfection during their earthly life would be able to enjoy again the absolute being and happiness; those which have remained imperfect would be barred from entering heaven and remain suspended between heaven and earth with the devils dragging them on every side until they are forced back to the hollows of gloomy bodies and the bounds of physical nature. 46

In leaving the body, the soul leaves simultaneously the lesser hell which is the transient life on earth subject to generation and corruption, change and putrefaction. Greater hell is the eternal condemnation of the wretched soul to roam in the underworld, burdened with the accumulated ignorance and fettered with depression and pain. Paradise, on the other hand, is the vast space of heaven, where the righteous souls float in an infinite spread of light in perpetuation and immortality, in a state of happiness and grace. 47

When all the individual souls have left their bodies and are reunited with the world-soul, the world-soul would lose the reason for its independent existence: so it would return to God. The universe would cease, and there would remain one being: God. This is the greater resurrection: the closing of a manifestation of God. 48

4. Nature and the Sciences

The Ikhwan al-‘Asa happened to compile in their “Epistles” the scientific materials available to them and, at the same time, support their esoteric doctrine. They tried to arrange these materials, the scientific legacy of Greece since the earliest Ionian thinker, Thales of Miletus, in independent chapters. The picture which resulted was that of accumulation rather than that of exposition, and never that of exhaustiveness and systematization. We do not know, however, what additions they made; but we are sure that they did give us a general account of the scientific life of the Muslims in the Middle Ages, with its bright and dark sides. Further, the “Epistles” supply us with a picture, though imperfect, of the ancient world of science.

(1) In arithmetic the Ikhwan al-‘Asa depended in the main, as they say, 49 on Pythagoras and Nicomachus. “Pythagoras” must mean the Pythagorean school; Nicomachus was a late neo-Pythagorean of Gerasa (present Jarash in

48 Rasa’d, i, pp. 111, 112, 115 ff., 155, 155, 163; ii, p. 144.
50 Rasa’d, iv, p. 332; jâm‘ah, i, p. 332; ii, p. 295.
51 Rasa’d, i, pp. 109, 241; ii, pp. 250 ff., 357 ff.; iv, p. 413; jâm‘ah, i, pp. 513 ff., 554, 559.

44 Rasa’d, i, pp. 109, 226, 225, 277, 337; ii, pp. 43, 277; iii, pp. 51, 56 f., 59 f.; iv, p. 82; jâm‘ah, i, pp. 506, 683, 687; ii, pp. 28, 87.
45 Rasa’d, i, p. 260; iii, pp. 25 f., 29, 36, 33 f., 105 f., 279, 289.
46 Ibid., ii, p. 82; iii, pp. 64, 189, 279, 282, 284, 286, 289, 343, 346; iv, p. 82.
47 Ibid., iii, pp. 315 f., 320.
48 Ibid., i, p. 35.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Jordan who flourished about the middle of the second Christian century.49 He elaborated the Pythagorean mathematics and wrote a book entitled *Arithmetic* or “Introduction to Arithmetic,” in which he maintained that “numbers had a pre-existence in the spirit of the Creator before the formation of the universe. He wrote another book which the Ikhwan al-Šafa must have known and used: *Arithmetika theologica* or “Theology of Numbers.”50 They also knew a book by Euclid on arithmetic called al-Ushūl.51

(2) Geometry has for its aim the training of the soul, by which it realizes promotion in knowledge from perception to conception, from the physical to the spiritual and from the concrete to the abstract. Geometry (Ar. *handasa*) is of two kinds: *haṣṣīṣyāh*, tangible, sensible, or common plane and solid geometry which helps man to acquire skill in crafts; and *aqīğiyāh*, intellectual or rational, namely: analytic and descriptive, which enables man to be versed in theoretical sciences.52 The Ikhwan al-Šafa knew Euclid and other writers on geometry53 from whom they drew their information on the subject.

To geometry belong the mysterious or magical figures, the smallest of which is composed of nine squares in three rows. In these squares are inserted the numbers 1 to 9 in a manner that any row, horizontal, perpendicular, or diagonal, must give the uniform sum of 15.54

(3) The aim of the “Epistle” on music is to stimulate the souls, already instructed in mathematics, physics, psychics, and theology, to join the immortals in the vast space of heaven. Music itself is a spiritual art founded by wise men. It has a strong and varied effect on all souls. It is either soothing or exciting, gratifying or grieving. On this account, music is played to calm the sick and insane, to tranquilize a weeping child or to lull him to sleep. Even animals are subject to the effect of music. Music is also played in temples because of the touch of awe it possesses.55

Pythagoras was said to have heard the sound of the moving spheres and planets. Since the motions of these spheres have regularity and ratios to one another, their sounds must have tunes which are of highest perfection and harmony. These tunes are intended for the inhabitants of the heaven. Pythagoras discovered the scale and essentials of music as a result of hearing the sounds of the heavenly bodies.56

---

51 “Principles” or “Essentials” (Rusī’i, i, pp. 44 ff.). Certainly, this is not the book of Euclid on geometry which was later called the Elements (Ibid., p. 289; cf. also pp. 171, 442).
52 Rusī’i, i, pp. 50 ff., 63 ff., 68–71; Jami’ah, i, p. 175 ff.
53 Rusī’i, i, p. 68; cf. pp. 103.
54 Ibid., i, pp. 71 ff.; cf. p. 69.
55 Ibid., i, pp. 132 ff., 134, 136, 154, 158, 175, 179 ff.; Jami’ah, pp. 185–88, 190 ff.
56 Rusī’i, i, pp. 152 ff., 158 ff., 168.

Ikhwan al-Šafa

(4) The universe, say the Ikhwan al-Šafa, is made up of all the bodies in existence. It is finite and spherical in shape. Being is one solid body; it stuffs the whole space: it is the universe. Outside the universe there is neither Being nor Non-Being, neither emptiness (vacuum) nor fullness, since the universe has no outside.57 On this they agree with the Eleatic Parmenides and his disciple Zeno;58 but they disagree with them fully on the question of motion. Parmenides and Zeno presumed that since the universe is completely replete, the movement of individual bodies is impossible. The view of the Ikhwan al-Šafa was: since the mass of the universe is not of the same density, the more dense may move through the less dense, as the fish swim in water and the birds fly in air.59

The earth stands in the centre of the world; then come seven concentric spheres in which revolve the planets: the moon, Mercury, Venus, the sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Finally comes the sphere of the fixed stars. The number of the stars which were determined by astronomical observation, including the seven planets, was one thousand and twenty-nine. All the stars are luminous except the moon which receives its light from the sun.60

The movement of the planets was explained by the rotation of the outer sphere clockwise: from east to west above the earth, and from west to east under the earth, once every day. The outer sphere carries the other spheres along with it. From this it follows that these spheres with their planets too should complete a revolution around the earth in one day.61 But the ancients noted that the planets have complicated movements: sometimes they appear to overtake the sun and continue their courses ahead of it; and sometimes the sun appears to overtake them. With the planets nearer the earth—the moon, Mercury, and Venus—this phenomenon was more conspicuous and gave rise to the theory of epicycles. This means that the orbits within the outer sphere are not homocentric with it, concentric or having one common centre, but eccentric, i.e., having independent centres.

Aristotle was in favour of homocentricity; Claudius Ptolemy (d. 168 A.D.), the Alexandrian astronomer, upheld the theory of epicycles. Unfortunately, the Ikhwan al-Šafa sided with Ptolemy and rejected; at the same time, the view that the heavenly bodies revolve from west to east,62 a view which seems to have had some upholders among the Pythagoreans.63

Regarding the magnitudes of the stars, they showed some boldness. The earth, they said, is but a point in a large circle. The smallest planet has a size eighteen times that of the earth; the largest is one hundred and seven times.64

---

60 Ibid., i, pp. 73 ff., 86, 87; ii, pp. 21, 22, 25, 267, 28, 37; iii, pp. 189 ff.; iv, p. 321.
61 Ibid., i, pp. 100, 244; ii, pp. 21, 747; iii, p. 314.
62 Ibid., ii, pp. 32 ff.
64 Rusī’i, i, p. 117; cf. pp. 27 ff.
They maintained, further, that the celestial bodies are neither heavy nor light. If any body, they argue, is in its specially assigned place in the spheres, it does not exert weight. It acquires weight, on the contrary, when it comes into the neighbourhood of other strange bodies, not of the same material (water in water or air in air, for example, has no weight). Weight, they say, is nothing but the mutual attraction and mutual repulsion in the face of resistance.\textsuperscript{85} We are reminded in this case of the artificial satellites and of the fact that they lose all weight as soon as they leave the zone of the gravity of the earth. In the same spirit, they declared also that the sun and the stars are neither hot nor cold.\textsuperscript{86}

The Ikhwan al-\textit{Sa\={f}a} accepted the solar year to be of 365\textfrac{1}{4} days. On this basis they computed the revolutions of the planets around the earth: Saturn completes a revolution of its orbits in 29 years, 5 months and 6 days; Jupiter in 11 years, 10 months and 26 days; Mars in about 23 months; Venus in 584 days, and Mercury in 124 days only.\textsuperscript{87} The Ikhwan al-\textit{Sa\={f}a} supplied us with data which enable us to construct formulae for the extension of the universe and for its volume which may be computed roughly at: 1,300,000,000 and 150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 km, respectively or $13 \times 10^8$ and $15 \times 10^8$. This is nothing to be compared with the real measurements, but it serves to give us an idea of the boldness of the Ikhwan al-\textit{Sa\={f}a} in their age.

(5) The earth, say the Ikhwan al-\textit{Sa\={f}a}, is a sphere. Their proof is that any line on the surface of the earth or on the face of a river is an arch, and any portion of the sea is a part of the shell of a spherical body.\textsuperscript{88} George Sarton, the historian of science, holds that the idea of the sphericity of the earth is as old as Pythagoras; but he wonders how Pythagoras could arrive at a proof. He declares that Pythagoras must have postulated the sphericity of the earth out of wild boldness.\textsuperscript{89}

They believe also that the earth stands in the centre of the universe, suspended in the midst of the air, because it is in its special place within a space free from the attraction and repulsion of every other heavenly body.\textsuperscript{90} Although the Ikhwan al-\textit{Sa\={f}a} were essentially Pythagorean, they rejected the Pythagorean view that the earth has two motions: a revolution around a central fire and a rotation on its axis.\textsuperscript{91} They believed, however, that it had a sway (forwards and backwards) on its axis, and that when it was created it was in motion; but afterwards it came to a standstill.\textsuperscript{92} It seems that they followed, in this view, Democritus who held that the earth had in the beginning a motion, but afterwards it came gradually to a standstill.\textsuperscript{93}

The earth is not solid or massive, but it is full of cavities. The solid parts of its interior are also of different densities.\textsuperscript{94} Further, it has no bottom, in the common meaning of the word; its bottom is its centre. So, wherever a man stands on the earth, his head is always towards the sky (above the earth) and his feet are always towards the bottom or centre of the earth.\textsuperscript{95} In spite of all this genial explanation, they believed that we live on one side of the earth only.\textsuperscript{96}

(6) In the two chapters on geography and meteorology, based principally on \textit{Meteorologica}\textsuperscript{97} and other Greek works, the Ikhwan al-\textit{Sa\={f}a} speak of the equator, of the polar zones where the winter is a night of six continuous months and the summer is a day of six continuous months, of the four seasons of longitude and time, of the mountains and their nature as reservoirs of water, and cognate topics.\textsuperscript{98} Their explanation of the eclipses is noteworthy,\textsuperscript{99} but their interpretation of the ebb and flow of tides is false: they believed that the rays of the moon heat the waters of the sea and cause their rise.\textsuperscript{100}

(7) In physics and chemistry the Ikhwan al-\textit{Sa\={f}a} held, with Aristotle, the Theory of the Four Elements and rejected the atomic theory.\textsuperscript{101} They maintain also with the Ionian physicists that the so-called four elements: fire, air, water, and earth, change into one another. Furthermore, when these four elements undergo intense heat and strong pressure inside the earth, they change into mercury and sulphur. If aerial moisture mixes with earth, it becomes mercury, a masculine element; if oily moisture mixes with earth, it changes into sulphur, a feminine element. From the further intermixture of sulphur and mercury, in different proportions, are formed all the mineral bodies: clay, glass, iron, copper, ruby, silver, gold, etc.

(8) The natural world is made up of three kingdoms: the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms. Evolution rests on the view that every kingdom constitutes the primary matter and nourishing material for the next higher kingdom. Accordingly, the mineral kingdom must have come into existence long before that of plants. The plants came into existence before the animals; sea animals before the animals on land; the less developed before the more developed; and all animals were in existence ages before man.\textsuperscript{102} At the top of the animal

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ibid.}, ii, pp. 40ff.
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{Ibid.}, i, pp. 84, 86-88; ii, p. 31; iii, pp. 255-57.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid.}, ii, p. 149.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ras\={a}d\={u}l'}, i, pp. 111, 113; ii, pp. 22, 40, 49, 79, 118, 307, 310; \textit{Jami\={a}h}, i, pp. 149f.
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Ibid.}, ii, p. 65 unten.
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Ras\={a}d\={u}l'}, ii, pp. 309ff.
sensible bodies, to the imaginative zone in the front part of the brain. Next, the imaginative faculty passes the traces which the abstract forms have left on it to the reflective faculty, in the middle part of the brain, to ponder upon them and verify their indications; then, the indications are transmitted in turn to the retentive faculty (or memory) in the back part of the brain to be stored there until a recollection of them is needed. At the right time the relevant data are referred to the expressive or talkative faculty by which they are abstracted, generalized, and given the form expressible by the tongue to be received intelligibly by the ear.\textsuperscript{109}

6. Politics

(1) The Ikhwān al-Ṣafa had no interest in the theory of State or in the forms of government. Nor could they be influenced, in this respect, by Greek writers. The two worlds were totally different: Plato and Aristotle lived in City-States; the Ikhwān al-Ṣafa lived in the great cities of an empire. At any rate, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafa believed that the State rests on two foundations: religion and kingship. A king is indispensable, though he may be a tyrant, if the State is to lead a secure and prosperous life. A group of wise men, however, may do without a king.\textsuperscript{110}

(2) The indifference of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafa about the State was counter-balanced by their keen interest in al-sīḥat al-madaniyyah, a blend of civics and domestic economy, which bears more on the personal and communal behaviour of man. As a rule, the Ikhwān al-Ṣafa preferred that their followers should practise celibacy. But since that was impracticable, marriage was enjoined to serve two purposes: first, that the race may continue—a reason which was given by Aristotle too; and second, because there are people who cannot remain celibate.\textsuperscript{111}

A man of standing should be a kind of a ruler in his community. He should first exercise self-control in the different situations through which he passes, because he who can control himself may be able to control others.\textsuperscript{112} Regarding his children and brothers, he should give them a fair, uniform but firm treatment from which he should allow no deviation except in circumstances not under his control. People are governed easier and better if they have been accustomed to a certain way of government. As for other relatives of his servants, and dependants, he should be bounteous in their maintenance and meek in their treatment. But it is of no use to disclose to them any trouble or want of his. This would impair his authority in their eyes without helping him in the least. If he was ever short of means, and consequently obliged to
lay a restriction on his favours to them, he should try to make them believe that he has done so on purpose and not because he has yielded to a certain pressure.  

A man should choose his friends carefully and treat them with tact: know them well and betray none of his secrets to them. Further, he should appear always, before them, consistent in his opinion and behaviour, because they are expected to share with him his doctrines and way of life (the ultimate aim of the Ikhwan al-Safa in making friends is to propagate their doctrines among these friends). It is very important that the relatives of a leading personality should follow his doctrines and adopt his views, otherwise his friends would lose their enthusiasm for him. He should disdain publicly any relative who proves to be at variance with him in the matter of doctrine.

7. Ethics

Muslims have always been more interested in morals and matters of conduct than in ethical theories, because Islam insists on good or righteous deeds as well as on good intentions. The Ikhwan al-Safa's interest in ethics was confined to its bearing on their doctrine: acquiring theoretical knowledge and doing good in this life so that their souls may enjoy eternity and happiness in the hereafter. They start from the assertion that characters are either inborn or acquired. Inborn characters begin with the formation of the foetus in the womb, and they develop therein gradually under the influence of the planets. Innate characters, or virtues, are specialized aptitudes assigned to different organs. They enable the soul to act through every organ and produce the sensation, action, or craft particular to that organ without need for deliberation or choice. At one place the Ikhwan al-Safa assume that inborn characters are uniformly good. At another, they maintain that they are bad, and, consequently, all religions were revealed to resist the innate characters of man and to reform them if possible.

After birth man begins to acquire virtues. He continues to do so until his death. There is in man an aptitude to do good, and with the same aptitude he can do evil. Character and behaviour are teachable.

Anything which should be done, if done as it should, to the extent to which it should, in the place where it should, at the time when it should, and in view of the end for which it should, is called good. And he who does that thing deliberately and with choice is called a wise man, a philosopher, and a perfect man. Good, for the masses, is that which religion has enjoined, and evil, that which religion has prohibited.

Ikhwan al-Safa

Acquired characters are determined and modified by the disposition of the body, climate of the land, and the contact of the children with their parents, tutors, comrades, and with the people in prominence. The different circumstances through which man usually passes are important factors in making people change from one character into another.

The Ikhwan al-Safa urge their followers to be idealistic in their behaviour. The good they seek should be final and self-sufficient. One should do good not because one expects from doing it, or for doing it, a benefit, nor because one expects to avoid some loss.

8. Education

As soon as a child is born, he comes under the influence of social factors for four complete years, during which he reaches a certain stage of intelligence and comprehension. After the fourth year the child begins to acquire his habits, knowledge, doctrines, crafts, and hobbies by imitation, as a result of his contact with those who happen to be around him. The masses copy the external behaviour of the dominant class.

Children are apt to use an analogy characteristic of them. They believe that their parents are perfect and that the conditions prevailing in their own homes are models for all the conditions elsewhere. On the practical side, children are more apt to master the arts, sciences, and crafts of their parents than those of strangers.

Knowledge is the abstraction of the knowable in the soul of the knower through the aid of a teacher. The aptitude to learn belongs to the soul alone. The end of teaching is to purify the souls of the taught and give them correct behaviour in order to prepare them for immortality and happiness in the hereafter. A science which does not lead to happiness in the hereafter is useless.

Every soul is potentially learned; the parents and tutors polish its aptitude and help it to become learned in action. A teacher is absolutely necessary, especially to common people.

The brain is able to store simultaneously all kinds of information, however diverse and contradictory they may be, since it stores their abstractions only. And in spite of the fact that the data stored in the brain fade gradually, and that some of them are sometimes totally forgotten, they do not annul another.

---

113 Rosad'i, i, pp. 229-38, 246; ii, p. 372; iii, pp. 288f., 395; iv, pp. 109, 111, 141, 345; Jam'ah, i, p. 237.
114 Rosad'i, iv, pp. 118, 141f., 297f.
115 Rosad'i, i, pp. 153, 360f.; ii, pp. 129, 279f.; iii, pp. 147f.
117 Rosad'i, i, pp. 195, 198, 211, 225, 271, 373, 317; iii, p. 33.
118 Rosad'i, i, pp. 198, 211, 225, 317; ii, p. 352; iii, pp. 90, 436; iv, pp. 18, 127.
119 Rosad'i, iii, pp. 236ff.; iv, p. 114.
Essentially, knowledge is never spontaneous; it must be taught and learnt. A teacher is simply a guide for the soul to knowledge. Knowledge is handed down traditionally through religious leaders, the Imāms, whose ultimate source of knowledge is the Prophet, who acquires his knowledge from God by inspiration. The Ikhwān al-Šafa touch at a thorny problem in education. They believe that neither the pupil may benefit from the tutor, nor the tutor may benefit from the pupil, unless there is a kind of intimacy between them. We know for certain that some kind of a reserved friendship is very useful in this respect. But the Ikhwān al-Šafa overshoot themselves and speak frankly of “the desire of grown-up men for boys” as an incentive for effective real education. Furthermore, they mention explicitly that such manners belong only to nations which esteem science, art, literature, and mathematics, like the Persians, the peoples of Mesopotamia and Syria as well as the Greeks. Nomads, who as a rule have no interest in science, art, etc., lack this desire.

The idea of Platonic love contaminated the Ikhwān al-Šafa as a result of their readings in Greek history in general and in the philosophy of Plato in particular. Plato advocated it especially in his Symposium. Sarton blames Plato and says of him: “Platonic love for him was the sublimation of paederasty; true love is called in the Symposium the right method of boy-loving.” The Ikhwān al-Šafa condemn this desire, however, in all fields other than education. Plato too seems to have condemned it in a later work of his, Nomoi (The Laws), at least twice.

9. Religion

On the practical side of belief, the Ikhwān al-Šafa speak of religion and laws. The word for religion in Arabic is din, i.e. custom or obedience to one acknowledged head. Religion is a necessity as a social sanction for the government of the masses, for the purification of the soul, and also because all people are predisposed to religiousness and piety. In this sense, religion is one for all people and for all nations.

By Law (Ar. Shari'ah or namās, from the Greek word: nomos, law) the Ikhwān al-Šafa meant what we mean today by religion. Laws (religious) are different to suit different communities, groups, and even individuals. These laws are dictated by the wise men of every people for the benefit of their respective nations.

---

Ikhwān al-Šafa

On this basis the Ikhwān al-Šafa declare that all metaphysical themes in the sacred books such as creation, Adam, Satan, the tree of knowledge, resurrection, the Day of Judgment, hell, and paradise should be taken as symbols and understood allegorically. Only the masses, who cannot think adequately for themselves, understand these themes in their literal and physical sense. Themes of a lesser magnitude, as “He sendeth down water from the sky,” should also be treated symbolically: water in this context being the Qur'ān.

The Ikhwān al-Šafa were not satisfied with any of the existing religions; they, nevertheless, urged everybody to select one of them. To have a defective religion is better than to be a disbeliever, since there is an element of truth in every religion. Everybody should be left free to embrace the religion he chooses; he may also change his religion, perhaps often too, though he is expected to look for the best religion in his time. He should refrain, however, from contradictory opinions and false doctrines: a wise man does not embrace two contradictory religions at the same time.

There should be no compulsion in religion; compulsion should be effected only through the laws. This is so because religion is a self-conviction felt in the heart. The laws of religions, on the contrary, are social orders, to abide by which is necessary for the maintenance of security and welfare of the community.

The Ikhwān al-Šafa formulated a definite attitude towards all existing religions, sects, and schools of theology. We shall content ourselves with their attitude towards Islam.

Islam is considered by them to be the religion par excellence: the best and most perfect of all religions. The Qur'ān overruled all earlier revealed books. It, being the last, confirmed in them that which resembled its contents and abrogated that which was contrary to its precepts. Muhammad, peace be upon him, is the head of all the prophets and the last of them. He is the governor of all governors; in him has God united the elements of kingship and prophethood, so that his followers may enjoy the worldly as well as the spiritual glories.

---

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The numbering of the verses of the Qur'ān followed in this chapter is according to Taafsir al-Jalāldin, Cairo, 1346/1927. There is sometimes in the long Surahs a slight difference in the numbering of verses (resulting from the division of a
Part 2. The Sufis

Chapter XVI

EARLY SUFIS*

DOCTRINE

Sufism like many other institutions became, early in its history, a fertile ground for imitators, impostors, and charlatans. The corrupting influence of these charlatans was regarded as a source of great confusion to all those who either wanted to follow the Path of Sufism, or wanted honestly to understand it. One reason why this was so was that Sufism by its very nature was a discipline meant not for the average but for those who always felt ambitions for something above the average.


The Kitāb al-Luma‘ is regarded as one of the oldest, if not the earliest, Sufi texts available. Its author is ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Sarrāj al-Ṭūsī who died in 578/1183 A.D. He is quoted by Abu al-Raḥmān (al-Sulamī) in his book Kitāb al-Luma‘ al-Makki, 1320 A.H. and the latter text itself is a collection of the older traditions and sources of early as well as later writers on Sufism. He is considered to be the first and the founder of the Qadhāwī School of Sufism.

Early Sufis

Besides these charlatans and impostors who put on the garb of Sufism and exploited the credulous and the unwary, there was another group of men who unwillingly became the source of corruption and confusion. Since a Sufi more often than not was a man significantly different from the average, it was but natural that some among the Sufis went so far away from the norms of their societies and communities that they created doubts in the minds of their followers regarding the legitimacy of the commonly accepted norms. Such doubts, if not properly tackled, could lead to the corruption of vast segments of the communities concerned, an inevitable result of which would have been either a widespread scepticism regarding the certitudinal and universality of the Sufis. No such condition could have resulted in the collapse of the moral basis of all Muslim communities, the latter could have resulted in the condemnation not only of the exceptional Sufis, but of all Sufis without exception, as deviants from the accepted norms.

Most of the early treatises on Sufism, like the one that will be referred to in this chapter, were written with two main aims in view: (1) to point out to all those who cared to read these works what Sufism really meant; and (2) to raise as strong a note of protest as possible against the current malpractices of the charlatans and impostors so that even those who may not have the time and the will to follow the path of true Sufism may at least escape the clutches of these charlatans.

The extent to which this two-fold desire of the early writers shaped their works is worth noting, because it is a measure of the dependability of these works. This is how the author of Kitāb al-Luma‘, one of the earliest, if not the earliest, Sufi texts available, Sarrāj (d. 566/1173), felt: "It is necessary for the intelligent among us that they understand something of the principles, aims, and ways of those who are the people of rectitude and eminence among this group (Sufis) so that we can distinguish them (genuine Sufis) from those who just imitate them, put on their garb, and advertise themselves as Sufis."

A History of Muslim Philosophy

"There are to be found (in our days)," he adds, "many of those who just parade as Sufis, point to themselves as genuine Sufis, and set themselves to the job of answering all sorts of questions and queries regarding Sufism. Everyone of these impostors claims to have written a book or two on Sufism which in reality he has filled with nothing but utter trash and absurdly nonsensical material in answer to equally meaningless and silly questions. Such impostors do not realize that it is not only not good but is a positive evil to do all this... The early masters discussed the Sufistic problems honestly and earnestly only to point out through their wise word the true answers to them. They turned to handle them only when they had severed their connection with the materialistic world, had chastened themselves through long and austere prayers, practices, and discipline, and had arrived at the clearest knowledge of reality, which knowledge found its full and necessary expression in their honest, sincere, and truthful actions. Such early masters used to be models of men who having burnt their boats of worldly affairs lived in constant contact with the Almighty."23 In his Kitāb al-Ta'arru', another very early work, Kalābādī (d. 378/988) wrote: "Finally the meaning departed and the name remained, the substance vanished and the shadow took its place: realization became an ornament, and verification a decoration. He who knew not (the truth) pretended to possess it, he who had never so much as described it, adorned himself with it; he who had it much upon his tongue, denied it by his acts, and he who displayed it in his exposition, concealed it by its actual conduct."24 In his Rūṣālah, al-Qushairī (d. 465/1072) too talks in the same vein: "There set in decadence in this Path (Sufism) to such an extent that both reality and the path were lost to men. Neither were the old teachers to be found who could guide the young seekers of the true path, nor were the young stalwarts to be seen anywhere whose life one could take as a model. Piety left us bag and baggage. Greed and avarice became the rule of the day. And all hearts lost genuine respect for the Shari'ah."25 Later on, the author of Kābi al-Mahjūb, 'All Hujwīri (d. c. 456/1063), came out even in stronger terms against what was prevalent in his days: "God has created us among men who give the name of Shari'ah to all that their base selves crave for, and who give the name of honour and science to all those tricks with which they seek worldly power and glory, and who call double-dealing the fear of God, and who label the art of concealing hatred of men in their hearts the virtue of tolerance."26 'Āṭār, who came much later, is perhaps, just because of that, more explicit than his predecessors: "Ours is the period in which this mode of talking (the truth) has taken on the veil of complete concealment. It has become fashionable with the charlatans to parade as the wise and the virtuous, and the genuine men of love and insight have become rare like anything. We are living in such times that the evil-doers have pushed the good and the virtuous into complete oblivion."27

The great concern for truth that all those writers felt came out indirectly also in the special mode of recording and reporting statements from great Sufis which all of them generally (and al-Qushairī especially) adopt. Practically every point that al-Qushairī makes, regarding every feature, major or minor, of Sufi way of life, is supported by him with three types of evidence: (1) Some statement from the Qur'ān, better than which there is no basis for any principle governing the life of the faithful. (2) Some hadith or some incident in the life of the Holy Prophet. (3) Some comment or some incident in the life of a great Sufi.

So far as the first of these is concerned, we know, the matter is very simple. Nobody can afford to misquote the Qur'ān, for the danger of discovery is always there. As to the second and third types of evidence, the risks of misquoting are always there. It was to avoid these risks that scholars of Hadith had devised the special techniques which came later on to be known as techniques of iṣnaḍ (the method of basing traditions on the authority of narrators), and Asnā' al-Rijāl (the chain of narrators supporting a tradition). The care that the Hadith-writers took regarding their iṣnaḍ and its various links was so great that it became the model of authentic reporting in all historical writings. Al-Qushairī follows this technique of Hadith-writing in practically everything he reports and every point regarding the practices of the Sufis he makes, to such an extent that nearly half of his long treatise consists of nothing but the iṣnaḍ.

B

Although none of our sources goes beyond the fifth/eleventh century, we have evidence, in these very sources, that people had started taking interest in Sufism, and in using the words taṣawwuf and ṣūf. Sarrāj starts by repudiating the view that the word ċūf is of recent (relative to Sarrāj's days) origin and that the people of Baḥdār were the first to use it. He thinks, on the other hand, that the word was current in the days of the Tabī'īn (the Successors of the Companions of the Prophet) as well as the Tabī'īn (the Successors of these Successors). By implication, he would say, although he does not verbalize it, that the word was current even in the days of the Prophet and his Companions, because, as he states explicitly, it was current in pre-Islamic days.

A History of Muslim Philosophy

To show that the word ǧīf was current in the days of Tābī’īn, Sarrāj quotes a comment from Sufyān of Thaur: “If it were not for Abu Hāshim the Sufi I would not have understood the true meaning of…”

It is easy to identify Sufyān of Thaur’s period if we were to recall the well-known story of Qādi Shurab’s appointment as the Qādi of Baghdad by the Caliph Abu Ja’far Maṣṣūr. Sufyān, according to Hujwiri, was one of the original four great saints and scholars of the day whom the Caliph had called up to select from among them the one who was really fit to administer justice to the people of his vast empire.8

To show that the word ǧīf was current in the days of Tābī’īn, Sarrāj quotes a comment from Hasan of Baṣrā: “I saw a Sufi going round the Ka’bah; I offered him something, but he did not accept it saying…”19

That Hasan of Baṣrā belonged to the period of Tābī’īn is borne out by Hujwiri who includes him among the eminent Sufis of this period.10 The exact part of this period to which Hasan of Baṣrā belonged is brought out by ‘Aṭṭār who mentions that Hasan was a child when the Prophet was still alive, and on growing he took ‘Ali bin abi Ṭālib or his son Hasan as his preceptor. Hasan had met, according to ‘Aṭṭār, a hundred and thirty Companions of the Prophet of whom seventy had fought at Badr. Hasan died in 110/728.11

Sarrāj anticipates the question why none of the Companions of the Holy Prophet was ever called a Sufi if this word was current during his time. He answers this question by emphasizing that since the honour of having the Prophet as one’s preceptor in person and having worked with the Prophet for the glory of God was in the eyes of every true believer the highest honour, nobody ever thought of calling the Companions of the Prophet by any other name. It was for this reason that the word ǧīf was considered to be the embodiment of all that was the noblest in a Sufi without his being called so.12

To show that the word ǧīf was current in the pre-Islamic days Sarrāj quotes from the “History of Mecca” by Muhammad bin Išāq bin Yaḥṣar, and from others, that there was a period in the history of Mecca when everybody had gone away from Mecca so that nobody was left there to pay homage to the Ka’bah and to go round it. During these days a Sufi used to come from a distant place in order to go round the Ka’bah in the prescribed manner. If this story is true, Sarrāj points out, then it is evident that the word ǧīf was current in the pre-Islamic days, and was used for men of excellence and virtue.13

Early Sufis

Having brought out that the word ǧīf was current even in pre-Islamic days, Sarrāj argues that it is derived from ǧif which stands for coarse woolen clothes which had come to be accepted as the conventional dress of the pious, even of the prophets, among the Semitic people. And to show that it was an established custom among the Arabs to refer to men by their specific conventional garb rather than by their specific attributes and traits, Sarrāj quotes from the Qur’an: sa gil al-kawāḍrīyyin, emphasizing that the Companions of Jesus Christ were referred to by their white garb rather than their virtuous traits.14

The two comments from Sufyān of Thaur and Hasan of Baṣrā quoted by Sarrāj as evidence of the fact that the word ǧīf was used by Tābī’īs as well as Tābī’īn, have been quoted by several later authors too. Dr. Zakī Muḥārak, author of al-Tāṣawwūf al-Islāmī fī al-Adab w-al-Ākhlāq (second edition, 1954), quotes the comment attributed to Hasan of Baṣrā from ‘Aṭṭār’s book ‘Aṭṭār’s book Nasr al-Mahāsin al-Qāḥiyah fī Fadl al-Asbāb al-Maqāmāt al-Ālīyyah, and the comment attributed to Sufyān of Thaur from Zahr al-Adab of Abu Išāq al-Ḥuṣayn (who must not be confused with Abu al-Ḥasan ‘Ali son of Ibrāhīm al-Ḥuṣayn al-Baqir, a pupil of Shibli, who died in the year 371/981 and from whom Sarrāj himself quotes quite a few comments). Even if these later authors had ultimately taken these comments from Sarrāj, which is not improbable, their quoting them at least points to the fact that they did not regard Sarrāj’s point of view altogether unacceptable.15

Sarrāj’s view that the word ǧīf was current in pre-Islamic days is supported similarly by abi al-Farāḥ ibn al-Jauzi, Zamākhshārī, and Frīdūzābādī. Dr. Zakī Muḥārak quotes the following extract from ibn al-Jauzi’s book Tālāb ibn as-Salāh: “Muhammad ibn Ṣa‘īd related to us from abi Išāq Ibrāhīm ibn Sa‘īd al-Ḥibal who said: ‘Abu Muhammad ‘Abd al-Gani ibn Sa‘īd al-Ḥaṣan said: I asked Wald ibn al-Qāsim: What is it on account of which a person is called a Sufi? And he answered: There were a people in the pre-Islamic days known as al-Sūfīyyah; they had given up every worldly thing for the sake of God Almighty, and had made Ka’bah their permanent abode, and place of worship. Those who lived like them came to be known as al-Sūfīyyah.”16

Kalābādhī mentions that there had been seventeen Sufi writers before him who had published the sciences of alchemy in books and treatises, and eleven Sufis who had written on conduct. Al-Qushairi states explicitly in one place that the word tāṣawwūf had been used by people before the second/eighth century: “Those among the Sunnites who took extreme care in keeping their contact with God alive and saving themselves from the paths of negligence came to be known by the special

---

8 Al-Sarrāj, op. cit., p. 22.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
12 ‘Aṭṭār, op. cit., p. 18.
13 Al-Sarrāj, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
14 Ibid., p. 22.
14 Ibid., p. 21.
16 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

name of *ahl al-tasawwuf*. And this name for these leaders of the pious became well known among people before 200/815.  

Men who followed the Path of Sufism had started using the word *ṣūfī* as part of their titles and names long before *Risālat al-Qūshāirīyāt* was composed.

Hujwiri traces back the use of the word *ṣūfī* even to the Holy Prophet; for example he remarks in one place: “And the Prophet, peace and blessings of God be upon him, said, ‘He who hears the voice of the people of *tasawwuf* and yet does not take their words to heart is listed in the eyes of God as one of the negligent ones.'”  

C

Sufism went through considerable development and modification as the Muslims came into contact with peoples of other races and cultures in the course of their history. Consequently, what came to be known as Sufism later on must be distinguished from what Sufism was in its early days. For, in spite of a great deal of what in later Sufism may be recognized as nothing but an elaboration of what was there earlier, it would be instructive to find out at least what the earlier form was. The ideal thing from this point of view would be to go back to the writers of the first and second/seventh and eighth centuries. But unfortunately the sources available to us do not go so far back. We will have, therefore, to be content with whatever can be culled from the sources available.

Qūshāirī makes a large number of statements about the characteristics of a true Sufi of his own day or of two or three generations earlier. Hujwiri holds practically the same view; only his account is more detailed.

One of the first things that Qūshāirī emphasizes regarding a Sufi is that he is absolutely convinced that of all the paths of life open to a man his path is the best. This is how Qūshāirī expresses it: “The grounds on which their path was built were stronger than the grounds on which the paths of others were established, be they men of tradition and culture, or men of thought and intellect.”

Having felt convinced that Sufism is the best of all the paths, the Sufi has to take a few decisions regarding his relation to God, man, and the world. For it is in the light of these relations that he can be distinguished from others. In a way these relations constitute the criteria on the basis of which a genuine Sufi could be distinguished from those who just pretended to be so.

Out of these three types of relations the Sufi's relation to God is the most important, because the other two, strictly speaking, are derived from and based on it. Qūshāirī makes the following significant statements in connection with the Sufi's relation to God.

1. The first and foremost thing is that one's belief in God should contain no element of doubt. It should not be contaminated with new-fangled notions and misleading concepts, and should be firmly rooted in self-evident facts. 

Doubt in this context means vagueness about the attributes of God and scepticism regarding His existence. Obviously for the Sufi to avoid this vagueness and scepticism is possible only if he relies on whatever has come down to him by way of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. That this is so is pointed out by the warning against "new-fangled" notions and "misleading concepts." What these notions and concepts were, one can easily find out from what both Qūshāirī and Hujwiri bring under the heading of Malāḥidah and Qarāmiṭah, etc. But what is most remarkable in this connection is the emphasis the Sufi lays on factual evidence, for he believes that the purely conceptual is not the only relation man can have with God; this relation can be experiential too.

2. A person's relation to God should be so thorough, comprehensive, and intimate that it would lead him to feel as if he lives and does everything not because he is doing it all, but because God is doing it all. In identifying himself with God he would go through the double process of losing his mortal self in Him and experiencing Him in every act of his own self. As a consequence of this the Sufi, from the very beginning, endeavours to have a life about which it may be truly said that it is a life with and in Him.

3. Another way of putting the point stressed above is that the Sufi not only stops referring all his acts to his mortal self, but he builds up the positive attitude that it is the divine will which must be accepted by the Sufi as supreme, not on this or that occasion, nor in such and such particular situation, but always, and in every situation of which his life is composed.

4. The Sufi's relation to God is a pure relation in the sense that it is a relation just between him and His God without any material link.

5. This relation rides man of all occupation with affairs worldly and mundane.

6. The Sufi must regard himself as having been created for nobody and nothing except God.

Regarding their relations to their fellow-beings and the world at large, the early Sufis were quite explicit in emphasizing that the *Sharī'ah* is the framework within which these relations have to be built and maintained. With this in view they enjoined on every Sufi to pursue all the sciences on which the *Sharī'ah* is based; it was enjoined especially that he should seek enlighten-
ment about the way the Holy Prophet lived his life so that the Sunnah might become the guiding light for him in everything he does and every relationship he builds. While the different schools of Sufis had each its own unique pattern of Sufi techniques, they were all agreed on one common framework of ultimate reference, and that was the framework of the Shari'ah.

Apart from emphasizing that for a Sufi it is necessary at every stage to keep the Shari'ah in view as the ultimate criterion, the early Sufis seldom missed to point out that those who did not care much for the Shari'ah got themselves involved in confusion and contradiction. The early Sufis were always anxious that their fundamental position must be clearly distinguished from that of the orthodox scholars and the theologians, as well as the innovators and the sophists.

The distinction between the Sufi's position and that of the orthodox theologian lies in the fact that the theologian regards the Law (Shari'ah) and Reality (Haqiqah) as one and the same, while the Sufi maintains that the two are so different from each other that unless one explicitly recognizes the difference, one is apt to commit a fundamental error. Reality from this point of view is a special aspect of God, such that man can never completely comprehend it, whereas the Shari'ah is a code of human conduct which man can and must aspire to understand and act upon as completely as possible.

The identity of reality and the Shari'ah which the Sufi attributes to the theologian does not appear to be easy to understand. Going by what one finds in the writings of the leaders of the four schools of Fiqh, one would say that the theologian is very logical and cautious in his views regarding the attributes of God. He would be the last person to identify the Shari'ah and the Haqiqah, for whereas the understanding of Shari'ah requires no special faculty other than the one which an average mortal requires for solving the problems of his daily life, the understanding of Haqiqah requires a special capacity with which the prophets alone are endowed.

Regarding the distinction between the Sufis and the innovators and sophists, it is pointed out that while the Sufis hold that the Shari'ah and Haqiqah, in spite of their theoretical distinction, always operate in intimate relation, the innovators maintain that the Shari'ah is operative only so long as a man has not established contact with reality; for whenever he does establish this contact, the Shari'ah stops being operative and becomes altogether useless and futile.

The broad significance of this distinction is that the early Sufi never regarded himself as completely free from the bonds of the Shari'ah. He never fared claim himself, as some of Carmathians and others did, as law unto himself, or as a lawgiver to others.

---

Early Sufis

Apart from these distinctions between the position taken up by the Sufis on the one hand and theologians, Carmathians, etc., on the other, the early Sufi felt the need of another distinction, and that was the distinction between his attitude towards the Shari'ah and that of the average Muslim. He held that, while for the average man of religion a large number of conveniences and concessions are permissible within the framework of the Shari'ah, there are no such concessions and conveniences for the Sufi. The latter does not believe in sparing himself so far as the rules and regulations of the Shari'ah are concerned. For him there is no “take it easy” in the Shari'ah. The early Sufi believed in an extremely high level of conformity with the Law. As there is no transgression for the Sufi, there is no relaxation for him. Even the relaxation permissible to others is a threat to him.

This unsparring attitude of the Sufi is not the result of his belief in asceticism per se. It is rather the logical result of his basic attitude towards God which is his starting point, and by virtue of which alone he is justified in calling himself a Sufi. The concessions given by the Shari'ah to an average Muslim are determined by his station in life in so far as he accepts the rights and obligations conferred or enjoined on him by the various groups of which he willingly accepts the membership. For the Sufi there is no such membership of social groups, to begin with; and, therefore, he can claim no special rights and obligations for the fulfilment of which concessions and conveniences within the Shari'ah may be necessary. This point becomes clear when one compares the attitude of the Sufi with that of the ascetic. Whereas the ascetic believes in the strategy of now sacrificing this asset or resource, now that in his search for good ness, the Sufi believes in an all-out bid to reach God. There is nothing too precious, too dear, or too delicate to be spent and expended in the Sufi's endeavour at reaching the fountain which alone can quench his thirst.

It would be easier to understand this attitude still further if we bear in mind why the early Sufi regarded the jihad with the self as the bigger and the more difficult and worthwhile form of jihad than the jihad against the political enemy with the help of the sword. For the Sufi engaged in the jihad against himself, all actions stemming from his narrow personal considerations lead to evil directly or indirectly.

This belief, that everything that is narrowly selfish and personal must directly or indirectly lead to evil, is closely related, in the mind of the early Sufi, to his attitude towards God as the only reality, which in technical language is known as tauhid.

It is the Sufi's acceptance of tauhid as basic and fundamental that helps him build the right type of relation with God without which there is nothing in his life because of which he may be called a Sufi. It would be necessary, therefore, to state clearly what tauhid meant to the early Sufis.

---

Ibid., pp. 182, 186.

Ibid., p. 217.

318
A History of Muslim Philosophy

A Sufi like Junaid of Baghdad believed that tawhīd means that a man has the knowledge, as sure as any scientific knowledge today would be, that God is unique in His timelessness, and that there is none like Him, and, further, that nothing and nobody can carry out the actions which He, and He alone, is capable of carrying out. On another occasion Junaid puts his ideas about tawhīd thus: It is the maximum of certainty with which you believe that all motion as well as lack of motion of things created is the act of God. Ja'far Ṣādiq explained tawhīd by saying: He who thinks that Allah is in something, or of something, or on something, commits the sin of making things other than God's equals, because if God be on something it would mean He is being supported or carried by that something, and if God be in something it would mean that He is encircled by that something, and if He is of something it means that He is in time and in space. Abu 'Ali Rūḏbārī expressed what tawhīd meant to him by saying: God is other than that which man's thinking and imagining makes Him out to be, because He Himself says in the Qur'an, "There is nothing like Him and He hears all and sees all." Abu 'Ali al-Daqqqāq, the teacher of Qushairī, puts his ideas about tawhīd in one pithy comment: Somebody asked a Sufi where is God, and he replied, "Woe be to you, you wish to see with your physical eyes where God is." Husain ibn Maṣūr thought the first step in tawhīd means denying the possibility of there being an equal of God as completely as possible. Ḥusayn regarded that tawhīd is based on five principles: (1) absolute negation of God's temporality, (2) complete assertion of the eternity of God, (3) relinquishing of lands and abodes, (4) separation from brethren, and (5) complete disregard of that which one knows and that which one does not know.

Explaining the third principle, Ḥujwīrī says: It means the forsaking by the disciple of the established ways of seeking comfort and convenience for one's own self. While explaining the last one of the principles, he says: Man's knowledge of things is built upon the answers to his own hows and whys provided by his own intellect, imagination, or observation; all that such man-made knowledge asserts about tawḥīd is contradicted by the true notion of tawḥīd, and that which man's ignorance regards as tawḥīd is contradicted by man-made knowledge itself. Hence tawḥīd is neither encompassed by that which man knows, nor by that which man does not know. Offering a positive comment of his own, this is how Ḥujwīrī expresses what tawḥīd means: It is the sifting and absolute distinguishing of the eternal from that which is in time, in the sense that you must not regard the eternal as subject to the laws which govern that which is in time. You must not regard being in time as in any way similar to not being in time. You must accept God to be eternal and yourself to be in time. Nothing that is yours, or is like you, can be attributed to Him, and nothing which is an attribute of His can qualify you, because there is no mixing of the eternal and that which is in time; the eternal was there even before the birth of the possibility of the becoming of that which is in time.

Keeping in mind the simple, almost naïve, formulations of tawḥīd in the comments given above, one cannot help thinking that the men responsible for these formulations were not so much experts in philosophical polemics, as they were practical men concerned primarily with the guidance of their disciples. None of these formulations can stand the rigour of logical analysis, and yet every one of the formulations can provide a framework of practical conduct. It is in view of this that, in spite of discerning traces of syllogistic pattern here and there, one must regard the efforts of the early Sufis as primarily the result of their training in the traditions of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, rather than the influences, Greek or Manichaean, of philosophical thought, to which men like Qushairī and Ḥujwīrī, and their predecessors like Junaid, must have been exposed. It took several centuries more for these philosophical influences to become practically the core of Sufi thinking. But during the period with which we are concerned Sufi thinking was mostly free of such influences.

The early Sufi believes that once he had set the pattern of his life in the mould of the attitudes and relations, described somewhat in detail above, he was ready to make a start in realizing his ultimate ambition, namely, the ambition of experiencing God in such a way that he might be able to say, like every Sufi: "What for others is just a matter of conjecture and vague hypothesis is for him there like the most certain entity, and what for others is a matter of conceptual understanding of God is for him something to be experienced as an existent about the reality of which there can be no possible doubt, so that he can sing with the poet:

"My night is aglow with the beauteous grandeur of the face,
While the darkness of night envelops everyone else,
While others are enshrouded in the pitch darkness of night,
I am experiencing the brilliant light of the day."!

But how he should make a start, and what exactly he should do after having made a start, are matters of controversy among the Sufis. These controversies are more keen and intense among the later Sufis than among the early ones. The intensity of these controversies among the later Sufis can be judged from the simple fact that, as we come out of the period of early Sufism and get

320

321
into the later period we find no Sufi who is not anxious to link himself to one of the orders like Qādirīyyah, Ḥijāṭīyyah, Naqūbāndīyyah, Qalandārīyyah, Ṣāḥībīyyah, Uwaisiyyah, Suhrawardīyyah, Malāmīdīyyah, etc. Among the early Sufis, on the other hand, we find practically no trace of such anxiety. For example, one finds little mention of such orders in Ḥuṣainī, though Ḥujwīrī, who came after Ḥuṣainī, shows a good deal of order-consciousness. This order-consciousness of Ḥujwīrī, which mostly probably reflects the order-consciousness of his contemporary Sufis, finds expression in a discussion of such orders as: al-Muhāsibīyyah, al-Ṣaḥīḥīyyah, al-Junaidīyyah, al-Qasīmīyyah, al-Salāḥīyyah, al-Rahūlīyyah, al-Ṣaḥīḥīyyah, al-Husainīyyah, al-Nūrīyyah, etc.

Without going into a detailed discussion of what among the early as well as the later Sufis constituted the basis of inter-order distinctions, one can safely say that at least one basis of such distinctions was just this matter of how one should make a start, and what one should do after having made a start. It seems every one of these orders, more the later ones than the earlier, had its own prescribed technique. That in Kālābīdī and Ḥuṣainī there is little mention of Sufi orders—and Ḥujwīrī discusses them with a good deal of keenness—indicates only that whereas the specific techniques of the respective orders might have been introduced in their rudimentary form in the days of the masters after whom the orders came to be known, it took several generations of followers and practitioners to recognize the merits of these techniques and give them their adequate and more or less perfected forms.

If one could, therefore, overlook the rudiments of techniques which some of the early Sufis might have introduced for the benefit of their respective groups of disciples, one could discover a large body of precepts which constituted the universally accepted techniques which all early Sufis regarded as indispensable. It is such techniques that Ḥuṣainī emphasizes in his chapter: “The Last Words to the Disciples,” and it is to some of these that we must now turn.

The first step which is regarded absolutely necessary by Ḥuṣainī in this connection is that the disciple should seek a preceptor and put himself entirely under his guidance. For, if the disciple does not do that and relies entirely on his own initiative and efforts, he is never going to succeed.42 The disciple who has no preceptor finds Satan himself acting as one.43 Without a preceptor no disciple can achieve more than the mastering of indistinct techniques of piety which by themselves never lead to his seeing the light and achieving an experiential contact with the Creator.44

The early Sufis regarded reliance on just one’s own initiative as misleading, perhaps because they considered the experiences of a beginner to be mostly theoretical, for when he thinks he is in contact with reality, he may actually be just imagining things; or he may be a victim of illusions and hallucinations. If it is just the disciple’s own insight, limited as it is in the beginning, and

---

42 Ibid., p. 181.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

The early Sufis' insistence on every disciple taking a preceptor raises some other issues altogether different from the ones we have discussed so far. The pre-Islamic Arab tribes insisted on certain groups of their members specializing in their genealogical trees, customs, war-records, naturally under some teachers. Likewise the early Islamic period saw schools of Tafsir, Fiqh, etc., coming into existence. The pattern of pupil-teacher relationship was, therefore, not altogether unknown to the early Sufis. But what the pupil in all these fields learnt from the teacher fell under the heading of knowledge in the usual sense of the term. He who had more knowledge and information could impart it to him who was prepared to sweat for it. The question arises: Was this type of pupil-teacher relationship the model of the disciple-preceptor relationship in the Sufis' special field?

There is no simple answer to this question. That the Arabs were familiar with the possibility of one's having knowledge of the phenomena other than the natural ones goes without saying. That the Jews and the Christians among them were familiar with the knowledge of the divine, distinct from the mundane, is also well known. But what is not clear is whether in the days immediately preceding Islam the disciple-preceptor type of relation was developed and cultivated in an institutionalized form or not. For, on the one hand, we have the Semitic Institution of the Prophets who by virtue, not of any ascetic practices of his own, but by virtue of divine blessing, is chosen to have living contact with the Almighty and, thus, become His agent for leading the Semitic people to the righteous path; and, on the other, we have the institutions of the Rabbi and the Rabbah, who by virtue of the ascetic practices to which they devote their entire lives can acquire some sort of contact with the Almighty which puts them above the average mortal. The Rabbi and the Rabbah in this sense are in the same category as the Kāhin of the pagan Arabs, i.e., men who through the practices they learnt from their masters were thought to have achieved a contact with reality which could not have been achieved by those who did not have the benefit of those practices. Of course, the reality with which the Rabbi and the Rabbah establish contact must be distinguished from the reality with which the pagan Kāhin established contact.

If one looks at the disciple-preceptor relation of the early Sufi against this cultural background of the Semitic peoples, it is easy to see how much of it is influenced by the Jewish and Christian practices. But that is not tantamount to calling Sufism un-Islamic. Strictly speaking, the Sufi disciple-preceptor relationship is as different from its Jewish and Christian models as Islam is different from Judaism and Christianity, for the roots of such models of relations go into the over-all systems from which they spring.

The Sufi disciple-preceptor relation would be un-Islamic if it could be demonstrated that the features which distinguish it from its Jewish and Christian models are not derived from Islam but are, rather, derived from sources other than Islamic. One could say, without going into further discussion, that these extra-Jewish and extra-Christian elements in the systems of the early Sufis were not derived from sources other than the Qur'an and the Sunnah. And one could cite, in support, cases like that of Shibli, the preceptor, and Husri, the disciple. Shibli told Husri in the very beginning of their relationship that if between one Friday and the next, when he had to come to Shibli, i.e., for one whole week, any thought of anything, or any being other than God entered his mind, his coming to Shibli was altogether forbidden.

The case of Shibli and Husri is instructive from another point too. It illustrates in a simple and concrete form what exactly the Sufi preceptor does for his disciple.

To think of nothing and to live a life involved in nothing but God, not only for one whole week, but week after week, is the least that is expected of a beginner. Such a way of life is easier described than actually lived. Life as an average mortal lives presents no parallel to this kind of involvement. For the Sufi, especially the beginner, in spite of his having selected the Path of Sufism, is still a member of a living society which does not stop making demands on him; and he needs attending to so many other things just to survive and remain strong enough to carry out the task that the Shafi prescribed for him even in the context in which he has put himself. To carry out adequately all this and yet let no thought other than that of God enter his mind even for the fraction of a moment seems, at the face of it, quite an impossibility. The only parallel one finds in ordinary life is that of a lover. The lover is seldom forgetful of his love in spite of all his activities of daily life; rather, he does everything ultimately for the sake of his beloved. Even so the Sufi does everything for the sake of his beloved, God. Once this becomes possible, acts not only like those of the prescribed five prayers a day, but even those remotely connected with praying, become acts carried out by him with God constituting the constant frame of reference.

The case of an ordinary lover is easier to understand for the simple reason that, as we all know, there is a lot within us which can never find expression or satisfaction without one's being in love. The person with whom one is in love offers a living answer to so many of the problems of the lover's personality that, without being in love with just such and such a person, the lover might have remained incomplete himself. In so far as there is this personal, specific, and concrete element in every lover-beloved relation, it falls below the Sufi-God relation. But in so far as every genuine lover-beloved relation means the living by the lover a life which, even when it does not appear to be lived for the sake of the beloved, is actually coloured by the tender thoughts of the beloved deep in the heart of the lover, the lover-beloved relation offers the only parallel in ordinary life for the Sufi-God relation of the type Shibli demanded of Husri.

How the Sufi comes to fall in love with God, the unseen, is one of the greatest
mysteries of Sufism. One may, however, safely infer that unless there is a preceptor this would be impossible for a beginner. The conceptual unseen somehow must be made experiential, for otherwise the Sufi can never have a more personalized and intimate understanding of Him than just an intellectual grasp of that which His logically defined nature can provide. One may say that the preceptor helps his disciple fall in love with God first by turning the intellectual acceptance of God by him into an emotional acceptance. Once the disciple has worked through this stage, and succeeded in converting his own intellectual acceptance of his Creator into an emotional acceptance, he is ready for the next stage, the stage of finding this emotional acceptance of the Creator so overwhelming that every other reality, social, biological, etc., is completely subordinated to it. And if one were to go into it one may find that these are just the first stages in the Sufi’s long, life-long, career in God. Since our purpose at present is not so much the detailed description of the various stages in the Sufi’s development as the finding out of how the preceptor helps his disciple in falling in love with God we will stop at this point. But before we pass on to the next point we must stress one thing: it is all very well to try to explain the preceptor-disciple relation in terms of modern psychology, but we must not overlook the fact that this in itself is no more than a conjecture. Instead of relying on such explanations the best thing would be to go back to the accounts of the Sufis themselves with an open mind. If and when they open their lips to describe how they came to fall in love with God and what happened to them from that point on, we must lend credence to their word, for otherwise we shall be left with no data on which to build our own explanations. Unfortunately, there is very little in the literature concerning the early Sufis which could throw light on the actual experiences of the disciple in his progress and development, and we have, consequently, to be content with just the hints we find here and there.

Even the most intimate emotional involvement of the Sufi with the Creator does not result in his losing the perspective of his material surroundings. Account after account of a genuine Sufi’s life will convince even the most sceptical that, if at all, the over-all perspective of a Sufi is more realistic than the perspective of even the most realistic of the ordinary mortals among whom he has to live. Keeping this in mind it would not be very difficult for any student of Sufism to reject the charge usually levelled against the Sufis that they are mostly unrealistic persons wrapped up most of the time in the pseudo-universe of which God, a distorted father image, is the centre. For the early Sufi, who was lucky to have met many of those who had the privilege of seeing the Holy Prophet and learning the Islamic way of life through their personal contact with him, God was the Being not of mere conceptual nature, but rather a Being who was responsible for the Heavenly Journey of the Prophet; the Being to whom in their hour of distress they could turn and call aloud: “When is Allah going to help us!” and the Being from whom they expected to get the response in concrete terms which their anguished hearts desired. For such early Sufis God was not a pseudo-father image; He was rather the most real and living Being, and the ultimate refuge of those lost in delusions and hallucinations.

But when all is said and done we must admit that the techniques the preceptor employs to emotionalize the disciple’s intellectual grasp of God are mystery to all save those who are lucky enough to enter into such a relation with a preceptor. All that we can do by way of making an effort at an intellectual and theoretical understanding of these techniques is to describe and discuss briefly such of the hints as Qushairi gives in the chapter mentioned above.

One of the first things which the disciple learns to do in order to establish his relation on a firm and operative footing is to put himself completely into the preceptor’s hands. This attitude of complete faith in and reliance on the preceptor may lead the disciple sometimes into actions which, to all intents and purposes, go against the most explicit injunctions of the Shari’ah. But the disciple, in spite of his awareness of what the Shari’ah demands of him, must obey the preceptor. This aspect of the preceptor-disciple relations has been emphasized by the early Sufis as much as by the later ones. And it came in for very strong criticism from the orthodox theologians. But, in spite of the emphasis the early Sufis laid on the role of the Shari’ah in their lives, they justified this attitude, of blind obedience of the preceptor, on the ground that it was just a passing phase in the development of the beginner, and a necessary phase because, without it, it was impossible for the beginner to get out of the personal and self-centred frame of reference which throughout his life up to the point he took a preceptor had been his only operative frame of reference. The way Qushairi puts the whole idea is: when the disciple has rid himself completely of the influence of his worldly position, status, and wealth, it becomes incumbent on him to set right his relation with God by deciding never to say no to his Shaiikh.46

46 Ibid.

Once the disciple has put himself completely in the hands of his preceptor, the chances are that he will soon start having experiences of reality which till then were altogether unknown to him. This first contact with reality might not always be conducive to happy results. Sometimes the novice feels the urge of communicating these novel and marvellous experiences of his to anybody and everybody just to test whether he still is in possession of his senses; sometimes he communicates with others to share his delight as well as his agony with them and seek strength from such a sharing of experiences; and sometimes he communicates with others because of some other emotional urges. All this is forbidden. He should keep his experiences of reality as his most precious personal secrets to himself and divulge them to nobody except his preceptor.47

47 Ibid.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Although the early Sufi writers have given no explicit reason for this injunction, their general tone suggests that the first experiences of reality of a Sufi are based on such a delicate relation between him and his Creator that unless extreme care is taken the Sufi runs the risk of losing all capacity for such experiences. It was felt that until the newly developed relationship between the beginner's personality and his Creator is properly stabilized he should be as watchful and jealous of this unique achievement as possible. And there is no way of doing that better than sharing all such experiences with the preceptor, for he can, through his identification with the disciple, lend him his own strength and stability.

Having worked with the disciple through these early experiences, the Shaikh finds out the strength as well the weaknesses of the disciple. In the light of this understanding the preceptor then selects one of the various names of the Almighty and takes him through an involvement with it in such a way that, by the time he finishes this period of training, he is completely influenced by it in everything he does. There are several stages in this which the disciple must pass through under the watchful supervision of the Shaikh. He first repeats this name of the Almighty with just his tongue. Then he puts his heart and soul into it to such an extent that it is not just the tongue which utters the name of the Almighty, but even his heart and soul utter nothing but this name. Then the disciple is told to keep engaged in the uttering of the name all the time and continue thus till he feels actually as if he is with his heart and soul occupied with and engaged in nothing but his Creator. It is at this last stage that the disciple achieves for the first time that involvement with the Almighty which alone makes it possible for him to go on in his endeavour to achieve an infinitely progressive type of involvement with Him.

The beginner's ability to achieve a view of the universe around him as nothing but that aspect of Being which is signified by the particular name of the Almighty, on which the master trained him, depends a great deal on the influence exerted on him by the master's personality. But apart from this there is a considerable amount of hard work which has to be done by the beginner himself by way of long prayers, series of night-long vigils, self-denial in food, sleep, rest, etc. This hard work which is planned and prescribed by the master has to be carried out by the disciple, however arduous and inconvenient it may be. To this hard work the early Sufis gave the name of mujâhadah.

The true significance of mujâhadah is realized only when one finds in the accounts of the early Sufis how much of the first experiencing of reality depends on it. Hujwiri holds, for example, that muâkâhadah (i.e., the first seeing of the Almighty with the mind's eye) can never occur without mujâhadah. One explanation of the significance of the beginner's hard work (muâkâhadah), in so far as it is a necessary condition for his first contact with reality (muâkâ-
A History of Muslim Philosophy

All that we are in possession of, therefore, in the writings of the early Sufis, regarding the states and relations through which they pass after the first crack in the barrier between them and their Creator, is a collection of care-coined and scrupulously selected terms which some of them employ to convey something at least of what they see in the course of their journey into the Infinite.

Two such terms are station (maqām) and state (ḥāl). Each one stands for a specific type of development the Sufi goes through. The basis of distinction between them is the same as the one between muṣṭafā and muṣṭafidāt. Station is the general term which covers all those stages which the Sufi remains the recipient so long as he does not falter and remains steadfast in his pursuit of reality. This is expressed by Hujwiri in the following words: Maqām is consequent upon one's own actions; maqām is one of the blessings; ḥāl is one of the blessings conferred on him independently of his actual actions."²²

That of the almost innumerable series of stations a perfect Sufi may achieve only a few, is explicitly mentioned by the early Sufis. But we know which is the first and which is the last, for Hujwiri sums up the whole thing in two sentences: (1) Fussūh (renunciation of all that is evil in the Sufi's life up-to-date) is the beginning of the series of maqāmat;²³ (2) riḍa" (absolute satisfaction with the state in which God keeps the Sufi) is the last of the series.²⁴

Hujwiri indicates, what he believes to be the true relation between maqām and ḥāl, by adding: Riḍa" is the last of the series of maqāmat but the first of ḥāl. This shows that in spite of the earlier impression that the series of ahwāl is the beginning of the series of maqāmat. This point of view looks to the Creator than to his own personal endeavours. This point of view looks to his Creator than to his own personal endeavours. This point of view looks to his Creator than to his own personal endeavours. This is the same as the series of states in which God keeps the Sufi of the Infinite, must of necessity be infinite as a series. The two series of the Infinite, must of necessity be infinite as a series. The two series of the Infinite, must of necessity be infinite as a series. The two series of the Infinite, must of necessity be infinite as a series. The two series of the Infinite, must of necessity be infinite as a series. The two series of the Infinite, must of necessity be infinite as a series.

The discussion of the maqāmat being a finite series of states, and ahwāl being an infinite series of states, through which a Sufi may travel, raises an interesting issue. Are we really justified in believing that the Sufi's ahwāl constitute an infinite series of states of development to which there is no end? Whatever else one might say in answer to the question, within the framework of the Shari'ah, the answer in the affirmative is completely ruled out. There must be a point at which the development of the Sufi must stop in order to remain short of the status of a nabi or a ruwāl (a prophet without a book, or the one with a book).

Another interesting point that comes out of the discussion of the early Sufi's concept of maqām and ḥāl is related to his attitude towards the problem of free-will. One can infer from the early Sufi's attitude, regarding maqām and ḥāl, that with regard to the former he believes in individual freedom and initiative as well as responsibility, and regarding the latter he believes that individual freedom and initiative can take him only up to a point and no further.

Another pair of terms that was common among the early Sufis was that of knowledge (ʿilm) and gnosis (ma'rifah). The difference between the two is brought out first by pointing out that, whereas the theologians (ʿulamā‘) make no distinction between them, the Sufis believe that the one must never be confused with the other. For the theologian all sure and certain knowledge is ʿilm; therefore, ma'rifah, in the sense in which the Sufis use it, is also ʿilm and nothing else. They consequently think that “the possessor of knowledge” (ʿilm) and “the possessor of gnosis” (ʾārif) mean one and the same thing. But, as Hujwiri points out, the theologians contradict themselves when they assert that whereas ʿilm is a descriptive term and can be used for God, the term ʾārif cannot be used thus.²⁵

The Sufis think that between knowledge and gnosis there is a basic distinction which should never be lost sight of. Knowledge, in their eyes, is that which in the last resort, when analysed, never takes us beyond empty verbal form; gnosis, on the other hand, is that awareness which when analysed ends up in direct experience of concrete facts, processes, and things. Knowledge, therefore, seldom influences one's real conduct, while gnosis can seldom remain without influencing it. From their point of view, knowledge is a rudimentary form of gnosis. Consequently, the possessor of knowledge may not at the same time possess gnosis, whereas the possessor of gnosis must have at one stage possessed knowledge.²⁶

Apart from this way of distinguishing gnosis from knowledge, the early Sufis tried to bring out the distinction in yet another way. This they did by emphasizing that, whereas in the case of one's knowledge regarding something communication is both possible and desirable, in the case of one's gnosis it is neither possible, nor desirable. In order fully to appreciate this distinction between the two modes of knowledge which the early Sufis regarded basic and fundamental one must keep in mind the fact that in their eyes it is only the knowledge of the ultimately Real which can develop from knowledge into

²² Hujwiri, op. cit., p. 223.
²³ Ibid.
²⁴ Ibid., p. 224.
²⁵ Ibid., p. 445.
²⁶ Ibid., p. 320.

330
gnosis; apprehension of other facts, things, or processes can never develop beyond knowledge and, therefore, must remain short of gnosis. Theoretically, this implies the impossibility of gnosis and the possibility only of knowledge of one’s own self. From this point of view, the attitude of the early Sufi so far as knowledge of reality is concerned is as different from that of the positivist as of any traditional metaphysician.

Another way in which Hujwiri tries to bring out the distinction between knowledge and gnosis is that knowledge can be acquired, while gnosis is a gift of God; therefore, it can never be a substitute for gnosis.

All these distinctions between knowledge and gnosis are summed up by Qushairi in what he relates from his preceptor, abu’Ali al-Daqqāq: Gnosis is achieved by one who has knowledge of the Real in all the various aspects and then carries out his dealings with everybody within the constant framework of reference to God, gets rid of his own base features . . . and does not permit even a single thought to enter his mind which attracts him to anything but God . . . who has achieved all this is known as a gnostic and his state is known as that of gnosis. Such a person achieves gnosis of his Creator in proportion to his estrangement from his own self. Keeping this statement in mind, one could say that the involvement of the gnostic with his Creator is an involvement as concrete and actual as one can think of; it is not mere conceiving of this or that virtue and just imposing on oneself the intellectual framework thus evolved.

Another pair of terms popular among the early Sufis is that of jana’ and bagh. As to the definition of these terms there is considerable agreement between the early Sufis. But when they come to interpret these definitions in detail, differences crop up. This is illustrated even in the attitudes of Qushairi and Hujwiri. Qushairi maintains, he whom the glory of reality overwhelms to such an extent that he observes neither in himself, nor in its effects, nor in the form of its traces and tracks, anything other than reality, is described as one who has achieved jana’; in respect of things created, and bagh in respect of the Creator. Hujwiri, on the other hand, maintains: jana’ is the complete loss of the mortal self of the conditions of his being, and bagh is his being lost in the vision of the Real. He achieves jana’ through the vision of his own actions and bagh through the vision of the acts of God. His dealings with others are coloured by reference to Him and not to his own mortal self. Hence, he who loses all that is mortal and finite in his mortal self achieves permanence proportionately in the vision of divineness of the Real.

This withdrawing from one’s own self, and everything else, into the Creator is easier to understand if we take into consideration an explanatory comment of Qushairi: So far as his evil actions and conditions are concerned, jana’ of the mortal self means his getting rid of all traces of these as completely as possible; while in respect of his own self and other persons and things, jana’ means just the loss by him of his consciousness of his own self and that of other persons and things as the frame of reference for his actions . . . for when he is said to have achieved jana’ with regard to his self and other persons and things, it is still recognized that his self exists and other persons and things exist too; only he has lost consciousness of his self, on the one hand, and of other persons and things, on the other.

Summing up all this one could say jana’ means the complete disappearance of three things: (1) the bad actions, tendencies, and conduct, (2) the low and base self, and (3) the world at large. So far as the first form of jana’ is concerned, the disappearance means their disappearing altogether from existence; so far as the second and third forms of jana’ are concerned it means that, in spite of the self and others still being in existence, the Sufi has become oblivious of their existence.

Hujwiri interprets jana’ and bagh still in another way by connecting the two with the unity of God (tawhid). Both jana’ and bagh are rooted in one’s being sincere in accepting unity, for, when one accepts unity one must also accept as being completely in the hands of God. One who is, thus, in the hands of Another has the status of one who has achieved jana’. Such a person must accept his complete helplessness. For him there is no other status than that of a person who has been made what he is by the Lord. So he must build up the permanent attitude of total submission (riga’) towards his Creator. Anybody who interprets jana’ and bagh in any other way than this, i.e., regards jana’ as the actual disappearing of the mortal self, and bagh as the actual permanence in the Real, is no other than a sophist.

That which distinguishes this comment of Hujwiri’s from Qushairi’s comments in general, and the one that follows in particular, is the consciousness of the corrupting influences that the Cummastians, Malikī, etc., had started exercising in his days. He wished to keep the definitions of jana’ and bagh as precise as possible, lest they should become tools in the hands of those who were interested in getting Sufism rid of its roots in the Sharī’ah and Tawhid.

This is how Qushairi describes jana’ and bagh in the comment particularly pointed out above: “When a person has achieved jana’ of his self, as described so far, he goes from the vision of his jana’ into the higher stage of his actual jana’ . . . The first stage in this ascent is the jana’ of his self and all its attributes through his permanence in the attributes of the Real. Then comes the second stage of his losing his status in the attributes of the Real and achieving a vision of God Himself. And last of all he loses his status in the vision of the reality by merging himself completely in the being of the Real.”
A History of Muslim Philosophy

One thing that, in all fairness to Qushairi, must be pointed out regarding this last comment of his is that in spite of his mode of expression being very much like that of the Malāḥad, the Carmathians, etc., against whom Hujwiri wishes to warn his readers, Qushairi does not mean to maintain that ānādī is the actual ānādī of the mortal self and baqīʻ is its actual baqīʻ in the Real as the Carmathians, etc., maintained. Qushairi, on the other hand, maintains, as would be clear from the comments from him quoted earlier, what in substance is maintained by Hujwiri himself.

Although there are scores of such pairs and groups of terms as have been discussed above, what has been said so far should be enough to give us some idea at least of what type of men the early Sufis were, and what went into making them what they were. If, on the other hand, we were to go into a detailed study of their mode of life we will not be able to do justice to it without taking into consideration not only their basic attitudes, as has been done so far, but even the specific applications of these to each and every little detail of their daily lives. The early Sufi was involved in his Creator in a relationship, an extremely pale example of which is the relation of the maddest love between two human beings. As the lover thinks of nothing, dreams of nothing, sees nothing, and feels nothing but his beloved and of his beloved all the time, a Sufi thinks of nothing, dreams of nothing, sees nothing, and feels nothing but his beloved and of his beloved, that is, his Creator. The result is that when one studies the lives of these Sufis, one finds that they take not even a single step in their lives without feeling sure within themselves that this and nothing else will please Him. How they should walk when they tread the earth, how they should talk when they mix with their fellow-men, how they should dress, what they should eat, what they should drink, what they should do when they get up in the morning if they go to sleep at all—each and every little detail of everything relating to these matters is prescribed for them. And the basic principle underlying all such prescriptions is that even the maximum of obedience, service, sacrifice, devotion, and love is not enough; so they should always regard the maximum as the minimum, and constantly strive for a devotion more thorough and a love more intense. It is this burning desire to lose oneself in the Creator on an ever-increasing scale in everything, major or minor, over the whole period of one's life, which distinguishes the early Sufi from everybody else.

Early Sufis (Continued)

Chapter XVII

EARLY SUFIS (Continued)

Although space does not allow us to go into the detailed study of the lives of the early Sufis we may yet give a brief biographical account of some of them who made a definite contribution towards the general doctrine which we have described in the preceding chapter.

A

SUFIS BEFORE AL-ḤALLAJ

1. Ḥasan of Basrah (21/642-110/728)

Ḥasan of Basrah belonged to the class of those who did not see the Prophet but his Companions (Ṣababah) and the Companions of his Companions (Tabi‘īn). Although he took no active part in politics, yet in his fight against the Umayyads, he was sympathetic towards Imām Ḥusain.

Ḥasan represented a tendency towards otherworldliness, piety, and asceticism in which the element of fear of God predominated. In a letter to ʻUmar b. ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz, the Umayyad Caliph, he said, “Beware of this world, for it is like a snake, smooth to the touch, but its venom is deadly. . . . Beware of this world, for its hopes are lies, its expectations false.” Later on, in the same letter, he praised hunger and poverty as symbols of the righteous and looked upon wealth as an evil which distracts people from their rightful goal. He regarded piety as the quintessence of true religion. According to him, it has three grades. The first is that a man should speak the truth even though he is excited through anger. The second grade of piety demands that he should control his bodily organs and refrain from things which God has forbidden. The third and last stage of piety is that he should desire only those things which lead to God’s pleasure (rīḍā). A little of piety is better than prayer and fasting of a thousand years. It is the lust for this world and avarice that destroy piety.

Ḥasan was so much overpowered by fear and was seldom seen laughing that when he sat he appeared as if he were sitting before an executioner. He was ever conscious of his sins and the fear of hell. He thought he would consider himself fortunate if he would be delivered from hell after tribulations of a thousand years. Somebody asked him how he felt himself in this world. He replied

1 see n. 33
2 See n. 34
3 Ḥ. A. R. Arberry, Sufism, pp. 33-34.
5 see n. 26
6 see n. 19
7 see n. 21
8 see n. 21
9 see n. 21
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Imagine a people in a boat which has capsized and everybody is trying to save himself by clinging to broken pieces of wood. Such is the real position of man in this world. 7

2. Abu Ḥāshim of Kūfah (d. 160/776)

Abū Ḥāshim belonged to Kūfah. There were people before abu Ḥāshim who were famous for their asceticism (zuhd), piety (wur), engagement in the science of practical religion, trust in God, and love; but it was abu Ḥāshim who first of all came to be called by the name of Sufi. The first monastery where the Sufis began to gather for exchange of ideas and mutual discussion about their mystic experiences was established by some wealthy Christian in Ramlah in Syria where he had observed some Muslim saints engaged in mystic exercises in the open.

According to Suflān Thaurī, abu Ḥāshim knew the subtlety of rijḍah (showing off) more than anybody else. Abū Ḥāshim once said that it was far easier to pull down a mountain with the help of a needle than to remove vanity and arrogance from one's heart. On seeing a judge coming out of the house of a minister, he remarked: May God protect people from knowledge that does not lead to the benefit of the heart. 8

All these incidents point to the fact that, according to abu Ḥāshim, inner transformation of the heart was the essence of Sufism.

3. Ibrāhīm b. Adham (d. 160/777)

Ibrāhīm b. Adham, whom Junaid of Baghādād called the key to Sufism, also advocated asceticism which, according to him, involved otherworldliness, celibacy, and poverty. For him a true saint is one who covets nothing of this world, nothing of the next, and devotes himself exclusively to God. 9 In the same strain he told a questioner who had asked him about his occupation that he had left the world to the seekers of the world and the hereafter to the seekers of the hereafter, and had chosen for himself the remembrance of God in this world and the beatific vision in the next. 10

He advocated celibacy and poverty as the prerequisites of true asceticism. According to him, he who adopts poverty cannot think of marriage, for it becomes impossible for him to fulfill the needs of his wife. When a Sufi marries, he enters, so to say, a boat, but when he gets a child, his boat sinks and his asceticism disappears. 11 A certain man was bewailing of his poverty. Ibrāhīm b. Adham remarked that he had paid nothing for this poverty of his. The man was surprised and asked: Is poverty a thing to be bought? Ibrāhīm said: Yes, I chose it of my own free-will and bought it at the price of worldly sovereignty and I am ready to exchange it once in a lifetime for a from the world. 12

In Ibrāhīm b. Adham we meet with the practice of courting blame (malāmah) for the purpose of self-discipline. Once he was asked if he was ever happy in his life by attaining his heart's desire. He replied: Yes, twice. He related two different events when people not knowing him mocked and jeered at his cost. 13 He referred to the principle of tawakkul (trust in God), but in his case it was a moral principle as enunciated in the Qurān, which does not exclude earning one's livelihood by one's own efforts.

4. Shaqiq of Balkh (d. 194/810)

Shaqiq of Balkh was a pupil of abu bin Adham. He developed and perfected the doctrine of tawakkul. 14 The story of his conversion to Sufism is revealing. Once in the course of his trade he went to Turkestan and visited a temple of idol-worshippers. Shaqiq told the people there that their Creator is omnipotent and omniscient and they should, therefore, be ashamed of worshipping idols which are powerless in providing them anything. The idol-worshippers told him: If your Creator is omnipotent and all-knowing, why have you come into this distant land for seeking livelihood? Can He not provide you in your own town? On hearing this Shaqiq gave up the world, went to Khorasan and became an ascetic. 15

Shaqiq interpreted tawakkul as negation of earning one's living. He once remarked that the efforts put in by man in seeking livelihood are the result of his ignorance of God's ways of dealing with men and, therefore, to work hard in order to win bread is unlawful (harām). 16

5. ʿArīth Muḥāsibi (165/781--243/857)

ʿArīth Muḥāsibi started his life as a theologian and belonged to the school of Shāfiʿī. He advocated the use of reason and employed the technique of the Muʿtazilites in controversies with them and was thus a precursor of the Ashʿarites. His career resembled that of Ghazālī's in some respects. Both had a complete theological education, were well versed in philosophical and religious problems of their day, and were later on converted to the Sufistic Path, partly under the stress of circumstances and partly as a result of their inner moral

---

7 ibid., p. 28.
8 Jāmiʿ, Nafsahāt al-ʿUns, pp. 31-32.
10 Aṭṭār, op. cit., p. 65.
11 ibid., p. 92.
12 M. Smith, Readings from the Mystics of Islam, pp. 19-21.
13 Hujwīrī, op. cit., p. 68; see also Aṭṭār, op. cit., pp. 65-66. The events related in the two books are different, but they lead to the same conclusion.
15 ibid., p. 127.
16 ibid., p. 129.
which a seeker attains after making necessary efforts to reach it; it involves all the obligations pertaining to the stage. State (ḥāl), on the other hand, is something that man receives through God’s grace without involving any effort on his part. In short, station belongs to the category of acts, while state belongs to the category of gifts, as stated in the preceding chapter.

Satisfaction (riḍā) is an attitude of mind which also, according to Muḥāṣibī, a man is able to attain through divine grace and not through his own efforts. He says, “Satisfaction is the quintessence of the heart under the events which flow from the divine decree.”

With regard to the problem whether an attitude of poverty (faqīr) or wealth (ghinā) is preferable for a mystic, Muḥāṣibī holds that the latter attitude is better. He argues that wealth is an attribute of God, whereas poverty cannot be ascribed to Him and, therefore, an attribute common to God and man is superior to an attribute that is not applicable to God. Similarly, his attitude in the controversy as to whether presence (buḍūr) or absence (ṣāḥbah) is preferable for the mystic, is that presence is superior to absence, because all excellences are bound up with presence. He says that absence from one’s self is a preliminary stage on the mystic Path which gradually leads to presence before God, and the Path becomes for him an imperfection after he has arrived at the goal.

6. Rāḥib al-‘Adawīyyah of Baṣra (85 or 99/713 or 717-185/801)

Rāḥib al-‘Adawīyyah of Baṣra was a famous woman mystic, well known for her advocacy of disinterested love for God. She was born into a poor home, stolen as a child, and sold into slavery. But her devotion to a life of piety and prayer enabled her to win her freedom. She decided to adopt a life of celibacy in spite of many offers of marriage by renowned mystics of her time. Once her companion suggested to her in the spring season to come out of the house to behold the works and beauties of God. She replied: Come you inside that you may behold their Maker. Contemplation of the Maker has turned me away from the contemplation of what He has made.

Rāḥib’s main contribution to mysticism was her doctrine of disinterested love of God which served both as a motive and a goal for her. With most of her contemporary mystics the guiding motive for asceticism and otherworldliness was the fear of hell or the reward of paradise. Rāḥib, on the other hand, tried to emphasize that a man who claims to attain union with God should be oblivious of both. ‘Aṭṭār relates that once some mystics came to Rāḥib. She asked: Why do you worship God! One said: There are seven stages in

---

14 Ibid., pp. 45-47.
16 Ibid., p. 146.
two different paths for the mystic to follow. The first path, lesser in degree, is to avoid sin, to leave the world, and to control passion; the second path, higher in degree, is to leave all besides God and to empty the heart of everything.\(^{23}\)

Dhu al-Nun interprets *tawaakkul* (trust in God) as opposed to reliance on intermediate causes and the use of planning.\(^{24}\) It demands solitude and complete break with the world and its people, and total and full reliance on God.\(^{25}\) Repentance, according to him, is essential for everybody; the common people repent of their sins, while the elect repent of their heedlessness. Repentance is of two kinds: repentance of return (*imālah*) and repentance of shame (*istikāḍ*). The former is repentance through fear of divine punishment, the latter is repentance through shame of divine clemency.\(^{26}\)

Dhu al-Nun distinguishes knowledge from certainty (yaqīn). Knowledge is the result of sensory perception, i.e., what we receive through bodily organs, while certainty is the result of what we see through intuition.\(^{27}\) In another context he says that knowledge is of three kinds: first, knowledge of the unity of God and this is common to all believers; second, knowledge gained by proof and demonstration and this belongs to the wise, the eloquent, and the learned; the third, knowledge of the attributes of Unity and this belongs to the saints, those who contemplate the face of God within their hearts, so that God reveals Himself to them in a way in which He is not revealed to anyone else in the world.\(^{28}\) It is this knowledge which is called gnosis (*ma'rījah*), the idea of which, it is claimed, was first introduced into Sufism by Dhu al-Nun. The core of gnosis, according to him, is God's providential communication of the spiritual light to one's heart.\(^{29}\) The gnosis see with direct knowledge, without sight, without information received, without observation, without description, without veiling, and without veils. They are not in themselves; but in so far as they exist at all, they exist in God. Their movements are caused by God and their words are the words of God which are uttered by their tongues, and their sight is the sight of God which has entered into their eyes.\(^{30}\) Thus, with Dhu al-Nun the highest achievement of the mystic is to get super-intellectual knowledge known as gnosis which involves complete unconsciousness on the part of man. In one of his statements quoted by 'Atṭār, he says, that "the more a man knows God, the more he is lost in Him." It appears that he had in his mind the mystic state which his contemporary, Bāyazīd of Bistām, designated as *fana'*.\(^{31}\)

---

23 Ibíd., p. 236.
24 *Aṭṭār, op. cit.*, p. 47.
26 P. Smith, *Rabī'ah, the Mystic*, pp. 102–04. Commenting on these verses, al-Ghazālī says: "She meant by selfless love, the love of God for the bestowal of His favours and grace and for temporary happiness, and by the love worthy of Him, the love of His beauty which was awarded to her, and this is the higher of the two loves and the finer of them" (*Ihya'*)*. See also *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, p. 463a.
30 ‘Aṭṭār, op. cit., p. 84.
32 *Ibid.*, p. 84; see also Hujwiri, op. cit., p. 275.
33 'Aṭṭār, op. cit., p. 86.
Bāyazīd Biṭāmī was a Persian Muslim whose ancestors were Zoroastrians. In his early life he was a jurist and was reckoned among aḥāb al-rū'ī, the followers of Abu Ḥanīfah, but later on he turned to Sufism. His teacher in mysticism was a Kurd. It is related that he associated with a mystic Abu 'Ali of Siid, who taught him the doctrine of annihilation in unity (fanā' fi al-tauhīd) and in return Abu Yázid taught him the doctrine of monotheism as embodied in the Qur'ānic chapters, Fātīḥah and ʿIḥlās. He was familiar with the Indian practice of "watching the breaths" which he described as the gnostic's worship of God.

For thirty years Bāyazīd wandered in the deserts of Syria, leading a life of extreme asceticism—with scanty sleep, food, and drink. He once said that a mystic can reach his goal only through blindness, deafness, and dullness. He seemed to be very scrupulous in the observation of Islamic injunctions and would not tolerate any deviation, however small or insignificant it might be.

In Bāyazīd's utterances we notice a distinct tendency towards monism. He tries to reach the divine unity by the process of abstraction (taṣrīḥ) till he is devoid of all personal attributes and feels himself as well as others submerged in the One. In this state of unity he gave expression to his experiences which remind one of the an al-haqq of Hallāj: "I went from God to God, until He cried to me, 'O thou I.' "Glory to me! How great is my majesty." "When I came out of my 'self,' I found the lover and the beloved as one, for in the world of thought, all is one." "For twelve years I treated the self (nafs) in me as a smith does with his material, heating and beating alternately in the fire of penance and with the hammer of blame (malāmah) till it became a mirror. For five years I was busy in polishing this mirror with different kinds of religious practices. For one year I looked within myself, and discovered a girdle of infidelity (zumādr) round my waste. For another five years I tried to remove that girdle till I recovered my true faith. Then I found everything dead before my eyes and God alone living." "What is 'ṣūra'? It is I. What is Chair (kursi)? It is I. What is the Table or the Pen? It is I. What are prophets like Abraham, Moses and Muhammad? They are I." Explaining it further, he remarked that whoever becomes annihilated in God finds that whatever is, is God. His negativism (taṣrīḥ) is illustrated by the following quotation: "Nothing is better for man than to be without aught: having no

asceticism, no theory, no practice. When he is without all, he is with all." A mystic should be in a domain where neither good nor evil exists; both good and evil belong to the phenomenal world; in the presence of unity there is neither command (amr) nor prohibition (nahi). Bāyazīd is the first Sufi who gives a detailed description of his mystic experience and calls it by the name of ascension (mu'arid), a practice which was later followed by Ibn 'Arabi and others. We give below a few passages from the account given by 'Attār in his Tadhkīrah. When I attained the stage of indifference (isquṣa) towards the things of this world and was lighted up by the light of God, several mysteries were revealed to me. I looked from God towards myself and found that my light was utter darkness in comparison with God's light, my loftiness was utter lowness; it was all purity there and all darkness here. But when again I looked, I found my light in His light, my loftiness in His loftiness, and that whatever I did I did through His power. His light shone in my heart and I discovered that in truth all worship was from God and not from me, though all the time I had thought that it was I who worshipped. I felt perplexed and received the explanation: All that is, is I and not I... I looked from God towards God and saw Him as the only reality. I remained in this stage for long, left all efforts and all acquired knowledge. Grace from God began to flow and I got eternal (savi) knowledge. I saw that all things abide in God. Then I was given wings and I began to fly in the air and saw strange and wonderful things. When He noticed my weakness, He strengthened me by His strength and put the crown of honour on my head. He opened the gate of the avenue of divine unity (taṣwīd) before me. Then I stayed in the stage of malakūt till the apparent and hidden aspects of I-ness vanished. A door was opened into the darkness of my heart and I got an eloquent tongue to express taṣwīd and taṣrīḥ (abstract unity). Now, my tongue came from God, my heart felt the effulgence of His light, and my eyes reflected His creativity. I spoke through Him and talked through His power. As I lived through Him I became eternal and immortal. When I reached this stage, my gestures and my worship became eternal; my tongue became the tongue of unity (taṣwīd) and my soul the soul of abstraction (taṣrīḥ). It is He who moves my tongue and my role is only that of an interpreter: talker in reality is He, and not I. My soul passed through all the world of the unseen. Paradise and hell were shown to it but it paid no attention to them. It traversed the different spheres where it met the souls of prophets. When it reached the sphere of the soul of Muhammad, it saw millions of rivers of fire without end and a thousand veils of light. If I had put my foot into them, I would have been burnt. I lost my senses through awe and fear. I tried hard to see the ropes of Muhammad's tent, but could not till I reached God. Everybody can reach God according
A History of Muslim Philosophy

to his light, for God is with all; but Muhammad occupies a prominent position, and so unless one traverses the valley of idh, one cannot reach the valley of Muhammad, though as a matter of fact both valleys are one."

9. Junaid of Baghda (d. 298/910)

Junaid of Baghda was well versed in theology, jurisprudence, and ethics and was acclaimed as a leader in the science of Sufism by the Sufis of all schools. He was perhaps the first mystic who explicitly expressed his indebtedness to Ali for his mystic knowledge, for Ali, according to him, possessed an abundance of both exoteric and esoteric knowledge ('ilm and ilm al-mah). He studied law under Abu Thaur and associated with Harith Muhsin and discussed different problems of Sufism during walks with him.

Junaid advocated the principle of sobriety (sabir) as opposed to that of intoxication (subr). According to him, intoxication is an evil, because it disturbs the normal state of a mystic and leads to the loss of sanity and self-control. In this connection, the conversation between Junaid and Hallaj, when the latter asked how the society of 'Ali b. Uthman al-Makki came to Junaid seeking his company, is illuminating. Junaid refused to accept him as his disciple because, as he said, association demands sanity which was lacking in him. Hallaj replied: O Shabih, sobriety and intoxication are two attributes of man, and man is veiled by His Lord until his attributes are annihilated. Junaid replied: You are in error. Sobriety denotes soundness of one's spiritual state in relation to God, while intoxication denotes excess of longing and extreme of love, and neither of them can be acquired by human effort.

This advocacy of the doctrine of sobriety made Junaid a model Sufi who was acceptable both to the mystics and the theologians, and it is for this reason that we find in him an advocate of religious Law. Nobody could raise any objection against him with regard to his apparent behaviour (zahir) which was in perfect consonance with the Shari'ah, or with regard to his inner state (ba'in) which was in perfect harmony with the principles of mysticism. According to him, only he can truly traverse the Path (farih) who walks with the Book of God (al-Qur'an) in his right hand and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet in his left hand. He preferred to wear the dress of the 'ulama' rather than mystics and in spite of constant requests by his disciples and others he would not like to change it for the woolen garb (khir) of the mystics.

---

Early Sufis (Continued)

According to him, the only safe path open to the people is the path laid down by Muhammad, for true and sure knowledge is the knowledge revealed by God in the Qur'an and enunciated by the Holy Prophet, as embodied in the Sunnah. Tawhid, according to Junaid, is the separation of the eternal from that which was originated in time, for, as he puts it, God cannot be comprehended by any of the categories of our phenomenal existence. Explaining further, he says that belief in unification is "that one should be a figure in the hands of God, a figure over which His decree pass according as His omnipotence determines, and that one should be sunk in the sea of His unity, self-annihilated and dead alike to the call of mankind to him and his response to them, absorbed by the reality of the divine unity in true proximity, and lost to sense and action, because God fulfils in him what He has willed of him, namely, that his state should be as it was before he existed." According to Junaid, the efforts of man in search of truth throughout human history have been directed towards fulfillment of the covenant entered by man in the presence of God and to return to the state in which he was before he was born. Most of the pantheistic Sufis look upon Ibils as their teacher in unification and regard his refusal to bow down before Adam as a testimony of his strict unitarianism. In his conversation with Ibils, Junaid asked him the reason for his refusal and received the same reply. But Junaid does not become an "advocate of the devil" like other pantheistic mystics, and points out his (the devil's) mistake in taking cover under God's will (ma'Nah) in order to violate his command (amr). Junaid said, "You lie. Had you been an obedient servant, you would not have transgressed His command," thus stressing the strictly monotheistic position that moral behaviour is the sina qua non of a truly religious life which consists in total obedience to God's command (wudiyah). He defines wudiyah as the state in which a man realizes that all things belong to God, that He is the cause of their being and existence, and to Him alone they will all return.

Trust in God (tawakkul), according to Junaid, is to maintain your relation with God now, as you had before you came into existence; it consists neither in acquisition (kash) nor in non-acquisition, but in putting your heart in tune with God's promise. Repentance involves three stages: first, the expression of regret at the wrong done; secondly, the resolve to avoid doing that wrong for ever; and, thirdly, to purify oneself of all dross, evils, and impurities.
Early Sufis (Continued)

and Turkcestan (as far as Maimun-Turjan), with a kind of apocalyptic goal (seeking the hiding-place of the Tlalqainyyn, the future Anfar al-Mahdi). Then he performed his last hajj; on the Yaum 'Arafah, he dedicated himself, at the Wāqfah, as a substitute for the shahibah (just as some Sh'ites think of the Martyr of Karbala as shahibah 'asim). Back in Baghdad, he began an extraordinary way of talking in the streets, about his desire of dying as sacrificed by the law for the sake of the Law (karnu aniin muhajjā, wa ana shahid). It was in the last days of Mu'tazid's Caliphate that a decree (futuo) was given against al-Hallaj for his queer way of proving his love for God by offering his life, by a Zahiri lawyer ibn Dāwūd (d. 297/909), the author of a charming anthology about pure love (Khitāb al-Zahrā'). But another lawyer, ibn Suraj, a Shāfī, saved him by pleading that mystical utterances were not to be judged on juridical grounds. It is said that one day al-Hallaj uttered the famous words ana al-Haqq (I am the Creative Truth), a kind of eschatological cry (named sīyâh bi al-Ḥaqq) in the Holy Qur'an. "Blasphemy," said the lawyers. Al-Hallaj himself explained it in verses: "Oh! the secret of my heart is so fine that it is hidden from all living beings. . . ." Involved in the Sunnite plot of the Caliph ibn al-Mu'tazz, al-Hallaj was prosecuted; he remained hidden in Susa near the tomb of Prophet Daniel, the "announcer of the Last Day," but was arrested in 301/913. The first trial under 'Ali bin 'Ism, the "good vizier," was suspended through the influence of ibn Suraj, and al-Hallaj was merely kept as a prisoner in the royal palace for nearly eight years and eight months. Afraid of Hallaj's influence on the Court of the Caliph Muqtadir, two Shāfi' leaders, the sakk ibn Raud Naubahki and his rival Shāhalmāghani, succeeded in persuading the vizier Hāmid bin 'Abbās, through his Shī'ah financial supporters, to reopen the trial on two charges. The first of these charges was that he was a Qārmāṣān agent of the Fātimids. It is true that Hallaj on grounds not political but spiritual did share with the Fātimid belief in the apocalyptic significance of the year 290 of the Hijrah, for in the esoteric alphabet 290 means "Maryam" or "Fatī." The second charge was that with the Qarmāṣān rebels he advocated the destruction of the Ka'bah and Mecca. It is also a fact that, while in Mecca, Hallaj did write to his disciple Shākir, "Destroy your Ka'bah," meaning in esoteric language "Do sacrifice your life for the sake of Islam as I do." The Qāḍi abu 'Umar Ḥamādī, a Mālik, insisted on taking this allegorical letter in an unjustifiable literal sense. And al-Hallaj was condemned to death, and "crucified" (maqṣūd, cf. Qur'an, vi, 124) on 24th of Dhu al-Qa'dah 309/26th of March 922. Curiously enough, this year 309 is the Qur'anic year of the "Awakening of the Seven Sleepers" (Qur'an, xviii, 25), celebrated by the Islam's elite Fātimid propagandists as the year of the coming out of the Mahdi from the cave of concealment (but al-Hallaj's disciples explained it mystically).

Al-Hallaj's crucifixion has been looked at by the Sunnite Sufis as the height (mi'rāj) of saintship; and many beautiful utterances are ascribed to al-Hallaj while on the stake. Naṣr Qushūrī, the high chamberlain, put on mourning

A History of Muslim Philosophy

B

AL-ḤALLĀJ

Al-Hallaj (abu al-Mughīth al-Ḥusain bin Mansūr bin Mahmma al-Baqīwī, in Persian and Turkish literature abridged as Mansūr) was a Muslim mystic and thinker who taught in Arabic. He was born in Persia, at al-Ṭūr, near Baqi’a to the north-east of Sīrāt in 244/857. Baqi’a was deeply arabiized; the great grammarian Simawahli was born there, among Harīthīyyah Yamani clients. Hallaj’s father, a wool-carder by profession, took the boy, a wool-carder by name (in Arabic word khalji means a wool-carder), with him to Wāsi’, an Arab city of the Ḥabībites with a minority of the Shī’ah. Wāsi’ had a good school in which teaching of the Qur’an was undertaken. At this school, al-Hallaj became a šīfa, trying to “interiorize” his recitation of the Qur’an, so that his “bismillah” could become his “fan”, i.e., his invocation of the name of God might unite him with God’s creative will. So did he begin the mystic quest. He became a disciple of Sahl bin ‘Abd Allah of Tustar (the founder of the Salāmīyyah school) whom he left in order to settle down in Bagdad, where he received the Sufi gown (khirga) from ‘Amr bin Uthmān Makkī’s hands. He was married to umm al-Ḥusain. It was a monogamous wedding, unhasken during his whole life. From her he had three sons. She already had a daughter from another Sufi, abu Ya’qūb Aqṣa’ ‘Aṣārī. The Kārnāba’īyyah, bann al-’Amr of Nahr Tirah, were clients of the bann Mūjahīgh (Tamīm clan) and political supporters of the rebellion of the Zanj, which raised the slaves of Baṣrah against the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate under a supposed ‘Alid (Zaidī) leader. Such was the beginning of al-Hallaj’s contacts with the revolutionary Shī’ah, contacts perceptible in the technical terms of his apologestics. Al-Hallaj, in fact, remained always a Sunnite, with a strong leaning towards hard asceticism in observing the Ramaḍān fasts and, when in Mecca, in performing ‘umrah, in complete silence (cf. Qur’an xix, 27) so as to listen to God from inside.

When he came back to Tustar, he threw off the khirga to deliver God’s message to laymen, scribes, and publicists, most of them case-hardened and sceptical. Some of them, of vizierial families, listened to him, becoming his friends (Sunna: Qannālīyyah: ibn Wahab and ibn Jarrāh), or his enemies (Imāmī: ibn al-Furāt and ibn Naubahkī), denouncing him either as a miracle-worker or as a trickster. Friends from Baṣrah induced him to carry on his apologetical mission among the Arabs colonizing Khurāsān, and among the ribāṭ of the muḥājīnān. After five years al-Hallaj came back to Tustar and, with the help of Ḥanīd Qumnsī, settled among workers of the imperial Dār al-Ṭūr (fashion-house) of Tustar (for the kiswa covering of the Ka’bah) in a suburb of Bagdad. Then took place a second hajj, and a second mission to Khurāsān.
clothes publicly with the approval of the Queen-Mother, Shaglab. And some Sufi witnesses, Qannub and Shibli, acknowledged his death as the seal of a most saintly vocation.

Though it was proclaimed after the year 309/922 that al-Hallaj had been executed in compliance with the unaniyty (i'jma') of the jurists (jadhal), yet a respected lawyer, his friend ibn 'Ata', had objected to this verdict and was killed for that. Ibn 'Ata's death nullifies this so-called i'jma'. The memory of al-Hallaj slowly spread afloat with beauty. Among the Shabtiyyah, ibn al-Muslimah, the very day he was appointed as vizier (437/1045), was seen coming to al-Hallaj's place of crucifixion (masjid al-Hallaj) and praying—a silent act of rehabilitation. Sufis have kept his creed ('jadhal') as a motto in their exoteric books (e.g., Kalabadhi, and Quhshuri); and they have his name "understood" in their esoteric ism (with his friends Shibli and Naṣr-ābādhi). Farid al-Dīn 'Atā'ī celebrated al-Hallaj's martyrdom as the "apex" of Sufism, and the great painter Behzād painted it for Bashqara in Herat.

Independent Muslim philosophers, Baqillānī, Manṭiqi, Abū Hayyān Ta'ḥīlī, and Abu al-Hasan Dailamī, set off the metaphysical originality of al-Hallaj's spiritual experiences. In spite of his adversaries classifying him among the adepts of existential unity (waḥdat al-wujūd), al-Hallaj has been proved to be a vindicator of cognitive unity (waḥdat al-ghubad). 'Abd al-Qadir Jilānī, Rāhīnān Bāqillī, and Fakhīr al-Dīn Fārisī have given convincing explanations of and commentaries on the doctrine of Unity, in spite of the subtleties of ibn 'Arabi's school. Jalāl al-Dīn Rāmī, and after him the great mystics of India, Simnānī, 'Ali Hamadānī, Masḥīkhī-Makhdūmī-Jahānīyān, Gisūdārī, Ahmad Sirhindī, and Bedil have considered al-Hallaj to be a believer in cognitive unity (ghubadī). In his Jādīd Nāmeh, the great poet-philosopher of Pakistan, Iqbal, stated that al-Hallaj was a kind of "Promethean" personage. L. Massinon also heard him say this when Iqbal gave him the privilege of a visit to him in Paris in 1351/1932.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Early Sufis

Al-Hallaj
Al-Hallaj, Kātb al-Taṣawwuf (with Bāqillī's commentary in Persian), ed. L. Massinon, Paris, 1913; Aḥbāb al-Hallaj, 3rd ed. of the Aḥbāb wa Manṣūf, collected

Chapter XVIII
'ABD AL-QADIR JILANI AND SHIHB AL-DIN SUHRAWARDI

A
'ABD AL-QADIR JILANI

Shahīkh 'Abd al-Qadir Jilānī (470–561/1077–1166) was born at a period when Malikshah the Saljuq (465–485/1072–1091) ruled over a vast Muslim Empire. This period is famous for great patronage of learning. It was during this period that the great Niẓāmīyyah University was founded in Baghdād by Niẓām al-Mulk. But after Malikshah's death in 485/1092, fight for succession started which brought about anarchy and disorder in the country. In 513/1119 Sanjar succeeded in securing the throne and was crowned at Baghdād. But after his death in 552/1157, there was once again the same anarchy and disorder. Constant wars between the different factions of the Saljuqs destroyed the peace and security of the Empire.

But there are two events which stand out prominently. They contributed much towards the disintegration of the social and political structure of the Muslims of this period. The first was the rise and gradual spread of the group of people called Assassins under the leadership of Hasan bin Shabah. Thousands of people, great and small, fell to the dagger of these fanatics. The second was the starting of the Crusades. The first Crusade lasted from 488–489/1095 to 493/1099. The Christian hordes succeeded in occupying
of man proceed from anything but from God, because if you say so you will become an unbeliever and belong to the category of people known as the indeterminists (Qadarīyyah). You should rather say that actions belong to God in point of creation and to man in point of acquisition (kaḥāb). But in a later Discourse (sixteenth), he points out that to rely on kaḥāb is ghīrakh, i.e., association of partners with God. There is a verse in the Qur’ān which refers to a particular episode in the life of Abraham. While denouncing idol-worship, he says that it is God who created you as well your handiwork (ta’malān). Muslim pantheists and determinists have always used this verse in support of their contention, rendering ta’malān as “what you do,” instead of correct rendering, “what you make.”5 Baqī Jilānī here follows the same line, arguing for total determinism, though he does not advocate cessation of all activities.6

There is another verse of the Qur’ān in which God says, “Enter the garden of paradise because of what you have been doing.”7 Here, the text unequivocally points out that paradise is the reward of actions. But this being incompatible with the creed of determinism, Baqī Jilānī hastens to add, “Glory be to Him, how generous and merciful of Him! He ascribes the actions to the people and says that their entry into paradise is on account of their deeds, whereas their deeds owe their existence to His help and mercy.”8

Good and evil are the twin fruits of a tree; all is the creation of God, though we should ascribe all evil to ourselves.9 There is, however, the question of undeserved suffering which a man of conscience has to undergo. Baqī Jilānī thinks that the spiritual peace which is indispensable for a mystic cannot be said to be complete unless he is trained in the school of adversity. The degree of the undeserved suffering, according to him, determines his spiritual rank. He quotes a tradition of the Holy Prophet in this respect: “We prophets are beset with the greatest number of trials and so on according to rank.”10 What is essential is to hold fast to faith for the ultimate victory of good over evil. This victory is possible not only in the hereafter but also in this world. If a man has faith and is grateful, these things will put out the fire of calamity in this life.

Men can be divided, according to the Baqī, into four categories. The first category includes those who have neither tongue nor heart. They are the majority of the ordinary people, who do not care for truth and virtue and lead a life of subservience to the senses. Such people should be avoided except when they are approached and invited to the path of righteousness and

---

1. Futūḥ al-Qāšīb, Discourse 54, pp. 102-04.

2. ibid., Discourse 10, pp. 23-24.


4. Futūḥ al-Qāšīb, Discourse 27, pp. 56-58. See also Discourse 13, p. 29, and Discourse 70, pp. 129-30.

5. Qur’ān, xvi, 32.

6. Futūḥ al-Qāšīb, Discourse 27.

7. ibid., Discourse 27, p. 56.

8. ibid., Discourse 70, p. 130.

9. ibid., Discourse 27, p. 59.
which is characteristic of pantheistic mysticism, though we do not find in the Futūḥ al-Ghayb this statement associated with the usual metaphysical implications that we find, for instance, in ibn 'Arabi and his followers. It is only an expression of psychological experience of the individual traversing the mystical Path. A man who reaches this stage acquires the creative power (takwūn) like God’s, and his ordering a thing to be (kun) becomes as effective as God’s.15

Shaikh Jilānī holds that mystic intuition gives the recipient knowledge of reality that is not possible to gain through reason. Not only that; vision (bashīḥ) and experience (mughābkah) overwhelm the reasoning power of man. This manifestation reveals two aspects of God: (a) His majesty (jalā‘) and (b) His beauty (janā‘), both of which are revealed to one at different times.16 But in another Discourse he approaches the problem in a truly empirical way. He says that the only way to know Reality is to look to the self (nafs) as well as to observe nature (ajjā‘). It is only through this approach that we can arrive at a true conception of God. He quotes with approval the following statement of ibn al-‘Abbās, the famous Companion of the Holy Prophet: "Everything reflects one or other of the attributes of God and every name signifies one of His names. So surely you are surrounded by His names, His attributes, and His works. He is manifest in His attributes and concealed in His person. His person is concealed in His attributes and His attributes are concealed in His actions. He has revealed His knowledge through His will and His will is manifest in His continuous creative activity. He has concealed His skill or workmanship and has expressed it only when He has so willed. So He is hidden in His aspect of ghaib (unseen) and He is manifest in His wisdom and power."17

Mysticism, according to the Shaikh, is not the result of discussion and talk but of hunger and privation. It consists of generosity, cheerful submission, patience, constant communion with God through prayer, solitude, wearing of woollen dress, globe-trotting, and faqr,18 and also of humility, sincerity, and truthfulness.19

B

SHAHAB AL-DIN SUHRAWARDI

Shaikh Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi (539–632/1144–1234) was born at a time when the fate of the whole Muslim world was hanging in the balance. The last king of the Saljuqs, Sultan Sanjar, died in 552/1157. Soon after the Ghuzz came on the scene, and carried fire and sword wherever they went; peace was, however, restored by the Khwārizm Shāh. But in 615/1218 started

10 Ibid., Discourse 10, p. 23–26. See also Discourse 18, p. 40.
11 Ibid., Discourse 33, pp. 66–69. See also Discourse 77 where a different division is presented.
12 Ibid., Discourse 40, p. 81, and Discourse 17, p. 37.
the Mongol invasion under Chingiz Khan. One town after another was ravaged and people were indiscriminately massacred. There was nobody to check this advance. The people had lost all morale.

It was during this period of insecurity and fear that Shaikh Suhrwardi lived. He died in 624/1226 eight years after the death of Chingiz Khan. These events must have influenced the mind of the Shaikh; hence the note of pessimism often met with in his work ‘A’udur’i al-Ma’arij, in which he expresses with a sad heart the decline in moral character of his contemporaries. He passed the major part of his life at Baghdad where he now lies buried. He founded the school of mysticism which is known as Suhrwardiyyah after his name. His work ‘A’udur’i al-Ma’arij is a standard treatise on mysticism extensively used in all mystical circles.

Origin of Sufism.—According to him, the word şuﬁ is etymologically derived from ‘şuf’, the coarse woolen cloth which, as he says, was worn by the Holy Prophet. He enumerates several other views: (i) The Sufis are those who stand in the first rank (şufa) before God; (ii) the word was originally şa’fwa and was later on changed into şuﬁ; (iii) it was derived from şuﬁa, the mound where a group of Muslims used to spend their time in religious learning and ascetic ways of life. According to Suhrwardi, these derivations are etymologically incorrect, though with regard to the third it may be said that the life led by the people of the şuﬁa resembled the pattern of life adopted by the Sufis. He also refers to a particular group of the people of Khurasan21 who used to live in caves far off from inhabited places. They were called Şuqafatiyyah, from Şuqafat, the name of the cave. The people of Syria used to call them Jan’iyyah.

A detailed discussion about the origin of the word şuﬁ has already been given in Chapter XVI, where, on the authority of Sarraj, it has been maintained that the word şuﬁ was in use in Arabia even in pre-Islamic days. Suhrwardi, however, thinks that this word was not used in the time of the Holy Prophet. According to some people, it became current during the third generation after the Prophet (Taba Tabi’in). According to others, it came into use in the third century of the Hijrah. The titles of Şahibah (Companions of the Prophet) and Taba’in (their Successors) were held in great esteem and, therefore, the word şuﬁ—a title of honour, no doubt—did not make its appearance during their times. But when these peaceful times disappeared and gave place to turbulent periods of unrest and political intrigue, pious people found it convenient for their peace of mind to shun society and live in seclusion and pass their time in meditation and spiritual exercises.22

What is Sufism?—Suhrawardi tries to establish a very intimate relationship between Sufism and knowledge. According to him, knowledge that is followed by moral behaviour is the main characteristic of Suﬁ life. Such knowledge is called by him Fiqh which is not used in the usual legal sense but for spiritual insight as it is used in the Qurʾan. He refers to several Qurʾanic verses to prove this point. First, he quotes the verse: “He (God) taught man what he did not know,”24 and concludes that the spiritual status of man is based solely on knowledge.25 Secondly, he holds that Sufs are the people who acquire spiritual insight into religion and this helps them lead people to the right path. This spiritual perception, according to him, pertains to the sphere of the heart and not to the sphere of the head.26 He argues that, according to the Qurʾan, knowledge and moral uprightness are the characteristics of the truly learned persons. He holds that knowledge is the consequence of taqwa, i.e., piety and moral integrity. In a verse it is said that “those of His servants only who are possessed of knowledge have taqwa.”27 This verse is very significant in establishing the relationship between knowledge and moral behaviour, for, as Suhrwardi puts it,27 it excludes knowledge from those who are not characterized by moral integrity (taqwa).

But to what kind of knowledge does Suhrwardi refer? In this connection he enumerates different views. According to some, it is the knowledge of the psychological states of an individual, for, without this kind of knowledge, it is contended, it is not possible for a person to distinguish between different types of revelations and experiences.28 According to others, it is the knowledge concerning worldly matters, for, without proper information in this respect, a person is liable to be misled in his religious pursuits. According to Abu Taib of Mecca, it is the knowledge of the five religious duties of a Muslim. But, according to Suhrwardi himself, the knowledge which is incumbent on all Muslims is the knowledge of religious commandments and prohibitions. And yet true knowledge, which manifests itself in practice and moulds and informs the life of the individual possessing that knowledge, is not formal knowledge that is imparted in schools and colleges but a state of the heart that grasps the truth of things without thereby becoming the master of details. Such a person is called in the Qurʾan the one firmly rooted in knowledge (raḥīkh fi al-im).29 He calls it the knowledge which one receives as a legacy (‘ilm

21 According to the tradition transmitted by Ana b. Mālik; cf. ‘A’udur’i al-Ma’arij, Chap. 6.
22 Khurasan had been one of the centres of Buddhist missionaries before Islam where, it seems, people adopted the practices of Buddhist Bhikkhus in later times.
absolute majdhub. People belonging to these two categories do not deserve to be adopted as spiritual guides. The absolute ascetic retains the consciousness of self to the last. He starts with ascetic practices but, unfortunately, he is not able to ascend to the stage of islah. The absolute majdhub, on the other hand, receives through divine grace a little illumination, and some veils from the face of Reality (God) are removed for him, but he does not put in the requisite labour that forms an indispensable part of mystic discipline. (3) First alldh and afterwards majdhub. Such a person is fit for becoming a guide. He starts with ascetic practices and reaches the goal of his endeavour, viz., spiritual illumination, which relieves him of the severity of his earlier discipline. He becomes the repository of divine wisdom. (4) But the most perfect stage, according to him, is the fourth, viz., first majdhub and afterwards alldh. Such a person receives divine illumination in the beginning and veils are removed from his heart. His interest in the material world vanishes and he looks towards the spiritual world with eagerness and joyful expectations. This inner transformation affects his outward life and the antagonism between love and Law ceases for him. His outward and inward life, this world and the other world, wisdom and power, all become one. His faith is so deep that even if all the veils that hide the face of the Real were removed, he will gain nothing thereby.34

Suhrawardi makes a distinction between a person of the third rank and a person of the fourth rank. The former who follows the path of a lover (mubadda) is freed from the bonds of the lower self (nafs) but is tied down in the bondage of the heart. The latter who traverses the way of the Beloved (Majdhub) is freed both from the lower self and the heart.35 Again, the former follows the forms of action (fa'ar al-aman) and thinks that just as a man cannot do without a body so long as he is alive, so action of one sort or other is indispensable for him. But the man belonging to the fourth category passes beyond all these. He leaves behind everything—lower self (nafs), heart, states, and actions—and achieves complete unity with God to the extent that God becomes his ears and eyes so that he hears with God's ears and sees with God's eyes.36

Sufism covers both poverty (fugr) and continence (zakhd), but is identical with neither. Fugr is a difficult term to translate. Usually it means poverty, but in mystic morality it signifies the positive attitude of total independence from worldly needs. Suhrawardi quotes different definitions and descriptions of fugr in Sufism given by several eminent mystics. Rumi says that Sufism is based on three principles, the first of which is attachment to poverty. Mar'if of Karshay says that he who does not possess fugr is not a Sufi. Fugr, according

**A History of Muslim Philosophy**

al-sirrih from the prophets and saints. He distinguishes it from the knowledge gained through formal education (ilm al-didash).33 Their relation, according to him, is like the relation of butter and milk. It is not milk but butter that is the object of man. We take milk only because it yields butter and fat. This type of knowledge is usually divided into three stages: knowledge by inference, knowledge by perception (or observation), and knowledge by personal experience or intuition (ilm al-yaqin, ans al-yqin, and lugh al-yqin). A person who attains to the stage of intuition, though less careful in observing ritualistic formalities, is far superior to a man who has many ritualistic practices to his credit but whose knowledge is not of the highest type.34

Sufism, according to Suhrawardi, is characterized by two things. It consists in following the practice of the Holy Prophet (Sassanah) and in inculcating purity of natures and attaining the highest integrity of character. There are two different categories of Sufis. The first includes those persons in whom mystical illumination (kashf) is followed by exercise of personal effort (fitraih). He quotes the example of Pharaoh's magicians when they realized the spiritual nature of Moses in conjunction with their petty tricks, they were overwhelmed by the effulgence of spiritual illumination as a result of which they decided there and then to break with the Pharaoh in favour of Moses. This decision of theirs for which they willingly bore all the terrible consequences with which the Pharaoh threatened them came to them with an ease that follows spiritual illumination. To the second category belong those people who lead a hard ascetic life spending, their days in prayers and nights in meditation. It is only after a long struggle spread over days, months, and years that they receive divine illumination. Here illumination is the fruit and crowns of personal efforts and hard ascetic life. He quotes a saying of Jannai: "We did not gain access to the holy domain of Sufism through discursive reasoning or intellectual discussion but through hunger, abdication of worldly lust and prestige, and discarding of even lawful things."

There are two other kinds of people usually called Sufis but, according to Suhrawardi, they cannot be included among mystics at all. The first are the majdhubi, i.e., those who receive spiritual illumination through divine grace but cannot reap the full fruit of their illumination because they are not able to supplement it with their personal efforts. The others are the ascetics, who spend their whole life in self-mortification and meditation but whose efforts are not crowned with illumination.35

In another place, discussing the qualities of a spiritual guide, he divides persons into four categories: (1) Pure or absolute ascetic (alldh); (2) Pure or

33 `Awafri al-Ma'arif, Chap. 9, p. 21; Chap. 6, p. 14; Chap. 25, p. 50.
34 `Ibid., Chap. 3, p. 54.
35 `Ibid., pp. 61-64. He adds that any revocation or ecstatic experience (kashf or awqat) which is contrary to the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet is unacceptable to the Sufis.
37 He defines nafs as a dark earthly veil and qalb as a veil of heavenly light.
38 `Awafri al-Ma'arif, Chap. 16, pp. 103-07.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

to Shibli, is indifference towards all except God.\textsuperscript{34} According to usage of the terms in Syria,\textsuperscript{37} there is no difference between Sufism and \textit{fagr}. They argue on the basis of the Qur'\'anic verse that "the books are for the poor (\textit{fuwārā}) who have devoted themselves to the way of God,"\textsuperscript{38} which, according to them, is the description of the Sufis. But Suhrawardi disagrees with this view. He thinks that a person's constant attachment to poverty and fear of riches is a sign of weakness; it amounts to reliance on external causes and conditions and dependence on expected reward. But a true Sufi is above all these things. He is motivated neither by fear nor by rewards; he is above all such limitations. Again, adoption of poverty and avoidance of riches imply exercise of personal will and freedom of choice which is contrary to the spirit of Sufism. A true Sufi has subjected his will to the will of God and, therefore, he sees no difference in poverty or riches.

Sufism is, thus, distinct from \textit{fagr}, though the latter forms the basis of the former in the sense that the way to Sufism passes through \textit{fagr}, not in the sense that both are identical or indispensable to each other. The same is the case with asceticism (\textit{zuhd}), which may be a preparatory stage for Sufism but cannot be identified with it at all. There is a Qur'\'anic verse which says to the believers, \textit{36} be "upright (\textit{qaswāna}) for Allah and bearer of witness with justice".\textsuperscript{39} This uprightness (\textit{qaswāna}) is, according to Suhrawardi, the essence of Sufism. There are three stages in the mystic process: first, faith (\textit{imān}); secondly, knowledge (\textit{ilm}); and lastly, intiyya (\textit{dārug}). When a person is at the first stage, he is called "one who is like a true Sufi in appearance and dress (\textit{mutashābih})." When he attains to the second stage, he is called "one who pretends to be a Sufi (\textit{mutaṣawwaf})." Only he who reaches the last stage deserves to be called a true Sufi.\textsuperscript{40} Suhrawardi again refers to a Qur'\'anic verse\textsuperscript{41} where three different kinds of persons are mentioned who have been chosen by God as the repositories (\textit{wāarih}) of the knowledge of the Book: "Of them is he who makes his soul suffer a loss, of them is he who takes a middle course, and of them is he who is foremost in deeds of goodness." The Qur'\'an uses the word \textit{zālim} for the first, \textit{muqtaṣid} for the second, and \textit{sābiq} for the third. According to some, \textit{zālim} is the ascetic (\textit{ṣāhid}), \textit{muqtaṣid} is a gnostic (\textit{ṣarif}), and \textit{sābiq} is the lover (\textit{muḥabb}) of the Qur'\'an. According to others, the first is one who picks up the book of God, the second one is the one who patiently bears it, while the third feels positive pleasure in it. According to another version, the first are those who worship God carelessly and as a matter of routine, the second do it with hope and fear, while the third are those who do not forget God at any time. These three categories are identical with the three types of mystics: \textit{Mutaṣhabb}, \textit{Mutaṣawwaf} and the Sufi, respectively.\textsuperscript{42}

He refers to two other groups. The first are Malikī people who do not manifest good deeds and do not hide evil. But they are inferior to a true Sufi who is so engrossed in his experiences and illumination that he does not know what to hide and what to manifest.\textsuperscript{43} The second are Qandārī people who are people of integrity but who do not subject themselves to full ascetic discipline. They have no ambition for further spiritual progress and lead a life of happiness and contentment.\textsuperscript{44}

He mentions a group of people who claim that \textit{Shari'ah} (the religious Law) is binding only up to a certain stage. When reality manifests itself to a gnostic, the bonds of the Law disappear. Suhrawardi holds that these are misguided people, for Law and reality (\textit{Shari'ah} and \textit{Haqq}) are not antagonistic but interdependent. He who enters the sphere of reality (\textit{Haqq}) becomes bound to the rank of slavery (\textit{ubdūyīya}). Those who subscribe to the doctrine of incarnation (\textit{bulūl}) and employ the Christian terms \textit{lāhū} and \textit{nāsūt} without understanding their real significance are all misguided people. He holds that the saying attributed to Bāyāzīd, viz., \textit{subḥānā, ma'āramu šāhīn} (all praise to me, how exalted is my position!), if spoken by him at all must have been said about God and not about himself as is commonly held. The \textit{ana al-'Iraq} (I am the Truth) of Ḥallāj must be similarly interpreted according to the true intention of the statement. Suhrawardi adds that if it were known that Ḥallāj by this statement implied incarnation (\textit{bulūl}), he would condemn him outright.

There are some people who think that they receive words from God and often converse with Him, and, as a result of this conversation, they claim to receive messages which they attribute to God. Such people, according to Suhrawardi, are either ignorant of the true nature of their experience or are deceived by their intellectual conceit. The words they hear are mere words which appear in their mind and in no way can be attributed to God. Such things

---

\textsuperscript{34} One mystic, abu al-Muṣaffar Fārsī, said that \textit{fagr} is one who is independent even of God. Such a saying is, of course, a blasphemy, but almost all mystics have tried to explain away its sting. Quṣāhī in his \textit{Risālah} and Suhrawardi in his book both try to justify this saying, but Ibn al-Qayyim is not satisfied with any of these explanations and rejects this definition in its totality. See \textit{Ibn al-Farāh al-Qāyim}, \textit{al-Ṭibā' al-Bāgī} (Agency, Lahore, pp. 124-25).

\textsuperscript{37} Syria here does not stand for the geographical area which is now called Syria. Previously, nearly all the land now including Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, etc., was called Syria.

\textsuperscript{38} Qur'ān, ii, 278.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibn \textit{Maṣ'ūd}, v. 8.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Awṣārij al-Maṣ'ūrij,} Chap. 7, pp. 80 ff.

\textsuperscript{41} Qur'ān, xxv, 32.
defending both these principles in spite of his view that they are not in complete accord with the Islamic way of life, as enunciated by the Qur'ān and sanctioned by the Holy Prophet. While discussing begging, he refers to several traditions which prohibit a man from begging and yet he insists that a Sufl who is engaged in a life of total dedication to the Qur'ān (rememberance of God) is compelled to satisfy his minimum physical needs of hunger and thirst by resort to begging. For justifying his point of view he misinterprets the traditions. There is a saying of the Prophet that the most lawful of foods for a Muslim is what he earns by his own hands. Many mystics tried to explain it away by holding that "earning by hand" means stretching hand in prayer to God for sending them food through other persons. He refers to Abu Tahir of Mecca who rejected this misinterpretation and still clings to it.53 There is another tradition according to which the upper hand (of the giver) is better than the lower hand (of the beggar). But Suhrawardi, following Hajwiri, interprets it again in his own way. According to him, the upper hand is the hand of the beggar who by receiving alms gives blessing to the alms-giver.54 Similarly, discussing the question of celibacy, he wavers between the two positions. On the one hand, he feels inclined towards celibacy as a logical consequence of the conception of mystics that he holds. On the other hand, there are many traditions to the effect that he who does not marry does not belong to the Muslim community. Ultimately, he leaves the question to the discretion of the individual mystic or to the advice of the spiritual guide.55

On the question of listening to music, again, his attitude is non-committal. On the one hand, he quotes several eminent Sufis who were fond of music and who referred to several traditions in their support. On the other hand, there were several eminent persons who did not like it because, according to them, there was no scriptural support for it. While discussing the question of musical assemblies, he points out that some people look upon these assemblies as innovations. But he adds that not all innovations are religiously blameworthy and, therefore, the question under discussion cannot be decided on this ground.56 Again, he quotes a tradition in support of the mystic dance (zawj) and tearing of the mystic robe (jāp) in these assemblies and yet adds that traditions invariably reject them as unlawful.57 and, therefore, the matter stands where it is. But on the whole he seems to be in favour of music.58

With regard to travel, Suhrawardi thinks that a Sufl cannot be expected to conform to any particular pattern of life. He divides Sufis into four classes

44 'Avdār al-Ma'mūrī, Chap. 9, pp. 93-96.
45 Qur'ān, iii. 109.
46 He quotes the story of two brothers, one of whom was a Sufl and the other a soldier. The latter wrote to his brother inviting him to join war against the enemy because the times were critical. The Sufl brother refused to accept his advice for he preferred his way of life to that of his brother's, with the remark: "If all people were to follow my path and remember Allah sitting on their prayer-carpet, they would have conquered Constantinople." 'Avdār al-Ma'mūrī, Chap. 13, pp. 125-26.
47 Qur'ān, xxiv, 36-37: "In because which Allah has permitted to be sanctified so that His name may be remembered in them; they glorify Him therein in the morning and evening, men whom neither merchandise nor selling divers from remembrance of Allah . . . ."

360
A History of Muslim Philosophy

in this respect: First those who start their mystic career as travellers but then change into stays-at-home. Their travelling is for several purposes— for acquiring knowledge, which, as the Shaikh quotes different traditions, is incumbent on all Muslims; for visiting persons versed in knowledge (risākhaN fi ál-Álim) and benefiting from their company; for observing the various forms of natural phenomena, for, according to the Qur‘án, God shows “His signs in the objective world and in the subjective world of the self till the truth is clear to them”44; for moral and spiritual discipline which will season them and train them to achieve self-control and other virtues. The second are those who start their mystic life with a retreat to solitude and end up with travelling. Such persons happen to enjoy the company of a perfect saint and under his guidance cover several stages of the mystic discipline and then after maturity try to consolidate their position by travelling from place to place. To the third category belong people who start their mystic life in solitude and retirement and end with it. “Such people keep their heads on the knees and find therein the Mount of Sinai.” In other words, they enjoy the nearness and see the light of divine illumination. It is said that water if stationary begins to stink. To this the mystics reply that one should become as vast as an ocean and thereby become protected from stagnation and nasty smell. To the fourth category belong people who are always on the move and with them travelling is the beginning and end of mystic discipline.

Psychology: Soul, Appetitive Self, Heart.—The Shaikh bases his account of the soul (rukh) on two verses of the Qur‘án. In the first it is held47 that man was created by God from fine clay, then it successively changed into a moist germ, a clot of blood and flesh, till all of a sudden this compound of apparently chemical changes assumed a form beyond the material plane, acquired the new spiritual dimension and became a new creation (khilqan akhbar). Beginning as a piece of matter, man acquires at a certain stage of development characteristics which as if push him out of this plane into the plane of life. This stage, according to Suhrawardi, was reached when soul was breathed into him. But what is this soul which changes a piece of clay and matter into a being of a different dimension? He refers to the second verse: “They ask you of the soul (rukh). Say, the soul is from the command (amr) of my Lord.”48

On the basis of this verse, some mystics regard the soul as eternal—as being an emanation of God’s amr, which, as an attribute of God, is eternal. Suhrawardi, however, thinks that the soul is not eternal but created (hidith), though it is the most subtle of all things and purer and lighter than all else.

The next question is to determine whether it is an attribute (‘ard) or a substance (jaubah). In a tradition it is mentioned that the souls have the capacity to move here and there, fly to different places, etc. On this basis

44 Qur‘án, xli, 53.
47 ibid., xxxiii, 2-14.
48 ibid., xvii, 85.

some mystics are inclined to the view that soul is a substance characterized by some definite attributes. But Suhrawardi does not accept this interpretation. He holds that the account of the soul in the traditions is only symbolical and, therefore, cannot be taken in a literal sense. Soul is neither eternal nor is it a substance but created (hidith) and is an attribute (‘ard). It is a created thing which acts according to its nature; it keeps the body alive as long as it is associated with it; it is nobler than the body; it tastes death when it is separated from the body, just as the body meets death when it is separated from the soul.

There are, according to him, two stages of the soul. The first is that of the animal soul (rukh al-bayanii) which is a subtle body. It is the source of movement in the human body and produces in it the capacity of receiving sensations from the outside world. This soul is common to all animals and is intimately connected with the digestive organism of the body. The other grade of the soul is that of Suhrwardi calls the heavenly soul of man. It belongs to the world of command (‘ilm al-amr). When it descends upon the animal soul, the animal soul is totally transformed. Now it acquires the characteristic of rationality and becomes capable of receiving inspiration (ilham).

The appetitive self (nafs) is the source of all undesirable activities. It has two dominant impulses, rage and avarice. When in rage, it is like a circular substance which is by its nature always on the move. When avaricious, it is like the moth which, being not satisfied with a little light, throws itself headlong into the flame of the candle and burns itself to death. A man is able to attain true rank of manliness when he tries to purify his self (nafs) of those gross characteristics by bringing into play reason and patience.

The self passes through three different stages of development. The first stage of the Self is evil-promoting (ammadrah), the second is repentant (kuwamah), while the third is satisfied (mumma’innah).

Heart (qalb) is a spiritual principle (laqiyah) and has its locus in the heart of flesh. It comes into being as a result of mutual attraction between the human soul and the appetitive self. According to a tradition of the Holy Prophet (narrated by Hudhaifah), there are four kinds of hearts. The first is like a pure soil free from all kinds of vegetation. It is illuminated as if by a shining lamp. It is the heart of a true believer (ma’min). The second is a dark, inverted heart which belongs to an unbeliever. The third belongs to a hypocrite and is enveloped in a veil. The last is a pure but many-faceted heart, with an inclination towards good as well as evil.41

Mystery (Sirr).—There is difference of opinion among the mystics with regard to the exact place which the secret occupies in the psychological makeup of man. According to some, it is prior to the soul (rukh) and posterior to the heart (qalb) as a spiritual principle. To others it is posterior to the soul, though higher and subtler than it. According to these mystics, sirr is the

40 ‘Awaari al-Ma‘ari, p. 552.
41 ibid., pp. 555-558.
42 Ibid., p. 553.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

locus of spiritual observation (maṣlaḥah), soul is the locus of love, and heart is the locus of gnosis (muḥāfiz).” Sukhrawardi, however, thinks that secret (atīr) has no independent being like the soul and heart. It refers to a particular stage in the spiritual development of man. When man is able to free himself from the dark prison of the appetitive self, and looks towards the spiritual soul, his heart acquires a new characteristic which is called mystery (atīr). Similarly, at this stage his soul also attains a special position which again is called mystery. At this stage, man acquires the satisfied self and he acts and wills what God wishes him to do or will; he loses his individual power of action and freedom of choice and becomes a perfect servant (abī).

Reason (ʿAqīl).—It is the essence of the heavenly soul, its tongue, and its guide. The ʿAshāfī quotes the usual traditional account that reason was the first creation of God. God asked it to come forward, to turn back, to sit, to speak, to become silent in turn, and it obeyed God’s orders to the very letter. At this God said, “I swear by My majesty and power that I did not create a being dearer and more honourable than you. I shall be known, praised, and obeyed through you. I shall give as well as take through you. My pleasure and wrath shall follow deeds through you. People shall be rewarded or punished in accordance with you.” Some people think that reason develops from the study of sciences (tālib), especially those which are necessary and axiomatic. But Sukhrawardi does not seem to agree to this, for, as he argues, there are many people who are not versed in any art or science and yet possess abundance of reason and common sense. It is the inherent capacity of man which helps him in acquiring different kinds of arts and sciences. There is placed in man a natural power which prompts him to acquire different kinds of knowledge. It is thus truly established that reason is the tongue of the soul which is the Word of God (farn Allah). From this flows the light of reason which then leads to the discovery of knowledge, science, and art. Some people think that reason is of two kinds. By the one, man looks to the affairs of this world, and its seat is brain. The other reason has its place in the heart (qalb) with which a man looks to the affairs of the other world. But, according to Sukhrawardi, this division is meaningless and unnecessary. Reason as the vehicle of the soul (rūḥ) is one. When it is supported and supplemented by the light of the ʿAshāfī and spiritual perception (bīdarān), it helps a man traverse the straight path of guidance and tread the middle course of the golden mean. Such a person gets knowledge of the heavenly sphere (mašāhīd) which is the innermost secret (idrās) of the universe. This illumination is the peculiar characteristic of the elect. Such men are capable of looking at the affairs of both the worlds, the world of matter and space and the world of spirit, the present world and the next world. When reason is not supported and supplemented by the ʿAshāfī and bīdarān, a man may be

able to do well in this world, but he shall be deprived of the blessings of the world of spirit.

As the goal of the mystics is thoroughly practical, their ascension as novices into the psychological field is really for the purpose of securing a good ground on which to build an edifice of moral and spiritual development. Their aim is to attain a vision of God and enjoy communion with Him. This involves the necessity of the destruction of vices and elimination of imperfections, which often raise their head imperceptibly. The main cause is the wrong interpretation which a man puts on the revelations (ilāhān) he receives after undergoing mortification. A true mystic is one who is able to discriminate between the sources of these experiences (ḥaqqāqāt). With regard to the sources, he divides these experiences into four kinds: (i) those that flow from the appetitive self (nafs), (ii) from God (Ḥūqūq), (iii) from Satan, and (iv) from the angels. There must be one of the following causes why a person cannot discriminate between the sources of experience: (a) weakness in faith, (b) lack of proper knowledge with regard to the appetitive self and morals, (c) following the dictates of the appetitive self, and, lastly, (d) love of the world and material goals. Anyone who protects himself from all these causes will surely be able to distinguish between revelations from God and those from Satan. It is an established fact, according to Sukhrawardi, that he whose source of livelihood is not pure cannot be safe from evil influences. An attitude of balanced detachment from the material world, mortification of flesh, and constancy in ascetic practices are essential for a true mystic, and it is only then that a mystic can hope to achieve the beatific vision.

State and Station (Bāl wa Maqām)—Sukhrawardi thinks that most mystics confuse state with station because there is a great similarity between the two, and yet these must be distinguished, for otherwise there is a possibility of a misunderstanding of the true nature of the mystic experience.

State (bāl) as a technical term is indicative of a psychological condition which is implied in its etymology, viz., its liability to change and progress, while station (maqām) implies a psychological condition which is relatively permanent. A psychological attitude that a mystic adopts at a particular stage of his mystic experience may be called state because the mystic is not yet used to it, but when later on through practice it becomes a permanent feature of his mystic life, it becomes a station. Take, for instance, the attitude of critical examination (maṣlaḥah) of one’s self from a moral point of view. When a mystic adopts this attitude first, it is a state which occurs at different periods; it comes and goes at intervals. By constant practice, however, he is able later on to make it a permanent feature of his normal life. Then it is a station. Again, the mystic tries to adopt the attitude of meditation or

44 ʿAbd al-Qadir Jillani and ʿAbd al-Din Sukhrawardi
45 Ibn ʿArabi, al-Muṣṭafā, Chap. 54, pp. 541-64.
46 ibid., Chap. 57, pp. 665-78.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

contemplation (muraqabah) which becomes his state. Sometimes he is able to contemplate but, due to negligence and other distractions, he cannot find it possible to make it a permanent feature of his life. But steadily and gradually he gains his desired end and a day comes when contemplation becomes a station. Then he advances to the third stage, of observation (mushahadah), where he perceives with his own eyes the secrets of the spiritual world. This, again, is a state and only gradually by personal effort passes into a station. Thus it follows that “station” is a psychological state which is the result of personal effort, while “state” is the result of divine grace. Every moral attitude is characterized by both. Conti nence (zuhd), complete reliance on God (ta’wekkul), and submission to God’s pleasure (ridā’), for instance, have both these aspects—at one stage, they are acquired after a constant and toil some effort and, at another stage, they become a permanent feature of the life of a mystic due to divine grace.44

Among the states Suhrwardi discusses love, feeling of nearness to God (gurb), bashfulness, reverence, union (ittiṣāl), contraction (gabā) and expansion (baṣ), annihilation (janā’), and abiding (baṣq), etc.

Love.—There is an instinctive love in man for wife, wealth, and children, but the love at which the mystics aim is not instinctive. It flows from the heart of an individual after he has reached a particular level of moral development where all his capacities and tendencies are directed towards the realization of union with God. It is then that the sentiment of love appears in him and all inclinations are subordinated to it. He begins to feel love for God with the full force of instinctive impulse as well as conscious purpose. There are four kinds of love, according to Suhrwardi: (1) love of appetitive soul (nafs), (2) love of reason, (3) love of heart as a symbol of spiritual perception, and (4) love of soul (rūḥ). The love for God which is the ideal of the mystics combines all these loves.

When love appears in a mystic on the basis of the first three sources, it is called general love which is the result of direct apprehension (mushahadah) of God’s attributes. But when he passes from attributes to God’s essence (dhāt), his love assumes a new dimension; it flows from his soul, and he is thus enabled to attain his goal. At this stage the mystic acquires and appropriates all the divine attributes. His position becomes what God says: “When I love a person I become his eyes and ears, etc.”

Nearness (Qurb).—This is not physical nearness but only a psychological state in which the mystic feels a profound consciousness of intimacy with the Ultimate Reality. The Qur’an says: “And prostrate and draw near (to Him).”45 On this basis Suhrwardi thinks that attainment of nearness depends upon concentration on God which enables the individual to surpass levels of normal consciousness. There are two stages in this process. In the first place, the

44 Ibid., Chap. 5, pp. 578-82.
45 Qur’an, xvii, 5.

‘Abdal-Qādir Jilānī and Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrwardi

mystic falls as if into a trance and is overcome by intoxication (sukr); his consciousness of self (nafs) disappears in the spiritual light of his soul (rūḥ). The next phase begins when both nafs and rūḥ regain their separate identities and the individual feels the consciousness of nearness intimately and yet, in spite of it, the consciousness of otherness, which is involved in his relation of slavehood (ubādīyya) to God, is also conspicuously present. He quotes a mystic as saying: “By following the Sunnah one attains gnosis (mar’īfah) by observing the obligatory duties (fardū’d) one reaches nearness, while by practising daily extra prayers (naṣīf) one attains love.”

Bashfulness (Hāyā’).—There is a saying of the Holy Prophet: “Be modest with God as it is due to Him.” Suhrwardi explained it as follows: “He alone can be called modest in relation to God who is careful of his daily behaviour towards Him and remembers his death and the hereafter, with the result that his heart cools off towards this world and its entanglements.”

But this modesty or bashfulness, being acquired, is a station (maqām), while bashfulness of a special quality is a state. In order to define it, Suhrwardi quotes certain sayings of some mystics. One says: “Bashfulness and attachment (uns) hover about the heart, and when they find that it is possessed of continence (zuhd) and piety (warr), they descend into it, otherwise they move away.” This bashfulness is the submission of one’s soul to God for maintaining the grandeur of His majesty (jalāl), while attachment is the soul’s experience of pleasure in the perfection of His beauty (jamāl). When both bashfulness and attachment combine, it is the end of a mystic’s ambition. According to Abu Sulaimān, there are four different motives of action: fear, hope, awe, and bashfulness, and that action is the best which is motivated by the last.

Union (ittiṣāl).—As Nūrī says, union is the revelation of the heart and the observation of secrets. There is a person who attains union through his personal efforts but loses this position as soon as there is slackness in his efforts. This is all but natural, for human efforts cannot be kept up at the same degree of intensity for a long time. Such a person is called muťaqad. But the union that Suhrwardi commends is one which is the result not of personal effort but of divine grace. A person who receives it is called united (wāḥid). But there are several grades of this union.

There is a person who receives illumination from divine actions. To such a person, actions, his own as well as those of others, cannot be attributed, for his role is only passive. It is God who does all actions through him and he loses all freedom of choice or independence of action. Secondly, there is illumination from divine attributes. Here the recipient through revelation of divine attributes of majesty and beauty stays at the stations of awe (baṣ) and attachment (uns). Then there is the illumination of divine essence (dhāt) which is a stage towards annihilation (janā’). A person at this stage is illuminated with the divine light of faith and in the observation of God’s face loses his individuality. This is a further stage in union (ittiṣāl). It
is open only to a few, the [mawarradhab, who enjoy nearness to God. Above it is the stage of spiritual perception (fikr al-yanin) which is vouchsafed to very few persons and that only for the twinkling of an eye. It is the complete permeation of divine light in the recipient, so much so that his self (nafs) and heart both feel overpowered by it. And, in spite of its being a very rare experience attainable by a few select persons, the recipient feels that he is perhaps at some preliminary stage of his journey towards union. It is a long and toilsome journey for which perhaps a life of eternity may not suffice.

**Contraction and Expansion (Qubd wa Bas).**—These two emotional states are dependent for their appearance on certain preliminary conditions. They are usually experienced by a mystic when he is traversing the early stages of what Suhrawardi calls the states of special love.** They appear neither at the stage of general love, nor at the termination of the stage of special love. There are some emotional experiences in the state of general love which seem to correspond to contraction and expansion, but which in reality are nothing more than fear (dhuqan) and hope (ma'atir), while at other times they are what he calls grief (haṣaan) and pleasure (rides) which the experient feels with contraction and expansion. Grief and pleasure emanate from the self (nafs) which is yet at the appetitive stage (nafs-i-amsarad), a stage susceptible to the promptings of evil. Haṣaan is the feeling of dissatisfaction experienced at the failure of attaining the object of self-love while rides is the crest of the wave when the self of insincerity is all astir.

It is only when the mystic enters the next stage which is connected with the stage of special love and when his appetitive self becomes the repentant self (nafs-i-husnadah) that the true moods of contraction and expansion make their appearance. The mood of contraction is the result of a psychological state when the self (nafs) is in ascendance, while the mood of expansion follows when the heart (as an organ of spiritual perception) is in ascendance. When the appetitive self becomes repentant (husnadah), there is a constant up and down in the urges towards evil; sometimes the urge towards good has the upper hand, while at others there is a tendency towards the other pole. The appearance of contraction and expansion corresponds to these two poles of the life of the self. Nafs is the veil of darkness and heart is the veil of light. and as long as an individual is in the sphere of these veils, he continues to experience these two moods of contraction and expansion. But as soon as he passes beyond these veils, these moods also disappear. In the experience of annihilation (fana' i) and abiding (bqi'), there is neither contraction nor expansion; they are intimately connected with the consciousness of selfhood.

According to some Sufis, the mystic first experiences contraction in his spiritual development and then it is followed by expansion. Suhrawardi also holds, the same opinion. But there are certain situations where this order is reversed. Under the mood of expansion, the experient feels overjoyed and happy. This happiness then filters down to the self (nafs) which is by nature inclined to interpret it appetitively so that this mood of expansion degenerates into an attitude of pleasure. At this stage the mood of contraction of necessity makes its appearance to bring the self to the state of sanity and equilibrium. If the self were to be free from a tendency towards the extremes, the mystic would be in a perpetual state of expansion (basj) and blessedness. When the self passes into the last stage and becomes the satisfied soul, it attains complete harmony and passes beyond the bi-polar strife of good and evil. For such a person the moods of contraction and expansion are non-existent.

**Annihilation and Abiding (Fana' i wa Basj).—According to Suhrawardi, what most mystics describe as the state of annihilation (fana') is in reality 'not fana' but something else. According to some, fana is the annihilation of all attachment, absence of all urges towards satisfaction of worldly desires, etc. This state, according to Suhrawardi, is what is implied in repentance of a true type (fana'i al-ikhtikar). To some fana is the annihilation of evil attributes and basj, the abiding of good attributes. This, again, according to Suhrawardi, is not true fana' and basj but the result of mortal transformation and purification (takyyik). There are many phases of fana', but the state of absolute fana is one where the Being of God is in overpowering and overwhelming that the consciousness of the finite self is totally obliterated. He quotes with approval the following event as a true representation of the state of annihilation (fana'). A person greeted 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar while he was engaged in circumambulation (fana') of the Ka'bah to which he made no response. Later on he heard that the man had complained to someone at the absence of his response. At this 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar replied that in that state he was in communion with God and therefore, did not have any consciousness of himself, not to speak of others.

There are two kinds of fana'. The first is the apparent annihilation (fana al-ghbir). Here the mystic receives illumination through divine action with the result that freedom of action and choice disappears from him. He sees all actions, his as well as those of others, emanating directly from God. At the stage of the real annihilation (fana' bi-dhikir), the mystic receives illumination from God's attributes and His essence (dhi'il) with the result that he is overwhelmed by the divine amr so much so that he becomes totally immune from evil promptings of all kinds. Some people in the state of annihilation lose all consciousness but, according to Suhrawardi, it is not an essential phase of this state. In the state of abiding (bqi'), the mystic is restored the power of action which had been annihiliated previously. God allows him full freedom to act as he likes and as the situation demands. In this stage he is conscious of the obligations both to the world and to God and none of these becomes a hindrance to the other. His duty to the world does not make him oblivious of his duty.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

to God, nor does his communion with God debar him from turning his attention to the worldly matters.

The apparent annihilation (fanā' al-zāhir) is for those who are at the station of heart and are busy with emotional states, while the real annihilation (fanā' al-bātīn) is for those who have passed beyond that station and attained union with God and who are what he calls bi-Allah (with God).  

Union and Separation (Jami' wa Tafrīqah).—According to Junaid, nearness to God in ecstasy (wajd) is union while the sense of selfhood (baṣāṭīnāt) and absence from God (ghayb), i.e., awareness of self, is separation (tafrīqah). Suhravardi accepts this position and says that the state where the mystic feels himself united with God (taḥārid al-tajīd) is denoted by union (jami'), while ordinary and normal state of consciousness, where the mystic feels the separate individuality of his own self as well as of other things, is called separation (tafrīqah). He adds that both these states are complementary; if we ignore union, we are landed in negation of the divine attributes (ta'ālī) and if we ignore separation, it leads to heresy (tīhād) and denial of God (zaqāqaqah).

Union is annihilation in God (fanā' bi-Allah), while separation (tafrīqah) is relationship of an obedient servant to God ('abdīyyah). Union is the result of man's possession of a soul, while separation is due to his possession of a body, and as long as the combination of the soul and the body persists, these two states must equally be emphasized in the life of the mystic.

There is another state which is called by mystics the union of the union (jami' al-jami'). When a mystic looks towards God's action, he is in the state of separation; when he looks towards God's attributes, he is in the state of union; and when he looks towards God's essence, he is in the state of union of the union.

Process of Self-Purification.—The ideal life, according to Suhravardi, is the life of a perfect man who, in spite of the highest spiritual attainments, is yet conscious of his subservience to the Law of Shari'ah. But this stage of purification cannot be attained without a long process of self-mortification which demands self-examination, introversion, contemplation, patience, submission to God's will, and an attitude of complete detachment. The spark of life that is kindled within the heart of the mystic has a charm of its own, but it cannot be kept burning unless it is fed constantly on the oil that flows from continuous efforts towards asceticism. He receives wayward glimpses of the Infinite Beauty and is charmed, but they prove fleeting; he wants this experience to be broadened in extensity and deepened in intensity; he wants this experience to be stabilized and enriched—hence the necessity of the whole process of self-purification. The result is second birth out of the womb of spirit into the kingdom of the re-awakened spirit.

Suhravardi gives the details of this process of gradual enlightenment. There

are four preliminary stages: Faith, repentance (taubah), continence, constancy in unblemished virtuous actions. These four must be supplemented by four other things which are essentials of asceticism, viz., minimum conversation, minimum food, minimum stay-at-home, and minimum contact with people.

Repentance (taubah) over past shortcomings and determination to avoid them in future are effective only when a person keeps a constant check over his thoughts and actions and is fully awake to all situations. But to maintain this psychological state of repentance there are certain essential requirements. The first is self-examination (muḥāsabah) and the other is introspection or meditation (muḥāsabah). A person asked Wāṣṭi, "Which is the best virtuous action?" He said, "Outwardly self-examination and inwardly meditation; both are perfected by each other and help to maintain the attitude of repentance in the mystic which leads to concentration on and communion with God (tābīb)"

The other thing that is essential for a mystic is patience (ṣabr) without which it is not possible for him to continue his life. This moral quality enables him to endure the vicissitudes of life. It is far more easy for an individual to show his mettle in adversity than in prosperity and hence the mystics have emphasized the importance of patience in a state of affluence which is regarded superior to patience shown in a state of want. The next state is that of ṭālī which is in a way the fruit of conversion (taubah) where the mystic enters the sphere of fear and hope. He feels shocked at the tendency towards evil and, being morally at a higher stage of development, he fears succumbing to these temptations. This feeling of fear, therefore, serves to keep him aware and make him watchful of any fall towards the satisfaction of his baser self. He is repentant and feels hopeful of ultimate victory over these evil forces. Thus, the life of the mystic moves between these two poles of fear and hope and gradually attains the stage of what Suhravardi calls continence (ṣuddah), which in a way sums up all that he has achieved so far. The stage of continence, in other words, is the stage where the fruits of conversion (taubah) with its constituents of self-examination and meditation, patience and voluntary submission to God, piety, hope, and fear, all converge and make the mystic into a perfect ascetic who lives, moves, and has his being in complete communion with God and in total reliance (tausḵul) upon Him. This second stage of continence is distinct from poverty (faqr). A faqr is one who is forced by circumstances to lead a life of poverty, while the continent person (zāhid), on the other hand, adopts this life of detachment of his own free-will even when the state of affluence is open to him.

The third stage is that of stability in morally virtuous actions. According to Suhravardi, a zāhid who does not follow the Law of the Shari'ah is liable to be led astray. It is only through constancy in action for God ('aml li-Allah),

67 'Awtādir al-Mu'ārif, Chap. 61, pp. 353-55.

He calls them scolding of one's self (ṣafir), warning (insībāh), and awakening (bidār).
A History of Muslim Philosophy

remembrance (dhikr), recitation from the Qur'an, prayers, and meditation (muraqabah) that a mystic can hope to attain his objective which is 'abdulqayyim, perfect obedience to God. Sahl b. 'Abd Allah Tustari said about this stage: 'When a man after passing through repentance, continence, and constancy in virtuous deeds reaches the stage of slavehood, he becomes totally passive towards the divine will and of his own free-will decides no longer to exercise his freedom of choice and action. Then he is granted full power of activity and freedom of action because he has identified himself with the will of God. His self-detra. mineration is equivalent to God-determinatration; the liability of his failing a prey to evil temptations and ignorance are totally obliterated.'

According to Suhrawardi, the stage of giving up freedom of choice and action is the stage of annihilation, while the second stage where the mystic freely acts, because his will follows the will of God, is the stage of abiding in God. It is the shedding of the mortal self for the eternal, material for the spiritual, human for the divine. The mystic at this stage is the perfect servant.79

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter XIX

SHIHAB AL-DIN SUHRAWARDI MAQTUL

The intellectual life of Islam and that of Christianity—the two sister civilizations—in the Middle Ages can be compared with each other to a large extent through the role that Aristotelian philosophy played a them. Peripatetic science and philosophy entered the Western world through translations from the Arabic in the seventh/thirteenth century and eventually became dominant to such an extent as to replace the Augustinian and Bonaccio wisdom of the earlier period only to be overthrown itself by the humanistic rationalism of the Renaissance. In Islam the attack of Sufis and theologians upon the rationalistic aspect of Aristotelian philosophy weakened its hold at the very time when that philosophy was gaining strength in the Christian West and was replaced in the Muslim world by two elements, the doctrinal Sufism of Muhay

1 The Arabic word hikma is neither philosophy as correctly understood in modern European language, i.e., one form or another of rationalism, nor theology. It is, properly speaking, thoughness as understood in its original Gkra sense and not in any way connected with the pseudo-spiritualistic movements of this century. It is also unqualified immanence as the Latin root sens, like the Arabic word da'wah by which this wisdom is known, means taste. Moreover, it can be designated as speculative wisdom because specula means mirror and this wisdom seeks to make man's soul a mirror in which divine knowledge is reflected.

2 Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi is often called al-Maqtul, meaning he who was killed, since he was put to death for certain indirect formulations. We, however, refer to him as Shihab al-Din by which name he is universally known among his disciples.

and many stories told of his unusual powers. His countenance was striking to all his contemporaries. His illuminated and ruddy face and dishevelled hair, his handsome beard and piercing eyes reminded all who met him of his keen intelligence. He paid so little attention to his dress as did to his words. Sometimes he wore the woolen garb of the Sufis, sometimes the silk dress of the courtiers. His short and tragic life many similarities to the life of Hallaj, whom he quoted so often, and to that of the Sufi poet ‘Ain al-Quddat Hamadani who was to follow a similar career a few years later.

The writings of Suhrawardi are numerous despite his short and turbulent life. Some of them have been lost, a few published, and the rest remain in manuscript form in the libraries of Persia, India, and Turkey. Unlike his predecessors, ibn Sina and al-Ghazali, he never translated into Latin and, therefore, never became well known in the Western world. Yet, his influence in the East can almost match that of ibn Sina, and any history of Islamic philosophy written without mentioning him and the school of Ihsan is, to say the least, incomplete. Histories of Muslim philosophy written by Westerners, like Munk and de Boer, usually end with ibn Rusdi because the authors have considered only that aspect of Muslim philosophy which influenced Latin scholasticism. Actually, the seventh/thirteenth century, far from being the end of speculative thought in Islam, is really the beginning of this most important school of Ihsan. Suhrawardi’s writings came to the East at the same time as Peripatetic philosophy was journeying westward to Andalusia and from there through the influence of ibn Rusdi and others to Europe.

There are altogether about fifty titles of Suhrawardi’s writings which have come down to us in the various histories and biographies. They may be divided into five categories as follows:

1. The four large doctrinal treatises, the first three dealing with Aristotelian (masbed) philosophy with certain modifications and the last with Ihsan wisdom proper. These works, all in Arabic, include the Talavak, Muqawamati, Muqabali, and the Ikhwan al-Ihsani.7

We are most grateful to Prof. M. Minovi and Mr. M. Danooshpouh of the University of Tehran and to Dr. M. Bayani, the head of the Tehran National Library, for making these manuscripts available to us.

8 See the introduction in M. Bayani, Dow Rishadi-i Farsi-i Suhrawardi, Tehran, 1925.


7 The metaphysical sections of the first three treatises have been published in the first volume of the Opera by Corbin and the complete Ikhwan al-Ihsani in the second volume entitled Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques (Opera Metaphysica et Mystica, II), Institut Franco-Iranien, Tehran, and Andrien Maissoneuve, Paris, 1952. Henceforth we shall refer to the two volumes as Opera, Volumes I and II.

A commentary upon the Fugah of Farabi which no trace has as yet been found is also attributed to him.

10 The hadith muta’alleh which Suhrawardi considers himself and other sages before him to be is exactly theophores by which the Greek sages were designated. See the Prolegomenes by H. Corbin to Suhrawardi’s Opera, Vol. II, p. xxiv.

11 Suhrawardi is careful in distinguishing between exoteric Zoroastrians and the sages among Zoroastrians whom he follows. As he writes in Khamain al-Tapawuwi: “There were among the ancient Persians a community of men who were guided towards the Truth and were guided by Him in the Right Path, ancient sages unlike those who are called the Magi. It is their high and illuminated wisdom, to which the spiritual experiences of Plato and his predecessors are also witness, and

Shâhâb al-Dîn Suhrawardi Maqtûl

al-Qâbûl8 all of which explain further the subject-matter of the larger treatises. These works are partly in Arabic and partly in Persian.

3. Initiatory narratives written in symbolic language to depict the journey of the initiate towards gnosis (marifah) and illumination (ishar). These short treatises, all written in Persian, include ‘Aqî: Surkh, Awad-i Par-i Jawa’î, al-Qurbat al-Garbîyyah (also in Arabic), Luqat-i Mîrâd, Risâlah fi Hâlat al-Tafâlliyah, Rûbi wa Jamâ’al-i Şâfiyân, Risâlah fi al-Mîrâj, and Şafîr-i Simurg.

4. Commentaries and transcriptions of earlier philosophic and initiatic texts and sacred Scripture like the translation into Persian of the Risalat al-Tâ’ir of ibn Sina’s Ihsan wa Tawbîhat, and the treatise Risâlah fi Haqiqat al-Ishq which last is based on ibn Sina’s Risâlah al-Ishq and his commentary upon the verses of the Qur’an and on the Hadith.9

5. Prayers, litanies, invocations, and what may be called books of the hour, all of which Shâhrazârî calls al-Wâridât wa-al-Taqâsîd.

These works and the large number of commentaries written upon them during the last seven centuries form the main corpus of the tradition of Ihsan and are a treasure of traditional doctrines and symbols combining in them the wisdom of Sufism with Hermeticism, and Pythagorean, Platonic, Aristotelian, and Zoroastrian philosophies together with some other diverse elements. There is little doubt that Suhrawardi is greatly indebted to the Muslim philosophers, especially ibn Sina, for the formulation of many of his ideas. Moreover, inasmuch as he is a Sufi as well as a philosopher of, more properly speaking, a theosophist,10 he is in debt, both for spiritual inspiration and for his doctrines, to the great chain of Sufi masters before him. More specifically he is indebted to Hallaj whom he quotes so often and to al-Ghazali whose Maşhâr al-Awad played so important a role in his doctrine of the relation of light to the Imân.

Suhrawardi came also under the influence of Zoroastrian teaching, particularly in angelology and the symbolism of light and darkness.11 He identified
the wisdom of the ancient Zoroastrian sages with that of Hermes and, therefore, with the pre-Aristotelian philosophers, especially Pythagoras and Plato, whose doctrines he sought to revive. Finally, he was influenced directly by the vast tradition of Hermeticism which is itself the remains of ancient Egyptian, Chaldean, and Sabean doctrines metamorphosed within the matrix of Hellenism and is based on the primordial symbolism of alchemy. Suhrwardi considered himself to be the reviver of the perennial wisdom, philosophia perennis, or what he calls *Hikmat al-Ladanniyah* or *Hikmat al-Atifah* which existed always among the Hindus, Persians, Babylonians, Egyptians, and the ancient Greeks up to the time of Plato. The concept of the history of philosophy for Suhrwardi and his school is itself of great interest. This school identifies philosophy with wisdom rather than with rational systematization. Philosophy for it does not begin with Plato and Aristotle; rather, it ends with them. Aristotle, by putting wisdom in a rationalistic dress, limited its perspective and separated it from the unitive wisdom of the earlier sages. From the *Ishq-i Qul* point of view, Hermes or the Prophet Idris is the father of philosophy, having received it as revelation from heaven. He was followed by a chain of sages in Greece and in ancient Persia and later in Islam which unified the wisdom of previous civilizations in its milieu. The chain of transmission of *ishq-i Qul* doctrines, which must be understood symbolically rather than only historically, may be schematized as follows:

- **Hermes**
- Agathodemos (Seth)
- Anaximander
- Pythagoras
- Empedocles
- Plato
- Neo-Platonists
- Dhū al-Nūn Mīrzā
- Abu Sahl Tustari
- Suhrwardī

Hermes

Aegidius

Persian priest-kings:

- Kāmarūz
- Faridūn
- Khaṣṣār

Suhrwardī

Abū Yāzīd Bistānī

Manṣūr Hallāj

Abū al-Ḥasan Kharrāṣīnī


14 Originally, philosophy like all forms of wisdom consisted of a doctrine, a rite, and a “spiritual alchemy.” In Greek civilization the first element gradually separated from the others and became reduced to a theoretical form of knowledge which came to be known as philosophy. In the 56th section of *Zuhūqī, Suhrwardī* writes how he saw Aristotle, who is most likely Plotinus, the author of the *Theology of*
THE MEANING OF ISHRĀQ

The Arabic words ʿishrāq meaning illumination and mashriq meaning the east are both derived etymologically from the root ʿshrq meaning the rising of the sun. Moreover, the adjective illuminative, mashriqiyah, and Oriental, mashriqiyyah, are written in exactly the same way in Arabic. This symbolic identification of the Orient with light which is inherent in the Arabic language and is employed often by the Ishaqqi sages, has given rise to many difficulties in the interpretations of that wisdom which is both illuminative and Oriental. Already in his Mutāṣat al-Mashriqyyin most of which is lost, ibn Sina refers to an Oriental wisdom which is superior to the commonly accepted Peripatetic (mashʿār) philosophy.18 Due to the fact that the word mashriqyyin could also be read as mashriqiyyin in Arabic, the latter meaning illuminative, one could interpret the esoteric teachings which ibn Sina proposes as being illuminative as well as Oriental. Since the famous article of Nallino,19 it has become common opinion that the reading is Oriental and has nothing to do with illumination. Yet, this opinion, however correct it may be linguistically, is essentially limited in that it does not take into account the profound symbolism inherent in the language and does not consider the great debt which Suhrawardi and Ishaqqi wisdom owe to ibn Sina.

Suhrawardi writes that ibn Sina wanted to recapture Oriental philosophy but did not have access to the necessary sources.20 Yet, if we consider how the sacred geography of the Orient of light and the Occident of darkness in the initiatory trilogy of ibn Sina, Ḥawqī'un, Risālat al-Taʿir, and Salāmān wa Abūl, is followed by Suhrawardi, how the Shihāb al-Ishraq translated several of the treatises of ibn Sina into Persian, and how parts of Ḥikmat al-Ishraq resemble closely the commentary of ibn Sina upon the Theology of Aristotle, it will become clear how profoundly the roots of Ishaqqi philosophy lie in certain of the later non-Aristotelian works of ibn Sina and how illumination and the Orient are united in this form of wisdom.

The unification of the meaning of illumination and the Orient in the term

put as a sign of departure from the straight path (ṣirāṭ al-mustaqim) or the universal orthodoxy which embraces all the perspectives within the tradition. The vocation of Islam is the re-establishment of the primordial tradition so that all the streams of the ancient religions and cultures have flowed into it without in any way destroying its purity.


18 In European languages the word “orient” means both the east and the placing of oneself in the right direction, and refers to the same symbolism.
20 As Corbin states, “Ishaqqi is a knowledge which is Oriental because it is itself the Orient of knowledge.” Suhrawardi, Opera, Vol. I, p. xxix.
20 Throughout our writings we use the word “intellect” as the instrument of gnosis, of direct intuitive knowledge where the knower and the known become identical, and distinguish it from reason which is its passive reflection.
21 Ibn Wahshiyyah, Ancien Alphabet et Hieroglyphic Characters, London, 1806, p. 100. These historical connections are discussed by H. Corbin in Les motifs zoroastriens dans la philosophie de Suhrawardi, Editions du Courrier, Teheran, 1325 Solar, p. 18, and the Prolegomen to Suhrawardi, Opera, Vol. I, pp. xxv ff. We are indebted to him for drawing our attention to them.
In reading the texts of Suhrawardi one is particularly struck by the large number of quotations from the Qur'an, hadith, and the sayings of earlier Sufis and by the profound transformation into the Islamic mould of all the diverse ideas which Suhrawardi employs. It is by virtue of such an integration and transformation that the ighraqi wisdom could come to play such a major role in Shi'ism.

In the introduction to Hitemat al-Ihraq, Suhrawardi outlines the hierarchy of those who know in a manner which demonstrates how he integrates ancient wisdom into the perspective of Islam. There are, according to this scheme, four major types of "knowers":

1. The hakim idbi, or theosophs, who knows both discursive philosophy, i.e., Aristotelianism, and gnosis (ta'alleh). Suhrawardi considers Pythagoras, Plato, and himself among this group.

2. The sage who does not involve himself with discursive philosophy but remains content with gnosis, like Yâlilâj, Bistami, and Tustari. 

3. The philosopher who is acquainted with discursive philosophy but is a stranger to gnosis like Fârâbî or ibn Sina. 

4. He who still seeks knowledge (fâlîb) but has not yet reached a station of knowledge.

Above all these degrees is that of the Pole (Qubh) or Leader (Imâm) who is the head of the spiritual hierarchy and of his representatives (khulûjâ). 

The stations of wisdom are also described in a purely Sufi fashion as degrees of penetration into the divine unity expressed by the ghabadâh. In his initiatory treatise, Sâfir-i Simurgh (Song of the Griffin), Suhrawardi enumerates five degrees of unity: 1) ilâha il-Allâh, none is worthy of worship but God, which is the common acceptance of the oneness of God and rejection of any other divinity; 2) huwa illa huwa, there is no he but He, which is the negation of any otherness than God, i.e., only God can be called "He"; 3) an ilah ana, there is no one but Thou, which is the negation of all oneness outside of God; 4) an ilah ana, there is no "I" but the divine "I", which means that only God can say "I"; finally, the highest station of unity which is that of those who say walla khall an ilâhu illa waj'ahu, i.e., all things perish except His face (essence). The formulations of Sufism become, therefore, the framework of his classification of knowledge into which he tries to place the heritage of universal gnosis and philosophy inherited by Islam.

34 Suhrawardi is considering only the Peripatetic aspect of ibn Sina.

33 Suhrawardi, Opera, Vol. II, pp. 50–11. Actually, the stations mentioned are more numerous; we have described only the major ones.


31 In this same treatise Suhrawardi writes that the most noble knowledge is gnosis which lies above human reason. As he says, "To seek the knowledge of God through reason is like seeking the sun with a lamp." Ibid., p. 14. 

37 There is a profound correspondence between the microcosm and the macrocosm in all traditional wisdom so that the inward journey of man through the centre of his being corresponds to a journey through the various stages of the universe and ultimately beyond it. To escape from the prison of the lower soul (nafs ammârî) is also to pass beyond the crypt of the cosmos.


35 It is said that when Christian Rosenkranz, the founder of the order of the Rose-Cross, abandoned Europe, he retired to the Yemen.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

heavens or the faculties of the soul. They will be able to escape only at night and not during the day which means that man reaches the intelligible or spiritual world only in death, whether this be natural or initiatory, and in dream which is a second death. In the well there is such darkness that one cannot see even one’s own hands, i.e., matter is so opaque that rarely does light shine through it. Occasionally they receive news from the Yaman which makes them homesick, meaning that they see the intelligible world during contemplation or in dreams. And so, they set out for their original home.

One clear night an order is brought by the hoopoe from the Governor of the Yaman telling them to begin their journey to their homeland, meaning the reception of a revelation from the intelligible world and the beginning of asceticism. The order also asks them to let go the hem of their dress, i.e., become free from attachment, when they reach the valley of ants, which is the passion of avidity. They are to kill their wives, i.e., passions, and then sit in a ship and begin their journey in the name of God. Having made their preparation they set out for their pilgrimage to Mount Sinai.

A wave breaks between the disciple and the son, meaning that the animal soul is sacrificed. Morning is near, that is, the union of the particular soul with the universal soul is approaching. The hero discovers that the world in which evil takes place, meaning this world, will be overturned and rain and stones, i.e., diseases and moral evils, will descend upon it. Upon reaching a stormy sea he throws in his foster-mother and drowns her, meaning that he even sacrifices his natural soul. As he travels on still in storm, i.e., in the body, he has to cast away his ship in fear of the king above him who collects taxes, meaning death which all mortals must taste. He reaches the Mount of Gog and Magog, i.e., evil thoughts and love of this world enter his imagination. The jins, the powers of imagination and meditation, are also before him as well as a spring of running copper which symbolizes wisdom. The hero asks the jins to blow upon the copper which thus becomes fiery, and from it he builds a dam before Gog and Magog. He takes the carnal soul (nafs ammārkāt) and places it in a cave, or the brain which is the source of this soul. He then cuts the “streams from the liver of the sky,” i.e., he stops the power of motion from the brain which is located in the head, the sky of the body. He throws the empyrean heaven so that it covers all the stars, the sun, and the moon, meaning all powers of the soul become one colour, and passes by fourteen coffins, the fourteen powers of ḳhrāqī psychology, and ten tombs, the five external and the five internal senses. Having passed through these stages he discovers the path of God and realizes that it is the right path.

32 Suhrāwārī indicates here the main technique of Sufism which is the invocation (ḏākīr) of one of the names of God and which Sufi masters call the sacred barque that carries man across the ocean of the spiritual path to the shore of the spiritual world.

33 These fourteen powers are: attraction, retention, purification, repulsion, digestion, growth, sleep, imagination, anger, lust, and the four humours.

Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrāwārī Maqtūl

The hero passes beyond the world of matter and reaches a light, the active intellect which is the governor of this world. He places the light in the mouth of a dragon, the world of the elements, and passes by it to reach the heavens and beyond them to the signs of the Zodiac which mark the limit of the visible cosmos. But his journey is not yet at an end; he continues even beyond them to the upper heavens. Music is heard from far away, and the initiate emerges from the cavern of limitation to the spring of life flowing from a great mountain which is Mount Sinai. In the spring he sees fish that are his brothers; they are those who have reached the end of the spiritual journey.

He begins to climb the mountain and eventually reaches his father, the archangel of humanity, who shines with a blinding light which nearly burns him. The father congratulates him for having escaped from the prison of Qairawān, but tells him that he must return because he has not yet cast away all bonds. When he returns a second time, he will be able to stay. The father tells him that above them is his father, the universal intellect, and beyond him his relatives going back to the Great Ancestor who is pure light. “All perishes except His essence.”33

From this brief summary we see how ḳhrāqī wisdom implies essentially a spiritual realization above and beyond discursive thought. The cosmos becomes transparent before the traveller and interiorized within his being. The degrees of realization from the state of the soul of fallen man to the centre of the soul freed from all limitation corresponds “horizontally” to the journey from the Occident of matter to the Orient of lights, and “vertically” to the ascent from the earth to the limits of the visible universe and from there, through the world of formless manifestation, to the divine essence.

Ḥikmat al-İhrāq

İhrāği wisdom is not a systematic philosophy so that its exposition in a systematic fashion is hardly possible. What Suhrāwārī says in one text seems at first sight to be contradicted in another work, and one has to discover the point of view in each case in order to overcome the external contradictions. In expounding the major points of ḳhrāqī wisdom we will, therefore, follow the outlines of Ḥikmat al-İhrāq, the most important text in which this wisdom is expounded, drawing also from the shorter treatises which Suhrāwārī wrote as further explanations of his major work.

Ḥikmat al-İhrāq is the fourth of the great doctrinal works of Suhrāwārī; he first deals with Aristotelian philosophy which is the necessary prerequisite and foundation for illuminative wisdom. It deals with the
A History of Muslim Philosophy

philosophy of Ishraq itself which is written for those who are not satisfied with theoretical philosophy alone but search for the light of gnosis. The book which in the beauty of style is a masterpiece among Arabic philosophical texts was composed during a few months in 582/1186, and, as Suhrwardi himself writes at the end of the book, revealed to him suddenly by the Spirit. The work consists of a prologue and two sections: the first concerning logic and the criticism of certain points of Peripatetic philosophy, and the second composed of five chapters (maqâlîs), dealing with light, ontology, angelology, physics, psychology and, finally, eschatology and spiritual union.

In the section on logic he follows mostly the teaching of Aristotle but criticizes the Aristotelian definition. According to the Stagirite, a logical definition consists of genus plus differentia. Suhrwardi remarks that the distinctive attribute of the object which is defined will give us no knowledge of that thing if that attribute cannot be predicated of any other thing. A definition in Ishraqi wisdom is the summation of the qualities in a particular thing which when added together exist only in that thing.

Suhrwardi criticizes the ten categories of Aristotle as being limited and confined only to this universe. Beyond this world there is an indefinite number of other categories which the Aristotelian classification does not include. As for the nine categories of accidents, he reduces them to four by considering relation, time, posture, place, action, and passivity as the one single category of relation (nisbah) to which are added the three categories of quality, quantity, and motion.

Suhrwardi alters several points of Aristotelian philosophy in order to make it a worthy basis for the doctrine of illumination. A major point of difference between the Ishraqis and the Muslim followers of Aristotle (Maghasis), also a central issue of Islamic philosophy, is that of the priority of Being or existence (wujiḏ) to essence (mâhiyyah). The Maghasis like the Sufis consider Being to be principal and mâhiyyah or essence to be accidental with respect to it. Suhrwardi objects to this view and writes that existence does not have any external reality outside the intellect which abstracts it from objects. For example, the existence of iron is precisely its essence and not a separate reality. The Maghasis consider existence to have an external reality and believe that the intellect abstracts the limitation of a being which then becomes its essence. The argument of Suhrwardi against this view is that existence can be neither substance nor accident and, therefore, has no external reality. For if it is an accident, it needs something to which it is an accident. If this something is other than existence, it proves what we sought, i.e., this something is without existence. If existence is a substance, then it cannot be accident, although we say accidents "are." Therefore, existence is neither substance nor accident and consequently can exist only in the intellect.

The issue involved, which is essential to the understanding of all medieval and ancient philosophy, is the relation between Being and existence, on the one hand, and the archetypes and limitations on the other. The Maghasis and Sufis consider the universe to consist of degrees of Being and limitations which distinguish various beings from one another. The Sufis, particularly those of the school of ibn 'Arabi who are concerned essentially with metaphysical doctrines, transpose these limitations into the principal domain and consider them the same as the archetypes or the Platonic ideas. The traditional interpreters of Shâhiḏ al-Ishraq interpret his doctrine in a way which does not destroy the principality of Being, but rather subordinates the existence of a thing which is temporary and "accidental" to its archetype which with respect to the terrestrial existence of the thing is principal. In other words, essence (mâhiyyah) is subordinated to Being (wujiḏ), if we understand by this term Being qua Being; but as archetype, it is superior to particular existence which is an "exteriorization" of Being. The Ishraqis believe in fact that it is useless to discuss about the principality of wujiḏ and mâhiyyah, of Being and essence, because the essence or mâhiyyah is itself a degree of Being. The Ishraqis differ from the Maghasis in that the former considers the world to be actual in its being and potential in its qualities and attributes, and the latter believes, on the contrary, that the world is potential in its being and actual in its qualities and perfections.

---

34 The inspiration for the book came to the author on an auspicious day when all the seven planets were in conjunction in the Sign of the Balance.

35 Suhrwardi writes that he who wishes to understand the essence of this work should spend forty days in a retreat (halâlah) occupying himself only with invocation (šikr) under the direction of the spiritual guide whom he calls in several places qa'im bi al-Kutub.

36 For his criticism, see Suhrwardi, Opera, Vol. II, pp. 46ff.

37 The term mâhiyyah in Arabic is composed of mā meaning "what" and hâyâh derived from the word hâ"a (“it”). It is the answer given to the question "What is it?". It is used to denote the essence of anything whether the existence of that thing is certain or doubtful, while the word šir is used to denote the essence of something which possesses some degree of being.

In Islamic philosophy reality is understood in terms of wujiḏ and mâhiyyah, the latter meaning the limitation placed upon Being and identified with the Platonic ideas. See S. H. Nasir, "The Polarisation of Being" [Proceedings of the Sixth] Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Lahore, 1969, pp. 50-55.

384

Shihâb al-Din Suhrwardi Maqâlîs

respect to it. Suhrwardi objects to this view and writes that existence does not have any external reality outside the intellect which abstracts it from objects. For example, the existence of iron is precisely its essence and not a separate reality. The Magha's consider existence to have an external reality and believe that the intellect abstracts the limitation of a being which then becomes its essence. The argument of Suhrwardi against this view is that existence can be neither substance nor accident and, therefore, has no external reality. For if it is an accident, it needs something to which it is an accident. If this something is other than existence, it proves what we sought, i.e., this something is without existence. If existence is a substance, then it cannot be accident, although we say accidents "are." Therefore, existence is neither substance nor accident and consequently can exist only in the intellect.

The issue involved, which is essential to the understanding of all medieval and ancient philosophy, is the relation between Being and existence, on the one hand, and the archetypes and limitations on the other. The Magha's and Sufis consider the universe to consist of degrees of Being and limitations which distinguish various beings from one another. The Sufis, particularly those of the school of ibn 'Arabi who are concerned essentially with metaphysical doctrines, transpose these limitations into the principal domain and consider them the same as the archetypes or the Platonic ideas. The traditional interpreters of Shāhīḏ al-Ishraq interpret his doctrine in a way which does not destroy the principality of Being, but rather subordinates the existence of a thing which is temporary and "accidental" to its archetype which with respect to the terrestrial existence of the thing is principal. In other words, essence (māhiyyah) is subordinated to Being (wujiḏ), if we understand by this term Being qua Being; but as archetype, it is superior to particular existence which is an "exteriorization" of Being. The Ishraqis believe in fact that it is useless to discuss about the principality of wujiḏ and māhiyyah, of Being and essence, because the essence or māhiyyah is itself a degree of Being. The Ishraqis differ from the Magha's in that the former considers the world to be actual in its being and potential in its qualities and attributes, and the latter believes, on the contrary, that the world is potential in its being and actual in its qualities and perfections.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Another important criticism of the Aristotelians by Suhrwardi is that of the doctrine of hyloism, or form and matter, which is the foundation of Aristotle’s philosophy. As we shall see later, Suhrwardi considers bodies to be darkness and transforms the Aristotelian forms into the guardian lights or angels which govern each being. He defines a body as an external, simple substance (jauhar basil) which is capable of accepting conjunction and separation. This substance in itself, in its own essence, is called body (jisr), but from the aspect of accepting the form of species (tirah nau’tiyyah) it is called the materia prima or blyce (hayat). He also differs from the Aristotelians in defining the place (makin) of the body not as the internal surface of the body which contains it but as the abstract dimension (lwa’d qawah) in which the body is placed. Suhrwardi follows ibn Sina and other Maghribis in rejecting the possibility of a void and an indivisible particle or atom, and in considering the body to be indefinitely divisible even if this division cannot be carried out physically.

Other elements of Peripatetic philosophy which Suhrwardi condemns include its doctrine of the soul and arguments for its subsistence which he believes to be weak and insufficient; its rejection of the Platonic ideas which are the cornerstone of ishqâq’s wisdom and upon the reality of which Suhrwardi insists in nearly every doctrinal work; and its theory of vision.

This last criticism is of interest in that Suhrwardi rejects both of the theories of vision commonly held during the Middle Ages. Regarding the Aristotelian theory that forms of objects are imprinted upon the pupil of the eye and then reach the sensus communis and finally the soul, Suhrwardi asks how the imprints of large objects like the sky upon this small pupil in the eye is possible. Since man does not reason at the time of vision which is an immediate act, even if large objects were imprinted in smaller proportions, one could not know of the size of the object from its image. The mathematicians and students of optics usually accepted another theory according to which a conic ray of light leaves the eye with the head of the cone in the eye and the base at the object to be seen. Suhrwardi attacks this view also by saying that this light is either an accident or a substance. If it is an accident it cannot be transmitted; therefore, it must be a substance. As a substance, its motion is independent either on our will or it is natural. If dependent on our will, we

41 Suhrwardi defines a substance in maghâbi fashion as that possible being (mumkin) which has no place (mahbûl), and accident as that possible being which does have a place. He also defines a body as that substance which has height, width, and depth. Partav-Nâmeh, MS., Teheran National Library, 1257, pp. 190 ff.
42 In his works Suhrwardi insists on the perishable nature of the body and its being a prison into which the soul has fallen. In the Bustân al-Qulûb, MS., Teheran Sipahsâlir Library, 2011, he gives as argument for the permanence of the soul and its spiritual nature, the fact that the body of man changes its material every few years while man’s identity remains unchanged. The maghâbi doctrine of the soul is essentially one of defining its faculties; the ishqâq view is to find the way by which the soul can escape its bodily prison.

should be able to gaze at an object and not see it, which is contrary to experience; or if it has natural motion, it should move only in one direction like vapour which moves upward, or stone which moves downward, and we should be able to see only in one direction which is also contrary to experience. Therefore, he rejects both views.

According to Suhrwardi, vision can occur only of a lighted object. When man sees this object, his soul surrounds it and is illuminated by its light. This illumination (ishqâq) of the soul (nasî) in presence of the object is vision. Therefore, even sensible vision partakes of the illuminative character of all knowledge.

With this criticism of the Aristotelian (maghâbi) philosophy, Suhrwardi turns to the exposition of the essential elements of ishqâq wisdom itself beginning with a chapter on light, or one might say the theophany of light, which is the most characteristic and essential element of the teachings of this school. Light (nûr), the essence of which lies above comprehension, needs no definition because it is the most obvious of all things. Its nature is to manifest itself; it is being, as its absence, darkness (qulûh), is nothingness. All reality consists of degrees of light and darkness. Suhrwardi calls it Absolute Reality the infinite and limitless divine essence, the Light of lights (Nûr al-anwar). The whole universe, the 18,000 worlds of light and darkness which Suhrwardi mentions in his Bustân al-Qulûb, are degrees of irradiation and effusion of this Primordial Light which shines everywhere while remaining immutable and for ever the same.

Suhrwardi “divides” reality according to the types of light and darkness. If light is the dependent light (nûr jauhari) or incorporeal light (nûr mujarrad); if it depends for its subsistence upon itself rather than upon the body, it is called accidental light (nûr ‘arsh). Likewise, if darkness is dependent by itself it is called obscurity (ghusor) and if it depends on other than itself for its subsistence it is called form (ha’â). This division is also based on the degrees of comprehension. A being is either aware of itself

44 As the quotations we have already cited demonstrate, Suhrwardi insists that he is not dealing with the dualism of the Zoroastrians. Rather, he is explaining the mysterious polarization of reality in this symbolism. The Ishqâqis usually interpret light as Being and darkness as determination by ideas (mabhiyâh). They say that all ancient sages taught this same truth but in different languages. Hermes spoke of Osiris and Isis; Osiris or the sun symbolizes Being and Isis or the moon, mabhiyâh. They interpret the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers in the same fashion.
45 Actually this term means both the divine essence and its first determination which is the archangel or the universal intellect.
46 See the immense panorama of diversity which we call the Universe is, therefore, a vast shadow of the infinite variety in intensity of direct or indirect illuminations of rays of the Primary Light.” Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, Luzac & Co., London, 1908, p. 135.
47 In his Risâliy Yusdän Shîhâbbi, Maßâh’i ‘Ilmi, Teheran, 1316 Solar, pp. 138 ff., Suhrwardi divides comprehension (‘adrak) into four categories: —
light (nūr al-ghîr) comes into being which receives two illuminations, one directly from the Supreme Light and the other from the first light. The process of effusion continues in the same manner with the third light receiving illumination four times, twice from the light preceding it, once from the first light and once from the Supreme Light; and the fourth light eight times, four times from the light preceding it, twice from the second light, once from the first light, and once from the Light of lights or Supreme Light.25 In this manner the order of archangels, which Suhrwardi calls the longitudinal order (tābāqat al-tūl) or “world of mothers” (al-ummahāt) and in which the number of archangels far exceeds the number of intelligences in Aristotelian cosmology, comes into being.26 Each higher light has domination (qahr) over the lower and each lower light, love (mahabbah) for the higher. Moreover, each light is a purgatory or veil (barzakh) between the light above and the light below. In this manner the supreme order of angels is illuminated from the Light of lights which has love only for Itself because the beauty and perfection of Its essence are evident to Itself.

The supreme hierarchy of being or the “longitudinal” order gives rise to a new polarization of Being. Its positive or masculine aspect such as dominance, contemplation, and independence gives rise to a new order of angels called the latitudinal order (tābāqat al-'ard) the members of which are no longer generators of one another; rather, each is integral in itself and is, therefore, called mutakāfīyyah. Suhrwardi identifies these angels with the Platonic ideas and refers to them as the lords of the species (arbāb al-anwâl) or the species of light (anwâr nūriyyah). Each species in the world has as its archetype one of these angels, or to express it in another manner, each being in this world is the thermic (jīlām) of one of these angels which are, therefore, called the lords of thermic (arbāb al-jīlām). Water is the thermic of its angel ābud, minerals of āhūd, vegetables of mūrūd, fire of urdibihūd, etc.27 Suhrwardi uses the names of the Amâkâ pundits (Amâshâh Spentâsi), the separate powers of Ahura Mazda in Zoroastrianism, to designate these archetypes, and in this way unites Zoroastrian angelology with the Platonic ideas. These longitudinal angels are not, however, in any way abstract or mental objects, as sometimes the Platonic ideas are interpreted to be. They are, on the contrary, concrete as angelic hypostases and appear abstract only from man’s point of view who, because of his imprisonment in the cage of his senses,

25 Suhrwardi, Opera, Vol. II, pp. 133 ff. Also Prolegomena, II, pp. 42 ff. In ahrām wisdom all of the cosmic hierarchies are understood in terms of a series of illuminations (tābāqat) and contemplation (ashâr), the first being a descent and the second an ascent.
26 Usually in medieval cosmology the elements, the acceptors of form, are called the “mothers” and the celestial orbits, the givers of form, the “fathers.” The term “mothers” used by Suhrwardi to designate the archangelic world should not, therefore, be confused with the elements.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrwardī Maqtił

considers only the object of the senses to be concrete. These angels are the real governors of this world who guide all of its movements and direct all of its changes. They are at once the intelligences and principles of the being of things.

From the negative and feminine aspect of the longitudinal order of archangels, that is, love, dependence, and reception of illumination, there comes into being the heaven of fixed stars which these angels share in common. The stars are the crystallization into subtle matter of that aspect of the archangels which is “Non-Being” or removal from the Light of lights. This “materialization” marks the boundary between the Orient of pure lights or the archangelic world which lies beyond the visible heavens and the Occident which is comprised of increasing condensations of matter from the luminous heavens to the dense earthly bodies.

The latitudinal order of angels or the archetypes gives rise to another order of angels through which they govern the species. Suhrwardī calls this intermediary order the regent lights (anṣār al-mudabbirin) or sometimes anṣār ispaḥbad using a term from ancient Persian chivalry. It is this intermediary order which moves the heavenly spheres the motion of which is by love rather than by nature, and which governs the species as the agent of the archetypes for which the species are theurgies (fīlsāṭāt) or “icons” (aṣpām). The ispaḥbad lights are also the centres of men’s souls, each soul being the angel of some individual person. As for mankind itself, its angel is Gabriel. Humanity is an image of this archangel who is the mediator between man and the angelic world and the focus in which the lights of the Orient are concentrated. It is also the instrument of all knowledge inasmuch as it is the means by which man’s soul is illuminated.

This archangel as the Holy Spirit is also the first and supreme intelligence and the first as well the last prophet, Muhammad (upon whom be peace), the archetype of man (rabb al-nān’ al-insān) and the supreme revealer of divine knowledge.

The physics and psychology of Ḥikmat al-ṣūraḥ treat of the world of bodies and the world of souls which, along with the world of the intelligences or angels, comprise the totality of this universe. As already mentioned, Suhrwardī does not divide bodies into form and matter. Rather, his division of bodies is based on the degree in which they accept light. All physical bodies are either simple or compound; the simple bodies are divided into three classes: those that prevent light from entering (ḏāji), those which permit the entrance of light (ṭātīj), and those which permit light to enter in various degrees (muṭāṣāt) and which are themselves divided into several stages.

The heavens are made of the first category in the luminous state. As for the elements below the heavens, they consist of earth belonging to the first category, water to the second, and air to the third. Compound bodies belong likewise to one of the above categories, depending on which element predominates in them. All bodies are essentially purgatories or ismuṣ (bārāzāk) between various degrees of light by which they are illuminated and which they in turn reflect.

Suhrwardī rejects the view that the change of bodies is due to particles of one element entering into those of another. As a reason against this view he cites the example of a jug full of water that has been heated, i.e., according to this view particles of fire have entered into it. The volume of the water, however, does not change since it does not spill over; therefore, particles of fire cannot have entered into it. Qualitative change is due rather to the coming into being of a quality which is intermediate between the qualities of the original bodies and which is shared by all the particles of the new compound. For example, when water is heated a new quality between the cold of the water and the heat of the fire is brought into being by the light governing the change.

In the explanation of meteorological phenomena, Suhrwardī follows closely the teachings of Ibn Sīnā and Aristotle in accepting the exhalation and vapour theory. He differs, however, from them in the importance he attaches to light as the cause of all these changes. For example, the heat which is responsible for evaporation is nothing but one of the effects of reflected light. All changes in fact which one observes in the world are caused by various hierarchies of light. The elements are powerless before the heavens, the heavens are

390

391
dominated by the souls, the souls by the intelligences, the intelligences by the universal intellect, and the universal intellect by the Light of lights.

The elements or simple bodies combine to form compounds which comprise the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms, each of which is dominated by a particular light or angel. All that exists in the mineral kingdom is “lighted body” (barzakh nāṭiyah) the permanence of which is like that of the heavens. Gold and various jewels like rubies make man happy because of the light within them which is akin to the soul of man. This light within the minerals is governed by isfandārmudh which is the master of theology for earthly substances.

With greater refinement of the mixture of the elements, plants and animals come into being having their own faculties and powers which are so many “organs” of the light governing them. In higher animals in man who is the most complete terrestrial being these faculties appear in their perfection. Man as the microcosm contains in himself the complete image of the universe, and his body is the gate of life for all elemental bodies. This body in turn is the theology for the ispahbad light which governs each man. All the faculties of the soul are aspects of the light which shines upon all elements of the body and illuminates the powers of imagination and memory for which it is the source. This light is connected with the body by means of the animal soul (rūḥ āyandāniyyah) the seat of which is in the liver and leaves the body for its original home in the angelic world as soon as death destroys the equilibrium of the body elements. It is the love (maḥabbah) of the light which creates the power of desire as it is its domination (gahr) which brings about anger.  

Suhrawardi draws heavily upon the psychology of ibn Sina for the enumeration of the faculties of the various souls. It may be said in fact that with a few changes his classification is the same as that of his famous predecessor, despite the different role which the intellect or light plays in governing and illuminating the various faculties in each case. The classification of the various faculties of the soul by Suhrawardi may be outlined as follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vegetative soul</th>
<th>attraction (fādibah)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(al-naja al-nafsiyyah)</td>
<td>feeding (ghādīqiyah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>retention (mārīkiah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>digestion (naḏīqiyah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reproduction (muqaddidah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>repulsion (dāffah)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal soul</th>
<th>power of motion (muḥarrikiyah)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(al-naṣr al-ḥayandāniyyah)</td>
<td>power of desire (muṣtiqiyah)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī Maqtūl

Man, besides the above faculties and the five external senses, possesses five internal senses which serve as a bridge between the physical and the intelligible worlds and have their counterpart in the macroscopic order. These senses consist of:

- **Sensus communis** — The center in which all the data of the external senses are collected. It is located in the front of the frontal cavity of the brain.
- **Fantasy** — The place of storage for the sensus communis. It is located in the back of the frontal cavity.
- **Apprehension** — Governs sensible things by what does not belong to the senses. It is located in the middle cavity.
- **Imagination** — Analyses, synthesizes, and governs forms and is sometimes identified with apprehension. It is located in the middle cavity.
- **Memory** — The place of storage for apprehension. It is located in the back of the middle cavity.

These faculties are crowned by the intellectual soul (naja niťiqah) which belongs to the spiritual world and which, through the network of these faculties, becomes for a period attached to the body and imprisoned in the fortress of nature. Often it is so lost in this new and temporary habitat that it forgets its original home and can be reawakened only by death or ascetic practices.

The last section of the Ḥikmat al-Iḥrāq concerning eschatology and spiritual union outlines precisely the way by which the spirit returns to its original abode, the way by which the causality of the intellect is achieved. Every soul, in whatever degree of perfection it might be, seeks the Light of lights, and its joy is in being illuminated by it. Suhrawardī goes as far as to say that he who has not tasted the joy of the illumination of the victor has tasted no joy at all. Every joy in the world is a reflection of the joy of gnosis, and the ultimate felicity of the soul is to reach toward the angelic lights by purification and ascetic practices. After death the soul of those who have reached some measure of purity departs to the world of archetypes above the visible heavens and participates in the sounds, sights, and tastes of that world which are the

---

44 Suhrawardī, Hayākūl al-Nūr, Sections 6 and 7. In certain other writings Suhrawardī avers that the light of each man is created with his body but survives after it. By creation, however, Suhrawardī means essentially “individualization” and “actualization” rather than creation in the ordinary sense. There is no doubt that his basic teaching is that the spirit or soul comes from the world of light and ultimately returns to it.
principles of terrestrial forms. On the contrary, those whose soul has been tarnished by the darkness of evil and ignorance (ashâb al-shaqi'ah) depart for the world of inverted forms (quwâr mu'allaqah) which lies in the labyrinth of fantasy, the dark world of the devils and the jinn. As for the gnostics or the theocephals (muta'allîkhin) who have already reached the degree of sanctity in this life, their soul departs to a world above the angels.

After leaving the body, the soul may be in several states which Suhrawardi outlines as follows. Either the soul is simple and pure like that of children and fools who are attracted neither to this world nor to the next. Or it is simple but impure and as such is attracted more to this world, so that upon death it suffers greatly by being separated from the object of its desire; gradually, however, it forgets its worldly love and becomes simple as in the first case. Or it is not simple but perfect and pure and upon death joins the intelligible world to which it is similar and has an indescribable joy in the contemplation of God. Or it is complete but impure, so that upon death it suffers greatly both for separation from the body and from the First Source; gradually, however, the pains caused by alienation from this world cease and the soul enjoys spiritual delights. Or the soul is incomplete but pure, i.e., it has a love for perfection but has not yet realized it; upon death, therefore, it suffers ceaselessly, although the love of this world gradually dies away. Finally, the soul is incomplete and impure, so that it suffers the greatest pain. Man should, therefore, spend the few days he has here on earth to transform the precious jewel of his soul into the image of an angel and not into that of an animal. The highest station to be reached by the soul is that of the prophets (nâfs qadriyyah) who perceive the forms of the universals or archetypes naturally. They know all things without the assistance of teachers or books. They hear the sounds of the heavens, i.e., the archetypes of earthly sounds, and not just vibrations of the air, and see the intelligible forms. Their souls and those of great saints also reach such degree of purity that they can influence the world of the elements as the ordinary soul influences the body. They even make the archetypes subsist by will, that is, give them existence.

The knowledge of the prophets is the archetype of all knowledge. In his nocturnal Ascension (mi'râj) the Prophet Muhammad—upon whom be peace—

journeyed through all the states of being beyond the universe to the Divine Presence or microcosmically through his soul and intellect to the Divine Self. This journey through the hierarchy of Being symbolizes the degrees of knowledge which the initiate gains as he travels on the Path in imitation of the bringer of revelation who has opened the way for him. A prophet is absolutely necessary as a guide for the gnostic and as a bringer of Law for society. Man needs a society in order to survive and society needs law and order and, therefore, prophets to bring news of the other world and to establish harmony among men. The best man is he who knows, and the best of those who know are the prophets, and the best prophets are those who have brought a revelation (mursîlîn), and the best of them are the prophets whose revelation has spread over the face of the earth, and the completion and perfection of the prophetic cycle is the Prophet Muhammad—upon whom be peace—who is the seal of prophethood.

The Initiatory Narratives

In a series of treatises written in beautiful Persian prose, Suhrawardi expounds another aspect of išrâ'îq wisdom which is the complement of the metaphysical doctrine. These works which we have called initiatory narratives are symbolic stories depicting the journey of the soul to God much like certain medieval European romances and poems such as Pariasil and the Divine Comedy although of shorter length. Unfortunately, in this limited space we cannot deal with all of these narratives each of which treats of a different aspect of the spiritual journey using various traditional symbols such as the cosmic mountain, the griffin, the fountain of life, and the lover and the beloved. Some of the more important of these narratives are the Risâlah fi Mi'râj (The Treatise on the Nocturnal Journey), Risâlah fi Ḥâlat al-Tâfâfyyah (Treatise on the State of Childhood), Râdî ba Jamâ'at-i Şâ'înîn (A Day with the Community of Sufis), Āwâz-i Par-i Jibâ'în (The Chant of the Wing of Gabriel), 'Aqîl-i Surkh (The Red Intellect), Sâfr-i Siyurgh (The Song of the Griffin), Lughât-i Mîrân (The Language of Termites), Risâlât al-Tohr (The Treatise on the Birds), and Risâlât fi Ḥaqîqat al-Ishq (Treatise on the Reality of Love). The titles alone indicate some of the rich symbolism which Suhrawardi uses to describe the spiritual journey. Each narrative depicts a certain aspect of the spiritual life as lived and practised by sages and saints. Sometimes theory and spiritual experience are combined as in the Āwâz-i Par-i...
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Jibra’īl71 where in the first part of the vision the disciple meets the active intellect, the sage who symbolizes the “prophet” within himself who comes from the “land of nowhers” (nā-kujā-ābadā), and asks certain questions about various aspects of the doctrine. In the second part, however, the tone changes; the hero asks to be taught the Word of God and after being instructed in the esoteric meaning of letters and words, i.e., jāfr, he learns that God has certain major words like the angels, as well as the supreme Word which is to other words as the sun is to the stars. He learns furthermore that man is himself a Word of God, and it is through His Word that man returns to the Creator. He, like other creatures of this world, is a chamt of the wing of Gabriel which spreads from the world of light to that of darkness. This world is a shadow of his left wing as the world of light is a reflection of his right wing. It is by the Word, by the sound of the wing of Gabriel, that man has come into existence, and it is by the Word that he can return to the principal state, the divine origin, from which he issued forth.

The Isḥāqi Tradition

The influence of Suhrawardī has been as great in the Islamic world, particularly in Shi‘ism, as it has been small in the West. His works were not translated into Latin so that his name hardly ever appears along with those of Ibn Sina and ibn Rushd as masters of philosophy. But in the East from the moment of his death, his genius in establishing a new school of traditional wisdom was recognized and he was to exercise the greatest influence in Shi‘ism. With the weakening of Aristotelianism in the sixteenth century the element that came to replace it and to dominate Islamic intellectual life was a combination of the intellectual Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabi and the Isḥāqi wisdom of Suhrwardī. These two masters who lived within a generation of each other came from the two ends of the Islamic world to Syria, one to die in Damascus and the other in Aleppo, and it was from this central province of Islam that their doctrines were to spread throughout the Muslim East, particularly in Persia. The main link between these two great masters of gnosis was Qūth al-Din Shirāzī who was, on the one hand, the disciple of Ṣadr al-Din Qūnawī, himself a disciple and the main expositor of the teachings of ibn ‘Arabi in the East, and, on the other, the commentator of Ḥikmat al-Ishraq.72

Throughout the last seven centuries the tradition of Ḥikmat al-Ishraq has continued especially in Persia where it played a major role in the survival of Shi‘ism during the Safavid period. Among the most important commentators written...

---

Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī Maqtūl

on Suhrwardī’s works are those of Shams al-Dīn Shahrazūrī and Qūth al-Dīn Shirāzī in the seventh/thirteenth century, Wudū‘ Tabrizī in the tenth/sixteenth century, and Mulla Ṣadrā in the eleventh/seventeenth century on the Ḥikmat al-Ishraq, the commentaries of Shahrazūrī, Ibn Kamānānā, and ‘Allāmah Ḥilīl in the seventh and eighth/thirteenth and fourteenth centuries on the Tuhafūt, and the commentaries of Jalāl al-Dīn Dāwānī in the ninth/fifteenth century and Maula ‘Abd al-Razzāq Lāhīji in the eleventh/seventeenth century on the Ḥikmat al-Ishraq. These commentaries and many others which we have not been able to mention here present a valuable treasure of Isḥāqi wisdom which has influenced so many philosophers, theologians, and gnostics from Khwājah Naṣr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Dāwānī to Mir Dāmād, Mulla Ṣadrā, Shāhīd Ahmad Aḥṣī‘ī, and Ḥājjī Mulla Hādi Sāzavīrā. Some of the works of Suhrwardī were also to influence the sages and philosophers in the Mughal Court in India where parts of his writings were even translated into Sanskrit,73 as they were translated into Hebrew some time earlier. Isḥāqi wisdom has, therefore, been one of the universal elements of Eastern intellectual tradition during the past centuries and, as it is a version of the perennial philosophy, it is touched by the breath of eternity which, in the case of all expressions of truth, gives it a freshness and actuality that make this wisdom as essential today as it has been through the ages.

---

BIBLIOGRAPHY


13 Corbin and certain other European scholars have also emphasized the role of Isḥāqi wisdom in the tenth/sixteenth-century Zoroastrianism and the movement connected with the name of Azar Kaiwān. This curious eclecticism in which elements of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Zoroastrianism are combined but which differs greatly from original Zoroastrian doctrines has left behind several works like the Dabistān al-Madhhāb and the Ḥusn tārīkh some passages of which seem to be forged. Such a leading scholar of Zoroastrianism as I. Pouraye-Douvov considers the whole work to be purposeful falsification. See his article “Ḥusn tārīkh,” Iran-i Imrāz, second year, No. II.

Whatever importance this syncretic movement which is so similar to the religious movements at the Court of Akbar may have had, its followers paid great attention to the writings of Shīkh al-Iṣraḥq. In fact, one of the disciples of Azar Kaiwān by the name of Fāzīnī Bahram ibn Farahād translated several works of Suhrwardī into Persian. For a discussion of the school of Azar Kaiwān, see M. Mu’īn, “Azar Kaiwān wa Pārīwān-i ‘ū,” Revue de la Faculte des Lettres, Tehran University, Vol. IV, No. 3, 1336/1917, pp. 25–42.
Chapter XX

IBN 'ARABI

A

LIFE AND WORKS

A fair and critical account of the life and thought of Shaikh Muhayi al-Din ibn al-'Arabi (or ibn 'Arabi as he was known in the East) presents certain difficulties. Biographical material is not lacking; he is given great prominence in many of the biographical and historical books, both in Arabic and Persian. Some whole books and chapters of books have been written in defence of his orthodoxy or against his alleged heterodoxy. Many of his own works, particularly the Futuḥat, Risād al-Quds, and the "Memorandum" in which he enumerates his works and describes the conditions under which they were written, throw abundant light on some of the obscure aspects of his life as a man, and above all as an eminent Sufi and Sufi author. But the account we derive from all these various sources is conflicting, and the real problem that faces us lies in drawing a true picture of his personality, his pattern of thought, and his works, based on such account. Yet as far as his personal life and his mental and spiritual make-up are concerned, our best source should be his own works to which we have already referred; for in such works we have first-hand information about his mental and spiritual progress. There are also abundant details concerning his early masters in the Sufi Path, his personal contacts with the men and women he encountered on his vast travels. Here and there we come across a vivid description of his mystical experiences, visions, and dreams. Without the help of such material which has hitherto been neglected, ibn 'Arabi's true personality, both as a thinker and a mystic, would remain considerably unknown to us. The task is by no means easy. It means hunting through his voluminous Futuḥat and other works for the biographical details we have just described. An outline of the main historical facts of his life is easy enough to give, but it would be no complete or scientific biography in the full sense of the word.

Ibn 'Arabi was born at Murcia—South-east of Spain—on the 17th of Ramaḍān 580/28th of July 1165. His nisba—al-Ḥātimi al-Tā'ī—shows that he was a descendant of the ancient Arab tribe of Ta'y—a fact which proves that Muslim mysticism was not the exclusive heritage of the Persian mind as some scholars maintain. He came from a family well known for their piety. His father and two of his uncles were Sufis of some renown. He received his early education at Seville which was a great centre of learning at the time. There he remained for thirty years studying under some of the great scholars of that city such as Abu Bakr b. Khalaf, ibn Zarqūn, and abi Muḥammad 'Abd al-Ḥaqq al-Iṣbahī. At Seville he also met a number of his early spiritual masters such as Yūsuf b. Khalaf al-Qumi who was a personal disciple of Shaikh abu Madyan,1 and Šalīh al-'Adawi whom he describes as a perfect ascetic. He refers to such men in terms of admiration and gratitude in his Futuḥat and Risād al-Quds and acknowledges his debt to them for the initiation he had received from them into the Path of Sufism.

While making Seville his permanent place of residence, he travelled widely throughout Spain and Maghrib establishing wherever he went fresh relations with eminent Sufis and other men of learning. He visited Cordova, while still a lad, and made acquaintance with ibn Rūshd, the philosopher, who was then the judge of the city.2

In 590/1194 he visited Fez and Morocco. At the age of 38, i.e., in 589/1193, he set out for the East during the reign of Ya'qūb b. Yūsuf b. 'Abd al-Mu'tinin, the Sultan of Africa and Andalusia. His apparent intention was to perform his pilgrimage, but his real aim was perhaps to seek settlement in another country far away from the very much troubled West. The political and religious atmosphere there was stifling, and men like ibn 'Arabi were looked upon with suspicion both by the narrow-minded theologians and the ruling monarchs. The Sultan of the Mawāhibīds and Murābiṭs feared them for the influence they had over their followers and the possible danger of using these followers for political purposes as was the case with abu al-Qāsim b. Qasī, head of the Murūdīn, who was killed in 546/1151. The Mālikite theologians of the West were most intolerant towards the new school of thought that was beginning to take shape at the time. Even al-Qazāwī's teaching was rejected and his books committed to the flames. The East, on the other hand, was more tolerant and more ready to accept new ideas and movements. Yet not the whole of the

---
2 Ibid., p. 199.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

East can be said to be so, for when ibn 'Arabi visited Egypt in 598/1201, he was ill-received by some of its people and an attempt was made on his life.

After leaving Egypt he traveled far and wide throughout the Middle East, visiting Jerusalem, Mecca (where he studied and taught Ḥadīth for a time), the Hijāz, Baghdad, Aleppo, and Asia Minor. He finally settled down in Damascus until he died on the 28th of Rabi’ al-Thānî 638/17th of November 1240. He was buried in Mount Qasiyūn in the private sepulchre of Qādi Muḥyī al-Dīn b. al-Dhakī.¹

Ibn ‘Arabi is one of the most prolific authors in Muslim history. He is adequately described by Brockelmann³ as a writer of colossal fecundity. There are at least 140 extant works which bear his name, varying from short treatises of some few pages to voluminous books like the Futūḥāt. The exact number of his works is uncertain. Sha‘rānī gives the figure of 400,⁴ and the Persian author Jāmī, the much exaggerated figure of 500.⁵ Muhammad Rajab Hīlī, in a book entitled al-Burkān al-Ashar fī Maṣāḥih al-Shaikh al-Akbar, enumerates 284 books and tracts. In the “Memorandum” which ibn ‘Arabi himself drew up in the year 632/1234, six years before his death, he gave the titles of 251 of his writings and said that that was as far as he could remember. The writing of the “Memorandum” has its significance. It provides a written evidence against anyone who might attempt to forge books in his name; and there must have been many among his enemies in the East who made such attempts.

To establish the identity and authenticity of all the works that have been ascribed to him is a task which has not been undertaken by any scholar yet. But we know within limits the genuineness of most of his major works, although doubt might arise with regard to certain parts of their contents. If what Sha‘rānī says about the Futūḥāt is true, it would make us wonder how much of this most important book is genuinely ibn ‘Arabi’s and how much of it is foisted upon him.⁶ When he tried to summarize the Futūḥāt, Sha‘rānī said, he came across certain passages which he thought were in conflict with the established opinions of the orthodox Muslims. He omitted them after some hesitation. One day, he was discussing the matter with Shaikh Shams al-Dīn al-Madāni (d. 955/1548) who produced a copy of the Futūḥāt which had been collated with ibn ‘Arabi’s own MS. of the book at Qunīyah. On reading it he discovered that it contained none of the passages which he had omitted. This convinced him, he goes on to say, that the copies of the Futūḥāt which were in current use in Egypt in his time contained parts which had been foisted upon the author as done in the case of the Fuṣūṣ and other works.⁷

Ibn ‘Arabi

This may very well have been the case, but having not yet read the Qunīyah MS. of the Futūḥāt which is still extant, one is unable to say how it compares with the printed texts of our time. A critical edition of the text based on the Qunīyah MS. is of utmost importance. Indeed it might considerably alter our knowledge of ibn ‘Arabi’s mystical philosophy. What seems more certain is that many works or parts of works were written by later disciples of ibn ‘Arabi’s school and attributed to him; and many others were extracted from his larger works and given independent titles. All these exhibit the same strain of thought and technique which characterize his genuine works. Such facts account, partly at least, for the enormous number of works which are usually attributed to him.

Although his output was mainly in the field of Sufism, his writings seem to have covered the entire range of Muslim scholarship. He wrote on the theory and practice of Sufism, Ḥadīth, Qur‘ānic exegesis, the biography of the Prophet, philosophy, literature, including Sufi poetry, and natural sciences. In dealing with these diverse subjects he never lost sight of mysticism. We often see some aspects of his mystical system coming into prominence while dealing with a theological, juristic, or even scientific problem. His mystical ideas are imperceptibly woven into his writings on other sciences and make it all the more difficult to understand him from a mixed and inconsistent terminology.

The dates of only ten of his works are definitely known, but we can tell, within limits, whether a work belongs to his early life in Spain and al-Maghrib, or to his later life in the East. With a few exceptions, most of his important works were written after he had left his native land, principally at Mecca and Damascus; and his maturest works like Futūḥāt, the Fuṣūṣ, and the Tanazzulāt were written during the last thirty years of his life. His earlier works, on the other hand, are more of the nature of monographs written on single topics and show no sign of a comprehensive philosophical system. It seems that it is his contact with the resources and men of the East that gave his theosophical speculations their wide range, and his mystical system of philosophy its finality. His opus magnum, as far as mystical philosophy is concerned, is his celebrated Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (Gems of Philosophy or Bezels of Wisdom) which he finished at Damascus in 628/1230, ten years before his death. The rudiments of this philosophy are to be found scattered throughout his monumental Futūḥāt which he started at Mecca in 598/1201 and finished about 635/1237. The general theme of the Fuṣūṣ was foreshadowed in the Futūḥāt in more places than one, and more particularly in Vol. II, pp. 357–77.

B

PATTERN OF THOUGHT AND STYLE

The extraordinary complexity of ibn ‘Arabi’s personality is a sufficient explanation of the complexity of the manner of his thinking and his style of

⁸ Brockelmann, GAL, Vol. I, p. 44.
⁹ Yaqūṭī, p. 10.
⁰ Al-Baḥrī, p. 634.
² Yaqūṭī, p. 3.
writing. It is true that sometimes he is clear and straightforward, but more often—particularly when he plunges into metaphysical speculations—his style becomes twisted and baffling, and his ideas almost intractable. The difficulty of understanding him sometimes can even be felt by scholars who are well acquainted with the characteristic aspect of his thought. It is not so much what he intends to say as the way in which he actually says it that constitutes the real difficulty. He has an impossible problem to solve, viz., to reconcile a pantheistic theory of the nature of reality with the monothetic doctrine of Islam. His loyalty to both was equal, and indeed he saw no contradiction in holding that the God of Islam is identical with the One who is the essence and ultimate ground of all things. He was a pious ascetic and a mystic, besides being a scholar of Muslim Law, theology, and philosophy. His writings are a curious blend of all these subjects. He is for ever trying either to interpret the whole fabric of the teaching of Islam in the light of his pantheistic theory of the unity of all being, or to find justification for this theory in some Islamic texts. The two methods go hand in hand, with two different languages, i.e., the esoteric language of mysticism and the exoteric language of religion, used concurrently. Logically speaking, Islam is irreconcilable with any form of pantheism, but ibn ‘Arabi finds in the mystic experience a higher synthesis in which Allah and the pantheistic One are reconciled. Interpretation within reasonable limits is justifiable, but with ibn ‘Arabi it is a dangerous means of converting Islam into pantheism or vice versa. This is most apparent in the Fāṣid, and to a certain extent in the Futūhāt, where the Qur’ānic texts and traditions of the Prophet are explained mystically or rather pantheistically. Furthermore, while he is thus occupied with eliciting from the Qur’ānic text his own ideas, he gathers round the subject in hand material drawn from all sources and brings it all into the range of his meditation. This accounts for the very extensive and inconsistent vocabulary which makes his writings almost unintelligible.

Whenever he is challenged or he thinks he would be challenged about the meaning of a certain statement, he at once brings forth another meaning which would convince the challenger. He was asked what he meant by saying:

“Oh Thou who seest me, while I see not Thee, How oft I see Him, while He sees not me!”

He replied at once, making the following additions which completely altered the original sense, by saying:

“Oh Thou who seest me ever prone to sin, While Thee I see not willing to upbraid: How oft I see Him grant His grace’s aid While He sees me not seeking grace to win.”


Similarly, when his contemporaries read his Tarjumān al-Asbābīyy, which is supposed to be written on divine love, they could see in the Diwān nothing but erotic poems describing beautiful women, lovely scenes of nature and ordinary human passions. They accused the Shaikh of being in love with Shaikh Makin al-Din’s daughter whose physical and moral qualities he describes in the introduction of the Diwān. On hearing this he wrote a commentary on the work explaining it all allegorically. He did not deny that he loved al-Niḥām—the beautiful daughter of Makin al-Din. What he denied was that he loved her in the ordinary sense of human love. For him she was only a symbol, a form, of the all-pervading beauty which manifests itself in the infinite variety of things.

“Every name I mention,” he says, “refers to her; and every dwelling I weep at is her dwelling... yet the words of my verses are nothing but signs for the spiritual realities which descend upon my heart. May God guard the reader of this Diwān against entertaining thoughts which do not become men with noble souls and lofty aspirations, for the hearts of such men are only occupied with heavenly things.”

It is not improbable that ibn ‘Arabi made a deliberate effort to complicate the style, as Professor E. G. Browne remarks, in order to conceal his ideas from the narrow-minded orthodox and the uninitiated. He certainly succeeded, partly at least, in covering his pantheistic ideas with an apparel of Qur’ānic texts and Prophetic traditions—a fact which is largely responsible for the controversy which raged throughout the Muslim world regarding his orthodoxy. But it is also possible, as we have already remarked, that he was equally convinced of the truth of Islam and of his own philosophical system which was verified by his mystical experience. In this case there is no need to talk about concealment of ideas or intentional complexity of style.

It would be a mistake to judge ibn ‘Arabi by the ordinary canons of logic. He is undoubtedly a thinker and founder of a school of thought, but he is pre-eminently a mystic. His mystical philosophy, therefore, represents the union of thought and emotion in the highest degree. It is a curious blend of reasoned truths and intuitive knowledge. He is also a man of colossal imagination. His dialectical reasoning is never free from forceful imagery and mystic emotions. In fact, his thought seems to be working through his imagination all the time. He dreams what he thinks, yet there is a deep under-current of reasoning running through. He does not always prove his ideas with a formal dialectic, but refers his readers to mystic intuition and imagination as the final proof of their validity. The world of imagination for him is a real world; perhaps even more real than the external world of concrete objects. It is a world in which true knowledge of things can be obtained. His own imagination was as active in his dreams as in his waking life. He tells us the dates when and

---

10 Introd. to the Com. on the Tarjumān.
the places where he had the visions, in which he saw prophets and saints and
discoursed with them; and others in which a whole book like the Fuyūṣ was
handed to him by the Prophet Muhammad who bade him “take it and go
forth with it to people that they may make use thereof.”
\[13\] He calls this an act of
revelation or inspiration and claims that many of his books were so inspired.

“All that I put down in my books,” he says, “is not the result of thinking or
discursive reasoning. It is communicated to me through the breathing of the
angel of revelation in my heart.”
\[13\] “All that I have written and what I am
writing now is dictated to me through the breathing of the divine spirit into
my spirit. This is my privilege as a heir not as an independent source; for the
breathing of the spirit is a degree lower than the verbal inspiration.”
\[14\]

Such claims point to a supernatural or supernatural source by which ibn
‘Arabi’s writings were inspired. Yet in discussing the problem of revelation
(kazbi and waki) in general, he emphatically denies all outside supernatural
agents, and regards revelation as something which springs from the nature of
man. Here are his own words:

“So, if any man of revelation should behold an object revealing to him
gnosis which he did not have before, or giving him something of which he
had no possession, this ‘object’ is his own ‘an (essence) and naught
besides. Thus from the tree of his ‘self’ he gathers the fruit of his own
knowledge, just as the image of him who stands before a polished mirror
is no other than himself.”
\[15\]

Revelation, therefore, is an activity of man’s soul, when all its spiritual
powers are summoned and directed towards production. It is not due to an
external agent, neither is it the work of the mind as we usually know it. What
is sometime seen as an “object” revealing knowledge to an inspired man is
nothing but a projection of his own ‘self.’

Ibn ‘Arabi is quite consistent with himself when he denies an outside source
of divine inspiration, for man, according to him, like everything else, is in
one sense divine. So there is no need to assume a duality of a divine revealer
and a human receiver of knowledge.

Another very important aspect of his thought is its digressive character.
He has offered the world a system of mystical philosophy, but nowhere in his
books can we find this system explained as a whole or with any appreciable
degree of unity or cohesion. He goes on from one subject to another with no
apparent logical connection, pouring out details which he draws from every
conceivable source. His philosophical ideas are widely spread among this mass

of irrelevant material and one has to pick them up and piece them together.
That he has a definite system of mystical philosophy is a fact beyond doubt.
It is hinted at in every page in the Fuyūṣ and in many parts of the Futūḥāt;
but the system as a complete whole is to be found in neither. It is extraordinary
that he admits that he has intentionally concealed his special theory by
scattering its component parts throughout his books and left the task of
assembling it to the intelligent reader. Speaking of the doctrine of the super-
select (by which he means the doctrine of the Unity of all Being), he says:

“I have never treated it as a single subject on account of its abstruseness,
but dispersed it throughout the chapters of my book (the Futūḥāt).
It is there complete but diffused, as I have already said. The intelligent
reader who understands it will be able to recognize it and distinguish it
from any other doctrine. It is the ultimate truth beyond which there is
nothing to obtain.”
\[16\]

The third aspect of his thought is its eclectic character. Although he may
rightly claim to have a philosophy of religion of his own, many of the com-
ponent elements of this philosophy are derived from Islamic as well as non-
Islamic sources. He had before him the enormous wealth of Muslim sciences
as well as the treasures of Greek thought which were transmitted through
Muslim philosophers and theologians. In addition, he was thoroughly familiar
with the literature of earlier Sufis. From all these sources he borrowed what-
ever was pertinent to his system; and with his special technique of inter-
pretation he brought whatever he borrowed into line with his own ideas. He read
into the technical terms of traditional philosophy and theology—as he did
with the Qur’anic terms—totally different meanings. He borrowed from Plato,
Aristotle, the Stoics, Philo, and the Neo-Platonists terms of which he found
equivalents in the Qur’an or in the writings of the Sufis and Scholastic Theo-
logians. All were used for the construction and defence of his own philo-
osophy from which he never wavered.

C

CONTROVERSY ABOUT HIS ORTHODOXY

There has never been in the whole history of Islam another man whose
faith has been so much in question. The controversy over ibn ‘Arabi’s ortho-
doxy spread far and wide, and occupied the minds of the Muslims for cen-
turies. We may even say that some traces of it are still to be found. Muslim scholars
in the past were not concerned with his philosophy or mysticism as such, but
with how far his philosophical and mystical ideas were in harmony or dis-
harmony with the established dogmas of Islam. Instead of studying him
objectively and impartially, and putting him in the place he deserves in the

\[15\] Fuyūṣ al-‘IḥBAR, p. 47.
\[13\] See ibn ‘Arabi’s works in the light of a memorandum ... by A. E. Affii,
Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Vol. VIII, pp. 112f.
\[14\] Quoted by Shārāni, Yawqī, p. 24.
\[15\] Ibid.
\[16\] Fuyūṣ, p. 66.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

In general and that of ibn 'Arabi and ibn al-Farîd in particular. The Ḥanbalite ibn Taimiyyah (d. 728/1328), with his bitter tongue and uncompromising attitude towards the Sufis, led the attack. He put these two great mystics in the same category with Ḥallâj, Qânawî, ibn Sâbîn, Tîlmînî, and Kirmâni as men who believed in incarnation and unification. In this respect, he said, they were even worse than the Christians and the extreme Shi'îtes.17 He does not even distinguish between the mystical ravings of Ḥallâj, the deeply emotional utterances of ibn al-Farîd, the cold-blooded and almost materialistic pantheism of Tîlmînî, and the monistic theology of ibn 'Arabi. They were all guilty of the abominable doctrines of incarnationism and pantheism. Curiously enough, he was less violent in his criticism of ibn 'Arabi's doctrine which, he said, was nearer Islam than any of the others.

By far the worst enemy of ibn 'Arabi and ibn al-Farîd and most insolent towards them was Burhân al-Dîn Ibrâhîm al-Biqâ'î (d. 858/1454). He devoted two complete books to the refutation of their doctrines, not sparing even their personal characters. In one of these books entitled Tanbih al-Qâbi 'ala Takfir ibn 'Arabi18 (Drawing the Attention of the Ignorant to the Inconstancy of ibn 'Arabi) he says:

"He deceived the true believers by pretending to be one of them. He made his stand on the ground of their beliefs; but gradually dragged them into narrow corners, and led them by seduction to places where perplexing questions are lurking. He is the greatest artist in confusing people; quotes authentic traditions of the Prophet, then twists them around in strange and mysterious ways. Thus, he leads his misguided followers to his ultimate objective which is the complete overthrowing of all religion and religious beliefs. The upholders of such doctrines hide themselves behind an outward appearance of Muslim ritual such as prayer and fasting. They are in fact atheists in the cloaks of monks and ascetics, and veritable heretics under the name of Sufis."19

These accusations are unjust as they are unfounded. Ibn 'Arabi, it is true, does interpret the Qur'ân and Prophetic traditions in an esoteric manner, and he is not the first or the last Sufi to do it, but his ultimate aim is never the abandonment of religious beliefs and practices as Bîqâ'î maintains. On the contrary, he did his utmost to save Islam which he understood in his own way. The charge of pretence and hypocrisy is contradicted by the bold and fearless language in which ibn 'Arabi chooses to express himself. He does not pretend to be a Muslim in order to please or avoid the wrath of true believers to whom Bîqâ'î refers. He believes that Islam which preserves the principle of the unity of God could be squared with his doctrine of the unity

18 MS. in the special collection of Ahmad Dhâki Pâsha, Cairo.
19 Ibid.
of all Being, and this he openly declares in the strongest terms. He may have deceived himself or expressed the mystical union with God in terms of
the metaphysical theory of the unity between God and the phenomenal world,
but he certainly tried to deceive no one.
In contrast to Bīqī'ī's terrible accusations, we should conclude by citing
the words of Balqūni who had the highest opinion of Ibn 'Arabi. He says:

“You should not be surprised that sheikh Muhay al-Din
has said, when he—may God have mercy upon him—plunged deep into
the sea of gnostics and the verification of truths, mentioned towards
the end of his life in the Fugāṣ, the Futūḥat, and the Tannazzul—things
which are fully understood only by people of his rank.”

D

INFLUENCE ON FUTURE SUFISM

Although Ibn 'Arabi was violently attacked by his adversaries for his views
which they considered unorthodox, his teachings not only survived the
attacks, but exercised the most profound influence on the course of all future
Sufism. His admirers in the East, where he spent the greater part of his life,
called him al-Sheikh al-Akhar (the Greatest Doctor), a title which has never
been conferred on another Sufi since. It pointed to his exceptional
qualities both as a great spiritual master and a Sufi author—and it is held to be true
of him to this day. He marks the end of a stage where speculative Sufism
reached its culminating point. The centuries that followed witnessed the rapid
spread of Sufi orders all over the Muslim world; and Sufism became the popular
form of Islam with much less theory and more ritual and practice. The
founders of the Fraternities were better known for their piety and spiritual
leadership than for their speculation. This is why Ibn 'Arabi's theosophy and
mystical philosophy remained unchallenged. They were in fact the only source
of inspiration to anyone who discoursed on the subject of the Unity of all
Being, whether in Arabic-speaking countries or in Persia or Turkey. Some
writers of his own school, such as 'Abd al-Karim al-Jili and 'Abd al-Razzaq
al-Kashani, did little more than reproduce his ideas in a different form. Other
schools of Sufism were not entirely free of his influence, at least as far as his
terminology was concerned. The tremendous commentary of Arisi on Quhsairi's
Risalah, which is the classical model of Sunni Sufism, abounds with ideas and
terms borrowed from Ibn 'Arabi's works.

His influence seems to show itself most markedly in the delightful works
of the mystic poets of Persia from the seventh/thirteenth to the ninth/fifteenth
century. 'Iraqi, Shabstari, and Jami were all inspired by him. Their wonderful
odes are in many respects an echo of the ideas of the author of the Fugāṣ
and the Futūḥat, cast into magnificent poetry by the subtle genius of the
Persian mind. They overflow with the ideas of divine unity and universal love
and beauty. God is described as the source and ultimate ground of all things.
He is for ever revealing Himself in the infinite forms of the phenomenal world.
The world is created anew at every moment of time; a continual process of
change goes on, with no repetition and no becoming. The divine light illumines
all particles of Being, just as the divine names have from eternity illumina-
ted the potential, non-existent realities of things. When these realities
become actualized in space and time, they reflect, like mirrors, the divine
names which give them their external existence. The phenomenal world is the
theatre wherein all the divine names are manifested. Man is the only creature
in whom these names are manifested collectively.

These are but a few of the many ideas which the mystic poets of Persia
borrowed from Ibn 'Arabi and to which they gave an endless variety of
poetical forms. It is said that 'Iraqi wrote his Lama'at after hearing Sadr al-Din
Qanawi’s lectures on the Fugāṣ, and Jami who commented on the same book
wrote his La‘dīb in the same strain. The following is an extract from 'Iraqi’s
Lama'at which sums up Ibn 'Arabi's theory of the microcosm (man):

“Though Form,” he said, “proclaims me Adam's son,
My true degree a higher place hath won.
When in the glass of Beauty I behold,
The Universe my image doth unfold:
In Heaven's Sun behold me manifest—
Each tiny molecule doth me attest...
Ocean's a drop from my pervading Sea,
Light a flash of my vast Brilliance:
From Throne to Carpet, all that is doth seem
Naught but a Mote that rides the sunlit Beam.
When Being's Veil of Attributes is shed,
My Splendour o'er a lustrous World is spread...”

E

DOCTRINES

1. Unity of All Being.—The most fundamental principle which lies at the
root of Ibn 'Arabi's whole philosophy, or rather theologico-philosophical and
mystical thought, is the principle of the “Unity of All Being” (wujūd al-
wujūd). Perhaps the word “pantheism” is not a very happy equivalent, partly
because it has particular associations in our minds, and also because it does
not express the full significance of the much wider doctrine of the Unity of All
Being as understood by our author. From this primordial conception of
the ultimate nature of reality all his theories in other fields of philosophy
follow with an appreciable degree of consistency.

20 A. J. Arberry, Sufism, pp. 102-03.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Much of the criticism leveled against ibn ‘Arabi’s position is due to the misunderstanding of the role which he assigns to God in his system—a fact which attracted the attention of even ibn Taimiyyah, who distinguishes between ibn ‘Arabi’s wahdat al-wujūd and that of other Muslim pantheists. He says that “ibn ‘Arabi’s system is nearer to Islam in so far as he discriminates between the One who reveals Himself and the manifestations thereof, thus establishing the truth of the religious Law and insisting on the ethical and theological principles upon which the former Shāhīhs of Islam had insisted.”21 In other words, ibn Taimiyyah does not wish to put ibn ‘Arabi in the same category with Tihmānī, Isrā’īlī, and Kirmānī whom he condemns as atheists and naturalists.

Ibn ‘Arabi’s pantheism is not a materialistic view of reality. The external world of sensible objects is but a fleeting shadow of the Real (al-‘Haqq), God. It is a form of acosmism which denies that the phenomenal has being or meaning apart from and independently of God. It is not that cold-blooded pantheism in which the name of God is mentioned for sheer courtesy, or, at the most, for logical necessity or consistency. On the contrary, it is the sort of pantheism in which God swallows up everything, and the so-called other-than-God is reduced to nothing. God alone is the all-embracing and eternal reality. This position is summed up in ibn ‘Arabi’s own words:

“Glory to Him who created all things, being Himself their very essence (‘ainuhā)”; and also in the following verse:

“O Thou Who hast created all things in Thyself, Thou uniteest that which Thou createst. Thou createst that which existeth infinitely In Thee, for Thou art the narrow and the all-embracing.”22

Reality, therefore, is one and indivisible. We speak of God and the world, the One and the many, Unity and multiplicity, and such other terms when we use the language of the senses and the unaided intellect. The intuitive knowledge of the mystic reveals nothing but absolute unity which—curiously enough—ibn ‘Arabi identifies with the Muslim doctrine of unification (tausīd). Hence the further and more daring identification of his pantheistic doctrine with Islam as the religion of unification.

“Base the whole affair of your seclusion (khilwah),” he says, “upon facing God with absolute unification which is not marred by any (form of) polytheism, implicit or explicit, and by denying, with absolute conviction, all causes and intermediaries, whole and part, for indeed if you are deprived of such tausīd you will surely fall into polytheism.”23

22 Fugāq, p. 88.
I am; and the Outward says no when the Inward says I am, and so in the case of every pair of contraries. The speaker is One, and He is identical with the Hearer.\footnote{Fus\={a}q, p. 77.}

Thus, ibn ‘Arabi’s thought goes on moving within that closed circle which knows no beginning and no end. His thought is circular because reality as he envisages it is circular. Every point on the circle is potentially the whole of the circle and is capable of manifesting the whole. Looking at the points with an eye on the centre of the circle (the divine essence), we can say that each point is identical with the essence in one respect, different from it in another respect. This explains the verbal contradictions with which ibn ‘Arabi’s books abound.

Sometimes he comes nearer the philosophers than the mystics when he explains the relation between God and the universe. Here we have theories reminiscent of the Platonic theory of ideas and the Iq\={a}qi\={a}’s doctrine of intelligible existence (al-wuj\={u}d al-dhikri) and the scholastic theory of the identification of substance and accidents (the theory of the \={a}j\={a}’r\={a}t\={i}). “Before coming into existence,” he says, “things of the phenomenal world were potentialities in the bosom of the Absolute.” They formed the contents of the mind of God as ideas of His future becoming. These intelligible realities are what he calls “the fixed prototypes of things” (al-a\={y}n al-thabitiy\={a}h). God’s knowledge of them is identical with His knowledge of Himself. It is a state of self-revelation or self-consciousness, in which God saw (at no particular point of time) in Himself these determinate “forms” of His own essence. But they are also latent states of His mind. So they are both intelligible ideas in the divine mind as well as particular modes of the divine essence. Hence the a\={y}n al-thabitiy\={a}h are identified, on the one hand, with the quiddity (mahiyyah) of things, and, on the other hand, with their essence (hu\={e}tiyyah). The former explains the first aspect of the a\={y}n as ideas; the latter, their second aspect as essential modes. He calls them non-existent in the sense that they have no external existence, on the one hand, and no existence apart from the divine essence, on the other. They are the prototypes and causes of all external existences because they are the potential relations between the divine names as well as the potential modes of the divine essence. When these potentialities become actualities we have the so-called external world. Yet, there is no real becoming, and no becoming in space and time. The process goes on from eternity to everlastingness.

This complicated relation between the One and the many is nowhere systematically explained in ibn ‘Arabi’s works, not even in the Fus\={a}q. A certain formal dialectic can be detected in the Fus\={a}q where the author attempts to explain his metaphysical theory of reality, but the thread of the formal reasoning is often interrupted by outbursts of mystic emotion. Ibn ‘Arabi is essentially a mystic, and in the highest degree a dreamer and fantastic as we have

\begin{quote}
Ibn ‘Arabi already observed. He often uses symbols and similes in expressing the relation between the multiplicity of the phenomenal world and their essential unity. The One reveals Himself in the many, he says, as an object is revealed in different mirrors, each mirror reflecting an image determined by its nature and its capacity as a recipient. Or it is like a source of light from which an infinite number of lights are derived. Or like a substance which penetrates and permeates the forms of existing objects; thus, giving them meaning and being. Or it is like a mighty sea on the surface of which we observe countless waves for ever appearing and disappearing. The eternal drama of existence is nothing but this ever-renewed creation (al-\={k}haliq al\-jadid) which is in reality a perpetual process of self-revelation. Or again, he might say, the One is the real Being and the phenomenal world is its shadow having no reality in itself.

But beautiful as they are, such similes are very ambiguous and highly misleading. They are at least suggestive of a duality of two beings: God and the universe, in a system which admits only an absolute unity. Duality and multiplicity are illogical. They are due to our incapacity to perceive the essential unity of things. But this oscillation between unity and duality is due to confusing the epistemic side of the issue with its ontological side. Ontologically, there is but one reality. Epistemically, there are two aspects: a reality which transcends the phenomenal world, and a multiplicity of subjectivities that find their ultimate explanation in the way we view reality as we know it. To our limited senses and intellects the external world undergoes a process of perpetual change and transformation. We call this creation but it is in fact a process of self-unveiling of the One Essence which knows no change.

2. Notion of Deity.—In spite of his metaphysical theory of the nature of reality, ibn ‘Arabi finds a place for God in his system. His pantheism, like that of Spinoza, is to be distinguished from the naturalistic philosophy of the Stoics and the materialistic atheists. God that figures in his metaphysics as an unknowable and incommunicable reality, beyond thought and description, appears in his theology as the object of belief, love, and worship. The warmth of religious sentiment displayed in his writings attaches itself to his conception of God in the latter sense which comes close to the monothestic conception of Islam. Indeed he tries his utmost to reconcile the two conceptions; but his God is not in the strict religious sense confined to Islam or any other creed. He is not the ethical and personal God of religion, but the essence of all that is worshipped and loved in all religions:

“God has ordained that ye shall worship naught but Him.”\footnote{Qur\={a}n, xvii. 24.}

This is interpreted by ibn ‘Arabi to mean that God has decreed that nothing is actually worshipped except Him. This is an open admission of all kinds of worship, so long as the worshippers recognize God behind the external “forms” of their gods. They call their gods by this or that name, but the gnostic
A History of Muslim Philosophy

(al-ārīf) calls his God “Allah” which is the most universal of all names of God. Particular objects of worship are creations of men’s minds, but God, the Absolute, is uncreated. We should not, therefore, confine God to any particular form of belief to the exclusion of other forms, but acknowledge Him in all forms alike. To limit Him to one form—as the Christians have done—is infidelity (kufr); and to acknowledge Him in all forms is the spirit of true religion. This universal religion which preaches that all worshipped objects are forms of One Supreme Deity is the logical corollary of ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical theory that reality is ultimately one. But it has its deep roots in mysticism rather than in logic. It is nowhere better expressed than in the following verse:

“People have different beliefs about God
But I behold all that they believe.”

And the verse:

“My heart has become the receptacle of every ‘form’;
It is a pasture for gazelles and a convent for Christian monks.
And a temple for idols, and pilgrims’ Ka’bah,
And the Tablets of the Torah, and the Book of the Qur’ān.
I follow the religion of love whichever way its camels take,
For this is my religion and my faith.”

So, all paths lead to one straight path which leads to God. It would be a gross mistake to think that ibn ‘Arabi approves of the worship of stones and stars and other idols, for these as far as his philosophy is concerned are non-existent or mere fabrications of the human mind. The real God is not a tangible object; but one who reveals Himself in the heart of the gnostic. There alone He is beheld.

This shows that ibn ‘Arabi’s theory of religion is mystical and not strictly philosophical. It has its root in his much wider theory of divine love. The ultimate goal of all mysticism is love; and in ibn ‘Arabi’s mystical system in particular, it is the full realization of the union of the lover and the Beloved. Now, if we look deeply into the nature of worship, we find that love forms its very basis. To worship is to love in the extreme. No object is worshipped unless it is invested with some sort of love; for love is the divine principle which binds things together and pervades all beings. This means that the highest manifestation in which God is worshipped is love. In other words, universal love and universal worship are two aspects of one and the same fact. The mystic who sees God (the Beloved) in everything worships Him in everything. This is summed up in the following verse:

Ibn ‘Arabi

“I swear by the reality of Love that Love is the Cause of all love.
Were it not for Love (residing) in the heart. Love (God) would not be worshipped.”

This is because Love is the greatest object of worship. It is the only thing that is worshipped for its own sake. Other things are worshipped through it.

God, as an object of worship, therefore, resides in the heart as the supreme object of love. He is not the efficient cause of the philosophers or the transcendent God of the Mu’tazilites. He is in the heart of His servant and is nearer to him than his jugular vein. “My heaven and my earth contain Me not,” says the Prophetic tradition, “but I am contained in the heart of My servant who is a believer.”

3. God and Man.—It was Husain b. Mansūr al-Hallāj (d. 309/922) who first laid down the foundation for the theory that came to be known in the writings of ibn ‘Arabi and ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jili as the Theory of the Perfect Man. In the final form in which ibn ‘Arabi cast it, it played a very important role in the history of Muslim mysticism. Hallaj’s theory was a theory of incarnation based on the Jewish tradition which states that “God created Adam in His own image”—a tradition which the Sufis attributed to the Prophet. He distinguished between two natures in man: the divine (al-lāhūt), and the human (al-nāsūt). The two natures are not united but fused, the one into the other, as wine is fused into water. Thus for the first time in the history of Islam a divine aspect of man was recognized, and man was regarded as a unique creature not to be compared with any other creature on account of his divinity.

The Hallajian idea was taken up by ibn ‘Arabi, but completely transformed and given wider application. First, the duality of lāhūt and nāsūt became a duality of aspects of one reality, not of two independent natures. Secondly, they were regarded as actually present not only in man but in everything whatever; the nāsūt being the external aspect of a thing, the lāhūt, its internal aspect. But God who reveals Himself in all phenomenal existence is revealed in a most perfect and complete way in the form of the perfect man, who is best represented by prophets and saints. This forms the main theme of the Fugā ‘al-Hikam and al-Tadhrib al-Iḥtiyyah of ibn ‘Arabi, but many of its aspects are dealt with in his Futūḥāt and other works. Each one of the twenty-seven chapters of the Fugā ‘ is devoted to a prophet who is both a Logos (kali-mah) of God and a representative of one of the divine names. They are also cited as examples of the perfect man. The Logos par excellence is the Prophet Muhammad or rather the reality of Muhammad, as we shall see later.

So man in general—and the perfect man in particular—is the most perfect manifestation of God. The universe which, like a mirror, reflects the divine attributes and names in a multiplicity of forms, manifests them separately

28 Fugā’, p. 194.
29 Qur’ān, 18.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

or analytically. Man alone manifests these attributes and names collectively or synthetically. Hence he is called the microcosm and the honoured epitome (al-mukhasar al-sharīf) and the most universal being (al-kaun al-jāmis), who comprises all realities and grades of existence. In him alone the divine presence is reflected, and through him alone God becomes conscious of Himself and His perfection. Here are ibn ‘Arabi’s own words:

“God, glory to Him, in respect of His most beautiful names, which are beyond enumeration, willed to see their a’qān (realities), or if you wish you may say, His (own) ‘ayn, in a Universal Being which contains the whole affair—inasmuch as it is endowed with all aspects of existence—and through which (alone) His mystery is revealed to Himself: for a vision which consists in a thing seeing itself by means of itself is not the same as that of the thing seeing something else which serves as a mirror. . . . Adam was the very essence of the polishing of this mirror, and the spirit of this form (i.e., the form in which God has revealed Himself: which is man).”

Here ibn ‘Arabi almost repeats the words of Ḥallāj who says:

“God looked into eternity, prior to all things, contemplated the essence of His splendour, and then desired to project outside Himself His supreme joy and love with the object of speaking to them. He also created an image of Himself with all His attributes and names. This image was Adam whom God glorified and exalted.”

Yet, the difference between the two thinkers is so fundamental. Ḥallāj is an incarnationist; ibn ‘Arabi, a pantheist. On man as the microcosm he says:

“The spirit of the Great Existent (the Universe)
Is this small existent (man).
Without it God would not have said:
‘I am the greatest and the omnipotent.’
Let not my contingency veil thee,
Or my death or resurrection,
For if thou examine me,
I am the great and the all-embracing,
The eternal through my essence,
And the temporal are manifested.”

This is why man deserves the high honour and dignity of being God’s vicegerent on earth—a rank which God has denied all other creatures including the angels. This superior rank goes not to every individual man, for some men are even lower than the beasts, but to the perfect man alone, and this for two reasons:

a) He is a perfect manifestation of God in virtue of unity in himself, of all God’s attributes and names.
b) He knows God absolutely through realizing in some sort of experience his essential oneness with Him.

Here ibn ‘Arabi’s metaphysical theory of man coincides with the theory of mysticism.

4. Ethical and Religious Implications.—We have already pointed out that ibn ‘Arabi’s pantheistic theory of the nature of reality is the pivot round which the whole of his system of thought turns. Some aspects of this philosophy have been explained; and it remains now to show its bearing on his attitude towards man’s ethical and religious life.

Everything in ibn ‘Arabi’s world is subject to rigid determinism. On the ontological side we have seen that phenomenal objects are regarded as the external manifestations of their latent realities and determined by their own laws. Everything is what it is from eternity and nothing can change it, not even God Himself. “What you are in your state of latency (thubūt) is what you will be in your realized existence (ṭabār).” This is the fundamental law of existence. It is self-determinism or self-realization in which freedom plays no part either in God’s actions or in those of His creatures. Moral and religious phenomena are no exception. God decrees things in the sense that He knows them as they are in their latent states, and pre-judges that they should come out in the forms in which He knows them. So He decrees nothing which lies outside their nature. This is the mystery of predestination (sirr al-qadar). Belief and unbelief, sinful and lawful actions, are all determined in this sense and it is in this sense also that men are the makers of their own destiny for which, ibn ‘Arabi says, they are responsible. “We are not unjust to them,” says God, “but it is they who are unjust to themselves.” “I am not unjust to My servants.” On this ibn ‘Arabi comments as follows: “[I (God) did not ordain infidelity (kufr) which dooms them to misery, and then demand of them that which lies not in their power. Nay, I deal with them only as I know them, and I know them only as they are in themselves. Hence if there be injustice they are the unjust. Similarly, I say to them nothing except that which My essence has decreed that I should say; and My essence is known to Me as it is in respect of My saying this or not saying that. So I say nothing except what I know that I should say. It is Mine to say, and it is for them to obey or not to obey after hearing My command.”

There is, therefore, a difference between obeying one’s own nature and obeying the religious command, a distinction which was made long before

---

20 Fugās, p. 48.
21 Ṭawāṣīn, p. 130.
22 Fugās, p. 152.
23 Fugās, p. 48.
24 Qur’ān, xxii, 10.
25 Fugās, p. 131.
Ibn ‘Arabi. On the one hand, all men—indeed all creatures—obey their own law which he calls the creative law (al-amr al-takwini). On the other, some obey and others disobey the religious law (al-amr al-talif). The first is in accordance with God’s creative will (al-ma’ṣūbihah) which brings things into existence in the forms in which they are eternally predetermined. The second is something imposed from without for some ulterior reason, ethical, religious, or social. Everything obeys the creative commands in response to its own nature, and by so doing obeys God’s will, regardless of whether this obedience is also obedience or disobedience to the religious or ethical command. When Pharaoh disobeyed God and Iblīs (Satan) refused the divine command to prostrate himself before Adam, they were in fact obeying the creative command and carrying out the will of God, although from the point of view of the religious command they were disobedient. To express the same thing in different words, an action-in-itself, i.e., irrespective of any form whatever, is neither good nor evil, neither religious nor irreligious. It is just an action pure and simple. It comes under one or another of these categories when it is judged by religious or ethical standards.

The whole theory reduces obedience and disobedience in the religious sense to a mere formality, and denies moral and religious obligations. It tells us that man is responsible for his actions, but affirms that he is not a free agent to will his actions. Responsibility and complete absence of freedom do not go together. Theoretically, there are different alternatives out of which man may choose his actions, but according to this theory he is so created that he chooses the only alternative which is determined by his own necessary laws. So he actually chooses nothing and has no more freedom than a stone falling down to the earth in obedience to its own law.

Thus, we go on moving within that closed circle of thought which is so typical of Ibn ‘Arabi’s reasoning. He has one eye on his pantheistic doctrine with all that it entails, and the other on Islamic teachings, and oscillates between the two all the time. His pantheistic doctrine implies that God is the Ultimate Agent of all actions, and Islam insists on the moral and religious responsibility of man for his actions. The two conflicting points of view cannot be reconciled, and Ibn ‘Arabi’s way of reconciling them is full of paradoxes. He is more consistent when he says that all actions are created by God and there is no real difference between the Commander and the command.24 There is no real servantship (‘ubūdīyah), for the servant is one who carries out the commands of his master. But in reality the servant of God is a mere locus (mahdall) through which God’s creative power acts. So the servant is the Lord and the Lord is the servant.25 This seems to contradict what we have already said, i.e., that, according to Ibn ‘Arabi, actions belong to man and spring directly from his nature in a determined way. Actually, there is no contradiction when we think of the distinction he makes between the One and the many. In fact, all his paradoxes can be solved when considered in the light of this distinction. When he says that God is the doer of all actions, he is regarding the question from the point of view of the One, for God’s essence is the essence of men to whom actions are attributed. And when he asserts that men are the doers of their actions, he is regarding the question from the point of view of the many.

Having reduced obligation, obedience, disobedience, and similar other concepts to mere formal relations, it was natural enough for him to give the concepts of punishment and reward a positive content. Heaven and hell and all the eschatological matters connected with them are described in the minutest details, but no sooner does he give a constructive picture of one of them than he uses his allegorical method of interpretation to explain it away. His method bears some remarkable resemblance to that of the ʿIsmāʾillians and the Carmathians, used for the same purpose. All eschatological terms such as punishment, reward, purgatory, the Balance, the Bridge, intercession, heaven, hell, and so on, are regarded as representations of states of man, and corporealizations of ideas. What we learn from Tradition, he says, are words, and it is left to us to find out what is meant by them,26 i.e., to read into them whatever meaning we please. This is precisely what Ibn ‘Arabi himself has done. Heaven and hell, according to him, are subjective states, not objective realities. Hell is the realization of the individual “self”; it is selfhood. Heaven is the realization of the essential unity of all things. There is no real difference between the two. If any, the difference is one of degree, not of kind. Salvation is the ultimate end of all. Speaking of the people of hell and heaven, Ibn ‘Arabi says: —

“Nothing remains but the Fulfiller of Promise alone;  
The threat of God has no object to be seen.  
When they enter the Abode of Misery they experience  
Pleasure wherein lies a bliss so different  
From that of the Gardens of Everlastingness.  
It is all the same; the difference is felt at the beatific vision.”29

This means that when the truth is known and God reveals Himself as He really is, everyone, whether in heaven or in hell, will know his position, i.e., will know how near or how far he is from the truth. Those who fully realize their essential oneness with God are the blessed ones who will go to paradise. Those who are veiled from the truth are the damned ones who will go to hell. But both parties will enjoy in their respective abodes happiness proportionate to their degree of knowledge.

---

25 Fuṣūṣ, p. 92.
27 Fuṣūṣ, p. 94.
CONCLUSION

In the foregoing pages an attempt has been made to give a bird's-eye view of a tremendously vast field. We have concentrated on the most important features of ibn 'Arabi's life and thought; many important facts have of necessity been omitted for lack of space. If ibn 'Arabi experienced—as we must assume he did—some sort of strain while writing his mystical philosophy, we are placed under greater strain while writing about him. There is more than one way of interpreting his ideas and fathoming his intricate and obscure style. This makes it possible for scholars to give not only different but conflicting accounts of his teachings. The present account deals with him as a thoroughgoing pantheist who tried his best to reconcile his pantheistic doctrine with Islam. In doing so he had to read new meanings into the traditional Muslim concepts, and change Islam from a positive into a mystic religion. It is true he never lost sight of the idea of Godhead, but his God is not the transcendent God of revealed religions, but the Absolute Being who manifests Himself in every form of existence, and in the highest degree in the form of man. People may agree or disagree with some of his theories, but the fact remains that in production and influence he is the greatest Arabic-speaking mystic Islam has ever produced. It has been said that he has annulled religion in the orthodox sense in which it is usually understood. This is not altogether true. He has done away with a good many concepts which were so narrowly understood by Muslim jurists and theologians, and offered in their place other concepts which are much deeper in their spirituality and more comprehensive than those of any of his Muslim predecessors. His ideas about the universality of everything—being, love, religion—may be considered landmarks in the history of human thought.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Part 3. THE "PHILOSOPHERS"

Those who were mainly interested in philosophy and science and were greatly influenced by Greek thought

Chapter XXI

AL-KINDI

A

LIFE

Al-Kindi (c. 183/801–c. 260/873) was the first Muslim philosopher. Philosophical studies in the second/eighth century were in the hands of Christian Syriacs, who were primarily physicians. They started, through encouragement by the Caliph, to translate Greek writings into Arabic. Being the first Arab Muslim to study science and philosophy, al-Kindi was rightly called "the Philosopher of the Arabs."

His full name is Abu Yusuf Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq ibn al-Ṣabbāh ibn Imrān ibn Ismāʿil ibn al-ʿAṣṣāḥ ibn Qais al-Kindi. Kindi was one of the great Arab tribes before Islam. His grandfather al-Asṣāḥ ibn Qais adopted Islam and was considered one of the Companions (Ṣabīḥah) of the Prophet. Al-Asṣāḥ went with some of the pioneer Muslims to al-Kindi, whose father and his descendant lived. Ishāq ibn al-Ṣabbāh, al-Kindi's father, was Governor of al-Kūfah during the reign of the 'Abbāsid Caliphs al-Mahdi and al-Rashīd. Most probably al-Kindi was born in the year 183/801, a decade before the death of al-Rashīd.

Al-Kūfah and al-ṣaḥrah, in the second/third and third/ninth centuries, were the two rival centres of Islamic culture. Al-Kūfah was more inclined to rational studies; and in this intellectual atmosphere, al-Kindi passed his early boyhood. He learnt the Qurʾān by heart, the Arabic grammar, literature, and elementary arithmetic, all of which formed the curriculum for all Muslim children. He, then, studied Fiqh and the new-born discipline called Kāfām. But it seems that he was more interested in sciences and philosophy, to which he consecrated the rest of his life, especially after he went to Baghdad. A complete knowledge of Greek science and philosophy required proficiency in Greek and Syriac languages into which latter many Greek works had already been translated. It seems that al-Kindi learnt Greek, but 1

1 Muṣṭafā 'Abd al-Rāziq, following de Boer, gives this date. On the biography of al-Kindi the best article is that of Muṣṭafā 'Abd al-Rāziq in Fīlāṣfāt al-ʿArab w-al-Maʿālim al-Ḥānī, Cairo, 1945, pp. 7–50. See also Ahmed Foud El-Ehwany's "Introduction" to the edition of al-Kindi's treatise on "First Philosophy," Cairo, 1943, pp. 2–49, and Abu Ḥādh's "Introduction" to Ṣaduq al-Kindi, Cairo, 1950, pp. 1–80.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

certainly he mastered the Syriac language from which he translated several works. He also revised some of the Arabic translations, such as al-Himṣī’s translation of Plotinus’ Enneads, which passed to the Arabs as one of the writings of Aristotle. Al-Qīṭī, the biographer, says that “al-Kindi translated many philosophical books, clarified their difficulties, and summarized their deep theories.”

In Bağdād he was connected with al-Ma’mūn, al-Mu’tasim, and the latter’s son Ahmad. He was nominated tutor of Ahmad ibn al-Mu’tasim, to whom he dedicated some of his important writings. Ibn Nabatāh says: “Al-Kindi and his writings embellished the empire of al-Mu’tasim.” He flourished also under the reign of al-Mutawakkil (r. 232–247/847–861). A story related by ibn abi Usāib’ah indicates the great fame of al-Kindi at that time, his advanced knowledge, and his famous private library. This is the full account: “Muhammad and Ahmad, the sons of Mūsa ibn Shākir, who lived during the reign of al-Mutawakkil, were conspiring against everyone who was advanced in knowledge. They sent a certain Sanad ibn ‘Ali to Bağdād so that he might get al-Kindi away from al-Mutawakkil. Their conspiracies succeeded to the point that al-Mutawakkil ordered al-Kindi to be beaten. His whole library was confiscated and put in a separate place, labelled as the ‘Kindian Library.’”

Al-Kindi’s notoriety for avariace was equal to his fame for knowledge. This bad reputation was due to al-Jāḥiẓ’s caricature of him in his Kitāb al-Bukhārī. However, al-Kindi lived a luxurious life in a house, in the garden of which he bred many curious animals. It seems that he lived aloof from society, even from his neighbours. An interesting story related by al-Qīṭī shows that al-Kindi lived in the neighbourhood of a wealthy merchant, who never knew that al-Kindi was an excellent physician. Once the merchant’s son was attacked by sudden paralysis and no physician in Bağdād was able to cure him. Someone told the merchant that he lived in the neighbourhood of the most brilliant philosopher, who was very clever in curing that particular illness. Al-Kindi cured the paralyzed boy by music.

B WORKS

Most of his numerous works (numbering about 270) are lost. Ibn al-Nadim and following him al-Qīṭī classified his writings, most of which are short treatises, into seventeen groups: (1) philosophical, (2) logical, (3) arithmetical, (4) globular, (6) musical, (6) astronomical, (7) geometrical, (8) spherical, (9) medical, (10) astrological, (11) dialectical, (12) psychological, (13) political, (14) causal (meteorological), (15) dimensional, (16) on first things, (17) on the species of some metals, chemicals, etc.

---

Al-Kindi

This account shows to what extent al-Kindi’s knowledge was encyclopedic. Some of his scientific works were translated by Gerard of Cremons into Latin and influenced very much the thought of medieval Europe. Cardano considered him to be one of the twelve greatest minds.

Scholars studied al-Kindi, until his Arabic treatises were discovered and edited, merely on the basis of the extant Latin translations. His De Medici- narum Compositorum Gradibus was published in 938/1531. Albino Nagy in 1315/1897 edited the medieval translations of these treatises: De intellectu; De Sommo et utissimo; De quinque essentis; Liber introductorius in artem logicae demonstrationis.

Since the discovery of some of his Arabic manuscripts, a new light has been thrown on al-Kindi’s philosophy. A compendium containing about 25 treatises was found by Witter in Istanbul. Now they have all been edited by different scholars, Walzer, Rosenthal, abu ‘Rahā, and Ahmed Fouad El-Ehwany. There are other short treatises discovered in Aleppo, but they have not yet been edited. It has become possible, to a certain extent, to analyse al-Kindi’s philosophy on more or less secure grounds.

C PHILOSOPHY

It was due to al-Kindi that philosophy came to be acknowledged as a part of Islamic culture. The early Arab historians called him “the Philosopher of the Arabs” for this reason. It is true that he borrowed his ideas from Neo-Platonist Aristotelianism, but it is also true that he put these ideas in a new context. By conciliating Hellenistic heritage with Islam he laid the foundations of a new philosophy. Indeed, this conciliation remained for a long time the chief feature of this philosophy. Furthermore, al-Kindi, specializing in all the sciences known at his time—of which his writings give sufficient evidence—made philosophy a comprehensive study embracing all sciences. Al-Fārābī, ibn Sina, and ibn Rushd were first scientists and then philosophers. For this reason ibn al-Nadim placed al-Kindi in the class of natural philosophers. This is his full account: “Al-Kindi is the best man of his time, unique in his knowledge of all the ancient sciences. He is called the Philosopher of the Arabs. His books deal with different subjects, such as logic, philosophy, geometry, arithmetic, ethics, medicine, etc.”

---

5 Albino Nagy, Die philosophischen Abhandlungen des al-Kindi, 1897.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

astronomy etc. We have connected him with the natural philosophers because of his prominence in science.¹⁷

Philosophy is the knowledge of truth. Muslim philosophers, like the Greek, believed that truth is something over and above experience; that it lies immutable and eternal in a supernatural world. The definition of philosophy in al-Kindi’s treatise on “First Philosophy” runs like this: “Philosophy is the knowledge of the reality of things within man’s possibility, because the philosopher’s end in his theoretical knowledge is to gain truth and in his practical knowledge to behave in accordance with truth.” At the end of the treatise, God is qualified by the term “truth,” which is the objective of philosophy. “The True One (al-Wāhid al-Haq) is, then, the First, the Creator, the Sustainer of all that He has created . . . .” This view is borrowed from Aristotle’s metaphysics, but the Unmovable Mover of Aristotle is substituted by the Creator. This difference constitutes the core of the Kindian system. Philosophy is classified into two main divisions: theoretical studies, which are physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; and practical studies which are ethics, economics, and politics. A later writer, quoting al-Kindi, gives the classification as follows: “Theory and practice are the beginning of the virtues. Much one of the two is divided into the physical, mathematical, and theological parts. Practice is divided into the guidance of one’s self, that of one’s house, and that of one’s city.”²² Ibn Nabatah, quoting also al-Kindi, mentions only the theoretical divisions. “The philosophical sciences are of three kinds: the first in teaching (al’ilm) is mathematics which is intermediate in nature; the second is physics, which is the last in nature; the third is theology which is the highest in nature.”²³ The priority of mathematics goes back to Aristotle, but the final sequence of the three sciences beginning with physics came from the later Peripatetics. Most probably al-Kindi was following Ptolemy, who gave a division of sciences in the beginning of Almagest.²⁴ Mathematics was known to the Arabs from that time on as the “first study.”

The definition of philosophy and its classification, as mentioned above, remained traditional in Muslim philosophy. As Mustafa ’Abd al-Raziq puts it: “This attitude in understanding the meaning of philosophy and its classification according to subject-matter directed Muslim philosophy from its very outset.”²⁵ First philosophy or metaphysics is the knowledge of the First Cause, because all the rest of philosophy is included in this knowledge.²⁶ The method followed in the study of first philosophy is the logic of demonstration. From now on, logic will be the instrument of the philosophers in their quest for

Al-Kindi

truth. Al-Kindi’s value as a philosopher was debated in ancient times because of the lack of logical theory in his system. Ša’id al-Andalusi says: “Al-Kindi wrote on logic many books which never became popular, and which people never read or used in the sciences, because these books missed the art of analysis which is the only way to distinguish between right and wrong in every study. By the art of synthesis, which is what Ya’qub meant by his writings, no one can profit, unless he has sure premises from which he can make the synthesis.” It is difficult for us to give an exact idea concerning this charge until his logical treatises are discovered. But the fact that al-Fārābī was called the “Second Master” because of his introducing logic as the method of thinking in Islamic philosophy²⁷ seems to corroborate the judgment of Ša’id just mentioned.

D

HARMONY BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

Al-Kindi directed Muslim philosophy towards an accord between philosophy and religion.²⁸ Philosophy depends on reason, and religion relies on revelation. Logic is the method of philosophy; faith, which is belief in the realities mentioned in the Qur’an as revealed by God to His Prophet, is the way of religion. From the very outset, men of religion mistrusted philosophy and the philosophers. Philosophers were attacked for being heretics. Al-Kindi was obliged to defend himself against the accusation of religious spokesmen that “the acquisition of the knowledge of the reality of things is atheism (kufr).”²⁹ In his turn, al-Kindi accused those religious spokesmen for being irreligious and traders with religion. “They disputed with men in defence of the untrue position which they had founded and occupied without any merit only to gain power and to trade with religion.”³⁰

The accord between philosophy and religion is laid down on the basis of three arguments: (1) that theology is part of philosophy; (2) that the prophet’s revelation and philosophical truth are in accord with each other, and (3) that the pursuit of theology is logically ordained.

Philosophy is the knowledge of the reality of things, and this knowledge comprises theology (al-rubūbiyyah), the science of monotheism, ethics, and all useful sciences.

Furthermore, the prophets have ordained the pursuit of truth and practice of virtue. “The totality of every useful science and the way to attain it, the getting away from anything harmful and taking care against it—the acquisition of all this is what the true prophets have proclaimed in the name of God . . . .

¹³ El-Ehwany, Islamic Philosophy, Cairo, 1957, pp. 35-36.
¹⁴ Mustafa ‘Abd al-Raziq, op. cit., p. 47.
¹⁵ “First Philosophy,” p. 82.
¹⁶ Ibid.

424
A History of Muslim Philosophy

The prophets have proclaimed the unique divinity of God, the practice of the virtues accepted by Him, and the avoidance of the vices which are contrary to virtues-in-themselves.”

Again, the pursuit of philosophy is necessary for it “is either necessary or it is not necessary. If theologians (those who oppose its pursuit) say that it is necessary, they should study it; if they say that it is not necessary, they have to give the reason for this, and present a demonstration. Giving the reason and demonstration is part of the acquisition of the knowledge of reality. It is necessary then that they should have this knowledge and realize that they must obtain it.”

In his treatise on “The Number of the Works of Aristotle,” al-Kindi makes a sharp distinction between religion and philosophy. The fact that he discussed this point in this particular treatise proves that he was comparing the religion of Islam with Aristotle’s philosophy. The divine science, which he distinguished from philosophy, is Islam as revealed to the Prophet and recorded in the Qur’an. Contrary to his general view that theology is a part of philosophy, here we find (1) that theology occupies a rank higher than philosophy; (2) that religion is a divine science and philosophy is a human one; (3) that the way of religion is faith and that of philosophy is reason; (4) that the knowledge of the prophet is immediate and through inspiration and that of the philosopher is by way of logic and demonstration. We quote in full this interesting and very important passage:

“If, then, a person does not obtain the knowledge of quantity and quality, he will lack knowledge of the primary and secondary substances, so that one cannot expect him to have any knowledge of the human sciences which are acquired by man through research, effort, and industry. These sciences fall short in rank of the divine science (al-ilm al-ilahi) which is obtained without research, effort, and industry, and in no time. This latter knowledge is like the knowledge of the prophets, a knowledge bestowed by God; unlike mathematics and logic, it is received without research, effort, study, and industry, and requires no period of time. It is distinct in being obtained by the will of God, through the purification and illumination of souls, so that they turn towards truth, through God’s support, assistance, inspiration, and His messages. This knowledge is not a prerogative of all men, but only of the prophets. This is one of their miraculous peculiarities, the distinctive sign which differentiates them from other human beings. Men who are not prophets have no way of attaining knowledge of the secondary substances or that of the primary sensible substances and their accidents without

17 Ibid.
18 In Orienta, Vol. X, No. 2, 1937, “New Studies on al-Kindi,” Walzer translates this term by “divine knowledge.” We guess what is meant in this context is the divine science as compared with human science. Guidi and Walzer edited this manuscript and translated it into Italian: Il Numero dei Libri di Aristotele. In the Italian translation the term is scienza divina which corresponds to divine science.

426

Al-Kindi

research and industry through logic and mathematics, and without any period of time.

“Hence, men of intelligence draw the evident conclusion that since this (knowledge) exists, it comes from God; whereas (ordinary) men are unable by their very nature to attain to a similar knowledge, because it is above and beyond their nature and the devices they use. Thus, they submit themselves in obedience and docility to it and faithfully believe in the truth of the message of the prophets.”

The Muslims follow the Word of God stated in the Qur’an and are convinced by its sure arguments. Philosophers refer to logical demonstration, i.e., their reason. Philosophical arguments depend on the self-evident first principles of demonstration. In al-Kindi’s view, the Qur’anic arguments, being divine, are more sure, certain, and convincing than the philosophical arguments which are human. The Qur’an gives solutions of some very important problems, such as the creation of the world from nothing, and resurrection. Al-Kindi holds that the Qur’anic arguments are “beliefs, clear and comprehensive.” Thus, they lead to certainty and conviction. Hence, they are superior to the philosopher’s arguments. An example of such sure arguments is to be found in the answer to the infidels who asked, “Who will be able to give life to bones when they have been reduced to dust?” The answer is: “He who produced them originally will give life to them.”

Thus, al-Kindi opened the door for the philosophical interpretation of the Qur’an, and thereby brought about an accord between religion and philosophy. In his treatise “The Worship (sujud) of the Primum Mobile,” the verse: “Stars and trees are worshipping” is interpreted by reference to the different meanings of the word “sujud.” It means: (1) prostration in praying; (2) obedience; (3) change from imperfection to perfection; (4) following by will the order of a person. It is this last meaning that applies to the worship of the stars. The heavenly sphere is animated and is the cause of life in the world of generation and corruption. The movement of the primum mobile is called worship (sujud) in the sense that it obeys God.

To sum up, al-Kindi was the first philosopher in Islam to effect an accord between religion and philosophy. He paved the way for al-Fārābī, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd. Two quite different views are given by him. The first follows the way of the logicians and reduces religion to philosophy. The second, considering religion a divine science, raises it above philosophy. This divine science can be known by a prophetic faculty. However, through philosophic interpretation religion becomes conciliated with philosophy.

19 “This” either refers to the divine science, the divine knowledge of the prophet, or the prophetic faculty. Walzer in his translation of this passage gives the latter interpretation. Cf. Orienta, p. 206.
20 M. Guidi and R. Walzer, op. cit., p. 395. Except at some places, we follow in the main the translation given by Walzer in Orienta, p. 206.

427
A History of Muslim Philosophy

GOD

An adequate and sure knowledge of God is the final objective of philosophy. Philosophy by its very name was a Greek study. For this reason, al-Kindi made a great effort to transmit Greek philosophy to the Arabs. As Rosenthal rightly puts it: "Al-Kindi himself states that he considered it his task to serve as an Arab transmitter and interpreter of the ancient heritage." In Theon's commentary on the \textit{Almagest} of Ptolemy, we find God described as immutable, simple, of invisible nature, and the true cause of motion. Al-Kindi in his treatise \textit{al-sinā' al-\textit{Umma}} paraphrases the same idea. He says: "For God, great is His praise, is the reason and agent of this motion, being eternal (\textit{qadim}). He cannot be seen and does not move, but in fact causes motion without moving Himself. This is His description for those who understand Him in plain words: He is simple in that He cannot be dissolved into something simpler; and He is indivisible because He is not composed and composition has no hold on Him, but in fact He is separate from the visible bodies, since He . . . is the reason of the motion of the visible bodies."[33]

Simplicity, indivisibility, invisibility, and causality of motion are the divine attributes stated by Theon. When al-Kindi mentions them he is simply a transmitter of the Hellenistic conception of God. The originality of al-Kindi lies in his conciliation of the Islamic concept of God with the philosophical ideas which were current in the later Neo-Platonism.

The basic Islamic notions concerning God are His unicity, His act of creation from nothing, and the dependence of all creatures on Him. These attributes are stated in the Qur'an in a manner which is neither philosophical nor dialectical. Al-Kindi qualifies God in new terms. God is the true one. He is transcendent and can be qualified only by negative attributes. "He has no matter, no form, no quantity, no quality, no relation; nor is He qualified by any of the remaining categories (al-ma\textit{\=qūlūt}). He has no genus, no differentia, no species, no proprium, no accident. He is immutable . . . He is, therefore, absolute oneness, nothing but oneness (\textit{wahdāt}). Everything else is multiple."[34]

To understand the position of al-Kindi, we must refer to the Traditionalists and the Mu'tazilites. The Traditionalists—ibn Hanbal was one of their chief representatives—refused to interpret the attributes of God. They simply called them "the names of God." When, for example, ibn Hanbal was asked whether the Qur'an, being the Word of God, is eternal (\textit{qadim}) or created (\textit{ma\textit{\=qūlīq}), he gave no answer. His only answer was that the Qur'an is the Word (\textit{kalsīm}) of God. The Traditionalists accepted the literal meaning of the Scripture, i.e., without any further interpretation.

The Mu'tazilites, such as were the contemporaries of al-Kindi, rationally interpreted the attributes of God to establish His absolute unicity. They solved the problem on the basis of the relation between the essence (\textit{dhāt}) of God and His attributes (\textit{ṣīhāt}). The main attributes in their view amount to three: knowledge, power, and will. These they negate, for, if affirmed of God, they would entail plurality in His essence. The Mu'tazilites and the philosophers shared this denial of the divine attributes. Al-Ghazālī rightly says in the \textit{Tahāfut al-Falāsīf} that "the philosophers agree exactly as do the Mu'tazilites that it is impossible to ascribe to the First Principle knowledge, power, and will."[35]

Al-Kindi, the first philosopher in Islam, followed the Mu'tazilites in their denial of the attributes. But his approach to the solution of the problem is quite different. First, it is not the essence of God and His attributes with which he is concerned; it is rather the predicability of the categories—as we have seen above—to the substance of God. Second, all things can be defined, hence known, by giving their genera and differentiae, except God who has neither genus nor differentia. In other terms, al-Kindi follows in his quest the "way of the logicians."

The Kandian arguments for the existence of God depend on the belief in causality. Everything that comes to be must have a cause for its existence. The series of causes are finite, and consequently there is a prime cause, or the true cause, which is God. Causes, enumerated by Aristotle, are the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final. In al-Kindi's philosophy, as repeated in many of his treatises, God is the efficient cause.

There are two kinds of efficient causes; the first is the true efficient cause and its action is creation from nothing (\textit{\textit{ibda}}). All the other efficient causes are intermediate, i.e., they are produced by other causes, and are themselves the causes of other effects. They are called so by analogy; in fact, they are not true causes at all. Only God is the true efficient cause. He acts and is never acted upon.


[32] This treatise is not yet edited. Rosenthal, in the above article on "Al-Kindi and Ptolemy," gave some excerpts and analysed it.


[34] With abu Ridah we understand this term to be intelligibles or concepts (al-	extit{ma\textit{\=qūlūt}), but categories is more suitable in this context.

[35] "First Philosophy," p. 141; in abu Ridah's edition, p. 160. The term \textit{wahdāt} means either unity or oneness, but in this context it is oneness.

Given that the world is created by the action of ībdā' in no time, it must be in need of a creator, i.e., God. Nothing which is created is eternal; God alone is eternal. Beings come to be and pass away. This is clear in the case of corporeal sensibles which are in perpetual flux and change. Also the world as a whole, the celestial bodies, and the universals, such as genera and species, are not eternal, because they are finite and composed. Everything which is finite in space and time is not eternal. The notion of infinity occupies an important place in the philosophy of al-Kindi, and will be discussed later in detail.

Another proof for the existence of God is the order observed in all natural beings. The regularity inherent in the world, the hierarchical degrees of its parts, their interactions, the most perfect state in every being realizing its highest goodness—all this is a proof that there is a Perfect Being who manages everything according to the greatest wisdom.

Beings are in continuous need of God. This is so because God, the Creator ex nihilo, is the sustainer of all that He has created, so that if anything lacks His sustenance and power, it perishes.

INFINITY

The world in Aristotle's system is finite in space but infinite in time, because the movement of the world is co-eternal with the Unmovable Mover. Eternity of the world was refuted in Islamic thought, since Islam holds that the world is created. Muslim philosphers, facing this problem, tried to find a solution in accord with religion. Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd were accused of atheism because of their pro-Aristotelianism; they assumed that the world is eternal. In fact, this problem remained one of the important features of Islamic philosophy, and al-Ghazālī mentioned it at the beginning of his twenty points against the philosophers in the Tahāfut al-Falāṣīfah.

Al-Kindi, contrary to his great successors, maintained that the world is not eternal. Of this problem he gave a radical solution by discussing the notion of infinity on mathematical grounds.

Physical bodies are composed of matter and form, and move in space and time. Matter, form, space, movement, and time are the five substances in every physical body. (Res autem quae sunt in omnibus substantiis sunt quinque, quarum una est kyle, et secunda est forma, et tertia est locus, et quarta est motus, et quinta est tempus.) Being so connected with corporeal bodies, time and space are finite, given that corporeal bodies are finite; and these latter are finite because they cannot exist except within limits.

Time is not movement; it is the number which measures the motion (Tempus ergo est numerus numerans motum) for it is nothing other than the prior and posterior. Number is of two kinds: discrete and continuous. Time is not of the discrete kind but of the continuous kind. Hence, time is definable as the supposed instants which continue from the past to the future. In other words, time is the sum of anterior and posterior instants. It is the continuum of instants.

Time is part of the knowledge of quantity. Space, movement, and time are quantities. The knowledge of these three substances and also the other two is subordinate to the knowledge of quantity and quality. As mentioned above, he who lacks the knowledge of quantity and quality will lack knowledge of the primary and secondary substances. Quality is the capacity of being similar and dissimilar; quantity, of being equal and unequal. Hence, the three notions of quality, greater, and less are basic in demonstrating the concepts of finitude and infinity.

The arguments against infinity are repeated in a number of al-Kindi's treatises. We give from his treatise "On the Finitude of the Body of the World" the four theorems given as proofs for finitude:

1. Two magnitudes of the same kind are called equal if one is not greater than the other.
2. If a magnitude of the same kind is added to one of the two magnitudes of the kind, they will be unequal.
3. Two magnitudes of the kind cannot be infinite, if one is less than the other, because the less measures the greater or a part of it.
4. The sum of two magnitudes of the kind, each of which is finite, is finite.

Given these axioms, every body, being composed of matter and form, limited in space, and moving in time, is finite, even if it is the body of the world. And, being finite it is not eternal. God alone is eternal.

---

38 "First Philosophy," p. 143.
39 Liber de Quinque Essentia. This treatise was translated into Latin in the Medieval Ages.
SOUL AND INTELLECT

Al-Kindi was confused by the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus concerning the soul, especially because he revised the parts translated from Plotinus’ Enneads, a book which was wrongly ascribed to Aristotle. He borrowed from Plotinus the doctrine of the soul, and followed the model of Aristotle in his theory of the intellect. In a short treatise “On the Soul,” he summarizes, as he says, the views of “Aristotle, Plato, and other philosophers.” In fact, the idea expounded is borrowed from the Enneads.

The soul is a simple entity and its substance emanates from the Creator just as the rays emanate from the sun. It is spiritual and of divine substance and is separate and distinct from the body. When it is separated from the body, it obtains the knowledge of everything in the world and has vision of the supernatural. After its separation from the body, it goes to the world of the intellect, returns to the light of the Creator, and sees Him.

The soul never sleeps; only while the body is asleep, it does not use the senses. And, if purified, the soul can see wonderful dreams in sleep and can speak to the other souls which have been separated from their bodies. The same idea is expounded in al-Kindi’s treatise: “On Sleep and Dreams,” which was translated into Latin. To sleep is to give up the use of the senses. When the soul gives up the use of the senses and uses only reason, it dreams.

The three faculties of the soul are the rational, the irascible, and the appeti- sive. He who gets away from the pleasures of the body and lives most of his life in contemplation to attain to the reality of things, is the good man who is very similar to the Creator.

Another treatise on the intellect played an important role in medieval philosophy, both Eastern and Western. It was translated into Latin under the title De Intellectu. The purpose of this treatise is to clarify the different meanings of the intellect (‘agl) and to show how knowledge is obtained.

Aristotle in his De Anima distinguished between two kinds of intellect, the possible and the agent. The possible intellect receives intellection and the agent intellect produces intelligible objects. The latter intellect is described by Aristotle as separate, unmixed, always in actuality, eternal, and uncorrupted.

Alexander of Aphrodisias in his De Intellectu holds that there are three kinds of intellect: the material, the habitual, and the agent, thus adding a new intellect which is the intellectus habitus or adeptus. The intellectus materialis is pure potentiality and is perishable. It is the capacity in man to receive the forms. The intellect in habitus is a possession, which means that the intellect has acquired knowledge and possessed it, i.e., has passed from potentiality into actuality. To bring a thing from potentiality to actuality needs something else to act as an agent. This is the third intellect, the agent intellect, also called the intelligencia agens and considered by some interpreters to be the divine intelligence which flows into our individual souls.

When we come to al-Kindi we find not three intellects but four. He divided the intellect in habitus into two intellects, one is the possession of knowledge without practising it and the other is the practising of knowledge. The first is similar to a writer who has learnt handwriting and is in possession of this art; the other is similar to the person who practises writing in actuality.

We quote the opening paragraph of his treatise:

“The opinion of Aristotle concerning the intellect is that it is of four kinds:

(1) The first is the intellect which is always in act.
(2) The second is the intellect which is potentially in the soul.
(3) The third is the intellect which has passed in the soul from potentiality to actuality.
(4) The fourth is the intellect which we call the second.”

What he means by the “second” is the second degree of actuality as shown above in the distinction between mere possession of knowledge and practising it.

A complete theory of knowledge is expounded in the rest of the treatise. There are two kinds of forms, the material and the immaterial. The first is the sensuous, because the sensibles are composed of matter and form. When the soul acquires the material form, it becomes one with it, i.e., the material form and the soul become one and the same. Similarly, when the soul acquires the rational forms which are immaterial, they are united with the soul. In this way, the soul becomes actually rational. Before that it was rational in potentiality. What we call the intellect is nothing other than the genera and species of things.

This intellectual operation is again illustrated in al-Kindi’s treatise on “First Philosophy.” He says: “When the genera and species are united with the soul, they become intellectibles. The soul becomes actually rational after its unity with the species. Before this unity the soul was potentially rational. Now, everything which exists in potentiality does not pass to actuality save by something which brings it from potentiality to actuality. It is the genera and species of things, i.e., the universals . . . which make the soul which is potentially rational to be actually rational, I mean, which get united with it.”

Al-Kindi abruptly passes from the above epistemological discussion to an ontological one concerning the oneness of the universals and their origin. The universals are the intellect in so far as they are united with the soul. Thus the question arises whether the intellect is one or many. It is one in one respect and many in another. This is his full account: “And as universals are many, as shown above, so is the intellect. It seems to us that the intellect is the first plurality. But it is also one, because it is a whole, as shown above.

32 El-Ehwany, Islamic Philosophy, Cairo, 1931, pp. 51-52.
33 "First Philosophy," p. 134.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

and oneness is applied to the whole. But the true oneness (waḍadh) is not of the intellect."

Following the doctrine of Plotinus, al-Kindi passed on to the metaphysical plane of the One. As mentioned above, he confused Aristotle’s metaphysics of Being with that of Plotinus. For this reason he was unable to elaborate a coherent system of his own. This was what al-Fārābī, the Second Master, was able to do.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


The term waḍadh means here oneness, not unity. At the beginning of this same paragraph he speaks about "the true one," and says it is not soul.

Chapter XXII

MUHAMMAD IBN ZAKARIYA AL-RĀZĪ

A LIFE

According to al-Bīrūnī,1 abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakariya ibn Yahya al-Rāzī was born in Rayy on the first of Sha’bān in the year 251/865. In his early life, he was a jeweller (Baihaqi), money-changer (ibn abi ʿUsābī’ah), or more likely a lute-player (ibn Juljul, Sa’d, ibn Khalikān, ʿUsābī’ah,

Muḥammad ibn Zakariya al-Rāzī

al-Ṣafadi) who first lost music for alchemy, and then at the age of thirty or (as Ṣafadi says) after forty left alchemy because his experiments in it gave him some eye disease (al-Bīrūnī), which obliged him to search for doctors and medicine. That was the reason, they (al-Bīrūnī, Baihaqi and others) say, he studied medicine. He was very studious and worked day and night. His master was ‘Ali ibn Rabbaan al-Ṭabari (al-Qīfī, ʿUsābī’ah), a doctor and philosopher, who was born in Merv about 192/808, and died some years after 240/855.2 With ibn Rabbaan al-Ṭabari he studied medicine and perhaps also philosophy. It is possible to trace back al-Rāzī’s interest in religious philosophy to his master, whose father was a rabbinist versed in the Scriptures.

Al-Razī became famous in his native city as a doctor. Therefore, he directed the hospital of Rayy (ibn Juljul, al-Qīfī, ibn abi ʿUsābī’ah), in the times of Mansûr ibn Isḥāq ibn Ahmad ibn Asad who was the Governor of Rayy from 290-296/902-908 in the name of his cousin Ahmad ibn Ismā’īl ibn Ahmad, second Sāmānīan ruler.3 It is to this Mansūr ibn Isḥāq ibn Ahmad that Rāzī dedicated his al-Tibb al-Mansūrī, as it is attested by a manuscript4 of this book, as against ibn al-Nadīm’s assumption,5 repeated by al-Qīfī6 and ibn abi ʿUsābī’ah,7 that this Mansūr was Mansūr ibn Ismā’īl who died in 365/975.

From Rayy al-Rāzī went to Baghdād during the Caliph Muktaflī’s time6 (r. 289/901-295/907) and there too directed a hospital.

It seems that after al-Muktaflī’s death (295/907) al-Rāzī came back to Rayy. Here gathered round him many students. As ibn al-Nadīm relates in Fihrist,8 al-Rāzī was then a Shāhīb “with a big head similar to a sack”; he used to be surrounded by circle of students. If someone came to ask something in science, the question was put to those of the first circle; if they did not know the answer, it passed on to those of the second, and so on till it came to al-Rāzī himself if all others failed to give the answer. Of these students we know at least the name of one, i.e., abu Bakr ibn Qārin al-Rāzī who became a doctor.9 Al-Rāzī was generous, humane towards his patients,

1 See on him: Fihrist, p. 296; al-Baihaqi, p. 22; ʿUsābī’ah, Vol. I, p. 309; Meyerhof, ZDMG, 85, 38 et seq.; Wüstenfeld, p. 55; Leclerc, Vol. I, p. 292; Brockelmann, GAL, Vol. I, p. 263, Suppl., Vol. I, p. 414-15; Brockelmann (Suppl., Vol. I, p. 415) refutes the contention that al-Razī was ibn Rabbaan’s pupil, on the ground that the latter was in Rayy in 224/838. But this proof is not sufficient, because ibn Rabbaan’s life is not well known as to enable one to assert that he did not go to Rayy much later, say between 265/878 and 270/883, especially when we know nothing about his later life till his death.
3 In Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah in Cairo, Taimūr 129, medicine.
4 Fihrist, pp. 299-300.
5 al-Qīfī, p. 272.
7 Ibn Juljul, p. 78.
8 P. 299, Flügel, pp. 314-416, Cairo ed.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

and charitable to the poor, so that he used to give them full treatment without charging any fee, and even stipends.11

When not occupied with pupils or patients he was always writing and studying.12 It seems that this was the reason for the gradual weakening of his sight that finally brought blindness to his eyes. Some say13 that the reason for his blindness was that he used to eat much too much of broad beans (ṣāqūlāb). It began with cataracts14 which ended in complete blindness. They say that he refused to be treated for cataracts saying that he "had seen so much of the world that he was fed up."15 But this seems to be more of an anecdote than a historical fact. It was one of his pupils from Tabaristan that came to treat him, but, as al-Birūnī says, he refused to be treated saying that it was useless as his hour of death was approaching.16 Some days after, he died in Rayy, on the 5th of Sha'ban 313/27th of October 925.17

Al-Rāzi’s Masters and Opponents.—We have already mentioned that al-Rāzi studied medicine under ‘Ali ibn Rabbān al-Tabari. Ibn al-Nadîm says18 that he studied philosophy under al-Balkhi. This al-Balkhi, according to ibn al-Nadîm, had travelled much, and knew philosophy and ancient sciences well. Some even say that al-Rāzi attributed to himself some of al-Balkhi’s books on philosophy. We know nothing else about this al-Balkhi, not even his full name.

Al-Rāzi’s opponents, on the contrary, are known better. They were the following:

1. Abu al-Qāsim al-Balkhi, chief of the Mu’tazila of Baghdād (d. 319/931), was a contemporary of al-Rāzi; he composed many refutations of al-Rāzi’s books, especially his ‘Itm al-Ḥālī.19 He had controversies with him especially on time.20

2. Shuhaid ibn al-Ḥusain al-Balqhi,21 with whom al-Rāzi had many contro-

22 Fihrist, p. 416, Cairo ed.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibn Jujul, p. 78.

26 Ibid.

27 Epître de Beruni, p. 5.

28 This is the date given by al-Biruni (ibid., p. 6). Other dates given are: (a) around 320/932 (S̄aid, Tabaqāt, p. 83, Cairo ed., repeated by al-Qifti, p. 178, Cairo ed., repeated by ibn abi Uṣābi’ah, Vol. I, p. 314, but on the authority of Balkhuṣṭār ibn Mu’arrif); (b) 295–300/907–912 and a fraction (ibn al-Khaṭir al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār, in Uṣābi’ah, Vol. I, p. 314); (c) 311/923 (ibn al-Imād, Shams al-Dīn al-Ḍabābī, Vol. II, p. 263); (d) 364/974 (History of Ibn Bīrūnī, quoted by Qifti, p. 178, Cairo ed.). Surely the most probable date is that given by al-Birūnī.

29 Fihrist, p. 416, Cairo ed.


31 Al-Bīrūnī, No. 62.


33 Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Rāzi

34 His theory of pleasure is expounded in his Taṣbīḥ Lakhdīṣ al-Nafs from which Abu Sulaymān al-Manṣūrī al-Sijistānī gives some extracts in Siwāq al-Ḥikam. Al-Bīrūnī died before 329/940.

35 Abu Ḥātim al-Rāzi, the most important of all his opponents (d. 322/933–934) and one of the greatest Ismā‘ili missionaries. He reproduced controversies between him and al-Rāzi in his A‘lm al-Nabwawāt. Thanks to this book, al-Rāzi’s ideas about prophets and religion are preserved for us.

36 Ibn al-Tammār, whom Kraus believes to be perhaps abu Bakr Ḥusain al-Tammār. He was a physician and had some controversies with al-Rāzi as is reported by Abu Ḥātim al-Rāzi in A‘lm al-Nabwawāt. Ibn al-Tammār refuted al-Rāzi’s al-Ṭabb al-Raqābī and al-Rāzi answered this refutation. In fact, al-Rāzi wrote two refutations: (a) refutation of al-Tammār’s refutation of ‘Isma‘i concerning matter; (b) refutation of al-Tammār’s opinion on the atmosphere of subterranean habitations.

37 Those of whom we know from the titles of the books written by al-Rāzi: (a) ‘Isma‘i, a Mutakallim who had written against the materialists and against whom al-Rāzi wrote a treatise; (b) Jarir the doctor who had a theory about the eating of black mulberry after water-melon; (c) al-Ḥasan ibn Muṣābir al-Ummi, to whom al-Rāzi wrote two epistles; (d) al-Kayyāl, a Mutakallim, against whose theory of the ‘Ismā‘ī, al-Rāzi wrote a book; (e) Mansūr ibn Talhah, who wrote a book on “Being” refuted by al-Rāzi; (f) Muhammad ibn al-Ḥaṣib al-Rasā’ī whose writing against alchemists was answered by al-Rāzi.

38 Al-ʿĀmil ibn al-Tayyib al-Sarakhshī (d. 290/899), an elder contemporary of al-Rāzi. Al-Rāzi refuted him on the question of bitter taste; al-Rāzi

39 436

40 437
refuted also his master, Ya‘qūb ibn Isḥāq al-Kindi, who had written against
the alchemists.38

7. We should add to all those known by names many others who were
refuted by al-Rāzī, especially the Muʿtaṣilah and different Mutakallimin.39

B
WORKS

Al-Rāzī’s books are very numerous. He himself prepared a catalogue of his
books, reproduced by ibn al-Nadim.40 Here we find: 118 books, 19 epistles,
then 4 books, 6 epistles, and one maqālah, the total being 148 works.

After ibn al-Nadim, al-Bīrūnī wrote an epistle on the bibliography of al-
Rāzī. This epistle, found in a unique manuscript in Leiden,41 was edited by
Paul Kraus,42 and translated into German by J. Ruska in his article: “al-
Bīrūnī als Quelle für das Leben und die Schriften al-Rāzī’s.”43 This catologue
is preceded by a short note on al-Rāzī’s life. The books are classified as follows:
(a) on medicine (1–56 books); (b) physics (57–89); (c) logic (90–96); (d)
mathematics and astronomy (97–106); (e) commentaries, abridgments, and
epitomes (107–13); (f) philosophy and hypothetical sciences (114–30); (g)
metaphysics (131–36); (h) theology (137–50); alchemy (151–72); (i) atheistic
books (173–74); (j) miscellaneous (175–84). In al-Nadim’s and al-Bīrūnī’s
lists, there are some common and some non-common titles.

Ibn abī Usbī‘ah (Vol. I, pp. 315–19) mentions 236 works of some of which
are certainly apocryphal.

The different titles given by al-Bīrūnī, ibn al-Nadim, al-Qifṭi, and ibn abī
Usbī‘ah were assembled by Dr. Mahmūd al-Najmābādi in his book: Sharḥ
Hal Muḥammad ibn Zakariya published in 1318/1900. He gave 290 titles.

As extant manuscripts of al-Rāzī’s books, Brockelmann (Vol. I, pp. 268–

Of his philosophical works, we have: —

1. Al-Ṭibb al-Rāzīnī (Brit. Mus. Add. Or. 25758; vat. Ar. 182 Cairo 2241
Taṣ).  
3. Amrāt Ibrāhīm al-Daulah (Rāghib 1463, ff. 98a–99b, Istanbul).

These three were published by Paul Kraus: “‘Abi Bakr Mohammad Filū
Zachariae Raghensis,” Opera Philosophica, fragmenta quae supersunt, 438

38 Ibid., p. 171.
39 Ibid., pp. 119, 120.
40 Führer, pp. 416–19.
42 Epître de Bérouni, contenant le repertoire des ouvrages Muḥammad ibn Zakariya
ar-Rāzī, publiée par Paul Kraus, Paris, 1936

Muḥammad ibn Zakariya al-Rāzī

Collegit et editid Paulus Kraus. Pars Prior. Cahirae MCMXXXIX. In this
edition Kraus published also fragments or expôses of the following books: —


The last one is spurious; it is attributed falsely to al-Rāzī in a manuscript
(Istanbul, Rāghib 1463, ff. 90a–98b). Kraus gives also the expôses of different
authors of al-Rāzī’s ideas on: (a) The five eternals (God, universal soul, first
matter, absolute space, and absolute time); (b) matter; (c) time and space;
d) soul and world. At the end of the volume he gives extracts from Aṭīm
al-Nūbūsawah of abu ʿAbdīm on prophecy, followed by extracts from al-Aqudūl
al-Dhahabīyah of Ahmad ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Kirmānī on the same subject.

7. Besides these books, Kraus published in Orientalia some other extracts
concerning al-Rāzī’s ideas on prophecy (Vol. V., Fasc. 3/4, Roma, 1936).

8. Al-Shukr ‘ala Prosulus which was prepared by Kraus to be edited and
was found among the papers he left after his suicide.

Nothing of these philosophical books was translated into Latin. All Latin
translations of his works were confined to medicine and alchemy.

C
PHILOSOPHY

1. Method

Al-Rāzī is a pure rationalist. He believes in reason, and in reason alone.
In medicine, his clinical studies reveal a very solid method of investigation
based on observation and experimentation. In Kitāb al-Faraj ba’d al-Shiddah
by al-Tanikhi (d. 384/994) and Qahār Maqālah of Niṣāḥi ‘Arāḍī Samar-
qandi written about 650/1155, we find a lot of cases attributed to al-Rāzī
where he shows an excellent method of clinical investigation. E. G. Browne,
in his Arabian Medicine, has translated a page supposed to be taken from
al-Rāzī’s Hāfla which shows this method. It runs as follows:

Al-Rāzī’s exaltation of reason is best expressed on the first page of his
al-Ṭibb al-Rāzīnī. He says: “God, glorious is His name, has given us reason
in order to obtain through it from the present and future the utmost benefits
that we can obtain; it is God’s best gift to us... By reason we perceive all
that is useful to us and all that makes our life good—by it we know obscure
and remote things, those which are hidden from us... By it, too, we succeed to
the knowledge of God, which is the highest knowledge we can obtain. ... If
reason is so highly placed and is of such an important rank, we should not
degrade it; we should not make it the judged while it is the judge, or
controlled while it is the controller, or commanded while it is the commander;

44 Manuscript in Oxford, Bodley Marsh 165, folios 239b-245b.
on the contrary, we should refer to it in everything and judge all matters by
it; we should do according as it commands us to do." 46

Even the most rationalistic mind could not exalt reason so clearly and so
highly. There is no place for revelation or mystic intuition. It is only logical
reason which is the unique criterion of knowledge and conduct. No irrational
force can be invoked. Al-Rāzī is against prophecy, against revelation, against
all irrational trends of thought.

Men are born with equal dispositions for knowledge. It is only through
cultivation of these dispositions that men differ, some cultivating them by
speculation and learning, others neglecting them or directing them to a practical
way of life. 48

2. Metaphysics

When one begins to expound al-Rāzī’s metaphysics, one at first comes
across a small treatise attributed to him: Maqālah li Abī Bākhr Muhammad
Ibn Zakariya al-Rāzī fi ma ba’d al-Tābi‘ah (Rāghib MS, No. 1463, ff. 90a–98b,
in Istanbul). There is much doubt about the authenticity of this treatise,
because its contents do not agree entirely with al-Rāzī’s otherwise known
doctrines. So, either it may belong to another period of al-Rāzī’s intellectual
development, 49 or it may contain only a systematic historical exposition of other people’s ideas without reference to his own, or it
may not be by al-Rāzī at all.

Anyhow, the main points treated here are: (1) nature, (2) foetus, and (3)
eternity of movement. The author refutes the partisans of the idea of nature
as principle of movement, especially Aristotle and his commentators: John
Philoponos, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Porphyry. At first he denies that
there is no need to prove the existence of nature, because it is not evident by
itself. If nature is one and the same, why does it produce different effects
in stone and in man? If nature permeates the body, does not that mean that
two things can occupy one and the same place? Why do those partisans say
that nature is dead, insensible, impotent, ignorant, without liberty and choice,
and at the same time attribute to it the same qualities as to God? Against
Porphyry the author says: You admit that nature acts in view of something
and not by hazard or mere chance; why then do you say that nature is dead
and not a living agent?

It seems that the author wants to refute all doctrines which pretend that
nature is the principle of movement and creation, by showing the contradic-
tions to which these doctrines necessarily lead. His standpoint is that there
is no place for admitting the existence of nature as principle of action and

47 Ibid., p. 296.
48 Ibid., p. 296.
49 Opera Philosophica, p. 114.
50 See Neo-Platonismus und Arabes, ed. A. Badawi, Cairo, 1955, Introduction.
51 Opera Philosophica, pp. 170–190.

Muḥammad ibn Zakariya al-Rāzī

movement. But he does not define his attitude; his exposė is negative and
destructive.

As for the question of eternity of movement and time, the author discusses
especially the ideas of Aristotle and Proclus. 46 He refers to his refutation
of Proclus. We know that al-Rāzī has written a treatise entitled “Doubts
about Proclus,” and Kraus 50 thinks that this is an argument in favour of the
authenticity of the attribution of the treatise to al-Rāzī, but we think that
this is a weak argument, because Proclus’ de aeternitate mundi was much
discussed by Arab thinkers after it had been translated by Ishāq ibn Ḥunain. 51
The author’s idea is that time is finite and not eternal, that the world is also
finite, that there is only one world, and, lastly, that outside that one world
there is no element and nothing (except God). Here he reproduces the ideas
of Metrodorus and Seleucus taken from pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita Philo-
sophorum.

The general trend of this treatise is polemical and dialectical. It cannot
be reconciled with al-Rāzī’s ideas on time, space, and Deity. Therefore, we
think that it is spurious and cannot even belong to another period of al-Rāzī’s
spiritual development.

The real doctrine of al-Rāzī should be searched for in his Kitāb al-‘Ilm al-
Nabawi. Unfortunately, that work is lost and we have only refutations of some
passages from it collected by Kraus. 52 We do not even have textual fragments
of al-Rāzī’s book. With all the inconveniences of adversaries’ exposės, we have
nothing more to do than to content ourselves with these refutations. What
we can conclude from these is that al-Rāzī treated in this book: space, vacuum,
time, duration, matter, metempsychosis, prophecy, pleasure, and Maniachism.

Al-Rāzī’s philosophy is chiefly characterized by his doctrine of the Five
Eternals. Al-Birūnī says 53 that “Muḥammad ibn Zakariya al-Rāzī has re-
ported from the ancient Greeks the eternity of five things: God, the universal
soul, first matter, absolute space, and absolute time, on which he founded his
doctrine. But he distinguished between time and duration by saying that
duration number applies to the one and not to the other, because finiteness attains
numerality; and, therefore, the philosophers have defined time as the duration
of what has a beginning and an end, whereas duration (dahr) has neither
beginning nor end. He said also that in Being these five are necessary: the
sensible in it is the matter formed by composition; it is spatial, so there must
be a space; alternation of its modes is a characteristic of time, because
some precede and others follow, and it is by time that oldness and new-
ness, and older and newer and simultaneous are known; so time is necessary.
In Being there are living things, so there must be soul; in it there are
intelligibles and their constitution is absolutely perfect; there must be then a creator, wise, omniscient, doing things as perfectly as possible, and giving reason for the sake of salvation."

Out of the Five Eternals, two are living and acting: God and soul; one is passive and not living: matter from which all bodies are made; and two are neither living and acting, nor passive: vacuum and duration. Sometimes we find vacuum (khali‘) instead of space (makān), and duration (dahr) instead of time (zamān) or duration in the limited sense (muddah).

This doctrine is attributed, in some sources (al-Fākhr al-‘Arāzī, al-Shahrastānī, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī), to the so-called Ḥarrānīyyah. Who were these Ḥarrānīyyah? The word comes from Harrān, the famous city of the Şābiyans and a centre of learning immediately before Islam and in the first four centuries of the Islamic era. Massignon thinks that these Ḥarrānīyyah are fictitious persons, and that what we find about them in our sources is a mere "literary romance" (roman littéraire). Kraus is also of the same opinion, and he gives his reasons as follows: (a) before al-‘Arāzī we find no one who attributes this doctrine of the five eternals to al-Ḥarrānīyyah; (b) al-‘Arāzī, in his ‘Im al-Ilahī, has expounded the doctrines of the Şābiyans Hartanīyyah and also his doctrine of the five eternals. But then Kraus gives a third reason which proves exactly the contrary of what the first two prove: al-Birūnī, al-Marzūqī, al-Rāzī, and al-Ṭūsī say that al-‘Arāzī reported this doctrine from the ancient Greeks, that is to say, the early Greek philosophers, especially Pythagoras, Democritus, etc. How can we then say that al-‘Arāzī attributed this doctrine to a fictitious school, Ḥarrānīyyah, when he said expressly in his ‘Im al-Ilahī that it was the doctrine of the early Greek philosophers? He was not in need of inventing the Ḥarrānīyyah, when he already had declared that it was the doctrine of the early Greek philosophers. For this reason, we cannot admit Massignon’s suggestion, nor Kraus’ evidence which are very weak. It is not right to identify what is attributed in the different sources to the Ḥarrānīyyah with al-‘Arāzī’s ideas unless this is expressly declared in the sources themselves.

We may now describe these Five Eternals.

(i) God

God’s wisdom is perfect. No inadvertence can be attributed to Him. Life flows from Him as light flows from the sun. He is perfect and pure Intelligence. From the soul life flows. God creates everything; He is incapable of nothing, and nothing can be contrary to His will. God knows things perfectly well. But the soul knows only what it experiences. God knew that soul would tend to matter and ask for material pleasure. After that soul attached itself to matter;

442

(ii) Soul

God, according to al-‘Arāzī, has not created the world through any necessity, but He decided to create it after having at first no will to create it. Who determined Him to do so? There must be another eternal who made Him decide this.

This other eternal is the soul which was living but ignorant. Matter, too, was eternal. Owing to its ignorance, the soul was fond of matter and formed figures from it in order to get material pleasures. But matter was rebellious to forms; so God intervened in order to aid the soul. This aid was that He made this world and created it in strong forms wherein the soul could find corporeal pleasures. God then created man and from the substance of His divinity He created the intelligence of man to awaken the soul and to show to it that this world is not its real world.

But man cannot attain the real world except by philosophy. He who studies philosophy and knows his real world and acquires knowledge is saved from his bad state. Souls remain in this world till they are awakened by philosophy to the mystery and directed towards the real world.

(iii) Matter

The absolute or first matter is composed of atoms. Each atom has volume; otherwise their collection nothing could be formed. If the world is destroyed, it too is dispersed into atoms. Matter has been there from eternity, because it is impossible to admit that a thing comes from nothing.

What is more compact becomes the substance of the earth, what is more rarefied than the substance of the earth becomes the substance of water, what

443

448 See especially, Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī, Muḥāsba, Cairo 1323/1905, pp. 85–86.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

is still more rarefied becomes the substance of air, and what is still more and
more rarefied becomes the substance of fire.

The body of the sphere is also composed of the particles of matter, but its
composition differs from the compositions of other bodies. The proof of this
is that the movement of the sphere is not directed to the centre of the world,
but to its periphery. Its body is not very compact, as that of the earth, nor
very rarefied as that of fire or air.

Qualities such as heaviness, levity, darkness, and luminosity are to be
explained by the more or less vacuity which is within matter. Quality is an
accident which is attributed to substance, and substance is matter.

Al-Rāzi gives two proofs to establish the eternity of matter. First, creation is
manifest; there must then be its Creator. What is created is nothing but formed
matter. Why then do we prove, from the created, the anteriority of the Creator,
and not the anteriority of the created being? If it is true that body is created
(or more exactly: made magāsī') from something by the force of an agent,
then we should say that as this agent is eternal and immutable before His
act, what received this act of force must also have been eternal before it
received that act. This receiver is matter. Then matter is eternal.

The second proof is based on the impossibility of creatio ex nihilo.
Creating, that is to say, making something out of nothing is easier than com-
posing it. God's creating men fully at one stroke would be easier than composing
them in forty years. This is the first premise. The wise Creator does not
prefer to do what is farther from His purpose to what is nearer, unless He is
incapable of doing what is easier and nearer. This is the second premise. The
conclusion from these premises is that the existence of all things should be
crushed by the Creator of the world through creation and not by composition.
But what we see is evidently the contrary. All things in this world are produced
by composition and not by creation. It necessarily follows that He is incapable of
creating from nothing and the world came to be by the composition of things
the origin of which is matter.

Al-Rāzi adds, universal induction proves this. If nothing in the world comes
to be except from another thing, it is necessary that natures are made from
another thing, and this other thing is matter. Therefore, matter is eternal;
it was originally not composed, but dispersed.

(iv) Space

As it is proved that matter is eternal, and as matter should occupy space,
so there is eternal space. This argument is nearly the same as that given by
al-Irānshahrī. But al-Irānshahrī says that space is the manifest might of God.
Al-Rāzi could not follow his master's vague definition. For him, space is the
place where matter is.

Muḥammad ibn Zakariya al-Rāzi

Al-Rāzi distinguishes between two kinds of space: universal or absolute,
and particular or relative. The former is infinite and does not depend on the
world and the spatial things in it.

Vacuum is inside space, and, consequently, inside matter. As a proof of the
infinity of space, the partisans (al-Ṭāhir al-Rāzī and al-Rāzi) say that a spatialized
thing cannot exist without space, though space may exist without spatialized
things. Space is nothing but the receptacle for the spatialized things. What con-
tains the two is either a body, or a not-body. If it is a body, it must be in space,
and outside this body there is space or no-space; if no-space, it is a body
and finite. If it is not-body, it is space. Therefore, space is infinite. If someone
says that this absolute space has an end, that means that its limit is a body.
As every body is finite, and every body is in space, so space is infinite in
every sense. What is infinite is eternal, so space is eternal.

Vacuum has the power of attracting bodies; therefore, water is conserved
(or retained) in a bottle submerged in water with the opening turned down-
wards.

(v) Time

Time, according to al-Rāzi, is eternal. It is a substance that flows (ja'ūhar
ṣājrī). He is against those (Aristotle and his followers) who pretend that time
is the number of the movements of the body, because if it were so, it would
not have been possible for two moving things to move in one time by two
different numbers.

Al-Rāzi distinguishes between two kinds of time: absolute time and limited
(mahsūr) time. The absolute time is duration (al-dahr). It is eternal and
moving. As for the limited time, it is that of the movements of the spheres
and of the sun and stars. If you imagine the movement of duration, you can
imagine absolute time, and this is eternity. If you imagine the movement of
the sphere, you imagine the limited time.

D

THEOLOGY

Al-Rāzi was a theist, but he does not believe in revelation and prophecy.
We content ourselves with giving a summary of his main ideas.

Al-Rāzi contesta prophecy on the following grounds:

1. Reason is sufficient to distinguish between good and evil, useful and
harmsful. By reason alone we can know God, and organize our lives in
the best way. Why then is there need for prophets?

2. There is no justification for privileging some men for guiding all men.

48 Ibid.
49 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzi, al-Mabādīth al-Maṣḥūriyyah, Hyderabad, 1343/1924,
because all men are born equal in intelligence; the differences are not because of natural dispositions, but because of development and education.

3. Prophets contradict one another. If they speak in the name of one and the same God, why this contradiction?

After denying prophecy, al-Rāzī goes on to criticize religions in general. He expounds the contradictions of the Jews, the Christians, the Manichaeans, and the Majūs. He gives the following reasons for the attachment of men to religion:

(a) Imitation and tradition.
(b) Power of the clergy who are in the service of the State.
(c) External manifestations of religions, ceremonials and rituals, which impose themselves upon the imagination of the simple and the naive.

He shows contradictions between religion and religion in detail. Al-Rāzī subjects the revealed books, the Bible and the Qurʾān, to systematic criticism. He tries to criticize the one by the aid of the other; for instance, he criticizes Judaism by means of Manichaeism, and Christianity by means of Islam; and then criticizes the Qurʾān by means of the Bible.

He denies especially the miraculousness (iʿjāz) of the Qurʾān, either because of its style or its contents and affirms that it is possible to write a better book in a better style.

He prefers scientific books to all sacred books, because scientific books are more useful to men in their lives than all sacred books. Books on medicine, geometry, astronomy, and logic are more useful than the Bible and the Qurʾān. The authors of these scientific books have found the facts and truths by their own intelligence, without the help of prophets. Science is drawn from three sources: reasoning, according to logic; tradition, from predecessors to successors according to sure and accurate testimony, as in history; and instinct which guides man without being in need of much reasoning.

After this negative criticism, he goes on to say that it would not even be reasonable of God to send prophets, because they do much harm. Every nation believes only in its own prophets and vehemently denies those of others, with the result that there have been many religious wars and much hatred between nations professing different religions.

These ideas of al-Rāzī were most audacious. No other Muslim thinker was so daring as he.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Rāzī’s moral philosophy is to be found in the only extant philosophical works of his, al-Ṭibb al-Rāzī and al-Sirat al-Falsafyyah. The latter work is a justification of his conduct of life, from the philosophical point of view, because he was blamed by some people for not living on the model of his master, Socrates. It is a curious and very interesting apologia pro vita sua.

He thinks that there should be moderation in a philosopher’s life—neither much ascetism, nor too much indulgence in pleasures. There are two limits: higher and lower. The higher limit beyond which a philosopher should not go is to abstain from pleasures that cannot be obtained except by committing injustice and doing things contrary to reason. The lower is to eat what does not harm him or cause illness, and to wear what is sufficient to protect his skin, and so on. Between the two limits, one can live without becoming unworthy of being called a philosopher.

Al-Rāzī claims that he in his practical life did not go beyond these two limits. He did not live in the service of a monarch or a man of arms, but as a doctor and counsellor. He was not greedy, nor in conflict with other people but, on the contrary, he was very tolerant as regards his own rights. He never exceeded in drinking, eating, or enjoying life. As for his love of science and study, it is all well known to everybody. From the theoretical point of view too, his works entitle him to be called a philosopher.

In al-Ṭibb al-Rāzī he treats, in twenty chapters, the main points of ethics. He wants to expound what the vices are and how we are to get rid of them.

He begins with the exaltation of reason, in the manner we have seen above. Then he goes in medius res by treating the question of passions. He says that man should control his passions; he brings out the distinction drawn by Plato between three aspects of the soul: reasonable, pugnacious, and appetite; and shows how justice should reign among them.

It is necessary that a man should know his own defects. For this, he can appeal to a reasonable friend who will tell him about his defects. He should get information about what other people, neighbours, and friends, think of him. Here al-Rāzī depends on two treatises of Galen: “On Knowing One’s Own Defects,” and “How Good People Benefit from Their Enemies.”

These are the contents of preliminary chapters. In the fifth, he expounds his theory of pleasure, a theory which he treats again in a special epistle. For him, pleasure is nothing but the return of what was removed by something harmful to the previous state, for example, one who leaves a shadowy place for a sunny and hot place gets pleasure on coming back to the shadowy place. For this reason, says al-Rāzī, natural philosophers have defined pleasure as a return to nature.

Al-Rāzī condemns love as an excess and submission to passions. He condemns vanity, because it prevents one from learning more and working better. Envy is an amalgamation of misery and cupidity. An envious man is the man who feels sad when another obtains some good things, even when no harm comes to him at all. If he has been harmed, then the emotion is not envy but enmity. If a person contents himself with what is necessary for him, then there would be no place for envy in his soul.

Anger is aroused in animals to make it possible for them to take revenge on harmful things. If it is in excess, it does much harm to them.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Lying is a bad habit. It is of two sorts: for good, or for evil. If it is for good, then it merits praise; otherwise, it is blameworthy. So its value depends on the intention.

Misery cannot be wholly condemned. Its value depends on the reason for it. If it is due to the fear of poverty and fear of the future, then it is not bad. If it is for mere pleasure of acquisition, it is bad. There must be a justification for one’s misery; if it is a reasonable one, it is not a vice; otherwise it is a thing to be combated.

Worry, when it is too much, is not a good thing, for its excess, without good reason, leads to hallucination, melancholy, and early withering.

Cupidity is a very bad state which brings pain and harm. Drunkenness leads to calamities and ills of body and mind.

Copulation, when in excess, is bad for the body; it causes early senility, weakness, and many other ills. One should indulge in it as little as one can, because excess in it leads to more excess.

Frivolity is also pernicious in some cases.

Acquisition and economy are good for living, but only in moderation. No more wealth should be acquired than is needed and spent, except a little saving for sudden calamities and bad future circumstances.

Ambition may lead to adventures and perils. It is well and good if we can get a better rank without adventure or peril; otherwise it is better to renounce it.

The last chapter treats a favourite theme in the Hellenistic and early medieval period, that of the fear of death. Here al-Raži contends himself by dealing with it from the point of view of those who think that the body is destroyed, the soul is also destroyed. After death, man is no longer alive, and he is not able to feel anything. During his life, man is submersed in pains, whereas after death there would be no pain whatever. The best thing for a reasonable man to do is to get rid of the fear of death, because if he believes in another life, he must be joyful because, by death, he goes to a better world. If he believes there is nothing after death, there is no cause for worry. In any case, one should reject every kind of worry about death, because it is not reasonable to worry.

CONCLUSION

Al-Raži had no organized system of philosophy, but compared to his time he must be reckoned as the most vigorous and liberal thinker in Islam and perhaps in the whole history of human thought.

He was a pure rationalist, extremely confident in the power of reason, free from every kind of prejudice, and very daring in the expression of his ideas without reserve.

He believed in man, in progress, and in God the Wise, but in no religion whatever.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Ancient Sources


B. Modern Studies


C. Editions of Philosophical Works


The only edition of al-Raži's philosophical books and fragments, still extant, is the one by Paul Kraus; "Abi Bakr Mohammad Fili Zachariae Baschensii, Opera Philosophica, fragmentaque quae supersunt," Collegii et edidit Paulus Kraus. Pars Prior. Chiaras MCMXXIX. Only the first volume was published; suicide prevented P. Kraus from publishing the second volume for which he had collected a good deal of material. This material was transferred, after Kraus's death, to the Institut Français d'Archeologie Orientale, in Cairo. It remains to be published.
Chapter XXIII

AL-FARĀĪBI

Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī was born in about 288/870 and he died in 339/950. Eminent founder of a philosophical system as he was, he devoted himself entirely to contemplation and speculation and kept himself aloof from political and social perturbations and turmoil. He left a considerable amount of literature. Besides his immediate pupils, there were many who studied his works after his death and became his followers. His philosophy set the standard for scholarly speculation both in the East and the West long after his death.

Since the last decades of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, several attempts have been made to write his biography, to collect his still unpublished works, and to elucidate some obscurities in his philosophy. In 1370/1950, on the occasion of the millennium of his death, some Turkish scholars discovered some of his works still in manuscript and removed certain difficulties concerning his thought. We cannot say if they have all been resolved. We do not even know if it is easy to resolve them unless we add further to our knowledge of his life and works. Public and private libraries still keep a considerable number of Islamic manuscripts behind closed doors; and we think it is time for these manuscripts to be brought to the light of the day.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to deal briefly with al-Fārābī’s life, his works, and his philosophy, with special reference to some of the lost links and misconceptions about or objections raised against his doctrine.¹

A LIFE

Contrary to the usage among some of the Muslim scholars, al-Fārābī did not write his autobiography, and no one among his disciples managed to give an account of his life as al-Juẓjāni did for his master ibn Sina. Material for that in the works of the biographers is quite unsatisfactory and inadequate. The rather lengthy biography in ibn Khallikān’s Wafayāt al-Aʿyān² is open to criticism as regards its authenticity. Thus, in the life of al-Fārābī, several obscure points and some unsolved problems are still to be investigated and settled.

His life falls into two distinct periods, the first being the time from his birth till about the age of fifty. The only information about this period is that he was born at Waṣj, a village in the vicinity of Fārāb in Transoxiana, in about 288/870. In spite of the scanty information we have

¹ A comprehensive treatise entitled La place d’Al-Farabī dans l’école philosophique musulmane was published by Ibrahim Madkour in 1934.

450

Al-Fārābī

about his family, his childhood, and his youth, it has been believed that he was Turkish by birth, that his father was a general, and that he himself worked as a judge for some time.³ What is better known is the cultural and intellectual movement which flourished and spread with the introduction of Islam in Fārāb at the beginning of the third/ninth century, and that the reputed philologist al-Jauhari, the compiler of al-Šīhāb, was one of his eminent contemporaries.

Al-Fārābī was able to draw largely on this movement. The basis of his early education was religious and linguistic: he studied jurisprudence, Hadith, and the exegesis of the Qurān. He learnt Arabic as well as Turkish and Persian. It is doubtful whether he knew any other language, and what has been stated by ibn Khallikān about al-Fārābī’s mastery of “seventy tongues” is more akin to the fabulous than to exact history.⁴ From his interpretation of the word safasīḥ (sophistry), it is obvious that al-Fārābī had no knowledge of the Greek language.⁵ He did not neglect to benefit himself from the rational studies which were current in his time, such as mathematics and philosophy, although it appears that he did not turn to them until much later. Contrary to what has been held, it does not appear that he paid much attention to medicine.⁶ And when he became extremely interested in these rational studies, he did not remain content with what he had acquired in this respect in his native town. Spurred by intellectual curiosity, he had to leave his home and wander abroad in pursuit of more knowledge.

That marks the second period of his life, the period of old age and full maturity. Baghdād, as an outstanding centre of learning throughout the fourth/tenth century, was naturally his first destination where he encountered various scholars among whom were philosophers and translators. It was the study of logic which attracted him to that circle of distinguished logicians of Baghdād of whom the most renowned was abu Bīshūr Matta ibn Yūnus considered to be the foremost logician of his age. Al-Fārābī studied logic under ibn Yūnus for some time. He surpassed his teacher and, on account of the eminent position he had gained in this field, he came to be called “The Second Teacher.” Another famous logician, Yahya ibn ‘Adi, was his disciple.

Al-Fārābī remained twenty years in Baghdād and then his attention was engaged by another cultural centre in Aleppo. There, in the brilliant and scholarly Court of Saif al-Daulah, gathered the most distinguished poets, philologists, philosophers, and other scholars. In spite of the strong Arab sympathies of that Court, no racial bias or prejudice could mar the scholarly and cultural atmosphere in which Persians, Turks, and Arabs argued and

⁴ Ibn Khallikān, op. cit., p. 113.
⁵ Al-Fārābī, Ibīd’, al-Ulām, Cairo, 1949, p. 65; Madkour, La Sophistique (Logique d’Al-Farabī), Cairo, 1958, Preface, p. v.
disputed and agreed or differed in the name of disinterested pursuit of knowledge. In that Court al-Fārābī lived, first and foremost, as a scholar and seeker after truth. The glamour and the glory of Court life never allured him, and, in the garb of a Sufi, he addressed himself to the hard task of a scholar and a teacher; and he wrote his books and his treatises among murmuring rivulets and the thick foliage of shady trees.

Except for several short journeys abroad, al-Fārābī remained in Syria till his death in 339/950. Ibn abi Ṣaḥīḥ records that al-Fārābī visited Egypt towards the end of his life. This is most probable, as Egypt and Syria have been closely linked for a long time in history, and cultural life in Egypt at the time of the Fatimids and the Ikhshāṣids had its attractions. However, the alleged report of the murder of al-Fārābī by some highwaymen while he was travelling between Damascus and ‘Asqalān quoted by al-Baḥāqī is incredible. Al-Fārābī had reached such an exalted position in the Court of Sa’d al-Daulah that the Amīr in person, together with his immediate entourage, attended the funeral service in honour of the dead scholar.

B WORKS

He left a considerable amount of literature; yet, if we accept the reports of some of the biographers, such as al-Qīṭī and ibn abi Ṣaḥīḥ, the number of his writings is seventy, small compared with that of his contemporaries, namely, al-Kindī and al-Rāzī the physician. However, we must bear in mind that in the lists of the works of these scholars, the biographers have often mentioned the same book under two, maybe more, different titles, and that most of the works they have listed were mere articles or short treatises.

Al-Fārābī’s works may be divided into two equal parts, one dealing with logic and the other with other studies. The logical works are concerned with the different parts of Aristotle’s Organon, either in the form of commentary or paraphrase. Most of these writings, however, are still in manuscript; and a great many of these manuscripts are not yet available. The second category of his works deals with the other branches of philosophy, physics, mathematics, metaphysics, ethics, and politics. A good part of it is available, and it gives a clear idea of the various aspects of al-Fārābī’s philosophy. But some of it is doubtful and his authorship of it is a subject of controversy, as in the case of Fussūg al-Hikam (Gems of Sage ness) or al-Muṣāfārī (Separateness)11 In this category, no really scientific study was attempted; al-Fārābī did not even mention medicine, and his discussion of chemistry was rather in the nature of a defence than in the form of elaboration and analysis.

Ibn Khallīkān is probably right when he maintains that al-Fārābī wrote most of his books in Baghðād and Damascus.12 There is no evidence of his having written any of his books before the age of fifty, and even if he did write any, it is not certain whether it was theological or philosophical. The biographers have not reported anything contradictory. Some scholars have attempted to make a chronological list of his works.13 But one wonders what the value of such a list would be since all his works were written in the last thirty years of his life, when he began to write as a fully mature philosopher; and there was certainly no noticeable change or development in his thoughts or doctrine during this period.

The style of al-Fārābī is characteristically concise and precise. He deliberately selects his words and expressions as he profoundly thinks of his ideas and thoughts. His aphorisms are pregnant with profound significance. That is why Max Horten has given a large commentary to explain the small treatise entitled Fussūg al-Hikam.14 Al-Fārābī has a particular style; anyone accustomed to it can well recognize it. He avoids repetition and redundancy and prefers brevity and conciseness. It seems that al-Fārābī was in favour of esoteric teaching and believed that philosophy should not be made available to the uninstructed among the masses,15 and that philosophers should expound their ideas garbed in obscurity, mystification, and ambiguity.16 Even today, it is not an easy task to comprehend the meaning implied in some Fārābīan aphorisms.

His method is almost identical with his style. He collects and generalizes; he arranges and harmonizes; he analyses in order to compose; he divides and sub-divides in order to concentrate and classify. In some of his treatises, division and classification seem to be his only objective. His treatise entitled “What Should Be Learnt Before Attempting Philosophy” is in the form of an index of the Greek schools of philosophy, the meanings of their titles and the names of their originators. He has been chiefly concerned with the study of the aims and the style of the works of Aristotle.16 His “Classification of Sciences” is the first attempt of its kind in the history of Islamic thought.17

Al-Fārābī is fond of opposites; in fact, he gives the opposite of almost every term he uses: thus negation implies affirmation; and Being, Non-Being. He wrote a treatise in answer to the questions he had been asked. In this treatise he gives the proposition with which he is confronted and contrasts it with its

---

12 Aidin Sayīlī, op. cit.
13 M. Horten, Das Buch der Ringelneine Fārābī, Münster, 1906.
14 Ciceri, De Unio, 2, 6.
16 Ibid., pp. 49–55.
17 Ṣā’id al-Andalusī, Ṭabaqāt al-Umam, Beirut, 1912, p. 53.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

opposite, in order to get an adequate solution. This reminds us of Plato’s Parmenides.

His main concern has been to elucidate the basis of a theory and the foundation of a doctrine, to clear up obscurities, and to discuss controversial questions in order to arrive at the right conclusions. However, he pays scant attention to ordinary topics; and what he supposes to be self-evident is passed by without the slightest attempt at an explanation. A good example of this is his treatise, “The Aims of the Stagirite in Every Chapter of His Book Named the Alphabet.” This study is almost akin to our introduction to or criticism of a new book. It can be favourably compared to a similar work by a contemporary philosopher. No wonder, ibn Sina found in this treatise the key to Aristotle’s “Metaphysics.”

The works of al-Fārābī became widespread in the East in the fourth and fifth/tenth and eleventh centuries, and they eventually reached the West where some Andalusian scholars became the disciples of al-Fārābī. Some of his writings were also translated into Hebrew and Latin, and had their influence on Jewish and Christian scholasticism. These works were published in the last decades of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, and some of them were translated into various modern European languages. Yet there is still great need for their republication with meticulous editing, especially now that the libraries of Istanbul are much more available to us than before, and we can fill some gaps through them.

C PHILOSOPHY

The philosophy of al-Fārābī has its distinct features and clear-cut aims. He has adopted some of the doctrines of previous philosophers, reconstructed them in a form adaptable to his own cultural environment, and made them so closely knit that his philosophy has become most systematic and harmonious. Al-Fārābī is logical both in his thinking and expression, in his argument and discussion, and in his exposition and reasoning. His philosophy might have depended on some false presuppositions, and might have expounded some hypotheses which modern science has refuted, yet it played a very significant role and influenced several schools of thought in subsequent times. Beginning with his logical studies, we will briefly explain the characteristics and the chief elements of his philosophy.

1. Logic.—It has been already mentioned that a considerable part of the works of al-Fārābī is devoted to the study of logic; but it is almost limited to the delineation of the Organon in the version known to the Arabic scholars of that time. He holds that “the art of logic gives, in general, the rules which, if followed, can correct the mind and direct man to the right way to truth away from the pitfalls of error.” For him, logic stands in the same relation to intelligibles as grammar to words, and proosody to verse. He emphasizes the practical and applied aspects of logic, indicating that intelligibles are to be tested by its rules, as dimensions, volumes, and masses are by measurement.

Logic also helps us in distinguishing truth from error and attaining the right way of thinking or in guiding other people along this way; it also indicates where to start our thoughts and how to conduct them necessarily to their final conclusions. Practice in rhetoric and dialectical discourses, or in geometry and arithmetic, can never be a substitute for logic, in the same way as learning a considerable number of poems and speeches is of no avail to a man ignorant of grammar. The art of logic—as is generally thought—is not an unnecessary ornament, because it can never be replaced by natural aptitude.

However, al-Fārābī has always had in mind the difference between grammar and logic; for the former is concerned with words only, while the latter deals with meanings and is related to words in so far as they are the embodiments of meanings. Moreover, grammar is concerned with the laws of language, and languages are as diverse as peoples and races; but logic deals with the human mind which is always the same anywhere and everywhere.

The subject-matter of logic is its topics in which the laws of intelligibles are studied. They are classified under eight heads: (1) Categories, (2) Interpretations, (3) First Analytic, (4) Second Analytic, (5) Topics, (6) Sophistic, (7) Rhetoric, and (8) Poetics, all of which constitute the real aim of logic. The fourth part is the most significant and noble of all the others; what is anterior may be considered to be an introduction and what follows an application and comparison leading to the avoidance of error and confusion.

It is obvious that al-Fārābī follows the footsteps of Aristotle, although he considers rhetorics and poetics as branches of logic. The same error was committed by the Peripatetics, especially by those of the school of Alexandria. Some of them even claimed that Porphyry’s Isagoge was a part of the Organon of Aristotle; but this claim is not supported by al-Fārābī known as “The Second Teacher,” Aristotle having been taken to be the First.

23 Al-Fārābī, Ihsāf al-Ulam, p. 53.
24 Ibid., p. 64.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
27 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
28 Ibid., p. 59.
29 Ibid., pp. 60-62.
30 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Undoubtedly, “Demonstration” was regarded by Aristotle as important, but he was rather proud of his discovery of syllogism.

The contribution of al-Fārābī to logic is two-fold. First, he has succeeded in properly and lucidly expounding the logic of Aristotle to the Arabic-speaking world. In the introduction of one of his recently published treatises, he indicates that he will explain the principle of syllogism after Aristotle in terms familiar to the Arabs; consequently, he substitutes examples from the daily life of his own contemporaries for the otherwise vague and unfamiliar examples originally cited by Aristotle. His process is in now way detrimental to the study of the logic of Aristotle, nor does it alter or vitiate the significance of his philosophy.33

On the other hand, al-Fārābī lays the basis for the quinary division of reasoning, indicating that it is demonstrative if it leads to certainty; dialectical if it leads to a semblance of certitude through good intention; sophistical if it leads to a semblance of certitude through bad intentions and falsity; rhetorical if it leads to a probable opinion; and poetical if it leads to imagery giving pleasure or pain to the soul.34 These different kinds are used according to the situation and the standard of the audience. Philosophers and scholars make use of demonstrative reasoning, theologians resort only to dialectic syllogisms, and politicians take refuge in rhetorical syllogisms. It is obvious that the way of addressing any group of people should be adapted to the standard of their understanding; and, thus, to use demonstrative syllogisms when addressing the populace and the masses is absurd.35

2. The Unity of Philosophy.—Al-Fārābī maintains that philosophy is essentially one unit. Thus, it is imperative for great philosophers to be in accord, the pursuit of truth being their one and only aim. Plato and Aristotle, “being the originators of philosophy and the creators of its elements and principles and the final authority as regards its conclusions and branches,”36 are closely in accord in spite of some of their apparent and formal differences. Thus, al-Fārābī believes in the existence of one school of philosophy, the school of truth. Therefore, the terms Peripatetics, Platonists, Stoics, and Epicureans denote only names of groups of philosophers; all constitute one single school of philosophy. Parties and cliques are a nuisance in philosophy as well as in politics. Al-Fārābī, as a philosopher and historian, has been fully aware of the danger of partisanship in philosophy. This partisanship was caused more or less by the fanatics among the disciples of the great philosophers. Instead of attempting to harmonize the doctrines of various philosophers, these disciples managed to widen the gap between two masters by stressing shades of difference and sometimes even by altering and misrepresenting their doctrines.37 This attitude of al-Fārābī is identical with the attitude of the twelfth/eighteenth-century philosophers towards the disputes and dissensions of the Renaissance philosophers.

There is no novelty in this doctrine of al-Fārābī; it has been previously held by the philosophers of the later Greek schools, especially those of the school of Alexandria. When Porphyry speaks about his master, he points out that he has found the ideas of the Peripatetics and the Stoics fused in Plotinus’ works.38 In fact, Porphyry has devoted several treatises to the attempt of reconciling the philosophy of Plato with that of Aristotle;39 and a number of scholars of the school of Alexandria followed in his footsteps;40 but none of these scholars ever thought of combining all the philosophers in a single school. This has been an omission, and al-Fārābī has been profuse in his writings in an attempt to point this out.

Religious truth and philosophical truth are objectively one, although formally different. This idea rendered possible the accord between philosophy and the tenets of Islam. Al-Fārābī undoubtedly has been the first scholar to raise a new edifice of philosophy on the basis of this accord; later philosophers have followed the lines charted out by him; ibn Sīna has been to a certain extent occupied in the exposition and delineation of its Platonic aspects, while ibn Rushd has been busy indicating the accord between Aristotelian philosophy and religion.

This doctrine of reconciliation has been based on two main points: first, revising the Peripatetic philosophy and garbing it in a Platonic form, in order to make it more consonant with Islamic tenets; and, secondly, giving a rational interpretation of religious truths. In fact, al-Fārābī expounds philosophy in a religious way and philosophizes religion, thus pushing them in two converging directions so that they may come to an understanding and co-exist. This revision of the Peripatetic philosophy has been concerned with two theories, one cosmological and the other psychological, viz., Theory of the Ten Intelligences and that of the Intellect. His rational explanation depends on two other theories, the first is concerned with prophecy and the second with the interpretation of the Qur’ān. The whole philosophy of al-Fārābī is summed up in these four theories which are inter-related and all of which aim at one end.

3. Theory of the Ten Intelligences.—This theory constitutes a significant part in Islamic philosophy; it offers an explanation of the two worlds: heaven and earth; it interprets the phenomena of movement and change. It is the foundation of physics and astronomy. Its chief concern is the solving of the problem of the One and the many and the comparing of the mutable

33 Al-Fārābī, Ḵṯāb al-Q̱iṣ̱ṣ̱ās al-S̱ag̱ẖṟ, ed. Dr. Mubahat Türker, Fārābī'nin İli̇zi̇ Maṉı̇qi̇, Ankara, 1958, pp. 244-45.
34 Ibid., “Ubūm, pp. 64-69.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., p. 32.
39 Picavet, Enquête d'histoire générale et comparée, Paris, 1907, p. 86.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

and the immutable. Al-Fārābī holds that the One, i.e., God, is the Necessary by Himself; hence, He is not in need of another for His existence or His subsistence. He is an intelligence capable of knowing Himself; He is both intelligent and intelligible. He is quite unique by His essence. Nothing is like Him. He has no opposite or equivalent. 40

If the above premises are admitted, what would be God’s influence on the universe and the relationship between Him and the many? Only through a kind of emanation has Al-Fārābī laboured to elucidate these problems. He holds that from the Necessary One flows or emanates only one other by virtue of Its self-knowledge and goodness. This emanant is the first intelligence. Thus, knowledge equals creation, for it is enough for a thing to be conceived in order to exist. The first intelligence is possible by itself, necessary by another; and it thinks the One as well as itself. It is one-in-itself, and many by virtue of these considerations. From this point Al-Fārābī starts the first step towards multiplicity. From thinking by first intelligence of the One flows another intelligence. By virtue of its thinking of itself as possible in itself flow the matter and form of the “first heaven,” because every sphere has its specific form which is its soul. In this way, the chain of emanations goes on so as to complete the ten intelligences, and nine spheres and their nine souls. The tenth and last intelligence, or agent intelligence, is that which governs the sublunary world. From this intelligence flow the human souls and the four elements. 41

These intelligences and souls are hierarchical. The first intelligence in this hierarchy is the most transcendent, and then follow the souls of the spheres and then the spheres themselves. The last in order is the earth and the world of matter, which falls in the fourth rank. 42 The ancient Greeks held that anything celestial is sacred and anything terrestrial is impure. The tenets of Islam categorically assert that heaven is the gūdah of prayer, the source of revelation, the destination of the “ascension.” Everything in heaven is pure and purifying. Al-Fārābī here conforms to both the religious tenets and the philosophical teachings; but his main difficulty lies in maintaining that the impure earthly world has evolved from the sacred celestial one.

The number of intelligences is ten consisting of the first intelligence and the nine intelligences of the planets and spheres, because Al-Fārābī adopts the same theories as held by the Greek astronomers, especially by Ptolemy according to whom the cosmos is constituted of nine encircling spheres all of which move eternally and circularly around the earth. Intelligences and souls are the originators of this movement. Every sphere has its own intelligence and soul. The tenth intelligence manages the affairs of the terrestrial world. The soul is the immediate mover of sphere: However it acquires its power from the intelligence. It moves through its desire for the intelligence; and

pursuit of perfection moves its sphere. Thus, its desire is the source of its movement. Intelligence in its turn is in a state of perpetual desire. The lower desires the higher and all desire the One which is considered the Prime Mover although It is immovable. 43

The movement of the spheres is effected by a kind of spiritual attraction: the inferior sphere is always attracted towards the superior. This process is a spiritual dynamism similar to that of Leibniz in spite of its dependence on unequal spiritual powers. It seems that Al-Fārābī, the musician, is attempting to introduce into the world of spheres the system of musical harmony.

However, Al-Fārābī’s conclusions about physics are closely connected with his theories of astronomy. From the tenth intelligence flows the prime matter, or ḥayl, which is the origin of the four elements, and from the same intelligence flows the different forms which unite with the ḥayl to produce bodies. The terrestrial world is only a series of different kinds of forms united with matter or separated from it. Generation is the result of the unity of form and matter, and corruption is the result of their separation. The movement of the sun produces hotness and coldness necessary for change. All the separate intelligences provide the movements appropriate to the terrestrial world. In this way physics is fused with cosmology and the terrestrial world is subjected to the heavenly world. 44

Nevertheless, Al-Fārābī repudiates astrology which was prevalent at his time, and which had been cherished by the Stoics and the Alexandrian scholars before him.

Al-Fārābī does not deny the law of causality and the connection between causes and effects. For causes may be either direct or indirect; and if it is an easy matter to discover the former, the latter are more difficult to detect. Hence happens chance or coincidence; and there is no way of controlling coincidences. For how could an astrologer associate the death of an Amir with an eclipse? Or how could the discovery of a new planet have any connection with a war? However, belief in fortuitous happenings is essential in politics and in religion, because it imbues men with fear and hope, and stimulates obedience and endeavour. 45

It is, thus, through the doctrine of the ten intelligences that Al-Fārābī solves the problem of movement and change. He has made use of the same theory in his attempt at solving the problem of the One and the many, and in his reconciliation of the traditional Aristotelian theory of matter and the Islamic doctrine of creation. Matter is as old as the ten intelligences, but it is created because it has emanated from the agent intelligence. To vindicate the unity of God, Al-Fārābī has resorted to the mediacy of these ten intelligences between God and the terrestrial world.

Some of the elements of the Theory of the Ten Intelligences can be traced to

40 Al-Fārābī, Risiṭlāṭ fī Ārā’ Aḥl al-Madinat al-Fāṭihā, Leiden, 1895, pp. 5-10.
41 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
42 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
43 Ibid., pp. 25-27.
44 Ibid., p. 59.
45 Al-Zamārat al-Maṭliyyah, pp. 107-10.
the different sources they have been derived from. Its astronomical aspect is closely identical with Aristotle’s interpretation of the movement of the spheres. The Theory of Emanation has been borrowed from Plotinus and the school of Alexandria. But, in its entirety, it is a Fārābīan theory, dictated and formulated by his desire for showing the unity of truth and his method of grouping and synthesis. He reconcile Plato and Aristotle and religion and philosophy. This theory met with some success among the philosophers of the East and those of the West in the Middle Ages. Yet reconciliation necessitates, from one side or the other, some concessions; and if it pleases some, others are sure to resent it. Hence, this theory has been fervently embraced by Ibn Sīna who has given it a concise and elaborate exposition, while al-Qhāḍālī is loud in denouncing it. Among the Jewish scholars, Ibn Gabīr does not give it even the slightest notice, while Maimonides enthusiastically subscribes to it. And in spite of the objections of Christian scholars to this theory, it has always elicited their respect and esteem.

4. Theory of the Intellect.—The psychology of Aristotle has long been reputed for its conciseness and precision; and as an objective study it has not been less noteworthy. Aristotle’s classification of the faculties of the soul is the first of its kind. He has emphasized its unity in spite of the plurality of its faculties and explained its relationship with the body. He has but inadequately dealt with the Theory of the Intellect, and in consequence stirred a problem which has puzzled the moderns as well as the ancients. However, his treatise “On the Soul” is the best of its kind among ancient works on psychology, and it even surpasses some of the modern works. In the Middle Ages it was as much in vogue as the Organon.

This book was introduced to the Arabs through translations from Syriac and Greek, together with ancient commentaries, especially those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and Simplicius. It was the subject of extensive study with Muslim philosophers, who in their turn commented on it and paraphrased it. Influenced by Aristotle and drawing on his work, these philosophers wrote various theses and treatises on psychology. They were chiefly concerned with the question of the intellect which stood out among all the problems studied by the scholastic philosophers.

Al-Fārābī has been fully aware of the significance of this problem, and has recognized it as an epitome of the whole Theory of Knowledge. He has closely identified it with his own philosophy; for it is related to the Theory of the Ten Intelligences, and it is also the foundation of the Theory of Prophecy. He has dealt with the problem of the intellect in several places in his works; and he has devoted to its elaboration a whole treatise, “On the Different Meanings of the Intellect.” This treatise had a wide circulation among the scholars of the East and the West in the Middle Ages, and it was translated into Latin at an early date.

Al-Fārābī

He classifies the intellect into practical intellect which deduces what should be done, and theoretical intellect which helps the soul to attain its perfection. The latter is again classified into material, habitual, and acquired.

The material intellect, or the potential intellect as Al-Fārābī sometimes calls it, is the soul, or is a part of the soul, or a faculty having the power of abstracting and apprehending the quiddity of beings. It can be almost compared to a material on which the forms of beings are imprinted, just like wax which becomes one with the inscriptions carved on it. These inscriptions are nothing but perceptions and intelligibles. Thus, the intelligible exists in potentiality in sensible things; and when it is abstracted from the senses, it exists in the mind in actuality. That explains perception and abstraction, the important operations of the mind which bring the intelligibles from potentiality to actuality; and when these intelligibles are conveyed to the mind, the intellect in its turn is transformed from an intellect in potency to an intellect in action.

Therefore, the intellect in act, or the habitual intellect as it is sometimes called, is one of the levels of the ascension of the mind in the acquisition of a number of intelligibles. Since the mind is incapable of comprehending all the intelligibles, it is intellect in action with regard to what it perceives, and intellect in potency with regard to what it has not yet perceived. The intelligibles themselves exist in potency in the sensibles. Once they are stripped of them, they become intelligibles in action. And once man has attained to this level of the intellect in action, he can comprehend himself. This kind of comprehension has no relation with the external world; it is a mental, abstract comprehension.

Once the intellect becomes capable of comprehending abstractions, it is raised again to a higher level, that of the acquired intellect, or the level where human intellect becomes disposed to conceive abstract forms which have no connection with matter.

The difference between this rational conception and sense-perception is that the former is a kind of intuition and inspiration; or, in other words, it is a kind of immediate apprehension. This is the noblest level of human apprehension, and it is reached only by the few and the select who attain to the level of the acquired intellect, where the hidden is unveiled, and come in direct communion with the world of the separate intelligences.

Thus, the intellect is capable of rising gradually from intellect in potency to intellect in action, and finally to acquired intellect. The two consecutive levels are different from each other, though the lower always serves as a prelude to the higher. While the intellect in potency is just a receiver of sensible forms, intellect in action retains the intelligibles and comprehends

47 Al-Thamarat al-Mardiyah, p. 54.
48 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
49 Ibid., p. 44.
50 Ibid., pp. 45, 46; al-Madīnāt al-Fārībāh, p. 52.
the concepts. The acquired intellect rises to the level of communion, ecstasy, and inspiration. Conceptions are of different levels: originally, they are intelligibles in potency existing in matter; once abstracted from matter they become intelligibles in action. Still higher are the abstract forms which can never exist in matter.

However, this gradual elevation is not spontaneous; for its initial stage is the intelligibles and the intellect in potency, and its transition from potentiality to actuality can never be effected except through the influence of a prior actuality whose action is appropriate to it. This actuality is the agent intelligence, the last of the ten intelligences. Human knowledge depends on a radiation from the separate intelligences; and agent intelligence stands in the same relation to human intellect as the sun to our eyes: our eyes depend on daylight for sight, and in the same way our intellect is capable of comprehension only when it is illuminated by the agent intelligence which illuminates its way.

Thus, mysticism is fused with philosophy, and rational alknowledge coincides with ecstasy and inspiration.

The above-mentioned theory of al-Fârâî concerning the intellect is obviously based on Aristotle. Al-Fârâî himself declares that his theory depends upon the third part of De Anima of Aristotle, but he has his own contribution to add. His conception of the acquired intellect is alien to Aristotle; for it is almost identical with the separate intelligences, and serves as the link between human knowledge and revelation. Thus, it is different from the acquired intellect as found in the theory held by Alexander of Aphrodisias and al-Kindî; and it is the outcome of al-Fârâî's mystic tendency and his leaning towards Plotinus' system. This fact becomes clearer if we consider the influence of the agent intelligence in the acquisition of knowledge, since it is the outcome of vision and inspiration; it offers also to the mind the abstract forms and enlightens the way for it. This theory helps in fusing psychology with cosmology, but it underestimates the activity of the human mind, since it is made capable of comprehension only when it is illuminated by heaven; but would the Sufis care about this deficiency of the human mind?

The general acceptance of this theory in the Middle Ages is clear from the fact that ibn Sina has not only embraced it, but has also added to it vigour and clarity; and in spite of ibn Rushd's strict adherence to the teachings of Aristotle, he has also come under its influence. Among the Jews, Maimonides has copied it almost to the letter. With the Christians, this theory has stood at the top of the problems of philosophy, because it is concerned with the theory of knowledge and is closely connected with the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. This theory has also given rise to different schools, some favouring and the others opposing it. To sum up, al-Fârâî's Theory of the

54 Al-Madīnat al-Fāsitāh, pp. 46, 53–56.
55 Al-Dhammat al-Mardīyyah, p. 75.
Thus, through continuous speculative studies, the sage gets into communion with the agent intelligence.

This communion is also possible through imagination, as happens to the prophets, for all their inspiration or revelation is caused by imagination. Imagination occupies an important place in al-Farabi's psychology. It is closely connected with inclinations and sentiments, and is involved in rational operations and volitional movements. It creates the mental images which are not imitations of sensibles and are the source of dreams and visions. If we could have a scientific interpretation of dreams, it would help to give us an interpretation of revelation and inspiration, for prophetic inspirations take the form either of true dreams in sleep or of revelation in waking. The difference between these two forms is relative; they are distinct only as regards their degree. In fact, a true dream is but one aspect of prophecy.

When imagination gets rid of conscious activities as in sleep, it is wholly occupied with some of the psychological phenomena. Influenced by some bodily sensations and feelings, or by some emotions and conceptions, it creates new images or composes, from retained mental images, their new forms. Thus, we dream of water or swimming when our temperament is humid, and dreams often so represent the fulfilment of a desire or the avoidance of fear that the sleeper may move in his bed responding to a certain emotion, or leave his bed and beat a person unknown to him, or run after him. It is needless to point out that these views in spite of their simplicity are similar to the ideas of modern psychologists, such as Freud, Horney, and Murray.

It is within the power of imagination to create mental images after the pattern of the spiritual world. The sleeper may, thus, behold the Heaven and its inhabitants, and may feel its enjoyments and pleasures. Imagination may also rise to the celestial world and commune with the agent intelligence from which it can receive the heavenly judgments relating to particular cases and individual happenings. Through this communion which may occur by day or at night, prophecy can be explained, since it is the source of true dreams and revelation. According to al-Farabi: “If the faculty of imagination is so powerful and perfected in a certain person, and is not completely overwhelmed by external sensations...it gets into communion with the agent intelligence from which images of the utmost beauty and perfection are reflected. He who sees those images would testify to the sublime and wonderful majesty of God...” Once the imaginative faculty in man is completely perfected, he may receive, when awake, from the agent intelligence the pre-vision of the present and future events...and thus he would, through what he has received, prophesy divine matters. This is the highest level to which imagination may be raised, and which man can attain through this faculty.”

---

Al-Farabi

Thus, the chief characteristic of a prophet is to have a vivid imagination through which he can commune with the agent intelligence during waking time and in sleep, and can attain to vision and inspiration. And revelation is but an emanation from God through the agent intelligence. Some persons, although in a lower degree than the prophets, have a powerful imagination through which an inferior kind of vision and inspiration can be achieved. In this way al-Farabi places the saints in a degree lower than the prophets. The Imagination of the populace and the masses is so weak that it does not admit of rising to union with the agent intelligence, neither at night nor by day.

Al-Farabi's attempt at reconciliation was not the only motive behind this theory. In the third and fourth/ninth and tenth centuries a wave of scepticism refuting prophecy and prophets was prevalent. Its spokesmen copied some of the arguments held by the unbelievers in prophecy. At the head of these sceptics was ibn al-Rawandi who was once one of the Mu'tazilites but later rejected their doctrine, and Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi the physician, a tough and powerful adversary. The latter, in particular, refuted any attempt to reconcile philosophy and religion, assumed that philosophy is the only way to reform both the individual and society and that religions are the source of conflict and strife. This attack aroused all the various Islamic centres to defend their dogmas. Al-Farabi had to contribute to that defence. He explained prophecy on rational grounds and gave it a scientific interpretation.

He borrowed his explanation from Aristotle's theory of dreams, which had already been introduced to the Arab world. Al-Kindi, the forerunner of al-Farabi, adhered to that theory. It assumes that dreams are images produced by the imagination the capacity of which increases during sleep after getting rid of the activities of wakefulness. Aristotle, however, denies that dreams are revealed by God, and never admits of prophetic predictions through sleep, otherwise the populace and the masses—who have so many dreams—would claim foretelling the future. Here, al-Farabi diverges from his master, and asserts that man through imagination can commune with the agent intelligence, but this is available only to the privileged and the chosen. The agent intelligence is the source of divine laws and inspirations. It is, in al-Farabi's view, almost similar to the Angel charged with revelation, as in the tenets of Islam. It is within the capacity of the prophet or the philosopher to commune with the agent intelligence, the former through imagination and the latter by way of speculation and contemplation. This is understandable for the two draw together upon the same source and get their knowledge

---

88 Ibid., p. 52.
from high above. In fact, religious truth and philosophic truth are both the radiation of divine illumination through imagination or contemplation.

The Fāraḥiān theory of prophecy had an obvious impact not only on the East and the West, but on medieval and modern history. Ibn Sīna adhered faithfully to it. His elaboration of that theory is closely similar to that of al-Fārābī. Ibn Ṣuhail, admitting its validity, was much astonished at al-Ghazālī’s criticism of it; for it corroborates the religious tenets and affirms that the spiritual perfection can be attained only through man’s communion with God. When the theory was introduced into the Jewish philosophic thought, Maimonides subscribed to it and showed much interest in it. It is noticeable that Spinoza in his Tractatus theologico-politicus expounds a similar theory which he most probably borrowed from Maimonides. It continued to be echoed by some of the modern philosophers in Islam, such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and the Jāmāl Muḥammad ‘Abduh.

6. Interpretation of the Qur’ān.—Some of the religious tenets are traditional (ṣamī‘īyāt); they are matters indemonstrable by way of reason, such as miracles, and the Day of Judgment comprising the Doomsday and Resurrection, the Path and the Balance, the Judgment and the Punishment. Acceptance of these ṣamī‘īyāt is one of the pillars of religion. The believers have but to accept them and remain content with the veracity of their source. But some thinkers in their attempt at giving a rational explanation interpret them in a certain way or reduce them to certain natural laws. The Mu‘tazilites made a noticeable endeavour in this field, for they went so far in the way of interpretation that they refuted the Transfigurists who qualified God with certain attributes contradictory to His transcendence and uniqueness.

Al-Fārābī attempts a different interpretation. He admits the validity of miracles since they are the means of proving prophecy. He holds that miracles although supernatural do not contradict natural laws. For the source of these laws is to be found in the world of spheres and its intelligences which manage the terrestrial world; and once we get in communion with that world, matters other than those of the habitual course happen to us. A prophet, as mentioned above, has a spiritual power by means of which he is associated with the agent intelligence. It is through this communion that he causes rain to fall, the moon to split asunder, the stick to be transformed into a snake, or the blind and leprous to be healed. In this way al-Fārābī tries—as the Stoics had done before—to reduce to causality matters beyond the habitual course of nature and even contradictory to it.

The Qur’ān points to various ṣamī‘īyāt, such as the Tablet and the Pen. Al-Fārābī holds that these should not be understood literally, for the Pen is not an instrument to write with, nor the Tablet a page on which sayings

are registered, but they are mere symbols for precision and preservation. The Qur’ān is also full of extensive symbols about the hereafter, Day of Judgment, and reward and punishment. No believer could deny these matters without undermining the principle of divine sanction and individual responsibility. Although al-Fārābī fully admits the eternal bliss or the painful suffering of the hereafter, yet he reduces them to spiritual matters having no relationship with the body and material properties, because the spirit, not the body, is what which enjoys or suffers, is happy or unhappy.

This interpretation conforms to the Fāraḥiān tendency towards spiritualism. Ibn Sīna borrowed it and widely applied it. In Ibn Sīna’s view the Throne and the Chair are symbols of the world of spheres. Prayers are not mere bodily movements, but aim at imitating the celestial world. It is as if these two philosophers wanted to lay the foundation of a philosophical religion and a religious philosophy. However, al-Ghazālī was dissatisfied with this attempt and he attacked it, taking the text of the Scripture literally. Ibn Ṣuhail, although advocating accord between religion and philosophy, was also dissatisfied, because he claimed that for the sake of their security religion and philosophy should be kept separate. If combined, they would not be understood by the ordinary man and might lead astray even some of those capable of deep thinking.

D CONCLUSION

We can now conclude that al-Fārābī’s doctrine is so fully harmonious and consistent that its parts are completely inter-related. From the One, the First Cause, al-Fārābī gets on to ten intelligences from which the two worlds of heaven and earth have flowed. His spheres are moved by the managing intelligences, and nature with its generation and corruption is subjected to these intelligences. The soul is governed by one of these intelligences which is the agent intelligence. Politics and ethics are no exceptions, for happiness pursued by men is but the communion with the celestial world. His “Model City” only aims at this end.

This doctrine is at the same time spiritualistic and idealistic, for al-Fārābī reduces almost everything to spirit. His God is the Spirit of the spirits, his astronomical spheres are governed by celestial spirits, and the prince of his city is a man whose spirit transcends his body. This spiritualism is rooted in ideas and concepts, and is given wholly to speculation and contemplation. The One is the Idea par excellence and is the Intellect that intellects

47 Ibid., p. 77.
48 Al-Madīnāt Al-Fāridhah, p. 67.
49 Ibn Sīna, Ta‘lī ‘Rā‘īl fi al-Hikmah w-al Tābī‘ah, Cairo, 1908, pp. 128-29.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Itself. The other beings are generated by this Intellect. Through speculation and contemplation man can commune with the celestial world and attain the utmost happiness. No spiritualism is so closely related to idealism as that of al-Farabi.

Although al-Farabi's doctrine is a reflection of the Middle Ages, it comprises some modern and even contemporary notions. He favours science, advocates experimentation, and denies augury and astrology. He so fully believes in causality and determinism that he refers to causes even for those effects which have no apparent causes. He elevates the intellect to a plane so sacred that he is driven to its reconciliation with tradition so that philosophy and religion may accord.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

We are content to mention here only the principal old sources and the latest writings concerning al-Farabi.

A. Life


B. Works


C. Philosophy


Miskawaih

Chapter XXIV

MISKAWAIGH

A

LIFE

Abd al-Mu'mammad ibn Ya'qub, surnamed Miskawaih, is also called abu 'Ali al-Khaizin. It is yet undecided whether he was himself Miskawaih or the son of (ibn) Miskawaih. Some like Margoliouth and Bergstrasser accept the first alternative; others, like Brockelmann,1 the second.

Yaquqt says that he was first a Magi (majusi) and was later converted to Islam. But this might be true of his father, for Miskawaih himself, as his name shows, was the son of a Muslim father, Muhammad by name.

He studied history, particularly al-Tabari's "Annals," with abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Kamil al-Qasim (350/960). Ibn al-Khamsar, the famous commentator of Aristotle's, was his master in philosophical disciplines. Miskawaih engaged himself too much in the study of alchemy, together with abu al-Tayib al-Razi, the alchemist. From certain statements of ibn Sina2 and al-Tawhidi,3 it seems that they had a poor opinion of his aptitude for speculative philosophy. Iqbal, on the other hand, regarded him as one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, moralists, and historians of Persia.4

Miskawaih lived for seven years in the company of abu al-Fasli ibn al-Amid as his librarian. After the death of abu al-Fasli (390/970) he served under his son abu al-Fath 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn al-Amid, surnamed Dhul al-Kifayatun. It seems that he also served 'Ashur al-Daulah, one of the Buwayhids, and later some other princes of that famous family.

Miskawaih died on the 9th of Safar 421/February 1030. The date of his birth is uncertain. Margoliouth gives it to be 330/941, but we think it should be 320/932 if not earlier, because he used to be in the company of al-Muhallabi, the vizier, who rose to the office in 339/950 and died in 352/963, by which time he must have been at least nineteen.

B

WORKS

Yaquqt5 gives a list of thirteen books attributed to Miskawaih. These are:

1. *Al-Fawz al-Akmar.*
2. *Al-Fawz al-Aqghar.*

---

1 GUL (S.), I, p. 582, n.i.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Itself. The other beings are generated by this Intellect. Through speculation and contemplation man can commune with the celestial world and attain the utmost happiness. No spiritualism is so closely related to idealism as that of al-Fārābī.

Although al-Fārābī’s doctrine is a reflection of the Middle Ages, it comprises some modern and even contemporary notions. He favours science, advocates experimentation, and denies augury and astrology. He so fully believes in causality and determinism that he refers to causes even for those effects which have no apparent causes. He elevates the intellect to a plane so sacred that he is driven to its conciliation with tradition so that philosophy and religion may accord.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

We are content to mention here only the principal old sources and the latest writings concerning al-Fārābī.

A. Life


B. Works


C. Philosophy


Miskawaih

Chapter XXIV

MISKAWAIH

A

LIFE

Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ya’qūb, surnamed Miskawaih, is also called abu ‘Ali al-Khāzin. It is yet undecided whether he was himself Miskawaih or the son of (ibn) Miskawaih. Some like Margoliouth and Bergstrasser accept the first alternative; others, like Brockelmann, the second.

Yaqūt says that he was first a Maqī (majūs) and was later converted to Islam. But this might be true of his father, for Miskawaih himself, as his name shows, was the son of a Muslim father, Muhammad by name.

He studied history, particularly al-Ṭabarī’s “Annals,” with abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Kāmil al-Qādī (350/960). Ibn al-Khāzmār, the famous commentator of Aristotle’s, was his master in philosophical disciplines. Miskawaih engaged himself too much in the study of alchemy, together with abu al-Tayyib al-Razi, the alchemist. From certain statements of ibn Sīna and al-Tuḥbā, it seems that they had a poor opinion of his aptitude for speculative philosophy. Iṣḥāq, on the other hand, regarded him as one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, moralists, and historians of Persia.

Miskawaih lived for seven years in the company of abu al-Faṣl ibn al-‘Amīd as his librarian. After the death of abu al-Faṣl (390/970) he served under his son abu al-Fath ‘Ali ibn Muhammad ibn al-‘Amīd, surnamed Dhu al-Kifāyatain. It seems that he also served ‘Aṣūd al-Daulah, one of the Buwayhids, and later some other princes of that famous family.

Miskawaih died on the 9th of Shārī’ 241/16th of February 1030. The date of his birth is uncertain. Margoliouth gives it to be 330/941, but we think it should be 320/932 if not earlier, because he used to be in the company of al-Muhallabī, the vizier, who rose to the office in 339/950 and died in 352/963, by which time he must have been at least nineteen.

WORKS

Yaqūt gives a list of thirteen books attributed to Miskawaih. These are:

1. Al-Fauz al-Akhbar.

468

469
3. Tajārb al-Umam (a history from the Deluge down to 369/979).
4. Uns al-Farid (a collection of anecdotes, verses, maxims, and proverbs).
5. Tartib al-Sa‘ādah (on ethics and politics).
6. Al-Mustafā (selected verses).
8. Al-Jām‘.

Of the above works al-Qifti mentions only 1, 2, 3 and 4 and adds the following:


Numbers 2, 3, 13 are now extant and have been published. We also have five others which are not mentioned by Yaqūt and al-Qifti. These are:


Muhammad Bāqir ibn Zain al-‘Ābidīn al-Khawansāri attributes to him also some treatises written in Persian (Raudat al-Jannah, Tehran, 1287/1870, p. 70).

As to the chronological order of his works, we know only from Miskawayh himself that al-Faus al-Abbar was written after al-Faus al-Aqghar, and that Tahdhib al-Akhlaq was written after Tartīb al-Sa‘ādah.7

C MISKAWAHI’S PERSONALITY

Miskawayh was essentially a historian and moralist. He was also a poet. Taubkī blames him for his miserliness and hypocrisy. He indulged in alchemy not for the sake of science, but in search of gold and wealth, and was most servile to his masters. But Yaqūt mentions that in later years he subjected himself to a fifteen-point code of moral conduct.8 Temperance in appetites,

---

* Al-Qifti, loc. cit.
* Al-Faus al-Aqghar, p. 120.

---

D PHILOSOPHY

First Philosophy.—The most important part of Miskawayh’s philosophical activity is dedicated to ethics. He is a moralist in the full sense of the word. Three important books of his on ethics have come down to us: (1) Tartīb al-Sa‘ādah, (2) Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, and (3) Jawādān Khīrād.

Miskawayh’s al-Faus al-Aqghar is a general treatise similar in conception to the earlier part of al-Farābi’s Ārī‘ Ašr al-Madinat al-Fālidh. It is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the proofs of the existence of God, the second with soul and its modes, and the third with prophethood. For his treatment of philosophy, he owes much to al-Farābi, particularly in his effort to conciliate Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. His historical turn of mind has been of benefit to him, for he generally refers precisely to his sources. For instance, at the end of Chapter V of the first part of al-Faus al-Aqghar he expressly acknowledges his indebtedness to Porphyry. He also quotes the commentators of Plato10 and Aristotle.11 His is the best exposé (pp. 53–55) of Plato’s proof concerning the immortality of the soul. He benefits especially from the book of Proclus entitled Kitāb Sharh Qawl Plato‘n fī al-Nafs ‘Chain Maitah.12 The first part of Faus al-Aqghar dealing with the demonstration of the existence of God is clear, terse, and solid. His argument here is that of the First Mover, which was most popular at the time. In that he is thoroughly Aristotelian. The fundamental attributes of God are: unity, eternity, and immateriality. Miskawayh devotes the whole of Chapter VIII to the problem of defining God affirmatively or negatively, and concludes that the negative way is the only possible way. He also shows neo-Platonic tendencies noticeably in Chapter IX. He says that the first existent which emanates from God is the first intelligence which (so says Miskawayh rather strangely) is the same as the active intellect. It is eternal, perfect in existence, and immutable in state, because “emanation is connected with it in a continuous way eternally, the source of emanation being eternal and wholly generous.” It is perfect in comparison with beings inferior to it, imperfect in comparison with God. Then comes the celestial soul, inferior to intelligence; it needs motion as expression of desire for perfection in imitation of intelligence. But it is perfect in relation to

---

7 Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, Egypt, 1329/1911, p. 42.
8 Al-Faus al-Aqghar, p. 120.
9 That is Proclus and Galen; ibid., p. 54.
10 That is Themistius; ibid., p. 42.
11 Ibn al-Nadim, al-Fihrist, Cairo, p. 333.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

natural bodies. The sphere comes into being through the celestial soul. In comparison with the soul, it is imperfect and so needs the motion of which the body is capable, i.e., the motion in space. The sphere has the circular motion which assures it of the eternal existence assigned to it by God. Through the sphere and its parts our bodies come into being. Our being is very weak because of the long chain of intermediaries between God and us. For the same reason it is changeable and not eternal. All classes of beings come to be through God, and it is His emanating being and permeating might which conserve order in the cosmos. If God abandons from this emanation, nothing will come into existence.

As a true religious thinker, Miskawih tries to prove that creation comes ex nihilo. He mentions that Galen said something against this view, but was refuted by Alexander of Aphrodisias in a special treatise. The argument given by Miskawih is as follows: Forms succeed each other, the substratum remaining constant. In this change from one form to another, where do the preceding forms go? The two forms cannot remain together because they are contrary. Secondly, the first form cannot go elsewhere, because motion in place applies only to bodies, and accidents cannot go from one place to another. There remains only one possibility—the possibility that the first form goes into nothing. If it is proved that the first form goes to Non-Being, then the second form comes and so the third, the fourth, and so on from nothing. Therefore, all things are generated from nothing.

Aristotle conceived of the universe as a process of becoming. The “nature” of each thing is a potentiality which moves through a process of development to an actuality which is its final nature. The movement is towards an end imminent from the first in the subject of movement. An altogether different theory appears in the fiftieth “Epistle” of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-Safa), where the process of evolution has been shown to advance from the mineral to the human stage under the guidance of the spiritual urge for return to God. The Brethren of Purity used this theory to determine the status of prophethood. Miskawih goes further and finds in it a stable basis for his moral theory as well. Like Aristotle he does regard happiness (sa‘id) as the chief human good, but unlike him he identifies it in the end with the realization of the vicegerency of God, the place which man occupies in the cosmic evolution by virtue of his specific attribute of rationality.

Miskawih’s theory of evolution is basically the same as that of the Brethren of Purity. It consists of four evolutionary stages: the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and the human. Coral (marjân), date-palm, and ape (qird) mark the transition from the mineral to the vegetable, from the vegetable to the animal, and from the animal to the human kingdom, respectively. The prophet, in the end, completes the circle of Being by imbibing the celestial soul within him.

Psychology.—Miskawih’s psychology is based on the traditional spiritualistic doctrine laid down by Plato and Aristotle, with a predominant Platonic tendency. He treats the subject in al-Fawz al-Aghbar and Takdib al-Akkil. In the first of these works he discusses the problems more thoroughly. But he repeats himself on many points in both the books; in both he has the same arguments, the same examples, and nearly the same words.

Against the materialists he proves the existence of the soul on the ground that there is something in man which admits different and even opposed forms at the same time. This something cannot be material, for matter accepts only one form in a determinate moment.

The soul perceives simple and complex things, present and absent, sensible and intelligible. But does it perceive them through one and the same faculty, or through many faculties? Soul has no parts; divisibility applies only to matter. Does the soul, in spite of being one and indivisible, perceive different things with different faculties and in different ways? In answering this question, Miskawih gives two different solutions: that of Plato, who says that similar perceives similar, and that of Aristotle who says that soul has one faculty that perceives complex material things and simple non-material things, but in different ways. In this connection Miskawih mentions Themistius and his book “On Soul.”

On the question of the immortality of the soul, Miskawih gives at first Aristotle’s doctrine. Then he gives (Chapter VI) three arguments of Plato; referring first to Plato himself, then to Proclus’ “Commentary on Plato’s Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul,” and finally to something that Galen said on this question. Miskawih says that Plato’s doctrine is too long and needs a commentary; therefore, he attempts to summarize it as clearly as possible, with the help of Proclus’ “Commentary.” In this and the following chapters (VII, VIII) he is a thorough Platonist and makes a special mention of Plato’s Laws and Timaeus. Plato says that the essence of the soul is motion, and motion is the core of the soul. Miskawih explains and says: This motion is of two kinds: one towards intelligence, the other towards matter; by the first it is illuminated, by the second it illuminates. But this motion is eternal and non-spatial, and so it is immutable. By the first kind of motion, the soul comes near to intelligence which is the first creation of God; by the second it descends and comes out of itself. Therefore, the soul comes nearer to God by the first motion, and goes farther by the second. The first leads to its salvation, the second to its perdition. Quoting Plato he says that philosophy is an exercise of voluntary death. There are two kinds of life: life according to intelligence, which is “natural life,” and life according to matter, which is

11 \textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, p. 56.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, p. 56.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, p. 56.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, p. 56.


13 Ibn al-Nadim, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 383.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, Part II, Chap. V.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, Part II, Chap. V.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, Part II, Chap. V.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, Part II, Chap. V.

14 Plato, \textit{Plato}, p. 61, 64, 67.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, Part II, Chap. V.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, Part II, Chap. V.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, Part II, Chap. V.\textit{A History of Muslim Philosophy}, Part II, Chap. V.

472

473
voluntary life. The same applies to death; therefore, Plato says. If you die by will, you live by nature. Here “will” is taken in the sense of “passion.”

But Miskawaih at once corrects himself by saying that this voluntary death does not mean renunciation of the world; that would be the attitude of those who know nothing about the objects of this world and ignore that man is civil by nature and cannot live without the help and service of others. Those who preach renunciation are iniquitous, because they want the services of others without rendering any service to them and this is complete injustice. Some pretend that they need very little, but even this very little needs the services of a great number of people. Therefore, it is the duty of every human being to serve others fairly: if he serves them much he can demand much, and if he serves them little, he can ask for little.

This is an important aspect of Miskawaih’s philosophical view, and explains his great interest in ethics.

Moral Philosophy.—Moral philosophy is so connected with psychology that Miskawaih begins his big treatise on ethics Taḥdīb al-Ākhlāq, by stating his doctrine of the soul. Here his exposition is less philosophical but richer in detail.

The point of transition from psychology to ethics is given on pages 18 to 21 where, following Plato, he draws a parallel between the faculties of the soul and the corresponding virtues. The soul has three faculties: rational, courageous, and appetitive, and correspondingly three virtues: wisdom, courage, and temperance. By the harmony of these three virtues, we have a fourth one, namely, justice. The Greek temperament being theoretical and speculative, Plato could go no farther than this. Equipped with a personal code of moral conduct, Miskawaih determined seven species of wisdom, viz., acuteness of intelligence, quickness of intellect, clearness of understanding, facility of acquisition, precision of discrimination, retention, and recollection; eleven species of courage, viz., magnanimity, collectedness, loftiness of purpose, firmness, coolness, stateliness, boldness, endurance, condescension, zeal, and mercy; twelve species of temperance, viz., shame, affability, righteousness, conciliatoriness, continence, patience, contentment, sedateness, piety, regularity, integrity, and liberality (which is further divided into six sub-species); and nineteen species of justice, viz., friendship, union, faithfulness, compassion, brotherhood, recompense, good partnership, fair-dealing, cordiality, submission, resignation, devotion to God, forgetting of enmity, abstention from speaking ill of others, discussing the character of the just, ignoring the account of the unjust, and abstention from trusting the ignoble, the mischief-monger, and the flatterer. We, however, cannot determine exactly whether these sub-divisions and distinctions are all Miskawaih’s own. Surely he benefited himself much from his predecessors, and especially from the school of

Miskawaih

abu Sulaiman al-Sijistānī al-Maṭṭiqī, the echo of whose works we find in Taḥdīb’s Muğābasāt.

So far Miskawaih has been Platonistic, but from page 29 onward he begins to be Aristotelian, and takes virtue as a mean between two vices. He applies this doctrine of the mean to the four cardinal virtues, and with this he ends the first chapter.

In the second chapter, Miskawaih goes on to discuss the question of human nature and its original state: whether it is born good or bad. He states the opinion of the early Greeks who say that nature can never be changed, but rejects it. Then he takes up the view of the Stoics who think that men are created good but become bad by their inclination to bad appetites and by keeping bad company. There is also a third opinion that men are created bad and they become good only by education. Galen rejects the last two views and says that men are of three kinds: some are good by nature, others are bad by nature, and a third class is intermediate between the two. Finally, Miskawaih states the opinion of Aristotle as given in the Nicomachean Ethics, and gives his own view that “the existence of the human substance depends on God’s will, but the amelioration of it is left to man and depends on man’s will” (p. 46).

Perfection attainable by man is of two kinds: the first is theoretical and the second practical. By the first he attains perfect science, by the second perfect character. Human faculties are three; the highest is reason, the lowest is appetite, and between the two lies courage. Man is man by the first. Therefore, perfection belongs especially to the rational soul. In each faculty there are many degrees, which Miskawaih enumerates in detail. Here (pp. 67–78) we find a long chapter on the education of children and youth.

The essential part of Miskawaih’s ethics begins from the third chapter (pp. 90 et seq.). In the first place he follows Aristotle as commented upon by Porphyry. It seems that he depends entirely on the commentary of Porphyry on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics,’ which was translated into Arabic by Iṣḥāq ibn Ḥunain, in twelve books. Unfortunately, this commentary is lost both in Greek and its Arabic translation. But we can gather something of its form from Miskawaih’s Taḥdīb al-Ākhlāq.

Following Aristotle, Miskawaih says (p. 90) that the good is that at which all things aim. This definition, which is supposed to be perhaps that of Eudoxus (c. 25 B.C.), is given in the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics. Miskawaih goes on then to say that what is useful to this end may also be called good, i.e., the means as well as the end can be called good. But happiness or well-being is a relative good—good for an individual person. It is only a kind of good and has no distinctive and autonomous essence.

Miskawaih, like Aristotle, gives a classification of happiness but adds more

26 Republic. Book IV.
28 Taḥdīb al-Ākhlāq, pp. 15–19.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

details, perhaps taken from Porphyry's commentary. This classification comprises (1) health, (2) wealth, (3) fame and honour, (4) success, and (5) good thinking.

After giving Aristotle's doctrine of happiness, Miskawiah states the views of Hippocrates, Pythagoras, Plato, the Stoics, and some physicians who believed that body is a part and not an instrument of man, and so held that happiness of the soul is incomplete if it is not accompanied by happiness of the body.

Miskawiah discusses these different doctrines and concludes by saying that we should reject the doctrine according to which happiness can come only after death and affirm that it is possible also in this world. No happiness is possible except by searching for the good in this world and the world to come. Here he affirms anew his two-fold Asha-kawung. But as a true religious man he gives preference to the next world. In support of this, he refers to the translation by Abu 'Uthman al-Dinaghqi of a treatise called "Virtues of the Soul" attributed to Aristotle. We find this treatise attributed to Aristotle nowhere else. There are two kinds of happiness, one according to this world, the other according to the next, but no one can have the second without passing through the first (p. 111), because, as Aristotle said, divine happiness, notwithstanding being higher and nobler, is yet in need of worldly happiness; otherwise, it would remain hidden.

The fourth chapter deals mainly with justice and explains in detail what is meant by it. Here again he follows the corresponding parts in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.24

In the fifth chapter he goes on to speak about friendship and love. A striking passage in this part is about two kinds of love: (a) love of man for God, and (b) love of disciple for master. The first is too high to be attained by mortal beings, and is reserved only for a few. As to the second kind of love, Miskawiah draws a parallel between the son's love for his parents and the disciple's love for his master, and says that the latter is nobler and more generous, because masters educate our souls and by their guidance we obtain real happiness. The master is a "spiritual father and a human lord; his goodness for the disciple is divine goodness, because he brings him up on virtues, feeds him with high wisdom, and conducts him to everlasting life in eternal blessing" (p. 175).

Friendship, in general, is most sacred and useful to all human beings. He who betrays it is more wicked than a counterfeit of coins. A good man is a friend to himself and other people are also friends to him; he has no enemy except the bad. The happy man is he who gains friends and tries his best to be of use to them. Miskawiah quotes Aristotle saying that man is in need of friends in good as well as in bad circumstances. Even a king is in need of friends because he cannot know his people's needs except through sincere friends, especially because they supply him information and help in execution of his orders. Man should do his best to please his friends and to be always on good terms with them without hypocrisy and flattery.

Miskawiah's treatment of justice ("adl) is largely Aristotelian, although for him this virtue is a shadow of divine unity,27 the true equipoise. The knowledge of the mean or the limit that moderation would set in each particular case is a prerequisite of justice, but, unlike Aristotle, he assigns this function to the divine code rather than to reason or prudence.28 The king as the deputy of God can exercise rational discretion in minor details according to the exigencies of time and place, without violating the spirit of the divine code. Aristotle recognized benevolence vaguely in the imperfect form of liberality which for him meant giving to "proper persons, in right proportion, at right times." With Ibn Miskawiah, it is such an excess over the just award as would eliminate all possibility of under-estimation in justice, provided that its prejudicial effects are confined to the rights of the benevolent person himself only and the recipient himself is a worthy choice for it. Charity, thus, is a form of justice which is safe from disturbance.29 Similarly, love, according to him, is not an extension of self-love, as held by Aristotle, but a limitation of it and love for another. He regards affection (mahabbah) as an inborn capacity for associating with mankind in general, but confines friendship (fadqah) to a few individuals, basing it on the considerations of profit, pleasure, or love as conceived by Aristotle. Love ("ishq) being the excessive desire for pleasure or good—the consideration of profit is alien to love—cannot extend beyond two individuals.30 The object of animal love is pleasure and that of the spiritual love is virtue or goodness. The former is condemnable, the latter praiseworthy. He makes a specific mention of the love of man for God, of disciple for teacher, and of son for his parents in a graded series, as pointed out earlier. Justice, he concludes, is brought about through fear and force, but affection is a natural source of unity, so that justice is not required where affection reigns supreme. Affection, thus, is the sovereign; justice is the vicegerent.

As in al-Fauz al-Aghor, so in Tahâdhîb al-Ahkâm (pp. 195-96) Miskawiah is against all forms of ascetic life, because ascetics "sever themselves from all the moral virtues mentioned above. How can he who retires from men and lives in isolation be temperate, just, generous, or courageous? Is he anything other than something inorganic and dead?"31 Divine happiness is the ultimate goal and the good of man. It belongs to man's divine part. It is pure good, while reason is the first good.

Spiritual Medicine.—The last two chapters of Tahâdhîb al-Ahkâm are devoted to what may be called spiritual medicine, a phrase which we find for the first time as the title of Muhammad ibn Zakarîya al-Râzî's famous book: al-Tibb

24 Ibid. "Courage": Book III A, Chaps. 6-9; "Temperance": Book III, Chaps. 10-12; "Justice": Book V H, I-II; "Wisdom": Book VI.

27 Tahâdhîb al-Ahkâm, p. 93.

28 Ibid., p. 95.


30 Ibid., p. 114.

31 Ibid., p. 198.
al-Rāzī. Miskawih uses the phrase Tibb al-Nuṣūṣ (p. 205), but the resemblance in the general treatment of the subject is obvious. This implies that Miskawih is undoubtedly acquainted with al-Rāzī’s treatise, although he does not mention him by name. The two begin by saying that the mastering of one’s passion is the essential foundation of spiritual hygiene. Both refer to Galen’s book “On Knowing One’s Own Defects.” (This work was translated into Arabic by Thuma and revised by Ḥunain.) But, whereas al-Rāzī contents himself with what Galen says in this respect, Miskawih contents it by saying that there does not exist a friend who can find for you your defects, and that an enemy is more useful in this respect than a friend (p. 200) because he is more aware of your vices and would have no hesitation in revealing them to you. In this connection Miskawih recommends the study of another of Galen’s treatises: “That Good People Benefit from Their Enemies,” which deals with this topic and is also mentioned by al-Rāzī. Thus Miskawih then refers to al-Kindi, who, in effect, said that the man who is in search of virtue should realize that the images of his acquaintances are mirrors in which are reflected the evils arising out of pains and passions.

In the end, Miskawih speaks of remedies for the diseases of the soul. He enumerates the most important diseases—anger, vanity, contentiousness, treason, cowardice, vainglory, fear, and sadness—and deals with their treatment. Some of his chapters correspond with some chapters in al-Rāzī’s Tibb, namely, those on vanity, sadness, and fear of death. He also reproduces some passages from al-Kindi’s treatise “On the Rejection of Sadness” (p. 256).

Why does not Miskawih mention Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Rāzī? It is because al-Rāzī’s conclusions and method of treatment were quite contrary to his own. Al-Kindi, on the other hand, was a kindred spirit. Al-Rāzī was bold, rationalistic, and abstruse, whereas al-Kindi was moderate, pious, and more accessible.

We have all along been showing what Miskawih owes to his Greek predecessors, but we should not forget that Islamic culture also has an important influence on him. In supporting some ideas which he expounds, he very often quotes the Qur’ān, traditions (ahādīth) of the Prophet, sayings of ibn abi Ṭālib and al-Ḥasan al-Baṣri, besides Arabic poetry.

Philosophy of History.—Miskawih is essentially a historian and moralist. His ethics is generic (being based on the place and position of man in the cosmic evolution), religious, and practical in character. He even felt it necessary to reform himself morally before writing his Tahādhib al-Akhlaq. In history, his point of view is philosophical, scientific, and critical. Anticipating the modern outlook, he determines both the function of history and the duties of the historian as follows.

 Bibliography

A. Works

Tahādhib al-Akhlaq wa Taḥbir al-Aʿrāq, Cairo, 1347/1928 (also many previous editions); al-Faṣa al-Aqṣār, Beirut, 1319/1901, Cairo, 1325/1907; Jāwārid Khiday, edited with a long introduction (in which one finds a comprehensive bibliography with indication of manuscripts and sources) and the commentary by Abdurrahman Badawi, Cairo, 1372/1952; Taḥbir al-Umm wa Taḥbir al-Humām, Vols. I, V, VI, ed. Leon Caetani, Gibb Memorial Series, No. 7. The last part was edited by H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margolouth with translation and commentaries, Oxford, 1920, 1921.

B. Studies


22 Ibn al-Nadim, op. cit., p. 504.
25 It was translated into Urdu by Ḥakim Sayyid Zafar Mahdi in 1815.
27 Ibid., p. 272.
29 Ibid., p. xi.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Chapter XXV

IBN SĪNA

In the history of philosophical thought in the Medieval Age, the figure of Ibn Sīna (370/980-428/1617) is, in many respects, unique, while among the Muslim philosophers, it is not only unique but has been paramount right up to modern times. He is the only one among the great philosophers of Islam to build an elaborate and complete system of philosophy—a system which has been dominant in the philosophical tradition of Islam for centuries, in spite of the attacks of al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and others. This ascendancy has been possible, however, not merely because he had a system but because that system had features of remarkable originality displaying a type of genius-like spirit in discovering methods and arguments whereby he sought to reformulate the purely rational and intellectual tradition of Hellenism, to which he was an eminent heir, and, to an extent within the religious system of Islam. The exact terms of this reformulation and their relation to Islam we shall discuss presently in this chapter; it is only to be noted at the outset that it was this kind of originality which rendered him unique not only in Islam but also in the medieval West where the reformulations of the Roman Catholic theology at the hands of Albert the Great, and, especially, of Thomas Aquinas, were fundamentally influenced by him.

Since in this chapter we are mainly concerned with Ibn Sīnā’s interpretation of Greek philosophical doctrines, we need not give an account of his sources in the Greek and Muslim philosophies. To be sure, the elements of his doctrines are Greek, and certain reformulations of Greek doctrines in his writings are also to be found in al-Fārābī (to whom Ibn Sīnā’s debt is immense) in varying degrees of development; but our task here is to state, analyse, and appreciate Ibn Sīnā’s teaching. And, indeed, Ibn Sīnā’s system, taken as a whole, is such that it is his, bearing the unmistakable impress of his personality. This is proved by the fact that he states his cardinal doctrines over and over again in his different works and often gives cross references, which are unmistakable signs of systematic thinking and not of random borrowing from heterogeneous sources.

The most fundamental characteristic of Ibn Sīnā’s thought is that of arriving at definitions by a severely rigorous method of division and distinction of concepts. This lends an extraordinary subtlety to his arguments. It can often give his philosophical reasoning a strongly scholastic complexity and intricacy of structure which can annoy the modern temperaments, but it is doubtless true that it is also this method which has resulted in almost all the original

1 Little can be added to the biography of Ibn Sīnā—a quasi-autobiography—which is available in Arabic works, e.g., al-Qūhī’s and modern works based upon them. Here it is omitted because it is scarcely important for an appreciation of his philosophical thought.

Ibn Sīnā

doctrines of our philosopher. It has enabled him to formulate his most general and basic principle, viz., to every clear and distinct concept there must correspond a distincio in re, a principle on which Descartes also based his thesis of the mind-body dualism. The fecundity and importance of this principle of analysis in Ibn Sīnā’s system are indeed striking: he announces it recurrently and at all levels, in his proof of the mind-body dualism, his doctrine of universals, his theory of essence and existence, etc. Examples of this principle are: “that which is affirmed and admitted is different from that which is not affirmed and admitted,” and “a single conceptual (lit. specific) entity cannot be both known and unknown at the same time except with regard to different aspects.”

This chapter will deal mostly with those concepts and doctrines of Ibn Sīnā which are not only capital and bring out the nature of his system, but have also both been influential and originally elaborated by him to a greater or lesser extent.

A

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING

Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of Being, like those of earlier Muslim philosophers, e.g., al-Fārābī, is essentialist. From God, the Necessary Existent, flows the first intelligence alone, since from a single, absolutely simple entity, only one thing can emanate. But the nature of the first intelligence is no longer absolutely simple, but not being necessary by itself, it is only possible, and its possibility has been actualized by God. Thanks to this dual nature which henceforth pervades the entire creaturely world, the first intelligence gives rise to two entities: (i) the second intelligence by virtue of the higher aspect of its being, actuality, and (ii) the first and highest sphere by virtue of the lower aspect of its being, its natural possibility. This dual emanatory process continues until we reach the lower and tenth intelligence which governs the sublunary world and is called by the majority of the Muslim philosophers the Angel Gabriel. This name is applied to it because it bestows forms upon or “informs” the matter of this world, i.e., both physical matter and the human intellect. Hence it is also called the “Giver of Forms” (the dator formarum of the subsequent medieval Western scholastics). We shall return later to these intelligences and these spheres to examine more closely their nature and operations; meanwhile we must turn to the nature of Being.

The procession of the immaterial intelligence from the Supreme Being by way of emanation was intended to supplement, under the inspiration of the Neo-Platonic Theory of Emanation, the meagre and untenable view of God

1 K. al-Qūhī (Psychological part, henceforth cited as “Psychology”).

2 “Psychology,” V. 7.

480
formulated by Aristotle according to whom there was no passage from God, the One, to the world, the many. According to Muslim philosophers, although God remained in Himself and high above the crested world, there were, nevertheless, intermediary links between the absolute eternity and necessity of God and the world of downright contingency. And this theory, besides, came very close to satisfying the Muslim belief in angels. This is the first occasion to remark how Muslim philosophers, by a re-embalming of the Greek tradition of philosophy, not only sought to build a rational system, but a rational system which sought to integrate the tradition of Islam. But what about the Theory of Emanation itself? Would it not destroy the necessary and all-important gulf between the Creator and the creation and lead to a downright pantheistic world-view—*ut teum Asr*—against which Islam, like all higher religions, had warned so sternly? No doubt, this type of pantheism, being dynamic, is different from the absolutist and static forms of emanation; yet it could lead to anthropomorphism, or, by a reverse process of ascent, to the re-absorption of the creature’s being into the being of God. Now, the guarantee against any such danger shall be Ibn Sina’s doctrine of essence and existence. This celebrated theory again is devised to fulfill equally both religious and rational needs and, once again, to supplement Aristotle.

Early in this section we said that God and God alone is absolutely simple in His being; all other things have a dual nature. Being simple, what God is and the fact that He exists are not two elements in a single being but a single atomic element in a single being. What God is, i.e., His essence, is identical with His existence. This is not the case with any other being, for in no other case is the existence identical with the essence, otherwise whenever, for example, an Edim who has never seen aphant, comes to the sight of one, he would *see facts* know that elephants exist. It follows that God’s existence is necessary, the existence of other things is only possible and derived from God’s, and that the supposition of God’s non-existence involves a contradiction, whereas it is not so with any other existent.4 A cosmological argument, based on Aristotle’s doctrine of the First Cause, would be superfluous in establishing God’s existence. Ibn Sina, however, has not chosen to construct a ‘full-fledged ontological argument. His argument, which, as we shall see later, became the

4 K. I. al-Shafii, Cairo, 1938, p. 234. II. 211-2. It will be seen that the formula of an ontological argument exist in a fairly developed form in this argument. It would then follow that the cosmological argument, based on Aristotle’s doctrine of the First Cause, would be superfluous in establishing God’s existence. Ibn Sina, however, has not chosen to construct a full-fledged ontological argument. His argument, which, as we shall see later, became the

cardinal doctrine of the Roman Catholic dogmatic theology after Aquinas, is more like the Leibnizian proof of God as the ground of the world, i.e., given God, we can understand the existence of the world. Here cause and effect behave like premises and conclusion, i.e., move back from a supposed effect to its cause, we work forward from an inductive premise to a conclusion. Indeed, for Ibn Sina, God creates through a rational necessity. On the basis of this rational necessity, Ibn Sina also explains the divine pre-knowledge of all events, as we shall see in his account of God.
existence. Now, it is not its matter alone without its form or its form alone without its matter which deserves non-existence but the totality (of matter and form).” This is why Ibn Sina substitutes a three-term analysis of the existent material objects instead of the traditional Greek dyadic formula. It must be noted that it is Aristotle’s doctrine which is being developed here. Many scholars have held that Ibn Sina is here following a Neo-Platonic line instead of the Aristotelian one, but, from this point of view, the Neo-Platonic doctrine is the same as that of Aristotle, viz., the dyadic schema of form and matter, except that, according to Plotinus, under the influence of Plato, the forms have a higher ontological status and exist in God’s mind who then proceeds to make them existent in matter. It should also be borne in mind that existence is not a really constituent element of things besides matter and form; it is rather a relation to God: if you view a thing in relation to the divine existentia-identity, it exists, and it exists necessarily and, further, its existence is intelligible, but when out of relation with God, its existence loses its intelligibility and meaning. It is this relational aspect which Ibn Sina designates by the term “accident” and says that existence is an accident.

Ever since the criticism of ibn Sina’s doctrine by ibn Rushd who, among other things, accused ibn Sina of having violated the definition of substance as that which exists by itself, and of Aquinas who, although he adopts the distinction between essence and existence under the direct influence of ibn Sina, nevertheless follows ibn Rushd in his criticism, the unanimous voice of the Western historians of medieval philosophy has been to the effect that existence, according to ibn Sina, is just an accident among other accidents, e.g., round, black, etc. We have said that ibn Sina regards existence as an accident with relation to objects (as distinguished from essence) he just means by it a relation to God; it is, therefore, not an ordinary accident. Further, if existence were an accident, one could think it away and still go on talking of the object just as one can do in the case of other accidents and, indeed, in that case ibn Sina would have been forced to hold something like the Chinese view held by many Muslim Mutakallimins that non-existent must also “exist” in some peculiar sense of that word. But this is the very doctrine which ibn Sina ridicules. The whole discussion on this point can be found in the article referred to in note No. 5 of this chapter. Here we give only one passage where our philosopher criticizes the view of those who hold that a non-existent “thing” must, nevertheless, “exist” in some sense so that we can talk about it. He says (K. al-Shif/i, “Met.”, 1, 5). “Those people who entertain the opinion hold that among those things which we can know (i.e., be acquainted with) and talk about, are things to which, in the realm of non-being, non-existence belongs as an attribute. He who wants to know about this should further consult the nonsense which they have talked and which does not merit consideration.” Indeed, according to ibn Sina, the ideas of existence and unity are the primary ideas with which we must start. These undervived concepts are the bases of our application of other categories and attributes to things and, therefore, they defy definition since definition must involve other terms and concepts which are themselves derived (Ibid., 1, 6).

It will be seen that this problem now is not a metaphysical one but has to do with logic. Ibn Sina has attempted to give his own answer to the question: How is it possible that we can talk of non-existent and what do these latter mean? His answer is that we can do so because we give to these objects “some sort of existence in the mind.” But, surely, our individual images cannot constitute the meanings of these entities for the obvious reason that when we talk, e.g., of a space-ship, it must have an objective meaning. It is, nevertheless, true that ibn Sina has seen the basic difficulty of the logic of existence. And our modern logic itself, despite its superior techniques and some valuable distinctions, seems nowhere nearer the solution. It has tried hard to contend that whenever I talk of a space-ship, although non-existent, I am not talking of a “thing,” of an individual object, but only of a generic object or a conglomeration of properties. But is this really so? Is it absurd to say that the “individual space-ship I am talking of now has this and this property”? Besides, the crux is the phrase “conglomeration or set of properties” — what is it to which they belong and of which I profess to be talking?

Besides this meaning of “accident” as a peculiar and unique relation of an existent to God, the term “accident” in ibn Sina has another unorthodox philosophic meaning. This concerns the relationship of a concrete existent to its essence or specific form, which ibn Sina also calls accidental. This use of the term “accident” is quite pervasive in ibn Sina’s philosophy and, without knowing its correct significance, one would be necessarily led to misinterpret some of his basic doctrines. Now, wherever two concepts are clearly distinguishable from each other, they must refer to two different ontological entities, as we said above, and, further, whenever two such concepts come together in a thing, ibn Sina describes their mutual relationship as being accidental, i.e., they happen to come together, although each must be found to exist separately. This is the case, for example, between essence and existence, between universality and essence. According to ibn Sina, essences exist in God’s mind (and in the mind of the active intelligence) prior to the individual existents exemplifying them in the external world and they also exist in our minds posterior to those individual existents. But these two levels of the existence of an essence are very different. And they differ not only in the sense that the one is creative, and the other initiatory. In its true being, the essence is neither universal nor particular, but it is just an essence. Hence he holds (K. al-Shif/i, “Inagoge to Logic,” Cairo, 1952, pp. 60-69; also ibid., “Met.”, V, 1) that both particularity and universality are “accidents” which happen or occur to the essence. Universality occurs to it in our minds only, and ibn Sina takes a strictly functional view of the universals: our mind abstracts universals or general concepts whereby it is enabled to treat the world of infinite diversity in a summary and scientific
manner by relating an identical mental construction to a number of objects. In the external world the essence does not exist except in a kind of metaphorical sense, i.e., in the sense in which a number of objects allow themselves to be treated as being identical. Existents in the external world are the individual concrete objects, no two of which are exactly the same. He says, "It is impossible that a single essence should exist identically in many" ("Met." V, 2), and again, "It (i.e. absolute manness) is not the manness of 'Amr; it is different from it, thanks to the particular circumstances. These particular circumstances have a role in the individual person of Zaid... and also a role in the 'man' or 'manness' insomuch as it is related to him" ("Met." V, 1). It is clear especially from this last statement that the "essence" virtually undergoes a change in each individual. That is why we must say that if we regard essence as a universal, that concrete determinate existence is something over and above the essence; it is something added to the essence, or it is an "accident" of the essence. Two things must be specially noted here. First, that existence is something added not to the external objects—this would be absurd—but to the essence. This is because everything whether it exists or not—indeed whether it is existable or not—in fact every concept is "something" of which assertions can be made, whether positive or negative. Indeed, even non-existence is "something," since one can talk about it. But a positive individual existence is more than just "something." (This distinction between "something" and an existent, treated by Ibn Sina ["Met." I, 5] which has confusely returned in present-day logic, was originally made by the Stoics [see, e.g., Statius, "Veterum Fragmenta," Vo. II, p. 117].) Hence ibn Sina says that when existence is attributed to essences, this existence is equivalent to "is something" and, therefore, such statements are not "profitable." But statements about essences are informative and profitable, since they add to the essence something that is new. Secondly, we must note that although ibn Sina speaks in several places of matter as the principle of multiplicity of forms or essences, he never says that matter is the principle of individual existence. The sole principle of individual existence is God—the Giver of existence; matter is the occasional cause of existence, supplying external attributes of multiplicity. We have given a considerable number of quotations from ibn Sina in the treatment of this problem not only because it is of capital importance for ibn Sina's philosophy, but also because there has been such a great deal of fundamental confusion in the traditional treatment of the subject that a clarification of the terms "existence," "accident" in this relation, and "essence" is absolutely necessary.

**B**

THE BODY-MIND RELATIONSHIP

With Aristotle, ibn Sina stresses the intimate connection of mind and body; but whereas Aristotle's whole trend of thought rejects a two-substance view, ibn Sina holds a form of radical dualism. How far these two aspects of his doctrine are mutually compatible is a different question: ibn Sina certainly did not carry his dualism through to develop a parallelistic, occasionalistic account of mind-body relationship. His remarks, nevertheless, on either side are both interesting and profound. We shall first state his arguments for the two-substance view and then discuss their close inter-connection. To prove that the human soul is a substance capable of existing independently of the body, our philosopher employs two different arguments. One appeals to direct self-consciousness, the other seeks to prove the immateriality of the intellect. We can postpone his teaching on the intellect till we discuss his theory of knowledge; here we shall state and discuss his first argument. Indeed, according to him, this is the more direct way of proving the incorporeal substantiality of the soul acting not as an argument but as an eye-opener (K. al-Shajî, "Psychology," V, 7).

The argument is stated by ibn Sina in the first chapter of the psychological book of the Kalila wa-Dimna and then re-stated and discussed in the last but one chapter of the same book. Let us suppose, as he says, that a person is created in an adult state, but in such a condition that he is born in a void where his body cannot touch anything and where he cannot perceive anything of the external world. Let us also suppose that he cannot see his own body and that the organs of his body are prevented from touching one another, so that he has no sense-perception whatsoever. Such a person will not affirm anything of the external world or even the existence of his own body but will, nevertheless, affirm the existence of his self as a purely spiritual entity. Now, that which is affirmed is certainly not the same as that which is not affirmed. The mind is, therefore, a substance independent of the body. Our philosopher is here describing an imaginary case impossible of realization, but his real point, as of Descartes, is that we can think away our bodies and so doubt their existence, but we cannot think away our minds. The affinity of ibn Sina's argument with that of Descartes' cogito ergo sum has been justly pointed out by historians of philosophy. Actually, this whole trend of thought is inspired by the argument of Plotinus for the separateness of the mind from the body. But there is an important difference between ibn Sina's and Descartes' formulations. With regard to Descartes, the question can be and has been raised: Is the existence of the self a matter of inference or an immediate datum of consciousness? Whatever the answer to this question may be, there is no doubt that consciousness or "I think" is constituted and

\* A similar development took place in the West, beginning with Augustine, and, again, under Neo-Platonic influences.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

necessarily involved in Descartes' "I am." This is so much so that "I think" and "I am" have the same meaning in Descartes. This being the position, it is obvious that in this case the consciousness of the self and its existence cannot be logically disengaged from each other. Ibn Sina, however, although the element of consciousness is present since one can "affirm one's own existence," it is nevertheless present only as a way of locating the self: it is a contingent fact and not a logical necessity. In fact, Ibn Sina presents a medial position between Descartes and Plotinus, for, according to the latter, consciousness, being a relation, signifies not utter self-identity but a kind of otherness; in complete self-identity, consciousness must cease altogether.

This argument, which seeks to establish dualism by doubting or denying the existence of the body, may be called the argument from abstraction in that it abstracts psychological functions from the total functions of the organism. Its fundamental weakness obviously is to insist that by thinking away the body, the body ceases to play a role in one's total consciousness. This problem could be solved by a simple inspection of the self in this manner, nothing would be easier. Ibn Sina seems to be aware that the position is liable to objections. He says ("Psychology," V, 7): "If my self were identical with any bodily member (say, the heart or the brain or a collection of such members) and if it were their separate or total being of which I were conscious as being my self, then it would be necessary that my consciousness of my self should be my very consciousness of those members, for it is not possible that the same thing should be both cognized and unrecognized in the same sense." He then goes on to say that "in fact I do not know by self-consciousness that I have a heart and a brain but I do so either by sense-perception (experience) or on authority." "I mean by what I know to be my self that which I mean when I say: 'I perceived, I intellect, I acted,' and all these attributes belong to me." But, Ibn Sina passes to consider the possible objection: if you are not aware of your self being a bodily member, you are neither directly aware that it is your soul or mind.

Ibn Sina's answer to this objection is: "Whenever I present bodily attributes to this something which is the source of my mental functions, I find that it cannot accept these attributes," and thus this incorporeal entity must be the soul. Here we clearly see that the argument has taken a new turn and the phenomenon of direct consciousness is being supplemented by a further consideration to the effect that the disparateness between the mental and physical qualities is such that both cannot belong to one substance. And this is the perennial argument for the two-substance theory, viz., that the mental and the physical attributes are of qualitatively disparate gender.

Ibn Sina

From the acceptance of the view, that the mind is a substance, the conclusion that the mind is a unity follows tautologically and Ibn Sina lays great stress on it. Indeed, once again, both doctrines, viz., the reality of faculties and the unitary nature of the soul, are stated with equal emphasis by him. The reality of mental faculties was established by Aristotle but was further pursued by his commentators, notably Alexander of Aphrodisias. Ibn Sina has devoted a special chapter to the question ("Psychology," I, 4) where he bases the multiplicity of faculties on the qualitative differences among mental operations. Nevertheless, he repeatedly stresses the necessity of an integrative bond (rebab) for the diverse operations. Indeed, he declares that even the vegetative and perceptual functions in man, for example, are specifically different from those in plants and animals, thanks to the rationality present in man which pervades and changes the character of all his functions. This integrative principle is the mind itself.

The soul in its real being is then an independent substance and is our transcendental self. We shall return to its transcendence when we discuss Ibn Sina's theory of knowledge in the next section. Here we shall note only that Ibn Sina's arguments for the immortality of the soul are based on the view that it is a substance and that it is not a form of the body to which it is attached intimately by some kind of mystical relation between the two. There is in the soul which emerges from the separate substance of the active intelligence simultaneously with the emergence of a body with a definite temperament, a definite inclination to attach itself to this body, to care for it, and direct it to the mutual benefit. Further, the soul, as being incorporeal, is a simple substance and this ensures for its indestructibility and survival, after its origination, even when its body is destroyed.

But if at the transcendental level the soul is a pure spiritual entity and

---

\footnote{An interesting question may be raised here about the unity of the mind. We have seen that the qualitative disparateness between the mental and physical phenomena has necessitated their attribution to different substances. This argument has been re-stated with great vigour in recent times by G. F. Stout who in his Mind and Matter lays down the "Principle of Generic Resemblance" for acts and operations if they are to fall in a single substance. C. D. Broad has rejected this doctrine in his Mind and Its Place in Nature on the ground that no criterion can be laid down as to how great a qualitative difference there should be to warrant us to assign phenomena to different substances. However, Broad himself favours a "Compound Theory" of mind and body, thus implicitly giving force to the same principle of qualitative resemblance and difference which he seeks to refute. For, why else should there be the necessity for a "Compound?"?}

Yet, if we accept the full consequences of the principle, what, we may ask, constitutes the resemblance between mental acts so as to attribute them to one substance? For, hoping, desiring, thinking are so mutually divergent phenomena. According to the modern traditional philosophy, coincidences may be a common quality satisfying the principle and, indeed, it has been regarded as the stuff of which mental phenomena are made. If we hold this, it will follow that unconscious desires, fears, and hopes are non-mental.

---

488

489
body does not enter into its definition even as a relational concept, at the
phenomenal level the body must be included in its definition as a building
enters into the definition of a (definite) builder. That is why Ibn Sina says
that the study of the phenomenal aspect of the soul is in the field of natural
science, while its transcendental being belongs to the study of metaphysics.
Now, since at the phenomenal level there exists between each soul and body
a mystique which renders them exclusively appropriate for each other—
whether we understand this mystique or not—it follows that the transmission
of souls is impossible. (Transmigration is rejected by Aristotle who does not
hold the two-substance view.) Indeed, this mystique is both the cause and the
effect of the individuality of the self. Ibn Sina, therefore, totally rejects
the idea of the possible identity of two souls or of the ego becoming fused with
the Divine Ego, and he emphasizes that the survival must be individual. It
is a primary fact of experience that each individual is conscious of his self-
identity which cannot be shaken by any kind of argument. Indeed, our philo-
sopher is so keen to affirm the individuality of personality that he says ("Psy-
thology," V, 5) that even the qualitative in the intellectual operations in
different individuals may be different—a statement which would have
shocked not only the Platonists and Neo-Platonists, but even perhaps Aristotle,
since, according to the universal Greek doctrine, the intellect represents, at
least, the qualitative identity of mankind, a doctrine which was later pushed
to its logical extremes by ibn Rusdi.

The relationship, then, between soul and body is so close that it may affect
the intellect. It goes without saying that all the other psycho-physical
acts and states have both aspects—mental and physical. This was emphasized
by Aristotle himself. But Aristotle’s doctrine, even if it is not outright material-
ist, is quasi-materialistic and, whereas it either emphasizes the double aspect
of each state or operation, or tends strongly to point out the influence of the
body on the mental phenomena, exactly the reverse is the case with Ibn Sina.
Indeed, his insistent stress on the influence of the mind on the body constitutes
an outstanding and one of the most original features of his philosophy. Whereas
in Aristotle, life and mind give a new dimension to the material organism, in
Ibn Sina, under the inspiration of the Neo-Platonic thought and the influence of
his own metaphysically spiritual predictions, this no longer remains a mere dimension. The material side of nature is both pervaded and over-
shadowed by its mental and spiritual side, even though, as a medical man, he
keen to preserve the importance of the physical constitution, especially in
the case of the character of the emotions and impulses. Indeed, as we shall
see, his medical art helped him to gauge the extent of mental influence on
apparently bodily states.

At the most common level, the influence of the mind on the body is visible
in voluntary movement: whenever the mind wills to move the body, the body
obeys. In his detailed account of animal motion, Ibn Sina has enumerated
four stages instead of Aristotle’s three. The three stages according to Aristotle

Ibn Sina

are: (1) imagination or reason, (2) desire, and (3) movement of the muscles.
Ibn Sina has split up the second into (1) desire and (2) impulsion (insin) for,
he says, not every desire can move to action but only when it is
impulsive, whether consciously or unconsciously. The second, and more
important difference between Ibn Sina and the traditional view is that according
to the latter the initiation of bodily movement must always lie in a cognitive
state, whether it is imagination or reason. Ibn Sina holds that, while in most
cases the cognitive act precedes the affective and the conative ones, this
is not true of all cases. We read ("Psychology," IV, 4): “All (the appetitive
and conative) faculties also follow imaginative faculties. . . . But sometimes
it happens, e.g., in cases of physical pain, that our natural impulse tries to
remove the cause of pain and thus initiates the process of stirring up imagi-
 nation. In this case, it is these (appetitive) faculties which drive the imagination
to their own purpose, just as, in most cases, it is the imaginative faculty
which drives the (appetitive and conative) faculties towards the object of
imagination.” Thus, according to Ibn Sina, the initiation of the animal motion
can lie in the affections as well as in the cognitive states. Psychologically
this is of great significance and marks an advance over the purely and one-
 sidedly intellectual accounts of traditional philosophy.

Here we reach the second level of the influence of the mind on the body,
viz., that of emotions and will of the will. Ibn Sina tells us from his medical
experience that actually physically sick men, through sheer will-power, can
become well and, equally, healthy men can become really ill under the influ-
ence of sickness-obsession. Similarly, he says, if a plank of wood is put
across a well-trodden path, one can walk on it quite well, but if it is put as
a bridge and down below is a chasm, one can hardly creep over it without
an actual fall. “This is because he pictures to himself a (possible) fall so
vividly that the natural power of his limbs accords with it.” ("Psychology;"
IV, 4). Indeed, strong emotions like fear can actually destroy the temperament
of the organism and result in death, through influencing the vegetative func-
tions: “This happens when a judgment takes place in the soul; the judgment,
being pure belief, does not influence the body, but rather when this belief is
followed by joy or grief” ("Psychology," I, 3). Joy and grief too are mental
states, ibn Sina goes on, but they affect the vegetative functions. Again,"We
do not regard it as impossible that something should occur to the soul,
in so far as it is embodied, and be then followed by affections peculiar to the
body itself. Imagination, inasmuch as it is knowledge, is not in itself a physical
affection, but it may happen that, as a result, certain bodily organs, sexual
for example, should expand. . . . Indeed, when an idea becomes firmly estab-
lished in the imagination, it necessitates a change in the temperament.”
(1bid., IV, 4). Just as, we are told, the ideas of health present in the doctor’s
mind produce actual health in a patient, so the soul acts on the body; only
the doctor produces cure through media and instruments, but the soul does
it without any instruments.

490
A History of Muslim Philosophy

If, indeed, the soul were strong enough, it could produce cute and illness even in another body without instruments. And here Ibn Sina produces evidence from the phenomena of hypnotism and suggestion (al-wulm al-dīnūlā). He uses these considerations in order to show the possibility of miracles which are a part of the discussion of the question of prophethood. Here we will recall what we said before that, according to Ibn Sina, a soul becomes exclusively attached to one body. Our newer consideration shows that it can transcend its own body to affect others. This would become possible only when the soul becomes akin to the universal soul, as it were.

It is on these grounds that Ibn Sina accepts the reality of such phenomena as the "evil eye" and magic in general. We may note that the influence of the emotions on the body was known and discussed in later Hellenism. Especially since the Stoic conception of the principle of "Sympathy" in nature and Ptolemy's elaboration of that principle, the mind-body interaction was explained on these lines. What is scientifically new in Ibn Sina is that he also explains phenomena like magic, suggestion, and hypnotism, and, in general, the influence of one mind on other bodies and minds on these lines, i.e., by referring them to the properties of the influencing mind. In Hellenism, these phenomena were accepted, but were regarded as exceptionally occult. And in the mystery-mongering superstition of later Hellenism, "Sympathy" was given an occult twist. Magical properties were assigned to special objects: metals, animals, etc., through which the magician or the hypnotizer worked or pretended to work on the gods or spirits to intervene in the realm of nature and to produce occult effects. But the only principle which Ibn Sina will accept—and here he strikes a very modern note—is to refer efficacy to the special constitution of the mind itself. This rests on the premise that it is of the nature of mind to influence matter and that it belongs to matter to obey the mind, and Ibn Sina will have no therapeutic magic: "This is because the soul is derived from certain (higher) principles which clothe matter with forms contained in them, such that these forms actually constitute matter... If these principles can bestow upon matter forms constitutive of natural species... it is not improbable that they can also bestow qualities, without there being any need of physical contact, action, or affection... The form existing in the soul is the cause of what occurs in matter" ("Psychology," IV, 4). The reason for this great change is that in later Hellenism the human soul had lost its dignity and people relied more and more for the explanation of the "para-natural" phenomena on the intervention of the gods.

C

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

In accordance with the universal Greek tradition, Ibn Sina describes all knowledge as some sort of abstraction on the part of the cognizant of the form of the thing known. His chief emphasis, elaborated most probably by himself, is on the degrees of this abstracting power in different cognitive faculties. Thus, sense-perception needs the very presence of matter for its cognitive act; imagination is free from the presence of actual matter but cannot cognize without material attachments and accidents which give to the image its particularity, whereas in intellect alone the pure form is cognized in its universality. It is very probable too that Ibn Sina elaborated this theory "of the grades of abstraction" to avoid the objection to which Aristotle's doctrine of cognition (according to which all cognition is the abstraction of form "without its matter") was liable, viz., if perception is the knowledge of form alone, how do we know that this form exists in matter? Or, indeed, how do we know that matter exists at all?

Ibn Sina's position on perception is generally that of native realism, like that of Aristotle and his commentators, holding a representational view of perception. But under criticism from scepticism and realism which point out the relativity of perceived qualities, this representational view becomes seriously modified and Ibn Sina finally accepts a quasi-causal or, rather, relational view of perceptual qualities, i.e., objects, which have certain real qualities in themselves, appear as such and such under such-and-such circumstances and from such-and-such a position. This is responsible for several subjective statements in Ibn Sina, who comes to distinguish between "primary" and "secondary" perceptions: the "primary" perception being subjective or of the state of the perceiver's own mind, the "secondary" perception being that of the external world. He did not clearly see, as we moderns do, the basic difficulties in this position. But his conception reappears in Western medieval philosophy as the distinction between the psychological or "intentional" object and the real object, a distinction which was much later developed by Locke into that of primary and secondary perceptual qualities.

But the great key-stone of Ibn Sina's doctrine of perception is his distinction between internal and external perception. The external perception is the operation of the external five senses. Ibn Sina also divides the internal perception formally into five faculties, although he shows a great deal of hesitation on the subject (see "Psychology," IV, 1). His chief aim is to separate the different functions or operations on a qualitative basis, and, of course, we once again remember his principle that to every clear idea there must correspond a distinction in reality. Indeed, his doctrine of the internal senses has no precedent in the history of philosophy. The first internal sense is sense compound, which is the seat of all the senses. It integrates sense-data into percepts. This general sense must be internal because none of the external five senses is capable of this function. The second internal sense is the imaginative faculty in so far as it conserves the perceptual images. The third faculty is again imagination in so far as it acts upon these images, by combination and separation. In man this faculty is pervaded by reason so that human imagination can deliberate and is, therefore, the seat of the practical intellect. The fourth and the most important internal faculty is called will which passed into
the West as six categories: it perceives immaterial motions like usefulness and harmfulness, love and hate in material objects, and, in fact, the basis of our character, whether influenced or uninfluenced by reason. The fifth internal sense conserves in memory those notions which are called by him "intentions" (maʿāliṭa).

The doctrine of ṣuwām is the most original element in Ibn Sīnā's psychological teaching and comes very close to what some modern psychologists have described as the "nervous response" of the subject to a given object. In Aristotle, this function is performed by imagination or perception itself, but Ibn Sīnā contends that perception and imagination tell us only about the perceptual qualities of a thing, its size, colour, shape, etc.; they tell us nothing about its character or "meaning" for us, which must be read or discerned by an internal faculty of the organism. In the Stoics, again, we have the perceptual-moral theory of the orisōs or "appropriation," according to which whatever is perceived by the external senses is interpreted internally by the soul as the bearer of certain values. But the Stoics, in this doctrine, were primarily concerned with the development of moral prophecy in man. Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of ṣuwām, on the other hand, despite its moral significance, is primarily a purely psychological doctrine, explaining our instinctive and emotional response to the environment.

This "nervous response" operates at different levels. At one level it is purely instinctive as when a sheep perceives a wolf for the first time and flees from it, or as the mother instinctively feels love for her baby. This occurs without previous experience and hence through some kind of "natural inspiration" ingrained in the constitution of the organism. Second, it is another level, a "quasi-empirical" level ("Psychology," IV, 3). This occurs through association of ideas or images of memory. A dog which has suffered pain in the past from being beaten by a stick or a stone, associates the image of the object and the "intention" of pain and, when it sees the object again, at once runs away. This phenomenon of direct association can also become indirect and irrational. This happens in the case of animals and also in the case of less reasonable human beings. Some people who have irrationally associated the yellow colour of honey with both the colour and the bitter taste of gall, do not eat honey and in fact at its sight exhibit symptoms of gall-like taste. This principle of association appeared later in Leibniz (Monadology, translated by R. Latta, p. 232); and the principle of irrational or automatic association has appeared more thoroughly worked out in recent experimental psychology under the name of the "conditioned reflex." Since unxes makes perceptual predictions on the basis of association of ideas, for which, says Ibn Sīnā, there are innumerable causes (cosignerity, similarity, etc.), its perceptual judgments may sometimes be false. Aristotle had noticed this failure of perception but could not explain it since he did not discern the influence of past experience on present perceptual judgments.

We come next to the doctrine of the intellect which Ibn Sīnā has elaborated in great detail. He has taken over in his doctrine the theory of the development of the human intellect announced by Aristotle very briefly and rather obscurely and then elaborated by Alexander of Aphrodisias and later by Fāṭrī. But he has added quite new and original interpretations of his own. The doctrine, in brief, distinguishes between a potential intellect in man as an active intellect outside man, through the influence and guidance of which the former develops and matures. Basically, the problem is that of the origin of human cognition and it is explained on the assumption of a supra-human transcendent intellect which, when the human intellect is ready, bestows knowledge upon it.

As against Alexander, al-Fāṭrī, and probably Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā holds that the potential intellect in man is an indivisible, immaterial, and indestructible substance although it is generated at a definite time in man and as something personal to each individual. This has important religious consequences, for, whereas, according to al-Fāṭrī only men of developed intellect survive and perish for ever at death, Ibn Sīnā holds the immortality of all human souls (According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, even the actualized intellect is possible so that no soul is immortal). The immateriality of the intellect is proved by Ibn Sīnā in an unprecedented, elaborate, and scholastic manner, the basic idea being that ideas or "forms," being indivisible, cannot be said to be localized in any material organ.

But it is in his account of the intellectual operation and the manner of the acquisition of knowledge that the most original aspect of his doctrine of intellects lies. Whereas, according to the Peripatetic doctrine, accepted by Fāṭrī, the universal, which is the object of the intuitive act, is abstracted from the particulars of sense-experience, for Ibn Sīnā it is directly the active intellect. The Peripatetic tradition has given the following account of the rise of the universal from perceptual experience: First, we perceive several similar individuals; these are stored up in memory and after a constant operation the light of the active intellect "shines" upon them that the essential nature common to all the particulars emerges from the this theory is neither nominalistic nor realist: it does say that the universe is more than what the instances of experience have given to the mind, it holds that the universal lies somehow in these instances. For Ibn Sīnā, the universal cannot emerge from the instances of sense because it does not lie the further, as we have seen already, the essence, according to Ibn Sīnā, is really a universal: it only behaves as such when it is in our minds. Besides, amount of particular instances would actually suffice to produce the universe essence which is applicable to infinite instances. He, therefore, declares that the task of our minds is to "consider" and reflect upon the particulars of sense experience. This activity prepares the mind for the reception of the (universal essence from the active intellect by an act of direct intuition. The perception of the universal form, then, is a unique movement of the intellective so not reducible to our perceiving the particulars either singly or totally a
A History of Muslim Philosophy

finding the common essence among them, for if so, it would be only a spurious kind of universal.

There is, besides, another vital consideration which leads to this view. The perception of the individual instances and the notting of their resemblance (which latter, indeed, itself presupposes the possession of the universal by the mind) were sufficient to cause the universal, then acquisition of knowledge would become mechanical and this mechanism would operate necessarily.

It is, however, in fact not true that cognition can be so mechanically and deterministically produced. The origin of knowledge is mysterious and involves intuition at every stage. Of all intellectual knowledge, more or less, it is not so much true to say “I know it” as to admit “It occurs to me.” All seeking for knowledge, according to Ibn Sina (even the emergence of the conclusion from the premises), has this prayer-like quality: the effort is necessary on the part of man; the response is the act of God or the active intellect. We are, indeed, often not aware as to what it is we want to know, let alone go ahead and “know it.” A theory of knowledge which fails to notice this fundamental truth is not only wrong but blasphemous.

All ideas or forms then come from outside. The precise sense of the “outside” we shall try to work out in the next section. But in the meantime we should notice certain other important characteristics of our knowledge. The first is that it is piecemeal and discursive, not total; it is also mostly “receptive” in the sense noted just above. In our normal consciousness we are not fully aware of the whence and whence of our cognition. True, there are people who are receptive in the ordinary sense of the word in that they do not discover either anything, or make that is new and original; they only learn for the most part; while there are others who discover new things. But even those latter are only “receptive” in the sense that, not being fully conscious of the whence and whither of their knowledge—not aware of the total context of reality—

they do not know the full meaning of their discoveries. This is because, in the common run of thinkers ideas come and go in succession and therefore, their grasp of reality is not total. Hence Ibn Sina rejects the general and especially later Greek doctrine of the absolute identity of subject and object in intellectual operation, for, he argues, in the case of normal consciousness, there being a succession of ideas, if the mind became identical with one object, how could it then become identical with another? In this connection he rebukes Porphyry for his “mytical and poetical statements.” Why he should single out the pupil of Plotinus, is not quite clear, for the doctrine is both Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic, although there, it must be admitted, moderate representatives like Alexander of Aphrodisias just as there are extremists champions of the doctrine like most Neo-Platonists.

Ideas in this detailed, discrete, and discursive form of knowledge, as we have said, come into the mind and go out of it. Ibn Sina is insistent that when an idea is not actually being used in intellection, it does not remain in the mind, or, in other words, there is, properly speaking, no intellectual memory as there is a memory of sensible images. There is nothing in the mind which can conserve intelligibles just as there is a conservatory in the soul for small flowers, and which are subject to a memory of universal propositions, for in the former case there is a reference to the particular flower itself. In Aristotle himself had indicated this doctrine in his De Memoria et Reminiscentia,

where he says that universals are remembered only per accidens. The order of thinking mind, says Ibn Sina, is like a mirror upon which there appears a succession of ideas reflected from the active intellect. This does not unlike a truth once acquired, because it “goes out of the mind,” has to be learnt all over again when it is remembered. By our initial acquisition acquire a skill to contact the active intellect and in remembering we use that skill or power. Resuming the analogy of the mirror, Ibn Sina says that, before acquisition of knowledge, the mirror was dusty; when we re-touch the mirror is polished, and it only remains to direct it to the sun (i.e., active intellect) so that it should readily reflect light.

Even so is the ordinary philosophic (or mystic) consciousness: it is no partial (in varying degrees) even when it is original and creative (again varying degrees) and it is, therefore, obviously not in total contact with reality, or, as Ibn Sina puts it, “is not one with the active intellect.”

even in our ordinary cognitive processes, there are serious pointers to existence of a type of consciousness in which this partiality and discursiveness may be overcome and which may be wholly creative, with the pulse of the total reality in its grasp. These pointers are illustrated by Ibn Sina by the example of a man who is confronted suddenly with a questioner who asks him a question which he has never asked himself before and, therefore, to which he ear give a detailed answer on the spot. He is sure, however, that he can answer it because the answer has just “occurred” to him and lies within him. He then proceeds to the details and formulates the answer. “The strange thing says Ibn Sina, ‘that when this man begins to teach the questioner the ans to his question, he is simultaneously teaching himself as well’ the details and elaborated form of knowledge even though he previously possessed knowledge in a simple manner. This simple, total insight is the creator of the detailed, discursive knowledge which ensues. Now, this simple, total insight (the scientic simplex of the medieval Latin scholastics comes from Ibn Sina) is the creative reason (or the active intellect); the formulated and elaborated form is the ‘psychic’ knowledge, not the absolutely intellectual cognition. A person possessed of this simple creative agency, if such a one exists, will be said to be one with the active intellect; and since he possesses a grasp of reality, he is sure, absolutely sure, of the whence and whither of knowledge (Ibn Sina puts a great emphasis on this self-confidence, certain conviction, or faith); he alone is aware of the total context of truth:

496

Ibn Sina
D

DOCTRINE OF PROPHETCY

The necessity of the phenomenon of prophethood and of divine revelation is something which Ibn Sina has sought to establish at four levels: the intellectual, the "imaginative," the miraculous, and the socio-political. The totality of the four levels gives us a clear indication of the religious motivation, character, and direction of his thinking. Indeed, from our description and partial interpretation of his central philosophical themes so far, his deeply religious spirit has emerged very clearly. His theory of "Being" has led to the dependence of every finite being, on God; and his doctrines of mind-body relations and of the genesis and nature of knowledge have both culminated in the religious conception of miracles in the one case, and of a creative revelatory knowledge in the other. And there is not the slightest suggestion that religiosity is something artificially grafted upon his purely rational thinking; on the contrary, it has organically grown out of a rigorous process of rationalisation, and goes down to the very kernel of his thought.

It may be said that Ibn Sina is a citizen of two intellectual-spiritual worlds; the Hellenic and the Islamic. In his own mind he has so intrinsically unified the two worlds that they are identical; the question of disloyalty to either, therefore, does not arise for him at all. Under this circumstance, both traditional Islam and the heritage of Hellenism were inevitably interpreted and modified to a greater or lesser extent. This is apparent in the whole of his philosophy which enters into the technically religious field, but is most palpably so in his doctrine of prophecy. In this doctrine, Ibn Sina drastically modifies the Muslim dogmatic theology by declaring that the Qur'anic revelation is, by and large, not all symbolic of truth, not the literal truth, but that it must remain the literal truth for the masses (this does not mean that the Qur'an is not the Word of God; indeed, as we shall see, it is in a sense literally the Word of God); further, that the Law, although it must be observed by everyone, is also partly symbolic and partly pedagogical and, therefore, an essentially lower discipline than philosophic pursuits. (This again does not mean that we can dispense with the Law at any stage of our individual or collective development, for to be social belongs to the essence of man.) The interpretation and modification of Hellenism in this doctrine is obvious.

Although most elements of the Muslim philosophic doctrine of prophethood exist in Hellenism, they nevertheless exist in a nebulous and sometimes in a crude form; further, they are scattered. Indeed, the Greeks had no conception of prophethood and prophetic revelation as the Muslims knew it. In fact, the Muslim conception of prophethood is new and unique in the history of religion. For the Muslim philosophers (especially ibn Sina, for although al-Farabi had pioneered the way, we do not find all the elements in him, notably, the intellectual and the miraculous), to have evolved out of these nebulous, crude, and disjointed elements an elaborate, comprehensive, and refined theory of prophecy to interpret the personalty of Muhammad, is nothing short of the performance of a genius. At the intellectual level, the necessity of the prophetic revelation is proved by an argument elaborated on the basis of a remark of Aristotle (Met. Post. I, Chap. 34) that some people can hit upon the middle term without forming a syllogism in their minds. Ibn Sina constructs a whole theory of total intuitive experience on the basis of this scanty remark. Since, he tells us, people differ vastly with regard to their intuitive powers both in quality and quantity, and while some men are almost devoid of it, others possess it in a high degree, there must be a rarely and exceptionally endowed man who has a total contact with reality. This man, without much instruction from outside, can, by his very nature, become the depository of the truth, in contrast with the common run of thinkers who may have an intuitive experience with regard to a definite question or questions but whose cognitive touch with reality is always partial, never total. This comprehensive insight then translates itself into propositions about the nature of reality and about future history; it is simultaneously intellectual and moral-spiritual, hence the prophetic experience must satisfy both the philosophic and the moral criteria. It is on the basis of this creative insight that the true prophet creates new moral values and influences future history. A psychologico-moral concomitant of this insight is also the deep and unalterable self-assurance and faith of the prophet in his own capacity for true knowledge and accurate moral judgment: he must believe in himself so that he can make others believe in him and thus succeed in his mission to the world.

This insight, creative of knowledge and values, is termed by ibn Sina the active intellect and identified with the angel of revelation. Now, the prophet as prophet is identical with the active intellect; and so far as this identity is concerned, the active intellect is called 'al-wasit al-ma'jud (the acquired intellect). But the prophet as human being is not identical with the active intellect. The giver of revelation is thus in one sense internal to the prophet, in another sense, i.e., in so far as the latter is a human being, external to him. Hence ibn Sina says that the prophet, in so far as he is human, is "accidentally," not essentially, the active intellect (for the meaning of the term "accidental,"
A History of Muslim Philosophy

see the first section of this chapter). God can and, indeed, must come to man so that the latter may develop and evolve, but the meaning of God can at no stage be entirely exhausted in man.

But although the intellectual-spiritual insight is the highest gift the prophet possesses, he cannot creatively act in history merely on the strength of that insight. His office requires inherently that he should go forth to humanity with a message, influence them, and should actually succeed in his mission. This criterion leads the Muslim philosophers, although they admit the diviness of the leading Greek thinkers and reformers, to fix their Minds upon Moses, Jesus, and, above all, Muhammad who, undoubtedly, possesses the requisite qualities of a prophet to the highest degree. These requisite qualities are that the prophet must possess a very strong and vivid imagination, that his psychic power be so great that he should influence not only other minds but also matter in general, and that he be capable of launching a socio-political system.

By the quality of an exceptionally strong imagination, the prophet’s mind, by an impelling psychological necessity, transforms the purely empirical facts and truths and concepts into lifelike images and symbols so potent that one who hears or reads them not only comes to believe in them but is impelled to act. This symbolizing and vivifying function of the prophetic imagination is stressed both by al-Fârâbî and ibn Sina, by the latter in greater detail. It is of the nature of imagination to symbolize and give flesh and blood to our thoughts, our desires, and even our physiological inclinations. When we are hungry or thirsty, our imagination puts before us lively images of food and drink. Even when we have no actual personal appetite but our physical condition is ready for this, imagination may come into play and by stirring up suitable vivid images may actually evoke this appetite by mere suggestion. This symbolization and suggestiveness, when it works upon the spirit and the intellect of the prophet, results in so strong and vivid images that what the prophet’s spirit thinks and conceives, he actually comes to hear and see. That is why he “sees” the Angel and “hears” his voice. That is why also he necessarily comes to talk of a paradise and a hell which represent the purely spiritual states of bliss and torment. The revelations contained in the religious Scriptures are, for the most part, of the figurative order and must, therefore, be interpreted in order to elicit the higher, underlying, spiritual truth.

It is the technical revelation, then, which impels people to action and to be good, and not the purely intellectual insight and inspiration. No religion, therefore, can be based on pure intellect. However, the technical revelation, in order to obtain the necessary quality of potency, also inevitably suffers from the fact that it does not present the naked truth but truth in the garb of symbols. But to what action does it impel? Unless the prophet can press his moral insight into definite enough moral purposes, principles, and indeed into a socio-political structure, neither his insight nor the potency of his imaginative revelation will be of much use. The prophet, therefore, needs to be a

Ibn Sina

Lawgiver and a statesman par excellence—indeed the real Lawgiver and statesman is only a prophet. This practical criterion throws into still bolder relief the personality of Muhammad in the philosopher’s mind. The Law (Sharî’ah) must be such that it should be effective in making people socially good, should remind them of God at every step, and should also serve for them as a pedagogic measure in order to open their eyes beyond its own exterior, so that they may attain to a vision of the true spiritual purpose of the Lawgiver. The Law is not abrogated at any stage for anybody, but only the philosophic vision of the truth given to the Law its real meaning; and when that vision is attained, the Law seems like a ladder which one has climbed but which it would still be-wise to dismount. For those relatively unfortunate souls which cannot see through the Law its philosophic truth, the technical revelation and the letter of the Law must remain the literal truth.

E

GOD AND THE WORLD

We have learnt in the first section that God is unique in that He is the Necessary Being; everything else is contingent in itself and depends for its existence upon God. The Necessary Being must be numerically one. Even within this Being there can be no multiplicity of attributes—in fact, God has no other essence, no other attributes than the fact that He exists, and exists necessarily. This is expressed by ibn Sina by saying that God’s essence is identical with His necessary existence. Since God has no essence, He is absolutely simple and cannot be defined. But if He is without essence and attributes, how can He be related to the world in any way? For Aristotle, who held this conception of the Deity, the world presented itself as a veritable other—it was neither the object of God’s creation, nor of care, not even of knowledge. His God led a blissful life of eternal self-contemplation and the world organized itself into a cosmos out of love and admiration for Him, to become like Him.

The Muslim philosophical tradition finds the solution under the influence of the Neo-Platonic example which combines God’s absolute simplicity with the idea that, in knowing Himself, God also knows in an implicit, simple manner the essences of things. The system is worked out and systematized by ibn Sina, who strives to derive God’s attributes of knowledge, creation, power, will, etc., from His simple unchanging being, or, rather, to show that these attributes are nothing but the fact of His existence. This is done by an attempt to show that all the attributes are either relational or negative; they are, thus, identical with God’s being and with one another. The Deity is, therefore, absolutely simple. That God is knowing, is shown by the fact that being pure from matter and pure spirit, He is pure intellect in which the subject and object are identical.

But God’s self-knowledge is ipso facto knowledge of other things as well, since, knowing Himself, He also inevitably knows the rest of the existents which proceed from Him. Here ibn Sina strikes an original note. According

500
to the philosophical tradition of Hellenism, God, at best, can know only the
essences (or universals) and not the particular existents, since these latter
can be known only through sense-perception and, therefore, in time; but God,
being supra-temporal and changeless and, further, incorporeal, cannot have
perceptual knowledge. This doctrine of the philosophers was especially re-
pugnant to Islam, for it not only made God’s knowledge imperfect, but it
made God Himself useless for those whose God He is to be. Ibn Sina devises
an argument to show that although God cannot have perceptual knowledge,
He nevertheless knows all particulars “in a universal way,” so that perceptual
knowledge is superfluous for Him. Since God is the emanative cause of all
existents, He knows both these existents and the relations subsisting between
them. God knows, for example, that after such a series of even a solar
eclipse would occur, and knowing all the antecedents and consequences of
this eclipse, He knows in a determinate manner its qualities and properties;
He knows, therefore, what this particular eclipse will be, and can differentiate
it completely from all other events even of the same species, viz., eclipse in
general. But when the particular eclipse actually occurs in time, God, not
being subject to temporal change, cannot know it. But He also need not
know it in this way, for He knows it already (see K. al-Najāt, Caire, 1938,
pp. 247–49). Very ingenious though this theory is and, we think, successful
in showing that sense-perception is not the only way to know the particulars,
it is obvious that it cannot avoid the introduction of time factor, and, there-
fore, change in divine knowledge. Al-Ghazālī’s criticism of the theory in the
thirteenth discussion of his Tahāfut al-Falāsiḥah certainly finds the target at
this point, although his view that according to Ibn Sina God cannot know
individual men but only man in general, is obviously mistaken, if God
can know a particular sun-eclipse, why can He not know, in this manner, an
individual person! Indeed Ibn Sina declares in the Qur’ānic language (op. cit.,
p. 247) that “not a particle remains hidden from God in the heavens or on
the earth.”

As regards God’s attributes of volition and creation, Ibn Sina’s emanationist
account renders them really pointless as al-Ghazālī has shown. In a thoroughly
intellectualist-emanationist account of the Deity, will has no meaning. For
Ibn Sina, God’s will means nothing but the necessary procession of the world
from Him and His self-satisfaction through this. Indeed, He defines it in purely
negative terms, viz., that God is not unwilling that the world proceed from
Him; this is very different from the positive attributes of choice and the
execution of that choice.

Similarly, the creative activity of God, for Ibn Sina, means the eternal
emanation or procession of the world, and since this emanation is grounded
finally in the intellectual nature of God, it has the character of inalterable
rational necessity. Even though al-Ghazālī’s criticism which annihilates the
divine activity of Ibn Sina to the automatic procession of light from the sun
and, thus, rejects the appellation of “act” to God’s behaviour, is not quite

Ibn Sina
correct (since according to Ibn Sina, God is not only conscious of the pro-
cession of the world from Him, but is also satisfied with and “willing” to it),
the term “creation” is nevertheless used only in a Pickwickian sense, and the
term “act” (in the sense of voluntary action) is also seriously modified, since
as we have said, there is no question of real choice. Rationally determined
activity is, of course, compatible with will and choice and can also be said to
be done with choice, but this choice has to be brought in as an additions
in the philosophical account of God there is just no room for this additions
factor either at the end or at the beginning.

The world, then, exists eternally with God, for both matter and form
flow eternally from Him. But although this concept was abhorrent to Islam,
therefore, Ibn Sina’s purpose in introducing it was to try to do justice both
to the demands of religion and of reason and to avoid atheistic materialism.
For the materialists, the world has existed eternally without God. For Ibn
Sina, too, the world is an eternal existent, but since it is in itself contingent
in its entirety it needs God and is dependent upon Him eternally. We see the
double purpose of the doctrine of essence and existence. Unlike atheism
it requires God who should bestow being upon existence; and in order to avoid
pantheism, it further requires that the being of God should be radically dis-
connected from the being of the world.

The chief criu of the eternity of the world, which has been stressed by his
opponents of the doctrine throughout the history of thought, is that it involves
an actual infinite series in the past. In answer, it has been said, ever since
Kant, that it is not impossible at all to imagine an infinite in the past, just as
it is not impossible to imagine it in the future, i.e., there is no absurdity
involved in starting from any given moment backwards and traversing the
past and at no point coming to the beginning of the past. The falsity of this
answer consists in assimilating the past to the future, for the past is somethin
actual in the sense that it has happened and is, therefore, determinate on
and for all. But the same falsity, we think, is implied in the objection itself
and it seems that the application of the term “infinite” is inappropriately use
for the past: the term “infinite” is used either for a series which is endless
which is both beginningless and endless. According to the thesis, the series
is beginningless in the past, and endless in the future, whereas the objection
seeks to put an end to the series at a given moment of time and then argue
for an infinity in the past. Also, whereas beginning is a temporal concept
beginninglessness is a negation and need not be a temporal concept, but if
definition obviously implies “infinity in the past” as a temporal concept.
The influence of Ibn Sina’s thought has been enormous. In the East, indeed, his system has dominated the Muslim philosophical tradition right down to the modern era when his place is being given to some modern Western thinkers by those who have been educated in modern universities. In the madrasas run on traditional lines, Ibn Sina is still studied as the greatest philosopher of Islam. This is because no subsequent philosopher of equal originality and acuteness produced a system after him. Ibn Rushd, the last great philosophical name in the medieval tradition of Muslim philosophy, did not formulate his thought systematically, but chose to write commentaries on Aristotle’s works. These commentaries, because of their superb scholarliness and acuteness, had a tremendous impact on the medieval West (which received Aristotle first through him) but were not only not influential in the Muslim East, but most of them are even lost in the original Arabic. His comparative lack of influence, of course, is chiefly due to the destruction of his works. For the subsequent philosophical activity was confined to the writing of commentaries on Ibn Sina or polemics against him. Rare exceptions, like Şerif al-Dîn al-Shîrînî, who wrote works on systematic philosophy, became less philosophical and more mystical in their intellectual, if not spiritual, temper. Nevertheless, these commentaries and polemics against and for Ibn Sina and later systems have never yet been studied to any appreciable extent by modern students.

Now, let us determine more exactly the influence of Ibn Sina within the Islamic tradition. To say that he has dominated the philosophical tradition in Islam is certainly not to say that he has dominated the Islamic tradition itself. On the contrary, the influence of Ibn Sina—which is equivalent to the influence of philosophy—within Islam suddenly and sharply dwindled after the polemics of al-Ghazâlî and later on of al-Bâqî and then declined and became moribund. He continued to be read in the madrasas merely as an intellectual training ground for theological students, not to philosophize anew but to refute or reject philosophy. The chief contributory factors to this situation were the formal rigidity of dogmatic theology and the fact that human reason itself became suspect due to the incompatibility of certain tenets of Ibn Sina with this theology (besides, of course, social, political, educational, and economic causes). Not only did the philosopher’s concept of the eternity of the world give affront to orthodoxy but also to those doctrines of his own which were developed with an especial regard for Islam, like the doctrine of prophet-hood. But perhaps the greatest theological objection was to his rejection of the bodily resurrection. On this point, although he maintains in the K. al-Najât (and the Shîrînî) that the resurrection of the flesh, while not demonstrable by reason, ought to be believed on faith; in his expressly esoteric work called Rasil al-Ashârî ‘alâ Ôlîya, he rejects it in totality and with vehemence.

Ibn Sina’s works were translated into Latin in Spain in the middle of the
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Government and the Arab League set up a Committee in Cairo to edit the encyclopaedia, *Kitāb al-Shāfi‘i*. Some parts of it have already been published.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter XXVI

IBN BĀJJAH

Abu Bakr Muhammād ibn Yahya al-Sʿalīgh, known as ibn Bājjah or Averpace (d. 333/1148), hailed from the family al-Tujjīb and is, therefore, also known as al-Tujjībī. Ibn Bājjah was born in Saragossa towards the end of the fifth/eleventh century, and prospered there. We have no knowledge of his early life, nor have we any idea of the teachers under whom he completed his studies. However, this much is clear that he finished his academic career at Saragossa, for when he travelled to Granada he was already an accomplished scholar of Arabic language and literature and claimed to be well versed in twelve sciences. This is evident from the incident that occurred in the mosque of Granada as recorded by al-Suyūtī: 'One day ibn Bājjah entered the mosque (jāmi‘ah) of Granada. He saw a grammarian giving lessons on grammar to the students sitting around him. Seeing a stranger so close to them, the young students addressed ibn Bājjah, rather by way of mockery: 'What does the jurist carry? What science has he excelled in, and what views does he hold?' 'Look here,' replied ibn Bājjah, 'I am carrying twelve thousand dinār under my armpit.' He thereupon showed them twelve valuable pearls of exquisite beauty each of the value of one thousand dinār. 'I have,' added ibn Bājjah, 'gathered experience in twelve sciences, and mostly in the science of Ḥarakat which you are discussing. In my opinion you belong to such and such a group.' He then mentioned their lineage. The young students in their utter surprise begged his forgiveness."

Historians are unanimous in regarding him as a man of vast knowledge and eminence in various sciences. Fath ibn Khāqān, who has charged ibn Bājjah of heresy and has bitterly criticized his character in his *Qādī‘id al-‘Iṣyān,*5 also admits his vast knowledge and finds no fault with his intellectual excellence. On account of his wealth of information in literature, grammar, and ancient philosophy, he has been compared by his contemporaries with al-Shaikh al-Ra‘īs ibn Sīna.6

Due to his growing fame, Abu Bakr Shahrāwī, Governor of Saragossa, appointed him as his vizier. But when Saragossa fell into the hands of Alphonso I, King of Aragon, in 512/1118, ibn Bājjah had already left the city and reached Seville via Valencia, settled there, and adopted the profession of a medical practitioner. Later on, he left for Granada, where occurred the incident referred to above. He then journeyed to north-west Africa.

On his arrival at Shāṭibah, ibn Bājjah was imprisoned by Amr ibn Isḥāq Ibrahim ibn Yūsuf ibn Tāṣḥīfīn most probably on the charge of heresy, as Fath ibn Khāqān has it. But as Renan opines, he was set free, probably on the recommendation of his own disciple, father of the famous Spanish philosopher ibn Ruḥd.

Later on, when ibn Bājjah reached Fez, he entered the Court of the Governor, Abu Bakr Yahya ibn Yūsuf ibn Tāṣḥīfīn, and rose to the rank of a vizier by dint of his ability and rare scholarship. He held this post for twenty years. This was the time of great troubles and turmoil in the history of Spain and north-west Africa. The governors of towns and cities proclaimed their independence. Lawlessness and chaos prevailed all over the country. The rival groups and personalities accused one another of heresy to gain supremacy and to win the favour of the people. The enemies of ibn Bājjah had already declared him a heretic and tried several times to kill him. But all their efforts proved a failure. Ibn Zuhr, the famous physician of the time, who, succeeded in killing him by poison during Ramaḍān 333/1138 at Fez, where he was buried by the side of ibn al-ʿArabi the younger.

A

HIS PREDECESSORS

There is no doubt that philosophy entered Spain after the third/ninth century. Some of the oldest manuscript copies of *Rassul Ikhwān al-Ṣafā* available in Europe are ascribed to Maslama in ibn Ahmad al-Majritī.7 Maslama was a great mathematician in Spain. He flourished during the reign of Hākam II and died in 598/1003.8 Among his disciples, ibn al-Ṣafā, Zahrāwī, Karmānī, and abu Muslim 'Umar ibn Ahmad ibn Khālidūn al-Ḥaṭṭārī were famous for mathematical sciences. Karmānī and ibn Khālidūn were also known as philo-

---

1 *Bughājah*, Egypt, 1326 A. H.
2 Egyptian ed., p. 300.
3 *Bughājah*, p. 207.
4 *Averroës et l’averroïsme*, pp. 32, 163.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Ibn Khaldūn al-Ḥațrāmi hailed from Seville and died in 449/1054. He was a prolific scholar whose full name is abu al-Ḥakam ‘Amr ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Ahmad ibn ‘Ali, hailed from Cordova, journeyed to the Eastern countries and studied medicine and arithmetic at Harrān. On his return to Spain he settled at Saragossa. According to the statement of Qāḍī Shā’id and Maqṣūr, he was the first man who took the Rasūl Iḥkān al-Ṣafā to Spain. Karāmnī died at Saragossa in 450/1060.

But philosophy had entered Spain long before the Rasūl Iḥkān al-Ṣafā were introduced in that region. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdūn al-Jābili travelled to the East in 437/952, studied logic with abu Sulaym Muḥammad ibn Tāhīr ibn Bahrām al-Sijistānī, and returned to Spain in 380/991. Similarly, ‘Abd al-‘Umr, the two sons of Yūnus al-Barrānī, entered Baghdad in 330/943, studied sciences with Thābit ibn Sīnān ibn Thābit ibn Qurrah, and after a considerable period returned to Spain in 351/960. This is evident that philosophy was imported to the West from the East and that in the fourth/tenth century Spanish students studied mathematics, Harith, Taṣfīr, and Fiqh as well as logic and other philosophical sciences at Baghdad, Baṣra, Damascus, and Egypt. But from the end of the fourth/tenth century, when philosophy and logic were condemned in Spain, the advocates of these sciences were persecuted, the common people stopped favouring these sciences as far down as the fifth and sixth/eleventh and twelfth centuries. This was the reason why ibn Bājjah, ibn Tūfayl, and ibn Rāghl had to face persecution, imprisonment, and condemnation. Very few people in those days dared deal with rational sciences.

Among the predecessors of ibn Bājjah, ibn Ḥazm deserves special attention. Ibn Ḥazm occupies a very high place in theology and other religious sciences. His Kitāb al-Faṣl fi al-Mīlāl wa-al-Nihāl is unique in that he has recorded the creeds and doctrines of the Christians, Jews, and others without displaying any prejudice. But in the domain of philosophy he has never been mentioned by any Spanish scholar side by side with the philosophers. Maqṣūrī records: “Ibn Ḥabīb and others say, ibn Ḥazm was a man of Harith, jurisprudence, and polemics. He wrote many books on logic and philosophy in which he did not escape errors.”

B HIS CONTEMPORARIES

For throwing light on the contemporary thinkers of ibn Bājjah we have no earlier authority than his own disciple ibn al-Imām, through whom we have received information about his writings. Al-Wāzir abu al-Ḥasan ‘Ali ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn al-Imām, a devoted disciple of ibn Bājjah, preserved the latter’s writings in an anthology to which he added an introduction of his own. That ibn Bājjah was very fond of this disciple, a vizier, is apparent from the preamble of his letters addressed to him which are available in the said anthology as preserved in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. In his introduction to the anthology, ibn al-Imām says: “...the philosophical books were current in Spanish cities in the time of al-Ḥakam II (390/991–406/978), who had imported the rare works composed in the East and had got them made clear. He (ibn Bājjah) transcribed the books of the ancients and others and carried on his investigation into these works. The way had not been opened to any investigator before him (ibn Bājjah). Nor had anything except errors and alterations been recorded concerning these sciences of the ancients. A number of errors for example, were committed by ibn Ḥazm, who was one of the most exalted investigators of his time, while most of them had not ventured even to record their thoughts. Ibn Bājjah was superior to ibn Ḥazm in investigation, and more penetrating in making distinctions. The ways of investigation in these sciences were opened only to this scholar (ibn Bājjah) and to Malik ibn Wuḥaib of Seville, both of whom were contemporaries. But except for a short account of the principles of logic nothing was recorded by Malik. Then he gave up investigating these sciences and speaking about them openly, because of the attempts made on his life due to his discussing philosophical sciences, and due to the fact that he aimed at victory in all his conferences on scientific subjects. He turned to the religious sciences and became one of the leaders in them; but the light of philosophical knowledge did not shine upon his mind, nor did he record in philosophy anything of a private nature which could be found after his death. As for abu Bakr (may Allah show him mercy) his superior nature stirred him not to give up investigating into, inferring from, and reading all that had left its real impression on his mind on various occasions in the changing conditions of his time.”

The words of ibn al-Imām are quite clearly appreciative of the merits of the contemporary Malik, and of predecessors like ibn Ḥazm. Ibn al-Imām’s praise of his teacher has been shared by a number of historians. Ibn Tūfayl, the famous author of the well-known philosophical romance, Ḥasy ibn Yaqṭān, and a younger contemporary of ibn Bājjah, singles out ibn Bājjah in the introduction to his immortal romance, and describes him as follows: “But none of them possessed a more penetrative mind, a more accurate view, or a more truthful insight than abu Bakr ibn al-Ṣa’īgh.”

Al-Ṣaqaqandī (d. 629/1231), in his famous letter in which he enumerates the achievements of the Spanish Muslims as against the Africans, challenges the latter by saying: “Have you anybody among yourselves like ibn Bājjah in music and philosophy?” Maqṣūrī records the following statement: “As for

---

7 Ibid., p. 41.
8 Ibid., p. 40.
11 Ibid., p. 42.
13 E. Poecoces 206, Foll. 128a–213a.
the works on music, the book of ibn Bajjah of Granada is sufficient by itself. He occupies in the West the place of abu Nasr al-Farabi in the East." 

Another contemporary of ibn Bajjah was al-Amir al-Muqtadir ibn Hūd, who reigned over Saragossa (438/1046-474/1081). He has been mentioned by al-Shaqqandi, who addresses the Africans in these words: "Have you any king expert in mathematics and philosophy like al-Muqtadir ibn Hūd, the ruler of Saragossa?" His son al-Mu'tamin (d. 474/1085) was a patron of rational sciences.

C

WORKS

We give below a list of ibn Bajjah's works:

1. The Bodleian MS., Arabic Pococke, No. 206, contains 222 folios. It was written in Rabii' II 547/1152 at Qus. This MS. lacks the treatise on medicine, and Riaḍat al-Wadā'...

2. The Berlin MS. No. 6060 (vide Ahlwardt: Catalogue), lost during World War II.

3. The Escorial MS. No. 612. It contains only those treatises which ibn Bajjah wrote as commentaries on the treatises of al-Farabi on logic. It was written at Seville in 667/1307.

4. The Khedivial MS. Akhḍar No. 290. It has been published by Dr. Omar Farrukh in his Ibn Bajjah w-al-Farajah al-Maghribiyah. On comparison it has been established that this is an abridgment of Ta'dīr al-Mutawaḥhad—abridgment in the sense that it omits the greater part of the text but retains the very words of the original writer.

5. Brockeimann states that the Berlin Library possesses a unique ode of ibn Bajjah entitled Tardisyyah.


7. Works edited by Dr. M. Saghir Hasan al-Mas'umi: (i) Kūṭab al-Naṣṣ with notes and introduction in Arabic, Majalla al-Majma' al-'Ilm...

Ibn Bajjah


D

PHILOSOPHY

Ibn Bajjah was skilled both in the theory and practice of the mathematical sciences, particularly astronomy and music, adept in medicine, and devoted to speculative studies like logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. In de Boer's opinion, he conforms entirely to al-Farabi in his logical writings and generally agrees with him even in his physical and metaphysical doctrines. Let us examine how far this statement is correct in the light of the writings of ibn Bajjah that have come down to us.

Ibn Bajjah has undoubtedly relied in philosophy and logic on the works of al-Farabi, but it is obvious that he has made considerable additions to them. Again, he has adopted an entirely different method of philosophical investigation. Unlike al-Farabi, he deals with the problems on the basis of reason alone. He admires the philosophy of Aristotle on which he has founded his own system. But, he says, for understanding the speculative method of Aristotle it is of utmost importance to understand, first of all, his philosophy correctly. That is why ibn Bajjah wrote his commentaries on the works of Aristotle. These commentaries bear clear evidence that he studied the texts of Aristotle very carefully. As in Aristotle's philosophy, ibn Bajjah has based his metaphysics and psychology on physics, and that is why his writings abound in discourses on physics.

E

MATTER AND FORM

De Boer writes: "Ibn Bajjah starts with the assumption that matter cannot exist without some form, while form may exist by itself, without matter." But this is erroneous. According to ibn Bajjah, matter can exist without form. He argues that if matter is not formless then it will be divided into "matter" and "form," and this will go on ad infinitum. Ibn Bajjah claims that the "First Form" is an abstract form which exists in matter that is said to have no form.

Footnotes:

16 The History of Philosophy in Islam, p. 117.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Aristotle defines matter as what receives form and is in a way universal. His matter in this sense differs from the matter of Plato who, though agreeing with the above definition, maintains that form in itself is real and needs nothing to bring it into existence. The aim of Aristotle is not only to state that matter and form are dependent upon each other but also to distinguish the particular form of a species from that of another species. The form of a plant is different, for example, from the form of an animal, and the form of an inanimate object differs from the form of a plant, and so on.

In the writings of Ibn Bajjah the word form has been used to convey several different meanings: soul, figure, power, meaning, concept. In his opinion the form of a body has three stages: (1) the general spirit or the intellectual form, (2) the particular spiritual form, and (3) the physical form.

He has divided the spiritual form into the following types:

1. The forms of circular bodies have only this much connection with matter that they make the material intelligibles perfect.
2. The material intelligibles which exist in matter.
3. Those forms which exist in the faculties of the soul—common sense, imaginative faculty, memory, etc., and are the via media between spiritual forms and material intelligibles.

Those forms which are related to the active intellect are called by Ibn Bajjah general spiritual forms, and those which are related to the common sense are called particular spiritual forms. This distinction has been maintained because the general spiritual forms have only one relation and that with the recipient, whereas the particular-spiritual forms have two relations—one particular with the sensible, and the other general with the peripatetic. A man, for example, recalls the form of the Taj Mahal; this form is not different from the form of the actual Taj Mahal when it is before the eyes—this form has, besides the aforementioned particular relation, a relation with the general body of perceivers, since there are many individuals who enjoy the sight of the Taj Mahal.

F

PSYCHOLOGY

Ibn Bajjah, like Aristotle, bases his psychology on physics. He begins his discussion of the soul with its definition by stating that bodies, natural or artificial, are composed of matter and form, their form being the permanent acquisition or the entelechy of the body. Entelechy is of various kinds: it belongs either to those existents that perform their function without being essentially moved, or to those that move or act while they are being acted upon. A body of this latter type is composed of both mover and moved, whereas the artificial body has its mover outside. Now, the form that supplies the entelechy of a natural body is called the soul. The soul is, therefore, defined as the first entelechy in a natural, organized body which is either nutritive, sensitive, or imaginative.

The ancient philosophers who preceded Aristotle had confined their study to the human soul alone and regarded the study of the animal soul as a part of natural science. Soul is an equivocal term, because it is not homogeneous in nature. If it were so, its functions would have likewise been homogeneous. It actually functions heterogeneously: nutritively, sensitively, imaginatively, or rationally.

Since every transitory being has to perform a particular function in virtue of which it stands as a part of the universe, the nutritive faculty has two ends, namely, growth and reproduction. This faculty does not only provide substances which are needed for the upkeep of the body, but also a surplus which is employed for the growth and development of the body. But when the growth is completed, the surplus is used for reproduction in those bodies that are reproductive.

The faculty of reproduction is to be distinguished from the nutritive faculty which acts on food and makes it a part of the body. This faculty is the "Actual Intellect" which changes a potential species into the body of an actual species. Those bodies that are not reproductive depend for the preservation of their species upon spontaneous generation. The reproductive faculty is the end of the faculty of growth and perishes only in old age when the nutritive faculty is left alone.

Sensory perception is either actual or potential. What is potential can become actual only when it is changed by something else. It, therefore, requires a mover to change it. This mover is the sensible, the moved being the sense-organ.

The sensibles or the natural accidents are of two kinds: either they are particular to the natural bodies or common to the natural and the artificial bodies; and they are, again, either mover or moved. They are always moved towards the species, since a mover causes motion in them only in so far as they are particular species, and not because they possess matter. Every sentient body is composite and is the result of a mixture of different elements. This mixture is produced by innate heat and gives rise, for example, to condensation and rarefaction, as of odours, flavours, and colours. But besides these material states, there arise certain other states such as reproduction and spontaneous generation which are caused by the intellect or some other mover.

As soon as the process of mixture begins, the form begins to be received. Motion and reception of form take place simultaneously; and when the soul attains perfection, the reception of form is completed, matter and form, thus, becoming a single whole. When form is separated from matter, it exists actually as abstracted from matter, but is not the same as it is when it is in matter—and this is possible only if it now exists as an idea in the mind. Sensation is, therefore, transitory. But how can a separate form be transitory, since transitoriness is only due to matter? The answer is this. The term "matter" is
A History of Muslim Philosophy

used for "psychical faculty" and "corporeal faculty" equivocally, and it means only the receptivity of form through which a body that has the faculty of sensitivity becomes sentient. The faculty of sense-perception is, therefore, a capacity in the sense-organ that becomes a form of the thing perceived.

But a further question arises: If perception is a form in matter, how can matter actually exist when it is not so informed? The answer is given as follows: "That 'apprehensions' are in a substratum and are identical with it, is clear, or else 'an apprehension' would not be a particular. But it does not follow from this that form cannot exist apart from matter since the matter of 'apprehension' is the receptivity of the forms of the apprehendibles only, and is called mater per pririus, while the matter of the 'apprehendible' is called per posterius."

Psychical perception is of two kinds: sensation and imagination. As said before, sensation is by nature prior to imagination, for which it supplies the matter. In short, sensation is a capacity of the body which is acted upon by the sensible. Since movements are many, sensations are also many; and because the sensibles are either general or particular, sensations are also genera or particular.

The five senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch—are five faculties of a single sense, viz., the common sense. Common sense plays the role of matter through which the forms of things become perceptible. It is through common sense that a man judges and distinguishes different states of the perceptible and realizes that every particle of an apple, for example, possesses taste, smell, colour, warmth, or cold. For this faculty preserves the impressions of the sensibles which enable the senses to apprehend the sensibles. The common sense is the entelechy of the whole body and is, therefore, called the soul. This faculty also supplies matter for the faculty of imagination.

Defined as the first entelechy of the organized imaginative body, the imaginative faculty is preceded by sensation which supplies material to it. Sensation and imagination have, therefore, been described as two kinds of the perceptior of the soul. But the difference between the two is obvious inasmuch as sensation is particular and imagination general. The imaginative faculty culminates in the reasoning faculty through which one man expresses himself to another, and achieves as well as imparts knowledge.

The appetitive soul consists of three faculties: (1) The imaginative appetite through which progeny are reared, individuals are moved to their dwellings, and have affection, love, and the like. (2) The intermediate appetite through which there is desire for food, housing, arts and crafts. (3) The appetite that makes speech and, through that, teaching possible and, unlike the other two, is peculiar to man.

The appetitive soul is applied to these three faculties per pririus et per posterius. Every animal possesses the intermediate appetite by which it inclines to nutrition. Some animals do not possess the imaginative yearning. The yearning of intermediate appetite precedes by nature the imaginative appe-

tence. The one thing that is clear is that every man has two faculties—the appetitive and the rational—and these precede others by nature.

The appetitive soul desires a perpetual object or an object in so far as it is perpetual. This desire is called pleasure, and the absence of desire is dizziness, pain, and the like. Action is caused by desire, and perpetuity is caused by the faculties. Desire is not distinctive of man. Anyone who does an action induced by desire is regarded to have done an action based on animality. It is obvious that when a man acts in this manner, he does it not because he is possessed of ideas. He attains perpetuality only to the extent to which he is possessed of them.

Though devoid of eternity, the appetitive soul has a strong desire for eternity. It loves only the intermediate imaginary form and the imaginary form. These are the only two forms which are perpetually loved by the appetitive soul. But since forms are many, the appetitive soul hesitates to make an attempt to realize them. Again, the appetitive soul seeks the service of nature, and suffers from pain and laziness when nature does not co-operate with it. As nature is not simple, it is not always in one and the same state. It is due to nature that an animal needs rest, and it is due to the appetitive soul that it feels dissatisfied with it when prolonged.

But these two forms (i.e., the intermediate imaginary form and the imaginary form) are transitory, not eternal. Hence the appetitive soul does not achieve eternity but that which represents it, and what represents it is not difficult to estimate, for individuals as individuals think that they achieve eternity through perfection and perfection through the attainment of power and freedom. Hence arises the power and freedom of those despots who hold sway over large areas of the world. Their unlimited power, abundant wealth, and unbridled activities, however, bring them no benefit, for most of them die of hunger and in utter regret for losing what they possessed. They are overtaken by fatigue and distress in dealing with the appetitive soul. In their hearts there survives the memory of their past and they feel regret and remorse. When this occurs to the class of despots, what will be the fate of those who are lower in rank? This is as it should be, because the anxiety of their appetitive soul is to collect what is not to be collected and achieve what is not to be achieved. The animals which have no reason do not suffer from this kind of remorse, for their appetitive soul has no ambition and they have no memory of their past whims. They suffer only from natural calamities such as old age, which is the lot of every natural organism.

The imaginative faculty in man is the faculty through which he receives impressions of the sensibles and presents them before himself in imagination after their disappearance. This function of the imaginative faculty takes place both in our waking life and in sleep. This faculty also composes forms of the objects of imagination never sensed before. Sometimes it imagines and composes something which is not an individual but something applicable to a whole class.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

At the final stage of imagination appears the intellect, and the rational faculty starts functioning; and we find in ourselves something which distin-
guishes us from other animals that obtain nutrition and possess sense-organs. Man finds in himself, for example, some objects of knowledge (concepts) containing the distinction between good and evil, useful and harmful. He also finds in himself things which he considers to be distinctly true, things which are merely conjectural, and things which are false. These known objects in the soul are called logos. Logos is in the first instance related to the potential rational faculty, the function of which is to receive the objects of knowledge. This is so because in the earlier stages man is devoid of them and receives them only at a later stage. The term “logos” is applicable to the objects of knowledge after they become potentially receivable, and also when they actually exist and are expressed through words. These objects of knowledge (concepts) which exist in potentiality and become actual in rationality, when considered in relation to the objects which they signify, constitute their know-
ledge since they are known through and recognized by them. When they are considered in so far as they are perceived by the imaginative faculty and are applied to the contents derived from them, they are called intelligibles; but when they are considered in so far as they are perceived by the rational faculty which completes them and brings them from potentiality into actuality, they are called mind or the intellect. There are various grades of knowledge, the first of which is the knowledge of a particularly specified object. This primarily comes into being by achieving the apprehension of the particular in the imaginative faculty in a general way only, i.e., it cannot be imagined specifically. Nor can any quality of the same be described. But it is distin-
guished in a general way without attending to any one of its qualities. This is the weakest knowledge of an object and resembles the imagination of an animal. Again, when the state of the particular is possible in the imaginative faculty, man advances to this particular with its detailed characteristics, which help him to recognize it to be the same at different times. He distinguishes Zaid, for example, as tall, fair, delicate, and considers all these descriptions in his imagination as though they were related numerically to one individual. Some people, however, think that sometimes words lead to absurdity for they intro-
duce multiplicity where there is only unity: for example, the particular which is described by the words “tall,” “fair,” and so on, is not more than one. How-
ever, this is the way in which man achieves the knowledge of individuals in so far as they are definite and particular. Since the qualities through which the particular individuals are known as described above are accidents attached to different individuals, there is no resemblance between any two individuals. Tallness in Zaid, for example, is not exactly the same as tallness in Bakr.

When the objects of imagination are obtained in the imaginative faculty, the rational faculty looks at them through its insight, and realizes the universal meanings. Through these universal meanings the rational faculty imagines and distinguishes the nature of every imagined object. And when the words

indicating the universal meanings are mentioned, the rational faculty distin-
guishes them, presents them before the mind, and apprehends them. All this occurs in more ways than one.

1. The rational faculty presents universal meanings before the mind, and apprehends them as true of the imagined individuals signified by them. Through insight the rational faculty sees the universal meanings in the individ-
uals. In this sense this faculty distinguishes universal meanings from one another in the manner described above.

2. According to another method, the rational faculty distinguishes these universal meanings perfectly, but when it sees them through its insight and presents them to the soul well arranged, it sees them through its insight in the imaginative faculty which also acts upon them, and makes them resemble the universal meaning and imparts to them forms which are common to more than one, but not to all individuals to which the meaning is applicable. The sculptor represents the form of a horse in stone, or a painter draws the form of a horse on the surface of a board, but this representation is imperfect, for it represents and reproduces the form of a horse that obtains nutrition, and neighs. But all that is represented thus is not common to all horses. The imaginative faculty represents things which are limited in respect of age, size, etc. The image of a horse is not common to the full-grown horse, the young horse, and the colt. Its image is common only to the horses of that particular size or age which the imaginative faculty represents.

As soon as the rational faculty makes distinctions of universal meanings, and presents them to the mind to look more closely into them through its insight, the latter looks into them through the image which the imaginative faculty represents. The rational faculty distinguishes whether the image is perfect or not perfect, common or not common. Without any difficulty it thinks of the intelligible meanings. In this way the universal meanings are apprehended by artists and most scientists. When the artisan, for example, thinks how to make an article, he presents the image of the particular article to his imaginative faculty, and prepares his plan to make it. Similarly, when a scientist looks into the objects of knowledge to know their nature and give their description, he presents their images to his imaginative faculty.

These are two methods by which the imaginative faculty serves the rational faculty by presenting to the latter the phantoms of an object, either the phan-
toms of the individual object itself or those of its image, which represents the universal meaning, as mentioned above. The rational faculty imparts universal descriptions to the objects of imagination. Whoever exerts the rational faculty to act on the objects obtained in the imaginative faculty sees the confirmation of what has been mentioned and sees through his rational faculty the divine gift flowing over the faculty. This is just like a person who sees by the faculty of seeing the light of the sun through the light of the sun.

The immediate cause of the apprehension of intelligibles and the activity of the rational faculty in actuality is a gift which is like the light of the sun
A History of Muslim Philosophy

through which one realizes and sees the creation of God so clearly that one becomes a believer in Him, His angels, books, messengers, and the next world, enjoys certain belief, and remembers God while standing, sitting, and lying. Every thought is obtained through this gift which is no other than man’s connection with the active intellect.

Thus, it may be concluded that Ibn Bajjah starts describing “Aristotelian Psychology” and in the end arrives at the position of Ibn Sina and also of al-Ghazali, whose name he mentions with respect and reverence.

INTELLECT AND KNOWLEDGE

According to Ibn Bajjah, the intellect is the most important part of man. In his opinion correct knowledge is obtained through the intellect which alone enables us to attain prosperity and to build character. Something has already been said about the source of the intellect and its working. The following extracts will, however, throw some further light on the matter:

“Is necessary for man to see through his own insight the contents of the imaginative faculty, just as he sees the individual objects with his eyes and distinguishes them fully. He is sure to find that those individual objects are repeatedly impressed upon the imaginative faculty. Many imaginative objects have one or more than one individual in the imaginative faculty. They also possess the accidents attached to these individuals, viz., measure, colour, knowledge, health, sickness, motion, time, space, and other categories. Having realized this all, a man sees through his insight that the rational faculty looks into the objects of imagination and apprehends their common characteristic, i.e., the differentia which distinguishes them from the objects of sense, differentia by virtue of which they are considered to be intelligibles and distinguished as intelligible objects. One should also realize that these differentiae are discerned by the rational faculty through the divine gift which flows over them in the same way as the objects of sight become manifest to the perceiving mind through the light of the sun that falls on them, without which light they would remain completely invisible. Through the same gift the whole is distinguished from its parts and is judged to be greater than the parts. Again, numbers considered to be numerals are declared by this gift as different and many when investigation into God’s creation—the creatures of heaven and earth, night and day, messengers, revelation, dreams, and what the soothsayer’s tongue utters—is repeated so much that man comprehends them through the imaginative faculty, and the rational faculty sees through its insight in a pure, simple, and peculiar way the existence of objects which are neither conceived by thought nor perceived by the senses. Its outlook becomes widened, and it desires to know the causes of those creatures which become intelligible. The rational faculty does not know the objects of knowledge adequately unless it knows them through four causes—form, matter, agent, and purpose. It is necessary to know all these causes in respect of the objects which inevitably possess them. Man is by nature inclined to investigate and know all these causes. His inquiry covers in the first instance the four causes of the objects of sense-perception. This is quite evident with respect to the objects of art as well as those of nature. He is all the more interested in knowing the causes of the intelligible objects, for this investigation is considered to be sublime, high, and useful. Finally, it is through investigation of causes that man reaches the belief in God, His angels, books, messengers, and the life hereafter.”

“Look,” says Ibn Bajjah, “into the wonders that lie between the intellect and the faculty of imagination through your penetrative soul. You can see with certainty that the intellect derives from the imaginative faculty the objects of knowledge called the intelligibles, and offers to the imaginative faculty a number of other objects of knowledge. Take, for example, the moral and artistic ideals, or those objects of knowledge which are either the events that might take place and are available in the imaginative faculty before their occurrence, or the events that have not occurred but have found their way into the imaginative faculty not through the sense-organs but rather through the intellect as in the case of true dreams. The most astonishing thing concerning the imaginative faculty is that which relates to revelation and soothsaying. It is clear in these cases that what the intellect offers to the human imagination does not proceed from the intellect itself, nor is acted upon by the intellect, but arises in imagination through an agent who has known it beforehand, and is able to create it. It is God who causes His will the mover of the active spheres to act upon the passive spheres as He likes. When, for example, He intends to make manifest what will occur in the universe, He first of all sends the knowledge to angels and through them to the human intellect. This knowledge comes to man in accordance with his capacity for receiving it. This is evident in most cases of God’s virtuous servants whom He has shown the right path and who are sincere to Him, particularly the apostles to whom He makes manifest through His angels in waking life or dream the wonderful events that are going to happen in the universe.

“God, the Almighty, makes manifest to His existing beings and creatures both knowledge and deed. Every being receives these from Him according to its rank in the perfection of existence: the intellects receive from Him knowledge according to their positions, and spheres receive from Him figures and physical forms according to their ranks and positions. Every celestial body possesses intellect and a soul through which it performs particular actions which are perceived by way of imagination, such as the imagination of transference from an imaginary place which continues to exist. Due to this individually perceptible particular transference there arise particular actions which are perceived by the bodies that come into being and pass away. This is most manifest in the sun and the moon from among the celestial bodies. It is through this intellect that a man knows sciences which are revealed to him from God and things that are intelligible. The particular events which are to take places in
the present and the future, as well as the events that happened in the past. This is the knowledge of the unseen of which God informs His chosen servants through His angels."

Ibn Bājja further elucidates the nature of human knowledge and the stages thereof when he says: "Knowledge in man means his seeing the existents together with their perfect existence in his intellect through the insight of his soul which is a gift of God. This gift of God is of different grades in different men, the greatest insight being that of prophets who perfectly know Him and His creatures, and enjoy that sublime knowledge in their own souls through their excellent insights without learning and without making any effort to learn. The highest knowledge is that of God Himself and His angels down to the knowledge of what particular events have taken place and will take place in this universe—knowledge gained through the insight of their hearts, without the use of the eyes. In a lower rank than that of the prophets are the friends of God who possess excellent nature through which they derive from the prophets that which enables them to attain to the knowledge of God and the knowledge of His angels, books, apostles, the Last Day, and the highest blessing, which they continue to attest by the insight they enjoy in accordance with the different degrees of the divine gift they receive. These sincere men also receive a little bit of the knowledge of the unseen in their dreams. The friends of God include the Companions of the Prophet. After them come a number of men whom God has favoured with insight through which they realize with certainty the reality of everything till stage by stage they attain to sure knowledge of God, His angels, books, apostles, and the Last Day. They realize through their insight that they have become pure and have achieved perfection or the highest blessing, which is continuity without destruction, honour without disgrace, and richness without fear of poverty. These people which include Aristotle are very few in number."

Ibn Bājja believes in the plurality of intellects and refers to the first intellect and the secondary intellects. In his opinion, the human intellect is the intellect remotest from the first intellect. He further explains the grades of the intellect by saying that some intellects have been directly derived from the first intellect, and some others are derived from other intellects, the relation of what has been derived to that from which derivation has been made being the same as the relation of the light of the sun which is inside the house to that of the sun which is in the courtyard of the house.

Knowledge of the nature of existents which the intellect possesses is of two kinds: (1) that which is intelligible but cannot be invented, and (2) that which is intelligible and can be invented. The intellect itself is also of two kinds: (i) theoretical intellect through which man understands things which he cannot bring into being, and (ii) practical intellect through which he conceives artificial beings which he can invent. Perfection of the practical intellect lies in man's understanding artificial objects and bringing them into being in accordance with his own intention. These are invented only through the organs of the human body, either by the movement of the organs without any implement from outside, or by moving the organs which in their turn move some external instruments. This happens when the artificial objects are accomplished by the human volition.

Human organs are moved per se, but when an artificial object is made, they are moved by the human volition at first in the mind, and then the object is produced outside the mind in accordance with the image formed in the mind before the organs bring it into being. This image is a phantom in the imaginative faculty of the soul and is general. This image disappears from the soul which obtains another image, and the process continues. Whenever man intends to make a certain object, he forms an image in the imaginative faculty. Then he can see by his insight that another faculty of the soul abstracts this image in the imaginative faculty and transfers it from one state to another until its existence is accomplished in the soul, and then he sets the organs into motion to bring the object into being. This faculty which understands and abstracts in imagination is called the practical intellect. When in the imaginative faculty the practical intellect primarily abstracts the image of the artificial object according to a particular form and size, the moving faculty moves the organs to invent the object. The intellect is, therefore, the first maker of the object, and not the organs which are moved by the soul, nor indeed the faculty which moves the organs. It is clear that the power of organs is not primarily found in nature but is caused to come into being by the faculty of the intellect which causes it to appear in imagination, and only then the organs cause the objects to be made through volition.

The imaginative faculty seeks the help of sense-perception at the time of inventing the object to present it to the faculty which has moved the organs, and to enable the intellect to compare and see whether the imagined object belongs to sense-perception in the same way as it belongs to the imaginative faculty.

The intellect has two functions to perform; (1) to present to the faculty of imagination the image of the object to be created, and (2) to have the object made outside the soul by moving the organs of the individual's body.

According to Ibn Bājja, the human intellect by degrees achieves nearness to the first intellect in two ways: (1) by achieving knowledge based on proof, in which case the highest intellect is realized as form; and (2) by achieving knowledge without learning or making an effort to acquire it. This second method is that of the Sufis, notably of al-Qāzālī; it enables one to gain the knowledge of God.

From this it is clear that though Ibn Bājja has emphasized the speculative method, he does not condemn the mystic method, as some Europeans would have us believe."

521

De Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, p. 177.
H

GOD, THE FOUNTAIN-HEAD OF KNOWLEDGE

With regard to the divine gift through which the rational faculty discerns the differentiae, one man excels another, and that in accordance with the capacity that God has given him. But these two gifts are innate, not acquired. The capacities and gifts which are acquired are next to the innate ones and they are acquired by doing, under the guidance of the prophets, what pleases God. Man, therefore, should respond to the Holy Prophet's call and do what he urges him to do. He can, thus, see through the insight of his heart the nature of every creature, its origin, and its final destination. He can know in the same way that God is a necessary being per se, is alone, has no associates, and is the creator of everything; that everything besides Him is contingent and has emanated from His perfect essence; that His self-knowledge implies His knowledge of all objects; and that His knowledge of objects is the cause of their coming into being.

To reduce the number of stages to achieve nearness to God, Ibn Bajjah advises us to do three things: (1) charge our tongues to remember God and glorify Him, (2) charge our organs to act in accordance with the insight of the heart, and (3) avoid what makes us indifferent to the remembrance of God or turns our hearts away from Him. These have to be followed continuously for the whole of one's life.

I

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Ibn Bajjah wrote a number of small treatises on the administration of the House-State and the administration of the City-State, but the only available book on the subject is Tadbirt al-Mu'awdhiq (Regime of the Solitary). As is clear from this book, Ibn Bajjah agrees to a great extent with the political theory of al-Farabi. He has, for example, accepted al-Farabi's division of the State into perfect and imperfect. He also agrees with al-Farabi in holding that different individuals of a nation possess different dispositions—some of them like to rule, and some others like to be ruled. But Ibn Bajjah adds to the system of al-Farabi when he exhorts that the solitary man (mu'awdhiq, or the penetrative philosopher) should keep aloof from the people in certain circumstances. Even though avoidance of people is in itself undesirable, it is necessary in the endeavour to achieve perfection. He also advises him that he should meet the community only on a few inevitable occasions for a short time, and that he should migrate to those countries where he finds knowledge, migration being perfectly permissible under the laws of the science of politics.

J

ETHICS

Ibn Bajjah divides actions into animal and human. The former are due to natural needs and are human as well as animal. Eating, for example, is animal in so far as it is done to fulfill need and desire, and human in so far as it is done to preserve strength and life in order to achieve spiritual blessings.

Ibn Bajjah draws our attention to the active human faculties, as man is too dignified to be qualified with the passive faculties which are either material or animal. The human faculty of learning is a passive faculty, but it is so in a different sense. The active faculty intends to attain perfection only, and then it stops, as in the art through which a trade is accomplished. But the repetition of the art is exercised only through the appetitive soul and opinion. What is done due to the appetitive soul is the action which is done by the agent for its own sake. And, what is done by opinion is the action which is done to gain some other end. The appetitive soul desires a perpetual object, the desire being called pleasure, and its absence dullness and pain. Anybody who performs an action in this way is regarded as having done an animal action. Those who act through opinion act only in so far as they are men. Opinion either moves one to that which is essentially perpetual, or to that which is

---

22 Tadbir, p. 52.
23 Ibid., p. 78.
24 Risa'ilot al-Wad'i', Bodleian MS. Fol. 137a.
perpetual because it is abundant. If the action is perpetual due to abundance, then the end will take the place of the preliminary action. This end-seeking is either due to propensity only, in which case it is an animal action, or due to opinion which has an intended goal in the achievement of which lies its completion. The end varies in accordance with the nature of the individuals; some people, for example, are born for shoe-making, and others for other vocations. Ends serve one another mutually, and all of them lead to one and the same ultimate goal—the chief end. The chief man is naturally he who prepares himself to aim at the chief end, and those who are not prepared for it are subservient by nature. Some people are, therefore, naturally submissive and are ruled by others, and some possess authority by nature and rule others.

Opinion is sometimes right essentially. It is so when it desires the eternal. Sometimes it is right accidentally and not in its essence. The opinions of the shrewd and crafty, for example, are right in respect of the objects they have set up before them; but they are not right-in-themselves. These opinions are relatively right but not universally so. Colocynthis is useful for a man of phlegmatic disposition, but not for all. On the other hand, bread and meat are useful both naturally and universally. The opinion which is right relatively as much as generally is right absolutely. But sometimes what is relatively right is not so in general, and is, therefore, right in one respect and wrong in another.

To declare an action animal or human it is necessary to have speculation in addition to volition. Keeping in view the nature of volition as well as speculation ibn Bajjah divides the virtues into two types, the formal virtues and the speculative virtues. A formal virtue is innate without any trace of volition and speculation, such as the honesty of a dog, since it is impossible for a dog to be dishonest. This virtue has no value in man. The speculative virtue is based on free volition and speculation. The action which is done for the sake of righteousness and not for fulfilling any natural desire is called divine and not human, since this is rare in man. Good, according to ibn Bajjah, is existence, and evil is absence of existence. In other words, evil for him is really no evil.

K

MYSTICISM

Renan is right in his view that ibn Bajjah has a leaning towards mysticism, but is certainly wrong in thinking that he attacks al-Ghazali for his insistence on intuition and Sufism. As a matter of fact, ibn Bajjah admires al-Ghazali and declares that the latter’s method enables one to achieve the knowledge of God, and that it is based on the teachings of the Holy Prophet. The mystic receives a light in his heart. This light in the heart is a speculation through which the heart sees the intelligibles in the same way as a man sees the sunlit objects through eyesight; and through this apprehension of the intelligibles it sees all that which by implication precedes them or succeeds them.

Ibn Bajjah holds the friends of God (khalij Allah) in high esteem and places them next only to the prophets. According to him, some people are dominated by corporeality only—they are the lowest in rank—and some are greatly dominated by a fine spirituality—this group is very rare, and to this group belong Uways al-Qarani and Ibrihim ibn Adham. 24

In his attitude towards God and His decree ibn Bajjah comes close to declaring himself a fatalist. In one of the treatises he declares that if we were to refer to the decree of God and His power we would verily attain peace and comfort. All existing things are in His knowledge and He alone bestows good upon them. Since He knows everything essentially, He issues orders to an intermediary to invent a form like the one which is in His knowledge and to the recipient of forms to receive that form. This is the case concerning all existents, even concerning transitory matter and the human intellect. In support of his view that God is the Ultimate Creator of all actions ibn Bajjah refers to al-Ghazali’s view, expressed at the end of his Minhaj al-Anwar, that the First Principle created agents as well as the objects of action to be acted upon; and he gets further support for this view from al-Farabi’s observation, in ‘Uyun al-Ma‘alil, that all are related to the First Principle in so far as the First is their creator. Ibn Bajjah also states that Aristotle said in his Physics that the First Agent is the real agent and the near agent does not act but through the First. The First makes the near act and the object to be acted upon. The near is known to the majority of people as agent only in affairs that concern matter. The just king, for example, deserves the ascription of justice, although he is distant in rank from him who is below him in the series of agents. Whoever ascribes an action to a near agent is like the dog that bites the stone by which it is struck. But such ascription of action to the near agent is not possible in affairs which do not concern physical matters. The active intellect which surrounds the heavenly bodies is the near agent of all transitory particulars. But He who created both the active intellect and the heavenly bodies is the real eternal agent.

God causes the existence of a thing to continue without end after its physical non-existence. When an existent reaches its perfection, it ceases to remain in time (zaman) but exists eternally in the continuous flux of duration (dahr). Ibn Bajjah here reminds one of the Holy Prophet’s saying: “Do not abuse dahr as dahr is Allah.” So interpreted, the saying implies that the human intellect enjoys eternal continuity. In support of this interpretation of the word dahr ibn Bajjah mentions his predecessors like al-Farabi and al-Ghazali.

24 Tadbir, p. 45.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter XXVII

IBN ṬUFAIL

A

LIFE AND WORKS

Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Muḥammad ibn Muhammad ibn Tufail (Latin, Abū Bakr), also known as Ibn Tufail, was born in the first decade of the 12th century, at Granada, in the province of Granada. He belonged to the prominent Arab tribe of Qais. Al-Marrākushi traces his education to Ibn Bājaḥ, in which view of Ibn Ṭufail’s denial of acquaintance with him, is incorrect. He started his career as a practicing physician in Granada and through his fame in the profession became secretary to the governor of the province. Later, in 549/1154, he became private secretary to the governor of Ceuta and Tangier, a son of ‘Abd al-Mu‘min, the first Muwahhid ruler of Spain who captured Morocco in 542/1147. Finally, he rose to the eminence of the physician and Qāṭi‘ of the Court and vizier of the Muwahhid Caliph abu Ya‘qūb Yūsuf (r. 558/1163-580/1184), whose personal interest in philosophy and liberal patronage turned his Court into a galaxy of leaders of philosophical thought and scientific education, and made Spain, what R. Briffaut calls, “the cradle of the rebirth of Europe.”1 Ibn Ṭufail enjoyed enormous influence with Caliph Abu Ya‘qūb Yūsuf, and it was he who introduced ibn Rushd (d. 598/1193) to him. On the express desire of the Caliph, he advised Ibn Bajjah to annotate the works of Aristotle, a task that had been taken up zealously by Ibn Bajjah but had remained unfinished to the time of his death.2 Ibn Ṭufail resigned his position as Court physician in 578/1182 due to old age and recommended ibn Rushd to his patron as his successor. He, however, continued to retain Abu Ya‘qūb’s esteem and after his death (580/1184) gained the favour of his son Abu Yūnus al-Mansūr (589/1184-595/1199). He died at Morocco in 581/1185-6. Abu Mansūr himself attended his obsequies.

Ibn Ṭufail was an illustrious physician, philosopher, mathematician, and poet of the Muwahhid Spain, but unfortunately very little is known about his works. Ibn Khāṭīb attributes two treatises on medicine to him. Al-Bīrūnī (his pupil) and ibn Rushd credit him with “original astronomical ideas.” Al-Bīrūnī offers a refutation of Ptolemy’s theory of epicycles and eccentric circles which in the preface to his Kitāb al-Hawi he acknowledges to be a contribution of his teacher ibn Ṭufail.3 Quoting ibn Rushd, ibn abi Usabi‘ah attributes Fi al-Buqa‘ al-Maktabah wa al-Qaṣīr al-Maktabah to ibn Ṭufail, but in ibn Rushd’s own account no such reference is traceable.4 Al-Marrākushi, the historian, claims to have seen the original manuscript of one of his treatises on the science of divinity.5 Miguel Casiri (1122/1710-1245/1770) names two extant works: Risālah Ḥāgy Ibn Yaqqān and Asrār al-Hikmah al-Mashriqiyah, the latter in manuscript form.6 The preface to the Asrār discloses that the treatise is only a part of the Risālah Ḥāgy Ibn Yaqqān, the full title of which is Risālah Ḥāgy Bin Yaqqān fi Asrār al-Hikmat al-Mashriqiyah.7

B

CREED OF THE MUWAHHIDS

The foundation of the Muwahhid dynasty is associated with the name of ibn Tūmar (d. 524/1130), a politically religious leader who claimed to be the Mahdi. He introduced in the West orthodox scholasticism of al-Qazzālī and exhorted people to observe the Žahrīte Ṣaqqāḥī. During his travels he met ‘Abd al-Mu‘min al-Qāmil (d. 558/1163), a poet’s son, and made him his disciple and successor in his puritanical movement. He raised the banner of revolt against the corrupt Murābit rulers of Spain, but success ultimately fell to the lot of ‘Abd al-Mu‘min, who took C. in, Tlemcen, Fes, Sale, Ceuta and in 542/1147 became the first Muwahhid ruler of Morocco. He was succeeded by Abu Ya‘qūb Yūnus (d. 580/1184) and then by Abu Yūnus al-Mansūr (d. 595/1199) on whose Courts the two great luminaries, ibn Ṭufail and ibn Rushd, shed imperishable lustre.8

3 Kitāb al-Muwaqqūt, p. 237.
4 MS. No. 669, Escorial; Published Bâkî, 1882. Cf. Léon Gauthier, Ibn Thufail, pp. 32, 34.
5 Gauthier, op. cit., p. 33, footnot.
6 O’Leary, Arabic Thought and Its Place in History, pp. 246-50.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

The Muwahhids professed to be Ghazalian. They were noted for their puritanical belief in the unity of God. Anthropomorphic notions were an anathema to them. Secondly, inspired by Ibn Tumart, they stood for the strict observance of the exoteric aspect of religion. The Zahirite Figh constituted the Muwahhid State religion. Thirdly, as a legacy of Ibn Bajjah, they regarded philosophy as a species of exoteric truth reserved for the enlightened few. The masses, being incapable of pure knowledge, should not be taught more than the literal sense of the colourful eschatology of the Qur'an.\(^{11}\)

Needless to say, the mental equipment of ibn Ṭufail is largely provided by the official religion of the Muwahhids, and his Ḥayy bin Yaqẓān is but a defence of the attitude of the Muwahhids both towards people and philosophers.\(^{12}\)

C

ḤAYY BIN Y AQẒĀN

Summary.—The treatise dramatically opens with the spontaneous birth of Ḥayy in an uninhabited island, followed by a popular legend about his being thrown to this desolate place by the sister of a certain king, in order to keep her marriage with Yaqẓān a secret. Unaided by social conventions, he is nourished there by a roe and taught by natural reason or common sense, which, though really very unequal, equips him with an inductive intellect to probe into the secrets of things. Unlike the lower animals, he becomes conscious of his being naked and unarmed with physical weapons of defence. He reflects over the situation and covers the lower parts of his body with leaves, arms himself with a stick, and thus comes to realize the superiority of his hands over the feet of animals. The death of the mother-roé leads him to the discovery of the animal soul which uses the body as an instrument, like the stick in his hands, shares light and warmth with fire, and thus bears resemblance to the heavenly bodies. He then turns to the analysis of the phenomena of nature, compares the objects around him, and discriminates between them, and classifies them into minerals, plants, and animals. Observation shows him that body is a common factor in all the objects, but they belong to different classes because of the functions peculiar to them. This leads him to assume a specific form or soul for each class of objects. But the soul being imperceptible, his dialectical ingenuity at last brings him to the idea of an ultimate, eternal, incorporeal, and necessary Being which is the efficient cause of the peculiar behaviour of bodies. This makes him conscious of his own immaterial essence; and acting upon a three-point code of ascetic discipline which will be explained later, he is finally absorbed in the unrestrained contemplation of the Ultimate Being.

---

\(^{11}\) D. B. Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory, pp. 251-54.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 254.

528

Ibn Ṭufail

At this stage, Asāl, a contemplative and meditative soul, from the neighbouring inhabited island appears on the scene in quest of attaining perfection in solitude. He informs Ḥayy, the child of nature, about the Qur'ānic conceptions of God, His angels, prophets, the Day of Judgment, etc., which he by his self-developed intellect immediately recognizes as truths. He, however, in the first instance, fails to see the wisdom implicit in the figurative languages of the Qur'ān about God and the hereafter, and in the permission that it gives one to lead a worldly life—a permission which is likely to turn one away from the truth. Full of ambition and hope, he sets out in the company of Asāl to the said inhabited island ruled by Salāmān and begins to reform its convention-ridden people. He endeavours hard to enlighten the masses through pure concepts, but, in the end, finds these concepts far above their heads. He then realizes the wisdom of the Prophet in giving them sensuous forms instead of full light, returns to his lonely island, and is absorbed in contemplation.

Sources.—Ḥayy bin Yaqẓān is a unique creation of ibn Ṭufail’s mystico-philosophical thought. Nevertheless, the idea of this romance is not entirely new. Ibn Sīna (d. 423/1037), among his predecessors, had written a mystic allegory of the same title. But the comparison ends here. Ibn Sīna’s dramatized tale narrates how one day he, with a few companions, went out for a ramble in the vicinity of a town and chanced to meet an old man, Ḥayy bin Yaqẓān, and requested him to be permitted to accompany him in his unending journeys. But the old man replied that that was not possible for ibn Sīna because of his companions whom he could not leave. In this allegory ibn Sīna himself represents the rational soul, the companions the various senses, and the old man, Ḥayy bin Yaqẓān, the active intellect.\(^{13}\) “With ibn Sīna,” thus, “the character of Ḥayy [Ḥayy] represents the Superhuman Spirit, but the hero of ibn Tufail’s romance seems to be the personification of the natural spirit of Man-kind illuminated from above; and that Spirit must be in accordance with the Soul of Muhammad when rightly understood, whose utterances are to be interpreted allegorically.”\(^{14}\)

Similarly, the names of Salāmān and Asāl, the other two characters of ibn Ṭufail’s romance, are not new in the philosophical literature. These, too, have been borrowed from ibn Sīna’s tale of Salāmān wa ʿAbdal, of which we know only through Tūsī’s paraphrase in his commentary on Iṣḥārāt. The story relates how ʿAbdal, the younger brother of Salāmān, was obliged to proceed to war in order to avoid the immoral designs of the latter’s wife, but was deserted by the army through her machinations and his wounded body was carried away by a gazelle to a place of safety. On returning home, he raised a strong army and regained the lost kingdom for Salāmān, whose wife becoming desperate poisoned him to death. The sorrow-stricken Salāmān lost heart and became a hermit. A mystic trance, at last, revealed to him that his own wife was the

---

\(^{13}\) S. M. Ḍafnān, Avicenna, p. 198.

\(^{14}\) De Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, p. 185.
cause of the catastrophe, and he killed her and all her accomplices. Salâmân, in this tale, represents the rational soul, Abâsîl the theoretical reason, and Salâmân’s wife, the passion-worshipping body. Notwithstanding the similarity of names and the episode of the gazelle, the basic theme of both the treatises is intrinsically different. With ibn Sîna the main object is to show how personal afflictions (he himself was a prisoner in the dungeon of a fortress while writing the allegory) invoke divine grace and cause the purification of the soul but the object of ibn Tûfâil is nothing less than to dramatize the development of theoretical reason from the gross sense-perception to the beatific vision of God.

By far the most marked, deep, and saturating influence, which seems to have coloured the basic structure of ibn Tûfâil’s romance, is that of ibn Bâjîh, his arch-rationalist predecessor. His lonely, metaphysically minded Háyy is only an extreme form of the “solitary man” of ibn Bâjîh’s Tadhîr al-Mulawwâbîd. Nevertheless, in spite of his recognition of the necessity of solitude for the improvement of theoretical reason, ibn Tûfâil feels rather unhappy over ibn Bâjîh’s one-sided emphasis on the role of reason in arriving at the ultimate truth. Somewhat sympathetically he complains of the “incompleteness” of ibn Bâjîh’s Tadhîr al-Mulawwâbîd. It is to the desire of removing this incompleteness that ibn Tûfâil’s Háyy Bin Yaqzân owes its origin. And it is the influence of Ghâzâlî (d. 505/1111) and perhaps also of Suhrâwârî Maqûl, his Persian contemporary, that made him supplement reason with ecstasy in its flight to the celestial world.

Of Háyy’s birth in an uninhabited island, ibn Tûfâil relates two versions. The scientific version of his spontaneous birth, he owes entirely to ibn Sîna. The legendary version is traced by Gracia Gómez (“Comparative Study of ibn Tûfâil and Baltazar Gracián,” Madrid, 1926) to Dhu al-Qarnain wa Qâṣâf al-Sâwam wa al-Mulak wa Bintuha, a Greek tale translated into Arabic by

---

19 Hûnain ibn Ishaq. The tale narrates how, under royal displeasure, the daughter of a king threw away her natural daughter, from the son of her father’s vizier. In the sea, the surging waves of which landed her in an uninhabited island where she was nourished by a ree. She grew up into a beautiful damael; later, Alexander the Great chanced to meet her in the island of Oreon. That the life of Hâyy resembles that of the damel in its initial stages, there can be no doubt, but the resemblance ends there. Besides, the aforesaid Greek tale does not seem to be the only source of this legend. Bâdi’ al-Zamân Forûnsî has lately traced the threads of the fable to the Persian tale of Mâna-o Dâra-o Nimurda. The romantic frame of Hâyy Bin Yaqzân is by no means original. It is of Alexandrian origin; it may have even a Persian strain. Nevertheless, it is ibn Tûfâil who changes a simple tale into a romance of a unique philosophical significance. It is the philosophical acumen rather than the poetic imagination that marks the treatise with novelty and makes it to be “one of the most original books of the Middle Ages.”

20 Object of the Treatise.—As al-Marrakûshî, the historian, has said, Hâyy Bin Yaqzân is a treatise which aims at giving a scientific explanation of the beginning of human life on earth. As a prelude to the story of Hâyy Bin Yaqzân, it is related that the moderate climate of the uninhabited island, coupled with a fair proportion of the elements, led to the spontaneous birth of the first man, who found the stick a successful weapon in the struggle for existence, and thereby got the conviction of his own superiority over other animals. But actually this beginning is meant merely to provide a background for showing the development of inductive intellect, independently of any social influence whatsoever.

21 Contradicting al-Marrakûshî’s position, but in complete agreement with de Boer, Dr. Muhammad Ghallâl rightly contends that the treatise essentially aims at showing that the individual man left to himself is able, with the resources of nature alone and without any help from society, to advance to and reach the ultimate truth, provided he has the necessary aptitude for doing so. The truth of the Qur’an and the Hadîth is open to pure intellectual apprehension, but it has to be guarded against the illiterate masses whose business it is not to think but to believe and obey. In fact, this view is an echo of ibn Bâjîh’s position, which later came to be regarded as the proper official attitude under the Muwahhidîs.

Muhammad Yûnus Farangi Mahallî points to a still higher aim implicit in the treatise. Religion is as much essential for a progressive society as are

---

22 Hâyy Bin Yaqzân, p. 13, footnote.
25 Khlîfût-i Muwahhidîn, p. 237.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

philosophy and mysticism—a thesis which is brilliantly exemplified by the co-operation of the three dramatic characters: Ḥāyī, the philosopher; ʿAsāl, the mystic; and Salāmān, the theologian. The underlying aim is not only to show that philosophy is at one with religion properly understood, but that both the exoteric and the esoteric aspects of religion and philosophy are expressions of the same eternal truth revealed to individuals according to their intellectual capabilities.

Philosophically speaking, the treatise is a brilliant exposition of ibn Ṭūfayl’s theory of knowledge, which seeks to harmonize Aristotle with the Neo-Platonists on the one hand, and al-Ghazālī with ibn Bājja, on the other. Al-Ghazālī was dogmatically critical of Aristotelian rationalism, but ibn Bājja was Aristotelian through and through. Ibn Ṭūfayl, following the middle course, bridged the gulf between the two. As a rationalist he sides with ibn Bājja against al-Ghazālī and qualifies mysticism with rationalism; as a mystic he sides with al-Ghazālī against ibn Bājja and qualifies rationalism with mysticism. Ecstasy is the highest form of knowledge, but the path leading to such knowledge is paved with the improvement of reason, followed by the purification of the soul through ascetic practices. The methods of al-Ghazālī and ibn Ṭūfayl are both partially the same, but, unlike the former, the latter’s ecstasy is marked by a Neo-Platonic strain. Al-Ghazālī, true to his theologico-mystical position, takes ecstasy as the means to see God, but to ibn Ṭūfayl, the philosopher, the beatific vision reveals the active intellect and the Neo-Platonic chain of causes reaching down to the elements and back to itself.

D

DOCTRINES

World.—Is the world eternal, or created by God at will out of sheer nothingness? This is one of the most challenging problems of Muslim philosophy. Ibn Ṭūfayl, quite in keeping with his dialectical ingenuity, faces it squarely in the manner of Kant. Unlike his predecessors, he does not subscribe to any of the rival doctrines, nor does he make any attempt to reconcile them. On the other hand, he subjects both the Aristotelian and the theological positions to seething criticism. The eternity of the world involves the concept of infinite existence which is no less impossible than the notion of infinite extension. Such an existence cannot be free from created accidents and as such cannot precede them in point of time; and that which cannot exist before the created accidents must itself be created in time. Similarly, the concept of creatio ex nihilo does not survive his scrutiny. Like al-Ghazālī, he points out that the notion of existence after non-existence is unintelligible without supposing the priority of time over the world; but time itself is an inseparable accident of the world, and so its being prior to the world is ruled out. Again, the created must needs have a Creator. Why then did the Creator create the world now and not before? Was it due to something that happened to Him? Obviously not, for nothing existed before Him to make anything happen to Him. Should it be attributed to a change in His nature? But what was there to bring about this change?

Consequently, ibn Ṭūfayl accepts neither the eternity nor temporal creation of the world.

This antinomy clearly anticipates the Kantian position that reason has its own limits and that its arguments lead to a maze of contradictions.

God.—Both eternity of the world and its creatio ex nihilo equally and inevitably lead to the existence of an eternal, incorporeal Necessary Being. The creation of the world in time presupposes a Creator, for the world cannot exist by itself. Again, the Creator must, of necessity, be immaterial, for matter being an accident of the world is itself subject to creation by a Creator. On the other hand, regarding God as material would lead to an infinite regress which is absurd. The world, therefore, must necessarily have a Creator that has no bodily substance. And since He is immaterial, it follows that we cannot apprehend Him by any of our senses or even by imagination; for imagination represents nothing except the sensuous forms of things in their physical absence.

The eternity of the world implies the eternity of its motion as well; and motion, as held by Aristotle, requires a mover or an efficient cause. If this efficient cause is a body, its power must be finite and consequently incapable of producing an infinite effect. The efficient cause of eternal motion must, therefore, be immaterial. It must neither be associated with matter nor separated from it, nor within it nor without it; for union and separation, inclusion and exclusion are the properties of matter, and the efficient cause, by its very nature, is absolutely free from it.

However, a question is posed here. God and the world both being eternal, how could the former be the cause of the latter? Following ibn Sina, ibn Ṭūfayl makes a distinction between eternity in essence and that in time, and holds that God does precede the world in point of essence, and not in respect of time. Take an example. If you have a body in your fist and move your hand, the body, no doubt, will move with the movement of the hand, yet its motion will be subject to the motion of the hand. The motion of the latter proceeds from its essence, that of the former is borrowed from the latter, though in point of time neither precedes the other.

As to the world becoming co-eternal with God, he maintains in a mystic strain that the world is not something other than God. Interpreting the divine essence in terms of light, the essential nature of which is perpetual illumination and manifestation, as held by al-Ghazālī, he conceives of the world as the
manifestation of God’s own essence and the shadow of His own light that has no temporal beginning or end. It is not subject to annihilation as the belief in the Day of Judgment tends to suggest. Its corruption consists in its transformation into another form rather than in its complete annihilation. The world must continue in one form or another, for its annihilation is inconsistent with the supreme mystic truth that the nature of divine essence is perpetual illumination and manifestation."  

Light Cosmology.—In full agreement with Ibn Sina and other predecessors, Ibn Tufail accepts the principle that from nothing can proceed except one. The manifestation of the existing plurality from unity is explained in the monotonous Neo-Platonic fashion, as successive stages of emanation proceeding from the divine light. The process, in principle, resembles the successive reflection of solar light in looking-glasses. The light of the sun falling on a looking-glass and from there passing into another, and so on, gives an appearance of plurality. All these are the reflections of the light of the sun, and yet they are neither the sun, nor the looking-glasses, nor anything different from both. The plurality of reflected light is lost into the unity of the sun when we look to their source, but reappears when we look to the looking-glasses in which the light is reflected. The same is true of the primal light and its manifestation in the cosmos.  

Epistemology.—The soul, in its first state, is not a tabula rasa, or a blank slate. The image of God is implicit in it from the very beginning, but, in order to make it explicit, we need to start with a clean mind, with neither bias, nor prejudice. Freedom from social prejudices and prepossessions as a primary condition of all knowledge is precisely the idea behind Ḥaṣṣ’ spontaneous birth in an uninhabited island. This being achieved, experience, intellection, and ecstasy play their respective roles freely in giving a clear vision of the truth inherent in the soul. Not mere discipline of spirit, but the education of the senses and the intellect, too, is essential for such a vision. The harmony of experience with reason (Kant), on the one hand, and that of reason with intuition (Berkeley and Iqbal), on the other, constitutes the very essence of Ibn Tufail’s epistemology.

Experience is a process of knowing the environment through the senses. The sense-organs owe their respective functions to the animal soul with its seat in the heart; from there the confused manifold of sense-data reaches the brain which spreads it all over the body through the nerve-paths. It is transmitted through the same paths to the brain, where it is organized into a perceptive whole.

Observation gives us knowledge about bodies which the inductive intellect, with its instruments of comparison and discrimination, classifies into minerals, plants, and animals. Each of these classes of bodies exhibits certain specific functions, which lead us to postulate specific forms or souls (like Aristotle) as the cause of the functions peculiar to the bodies of different classes. Such a hypothesis, however, is untenable on inductive grounds, for the supposed form or soul is not open to direct observation. Actions, no doubt, appear to be issuing from a certain body; in reality, they are caused neither by the body, nor by the soul in a body, but by some cause external to it and that cause is God as indicated before.  

Ibn Tufail also knows the limitations of his newly discovered method. Following al-Ghazālī and anticipating Hume, he sees no power in the cause which may necessarily produce the effect as it does. Hume’s empiricism ends in scepticism, but the mystic in Ibn Tufail makes him see that the bond of causality is an act of synthesis which he ascribes to God, but which Kant attributes to the a priori form of understanding. Ibn Tufail is at once a forerunner of Bacon, Hume, and Kant. He anticipated the inductive method of modern science; perceived the inability of theoretical reason to solve the puzzle of the eternity and temporal creation of the world, and that of the inductive intellect to establish a necessary connection between cause and effect; and finally cleared the clouds of scepticism by declaring with Ghazālī that the bond of causality is a synthetic act of God.

After educating the senses and the intellect and noticing the limitations of both, Ibn Tufail finally turns to the discipline of the spirit, leading to ecstasy, the highest source of knowledge. In this state, truth is no longer obtained through a process of deduction or induction, but is perceived directly and intuitively by the light within. The soul becomes conscious of itself and experiences "what the eye hath never seen, nor ear ever heard, nor heart (mind) of any man ever conceived." The state of ecstasy is ineffable and inexpressible, for the scope of words is restricted to what can be seen, heard, or conceived. Divine essence, being pure light, is perceived only by the light within, which comes into its own through the proper education of the senses, intellect, and spirit. The knowledge of essence, therefore, is itself essence. Essence and its vision are identical.

Ethics.—Not earthly felicity, nor even divine vicegerency, but complete union with God is the sumnum bonum of ethics. Its realization, after the improvement of inductive and deductive intellect, finally depends upon a three-point code of spiritual discipline, which, according to de Boer, has a "Pythagorean appearance." Man is a curious mixture of body, animal soul,
A History of Muslim Philosophy

and immaterial essence, and, thus, at once resembles animals, celestial bodies, and God. His spiritual ascent, therefore, consists in satisfying all the three aspects of his nature, by imitating the actions of animals, heavenly bodies, and God. As to the first imitation, it is binding upon him to provide his body with bare means of sustenance and protect it against inclement weather and wild animals, with the sole intention of preserving the animal soul. The second imitation demands of him cleanliness in dress and body, kindness to animate and inanimate objects, contemplation of the divine essence and revolving round one's own essence in ecstasy. (Ibn Tufail seems to believe that the celestial bodies possess animal soul and are absorbed in the unrestrained contemplation of God.) Lastly, he must equip himself with the positive and negative attributes of God, viz., knowledge, power, wisdom, freedom from corporeality, etc. Discharging one's obligation to oneself, others, and God, is, in brief, one of the essentials of spiritual discipline. The last obligation is an end-in-itself, the first two lead to its realization in the beatific vision, where vision at once becomes identical with the divine essence.

Philosophy and Religion.—Philosophy is purely intellectual apprehension of truth in concepts and images which, by their very nature, are beyond the grasp of conventional modes of expression. Language is a product of the material needs of social environment and as such can lay its hand only on the phenomenal world. The celestial world, being abstract and immaterial, altogether eludes its grasp. Described in material symbols, it loses its essential nature, and occasions men to think of it other than what it really is.

Why then does the Qur'an describe the divine world in parables and similitudes and thereby waive aside a clearer notion of it, and occasion men to fall into the grave error of attributing a corporeity to the essence of God, from which He is absolutely free? And why does not the Holy Book go further than the precepts and rites of worship, and give men leave to gather riches and allow them liberty in the matter of food, by which means they employ themselves in vain pursuits and turn away from the truth? Is it not the imperative need of the soul to free itself from earthly passions and chains before starting its journey towards heaven? Would not men lay aside worldly pursuits and follow the truth, if they were elevated to pure knowledge in order to understand things aright? Hazy's miserable failure to enlighten the masses by means of pure concepts clears the way to the answers to these questions. The Prophet acted wisely in giving the masses sensual forms instead of full light, for they had no other way of salvation. Elevated to pure knowledge, they would waver and fall headlong and make a bad end. Nevertheless, though Ibn Tufail voices the Muwahhid State policy of withholding the teaching of philosophy from the multitude, he clearly recognizes a class of gifted people who deserve philosophic instruction and to whom allegory is the best means of imparting knowledge and wisdom.

Religion is for the masses; but philosophy is a privilege of the gifted few. Their province should be scrupulously kept apart. Philosophy, no doubt, is at one with religion properly understood; both of them reach the same truth, but through different ways. They differ not only in their method and scope but also in the degree of the blessedness they confer on their devotees.

Religion describes the divine world in terms of esoteric symbols. It abounds in similitudes, metaphors, and anthropomorphic notions, so that they might better accord with the people's understanding, fill their souls with desire, and attract them to virtue and morality. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a species of esoteric truth. It seeks to interpret the material symbols of religion in terms of pure concepts and images culminating in a state where the divine essence and its knowledge become one.

Sense-perception, reason, and intuition are the bases of philosophical knowledge. Prophets too have intuitions; their main source of knowledge is revelation from God. The knowledge of the prophet is direct and personal, but that of the followers is constituted of testimony.

Philosophy is an exclusive affair of the individual; it presupposes a certain temperament and aptitude for enlightenment. Religion, on the contrary, is a social discipline. Its point of view is institutional, not individual. It aims, more or less, at a uniform betterment of the masses in general, ignoring the individual differences in ability and inner light.

Philosophy brings us face to face with reality. It demands unrestrained contemplation of truth, uninterrupted vision of the primal light, the source of all existence, by renouncing all worldly connections. Religion is not so exacting in its dictates. It decrees asceticism in any and every sense of the word; for the generality of mankind, for whom it is primarily meant, are incapable of living up to this ideal. It, therefore, fixes the absolute minimum and then gives men leave to lead a worldly life, without, however, transgressing the limits thereto.

Thus, the philosopher, left to his inner light, is capable of attaining to supreme bliss. As to the masses, they should rest content with a second-rate salvation, beyond which, owing to their own limitations, they cannot rise. Later on this theory, under the influence of Ibn Rushd, armed the medieval European scholars in their struggle against the Church, with the doctrine of "two-fold truth." John of Brescia and Siger of Brabant being two of its chief representatives. The story does not seem to end here; for the redeeming individualistic attitude of modern philosophy, an attitude that distinguishes it from both the medieval and the ancient outlook, also appears to be a characteristic deposit of the same theory.

536

38 Z. A. Siddiqi, Falesah-i Hāyī Bin Yaqūn, p. 103.

537
Ibn Tufail

a thirty-six-page appendix to his English version of the booklet (1120/1708), in order to refute ibn Tufail's thesis that the individual man, left to his a priori inner light, can arrive at the ultimate truth.44

A Spanish writer, Gregorio Baltsar's indebtedness to ibn Tufail occupied the world's attention during the first four decades of the present century. According to L. Gauthier, the early life of Andronico, the hero of Gregorio Baltazar's El Criticon (Saragos, 1062/1651), is a "manifest" and "undeniable imitation" of Ḥaṣṣay's legendary version of birth.45 But G. Gómez, the Spanish critic, claims that the El Criticon is nearer to the Greek tale of Ḥuṣn al-Qarnain wa Qisqat al-Sanam wa al-Malak wa Bintuh, referred to earlier, than to the Ḥaṣṣay Bin Ṭaṣqīn.46 D. K. Petrof, the Russian Orientalist, too holds that Gregorio Baltazar is an exception to ibn Tufail's influence.47 But L. Gauthier, in his latest version of the treatise (Beirut, 1933/1936), contradicts the position of Gomez and Petrof, and concludes that Gregorio Baltazar is indebted to the Greek Qisqat al-Sanam indirectly through the Ḥaṣṣay Bin Ṭaṣqīn of ibn Tufail.48 The influence of the romantic frame of the treatise is also visible in Menekes Felgo, Poa, Saij Bin ibi Yaza, and Tarzan.49 Even the Robinson Crusoe (1132/1719) of Daniel Defoe is no exception to its pervading influence, as proved by A. R. Pastor in his Idea of Robinson Crusoe.50

Of ibn Tufail's pupils Abu Iṣḥāq al-Bīrūnī and Abu al-Walīd ibn Rushd stand far above the rest. He maintained his leadership in the sphere of astronomy through al-Bīrūnī's51 whose theory of "spiral motion" (baḥrāt laubah) marks the culmination of the Muslim anti-Ptolemaic movement.52 In philosophy and medicine he dominated the scene in the person of Ibn Rushd,53 whose rationalism "ran like wild fire in the schools of Europe" and ruled their minds for no less than three centuries.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


---

44 Ibid., p. 168.
45 Gauthier, op. cit., p. 52.
46 Ḥaṣṣay Bin Ṭaṣqīn, p. 13.
47 G. Sarton, op. cit., p. 355.
48 Ḥaṣṣay Bin Ṭaṣqīn, p. 14, footnote.
49 Ibid., pp. 12, 14.
50 Kāmil Gīlānī, op. cit., p. 106.
52 He refuted Ptolemy's theory of epicycles and eccentrics circles and in the preface to his Kūḥ al-Hā'isī confessest that he is following the ideas of ibn Tufail (L. Gauthier, op. cit., p. 20).
53 G. Sarton, op. cit., p. 399.
54 He was advised by ibn Tufail with regard to his commentaries on Aristotle's works as well as his medical work Kulliyat. Cf. G. Sarton, op. cit., p. 355.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Chapter XXVIII

IBN RUSHD

A

INTRODUCTION

Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Rushd was born in Cordova in 520/1126. His family was renowned for its deep knowledge in Fiqh, and his father and grandfather held the office of the Chief Justice of Andalus. This religious descent gave him the opportunity to reach a high standard in Islamic studies. The Qur'an and its exegesis, the Tradition of the


For the editions of his writings, and his manuscript see: Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur, Vol. I, Weimar, 1898; Bouyges, Notes sur les philosophies arabes connues des Latins au Moyen-Age; Inventaire des textes arabes d'Averroes.
have produced something valuable on this subject was Ibn Bajjah, but he was occupied in worldly affairs and died before completing his works. Al-Ghazālī criticized the doctrines of the Muslim philosophers in his book *Tuḥfat*, and his way to attain to truth was a mystic one. Ibn Sina expounded the doctrine of Aristotle in *al-Shifāʾ*; but he mixed his own opinions with those of Aristotle. This short account given by ibn Ṭufail concerning the state of philosophical studies in eastern Islam explains why he asked ibn Rushd to comment on Aristotle.

Ibn Rushd lived in the midst of disturbed political conditions. He was born in the reign of the Almoravides who were overthrown in Marrákush in 542/1147 by the Almohades, who conquered Cordova in 543/1148. The Almohade movement was started by ibn Tūmart who called himself al-Mahdi. He tried to imitate the Fāṭimid s, who had appeared a century before and founded an empire in Egypt, in their encouragement of philosophy, their secret interpretations, and their excellence in astronomy and astrology.4 His three Almohade successors ʿAbd al-Muʿmad, abu Yaʾqūb, and abu Yūsuf, whom ibn Rushd served, were known for their encouragement of science and philosophy.

When abu Yaʾqūb became Amir, he ordered ibn Rushd to write commentaries on Aristotle. This is the account given by al-Marrākushī. Ibn Rushd said: “When I entered into the presence of the Prince of the Believers abu Yaʾqūb, I found him with abu Bakr ibn Ṭufail alone. Abu Yaʾqūb began praising me, mentioning my family and ancestors. The first thing the Prince of the Believers said to me was, ‘What is their opinion about the heavens?’ referring to the philosophers. ‘Are they eternal or created?’ Confusion and fear took hold of me. . . . But the Prince of the Believers understood my fear and confusion, and turned to ibn Ṭufail and began talking about the question he had asked me, mentioning what Aristotle, Plato, and all the philosophers had said.”4 In another account given by the same biographer, ibn Rushd relates that ibn Ṭufail summoned him one day and told him that the Prince of the Believers complained of the difficulty of the expression of Aristotle and his translators, and mentioned the obscurity of his aims saying: “If someone would tackle these books, summarize them, and expound their aims after understanding them thoroughly, it would be easier for people to grasp them.” And ibn Ṭufail got himself excused on the plea of old age and his occupation in government service and asked ibn Rushd to take up this work.

Thus, ibn Rushd started his commentaries on the works of Aristotle. He deserved for this undertaking the title of the “Commentator” for which he


4. This is also the opinion of Bouyges. In his preface to *Talkhis Kitāb al-Taṣāḥṣīb* (Beyrouth, 1932, p. v.), he says: “C'est un qualité de 'Commentateur' d'Aristote que le philosophe arabe ansalous Averroes (1126–1198) est devenu célèbre.”

Ibn Rushd

was renowned in medieval Europe. Dante in his *Divine Comedy* mentions him together with Euclid, Ptolemy, Hippocrates, Aviceena, and Galen, designating him as the great Commentator.

“Euclide geometra e Tolemeo,
Ippocrate, Aviceenna e Galeno,
Averoi, che'l gran commento feo.”

(Dante, *Inferno*, IV, 142–44)

It is related that he wrote three kinds of commentaries: the great, the middle, and the lesser. The great commentaries are called *taṣfīr*, following the model of the exegesis of the Qurʾān. He quotes a paragraph from Aristotle and then gives its interpretation and commentary. We have now in Arabic his great commentary of the *Metaphysics*, edited by Bouyges (1357–1371/1938–1951). The lesser ones are called the *talkhis*. In the Arabic language *talkhis* means summary, résumé or précis. One may say that these commentaries, although Aristotelian in the main, reveal also the true Rushdian philosophy. A compendium called the *Majmūʿah* or *Jawāmiʿ* comprising six books (*Physics*, *De Caelo et Mundo*, *De Generacione et Corruptione*, *Meteorologiae*, *De Anima* and *Metaphysica*) has now been published in Arabic. In these commentaries, ibn Rushd did not follow the original text of Aristotle and the order of his thought. An example of the middle commentaries is to be found in the “Categories,” edited by Bouyges in 1357/1932. At the beginning of the paragraph, ibn Rushd says: “*qāla*” (“dixit”) referring to Aristotle, and sometimes (not always) gives an excerpt of the original text.7 This method was current in eastern Islam, and ibn Sina followed it in his *al-Shifāʾ*, reproducing in many places the very phrases of the Arabic translation of Aristotle. In fact, ibn Sina declared that in his *al-Shifāʾ* he was following the “First Master.”

It is true that most of the commentaries are found in their Latin or Hebrew translations, or conserved in Hebrew translation, but the original Arabic texts are more sure and accurate. On the whole, the value of ibn Rushd's commentaries is historical, except for the lesser ones which reveal to a certain extent his own thought. His own philosophical opinions are to be found in three important books, the *Fat, the Kāshf* and the *Talkhis*, and in a short treatise called *al-Iṣḥāq*. His *Colligit* (*Kulliyyat*) in medicine is as important as the *Canon* of ibn Sina, and was also translated into Latin, but it was less famous than that of ibn Sina's. In jurisprudence (*Fiqh*) his book *Bidāyat al-Muṭṭahid* is used as an Arabic reference book.

7 The only Arabic middle commentary we have is the “Categories.” The text of ibn Rushd compared with the ancient Arabic translation shows that there is nothing additional. It is neither a summary nor a commentary. It is simply a new edition of the translation put in a new phraseology. Are all the so-called middle commentaries of this type? We leave the question open.
He was better known and appreciated in medieval Europe than in the East for many reasons. First, his numerous writings were translated into Latin and were circulated and conserved, while his original Arabic texts were either burnt or proscribed due to the antagonistic spirit against philosophy and philosophers. Secondly, Europe during the Renaissance was willing to accept the scientific method as viewed by Ibn Rushd, while science and philosophy began in the East to be sacrificed for the sake of mystical and religious movements. In fact, he himself was affected by this conflict between science (and philosophy) and religion. Religion won the battle in the East, and science triumphed in the West.

His disgrace, persecution, and exile in 593/1196 were the result of that conflict. The dispute for political power between the representatives of religion and philosophers never ceased from the third/ninth century onward. Al-Kindi described this dispute and defended the philosophers in his books. The men of religious learning (fugaha and ulama) were nearer to the masses who were influenced by them. The Muslim rulers, in need of their support, left the philosophers to the rage of the masses. Several accounts have been given concerning the exile of Ibn Rushd to Lucena, near Cordova. The charge was that he had written in some of his books of having seen the giraffe in the garden of the king of the Berbers. Ibn Rushd said in his defence that he had written "the king of the two lands." (Berber written in free hand without diacritical marks can be read as Barrain.) A second story holds that he had written down that Venus is divine. A third story is that he denied the historical truth of the People of 'Ad mentioned in the Qur'an.

The intrigues of the religious party succeeded to the point that not only was Ibn Rushd exiled but his writings too were publicly burned. A manifesto against philosophy and philosophers was issued and distributed everywhere in Andalus and Marrakesh, prohibiting the so-called dangerous studies and ordering to burn all the books dealing with such sciences. However, his disgrace did not last long and al-Manṣūr after his return from Marrakesh pardoned and recalled him. Ibn Rushd went to Marrakesh where he died in 595/1198.

B

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

The accord between philosophy and religion is rightly regarded as the most important feature of Islamic philosophy. Ibn Rushd's solution to this problem was really an ingenious one. As a philosopher, he found that it was his duty to defend the philosophers against the fierce attacks of the fugha and theo-

logians, especially after their condemnation by al-Ghazālī in his "Incoherence of the Philosophers." Ibn Rushd's treatise called: Fiqh al-Maqāl fī mā bain al-Hikmah wa-al-Shari‘ah min al-Istiqāl is a defence of philosophy in so far as it is shown to be in harmony with religion.

It may be doubted nowadays whether this question should receive so much attention, but in the sixteenth century it was really vital. Philosophers were accused of heresy (kufr) or irreligion. In fact al-Ghazālī condemned the philosophers as irreligious in his Tahājjud. If this accusation were true, the philosophers according to Islamic Law would be put to death, unless they gave up philosophizing or proclaimed publicly that they did not believe in their philosophical doctrines. Consequently, it was necessary for philosophers to defend themselves and their opinions.

Ibn Rushd begins his treatise by asking whether philosophy is permitted, prohibited, recommended, or ordained by the Shari‘ah (Islamic Law). His answer is, from the very outset, that philosophy is ordained or at least recommended by religion (religion is used in this context as synonymous with Shari‘ah and specifically Islam). Because the function of philosophy is nothing more than speculating on the beings and considering them in so far as they lead to the knowledge of the Creator. The Qur’an exhorts man to this kind of rational consideration (‘iṭbār) in many a verse such as: "Consider, you who have vision." Al-‘iṭbār is a Qur’ānic term which means something more than pure speculation or reflection (nasār).

To translate this Qur’ānic consideration in logical terms is nothing more than getting the unknown from the known by way of inference. This type of reasoning is called deduction of which demonstration (burkān) is the best form. And since God exhorts man to know Him through demonstration, one must begin to learn how to distinguish between the demonstrative and the dialectical, rhetorical, and sophistical deductions. Demonstration is the instrument by which one can attain to the knowledge of God. It is the logical method of thinking, which leads to certainty.

It follows that the Qur’an exhorts man to study philosophy since he must speculate on the universe and consider the different kinds of beings. We have now passed from the legal plane of Fiqh to the philosophical one, in spite of their distinction. The objective of religion is defined in philosophical terms: it is to obtain the true theory and the true practice (al-imām al-haqq wa-al’amal al-haqq). This reminds us of the definition of philosophy given by al-Kindi and his followers, which remained current all through Islamic philosophy. True knowledge is the knowledge of God, of all the other beings as such, and of the happiness and unhappiness in the hereafter. The way of acquiring knowledge is of two kinds, apprehension and assent. Assent is either demonstrative, dialectical, or rhetorical.

---


These three kinds of assent are all used in the Qur'an. Men are of three classes, the philosophers, the theologians, and the common people (al-jumbīr). The philosophers are the people of demonstration. The theologians—the Aṣḥā'ītes whose doctrine was the official one at the time of ibn Rushd—are of a lower degree, since they start from dialectical reasoning and not from scientific truth. The masses are the "people of rhetoric" who understand only through examples and poetic thinking.

So far, religion is compatible with philosophy. The act and aim of philosophy are the same as those of religion. Now about the compatibility of their methods and subject-matter. If the traditional (al-manqūl) is found to be contrary to the rational (al-ma'qūl), it is to be interpreted in such a way as to be in harmony with the rational. Allegorical interpretation (ta'wīl) is based on the fact that there are certain Qur'ānic verses which have an apparent (zāhir) meaning and an inner (bātin) meaning. Early Muslim scholars in the face of such verses avoided interpreting them, because they were afraid to confuse the minds of the common people. The Aṣḥā'ītes interpreted some such verses as that of "sitting on the Throne" (al-istiwā'), while the Hanbalites believed in its apparent meaning. The position of ibn Rushd, as a philosopher, is different from that of the early Muslims, the Aṣḥā'ītes and the Ḥanbalites. Ta'wīl is to be practised only by the philosophers who are the people of demonstration. Even then, this ta'wīl should be kept back as esoteric knowledge, far from being declared to the masses.

Ibn Rushd returns to the plane of Fiqh and compares the logical method of philosophy with the traditional one of Fiqh. This latter, called the principles of Fiqh, depends on four sources: the Qur'ān, Tradition, ijmā' (consensus) and qiṣṣa (legal syllogism). We have seen that the Qur'ān has to be rationally interpreted. Ijmā' comes from the unanimous assent of the opinions of all the qualified scholars at a certain time. But there was no consensus at any time about doctrinal matters, simply because some scholars believed, as mentioned in the Qur'ān, that there were certain matters which should be concealed. Only "those who are well grounded in learning" (al-rādi ibn al-'jam) had the right to know. And, since there is no consensus in doctrinal matters, al-Ghazālī had no right to condemn the philosophers as irreligious on the basis of ijmā'. They deserved, in al-Ghazālī's opinion, the charge of heresy (taḥfīr) for three things: their doctrine concerning the eternity of the world, their denial of God's knowledge of particulars, and their denial of bodily resurrection.

According to ibn Rushd, religion is based on three principles in which every Muslim of the above-mentioned three classes should believe. These are the existence of God, the prophecy, and resurrection. These three principles constitute the subject-matter of religion. As prophecy depends on revelation, philosophy remains distinct from religion, unless it is shown that reason and revelation are in accord with each other. This problem is discussed in other books of his in detail. But he who denies any one of the above principles is irreligious (kafr). He can believe what he likes through any of the demonstrative, dialectical, or rhetorical ways.

Philosophers should not declare their esoteric interpretations to the masses lest they should be led to heresy. The theologians who did so were responsible for the origin of the various Islamic sects which accused one another of heresy.

All in all, philosophy is the twin sister of religion; they are the two friends who, by their very nature, love each other.

C

THE WAY TO GOD

Having established that religion has apparent and inner meanings, symbolic for the common people and hidden for the learned, ibn Rushd endeavours in his book: al-Kashī 'an Manāhīj al-Ādillah to find out the way to God, i.e., the methods given in the Qur'ān to attain to the belief in the existence of God and to the knowledge of His attributes, according to the apparent meaning, for the first knowledge that every reasonable man is entitled to obtain is of the way which leads to the belief in the existence of the Creator.

Since this book was written in a theological form, ibn Rushd began to review the methods of the various Islamic sects, which he classified into five principal kinds: the Aṣḥā'ītes, the Muʿtazilites, the Bāqillātes, Ḥašḥawītes, and the Sufis. It was but natural that he should have reserved for his contemporaries, the Aṣḥā'ītes, the greatest part of his discussion, but strangely enough he never referred to the Bāqillātes mentioned in the above classification. The Muʿtazilites were briefly discussed along with the Aṣḥā'ītes, but not separately through their original writings which had not, as he later stated, reached the Maghrib.

The Ḥašḥawites maintain that the way to God is listening through oral transmission (al-samā') and not through reason. They mean that faith in God is received from the Prophet and that reason has nothing to do with it. But this contradicts what is mentioned in the Sacred Book which calls men in general to believe through rational proofs.

The Aṣḥā'ītes hold that the way to God is through reason, but their method is different from the religious way which the Qur'ān has called man to follow. They lay down certain dialectical premises from which they start, such as: the world is temporal; bodies are composed of atoms; atoms are created; the agent of the world is neither temporal nor eternal. Their arguments, however,

13 Al-Kashī 'an Manāhīj al-Ādillah, Cairo ed., p. 31. Ibn Rushd mentions in the beginning only four sects; the Sufis have been excluded. although he discusses their method later.

17 Ibid., p. 31. Al-samā' is also called the traditional.
are far from being understood by the common people, and are inconsistent and unconvincing. Another Ash'arite way is that of Abu al-Ma'āli. It is based on two premises, that the world is probable (jā'iz), and that what is probable is temporal. But this way abolishes the wisdom of creating the creatures as such. The way of Ibn Sina is in some respects similar to that of Abu al-Ma'āli; only he substitutes the probable by the possible.

The Sufis follow the mystic way. They say that the knowledge of God is thrown into the soul from high above, after we have got rid of our earthly desires. But, this way is not accessible to all mankind, and it abolishes speculation for which people are exerted all through the Qur'an.

What, then, is the true way to God which is suitable for all mankind? Two ways are mentioned in the Qur'an, called by Ibn Rushd the proof of providence and the proof of creation. The first is teleological and the second cosmological, both starting from man and other beings, not from the universe as a whole.

The proof of providence depends on two principles: the first is that all beings are suitable for the existence of man; and the second is that this suitability is by necessity due to an agent intending to do so by will, since this suitability cannot be achieved by chance. All beings are created for the service of man: stars shine at night for his guidance, his bodily organs are fit for his life and existence. A whole theory of value can be developed from this view.

The proof called creation takes into consideration the animals, plants, and heavens. It is also based on two principles: that all beings are created, and that everything created is in need of a Creator. The examples given refer to animated beings. When we see that bodies devoid of life are endowed with life, we know by necessity that there is a Creator of life, i.e., God. Heavens, also, are commanded to move and take care of the sublunary world. God says in the Holy Book: "Verily, those on whom ye call beside God could never create a fly if they all united to do so." He who wants to know God should know the essence and uses of things to attain to the knowledge of true creation.

These two ways are common both to the learned elite and the masses. The difference between their knowledge lies in the degree of details. Common people are content with the sensuous knowledge, which is the first step to science. The elite are convinced only by demonstration.

The significance of God's unity is expressed in the Qur'anic principle "No God but He." Negation of other deities is considered here to be an additional meaning to the affirmation of God's unity. What would happen if there were more than one God? The world would be subject to corruption: one god would be superior to the others, or the rest of the gods would find some device to dethrone the one in power.

God is qualified by seven main attributes: knowledge, life, power, will, audition, sight, and speech. They are human qualifications considered in their absolute perfection. Three positions can be taken as regards the relation between God's essence and His attributes. The first is the negation of the attributes. This is the position of the Mu'tazilites. The second is to affirm them in a state of complete perfection. The third is to conceive them as transcendent and beyond human knowledge. They are in the sphere of the unknowable. As a matter of fact, the Qur'an asserts the attributes and yet states that "Nothing is similar to Him," which means that He is unknowable. The common people may believe according to the apparent meaning of the text that He sees, hears, speaks, etc. The people of demonstration should not expound their interpretation before the masses. The doctrines of both the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites are unsound. Ibn Rushd criticizes their solutions in his book al-Manāhib and at length in the Tahhit. He holds that in the case of the attributes, without affirming or negating them, one must follow the apparent meaning mentioned in the Qur'an. As to philosophical interpretation, this must be kept esoteric.

The acts of God are reduced to five principal ones: creation, sending the prophets, predestination, justice, and resurrection. They constitute the relationship between God and the world and man.

Creation is an act of God. He created the world providentially, not by chance. The world is well ordered and is in a state of the most perfect regularity, which proves the existence of a wise Creator. Causality is presupposed. All the Rushdian proofs depend on the belief that nothing comes to be without a cause, and that there is a definite series of causes emanating from a Prime Cause. He says: "He who, in the artificial things, denies or cannot understand the cause resulting from causes would have no knowledge of the art or the

---

18 Ibid., p. 32, and ad passim.
19 Ibid., p. 40.
20 Ibid., p. 41.
21 Ibid., p. 44.
22 Ibid., p. 46.
23 Ibid., p. 48.
24 Ibid., p. 49. (La viša wa la hu.)
25 Wadāniyāsh; sometimes translated as "unity" which gives a different meaning, unity being wadāh.
26 Ibn Rushd refers to three verses; (i) xxii, 22—"If there were therein Gods besides Allah, then verily both (the heavens and the earth) had been disordered." (ii) xxiii, 91—"Nor is there any God along with Him; else would each God have assuredly championed that which he created, and some of them would assuredly have overcame others..." (iii) xxvii, 42—"If there were other gods along with Him, as they say, then they sought a way against the Lord of the Throne" (Pickthall's trans.).
27 Al-Kaššāsh, p. 53.
28 Ibid., p. 60; Sirāh xlii, 11—"Naught is as His likeness; and He is the Hearer, the Seeer" (Pickthall's trans.).
29 Ibid., p. 80.
artisan; similarly, he who denies the existence in this world of the dependence of effects on causes would deny the wise Maker.\footnote{Ibid., p. 96.}

The proof for sending prophets is based on two principles mentioned in the Qur'\textsuperscript{a}n. The first is that men of this type are those who prescribe the laws through God's revelation, not through human learning. The act of a prophet is to prescribe laws which if followed by men would bring them everlasting happiness. The second principle is that he who is found to be qualified to perform this act of lawgiving is a prophet. Just as the act of the physician is to cure the body, and he who effects this cure is a physician, so the act of the prophet is to prescribe laws and he who is found to do this act is a prophet. Theologians assume that our belief in the truth of the prophets lies in the belief in their miraculous acts, which are supernatural. But the Qur'\textsuperscript{a}n refuses to follow this way which was common to previous religions. When the Arabs told Muhammad that they would not believe in him unless he made a spring flow from dry earth, he answered through God's revelation: "I am only a human being, a messenger."\footnote{Ibid., p. 97; Surah xvii, 93—"Am I sought save a mortal messenger?"} The only miracle of Islam is its Holy Book, the Qur'\textsuperscript{a}n, which comprises the laws necessary for the well-being of man. Thus, there is nothing supernatural,\footnote{Supernatural in the sense of interrupting the course of nature (\textit{kh\textsuperscript{a}riq}).} since everything goes on according to natural laws resulting from the close association of causes and effects.

Predestination is a very difficult problem about which the opinions of the Muslim thinkers oscillate from absolute fatalism to absolutel free-will. Fatalism abolishes man's freedom and, consequently, his responsibility. The Mu'tazilites are in favour of free-will which is the ground of man's responsibility for his good and bad doings. If this view is assumed, God has nothing to do with man's acts, man being creator of his own acts. And, consequently, there would be other creators besides the Creator. The Ash'arites maintain a midway position saying that man is predestined and yet he acquires the power to act. This is their famous doctrine concerning the acquisition (\textit{al-kash})\!\!.\!\!. But this solution is, in ibn Rushd's view, self-contradictory. Their doctrine leads to fatalism.

Man is predisposed neither to fatalism nor to free-will. He is determined. Determinism is the production of acts according to their appropriate causes. Causes are external or internal. Our acts are accomplished both through our will and the compatibility of external happenings. Human will is determined by outer stimuli which are subject to definite regularity and harmonic order according to the universal will of God. Not only are our acts determined by causes from without, they are also related to causes from within ourselves. The determined regularity in external and internal causes is what we call predestin-

\footnote{Ibid., p. 96.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 97; Surah xvii, 93—"Am I sought save a mortal messenger?"}

\footnote{Supernatural in the sense of interrupting the course of nature (\textit{kh\textsuperscript{a}riq}).}

\footnote{Al-Kashf, p. 107.}

\footnote{Gibson, \textit{History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages}, New York, 1954, p. 219.}

\textbf{D}

\textbf{THE WAY TO KNOWLEDGE}

We pass now from ibn Rushd, the Muslim philosopher garbed in a cloak of \textit{Fiqh}, to the commentator of Aristotle, who was more faithful to the "First Master" than Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius. Medieval philosophy in Europe was influenced by Aristotle through the commentaries of ibn Rushd. As Gilson rightly puts it, "Strangely enough, very few men have been more influential than Averroës in shaping the popular notion of medieval philosophy which is now currently received as historical truth."\footnote{Gibson, \textit{History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages}, New York, 1954, p. 219.} It is true that his main system is Aristotelian, but under the influences of ideas received from different sources, he gave the system a new form.

The way to knowledge is one of the major problems discussed all through Muslim philosophy because of its relationship to higher existents, namely, the "agent intellect" with which man gets in communion. The soul and intellect are carefully distinguished by ibn Rushd in his consideration of the process of knowledge. A full account about the hierarchical order of beings is necessary to understand the place of these two entities. This is why ibn Rushd began his treatise \textit{Talabat Kitab al-Nafs} by giving a short review concerning the composition of beings and their source of behaviour and knowledge. From the very start he says: "The aim of this treatise is to set forth in psychology the commentators' opinions which are more related to natural science and more appropriate to Aristotle's purpose. It would be relevant before that to give a brief introduction about the necessary principles presupposed for understanding the substance of the soul." These are: (i) All perishable beings are composed of matter and form, each of which is not by itself a body,
A History of Muslim Philosophy

although through their combination the body exists. (ii) Prime matter has no existence in actuality, but is only the potency to receive forms. (iii) The first simple bodies in which prime matter is actualized are the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth. (iv) The elements enter in the composition of all other bodies through mixture. The remote cause of this mixture is the heavenly bodies. (v) Natural heat is the proximate cause of the real combination. (vi) Organic beings are generated from animistic individuals of their kind through natural heat. Soul is the proximate cause of their generation and their remote cause is the intelligence that moves the spheres.

Before further discussion of psychology Ibn Rushd asks the crucial question: "Can there be forms separate from matter?" The answer to this question constitutes the true way of knowledge.

Material forms can never be separate from matter, since physical forms—which is another expression of material forms—subsist only in matter. Hence they are temporal and subject to change. They are not eternal since they have no subsistence except in matter. It follows that separate forms are something other than the material forms. Consequently, the separateness of the rational soul, namely, the intellect, can only be demonstrated if it is shown that it is pure form. The soul is not separate because it is "the form of an organic natural body." The soul is divided according to its acts into five kinds: the nutritive, the sensitive, the imaginative, the cognitive, and the appetitive, and this last seems to be subsequent to the imaginative and sensitive.

The hierarchical order of the faculties is dependent on the order of the material forms, mentioned above. The way of animal knowledge is by sensation and imagination, and that of man, besides these two, by intellect. Thus, the way to knowledge is either through the senses or through the intellect, leading either to the knowledge of the particular or of the universal. True knowledge is that of the universal, otherwise animals can be said to have knowledge. The term "knowledge" is applied equivocally to animals, man, and God. Animal knowledge is limited by the sensuous and imaginative, whereas human knowledge is universal. Sensation and imagination exist in animals for their conservation. To assure their security, protect themselves, and obtain food, animals have to move towards or away from the sensibles. In case the sensibles are present, they are perceived by the senses; and in their absence, representations take their place. Sensations are, then, the condition of representation, and "everything which has representations necessarily has sensations." But, since man has a higher faculty, namely,

Ibn Rushd

intellect, he gets representations through thought and reasoning, whereas in animals representations exist by nature. Further, forms perceived by animals are finite, and sometimes, when perceived by man, they become universal images. Those who assume that animals have reason confuse universal images with universal concepts. Forms perceived by man are infinite, in the sense that the particulars they denote are infinite. Representations, in so far as they are the motor cause for movement, effect their action in man through their collaboration with concepts.

Human knowledge must not be confused with divine knowledge, since "man perceives the individual through the senses and universal exists through his intellect. The cause of man's perception changes through the change in the things perceived, and the plurality of perceptions implies the plurality of objects." It is impossible that God's knowledge should be analogous to ours, because "our knowledge is the effect of the existents, whereas God's knowledge is their cause." The two kinds of knowledge, far from being similar to one another, stand in opposition. God's knowledge is eternal, while man's knowledge is temporal. "It is God's knowledge which produced the existents, and it is not the existents which produce His knowledge." So far, we have seen that there is individual as well as universal knowledge. The first is the outcome of sensation and imagination, and the second is the result of the intellect. The act of the intellect is to perceive the notion, the universal concept, and the essence. The intellect has three basic operations: abstraction, combination, and judgment. When we perceive a universal notion, we abstract it from matter. This is more evident in a thing denuded of and far from matter, such as the point and line. Not only does intellect abstract simple apprehensions from matter, it combines them together and judges that some of them when predicated of some others are true or false. The first of these operations is called apprehension (intelligere in the Latin terminology) and the second is called assent (credulitas). We have, then, three successive operations. First, we get in the intellect single notions (intentions) totally abstracted from matter, and this operation is what has been called abstraction. Secondly, by way of combining two or more notions together we have the concept, such as the concept of man which is composed of animality and rationality, the genus and differentia. And this constitutes the case of a thing. Hence, a complete essence constitutes also its definition. Thirdly, since concepts are neither true nor false, when affirmed or negated in a proposition, we have a judgment.

The intellect is theoretical and practical. Practical intellect is common to

552

553
all people. This faculty is the origin of arts of man necessary and useful for his existence. Practical intellectibles are produced through experience which is based on sensation and imagination. Consequently, practical intellect is corruptible since its intellectibles depend for their existence on sensation and imagination. Hence they are generated when perceptions and representations are generated, and corrupted when these are corrupted.

Through practical intellect man loves and hates, lives in society, and has friends. Virtues are the product of practical intellect. The existence of virtues is nothing more than the existence of representations from which we move towards virtuous acts in the most right manner; such as to be brave in the proper place and time and according to the right measure.44

Two main questions must be settled concerning the theoretical intellect, the first its eternity and the second, its communion with the agent intellect. The first question can be put in other terms: Are the theoretical intellectibles always in actuality, or do they first exist in potency and then in actuality, thus being in some way material? This brings ibn Rushd once more to the consideration of the material forms, grading from the elementary forms (i.e. forms of the four elements) to the representations produced by the imaginative soul. They all have four things in common. (1) Their existence is subsequent to change. (2) They are diverse and multiple according to the diversity and plurality of their objects. (It follows from these two qualities that they are temporal.) (3) They are composed of something material and something formal. (4) The perceived is different from the existent, since the form perceived is one in so far as it is intelligible and multiple as regards its individuality.45

Intelligible forms in man are different from all the other material forms. (1) Their intellectual existence is one and the same as their objective existence which can be pointed out. (2) Their perception is infinite since the forms when abstracted have no individual plurality. (3) The intellect is the intellectible and perception is the perceived. (4) Intellect grows with old age, whereas all other faculties weaken, because the intellect operates without an organ.46

The operation of intellecction runs like this: there is the intellect or the person who perceives, and there are the intellectibles which are the object of intellect and perceived by the intellect. Intellectibles must be existent, otherwise the intellect would have nothing to apprehend, because it can only be attached to what exists, not to what does not exist.47 And, our knowledge is the effect of the existents. Now, these intellectibles, namely, the universals, either exist in the soul as held by Plato, or exist in the reality outside the soul. Ibn Rushd, following Aristotle, rejects the doctrine of idealism. Consequently, universals exist in reality and their existence is attached to the particular composed of matter and form. Through the operation of abstraction, the intellect denudes the forms of matter.

It follows that intellectibles are partly material and partly immaterial.48 They are material in so far as they depend on representations which in their turn depend on the particulars. The material intellect must not be understood as corporeal, but as mere possibility, the disposition to receive the intellectibles. What brings out the possible intellect from potency to actuality is the agent intellect. It is higher and nobler than the possible. It is itself existing, always in actuality, whether perceived by us or not. This agent intellect is from all points of view one and the same with the intellectibles.

Man can attain to the agent intellect in his life-time as he grows up. Since it has been shown that the intellect is nothing other than the intellectibles, the act of the intellect in acquiring the intellectibles is called the "union" (al-ittihād) or the "communion" (al-ittiqād).

Union is not something analogous to the way of the Sufis, since the agent intellect is not divine and does not illuminate our souls as some Neo-Platonists hold. Union is a rational operation explained on epistemological grounds, and is based on the requirement of the universal forms by the possible intellect. These universal forms have no existence in actuality apart from the sensible individuals.

When ibn Rushd was translated into Latin, some of his doctrines were accepted and some refuted. The movement which was influenced by him is called Latin Averroism. It means Aristotelian philosophy as interpreted by ibn Rushd, his distinction between philosophy and theology, his empirical rationalism, and more especially his theory concerning the intellect. On the whole, Latin Averroism considered ibn Rushd a faithful exponent of Aristotle and of truth. Meanwhile, there arose many theologians who opposed his doctrines. An example of this opposition is to be found in the treatise of Albert the Great, "On the Oneness of the Intellect against Averroes." Siger of Brabant followed ibn Rushd in his psychology in particular; a summary of Siger's treatise: "On the Intellect,"49 proves that he borrowed his ideas from a translation of the Kitāb al-Nafs. The Averroist movement lasted till the ninth/fifteenth century and had many reactions, which proves the great influence of the philosopher of Cordova.

E

THE WAY TO SCIENCE

Science, religion, and philosophy constitute three different realms. Man is by necessity forced to find some way of harmonizing these different aspects of culture which co-exist in the society in which he lives; otherwise his personality

44 Ibid., p. 71.
46 Ibid., p. 74.
47 Ibid., p. 76.
48 Ibid., p. 76.
49 Taḥāfiṭ, p. 281.
50 Kitāb al-Nafs, p. 88.
51 For this summary, see Wilson, op. cit., p. 396.
would disintegrate. Science is necessary for the welfare of all the people living in a civilized community. Their material existence is dependent on and correlated with the degree of scientific knowledge. Religion is even more fundamental in human societies. As Bergson puts it, "We find in the past, we could find to day, human societies with neither science nor art nor philosophy. But there has never been a society without religion." 4b Philosophy is the search for truth. It has rightly been said that man is a metaphysical animal. The greatness of famous philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Ibn Sina, ibn Rushd, Descartes, Kant, etc.—lies in placing each of these three disciplines in its proper place, both in the sphere of knowledge and of action. The first philosophers in Islam gave to science its due consideration, without devaluing religion. Al-Kindi, al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina were all scientists and philosophers. And with that, they were all sincere Muslims, except that they interpreted religion in the light of their scientific and philosophical knowledge.

Al-Ghazali was dissatisfied with the doctrines of the philosophers. He attacked them in his book "The Incoherence of the Philosophers" and accused them of kufr on twenty points. The eloquence of al-Ghazali, his deep knowledge of the art of controversy and argumentation, and his vast erudition in every study gave him a wide popularity to the point that he was considered an eminent authority on Islam (bujiat al-Islam).

Ibn Rushd answered the accusations point by point. The discussion between the two great figures is really an interesting debate, which mirrors a genuine conflict in Muslim society, between religion, on the one hand, and science and philosophy, on the other. Ibn Rushd, in his capacity as a philosopher aiming at truth, integrated the three apparently diverse realms. Through rational interpretation of the Qur'an, he effected the harmony of religion with philosophy. He unveiled the true way to religion as stated in the Qur'an.

He, now, turns to pave the way to science. In his enthusiastic defence of religion, al-Ghazali unintentionally shut the door to it. The mystic way of the Sufis prescribed by him is incompatible with the rational methods of science. The Muslims, unfortunately, followed al-Ghazali, the "Authority of Islam," and neglected little by little the study of the sciences. Their once great civilization faded. On the other hand, ibn Rushd defended science, and medieval Europe followed the way prescribed by him to attain to it. This is the true spirit of Latin Averroism which led to the rise of European science. Science is the body of systematized and formulated knowledge based on observation and classification of facts. But the way to science is more basic than the scientific truths so obtained, since through the scientific method we can attain to the scientific realities and progress more and more in our study.

The two Tâhjûs, of al-Ghazali and that of ibn Rushd, picture the ideas which were in play on the stage of Islamic civilization during the fifth and sixth/eleventh and twelfth centuries. Some of those ideas, though now considered to be of mere historical value, were of major importance at the time. The length at which the problem of the eternity of the world is discussed and its prime place at the head of the twenty discussions indicate the importance that al-Ghazali gave to it. Ibn Rushd considers that the main questions for which al-Ghazali charged the philosophers of being irreligious amount to three: eternity of the world, denial of God's knowledge of particulars, and bodily resurrection. In our view, the problem which still remains of vital importance is that of causality. Scientific thought can only be established on the basis of the causal principle. While Hume criticized causality, Kant tried to find out some rational grounds on which causality can stand. Through transcendental a priori forms of pure reason, Kant believed that science is safeguarded. The induction of Stuart Mill presupposes universal causation. Russell says: "Whether from pure prejudice, or from the influence of tradition, or for some other reason, it is easier to believe that there is a law of nature to the effect that causes are always followed by their effects than to the effect that this usually happens." 4b Only contemporary science has replaced the conception of "cause" by "causal laws," causal lines, statistics, etc.

Ibn Rushd found himself entitled to safeguard science and show the way to attain to scientific realities, since al-Ghazali undermined the necessary relation of cause and effect. As Quadri puts it: "La science perdait ainsi toute raison d'être. La substance n'avait plus de fondement. . . . La pensée scientifique devait être revendiquée et sauvée." 4c

Al-Ghazali begins the dialogue about the natural sciences by enumerating the different sciences "to make it known that the Holy Law does not ask one to contest and refute them." In this enumeration he mentions such sciences as the art of incantation, alchemy, astrology, etc. Ibn Rushd rejects such pseudo-sciences. The talismanic art is vain. Whether alchemy really exists is very dubious. Astrology does not belong to the physical sciences. 4b

The real reason why al-Ghazali denied the necessary causal relation is that "on its negation depends the possibility of affirming the existence of miracles which interrupt the usual course of nature, like changing of the rod into a serpent. . . ." 4b According to ibn Rushd, miracles must not be questioned or examined by the philosophers. "He who doubts them merits punishment." However, the miracle of Islam lies not in such miracles as changing the rod into a serpent, but in the Qur'an, "the existence of which is not an interruption of the course of nature assumed by tradition . . . but its miraculous nature is established by way of perception and consideration for every man. . . . And this miracle is far superior to all others." 4b In fact, ibn Rushd repeats here what he has stated before in his twin books the Fasl and the

---

Quadri, La Philosophie Arabe, Paris, 1947, p. 204.
Ibid., p. 313.
Ibid., p. 315.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

**Ibn Rushd** philosophers in a comical manner that “if a man who had left a book at home might find it on his return changed into a youth ... a stone changed into gold, and gold changed into stone; and if he were asked about any of these things he would answer, ‘I do not know what there is at present in my house.’” 41 Al-Ghazzali accepts the challenge saying: “There is no objection to admitting that anything may be possible for God.” An example of this possibility is the miracle of Ibrahim when he was thrown into fire and was not burnt. Fire by the will of God lost its quality of burning. Fire in itself is not an efficient cause. The true cause is God who through His will and power gives the things their qualities. There is no reason, then, why they might not be contrary to what they are.

To meet this argument, ibn Rushd looks at the problem from the philosophical point of view already mentioned. The permanence of things permits us to attain to the essence of a thing, its definition, and giving it a name. “For it is self-evident that things have essences and attributes which determine the special functions of each one of them and through which the definitions and names are differentiated. If a thing had not its specific nature, it would not have a special name nor a definition, and all things would be one.” 42

As to the second postulate concerning causality, “all events have four causes, agent, form, matter, and end.” Human mind perceives the things and conceives their causes. And, “intelligence is nothing but the perception of things with their causes, and in this it distinguishes itself from all the other faculties of apprehension; and he who denies causes denies the intellect. Logic implies the existence of causes and effects, and knowledge of the effects can only be rendered perfect through knowledge of their causes. Denial of causes implies the denial of knowledge.” 43 If they call the relation of cause-effect a habit, habit is an ambiguous term. Do they mean by habit (1) the habit of the agent, or (2) the habit of the existing things, or (3) our habit to form a habit about such things? Ibn Rushd rejects the first two meanings and accepts the last which is in harmony with his conceptualism. Because it is impossible that God should have a habit. The habit of existing things is really their nature, since habit can only exist in the animated.

On the whole, the way to science starts with faith which is the basis of certitude. Sceptics and agnostics have no place in science. Armed with this faith in the existence of the world as such, the intellect discovers the causes of things. Scientific knowledge is the knowledge of things with their causes which produce them.

---

Ibn Rushd nas Falaṣṭiynahu, by Antun Farah, Alexandria, 1905, p. 91. The author began an Arabian Averroism analogous to the Latin Averroism, and wrote articles on ibn Rushd in his journal al-ʾJamiʿah. When he published this book, he added the discussions of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Qasim Amin, the two leaders of recent renaissances in Egypt.

Tāhṣīl al-Tahṣīl, p. 318.

---

41 Ibid., p. 324.
42 Ibid., p. 318.
43 Ibid., p. 319.
THE WAY TO BEING

Two distinct types of metaphysics came down to the Arabs, a metaphysics of Being and a metaphysics of the One. The first is that of Aristotle, and the second that of Plotinus. Since the *Enneads* of Plotinus was mistakenly ascribed to Aristotle, al-Kindi was confused between the two systems and could not bring them into accord. Al-Farabi was more inclined to the philosophy of the One. He fused the two systems in the Necessary Being, God, the One of the Qur'an and the One of Plotinus. The way to the One is rather a mystic way, and that to Being is purely logical. The philosophy of al-Farabi was mixed with the wine of mysticism. Ibn Sina, following the way opened by al-Farabi, looked at the problem from a new standpoint, i.e., from the distinction between the necessary and the contingent, yet in his old age he dwelt upon the fusion of the One and the Being with a kind of divergence towards a gnostic mysticism. Ibn Rushd returned to the original doctrine of Aristotle and freed himself from the burden of Neo-Platonism. Being, and the way to attain to it, is the object of his short *Talkhis* on *Metaphysics*. At the beginning of this treatise he says: "Our aim is to pick up from the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle his theoretical doctrines." 44

As a faithful follower of Aristotle he defines metaphysics as the knowledge of Being as such. Metaphysics is part of the theoretical sciences. It studies Being absolutely ("-ifâd); the immaterial principles of physical sensibles such as unity, plurality, potency, actuality, etc., the causes of the existents on the side of God and divine entities. Physical science is concerned with the causes of individual beings. It remains for metaphysics to study the highest causes of the particulars.

The subject-matter of metaphysics is three-fold: the study of (1) sensible things and their genera, namely, the ten categories; (2) the principles of substance, the separate entities and how they are related to the First Principle, which is the Supreme Perfection and the Prime Cause; and (3) the particular sciences in view of correcting their sophistries. It is evident that the second part of this division is the most fundamental, and the two others are related to it. Hence, Ibn Rushd gives a more elaborate definition of metaphysics. "It is the science which studies the relationship of the different existents as regards their hierarchical order of causes up to the Supreme Cause." 45

Hence, knowledge of Being consists in an exploration into its causes and principles. True knowledge is conformity with the existent. Ibn Rushd confronts the mental with the external existence to the point that what exists in our minds is in conformity with what is outside, it is true of Being. Two distinct meanings are thus applied to Being, the one epistemological and the other ontological. Which of the two is the origin of the other, essence or existence? There is no ambiguity in the system of Ibn Rushd about this question. The external existents are the basis of our knowledge. If an entity exists in our minds without having any real existence outside, it would not be a being, but simply an entity such as chimera, for example. 46 Being and existence are, then, one and the same. To exist is to be real. The criterion of Being is its real existence, whether in potency or in act. Prime matter has being, although it never exists without form. When the intellect is attached to external existents, the being which is outside becomes inside the mind in the form of a concept or an essence. Existence, then, is presupposed in Being.

External existents are called substances. Substance is the first of the ten categories; the rest are the secondary substances. Prime substance has more substantiality than the secondary. When we say, "Socrates is a man," this denotes that Socrates is more substantial than human, humanity, or manness. Meanwhile, manness is as real as Socrates. Both the universal and the particular are substances. The particular has a sensuous existence, and the universal an intellectual one. But the individual substances are the starting point in the entire metaphysics of Ibn Rushd.

Physical bodies are commonly said to be composed of two principles, matter and form. This is not quite true, because a body is not only matter or only form; it is a whole composed of the two. It is a composite. This whole is additional to the two principles of Being. 47 Hence the principles of the sensible substances amount to three. The body is one unity which has many parts. By substance, we mean the whole composed of matter and form.

Some philosophers, for example Ibn Sina, assumed that every physical body has two forms, a specific form and a corporeal form. The latter, *forma corporeatis*, consists in the three dimensions which give the body extension in space. According to Ibn Sina, the form of corporeity is substance and is the cause of plurality in physical beings. Ibn Rushd rejects this view and says that Ibn Sina was totally wrong. 48 Individual substances are composed of matter and only one form. They have two kinds of existence, the one sensuous and the other intellectual. Matter is the cause of their corporeity and form the cause of their intelligibility.

A thing is known by its definition which gives its essence; and definition is composed of parts, the genus and the differentia. Genera, species, and differ-

44 *Talkhis ma ba'd al-Tab'ah*, Cairo edition by Osman Amin, 1958
47 *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 65. On p. 65 Ibn Rushd says: "It is evident that the sensible substances are three: matter, form, and the whole composed of them." Now one would ask, "If sensible substances are composed of matter and form, what do their names denote, the matter, the form, or the composite?" It is clear that the name most probably denotes the whole.
tiae are universals. Now, are the essences or the universals the same as the individual things, or are they different? Universals are identical with individuals, since they define their essences. Those who assume that the universals have a separate existence and subsist by themselves fall in contradictions very difficult to resolve. In their view human knowledge can be possible only if the universals have separate real existence. But, “it is evident that for the intellect of essences we have no need to assume the separateness of the universals.” They exist only in our minds as concepts denied of matter. Hence, this doctrine is conceptualism, as opposed to realism and nominalism. Human mind occupies a dignified place in nature and plays an active role in acquiring knowledge.

Moreover, universals are not eternal and immutable as Platonist idealism assumes. It is true that, as regards essence, universals are eternal since essence as such is not corruptible. But as regards the individual which is essentially corruptible, the universal is corruptible and changeable in so far as it is a part of the composite of form and matter. The first substance is the “this” which is pointed at.

How can the universals be eternal and at the same time corruptible? Or, as Ibn Rushd puts it: “How can eternal entities be the principles of corruptible things?” This difficulty is solved by reference to potency and actuality. The scale of beings is graded from pure potency to pure actuality. Prime matter is pure potency; it can only exist in a being combined with form. The lowest existents are the four elements of which sensible bodies are composed. Potency (dynamic in Greek) can be understood as possibility or disposition. Potency is so called as opposed to actuality. Now, the first substance can exist in actuality or in potency. Matter inherent in the substance is its potentiality. This potentiality is of different degrees according to proximity and remoteness. Man, for example, exists potentially in the sperm and in the four elements; the first potency is the near one, the latter is the remote one.

Four conditions are necessary for a thing to exist: (1) the proximate subject, (2) its disposition, (3) the motor causes, (4) the absence of preventing causes. Take, as an example, a sick man. Not all sick men have the possibility to be cured, and he who has the possibility should also have the disposition. In addition to these two conditions, he must have the efficient cause which brings him from sickness to health, provided there are no external preventions. The case of the natural objects is similar to that of the artificial ones.

Consequently, there is always a motor cause which brings a thing to exist in actuality. Sometimes, there are more than one motor causes. For example, bread has the potency to change into flesh and blood, and has as motor causes the mouth, the stomach, the liver, etc. The remote cause is the potency

\[ \text{n the elements to change into flesh. Along with these causes, bread is in need of a very remote cause, namely, the heavenly bodies.} \]

Since physical things are composed of matter and form, potency is always subsequent to matter, and actuality subsequent to form. Form, which is the act, is prior to matter at every point, because form is also the efficient and final cause. The final cause is the cause of all other causes, since these are there for the sake of it. Furthermore, potency is not prior in time to act, because potency can never be demulcd of act. Matter and form exist simultaneously in a being. The motor cause of a physical thing is apparently prior to the existence of the thing. A distinction must be made between a motor cause and an efficient cause. Motor cause applies only to change in place, namely, the movement of translation. All other changes, especially generation and corruption, are caused by efficient causes. Celestial bodies are moved by a motor, not an efficient, cause, because their movement is translation in space and they do not change. They are intermediate existents between the pure act and the existents which exist sometimes in potency and sometimes in act. Their similarity to existents in act lies in their eternity and incorruptibility. Their similarity to the things which exist in potency and come to actuality is in their change of place, their circular movement in space. Ibn Rushd terminates the discussion of this point by saying: “Consider how divine providence has managed to combine the two kinds of existence. In between pure act and pure potency, it has posited this kind of potency, namely, the potency in space through which the eternal and corruptible existences are connected.”

Furthermore, act is prior to potency in point of dignity and perfection, because evil is privation or one of the two opposites, such as sickness which, although existing, is bad as regards privation of health; and since potency is the possibility to become either of the two opposites, it is not an absolute good. Pure act is an absolute good. Hence, the nearer the things are to the First Principle which is pure act, the better they are. Celestial bodies have obtained their principles from the First Principle, God. And, likewise, everything on this earth which is good is the product of His will and design. As to evil, it exists because of matter. This world, as it is, is the best possible one. Either the world would not have existed at all, or it would have existed having some evil for the sake of a greater good.

We have seen that sensible substances are composed of matter and form. Now, are these two principles sufficient for the existence of sensible substances? Or, is there a separate substance which is the cause of their perpetual existence? It is evident that the sensible is in need of a motor cause, and this cause needs another, up to the First Mover whose movement is eternal. This brings us to the consideration of time.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Time is an eternal continuum subordinate to an eternal movement, which is continuous and one, because the true one is continuous. It is clear that ibn Rushd asserts the eternity of the world, on the assumption that both movement and time are eternal. Eternity of the world is the first and longest discussion in the Tahāfut of al-Ghazālī. The whole discussion is, as mentioned above, only of historical value, and, therefore, we need not dwell on it.

The First Mover moves the primum mobile by desire, not by representation. The world is animated, i.e., it has a soul. It also has intelligence. Celestial bodies are moved not through sensations and representations, as is the case with animals, but through the conception of intelligence. (Intelligence is so called with regard to celestial bodies; with regard to man it is called intellect.) Heavenly bodies have no senses, because these are found in animals for their conservation. Representations exist in animals for the same end. Celestial bodies are in need of conservation since they are eternal. Their movements are the product of desire (shauq) through intellect. The first mover of the firmament is moved by a most dignified desire—desire for the Supreme Good. The movers of the celestial bodies are, then, intelligences which are themselves immobile. There are thirty-eight movers and nine spheres.

The tenth intelligence, or the Intelligenzia Agens, is the last of these movers. It moves the sphere of the moon. It is the cause of the movement of the sublunary beings. It is this intelligence which gives forms to the elements and other existents.

Man is the nearest being to the celestial bodies, and this is because of his intellect. He is intermediate between the eternal and the corruptible. Through the agent intelligence, he acquires the forms which are its products. Thus, communion with the agent intelligence can be realized. And in this communion lies man's felicity and happiness.

Chapter XXIX

NASIR AL-DIN TUSI

A

LIFE

Khwājah Naṣr al-Dīn abu Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥasan, an accomplished scholar, mathematician, astronomer, and Shiʿite politician of the period of the Mongol invasion of the Ṣassānis and the Caliphate, was born at Tūs in 597/1201. After receiving early education from his father and Muḥammad b. Ḥasan, he studied Fiqh, Usūl, Ḥikmah and Kalām especially the Iṣkārāt of ibn Sīna, from Muhbād Fark al-Dīn Dāmād, and mathematics from Muḥammad Ḥāṣib, at Nīṣapur. He then went to Baḵhī, where he studied medicine and philosophy from Qurṭb al-Dīn, mathematics from Kamal al-Dīn b. Yūnus, and Fiqh and Usūl from Sālim b. Badrān.

Tūsī began his career as an astrologer to Naṣr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahīm, the Governor of the Ismāʿīlī mountain fortress of Quṭbīn during the reign of ʿAlī al-Dīn Muḥammad (618–652/1221–1255), the seventh Grand Master (Khwādhūn) of Amām. His “correspondence” with the waṣīr of the last ʿAbbāsīd Caliph, al-Qaṣīm b. Aḥmad (640–656/1242–1258) of Baḵhī, was, however, intercepted by his employers, and he was removed to Amām under close supervision, although he enjoyed there every facility to continue his studies. In 654/1258, he “played” the last ʿAbbāsīd ruler Rūm al-Dīn Khwāndūsh into the hands of Hulqū and then accompanied the latter as his trusted adviser to the conquest of Baḵhī in 657/1259.

B

THE MARĀḠAH OBSERVATORY

Tūsī's chief claim to fame rests on his persuading Hulqū to found the celebrated observatory (raṣād Khwātā) at Marāḡah, Abū Ḥārām, in 657/1259, which was equipped with the best instruments, "some of them constructed for the first time." Here he compiled the astronomical tables, called Zīj al-Ikhwānī, which "became popular throughout Asia, even in China." Besides being dedicated to the advancement of astronomy and mathematics in the late seventh/thirteenth century, this observatory was important in three other ways. It was the first observatory the recording and non-recording expenditure of which was met out of endowments, thus opening the door for the financing of future observatories. Secondly, just as ibn Ṭūfīnl (d. 581/1185) turned the Court of Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʿmin into an enviable intellectual galaxy that promoted the cause of knowledge and wisdom in the West, Tūsī made the Marāḡah observatory a "splendid assembly" of the men of knowledge and learning by making "special arrangements" for the teaching of philo-

---

1 Zand’s article on Tūsī in Hīdā, November 1956, Karachi.
2 Ivanov, Taqawwumātī, p. xxv.
4 After passing into the service of Hulqū, Tūsī, in the preface to Zīj al-Ikhwānī, referred to his connection with the Ismāʿīlītes as “casual” (Ivanov, op. cit., p. xxv) and also “rewinded” the dedication of Abū Ḥārām’s Naṣrī to Naṣr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahīm, his Ismāʿīlī patron at Qaṭbīn (Brown, Literary History of Persia, Vol. II, p. 456).
7 Ahmad Sayif’s article in Yādndeh-i Tūsī, Teheran University, Teheran, 1957, p. 61.
9 Yādndeh-i Tūsī, p. 86.

565
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Sophistical sciences, besides mathematics and astronomy, and by dedicating the income of endowments to stipends. Thirdly, annexed to the observatory, there was a huge library in which were stored the incorruptible treasures of knowledge looted by the Mongols and Tartars during their invasions on Iraq, Bagdad, Syria, and other territories. According to ibn Shākir, the library contained more than four hundred thousand volumes. To Tusi, retained his influential position under Abaqa, Hulagu’s successor, uninterrupted until his death in 672/1274.

C

WORKS

In an age of widespread political devastation followed by intellectual decline, Hulagu’s patronage to Tusi is of singular importance in the history of Muslim thought. The revival and promotion of philosophical sciences in the late seventh/thirteenth century centred round Tusi’s personality. To the Persians, he was known as “the teacher of man” (usūd al-baṣbhar). Bar-Hebraeus regarded him as “a man of vast learning in all the branches of philosophy.” To Ivanov, he appears an “encyclopedist,” and Afnan thinks him to be “the most competent...commentator of Avicenna in Persia.” One also cannot help being impressed by the “remarkable industry” displayed by him in “editing and improving” the translations made by Thabit bin Qurrah, Quṣaṣ bin Luqa, and Isḥaq bin Hunain of Greek mathematicians and astronomers. Brockelmann has enumerated fifty-nine of his extant works, but Ivanov attributes “something like one hundred and fifty works” to him. The list given by Mudarris Riṣūlī runs to one hundred and thirteen titles, excluding twenty-one the attribution of which to Tusi is doubtful.

Himself an accomplished scholar rather than a creative mind, Tusi’s position is mainly that of a revivalist and his works are largely eclectic in character. But even as a revivalist and eclectic, he is not lacking in originality, at least in the presentation of his material. His versatility is indeed astonishing. His manifold and varied interests extend to philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, physics, medicine, mineralogy, music, history, literature, and dogmatics. His important philosophical works are listed below.

19 Asdā al-Iṣbahā, p. YB.
21 Ivanov, op. cit., p. lxxv.
22 Afnan, Avicenna, p. 244.
25 Ivanov, op. cit., p. xxi.
26 Asdā, pp. YJ-VH.

Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī

1. Asdā al-Iṣḥābā (logic), 4747.
3. Tādīl al-Mīyār (logic).
4. Taṣirīd al-Aqīqīd (dogmatics), Teheran, 1926.
5. Qawā'id al-Aqīqīd (dogmatics), Teheran, 1926.
6. Risālīh i Tīqādīd (dogmatics).
8. Aṣḥāb al-Maṣhūr (Sufi ethics).
9. Risālīh dar al-ʿIḥbāt i Wājid (metaphysics).
10. Iḥbāt i Jawāb al-Mufāriq (metaphysics).
11. Risālīh dar al-Wājud i Jawāb i Muyarrad (metaphysics).
12. Risālīh dar al-ʿIḥbāt i ʿAql i Faʿal (metaphysics).
13. Risālīh Ṭahrār i Maʿālūt (metaphysics).
15. Risālīh ʿIlal va Maʿālūt (metaphysics).
17. Taṣawwurāt (metaphysics), Bombay, 1956.
19. Ḥall-i Muḥkāmāt al-Iṣbārāt, Lucknow, 1293/1876.

D

AKHLĀQ-I NĀŠIRI

Nothing can be farther from truth than the assertion that Aṣḥāb al-Maṣhūr of Ṭūsī is a mere “translation” of Ṭahābāt al-Aṣḥāb of ibn Miskawayh. The author was undoubtedly commissioned by Naṣīr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rahmān, the Isfahānī Governor of Qūshān, to translate the Kitāb al-Ṭahrār (Ṭahābāt al-Aṣḥāb) from Arabic into Persian, but he did not accept the suggestion for fear of “distorting and disfiguring the original.” Besides, ibn Miskawayh’s effort is confined to the description of moral discipline; the domestic and political disciplines are altogether missing in his work. These, according to Ṭūsī, are equally important aspects of “practical philosophy” and, therefore, are not to be ignored. With this in mind, Ṭūsī compiled Aṣḥāb al-Maṣhūr on the following pattern.

With regard to content, the part on moral philosophy is a “summary” and not a translation of Kitāb al-Ṭahrār, but the form, the arrangement of topics, and the classification of subjects in Ṭūsī’s own, which apparently give an air of originality to it.

For the parts on domestic and political philosophy, Ṭūsī is greatly indebted to ibn Sinā and Fārābī, but yet the mere addition of these two parts which

19 Aṣḥāb al-Maṣhūr, p. 5.
20 Ibid., p. 6.
21 Ibid., p. 145.
22 Ibid., p. 175.
thought of this deviation in terms of quantity (kammiyat) and, therefore, the excess (iṣrāf) and defect (tafriż) of a state were for them the only two causes of moral diseases. Ṭūsī for the first time propounded the view that the deviation is not only quantitative but also qualitative, and to this new type of deviation he gave the name of perversion\(^{20}\) (tradā'at). Consequently, a moral disease may have one of the three causes:—(1) excess, (2) defect, or (3) perversion of reason, ire, or desire. This explains adequately that fear constitutes the perversion of ire, and sorrow, the perversion of desire.

Equipped with the theory of triple causation of the maladies of the soul, Ṭūsī classifies the fatal diseases of the theoretical reason into perplexity (bairât), simple ignorance (jahāl-i ba'ârî), and compound ignorance (jahāl-i marâkab), constituting its excess, deficiency, and perversion—a classification which cannot be traced to ibn Miskawaih.

Perplexity is caused by the inability of the soul to distinguish truth from falsehood due to the conflicting evidence and confusing arguments for and against a controversial issue. As a cure of perplexity, Ṭūsī suggests that a perplexed man should, in the first instance, be made to realize that composition and division, affirmation and denial, i.e., the contraries, being mutually exclusive, cannot exist in one and the same thing at the same time, so that he may be convinced that if a proposition is true, it cannot be false, and if it is false, it cannot be true. After his assimilating this self-evident principle, he may be taught the rules of syllogism to facilitate the detection of fallacies in the arguments.

Simple ignorance consists in a man’s lack of knowledge on a subject without his presuming that he knows it. Such ignorance is a precedent condition for acquiring knowledge, but it is fatal to be contented with it. The disease may be cured by bringing home to the patient the fact that intellect and not physical appearance entitles a man to the designation of man, and that an ignorant man is no better than a brute; rather he is worse than that, for the latter can be excused for its absence of reason, he cannot.

Compound ignorance is a man’s lack of knowledge on a subject coupled with his presumption that he knows it. In spite of ignorance he does not know that he is ignorant. According to Ṭūsī, it is almost an incurable disease, but devotion to mathematics may perhaps reduce it to simple ignorance.

Ṭūsī regards anger (ghādāb), cowardice (jubun), and fear (khaṣaf) as the three prominent diseases of ire (quwamāt-i diṣṭā) on the side of excess, deficiency, and perversion, respectively. In his analysis of fear, especially the fear of death, and in his elaboration of the seven concomitants and ten causes of anger, he follows ibn Miskawaih.

Similarly, excess of appetite (iṣrāf-i shahwort) is caused by the excess of desire, while levity (batālāt) results from its deficiency, and sorrow (huṣn) and jealousy (bashad) constitute the perversion of this power. He defines jealousy

\(^{20}\) Aḥlāq-i Nāṣirī, p. 114.
DOMESTIC SCIENCE

Acknowledging his debt to Ibn Sina, Tusi defines home (manzil) as a particular relationship existing between husband and wife, parents and children, master and servant, and wealth and its possessor. The aim of domestic science (ta'addi-i manzil) is to evolve an efficient system of discipline, conducive to the physical, social, and mental welfare of this primary group, with father as its controlling head. The father’s function is to maintain and restore the equipoise of the family, having in view the particular dispositions of the constituents and the dictates of expediency in general.

Wealth is necessary for achieving the basic ends of self-preservation and race-preservation. For its acquisition, Tusi recommends the adoption of noble professions and the achievement of perfection in them, without ever giving way to inequity, immorality, and meanness. Hair-dressing and filth-cleaning are, no doubt, mean and repulsive professions, but they are warranted on the ground of social expediency.

Tusi regards the saving of wealth as an act of prudence, provided it is not prompted by greed or miserliness, and does not cause hardship to the constituents of the home or involve the risk of one’s integrity and prestige in society. In matters of expenditure, he stands for moderation in general. Nothing should be spent which may smack of extravagance, display, miscalculation or stinginess.

Not gratification of lust, but procreation and protection of property are the basic aims of marriage. Intelligence, integrity, chastity, modesty, shrewdness, tenderness of the heart, and, above all, obedience to husband are the qualities which ought to be sought in a wife. It is good if she is further graced with the qualities of noble birth, wealth, and beauty, but these are absolutely undesirable if not accompanied with intelligence, modesty and chastity. Administrative expediency requires that the husband should be awe-inspiring. He may be benevolent and magnanimous to his wife, but in the wider interests of the home, he should avoid excessive affection, keep her in subjection, and should not confide secrets or discuss important matters with her. Polygamy is undesirable because it invariably upsets the whole domestic organization. Women are feeble-minded by nature and psychologically jealous of another partner in the husband’s love and fortune. The concession of polygamy is reluctantly given by Tusi to kings because they are in a position to command unconditional obedience, but even for them it is desirable to avoid it as an act of prudence. Man is to the home as heart is to the body, and as one heart cannot give sustenance to two bodies, so one man cannot manage two homes. So great is the sanctity of home in Tusi’s eyes that he even advises people to remain unmarried if they are unfit to enforce family equanimity.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

On the discipline of children, Tusi, following ibn Miskawiah, begins with the inculcation of good morale through praise, reward, and benevolent censure. He is not in favour of frequent reproof and open censure; the former increases the temptation, and the latter leads to audacity. After bringing home to them the rules regarding dining, dressing, conversation, behaviour, and the manner of moving in society, the children should be trained for a particular profession of their own liking. The daughters should be specifically trained to become good wives and mothers in the domestic set-up.

Tusi closes the discussion with the greatest emphasis on the observance of parental rights, as enjoined by Islam. Psychologically speaking, children realize the rights of the father only after attaining the age of discrimination, but those of the mother are evident from the very start of life. From this Tusi concludes that paternal rights are largely mental, while maternal ones are largely physical in character. Thus, to the father one owes unselfish devotion, veneration, obedience, praise, etc., and to the mother, the provision of food, clothes, and other physical comforts.

Lastly, servants are to home as hands and legs are to man. Tusi recommends that they should be treated benevolently, so that they may be inspired to identify their interests with those of their master. The underlying idea is that they should serve out of love, regard, and hope, and not out of necessity compulsion, and fear, which affect adversely the interests of the home.

To sum up: Home for Tusi is the centre of domestic life. Income, saving, expenditure, and the discipline of wife, children, and servants, all revolve round the general welfare of the family group as a whole.

G

POLITICS

Farabi’s Siyāsat al-Madīnah and Ārāh al-Madīnat al-Fāqiḥāh form the first attempt towards the philosophical formulation of a political theory in the Muslim world. He used ‘ilm al-madani both in the sense of the civic science and the science of government. Following him, Tusi has also used siyāsat-i mudun in both of these senses. In fact, his treatment of the need for civic society (tamaddun) and the types of social groups and cities is largely derived from Farabi’s views on the subject.

Man is by nature a social being. To substantiate his position, Tusi refers to insan, the Arabic word for man, which literally means to be gregarious or associating. Since this natural sociability (uns-i taba’i) is characteristically human, it follows that the perfection of man consists in evincing this characteristic fully towards his fellow-beings. Civilization is another name for this perfection. It is for this reason that Islam has emphasized the superiority of congregational prayers over those offered in isolation.

The word tamaddun is derived from madinah (city) which means living together of men belonging to different professions for the purpose of helping one another in their needs. Since no man is self-sufficient, everyone is in need of help and co-operation from others. Wants differ from man to man and the same is true of the motives which induce one to co-operation. Some seek co-operation for the sake of pleasure; others are prompted by the consideration of profit; and still others aim at goodness or virtue. This diversity in the causes of co-operation leads to conflict of interests resulting in aggression and injustice. Thus arises the need for government to keep everyone content with his rightful lot without infringing the legitimate rights of others. Administration of justice, therefore, is the chief function of a government, which should be headed by a just king, who is the second arbitrator, the first being the divine Law. He can exercise royal discretion in minor details according to the exigencies of time and occasion, but this too should conform to the general principles of the divine Law. Such a king, Tusi concludes, is the viceroyer of God upon earth, and the physician of the world temper.

As to the qualities of this monarch, he should be graced with the nobility of birth, loftiness of purpose, sobriety of judgment, firmness of determination, endurance of hardship, large-heartedness, and righteous friends. His first and foremost duty is to consolidate the State by creating affection among his friends and dissatification among its enemies, and by promoting unity among the savants, warriors, agriculturists, and business men—the five constituents of the State.

Tusi then proceeds to lay down the principles of war ethics for the guidance of rulers. The enemy should never be taken lightly, however lowly he might be, but at the same time war should be avoided at all costs, even through diplomatic tricks, without resorting to perfidy. But if the conflict becomes inevitable, offensive should be taken only in the name of God and that too with the unanimous approval of the army. The army should be led by a man of dashing spirit, sound judgment, and experience in warfare. Tusi particularly emphasizes the maintenance of an efficient secret service to have vigilance over the movements of the enemy. Again, diplomacy demands that the enemy should, as far as possible, be taken prisoner rather than killed, and there should be no killing after the final victory, for clemency is more befitting a king than vengeance. In the case of a defensive stand, the enemy should be overthrown by ambush or surprise attack, provided the position is strong enough; otherwise no time should be lost in digging trenches building

572

Naṣr al-Dīn Ṭūsī

573

573

572

573

572

573

572

573

572

573
A History of Muslim Philosophy

fortresses, and even in negotiating for peace by offering wealth and using diplomatic devices.

Ṭūsī, being the wazīr of Hulāgū, was well aware of the degeneration of monarchy into absolute despotism, and, therefore, advised the attendants upon kings to avoid seeking close contact with them, for being in their company is in no way better than associating with fire. No office is more perilous than that of a minister to a king, and the minister has no greater safeguard against the jealousies of the Court and the vagaries of the royal mood than his trustworthiness. The minister should guard jealously the secrets confided to him, and should not be inquisitive about what is withheld from him. Ṭūsī was held in great esteem by the Mongol chief, yet he agrees with Ibn Mūqtaṣī, that the closer one may be to the king, the greater should he show his respect to him, so much so that if the king calls him “brother,” he should address him as “lord.”

SOURCE OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

According to Ṭūsī, the Qur’ānic injunctions relate to man as an individual, as a member of a family, and as an inhabitant of a city or State.[1] This three-fold division is evidently suggestive of the classification of practical philosophy into ethics, domestics, and politics by Muslim thinkers. The same is true of the content of these sciences; but it is no less true that later on these disciplines were considerably broadened under the influence of Plato and Aristotle. Shaulter’s remark that “ethics was the only subject in which the East did not imitate the West,” and that “the only influence which the West could bring to bear upon the East in connection with this subject, was the method of scientific treatment,”[2] is more true of domestics and politics, where Greek influence is least traceable, than of ethics proper.

PSYCHOLOGY

Instead of proving the existence of the soul, Ṭūsī starts with the assumption that it is a self-evident reality and as such it needs no proof. Nor is it capable of being proved. In a case like this, reasoning out of one’s own existence is a logical impossibility and absurdity, for an argument presupposes an argumentator and a subject for argument, but in this case both are the same, viz., the soul.

Nature of the Soul.—The soul is a simple, immaterial substance which perceives by itself. It controls the body through the muscles and sense-organs.

Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī

but is itself beyond the perception of the bodily instruments. After reproducing Ibn Miskawayh’s arguments for the incorporeality of the soul from its indivisibility, its power of assuming fresh forms without losing the previous ones, its conceiving opposite forms at one and the same time, and its correcting sense-illusions,[3] Ṭūsī adds two of his own arguments. Judgments of logic, physics, mathematics, theology, etc., all exist in one soul without any mingling, and can be recalled with characteristic clarity, which is not possible in a material substance; therefore, soul is an immaterial substance. Again, physical accommodation is limited and finite, so that a hundred persons cannot be accommodated at a place meant for fifty people, but this is not true of the soul. It has, so to say, sufficient capacity to accommodate all the ideas and concepts of the objects it knows, with plenty of room for fresh acquisition.[4] This too proves that the soul is a simple, immaterial substance.

In the common expression “My head, my ear, my eye,” the word “my”[5] indicates the individuality (huwā’iyah) of the soul, which possesses these organs, and not its incorporeality. The soul does provide a body as a means to its perfection, but it is not what it is because of its having a body.

Faculties of the Soul.—To the vegetative, animal, and human soul of his predecessors, Ṭūsī adds an imaginative soul which occupies an intermediate position between the animal and the human soul. The human soul is characterized with intellect (nūc) which receives knowledge from the first intellect. The intellect is of two kinds, theoretical and practical, as conceived by Aristotle. Following Kindī, Ṭūsī considers the theoretical intellect to be a potentiality, the realization of which involves four stages, viz., the material intellect (‘ajl-i hāyāltā), the angelic intellect (‘ajl-i malakī), the active intellect (‘ajl-i bi al-fā’l), and the acquired intellect (‘ajl-i musta’dād). It is at the stage of the acquired intellect that every conceptual form potentially contained in the soul becomes apparent to it, like the face of a man reflected in a mirror held before him. The practical intellect, on the other hand, is concerned with voluntary and purposive action. Its potentialities are, therefore, realized through moral, domestic, and political action.

The imaginative soul is concerned with sensuous perceptions, on the one hand, and with rational abstractions, on the other, so that if it is united with the animal soul, it becomes dependent upon it, and decays with it. But if it is associated with the human soul, it becomes independent of the bodily organs, and shares the happiness or misery of the soul with its immortality. After the separation of the soul from the body, a trace of imagination remains

[3] Every body belongs to a soul, according to this argument. In modern times, William James too has used the same argument to prove that every thought belongs to a mind. “It seems as if the elementary psychic facts were not thought, this thought or that thought, but my thought, every thought being owned.” W. James, Psychology (Briefer Course), p. 153.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

in its form, and the punishment and reward of the human soul depend upon this trace (baʿīdat) of what the imaginative soul knew or did in this world.\(^{43}\)

The sensitive and calculative imagination of Aristotle apparently constitutes the structure of Tūsī's imaginative soul, but his bringing the imaginative soul into relation with an elaborate theory of punishment and reward in the hereafter is his own.

As a matter of tradition handed down from ibn Sina and Ghazālī,\(^{44}\) Tūsī believes in the localization of functions in the brain. He has located common sense (ḥiss-i muṣḥarāt) in the first ventricle of the brain, perception (nuṣqu-wirāk) in the beginning of the first part of the second ventricle, imagination, in the fore part of the third ventricle, and memory in the rear part of the brain.

J

METAPHYSICS

According to Tūsī, metaphysics proper consists of two parts, the science of divinity (šāh-i Ilāhī) and the first philosophy (falsafah-i iliā). The knowledge of God, intellects, and souls constitutes the science of divinity, and the knowledge of the universe and the universals constitutes the first philosophy. The knowledge of the categories of unity and plurality, necessity and contingency, essence and existence, eternity and transitoriness also forms part of the latter. Among the accessories (furūʿ) of metaphysics fall the knowledge of prophethood (muḥāwērat), spiritual leadership (imāmat), and the Day of Judgment (qiṣṣat). The range of the subject itself suggests that metaphysics is "of the essence of Islamic philosophy and the realm of its chief contribution to the history of ideas."\(^{45}\)

God.—After denying the logical possibility of atheism and of an ultimate duality, Tūsī, unlike Fārābī, ibn Miskawayh, and ibn Sina, argues that logic and metaphysics miserably fall short of proving the existence of God on rational grounds. God being the ultimate cause of all proofs, and, therefore, the foundation of all logic and metaphysics, is Himself independent of logical proof. Like the fundamental laws of formal logic, He neither requires nor lends Himself to proof. He is an a priori, fundamental, necessary, and self-evident principle of cosmic logic, and His existence is to be assumed and postulated rather than proved. From the study of moral life as well, he arrives at a similar conclusion and, like Kant in modern times, regards the existence of God as a fundamental postulate of ethics.

\(^{43}\) Taṣawwurāt, p. 23.

\(^{44}\) Ghazālī has located retention (buṭūqāt) in the first ventricle (tajwiṭ) of the fore part of the brain, imagination (mawṣūṣiyah) in the middle ventricle of the brain, thought (ṣayādkur) in the middle of the brain, and recollection (mudākjur) in the rear ventricle of the brain. (Mīzān al-ʿĀmal, p. 25.)

\(^{45}\) Afnān, op. cit., p. 106.
the authority of God, then there is no doubt that it has come from God. If, on the other hand, it exists without the authority of God, that would mean the setting up of another god besides God.47

Again, in 

47

Tasawwar, Tusi holds the view that God's reflection is equivalent to creation and is the outcome of His self-conscious necessity. But in 

Fusul, he abandons this position as well. He now regards God as a free creator and blows up the theory of creation out of necessity. If God creates out of necessity, he argues, His actions should spring out of His essence. Thus, if a part of the world becomes non-existent, the essence of God should also pass into nothingness; for the cause of its non-existence is conditioned by the non-existence of a part of its cause, the non-existence of which is further determined by the non-existence of the other parts of its cause and so on. And since all existences depend for their existence on the necessity of God, their non-existence ultimately leads to the non-existence of God Himself.48

K

PROPHETHOOD

After establishing freedom of the will and resurrection of the body, Tusi proceeds to establish the necessity of prophethood and spiritual leadership. Conflict of interests coupled with individual liberty results in the disintegration of social life, and this necessitates a divine Code from God for the regulation of human affairs. But God Himself is beyond all sensory apprehension; therefore, He sends prophets for the guidance of peoples. This, in turn, makes necessary the institution of spiritual leadership after the prophets to enforce the divine Code.

L

GOOD AND EVIL

Good and evil are found mixed up in this world. The obtrusiveness of evil is inconsistent with the benevolence of God. To avoid this difficulty, Zoroastrians attributed light and good to Yazdan and darkness and evil to Ahraman. But the existence of two equal and independent principles itself involves a metaphysical inconsistency. Rejecting the view on this ground, Tusi explains away the reality and objectivity of evil with the enthusiasm of ibn Sina, his spiritual progenitor.

According to Tusi, the good proceeds from God and the evil springs up as an accident ("arq") in its way. The good, for instance, is a grain of wheat thrown into the soil and watered, so that it grows into a plant and yields a rich crop. The evil is like the foam which appears on the surface of the water. The foam evidently comes from the water-courses and not from the water itself. Thus, there is no evil principle in the world, but as an accident it is a necessary concomitant or by-product of matter.

In the human world, evil is occasioned by an error of judgment or through a misuse of the divine gift of free-will. God by Himself aims at universal good, but the veil of the senses, imagination, fancy, and thought hang before our sight and cloud the mental vision. Thus, prudence fails to foresee the consequences of actions, resulting in wrong choice, which in turn begets evil.

Again, our judgment of evil is always relative and metaphorical, that is, it is always with reference to something. When, for instance, fire burns a poor man's cottage or flood sweeps away a village, a verdict of evil is invariably passed on fire and water. But in reality there is nothing evil in fire or water; rather their absence would constitute an absolute evil in comparison to the partial evil occasionally caused by their presence.

Lastly, evil is the outcome of ignorance, or the result of some physical disability, or the lack of something which provides for the good. The absence of day is night, the lack of wealth is poverty, and the absence of good is evil. In essence, therefore, evil is the absence of something—a negative, not a positive something.

To the question why a finite sin is dealt with infinite punishment by God, Tusi replies that it is a mistake to attribute either reward or punishment to God. Just as the virtuous, by nature and necessity, desire eternal bliss and happiness, so the vicious by nature and necessity deserve eternal punishment and despair.

M

LOGIC

On logic, his works include Ahs al-Iqtiibas, Sharh-i Manqiq al-Ishari, Ta'dil al-Miyar, and Tajrid al-Mantiq. The first of these gives a comprehensive and lucid account of the subject in Persian on the lines of ibn Sinâ's logic in al-Ishrâ'.

Tusi regards logic both as a science and as an instrument of science. As a science, it aims at the cognition of meanings and that of the quality of the meanings cognized; as an instrument, it is the key to the understanding of different sciences. When knowledge of meanings as well as of the quality of meanings becomes so ingrained in the mind that it no longer requires the exercise of thought and reflection, the science of logic becomes a useful art (tanwi'), freeing the mind from misunderstanding, on the one hand, and perplexity, on the other.49

Having defined logic, Tusi, like ibn Sina, begins with a brief discussion of the theory of knowledge. All knowledge is either a concept (tasawwar) or a judgment (taqdis); the former is acquired through definition and the latter

47

Fusul, p. 18.

48

Ibid., pp. 16-18.

49

Tasawwarat, p. 44.

50

Ahs al-Iqtiibas, p. 5.
through syllogism. Thus, definition and syllogism are the two instruments with which knowledge is acquired.

Unlike Aristotle, Ibn Sina had divided all syllogisms into the copulative (syllogi) and the exclusive (syllogi) forms. This has followed this division and elaborated it in his own way. His logical works are Aristotelian in general outline, but he mentions four instead of three syllogistic figures; and the source of this fourth figure is found neither in the "Organon" of Aristotle nor in any of the logical works of Ibn Sina.

REVIEW

Ibn Sina, as we have already seen, owes his ethics to Ibn Miskawayh and politics to Fakhr al-Din; but neither of them reaches the depth and the extent of Ibn Sina's influence over him. Ibn Sina's logic, metaphysics, psychology, semantics, and dogmatics—all are substantially borrowed from him. Besides, his long and formal connection with the Nizari Ismailites also influenced his ethical, psychological, and metaphysical speculations. Historically speaking, his position is mainly that of a revivalist. But from the standpoint of the history of culture, even the revival of the philosophical and scientific tradition, specially in an era of political and intellectual decline, though marked by timorous erudition and repetition, is no less important than origination, inasmuch as it prepares the ground for the intellectual rebirth of a nation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Introduction

Al-Ghazali occupies a position unique in the history of Muslim religious and philosophical thought by whatever standard we may judge him: breadth of learning, originality, or influence. He has been acclaimed as the Proof of Islam (bustan al-Islam), the Ornament of Faith (ma'adin al-din), and the Renewer of Religion (muajjal al-din).1 Al-Suhbhi (d. 771/1370) went so far in his estimation of him as to claim that if there had been a prophet after Muhammad, al-Ghazali would have been the man.2 To be sure he gathered in his own person all the significant intellectual and religious movements of his time and lived over again in the inwardsness of his soul the various spiritual phases developed by Islam. He was in turn a canon-lawyer and a scholastic, a philosopher and a seer, a mystic and a theologian, a traditionist and a moralist. His position as a theologian of Islam is undoubtedly the most eminent. Through his living synthesis of his creative and energetic personality, he revitalized Muslim theology and reoriented its values and attitudes. His combination of spiritualism and fundamentalism in Islam had such a marked stamp of his powerful personality that it has continued to be accepted by the community since his time. His outlook on philosophy is characterized by a remarkable originality which, however, is more critical than constructive. In his works on philosophy one is struck by a keen philosophical acumen and penetration with which he gives a clear and readable exposition of the views of the philosophers, the subtility and analyticity with which he criticizes them, and the dexterity and open-mindedness with which he accepts them wherever he finds them to be true. Nothing frightened him nor fascinated him, and through an extraordinary independence of mind, he became a veritable challenge to the

---


2 Al-Suhbhi (Taj al-Din), Tahqiq al-Shafi'iyyah al-Kubra, Cairo, 1324/1906, Vol. IV, p. 101. See also note No. 16, below.
philosophies of Aristotle and Plotinus and to their Muslim representatives before him, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. The main trends of the religious and philosophical thought of al-Ghazali, however, come close to the temper of the modern mind. The champions of the modern movement of religious empiricism, on the one hand, and that of logical positivism, on the other, paradoxical though it may seem, would equally find comfort in his works. The teachings of this remarkable figure of Islam pertaining either to religion or philosophy, either constructive or critical, cannot, however, be fully understood without knowing the story of his life with some measure of letall, for, in his case, life and thought were one: rooted in his own personality. Whatever he thought and wrote came with the living reality of his own experience.

B

LIFE

Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Turayjib at-Tusi is generally known simply by his sobriquet al-Ghazali.\(^1\) He was born in 450/1058 at Tabaristan, one of the two townships of Tus, now in ruins in the neighbourhood of modern Meshed in Khorasan.

Al-Ghazali was not the first scholar of distinction in his family: there had been another Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 430/1041), his grand-uncle, who was a theologian and jurist of great reputation,\(^2\) possibly a model which he might have set before him in his ambitious youth. But he was early exposed to Sufistic influences. His own father was a pious devout who according to al-Sakkili would not eat anything but what he could earn with his own hands.


\(^2\) Known as Aljazuli, sometimes as Abahnem to Medieval Europe. Some of the Western scholars even now use Aljazuli (e.g. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, London, 1946, p. 677) or its various Arabic a-Ghazali, Aljazuli, Ghazali, etc. Whether al-Ghazali should be spelt with double or single 'Z' has been a matter of long and strong dispute. More general practise both with the contemporary Muslim writers and the Orientalists now is to use single 'Z'. Cf. R. N. Nadawi, op. cit., pp. 3-6; D. D. Moschoubili, "The Name al-Ghazali," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1892, pp. 18-22; S. Z. Werner, op. cit., pp. 63-83, 240-43.

known thereafter as al-Ghazali al-Kabir. He is reported to have taught canon-law (Fiqh) to al-Farmasli, the Sulh guide of our own al-Ghazali; cf. Macdonald, "The Life of al-Ghazali..." JAS, p. 126; also al-Sakkil, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 36.

and spend as much time as he could in the company of the divines. Early left as an orphan, al-Ghazali was brought up and educated by a pious Sufi friend of his father along with his brother who later made a mark as a great mystic. While still a boy al-Ghazali began the study of theology and canon-law, with the express desire for wealth and reputation as he himself has acknowledged\(^3\) first in his native town under Shaikh Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Radihadi al-Tusi and then at Jurjan under the Imam Abu Najr al-Ismi. After his return from Jurjan he stayed for a while in Tus and possibly during this period studied Sufism under Yasnul al-Nasaj and perhaps even undertook some of the Sufistic exercises. At the age of about twenty he proceeded to the Ni'matullah Academy of Ni'matullah to study under Abu al-Maali al-Jawnai known as Imam al-Haramain, the most distinguished Aqaidi's theologian of the day, only fourth from al-Ashari himself in an apostolic succession of the Aqaidi's teachers. The curriculum of the Academy included a wide range of subjects such as theology, canon-law, philosophy, logic, dialectics, natural sciences, Sufism, etc. Imam al-Haramain allowed full freedom of thought and expression to his pupils; they were encouraged to engage in debates and discussions of all kinds. Al-Ghazali gave early proof of great learning and also of a tendency towards philosophizing. Imam al-Haramain described him as "a plentiful ocean to be drowned" and comparing him with two other pupils of his observed: "al-Khaari's strong point is verification, al-Ghazali's is speculation, and al-Kiyai's is explanation.\(^4\) In his debates with other students he showed great suppleness of mind and a gift for polemics. Not long afterwards he was to be set back to his fellow-students and to write books. But al-Ghazali was one of those rare minds whose originality is not crushed by their learning. He was a born critic and possessed great independence of thought. It was very early during his studenthip at the Ni'matullah Academy of Ni'matullah that he became impatient of dogmatic teaching and freed himself from the bondage of authority (tawhid) and even showed the signs of scepticism.

During his stay at Ni'matullah, he also became a disciple to the Sufi Abu 'Ali al-Fadl ibn Muhammad ibn Abu al-Farmosli al-Tusi, a pupil of al-Ghazali's own uncle and of the reputed al-Qasimri (d. 465/1074). From al-Farmasli al-Ghazali learnt more about the theory and practice of Sufism. He even practised rigorous ascetic and Sufistic exercises under his guidance but not to the desired effect. As he himself narrates, he could not attain to that stage where the mystics begin to receive pure inspiration from "high above."\(^5\) So he did not feel quite settled down in his mind. On the one hand, he felt philosophically dissatisfied with the speculative systems of the scholastic theologians and could not accept anything on authority, on the other, the Sufistic practices

\(^3\) Cf. al-Sakkil, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 102.

\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 103, 106.

also failed to make any definite impression on him or he had not received any sure results. There is no doubt, however, that the increasing attraction of the Sufiatic teaching, with its insistence upon a direct personal experience of God, added to al-Qazwini's critical dissatisfaction with dogmatic theology. Al-Farabi died in 477/1084, and Imam al-Hamasi in 478/1086. Al-Qazwini was then in his twenty-eighth year, ambitious and energetic; the fame of his learning had already spread in the Islamic world. He betook himself to the Court of Nizam al-Mulk, the great vizier of the Saljuq sovereign Malikshah (r. 465/1072-485/1092) and joined his retinue of canonists and theologians. Nizam al-Mulk by his munificent patronage of scholarship, science, and arts had gathered round him a brilliant galaxy of savants and learned men. He used to hold frequent assemblies for debate and discussion and al-Qazwini soon made his mark at these and was conspicuous for his skill in debate.

Al-Qazwini's profound knowledge of Muslim law, theology, and philosophy so much impressed Nizam al-Mulk that he appointed him to the Chair of Theology in the Nizam's academy (established 458-60/1065-67) at Baghdad in 484/1091. He was then only thirty-four. This was most congenial to all the honours in the then Muslim world and one which had not previously been conferred on anyone at so early an age. As a professor in the Academy, al-Qazwini was a complete success; the excellence of his lectures, the extent of his learning, and the lucidity of his explanations attracted larger and larger classes including the chief savants of the time. Soon all Islam acclaimed his eloquence, erudition, and dialectical skill and he came to be looked upon as the greatest theologian in the Ash'arite tradition. His advice began to be sought in matters religious and political and he came to wield influence comparable to that of the highest officials of the State. Apparently, he attained to all the glory that a scholar could by way of worldly success, but inwardly he began to undergo an intellectual and spiritual crisis.

It may be recalled that not only theology but medicine and philosophy were also taught at Baghdad and the school of Baghdad from the first was characterised by its scientific spirit and freedom of thought. The city of Baghdad had more than thirty-five libraries for the use of scholars and the place attracted all sorts of people belonging to different sects and schools. A few generations back there flourished the association of the Khatim al-Safa; its meetings were attended by Abu al-'Ala' al-Ma'ariri, said to be the arch heretic in Islam who died (at the age of 84) only a year before al-Qazwini was born. Al-Quhathi, the teacher of Farauni, yet himself a pupil of al-'Ashari in theology, died in 465/1072 when al-Qazwini was a boy of seventeen, but then probably this is also the date of the death of Nizam al-Mulk, the Ismai'ili propagandist and philosopher. Umar Khayyam (d. c. 1123), the great mathematician, astronomer, and the great philosopher (the Lucretian and the Voltairian in Islam (in), enjoyed with al-Qazwini the patronage of Nizam al-Mulk. Only a year after al-Qazwini's appointment in the Nizamiyya Academy, Nizam al-Mulk died (485/1092) so the victim of the Ismai'ili assassination commanded by al-Husayn ibn al-Sallabi (483/1090-518/1124)—the second victim was no less than the king himself (Malikshah) only after an interval of thirty-five days.

Al-Qazwini's His old doubts and scepticism began to assuage him once again and he became highly critical of the very subjects that he taught. He keenly felt the hollowness of the meticulous spinning of casuistry of the canon-lawyers. The systems of the scholastic theologians (Mutazalismis) had no intellectual certainty, for they depended entirely on the acceptance of their initial dogmatic assumptions on authority. He denounced their over-emphasis on the doctrinal, for led to a faulty representation of religion by reducing it to a mere mould of orthodoxy and censure of dogmas. The disputes of the scholastics amongst themselves he considered as mere dialectical logomachies which had no real relation with religious life. Al-Qazwini turned once again to the study of philosophy, this time as diligently and as comprehensively as he could, but found, like Kant, that it was impossible to build theology on reason alone. Reason was good so far as it went, but it could not go very far. The Ultimate, the Supreme Truth, could not be reached through it. Becoming keenly aware of the theological limitations of reason, he fell into a state of scepticism and lost his peace of mind. The hypocrisy of his orthodox teaching became unbearable and he found himself to be in a false position.

But all was not lost: he had some assurances that he could be delivered from this state of despair through the Sufi way. It was not that he now discovered that in Sufism lay the possibility for a direct encounter with reality; this fact he had been realizing over a period of years. He had made a theological study of Sufism and had even ventured into Sufistic exercises; only he had not advanced far enough into them. If he could consecrate himself to the Sufistic way of life through spiritual renunciation, sustained asceticism, and prolonged and deep meditation, he might have received the light he sought. But this meant in his case giving up his brilliant academic career and worldly position. He was by nature ambitious and had great desire for fame and self-glorification. On the other hand, he was the most earnest seeker after truth. Besides, he had the anxiety to reach a secure faith which was accentuated by his thought of life after death. He remained in the throes of a severe moral conflict and in a spiritual turmoil for about six months beginning from Rajab 488/July 1096. He collapsed physically and mentally; appetite and digestion failed and he lost his power of speech. This made it easy for him to be silent, even to the point of solipsism. He said to his friends, "I am no longer the same person I was before; I am as if I were in a state of illness; I enter into a state of apathy."

10 He was himself a master of the canon-law and composed works of the very highest order on it, e.g., al-Wafi, al-Badi, al-Wasit, al-Musahafa, etc., According to Sayyidur Rahman (d. 1290/1779), al-Wafi was commented on by later scholars for about seventy times and that had al-Qazwini been a prophet he could have claimed this work as his miracle. Al-Qazwini on his part considered canon-law only to be 'Ibn al-mawdudah (knowledge dealing with practical affairs of life) and not fah al-mudahab (principle of Ultimate Reality); cf. M. Hasf Nadawi, op. cit., pp. 59-111.

11 For al-Qazwini's criticism of kalim, cf. his Hijay al-Asasna 'an 'Ibn al-
Kalim and 'Ibn al-Sabbagh & al-Wasi'wa al-A'qib. He, however, approved of kalim to explain and defend faith; cf. also al-Ispahani & al-Aqib. See note No. 28 below.
books besides Ḥiyā' but also resumed teaching from time to time. He keenly felt it incumbent upon him to crush heresy and unbelief around him and to call people back to the truth and moral power of Islam, both through writing and teaching: he virtually assumed the role of a moral and religious reformer. He began to devote himself more and more to the study of the traditions of the Prophet and make an extensive use of them for the purposes of edification and spiritual guidance.

On his return to Ṭūs he once again gave himself to the life of retirement and contemplation, but very soon Ḥādi bin-Ṭalha bin Mālik, the son of his old patron, ʿAbd al-Malik, who was the vizier to Sulaymān bin-Ṣawjar, urged him to accept the chair of theology at the Ma’mūnā Niẓāmān’s College at Niẓāmān which Ḥādi Ḥādi bin-Ṭalha bin Mālik which he did after some hesitation in Ḥīfa bin-Ṭalha bin Mālik August 1096. But he did not stay there long and retired once more to his home in Ṭūs and established a madrasa at which he began to teach both theology and jurisprudence. At the instance of the learned and the common people of Ḥīfa bin-Ṭalha bin Mālik he was once again summoned by the Grand Vizier al-Sa’īd to take up teaching in the Niẓāmān Academy of Ḥīfa bin-Ṭalha bin Mālik but al-Ẓāfari choose to remain at Ṭūs. There he lived in peace with some personal disciples having charge of his madrasa. Every moment was filled with study and devotion till his death on the 14th of Jamāda I 350/19th of December 1111. It was a beautifully complete and round life in which the end came to the beginning.

C  
METHOD

The most important thing about al-Ẓāfari’s system of thought is its method which may be described as that of the courage to know and the courage to doubt. The best expression of it is given in his famous autobiographical work, al-Masqūd wa al-Dalil (The Deliverer from Error), which he wrote some five years before his death. In al-Masqūd wa al-Dalil makes has also been analyzed by Mijal Asad Palacon in his Al-Ans, dogmatism, nominalism, et alia. Zarqūz, 1901. Ḥiyā’ is divided into four parts each comprising ten books. Part III, Book ii; Part II, Book viii; Part IV, Book vii has been translated into English by Dr. K. Macdonald, in his Religious Attitude and Life in Islam, Chicago, 1909, Lectures xii-xiv of Royal Asiatic Society, 1901-1902, and Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 673-680, respectively. Translation of some of the extracts from Part III and IV can also be found in Syed Nawaz Ali’s Some Moral and Religious Teachings of al-Qazwini, Lahore, 1946, pp. 18-133. Hans Bauser has made a German translation of some of the “Books” of Ḥiyā’ of his Islamische Ethik (Three Parts), Haar, 1916, 1917, 1922. For a complete Urdu translation of Ḥiyā’ of M. Abas, Masqoud al-arjīn, 4 Vols., Lucknow, 1903 (seventh edition). al-Masqūd wa al-Dalil as an autobiographical work is unique in the whole of Arabic literature for “the looseness and the fulness of its self-revelation.” It is the most often referred to book and has been translated and edited a number of times: C. Brockhams in his Arabische Literatur, Weimar, 1899, Vol. I, pp. 418-
A History of Muslim Philosophy

a critical examination of the methods of the various schools of thought current in his time in a manner closely similar to that of Descartes’ (d. 1650) in his Discours de la méthode (1637).

all kinds of knowledge, al-Ghazali held, should be investigated and nothing should be considered dangerous or hostile. For himself he said that he had embarked on the open seas of knowledge right from his adolescence setting aside all craven caution: “I poked into every dark recess and made an assault on every problem, I plunged into every abyss. I scrutinized the creeds of every sect and I fathomed the mysteries of each doctrine. All this I did I might distinguish between the true and the false. There was not a philosopher whose system I did not acquaint myself with, nor a theologian whose doctrines I did not examine. If ever I met a Sunni, I coveted to probe into his secrets; if an ascetic, I investigated into the basis of his doctrines; if one of the atheistic zindigs, I groped into the causes of his bod atheism.” 147 Such was the courage of al-Ghazali to know. He was free from the parochialism of the dogmatic theologians of his day who would rather consign the books of the atheists and philosophers to flames than read them. But prepared though he was to listen to every creed and doctrine, he would accept none and doubt all. For one thing, he came to the conclusion that the greatest hindrance in the search for truth was the acceptance of beliefs on the authority of others and blind adherence to the heritage of the past. He remembered the traditional saying of the Prophet: “Every child is born with a sound disposition (fitrah); it is his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian” 148 and he was anxious to know what that sound disposition was before it suffered the impress of the imposed convictions imposed by others. Indeed, he wanted to re-construct all his knowledge from its very foundation and was led to make the following reflections: “The search after truth being the aim which I propose to myself, I ought in the first place to ascertain what are the bases of certitude. In the second place I ought to recognize that certitude is a clear and complete knowledge of things, such knowledge as leaves no room for doubt, nor any possibility of error.” 149 As one might foresee, this thesis was the beginning of a serious attempt to construct a full system of knowledge only led him to a series of doubts. No part of the knowledge he had acquired


147 Cf. al-Munqiq (op. cit.), p. 101, where Descartes makes similar observations.


149 It is, however, a serious though widespread error of interpretation to consider al-Ghazali to be an anti-intellectualist. Macdonald’s statement in his article “al-Ghazali” in the Encyclopedia of Islam that “he thought that intellect should only be used to destroy truth in itself,” is very unfortunate. Nor is it Iqbal’s allegation that al-Ghazali denied dynamic character to thought and its self-transcending reference to the infinite (cf. S. M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Oxford, 1934, pp. 4-6). Al-Ghazali very definitively and explicitly brings out both these aspects of thought in his analysis of intelligence in the Mi‘yad al-‘Awwam (English translation by W. H. T. Gairdner, Lahore, 1852, pp. 83-91). The section in the Mi‘yad is quite noteworthy in view of the general opinion that the Mi‘yad was written by al-Ghazali at a time very close to the writing of al-Munqiq (probably after 1038/1628) as a series on the spiritual history of al-Ghazali, during which he came to advocate the supremacy of intuition over reason as against an earlier phase, see the work of ‘Ibad, when he ranked them as equal and made reason go parallel with intuition (e.g., Part I, Book I, Chapter 7). Thus, in al-Munqiq al-Ghazali makes a delimitation of the province of the human intellect by denying it a reality in the

hitherto could stand this rigorous test. He further observed, “We cannot hope to find truth except in matters which carry their evidence in themselves, i.e., in sense-perception and necessary principles of thought; we must, therefore, first of all establish these two on a firm basis.” But he doubted the evidence of sense-perception; he could see plainly as Descartes did later that they so often deceive us. No eye can perceive the movement of a shadow, still the shadow moves; a small coin would cover any star yet the geometrical computations show that a star is a world vastly larger than the earth.”

Al-Ghazali’s confidence in sense-perception having been shaken, he turned to the scrutiny of what he called the necessary principles, but he doubted even these. Is ten more than three? Can a thing both be and not be at the same time or be both necessary and impossible? How could he tell? His doubt with regard to sense-perception made him very hesitant to accept the infallibility of reason. He believed in the testimony of senses till it was contradicted by the verdict of reason. Well, perhaps there is above reason another judge who if he appeared would convict reason of falsity and if such a third arisher is not yet apparent it does not follow that he does not exist.

Al-Ghazali then considers the possibility that life in this world is a dream by comparison with the world to come; and when a man dies, things may come to appear differently to him from what he now beholds. 150 There may be an order of reality different from this spatio-temporal order which may be revealed to a level of consciousness other than the so-called normal consciousness such as that of the mystics or the prophets. Such was the movement of al-Ghazali’s thought, which though formulated a little artificially in the Munqiq was dramatic enough to make out a case for the possibility of a form of apprehension higher than rational apprehension, that is, apprehension as the mystic’s inspiration or the prophet’s revelation. 

150 Haldane and Ross, op. cit., p. 101, where Descartes makes similar observations.

151 Cf. ‘Ibad, Cairo, 1340/1921, Vol. IV, p. 19, where al-Ghazali refers to a tradition: ‘People are asleep; when they die, they awake.’
field of transcendental problems, yet it would not be altogether right to say that Ghashiali's epistemology is a mere intuitive critique of knowledge. Keeping other works of his in view, it may be said that his philosophy is mainly directed to the vindication that intellect and intuition must at the end supplement each other. Cf. M. Masududdin, "The Ethical Philosophy of al-Ghashiali," Aligarh, 1949, Vol. 1, Part III, pp. 228-259.


36 See next chapter (pp. 917-24).

37 Ama'iliyyat or Batinism were known as Ta'limites in Khurasan. Al-Ghashiali wrote a number of books against them; those mentioned in al-Mustajrib (p. 32) are: (1) Al-Mustajrib, (2) Ihyaa al-Hayy, (3) Muqaddas al-Khaliq, (4) Daru, (5) Qapba al-Mustajrib. The first work is the most elaborate of all. For the doctrine of the Ta'limites, cf. Hasani Nachawi, Sogdian-Arab Ghashiali's Ghashiali, pp. 19-34; also the article "Ama'iliyyat," Encyclopedia of Islam.
They renounced reason and held that truth can be attained only by a submissive acceptance of the pronouncements of an infallible Imám. This doctrine indeed was a part of the propaganda of the Fatimid Caliphate (297/909-255/1160) with its centre in Cairo and, thus, had its meetings in the political chaos of the day. Al-Ghazâlî's examination of the Ta'limâtīn was certainly due to his love for thoroughness in his search for truth, but perhaps he also wanted to make clear his position with regard to an ideology having political strings behind it.

It was the fourth class of the seekers of truth, namely, the philosophers, who engaged his attention most of all and troubled his mind more than anyone else.

D

ATTACK ON THE PHILOSOPHERS

1. Introduction.—Al-Ghazâlî's critical examination of the method and doctrines of the philosophers is the most exciting and important phase of his intellectual inquiry. He was not at all against philosophical investigation as such. His early interest in philosophy is evidenced by the treatises that he wrote on logic such as Mi'yar al-Imkān fī Fawa'id al-Ma'āni: "The Touchstone of Science in Logic" (quite an elaborate treatise) and Mi'yar al-Nurār fī al-Ma'āni: "The Touchstone of Speculation in Logic" (a smaller work). In the history of Muslim thought his is the first instance of a theologian who was thoroughly schooled in the ways of the philosophers: the doctors of Islam before him either had a dread of philosophy, considering it a dangerous study, or dabbled in it just to qualify themselves for polemics against the philosophers. But al-Ghazâlî very strongly realized that to refuse a system before literally inhabiting it and getting thoroughly immersed into its very depths was to act blindly. "A man," he tells us, "cannot grasp what is defective in any of the sciences unless he has so complete a grasp of the science in question that he equals its most learned exponents in the appreciation of its fundamental principles and even goes beyond and surpasses them..."18 In all intellectual honesty he refrained from saying a word against the philosophers till he had completely mastered their systems.

He applied himself so assiduously to the study of the entire sweep of Greek philosophy current in his time and attained such a firm grasp of its problems and methods19 that he produced one of the best expositions of it in Arabic entitled as Maqāsid al-Falāsiḥat (The Intentions of the Philosophers). This compendium was such a faithful exposition of Averroism that when it came to be known to the Christian scholastics through a Latin translation made as early as 540/1145 by the Spanish philosopher and translator Dominicus Gundisalvi,20 it was taken to be the work of a genuine Peripatetic. Albert the Great (d. 675/1260), Thomas Aquinas (d. 673/1274), and Roger Bacon (d. 694/1294) all repeatedly mentioned the name of the author of the "Intentions of the Philosophers" along with Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd as the true representatives of Arab Aristotelianism.21 But never did Arab Aristotelianism find a more vigorous foe than al-Ghazâlî. His compendium in philosophy was merely propaedeutic to his Talkhīṣ al-Falāsiḥat (The Incoherence of the Philosophers)22 in which he levelled a devastating attack on the doctrine of the Muslim Peripatetics with a dialectic as subtle as any in the history of philosophy.

Al-Ghazâlî, for the purposes of his scrutiny, divided the philosophers into three main groups: The materialists (dahrīyīn),23 the naturalists or the deists (taʿlīqīyīn), and the theists (dāhīyīyīn). The materialists completely dispensed with the idea of God and believed that the universe has existed eternally without a creator: a self-sustaining system that operates and develops by itself, has its own laws, and can be understood by itself. The naturalists or the deists, struck by the wonders of creation and informed of a running purpose and wisdom in the scheme of things while engaged in their manifold researches into the sciences of phenomena, admitted the existence of a wise Creator or Deity, but rejected the spirituality and immortality of the human soul. They explained the soul away in naturalistic terms as an epiphenomenon.

25 The date 1506 C.E. for the Latin translation of Maqāsid al-Falāsiḥat given in the Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 14th edition, Vol. II, p. 188b, is incorrect. This is the date when it was for the first time printed in Venice. Gundisalvi's translation under the title Logica et Philosophia Alquensis Arabice was made in collaboration with John of Seville to whose name it is sometimes ascribed. It might have been the case that John translated it from Arabic into Latin and Gundisalvi from Latin into Arabic; cf. G. Sarton, Introduction to the History of Sciences, Baltimore, 1931, Vol. II, pp. 168-72.

26 This confusion was caused by the fact that the Latin translation of Maqāsid in circulation amongst the seventeenth eighteenth-century scholastics did not contain the short introduction in which al-Ghazâlî speaks disparagingly of the philosophers' metaphysics and makes it clear that his ultimate purpose to make an objective and dispassionate study of it is to refute it in Talkhīṣ al-Falāsiḥat. It may be added that al-Ghazâlî again mentions his intention to write the Talkhīṣ in the ending paragraph of the book. How this was overlooked by the Latin scholastics is anybody's guess.

27 Maurice Bouyges in Introduction to his edition of Talkhīṣ al-Falāsiḥat points out that the word "incoherence" does not give an exact meaning of Talkhīṣ and that al-Ghazîlî has used it sometimes with reference to philosophers and sometimes with reference to his dilettantes. He, therefore, suggests that it would be better to retain the original word Talkhīṣ.

28 The Dahrīyīn are those who teach the eternity of time and matter. It is, however, difficult to give a precise translation of the term; in its usual usage in Arabic philosophy, Dahrīyīn are sometimes hardly distinguishable from the Tahīyyīm. Cf. the article "Dahrīyīm," Encyclopaedia of Islam.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

of the body and believed that the death of the latter led to the complete non-existence of the former. Belief in heaven, hell, resurrection, and judgment they considered as old wives' tales or pious fictions.

Al-Ghazali discussed the theists at length for, according to him, held a comparatively more final position and exposed the defects of the materialists and the naturalists quite effectively, thus saving him from doing so for himself. Soocrates, Plato, and Aristotle he listed as theists but concentrated on Aristotle who had criticized all his predecessors and even had refuted his own teacher, excusing himself of this by saying: "Plato is dear to us. And truth is dear, too. Nay, truth is dearer than Plato." 74

As far as the transmission of Aristotle's philosophy in Arabia was concerned, al-Ghazali found that none of the Muslim philosophers had accomplished anything comparable to the achievements of al-Farabi and ibn Sina. These two were Aristotle's most faithful and capable translators and commentators; the works of others were marked with disorder and confusion. Thus al-Ghazali came finally to concentrate on the philosophical weight of his day which had emerged from the writings of these two theistic philosophers (particularly ibn Sina) and applied himself to its examination in a systematic manner. He divided the philosophical sciences into mathematics, logic, physics, politics, ethics, and metaphysics, and went into their details in order to see if there really was anything false or untenable. He was most scientific in his approach: ready to accept whatever he found to be based on the evidence of factual data or susceptible of proof by argument in conformity with the principles of reason. He had least hesitation in accepting as true much of what the philosophers taught with regard to their sciences of mathematics, logic, and physics; he even had no serious quarrel with them in the sphere of politics and ethics.

The most grievous errors of the theistic philosophers, he found, consisted in their metaphysical views which, unlike mathematics and natural sciences, were not grounded in compelling reason or positive inquiry but on conjecture and fanciful speculations. Had their metaphysics been so very well grounded in sound reasoning as their mathematical sciences were, they would have agreed amongst themselves on metaphysical issues as they did on the mathematical ones. But, above all, what al-Ghazali saw to his dismay was that the philosophies of al-Farabi and ibn Sina at points did violence without any philosophical warrant or justification to the principles of religion as enunciated in the Qur'an. His empirical and theological spirit revolted very strongly against this. The positive facts of religion could not be sacrificed for sheer metaphysical speculations, nor could they be interpreted externally from the point of view of a preconceived system of philosophy. These had to be interpreted intrinsically and reckoned on their own grounds. The Muslim philosophers had failed to take this empirical standpoint. They had also been slow in realizing that notwithstanding a great breadth of outlook that the

---


---

594

study of Greek philosophy had brought to the Muslims, there was in the ultimate analysis quite a gulf between the inspiration of the Qur'anic teachings and the spirit of Hellenism.44 Carried away by their enthusiasm to bring a reconciliation between philosophy and religion, al-Farabi and ibn Sina, according to al-Ghazali, had so compressed the dogmas of Islamic religion within the mazdis of Avestan and Plotinian systems as to fall either into a morass of inconsistencies or get implicated into heretical positions.

All this al-Ghazali brought out with most accomplished understanding and admirable skill, and with a "trascendental" dialectic as subtle as that of Kant in his Tuhfut al-Falasifa which indeed is the most important of all his works from the point of view of our present study. Within less than a hundred years it called forth the most stimulating rejoinder (entitled Tuhfut al-Tuhfut) from the celebrated ibn Rusli and then a rejoinder of a rejoinder from Mufid ibn Mu'tafa ibn Yūsuf al-Bursawi generally known as Khwarizmī Zadah, a Turkish theologian who died in 893/1488.45 These works, particularly the first two, taken together epitomize the essential problems arising from the impact of classical philosophy on the teachings of religion.45

2. Method and Problems of Tuhfut.—It is generally believed that al-Ghazali wrote his Tuhfut al-Falasifa during the period of his doubts, but in fact the work is essentially of a polemical nature and shows in him an odd combination of scepticism and ascetic assurances. The general effect of the teaching of the philosophers, al-Ghazali felt, was so ruinous to the religious and moral life of the masses that his well-nigh apostolic humanism revolted against it and he dedicated himself to an open warfare against the philosophers. There is no doubt about the theological inspiration and the polemical spirit of the Tuhfut but then we add most emphatically that neither of them seriously affects the great philosophical value of this work.46 The modern reader cannot fail to be struck with clear anticipations of Hume (d. 1190/1776), Schleiermacher (d. 1250/1834), Ritschl (d. 1307/1889), and others, and even of the logical positivists of our day in some of the arguments and the general motif of the Tuhfut. His general position may be briefly described to be that the truths

44 Cf. M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 3-4. What really hinted at here is the Platonic and Neo-Platonic base in the Hellenic thought which inoculates a dichotomy between the empirical and the transcendental—the secular and the spiritual.

45 All the three works can be found in one volume published by Mu'jahid al-92 pp.; ibn Rushd's Tuhfut al-Tuhfut, 141 pp.; and Khwarizmī Zadah's Tuhfut al-Tuhfut, 137 pp.


47 Cf. al-Ghazali's Tuhfut al-Falasifa, English translation by Sabah Ahmad Kallab, The Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Lahore, 1954, pp. 1-1. All references to the Tuhfut are to this translation.

595
of the positive facts of religion can neither be proved nor disproved, and to do otherwise leads the philosophers to take more often than not quite nominalistic positions.

Al-Ghazālī assails the philosophers on twenty points\(^{39}\) (beginning with creation and ending with the last things) and endeavors to show that their dogmas of the eternity and the everlastingness of the world are false; their assertion that God is the creator of the world is dishonest for it is flagrantly inconsistent with their dogmas of the eternity of the world; that they fail to prove the existence, the unity, the simplicity and the incorporeality of God or God's knowledge either of the universals or of the particulars; that their views with regard to the souls of the celestial spheres, and the spheres' knowledge of the particulars and the purpose of their movement are unfounded; that their theory of causation which attributes effects to the very nature of the causes is false; and that they cannot establish the spirituality of the soul, nor prove its immortality; and, finally, that their denial of the resurrection of the bodies in the life hereafter is philosophically unwarranted. Al-Ghazālī charges the philosophers with the indefensible problem of (1) eternity of the world; (2) denial of God's knowledge of the particulars, and (3) denial of bodily resurrection. For the rest their views are heretical or born of religious indifference. But in all they are involved in contradictions and suffer from confusion of thought.

The problem which al-Ghazālī considers the most important is that of the eternity (qadam) of the world to which he allots the greatest space, almost a quarter of his book. This has been one of the most challenging and uncompromising problems in the conflict between religion and philosophy. The advocates of orthodoxy considered the eternity of the universe to be the most perishable thesis of the philosophers and vehemently combated against it. Al-Aqā'ī (d. 324/935) wrote a refutation of it in his Kitāb al-Faṣūlī which probably is the earliest scholastic treatise dealing with this question,\(^{40}\) and Ibn Hazm (d. 587/1094) made the doctrine a dividing line between the orthodox and the heterodox sects. The orthodox could not possibly concede the philosophers' claim of the eternity of the world, for with them there is nothing eternal but God; all else is created (kadalīk). To make anything eternal with God is to violate the strict principle of monothelism, for that involves the absoluteness and infinity of God and reduces Him to the position of an artificer: a Demiurge. Virtually, the doctrine drives one to the materialists' position that the world is an independent universe, a self-instantiated system, which develops by itself, and can be understood by itself. All this was hard to swallow for a theologian like al-Ghazālī.

The philosophers like al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā as Muslims did not deny that


A History of Muslim Philosophy

Muslim philosophers have accepted these assumptions merely in the dogmatic tradition of Aristotelian philosophy. The faulty reasoning of the philosophers or the inconsistencies in their positions are remediable but not so the uncritical acceptance of their assumptions. Al-Ghazali for himself is not prepared to accept any part of the Aristotelian system except the first principles of logic and rules of syllogism—nothing else until and unless it has logical cogency about it. On the other hand, he is not prepared to reject any of the doctrines of religion until and unless it is disproved with a similar logical rigour and cogency. Nothing is "possible" in philosophy till it is logically necessary, and nothing is "impossible" in religion till it is logically self-contradictory. Apparently, this is a double-faced criterion to judge variously the truths of philosophical assumptions and those of religious assumptions, but from the point of view of philosophy of religion it is perfectly justified. Philosopher qua philosopher has to accept the facts of religion as given by religion; this is the sine qua non of any empirical philosophy of religion. Thus, in spite of the fact that al-Ghazali's whole polemic against the philosophers derives its inspiration from the Aristotelian theology, his method remains in its essentials purely philosophical, fulfilling in its own way some of the most important requirements of the modern and even contemporary approaches to the problems of the philosophy of religion.43

These few observations with regard to al-Ghazali's method in the Tahāfiyet were necessary before we could enter into some of the detailed arguments which he gives in the refutation of the philosophers' various positions.

3. Eternity of the World. — The proof of the philosophers for the eternity of the world starts with certain assumptions with regard to the notions of cause and will. These take to be true axiomatically: (1) Every effect has a cause. (2) Cause must be the action of some external force other than the effect. (3) Cause or an act of will when executed must immediately lead to the effect.44 For world's coming from non-existence to existence there certainly should have been some cause; this cause could not be a physical cause for ex hypothesei none yet existed. If this cause arose from an act of will by God at some specific time, then the divine will itself should have been determined by some other cause. This cause which led to God to change His mind should certainly be outside His mind; but again this was not possible, for nothing outside Him yet existed. Thus, one is forced to conclude that either nothing ever arose from the being of God—which is not true, for the world does exist—or that the world must have been in existence from all eternity, as an immediate effect of His eternal will. Al-Ghazali declines to subscribe to any one of the assumptions as stated

phers avowedly admit that it differs from man's knowledge in so many respects that in their final position it becomes indeed an inexplicable mystery. God, according to them, possesses the knowledge of all the universals without this knowledge necessitating plurality, without its being additional to His essence, and without its multiplying in proportion to the multiplicity of the objects known. Some of them assert after Aristotle that God is the knower, the knowledge, and the known, and that the three are one. Should we judge all this by what applies to man's knowledge, it will be found to be an utter impossibility. While the philosophers admit that God's knowledge cannot be compared with man's knowledge, they insist upon drawing a comparison between God's will and man's will. This is exactly what al-Ghazālī calls the incoherence of the philosophers and, according to him, their thought-system taken as a whole reveals quite a number of such incoherences. Indeed, the philosophers' very notion of eternal creation is self-contradictory and meaningless. It is sense to speak of a creation of that which exists eternally! If God and the prime matter are both eternal, one is the cause of the other? Can the relation between two existents qua existents be regarded as a causal one?

Further, the philosophers put different constructions upon their notions of space and time. They assume time to be infinite and space to be finite, and yet consider time to be co-implicant of movement in space. Al-Ghazālī insists rightly that one who believes in the finitude of space must in consistency assume the existence of finite time, particularly when one holds the Aristotelian position that space, time, and movement in space are all related to one another. If and if they insist that it is impossible to think of empty space, they should equally realize that it is impossible to conceive of an empty time. These are just a few of the inconsistencies of the philosophers pointed out by al-Ghazālī in the course of his exposition with regard to the eternity of the world and they could be mentioned here only very briefly, considering the space at our disposal. One further point of criticism may, however, be added for its importance in the history of modern philosophy. Prior to its origination, the philosophers hold, the world must have either been possible (ṣumūk), or impossible (summūn), or necessary (wujūd). It is impossible that it should have been possible; for that which is impossible in itself is never brought into existence. Again, it is impossible for it to have been necessary in itself, for that which is necessary in itself is never deprived of existence. It follows then that the existence of the world must have always been possible in itself, otherwise it would never have come to be. This possibility cannot inhere in possibility itself, nor in the agent, nor in substance, for the possible is that which is in the process of becoming actual. Hence the subject of possibility is some substratum which is susceptible of possibility, and this is matter. Now, this matter cannot be considered to have been originated. If it had been originated, the possibility of its existence would have preceded its

existence. In that case possibility would have existed in itself, but possibility existing in itself is unintelligible. Hence matter is eternal and it is only the passing over of the forms to matter which is originated.

In rebutting this highly sophisticated argument of the philosophers al-Ghazālī points out in Kontišen that possibility like impossibility is a purely subjective notion to which nothing need correspond in reality. If possibility requires an existent to correspond to it, so would impossibility require something to correspond to it, but avowedly there is no existing thing in concrete reality to which impossibility may be referred. Hence possibility like impossibility is merely a concept; the assumption of an existing substratum to which this concept may be related is to have a metaphysical jump from mere thought to actual existence and is to commit as we understand now an ontological fallacy.

4. Theory of Emancipation.—The entire argument of the philosophers with regard to the eternity of the world is, thus, full of contradictions and unproved assumptions, but the most manifest of their inconsistencies and the sheer baselessness of their assumptions become signally conspicuous when they come to explain the origination of the world from the being of God in the terms of the Plotinian Theory of Emancipation. Plotinus considers the world to be a necessary outflow from the being of God like light from the sun; or better as Spinoza described it later like the properties of a triangle from a triangle. Muslim philosophers' subscription to this view according to al-Ghazālī is the clearest evidence that their verbal asovial of creation is a mere dissimulation and duplicity. The problem of emanation with the philosophers, however, arises because of their over-emphasis on the abstract unity and absolute perfection of God. Creation through an act of volition implies both will and knowledge, and these cannot be predicated of God as attributes apart from His essence without doing violence to His absolute unity. Further, both will and knowledge are limitations; will in particular implies a deficiency in a being who wills, for it means that he desires or wants to have that which he lacks. Hence the philosophers elaborated an ingenious theory of emanation which contrived to erect a cosmological staircase between the stable stillness of God's unity and the changing and varied multiplicity of the world. This staircase is constituted of a finely graded series of intelligences and souls of celestial spheres, each emanating from the other in an hierarchical fashion. The view that the celestial spheres are perfect and have souls and intelligences superior to that of man had the overwhelming authority of Aristotle and further it was possible and even fascinating to conceive of them in terms of angels as described by the theologians.

---


48 Plotinus uses the light metaphor, for he conceived light to be incorporeal after Pseudolus of Rhodes (c. 135-50 B.C.) who is perhaps the first to propound the notion of emanation.

49 Cf. Spinoza, Ethica, Part I, Section 17, note.

50 Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, 265 a 29, 282 a 29, b. 1.
with it the last sphere of the moon and its soul. The tenth intelligence, also called the active intellect (al-`aql al-farisi`), acts in our world. It produces the first matter (hay`ul) which is passive and formless but which is the basis of the four elements from which all creatures arise. The composition and decomposition of the elements is the cause of generation and corruption of all bodies. But all these transformations take place under the influence of the movement of the spheres. As the active intellect is the producer of matter, so it is the dispenser of forms, daturas formans (makhtul al-pawar). It gives to each matter its proper form and it also gives each body a soul (which in fact is its form) when that body is ready to receive it. Thus, active intellect is also the source of the existence of the human soul. But the human soul does not feel at home in its physical abode and yearns for nothing less than the First Principle Himself. Hence it starts its spiritual journey back to the original source traversing through the various stages of the intelligences of the spheres. This is a rounded though brief description of the emanationistic world-view so enigmatically elaborated by the Muslim philosophers, by Ibn Sina, for example, in both of his major works on philosophy, viz., Kitab al-Shif`a and Kitab al-Najat and in his Medinos al-Faidhah.

Determinism implicit in this emanationistic world-view is so opposed to theastic voluntarism of the Agnosti world-view that al-Ghazali launches the most vehement attack against it. His strictures against this grand cosmological construction made out of so many various foreign imported ideas are the strongest and the bitterest of all others that may be found in the entire Tahafut. All this, he inveighs, is arbitrary reasoning, idle speculation; a wild guess work; darkness piled upon darkness. If someone says he saw things of this kind in a dream, it would be inferred that he was suffering from some disease. Even an insane person could not rest satisfied with such postulates. In our own times, to say nothing of the scientists, F. R. Tennant who may be described as an eminent "religious positivist" holds the theory of emanation more or less in the same estimation.

Al-Ghazali's criticism of the emanationistic argument consists in showing, on the one hand, that it fails to account for the multiplicity and composition in

The nine spheres are as follows: the first sphere, the sphere of the fixed stars, the sphere of Saturn, the sphere of Jupiter, the sphere of Mars, the sphere of the Sun, the sphere of Venus, the sphere of Mercury, and the sphere of the Moon.

**65** Some of the Muslim thinkers have referred to the Qur'an, Ixxviii, 58, in support of the notion of the active intellect, e.g., al-Baidawi in his A`war al-Tasaww, ed. H. O. Fleischer, Leipzig, 1846-48, Vol. I, p. 382, also Hay`ul (Tehsir Tr.), Vol. I, p. 5, where al-Ghazali refers to the Tradition that "the first thing that God created was the Intellect."


**67** Cf. Tahafut, pp. 77, 87.

the universe and, on the other, that it does not at all succeed in safeguarding the absolute unity of God. If the formula ever so glily repeated that from one only one proceeds should be observed strictly logically, then all the beings in the world would be units, each of which would be an effect of some other unit above it, as it would be the cause of some other unit below it in a linear fashion. But in fact this is not the case. Every object, according to the philosophers themselves, is composed at least of form and matter. How does a composite thing such as a body then come into existence? Does it have only one cause? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the assertion that only one proceeds from one becomes null and void. If, on the other hand, a composite thing has a composite cause, then the same question will be repeated in the case of this cause as so on and so forth till one arrives at a point where the compound necessarily meets the simple. This contact between the compound effect and the unitary cause wherever it occurs would falsify the principle that only one proceeds from one. Now, strictly speaking, all the existences in the universe are characterized by composition and only the First Principle, i.e., God, alone can be said to possess true simplicity or unity, for in Him alone there is the complete identity of essence and existence. This would lead us necessarily to the conclusion that either the principle of "only one from one" fails to account for the composition and multiplicity which is apparent in the universe or that even God does not possess a genuine unity. But the philosophers cloak the issue with their artificial subtleties and the grandiose constructions they put upon their emanationistic foundations.

What earthly and even unearthly relation is there, al-Ghazali questions rightly, between the first intelligence's having a possible existence and the body of the sphere of the second intelligence which a supposed to proceed from it? Neither logic nor experience can substantiate this wild supposition and as such it is no more than pure nonsense. Further how is it possible that from two kinds of knowledge of the first intelligence, that is, knowledge of the First Principle and that of itself, should arise two kinds of existence, first, that of the second intelligence and, second, that of the soul of the highest sphere? How can the knowledge of a thing lead to the existence of a thing (as we would now put it after Kant) without committing an obvious ontological fallacy? How can the knower emanate from the knowing, al-Ghazali rightly wonders, as does P. R. Tournant, and like him depletes that of all the people, philosophers should believe in such mythical nonsense.66

Even if the triplicity with which the philosopher characterizes the first intelligence should be taken for granted (which indeed cannot be done) it fails to account for all that they want to deduce from it. The body of the highest sphere, which according to them proceeds only from one aspect of the essence of the first intelligence, is surely not unitary in nature but composite and that in three ways.

66 Ibid., p. 104.
would directly proceed from Him. Al-Ghazālī forces this conclusion upon the philosophers through their own logic.

For himself al-Ghazālī believes that: "The First Principle is an omnipotent and willing agent; He does what He wills, and ordains as He likes, and He creates the similar and dissimilar things alike, whenever and in whatever manner He wills? The impossibility of such a belief is neither a self-evident truth, nor a matter of inferential knowledge." Al-Ghazālī frankly and rightly confesses that the problem of God's relation with the universe in the final analysis remains ever beyond the comprehension of human understanding. The inquiry into the manner in which the world proceeded from God's will, he urges, is "an idle and aimless venture." The modus operandi of God's creative activity is wholly inexplicable and this inexplicability is inevitable; indeed, if it were explainable, it would not be "creative." Explanation in all its forms establishes some connection or similarity with what is experienced, whereas God's creativity is an activity through which the experiences and what is experienced by them come to be. How can human comprehension envisage the mode of God's act of creation when it is itself the creature of that act?

The philosophers try to avoid the charge of plurality with regard to the First Principle so far as His knowledge is concerned by affirming that the First Principle does not know anything other than Himself and that His self-knowledge is the same thing as His essence; so the knowledge, the knower, and the object of knowledge are all one in Him. This indeed was originally the position of Aristotle according to whom God is describable as thought thinking itself. In Aristotle's own words, "... it must be itself that thought thinks, and its thinking is thinking on thinking." This view of God as reflective thought, reflective in the literal sense of turning back upon itself, has been subjected to severe criticism by al-Ghazālī. According to him, self-knowledge of a literal and direct sort is an impossibility. He argues with Plotinus that self-knowledge even in the case of God implies an epistemological subject- object dualism and, therefore, would impede the philosophers' thesis of the absolute unity of the First Principle. Not only the Aristotelian conception of God as thought thinking thought does not absolve the philosophers from introducing plurality in the First Principle, but further lands them into many more difficulties with regard to their emanationistic world-view. Consider, for example, the relative equations of the First Principle and the first intelligence in terms of their knowledge. The First Principle which is the emanative cause of the first intelligence does not know anything other than Himself, whereas the latter knows not only its cause but further knows itself and the three...
effects which proceed from it, viz., the second intelligence, the soul of the highest sphere, and the body of that sphere. It is a strange theory, al-Ghazālī observes, which makes the effect have the knowledge of its cause but not the cause of its effect. The necessity of a cause possessing the knowledge of its effect is more compelling than the necessity of an effect possessing the knowledge of its cause. In fact, the philosophers make the first intelligence superior to and "noblest" than the First Principle in so far as from the First Principle only one thing proceeds, while from the first intelligence three things proceed. Further, the First Principle does not know what proceeds from Him; in fact, He does not know anything other than Himself, while the first intelligence knows itself, its cause, and its three effects. Al-Ghazālī feels so bitter at the Aristotelian conception of God as thought thinking itself that he goes to the length of saying that the philosophers by limiting God's knowledge to the sphere of self-knowledge virtually reduce Him to the status of the dead.

5. God's Knowledge of the Particulars. — Al-Ghazālī is very emphatic and uncompromising with regard to the all-circumscribed knowledge of God: "God knows the creeping of the black ant upon the rugged rock in a dark night, and He perceives the movement of the mote in the midst of the air." Ibn Sīna also subscribes to the view that God knows everything: "Nothing, not even as much as a particle of dust in the heavens or on the earth, remains hidden from His knowledge." Yet, interestingly enough, al-Ghazālī does not hesitate to level a charge of infidelity against him on this score for, according to ibn Sīna, though God knows all the particulars, He knows them only in a universal way. This means that God cannot have the perceptual knowledge of particular things but knows them by way of a universal knowledge. Ibn Sīna realizes the difficulty of his position and so adds that the understanding of it needs great intellectual subtlety. The reasons that he advances to deny perceptual knowledge to God are fully recognized by al-Ghazālī. Perceptual knowledge is characterized both temporally and spatially, whereas God is above both time and space and so it is not possible to ascribe perceptual knowledge to Him. A particular event occurs at a particular moment of time and suffers change with the passage of time. Change in the object of perception implies a change in the content of perception itself which obviously leads to change in the subject of perception, i.e., in the perceptual himself. But change in God is unthinkable; therefore, perception of a particular event is not possible for Him. Similarly, to distinguish between one particular object and another in space is possible only through the senses and implies a special relation of a sensible thing to the perceiver as being near to or far from him or in a definite position, and this is impossible where God is concerned. Hence, it is not possible for God to have perceptual knowledge of the particulars. His knowledge can only be that which rises above the particular "nores" and the particular "heres," that is to say, is of conceptual or universal nature.

Ibn Sīna's position as briefly outlined above seems to be very well grounded in sound reasoning and is quite understandable, yet, according to al-Ghazālī, it is so pernicious to religion that it altogether demolishes the entire edifice of religious law (hence his charge of infidelity). The theory implies that God cannot know any new state that emerges in John—He cannot know that John has becomes an infidel or a true believer, for He can know only the unbelief or the belief of man in general in a universal manner and not in specific relation to individuals. Yes, God cannot know Muhammad's proclaiming himself a prophet at the time when he did. And the same will be true of every other prophet, for God only knows that among men there are some who claim prophyacy, and that such and such are their attributes; but He cannot know a particular prophet as an individual, for that is to be known only by the sense.

There certainly is a point in what al-Ghazālī says here for it is really difficult to show any relation between the temporal and the timeless, yet the above criticism of his is a little wide of the mark for it is based on a misinterpretation of ibn Sīna's position. By the statement that God does not have perceptual knowledge of the particulars, ibn Sīna does not mean to say that God does not have the knowledge of the particulars or that His knowledge is restricted only to that of the universals or general concepts. Ibn Sīna insists that God does have knowledge of the particulars; only this knowledge comes to Him not through sense perception but through intellectual perception, not from moment to moment but eternally.

Ibn Sīna starts with the Aristotelian conception that God has only self-knowledge but adds emphatically that His self-knowledge necessarily implies knowledge of all the existent things in the universe in so far as He is the principal or the ultimate source of them all. There is not a single existent particular which does not proceed from Him directly or indirectly and the existence of which does not become in some way necessary through Him. The coming into existence of particular events and objects is due to the action and interaction of the various causes but ultimately all these have to be traced back to the First Cause. God, the First Cause, has the full presence of the working of all the various causes which originate from Him, and knows the effects produced by them and the time involved in their occurrence and recurrence. Thus, God knows the particular events even when they occur to a single individual under specific conditions and at particular times in so far as they are fully explicable in terms of general laws and all pervasive causal nexus. This may be illustrated with reference to an analogous human situation. An astronomer

6. Problem thirteenth of Tahdīṭ, pp. 153-62; cf. also other passages pertaining to God's knowledge by index. For a clear and balanced exposition of the philosopher's position with regard to this problem, see Nisqī Ḥaḍīṣ- ramifications (Urdu trans. by M. Hasan Iqbal, Qudūs 'Abdul Fādāl, Lahore, 1909), pp. 100-92.


5. Ibn Sīna says this in his Kīhbat al-Ṣūfī, "Metaphysics," VIII, 6. It is really an allusion to a verse of the Qur'ān (x, 61): "... and not the weight of an atom in the earth or in the heaven is hidden from thy Lord . . ." (also xxxiv, 3.)
A History of Muslim Philosophy

who has full understanding of the general laws governing the movements of the heavenly bodies can, through his proper calculations, describe the various phenomena such as the particular eclipses and the conjunctions of the stars. The analogy, however, though helpful, cannot be stretched to an identity, for, strictly speaking, there is nothing in our experience to compare with divine knowledge. Our knowledge is liable to error and is fragmentary, whereas God’s knowledge is infallible and all-embracing, so much so that the whole universe is known to Him in one single congruous manifestation which is not affected by time, God is immediately aware of the entire sweep of history regarded as an ordered string of specific events in an eternal now. Further, God not only knows but is also the very ground of the objects that He knows. The universe proceeds from the essence of God verily because of His knowledge of the universe: the ideal representation of the universal system is the very cause of its emanation. Had God not known the universe with all its concrete particularities, the universe would never have come into being. This is indeed a very original and quite ingenious knowledge of things about the particulars. Yet it is undoubtedly of highly speculative nature and so al-Ghazâlî is all out to bring quite an arsenal of criticism against it with a dialectical analyticity and rigour not incomparable to those of the logical positivists of our own day. He is not at all prepared to accept any of the assumptions of the philosophers until and unless they should either be statable in the form of analytical propositions or be verifiable through some kind of intuitive experience. The attribution of knowledge to God as it is, but particularly that of “the other,” cannot be without jeopardizing to some extent at least His absolute unity and simplicity which otherwise are so much emphasized, rather over-emphasized by the philosophers. Above all, the theory, like any of its kind, fails to relate in any satisfactory manner the eternity of God’s knowledge with the transience of human experience, which relation indeed is the very crux of religious experience. And so far as it suffers from the presuppositions of the intellectualistic-deterministic world-view of the philosophers, al-Ghazâlî simply has no patience with it. For one, it suggests a block universe such as makes little allowance if any at all even for the exercise of God’s will. These are just a few general remarks to indicate the mode and the various lines of al-Ghazâlî’s arguments against the philosophers; they may now be substantiated and amplified by listing some of the actual points of his criticism.

The statement that God’s self-knowledge necessarily implies the knowledge of all the existent particulars in the universe cannot be logically validated, nor can it be verified on the basis of any analogous human experience. God’s self-knowledge and His knowledge of others is considered to have the relation of logical entailment, for it is possible to imagine the existence of the one without imagining the existence of the other at the same time. Looking to our own experience it would be wrong to claim that man’s knowledge of what is other than himself is identical with his self-knowledge and with His essence.

It may be said that God does not know other things is the first intention (al-

usâl al-awwal) but that He knows His essence as the principle of the universe and from this His knowledge of the universe follows in the second intention (al-usâl al-âshir), i.e., by way of a logical inference. Now, the statement of the philosophers that God knows Himself directly only as the principle of the universe, according to al-Ghazâlî, is as much an arbitrary assumption as the earlier statement and is exposed to exactly the same kind of criticism. According to the philosophers’ own admission, it would suffice that God should only know only His essence; the knowledge of His being the principle of the universe is additional to it and is not logically implicated in it. Just as it is possible for a man to know himself without knowing that he is “an effect of God” (for his being an effect is a relation to this cause), even so it is possible for God to know Himself without knowing that He is the principle or cause. The principle or cause is merely the relation that He bears to His effect, the universe. His knowledge of His relation to the universe is not by any means entailed by His knowledge of His own essence. Do not the philosophers themselves in their doctrine with regard to the attributes of God affirm the possibility only of negative or relational statements about God on the plea that negations or relations add nothing to His essence? 14 Th e knowledge of the relation, therefore, cannot be identical with the knowledge of the essence. Hence the philosophers’ assumption that God knows His essence and thereby also knows Himself as the principle of the universe, remains unproved logically and unverified experientially. Al-Ghazâlî raises many more points of criticism of a similar nature which fully bring out the “posttristatic” and “analytic” threats in his thought. This type of criticism should have been sufficient with al-Ghazâlî, for it served his purpose of refuting the philosophers quite effectively, but his religious calling and persuasion impel him to launch many more attacks on the philosophers. They do not aim so much at the complete smashing of the philosophers’ arguments as to bring out other inconsistencies in their various positions or more so the difficulties of a religious nature in accepting them.

Al-Ghazâlî fully appreciates the motive of the philosophers in elaborating their theory with regard to the nature of God’s knowledge of the particulars, which is no other than that of safeguarding the immutability and the unity of God. Eliminating the factor of time or change altogether in God’s knowledge, however, has difficulties of its own which will be noted presently, but there is another aspect of the philosophers’ treatment of the problem of God’s knowledge which lands them into a morass of contradictions and annuls the very purpose for which it is belaboured, i.e., that of establishing the unity of God. Granted that God’s knowledge remains unaffected by change, for it rises above the distinction of “is,” “was” and “will,” yet how can God’s knowledge remain unaffected by the multiplicity and diversity of the objects that He knows? How can it be claimed that knowledge remains unitary even

14 Ibid.; cf. also al-Nâqî, pp. 408 et seq.
when the things known are unlimited in number and are different, for knowledge has to conform to the nature of the things known! If the change in the objects of cognition necessarily presupposes change in the subject, multiplicity and difference in the former presuppose the same in the latter.

"Would that I could understand," says al-Qushṣūlī, "how an intelligent person can allow himself to disbelieve the oneness of the knowledge of a thing whose states are divisible into the Past, the Present, and the Future; while he would not disbelieve the oneness of knowledge which relates to all the different Genera and Species. Verily the difference and the disparity among the diverse Genera and Species is more marked than the difference which may actually be found to exist among the states of a thing divisible in accordance with the division of time. If that difference does not necessitate multiplicity and difference, how can that do so either?"\(^{45}\)

Though the philosophers ascribe omniscience and fore-knowledge to God, they make His knowledge a sort of mirror which passively reflects in an eternal now the details of an already finished sequence of events just as we in a particular present moment have the memory of a fixed and inalterable sequence of past events. Thus, God's knowledge of time is restricted only to the relational aspect of time, i.e., that of the sequence of before and after or of earlier and later. There is, however, another aspect of time which typically characterizes the human experience and forms its very essence, namely, that of the ever-fleeting, ever-changing now. This is the time which is born anew at every moment, the time in which the future is perpetually flowing through the present into the past. Now, according to the philosophers' thesis of God's knowledge as explained above, in God's eternal being there can be no counterpart of the experience of this living time in which we humans move and act. God may know, for example, that my acts of religious devotion are subsequent to my religious conversion, but He cannot know now that I am actting or have acted in such and such a way. No God in His supra-temporal transcendence would remain impervious to my religious solicitations, for I am eternally doomed to the tyranny of this ever-fleeting, ever-trembling now.\(^{46}\) Should this be true and should I come to realize it, I may cry in despair: "Of what use is God to me?"\(^{47}\) Such is the catastrophe to which the philosophers' over-emphasis upon the eternity and changelessness of God's knowledge leads through its very incumbent logic. The problem of the relation of the eternity of God to

\(^{45}\) Tahādīṣ, p. 159. Even though al-Qushṣūlī is not justified in alleging that philosophers restrict God's knowledge merely to the universals, namely, the genera, the species, and the universal accidents, yet his criticism of the philosophers on this point is not vitiated by this misunderstanding and he is quite right in pointing out the inconsistency in their position.

\(^{46}\) Aristotle's conception of time is essentially intellectualistic and static, whereas al-Qushṣūlī's standpoint with regard to time, is keeping with his theistic occasionals, is intuitionistic and dynamic much like Bergson's durée. Cf. Louis Massignon, "Time in Islamic Thought," in Man and Time (Papers from the Kraus Yearbooks), London, 1956, pp. 108-14. Also M. F. Clough, Time, London, 1937.

\(^{47}\) Cf. Tahādīṣ, p. 189.
emanationist metaphysics of the philosophers was so radically different from his own dynamic-occasionalist world-view grounded in the theistic voluntaristic metaphysics of the Ash'arite tradition that al-Ghazali declared a complete parting of the way with them. Their world-view, al-Ghazali made it clear, militates particularly against the fundamental Islamic doctrine of God's providence and omnipotence, and leaves no possibility for the happening of miracles such as turning of a rod into a serpent, denaturing fire of its capacity to burn, revivification of the dead, splitting of the moon (all so clearly referred to in the Qur'an).44 There certainly is no scope for the exercise of God's free will in a universe in which there is no real becoming and in which the future is already given in the present as its necessary effect. Nor, in view of the reign of the inexorable law of causal necessity in such a universe, is there any possibility for the miracles, except those which can be "naturalized" through scientific explanation.

6. Causality—Al-Ghazali's desire to vindicate the truth of the religious position mentioned above led him to make a highly critical and sceptical analysis of the philosophers' concept of causality. This analysis, which bears a strikingly close similarity to that of Hume's, brings out clearly the most remarkable originality and acumen of al-Ghazali's thought. The problem that engaged him at the outset of his inquiry with regard to the seventeenth disputation in the Tahdîf is the problem of the alleged necessity of the causal connection as maintained and insisted on by the philosophers. He challenges the validity of this necessity right as he opens the discussion.45 "It is our view," he asserts, "the connection between what are believed to be cause and effect is not necessary." The reason that he offers for the justification of his position is that the relation between cause and effect is not that of logical entailment. The affirmation of the one does not imply the affirmation of the other, nor does the denial of the one imply the denial of the other. Neither the existence nor the non-existence of the one is necessarily presupposed by the existence or the non-existence of the other. The relation between quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and fire, or light and sunrise, etc., is not a necessary relation, for in no case does the one term logically imply the other. There is nothing logically contradictory in assuming that fire may not burn, and drinking may not quench thirst, and so on.

The alleged necessity of the causal connection is not logically warranted because through no amount of logical reasoning can we deduce the effect from

44 Miracles ascribed to the prophets Moses, Abraham, Jesus, and Muhammad respectively; cf. the Qur'an, xx, 17-23, xxviii, 31; xxi, 68, 69, xx, 124, xxxviii, 97, 98; iii, 46; v, 110; and lv, 1.

46 The real starting point of the discussion on causality belongs to the later part of the sixteenth disputation. See Tahdîf, p. 181.

614

the cause. At best it is based on observation or experience. We observe that objects succeed one another or that similar objects are constantly conjointed. Now, this proves succession, not causation, or conjunction, not connection. The fire which is an inanimate object has no power to produce the effect of burning; "observation shows only that one is with the other and not that it is by it," i.e., the effect happens with the cause and not through it ('inda khu la bikh).46

The notion of necessity is valid only in the case of logical relations such as identity, implication, disjunction, etc. In the sphere of mere natural relations necessity has no scope. In the order of nature, unlike the order of thought, we deal merely with the contingent and logical entities which remain unrelated to each other except in the minds of the perceivers. Objects as such are not connected with one another; only the ideas of them get connected in our mind by association. The relation between fire and burning is not a necessary relation, for it does not belong to the realm of necessity but to that of possibility such as may happen or may not happen depending on the will of God. "It is only," al-Ghazali enunciates clearly, "when something possible is repeated over and over again (as to form the Norm), that its pursuance of a uniform course in accordance with the Norm in the past is indubitably impressed upon our minds."47 Thus, if there is any semblance of necessity in the order of natural relations such as that of cause and effect, it is merely because the two terms which in nature remain extrinsic to each other, through constant repetition become conjointed in our consciousness. Causal necessity is just the habit of our mind: it is merely a psychological necessity and not a logical necessity. The psychological necessity differs from logical necessity in that its denial like the latter does not involve us in a logical impossibility. Hence the miracles, such as the fire not burning the body of Abraham when he was thrown into it, are not impossible to think. Al-Ghazali insists that the denial of miracles can be justified only when it should be proved that they are logically impossible and where such proof is not forthcoming their denial is sheer ignorance and obduracy.

It is interesting to note further that al-Ghazali, in the course of his discussion of the principle of causality and the possibility of miracles, comes close to propounding the notion of the composite nature of a cause and also that of plurality of causes. Cause he understands to be the sum total of many contributory factors, some of which are positive while others negative, and all of which have to be considered in conjunction. Take the case of a man seeing a coloured object: he should possess sound vision, he should open his eyes, there should be no obstruction between the eyes and the object of vision, the object should be a coloured one, the atmosphere should be not dark but have sufficient light, etc. Any one condition by itself cannot be taken to be a cause and a single negative condition such as the blindness of the

46 Tahdîf, p. 186.
47 Ibid., p. 189.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

person or the darkness of atmospheres may make the cause non-operative though logically not impossible. The relation of cause and effect is based on observation and as such does not rule out the possibility that the same effect might follow some cause other than the apparent one. Even where we recognize that there are many causes for the same effect, we cannot limit the number of causes just to those which we ourselves have observed. So there are many causes for the same effect23 and a cause is a sum total of many conditions. In view of this it is not possible to negate an effect on the negation of one particular cause but on the negation of all the various causes. This latter possibility, however, is emphatically discounted by al-Ghazali so far as we are concerned, for it presupposes a complete and exhaustive knowledge of all the causes and their conditions, which knowledge we humans can never come to possess. Moreover, causes by themselves are inert entities; will and action cannot be attributed to them. They act only through the power and agency of God.24 The only will is the absolutely free-will of God which works un-constrained by any extraneous force the self-imposed law of contradiction. Thus, the things to which God's power extends include mysterious and wonderful facts as such "elude the discernment of human sensibility." Indeed, God's power extends to all kinds of logical possibilities such as turning of a rod into a serpent or the revivification of the dead. For the same reason it is not impossible for Him to bring about the resurrection of bodies in the life hereafter and all other things with regard to paradise and hell which have been mentioned in the Qur'an.25 To deny them is both illogical and irreligious. One may add that, according to al-Ghazali, not only all miracles are natural but also all nature is miraculous.26 Nature, however, seems to be pervaded by a causal nexus only because as a rule God does not choose to interrupt the continuity of events by a miracle; it is possible, however, that He might intervene at any time. Such situations may make one sceptical of the phenomena of nature, but it may equally lead one to an acute mystical sense of the presence of God in all things. Scepticism of this kind and mysticism need not always be antagonistic—the former may as well lead to the latter. This indeed is said to have happened in the case of al-Ghazali.

3 Cf. Qur'an, xix. 5; xxvii. 22-31, 88, 89.
4 In spite of Hume's notorious repudiation of the miraculous (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section, 10, Parts 1 & 2), his notion of causality through its own logic can be finally reduced to the Ghazalian or better the Agh'arite position expressed in this statement. Cf. A. K. Taylor, "David Hume and the Miraculous," in his Philosophical Studies, London, 1954, pp. 350-65; also F. R. Tennant, Miracle and Its Philosophical Prepossessions, Cambridge, 1925, p. 84.

1 In the Munqith al-Ghazali expressly mentions that he had studied the Qur al-Qudah of Abu Tahir al-Mas'uki (d. 386/996), the works of Haraj al-Mushabbi (d. 342/957), and the fragments of al-Jawzi (d. 386/996), and Abu Yaqub al-Bistami (d. 561/1165). The end he adds that he had read the discoveries of all the bedding Sufis. In al-Ghazali's works, indeed, there are references to be found to all the great mystics of Islam. For al-Ghazali's Esoteric sources, cf. Marguerite Smith, Al-Ghazali: The Mystic, London, 1944, pp. 132-32. For a comparison of Qur al-Qudah and Iskaf of Shibli Nu'mani, al-Ghazali, Lahore, 1956, p. 107; for the comparison of Mushabbi's Kitab al-Wajib and Munqith, cf. J. A. Chever, Shifah, London, 1860, pp. 47-56.

A MYSTICISM

1. Introduction.—It will not be quite true to say that al-Ghazali's final resort to Sufi-mysticism was merely the result of his disillusionment with philosophy and dissatisfaction with scholastic theology. This is only a part of the truth; his own confessional statement to this effect in Munqith al-Munqith seems to be rather an over-statement of the actual facts. Sufiistic influences had all along been working upon his mind right from his early childhood. We need only recall that his father was a pious dervish and his guardian a Sufi devotee, that in his youth he studied2 and even practised Sufism first under Yusef al-Nasawi in Tusi and then under his older brother Ahmad al-Ghazali (d. 520/1126) made a name as a great Sufi. It is not improbable that he should have also learnt of Sufism from his teacher Imam al-Haramain, for it is reported that the Imam himself had been the pupil of the renowned Sufi Abu Nu'aim al-Ishabani (d. 430/1038). So al-Ghazali's eventual adoption of the Sufi way of life was in reality a continuation of these early influences and not simply the consequence of his failure to find the philosophical solution of the theological problems. Further, it has to be emphasized that, in spite of his explicit official denunciation of philosophy, al-Ghazali could never completely part company with it. His Sufi-mysticism was as much influenced by his thorough study of philosophy as by theology; in its final development it was the mysticism of a philosopher and a theologian. There is a marked note of Hellenic thought in his mystical doctrines and even the teachings of Neo-Platonism, and yet paradoxical though it may seem they remain circumscribed within the limits of orthodoxy. His is surely a sober kind of mysticism carefully encompassing all kinds of pantheistic extravagances and severely criticizing the antimonic tendencies of the intoxicated Sufis. On the one hand, he tried to make mysticism orthodox and, on the other, orthodoxy mystical. It is the mystical element in religion, he insisted, which is most vital and makes religious life a reality. Both to the philosophers
and the scholastic theologians he brought home the fact that the basis of all religious certainty is the first-hand living experience of God. He indeed did his best to vitalize the Law and the doctrine of Islam through this emphasis on the living religious experience, and this is evident from the very title of his magnum opus, *Ihyāʾ* (Recircivation of the Sciences of Religion). But the mystical teaching of al-Ghazālī found in *Ihyāʾ*, meant for all to read, must be studied in conjunction with what is given in his other works dealing more especially with the Sufi doctrine such as *Muḥākāt al-Awdaʾ, al-Muʿātir fī al-Aqīqah, Muḥākāt al-Ghālib* and the like. The theory developed in these works represents what may be labelled as theosophical mysticism and this cannot be properly understood without reference to al-Ghazālī's specific views about the nature of God and the human soul. From the point of view of our present study his mystical views with regard to God and soul may be profitably compared with those of the philosophers, i.e., al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and their followers.

2. God.—The philosophers have particularly emphasized the absolute unity of God. No positive attributes can be ascribed to God that leads to the subject-predicate dualism. Existence can only be referred to Him. He is above all distinctions and above all the categories of thought. This over-emphasis on unity above all qualities reduces God to a mere contentless infinity. He becomes an ineffable, indescribable, incomprehensible something. Such is the result of the dialectic of the philosophers' morastic reductionism. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, some of them, following Aristotle, have described God as thought thinking thought. That which He knows comes into being only from the over-effacement of His Being. He does not positively will anything, for willing implies a need—a deficiency. He recognizes only Himself or at best His first emanent, the first intelligence, and, thus, is purely transcendent to this world of change and multiplicity.

Like the philosophers, al-Ghazālī lays stress on the unity of God: God is the sole-existent and the ultimate cause and ground of all, the only self-subsisting reality. Yet He possesses the fullness of being, all the attributes mentioned in the Qurʾān inhere in Him, only the modality of this inhereance is rationally unknowable. We should, however, understand that all His attributes are spiritual. He is perfect goodness and perfect beauty: the supreme object of love. He is the light of lights, the eternal wisdom, the creative truth, but above all He is the eternal will.

To the philosophers God is primarily thought or intelligence, but to al-Ghazālī He is primarily a will which is the cause of creation. “The First Principle,” he says, “is an omnipotent and willing agent. He does what He wills, and ordains as He likes, and He creates the similar and dissimilar things alike, whenever and in whatever manner He wills.” So Ultimate Reality is essentially will. The entire choir of the heavens and the furniture of the earth are the direct work of God, produced out of sheer nothingness simply through His terrible “Ibe.” God has created the universe through His will, sustains it through His will, and one day will let it pass away by His will. According to the philosophers, God wills the world because He thinks of it. According to al-Ghazālī, “God has cognizance of the world because He wills it in and His willing it.”

Like the philosophers, al-Ghazālī also emphasizes the transcendent aspect of God. He is exalted beyond the limitations of space and time, for He is the creator of space and time. He was before time and space were. But He is also immanent in this spatio-temporal order; His eternal wisdom and supreme beauty manifest themselves through the wonders and glory of His creation. His eternal will is in action throughout the universe; it is in the swing of the sun and the moon and in the alternation of day and night. Everywhere around is the touch and working of God. Al-Ghazālī's God is not the Absolute of the philosophers who is bleak and cold, but a personal God, a living God. He desires intercourse with His creatures and makes it possible for them to enter into fellowship with Himself through prayer and contemplation and, above all, through the gift of mystical gnosis.

3. Soul.—The difference between al-Ghazālī and the philosophers with regard to the nature of the soul is not so very well marked. He only insists, like Kant, that the philosophers through their rational arguments cannot give any conclusive proof for the spirituality, substantiability, unity, immortality, etc., of the human soul. His attack on the philosophers on this issue is as incisive and analytic as that of Kant but probably more violent. He actually smashes one by one all the ten arguments which he himself expounds as forcefully as they could be in favour of their thesis. Like Kant, again, he does not disagree with their basic position but only with their method. He even joins the philosophers in their refutation of the position of some of the scholastic theologians, who maintained that the soul is a kind of subtle body or an accident and not a substance. What is more and rather strange, while determining the place of the soul in the realm of beings, al-Ghazālī talks the very language of

---

1 Qurʾān, ii, 117; xvi, 40.
3 Cf. Qurʾān, iii, 189, 190, vi, 100; ii, 5, 6; xiii, 3, 4, etc. cf. also al-Ghazālī's *Muḥākāt al-Ghālib* and *Muḥākāt al-Muʿātir* Allah, Cairo, 1321/1903.
the Neo-Platonic philosophers. His cosmological triad of the divine world ('ilām al-malakūt), the celestial world ('ilām al-jabrī), and the material, phenomenal world ('ilām al-malik u-ghāzalāh) runs closely parallel to that of Plotinus consisting of the universal mind, the universal soul, and matter.19 Like Plotinus, he seems to vouchsafe that the human soul belongs to 'ilām al-jabartī, i.e., midway between the divine world and the material world, and so is neither purely eternal like the former nor merely temporal like the latter but partakes of them both.

Al-Ghazālī's conception of the human soul, however, is essentially based on the teachings of the Qurʾān and the Traditions. The interesting thing about this conception is that it runs parallel to his conception of God. Soul like God is a unity and like Him it is primarily and essentially a will. Further, as God is both transcendent to and immanent in the universe so is soul with reference to body. "Man is made in the image of God,"20 is a saying of the Holy Prophet and it is twice stated in the Qurʾān that "Allāh breathed into man of His own spirit."21 The soul is a mirror illuminated by the divine spark reflecting the qualities and even the essence of God. "No; only are man's attributes," says al-Ghazālī, "a reflection of God's attributes but the mode of existence of man's soul affords an insight into God's mode of existence. . . ." Knowledge of the self is the key to the knowledge of God, for so is the oft-quoted tradition: "He who knows himself knows his Lord." "Both God and soul," al-Ghazālī adds, "are invisible, indivisible, unconfined by space and time, and outside the categories of quantity and quality: nor can the ideas of shape, colour, or size attach to them."22

The soul of man is different from anything else in the sensuous world. There are two worlds: the world of command (amr) and the created world (dhārij).23 Everything devoid of quantity and dimension belongs to the world of amr. Soul belongs to the world of amr also because it proceeds from the command of God: "Say, the spirit proceedeth at the command of my Lord!"24 is God's instruction to the Prophet. It is the world of amr that rules the created world: the command is the divine force which directs and regulates the world. Thus soul is a spiritual principle which having life in itself vitalizes the body and controls it and regulates it. Body is the instrument and vehicle of the soul. God is primarily a will and man is akin to God especially in respect of will. Falo ersum is the dictum on which al-Ghazālī builds his mystical

19 See Kīmīyā-i Šu’dāt, Urdu trans. by M. Inayat Ullah, Lahore, n.d., p. 36. Also cf. Qurʾān, xxv, 30.
20 Qurʾān, xv, 29; xxxiii, 72.
22 See Kīmīyā-i Šu’dāt, Urdu trans., p. 10.
23 Qurʾān, xv, 29.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

sophors, yet he did not remain altogether unaffected by it. It is indeed futile to look for any lifeless consistency in his attitudes which make a happy synthesis of voluntarism, pragmatism, and idealism. He concludes, for example, that a prophet is a person endowed with extraordinary intellect which enables him to attain contact with the active intellect, the proximate source of prophetic revelation. Like the philosophers, he also affirms that perfection of the soul consists in knowledge, albeit intuitive knowledge; like them, he also shows predilections for knowledge for its own sake. "The ink of the scholar is better than the blood of the martyr." It is certainly true so far as by knowledge we here understand knowledge of the religious sciences, but it is also in a sense true of all other sciences. Knowledge of the sciences dealing with things that God has made is regarded by al-Ghazali as a necessary prelude to the knowledge of God Himself. The study of all branches of knowledge and taking the greatest share of most of them is a necessary part of the mystic discipline. "If the soul has not been exercised in the sciences dealing with fact and demonstration, it will acquire mental powers."

It has almost become a fashion to label al-Ghazali as an anti-intellectualist and to ascribe to him much of the backwashness of Muslim community ever since the sixteenth/seventeenth century: its conservatism and its anti-liberalism. It is alleged that al-Ghazali through his emphasis on fundamentalism and spiritualism initiated a movement in Muslim thought that killed all zest for philosophic inquiry and scientific reflection, if it did not outright create an antipathy for them. The anti-intellectualism or the anti-liberalism of the Muslim community is a highly complex sociological phenomenon and its causes shall have to be explored in a great many areas; it would be too much of an over-simplification of facts to ascribe it to a single name, however great that name may be. We have only to remember that al-Ghazali never left philosophy altogether and that he himself was very well acquainted with the scientific knowledge of his day.

5. Pantheism. — Al-Ghazali's view of God as being both immanent and translucent, his firm belief in God being a personal God who allows His creatures to enter into communion with Him, his emphasis on God's being a creator who created the universe at a specific time through an act of volition, and his belief that God is limited in His knowledge and will, are all clearly pantheistic. The description of the mystic's experience of God at the higher reaches of his ecstatic flights as identification (tātbiq) or unification (wujūd) with God or inherence or indwelling (ba'd) in Him, as al-Ghazali has expressly mentioned as false and erroneous. At best the mystics can claim only a nearness to or proximity with God and no more. But it has been pointed out that in his doctrine of the soul it makes resemble God so closely both in essence and qualities that there remains hardly any difference between the two. Al-Ghazali is aware of this dangerous deduction and asserts most emphatically that there is one special quality (makhluq) which belongs to God alone and of which none else partakes and that is the quality of self-subsistence. God is self-subsistent (laqad) while everything else exists through Him and not through its own essence. "Nay, things through their own essence have nothing particular work but it cannot at all be justified if the whole course of his works is taken into consideration.

Considering, however, the number and complexity of the subjects with which his works deal, the various levels of readers for whom they were written and the fact of his own spiritual development, it is not always possible to reconcile his various views and attitudes and to defend him against all charges of inconsistence. One such difficulty arises when, after having considered his views about the nature of the soul and God, we come to formulate his position with regard to the relation between the two. Whether his conception of this relation makes an allowance for pantheism, is a question which has puzzled some students of al-Ghazali. Al-Ghazali's view of God as being both immanent and translucent, his firm belief in God being a personal God who allows His creatures to enter into communion with Him, his emphasis on God's being a creator who created the universe at a specific time through an act of volition, one and all, can hardly fit into any scheme of pantheism. The description of the mystic's experience of God at the higher reaches of his ecstatic flights as identification (tātbiq) or unification (wujūd) with God or inherence or indwelling (ba'd) in Him, as al-Ghazali has expressly mentioned as false and erroneous. At best the mystics can claim only a nearness to or proximity with God and no more. But it has been pointed out that in his doctrine of the soul it makes resemble God so closely both in essence and qualities that there remains hardly any difference between the two. Al-Ghazali is aware of this dangerous deduction and asserts most emphatically that there is one special quality (makhluq) which belongs to God alone and of which none else partakes and that is the quality of self-subsistence. God is self-subsistent (laqad) while everything else exists through Him and not through its own essence. "Nay, things through their own essence have nothing

21 Cf. Muhammad al-Afghani, Cairo, 1942/1925, pp. 35, 36; also Hayat, Part I, Book I, Section 7 on 'Aql (Inte11ec1t).
A History of Muslim Philosophy

but non-existence, and existence comes to them only from something else, by way of a loan." But surely there is the lurking danger of pantheism in such a statement if it is stretched to its logical limits. If the contingency of the world should be over-emphasised, it becomes nothing more than a show of shadows having no reality or actuality of its own whatsoever. All actuality is devoured by the being of God. This conclusion is confirmed by al-Ghazali's own approval of the pantheistic formula: la kwana illa kwana (there is no it but He) to which may be added his statement: "He is everything. He is that He is: none but He has ispeity or heity at all." To this may be added that al-Ghazali has taken a very lenient view of some of the obviously pantheistic utterances of the Sufis of extreme type such as "I am the Creative Truth;" "Glory be to Me! How great is My glory!"; "Within this rose is naught but Allah," etc. Statements of this kind clearly indicate a sense of complete self-deification. But al-Ghazali has no word of condemnation for them except the comment that "the words of passionate lovers is the state of ecstasy should be concealed and not spelt out or stated aloud." To this, the Sufis agree, but al-Ghazali seems to forget sometimes the advice he has so strongly given to those who have attained the mystic state that they should not try to speak the unpeachable and follow the poet who said:

"What I experience I shall not try to say;
Call me happy, but ask me no more." 18

B
ETHICS

Al-Ghazali is the best known Muslim writer on moral subjects. But there are some critics who have recently made attempts to belittle the importance of his ethical theory by trying to show that it is entirely, or at least mainly, derived from the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic doctrines and from the writings of the Muslim philosophers whose systems were Hellenic in spirit. Al-Ghazali was, undoubtedly, a widely read scholar and was, therefore, well versed in the ethical thought of the Greeks, which did influence him. But it would be basically wrong to say that he was dependent on Greek philosophy for his

20 Saying ascribed to Abu Yāsīn al-Burjānī, who is probably the first of the intoxicated Sufls.
21 Muṣaffā, p. 61.
22 Margarete Smith, Dr. Zaki Muhâkr, and others.

Al-Ghazali (Continued)

inspiration. He was, in fact, against the philosophers and their heretical doctrines. Throughout his writings, al-Ghazali takes his stand upon Islamic teachings and invariably quotes from the Qur'ān and the traditions in support of his views. Following the Qur'ān, for example, he lays emphasis on spiritual values like gratitude (zhād), repentance (taḥbâh), reliance (tanâqīf), fear (akhâr) of God, etc., which were completely unknown to the Greeks. Similarly, al-Ghazali is thoroughly Islamic in taking the perfect human representation of the moral ideal in the Prophet of Islam (peace be on him), whom God Himself testifies to have the highest character. Further, we can legitimately say that the notion of the love of God as the summum bonum, leading directly to the beatific vision in the next world, has nothing like it in Greek philosophy. This is undeniably based upon the Qur'ānic teachings. All these assertions will become clearer as we proceed with the detailed discussion.

Asceticism is the spirit that runs throughout all al-Ghazali's ethics. He does not deal with the heroic virtues like courage, etc., in detail, and lays greater emphasis on the purification of the heart after one has severed all ties with this world, at least in spirit. He says: "The experienced guide and teacher should bring home to the disciple that he should root out anger and keep no wealth... otherwise if he gets the slightest hint that both wealth and self-assertion are good and necessary in a certain measure, he will get an excuse for avarice and self-assertion, and to whatever limits he goes he will imagine that he is permitted as far as that. So he ought to be told to eradicate these tendencies." 21 Again, in Miftāḥ al-Anwa'r, al-Ghazali differentiates between two kinds of virtue: positive, i.e., good actions, and negative, i.e., the abandonment of bad ones. The negative side is better and more excellent. To elucidate this point further, he discusses the question in Ḥuḍr whether marriage or celibacy is better. After counting the advantages and the disadvantages of both, he ultimately tends to the conclusion that celibacy is better. One may marry, he grants, provided one is at the same time like the unmarried, i.e., lives always in the presence of God. All this has a colouring of otherworldliness.

Avoidance of the world is, however, not put forward as an end-in-itself. It has been over-emphasized by al-Ghazali simply to counteract the tendencies to vice, luxury, and pride, which were so common in his days. The curbing or controlling of passions has been stressed merely to achieve moderation; otherwise he fully knows the psychology of human nature. He is quite aware of the social spirit of the Qur'ān and of the Prophet's teaching that there is no asceticism in Islam. 22 Accordingly, al-Ghazali does sometimes lay emphasis on our duties and obligations to other individuals and to society as a whole. 23 Jihād has been mentioned as a necessary obligatory duty; even prayers have to be sacrificed, if need be, during a war. In the chapter on "Reincarnation

22 Qur'ān, Iviii, 4.
24 Ḥuḍr, Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, Vol. IV, p. 236.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

of the World," in the Ḥiyāʾ he warns against its evils and holds that renuncia-
tion is a grievous sin if a man has dependants who need his support. He
defends music by saying that "quietly and sport refresh and cheer the heart
and bring relief to the tired mind. . . . rest prepares a man for work, and
sport and gaiety for grave and serious pursuits." Further, among virtues,
he includes good appearance (fawaʾid al-husn) with adornment which is
sensible and has no tinge of ostentation in it. Similarly, there are the virtues
of self-respect, dignity, etc., which point to a man’s relation with other indi-
viduals and presuppose a social set-up.

Before discussing al-Ghazālī’s theory of ethics we may consider the problem
which forms the basis of all ethical systems, viz., the problem of the freedom
of the will. The fact that man can change from the state of the insinuating self
(ad-naṣfa al-ʿaṣūrūd) to the state of the self at peace (ad-naṣfa al-maṣmaʿīnāk)
through a good deal of conscious struggle and deliberate effort necessarily sug-
gests that he is free in his will. The Muʿtazilites had taught that the freedom
of the will is an a priori certainty, that man possesses power ( jsonData)
over his actions and that his real author. The Ashʿarites, who represented the ortho-
dox reaction, however, held that “Man cannot create anything. God is the
only creator. Nor does man’s power produce any effect on his actions at all.
God creates in His creature power (ṣūrat), and choice (ḥikmā). He then
creates in him action corresponding to the power and choice thus created.
So the action of the creature is created by God as to initiative and as to pro-
duction, but it is acquired by the creature. By acquisition (lazd) is meant
that it corresponds to the creature’s power and choice previously created in
him, without his having had the slightest effect on the action.” This position
comes very close to the “pre-established harmony” of Leibnitz. It, thus, gives
us at the most only a consciousness of freedom, and not freedom in the real
sense of the term.

Over this question al-Ghazālī finds himself on the horns of a dilemma. On
the one hand, God is represented as the dispose of everything. He is in the
unmoved mover of the material world and the only efficient cause of all
creation. Whatever happens in the heavens or on the earth happens accord-
ing to a necessary system and a predetermined plan. Not even a leaf can
move without His decree; His law is supreme everywhere. “Whosoever
God wishes to guide, He expands his breast to Islam; but whosoever He
wishes to lead astray He makes his breast tight and strait.” And, on the
other hand, man is shown to be responsible for his actions and for deserving
place either in hell or in heaven. This implies complete moral freedom.

Al-Ghazālī seeks to reconcile both these tendencies on the basis of an
analysis of the human mind. The heart or the soul of man, according to
him, is furnished with two kinds of impressions. Either there are sensations

34 Al-Ghazali, Ḥiyāʾ, Part II, Chap. on Music.
35 D. B. Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, p. 192.
36 Qurʾān, vi, 125.

through which one gets the sensible qualities of the outside world, or there is
reflection or internal sense which supplies the mind with its own operations.
These impressions, which al-Ghazālī calls Ḥiyāʾ (Locke would call them
“simple ideas” and James Ward would term them “presentations”), are,
according to him, the spring and fountain-head of all activity. Whatever the
heart intends, resolves, etc., must come to it as knowledge in the form of such
impressions. These impressions or ideas have an inherent tendency to express
themselves in overt movements. They have a motive part of their own and are
able of exciting a strong impulse or inclination (rizqūk) in the first instance.
This inclination must, if the action is to take place, be followed by decision
or conviction (Ḥiḍāth). (These three stages correspond pretty closely to what
psychologists call respectively appetite, desire, and wish.) Conviction, in turn,
is followed by resolution or the will to act (irḍāk). Will excites power and
then the action comes.

The first two stages of this process, viz., impression and inclination, are
recognized to be beyond man’s complete control; if an individual merely
thinks intently of falling forward, swaying forward begins. So “the conclusion
would be that, while the occurrence of a strong desire or inclination may
come without man’s responsibility, his reason is free to make a decision and
his will is free to accept the decision of reason as good and to implement
the corresponding action. In such a case, man would be free to do what he
desires, but the complete control of his desire would be beyond his power.”

Thus, al-Ghazālī tries to reconcile the positions of the determinists and the
indeterminists.

In fact, al-Ghazālī recognizes three stages of being. The lowest is the material
world where the absolute necessity of God’s will is all in all. Second is the
stage of the sensuous and the psychical world where a relative sort of freedom
is recognized. Lastly comes God who is absolutely free. But His freedom is not
like that of a man who arrives at decisions after hesitation and deliberation
over different alternatives. This is impossible in the case of God. “To speak
of choice between alternatives is to suggest that other than the best might be
chosen and this would be inconsistent with the idea of perfection.”

Thus, having established human freedom and responsibility and having
justified his discussion of ethical questions, al-Ghazālī goes on to present before
us his notion of the moral ideal and the means that are to be adopted for its
realization. The path is long and difficult and needs a great deal of patience
and perseverance on the part of the seeker. Slowly and steadily, by leading a
virtuous life, he has to take his soul towards perfection so that it might be
able to attain the knowledge of God and consequently divine love, which is
the sunnus bawma or the Highest Good in this world. This will lead to
the beatific vision in the world to come. It should, however, be remembered

37 Donaldson, Studies in Muslim Ethics, p. 156.
that man cannot move a single step forward without the help of God. He is
guided throughout by the gift of God (wilāya). Wilāya manifests itself in
various forms:
1. Guidance from God (hidāyah) is the very condition of all virtues. It
stands for the telling of the moral from the immoral, the good from the
bad and the right from the wrong. Unless these distinctions are clearly
seen, we cannot be supposed to do any good action or avoid evil.
2. Direction (ruḥdī). More knowledge of good actions might be necessary
but is not sufficient for their performance. We should also have the will
to do them. This is “direction.”
3. Setting aright (taṣlīd). It is the power from God which makes the body
obey the will in order to realize the end.
4. Confirmation (ṣīdīd). It makes circumstances congenial for the actualiza-
tion of the will.

Helped by God in this way the individual proceeds to exercise virtues
which gradually raise the heart higher and higher until it reaches the ideal.
Before taking up this enterprise, however, the soul or the heart is to be
subjected to a thorough surgical operation and cleansed of all impurities.
“He will indeed be successful who purifies it and he will fail who corrupts
it.”44 It is only when the heart has thus been freed of its fetters and the veils
of darkness and ignorance have been rent asunder that anything positive can
be attempted. Al-Ghazālī explains it by an allegory. Once the Chinese and
the Greeks held a contest on the art of drawing and painting. One part of a
big room was given to the Chinese and the other to the Greeks. In between
was hung a curtain so that they might not see the work of each other. The
Greeks decorated the wall with many rare colours, but the Chinese proceeded
to brighten their sides and polish it. When the curtain was raised, the beautiful
art of the former was reflected on the latter’s wall in its original beauty and
charm. Such is the way of the saints who strive for the purification of their
heart to make it worthy of the knowledge of God Most High. But what are
these impurities and what are they due to? What is that which darkness and
causes gloom upon the soul of man? Al-Ghazālī’s answer is: love of the world—
the root from which all the multifarious sins and vices spring. The pious people
avoid it and seek loneliness. “Be in the world as if you are a stranger or journey-
ing upon the road.”45 On seeing a dead goat, the Prophet of Islam (peace be
on him) is reported to have said, “The world has lesser value in the eyes of
God than this goat has for its owner.”

Let us now discuss briefly al-Ghazālī’s enumeration of the main kinds of
vices which result from the love of the world, the removal of which from the
heart is incumbent upon us.

---

44 Qur’ān, vii. 31.
anger when some desire of his is not fulfilled, when another person possesses the thing which, he thinks, should rightfully belong to him. When not gratified, anger often turns into malice, which consists in the desire that the desired thing should be lost to the possessor also. It is a feeling of pain at another’s good. Sometimes, however, there is no feeling of pain but simply a strong desire that one should also possess a thing like the one the other has. This is known as emulation (ghishah) and is not undesirable. We can overcome the vices of excessive self-assertion by forbearance, mildness, forgiveness, humility, etc.

Anger, malice, and emulation are aroused when man is not in possession of the objects of his desire. Pride and vanity, on the contrary, occur when he has secured such objects. Vanity is a sense of self-admiration. The individual regards his possessions as great, has no fear of losing them, and forgets that they are merely gifts of God. If he is vain about his intellect, wisdom, and opinion, all development in knowledge ceases and all progress is congealed. A proud man, on the other hand, actively compares himself with others; is rightly or wrongly aware of some religious or worldly perfection in himself, and feels elated and raised above them. He looks down upon them and expects respect from them as a superior. Learned men, wordsters, and devotees are very much prone to this evil. The cure of pride lies in recognizing God and one’s own self. By this he would come to know that pride becomes God and greatness belongs to Him alone. Further, he should remember his humble beginnings and recognize the filthy stuff he is made of. Let him consider the origin and end of his forefathers and of the proud persons like Pharaoh and Nimrud who tried to equal God Almighty. Let him consider also that beauty, wealth, and friendship are all transitory and unreliable.

To the third category of vices belong the lust of wealth (habb al-mal) and of position (habb al-jib), hypocrisy (rijal), and wilful self-deception (ghurur). Wealth in itself, however, is not bad. It is the use of it that makes it so. Wealth can be spent on the poor and the needy to alleviate their sufferings, but can also lead directly to sins or can supply means for them. Those who love money often forget God and His, in turn, prepares and reserves for them a painful doom.45 Love of wealth may lead to avarice: the more one has, the more one desires. It can also lead to miserliness, which means not spending even where one is duty-bound to spend. The cure of all these evils is to give away all that is superfluous and keep only as much as is essential for supporting life and getting peace of mind. We must further be convinced in our hearts that wealth, like shadows, is a transitory affair and that God is sufficient for us and our children. We should hasten to spend, when occasion demands, setting aside the checks and hesitations arising within.

Love of position means the desire to win and dominate the hearts of others. It is generally gained by creating in others a conviction that one possesses the so-called qualities of perfection such as beauty, strength, ancestry. Real perfection, however, lies in knowledge and freedom: knowledge of God and spiritual values, and freedom from the vices and the rebellious nature of passions. Just as wealth is allowed if used as a means for some good, so may we win the admiration of those whose help is necessary to realize the ideal. But if position is sought for its own sake, it is a vice and should be eradicated. One must impress upon oneself that position is not everlasting and that death is a leveller. One should also know that a prominent person creates enemies very easily.

The lover of position generally falls into hypocrisy and tries to deceive people that he possesses something which actually he does not. An individual, for example, may pretend to be a pious man by a thin, lean, neglected body, long prayers, virtuous and humble talk, and so on. In religious matters, hypocrisy has been condemned very much by both the Qur’an and the Sunnah. This deadly disease must be cured, otherwise all the so-called virtuous actions, the inner spiritual basis being absent, will be entirely useless and unacceptable to God. One must perform all good actions, including the religious observances and acts of worship, in secret. We may perform them in the open if our sincere intention is that others may also be persuaded thereby to do the same. Love of position also gives rise to self-deception. The individual is convinced that he has something which he really does not have. Four classes of people among the believers are, according to al-Ghazali, very likely to involve themselves in this evil. They are, for example, such religious devotees as do not have the real sense of values. They do not realize what is more important and what is less important and, by performing the latter, they assume themselves to be exempt from the former. For instance, they take greater care in the correct pronunciation of the words of the Qur’an than in understanding their true meanings. Instead of helping a hungry neighbour, they would go on pilgrimage to Mecca. Some dress themselves poorly and meekly and think they have become saints thereby. All these persons are deceiving themselves as to the true nature of things. Similar is the case with the Sufis. Some of them learn only the terminology of the real Sufis and think they are likewise able to see God. Some are always wondering about the power and majesty of God and do nothing more. Some do actually try to cleanse the heart and perform good actions but wrongly think that they have passed most of the stages and are the true lovers of God. Again, there are some who make a distinction between Sharī'ah and Fiqh and regard themselves above Sharī'ah. They give up the performance of obligatory duties and religious observances. The same is the case with the learned and the rich, who are generally involved in one kind of self-delusion or another.

Thus, we end the brief and synoptic survey of al-Ghazali’s account of the main vices of character. Now we turn to virtues, which are the redeeming qualities (al-manṣūbāt) and represent the positive efforts of the seeker towards God. Al-Ghazali has given us a detailed, interesting, and illuminating

---

45 Qur’an, ix, 34.
discussion on this topic in the fourth quarter of his "Revivification of Religious Sciences." The virtues that, speaking chronologically, come first are repentance, abstinence, poverty, and patience. Repentance belongs to the purgative period of life which is an indispensable prerequisite for the higher stages. It means abandoning the sins of which man is conscious and resolving never to return to them. It is a sort of spiritual conversion. "Those who repent and believe and do righteous work, for such Allah will change their evil deeds to good deeds." 42 The penitent knows that his heart has been shaved in the mist and darkness of sins, feels contrition and shame, and abandons them for ever. Love of the world, which is the root of all vices, has, however, to be removed first; the passions have to be subjected to a strict control and the devil within has to be turned out. But, certainly, we do not give up the world for nothing. We do get something in return: "... the ascetic who renounces what is sensual and material knows that what is abandoned is of small value in relation to what is gained, just as the merchant knows that what he receives in exchange is better than what is sold, otherwise he would not sell." 43 Al-Ǧaṣṣāli compares the ascetic with a person who is prevented from entering into the palace by a dog at the gate. He throws a morsel towards it and thus, by distracting its attention, enters and gets his desires from the king. The dog is like Satan, who prevents him from going towards God, and the morsel of bread is like the world by the sacrifice of which we can get something better.

This brings us to the virtue of abstinence (ṣawād). Repentance is simply turning away from something, whereas abstinence includes turning away from as well as towards something better and more excellent. As a term in Sufiistic literature, it signifies severing the heart's attachment from all worldly things, purging it of the rubbish, and then adorning it with the love of God. Abstinence can, in fact, have three stages. We might be inspired and motivated by the love of God itself, by the hope of reward, or by the fear of punishment. The highest grade is the love of God which makes us sacrifice all considerations of heaven and hell for the sake of God. This is absolute abstinence (ṣawād al-ṣanāfī). We are reminded here of the fable of a saint who was carrying in one hand a flame and in the other a glass of water with the alleged purpose of burning heaven with the one and quenching the fire of hell with the other, so that everyone acts sincerely to attain nearness to God.

The individual who renounces the world is a poor man (faqir) in the terminology of al-Ǧaṣṣāli and, in fact, of all mystics. So poverty is to be willingly cultivated. The ḫaqir are of various kinds: the abstinent (ṣāhid), who is pleased when wealth comes to him; the satisfied (ṣāqī), who is neither pleased at the possession of wealth nor pleased at its loss, and when it comes to him he does not positively hate it; the contented (qinî), who wants to

42 Ibid., xxi, 70.
43 Margaret Smith, Al-Ǧaṣṣāli: The Mystic, pp. 167-68.
44 Qur'an, lxx, 19.
46 Ibid., xiv, 7.
in the divine will. The servant no longer finds his own powers and personality to be self-sufficient and has allowed God to dominate his life... he considers himself as a dead body moved by the divine decree and is content that the divine strength should replace his own human weakness.46 Believing, therefore, is the casting of the soul into self-surrender and the withdrawal of it from self-assertion.

The moral soldier who is sincerely set upon his task must also form the habit of meditation and reflection. He has to reflect on the works of God, on the alternation of day and night, on the waxing and waning of the moon, on the rise and fall of nations, and on the general management of this cosmological scheme. For that purpose seclusion away from the active hustle and bustle of society is very necessary. A heart preoccupied with worldly things has no place for the knowledge of God. The true significance of meditation is a firm conviction in the omnipresence of God, which results from the realization that He is aware of what we do under cover of darkness and of what lies buried in the innermost depths of our heart. Further, 'from' meditation and reflection the soul is led on to contemplation, which is of three kinds: (i) contemplation bi al-baqq, i.e., the seeing of things pointing towards divine unity; (ii) contemplation fi al-baqq, i.e., seeing signs of the Creator in created things; and, finally, (iii) the contemplation of God Himself. This form of contemplation surely and undeniably leads to His love, the final aim of all moral endeavour. The last stage of contemplation and the love of God are not, however, the results of, but are simply occasioned by, our concentration and thinking. There is nothing like a causal necessity here. The sacred knowledge is direct and immediate and is due to God only. The Sufi has the impression that something has dropped upon him "as gentle rain from heaven," a gift of God due to His grace and mercy.

The highest contemplation is the valence of love, absorption of all human attributes in the vision of God, and then annihilation in the everlastingness of God. But why in the first instance should mere contemplation lead to His love? In answer, al-Ghazali explains at length how God is the ultimate and absolute source of all the causes because of which objects are loved. The sentiment of love is, broadly speaking, of four kinds:

(i) Self-love. An egotistic tendency is ingrained in the very nature of man. Instincts and the so-called organic needs point towards that fact. Our soul, life, or the pure ego is, certainly, the dearest to us, but beyond that we also love what William James would call our material and social selves.

(ii) Love of a benefactor for the benefits received from him. This is also a sort of self-love, though an indirect one. We love others because they promote our own cause in one way or another.

The document also includes footnotes:

46 Margaret Smith, op. cit., pp. 167-68.
iii. Love of beauty. Beauty has almost universally been recognized as a thing of intrinsic value. It means the orderly and systematic arrangement of parts, and this is not the quality of material things only; it lies in the activities and the behaviour of man and in his ideas and concepts. Whatever is beautiful is loved by us for its own sake.
iv. Love due to the harmonious interaction and secret affinity between two souls. A thief loves a thief and a noble person loves a noble friend.

Now, if love exists for all these separate causes, will not that individual be loved who holds all these in their supreme and perfect form? Such an individual is God Himself, the possessor of the most lovable qualities. It is to Him that we owe our very existence. He is the only real benefactor and from Him all benefits are received. If we get something from a human being, it really comes from God. Had He willed otherwise, we would not have been able to get it. Thirdly, God also possesses the attributes of beauty. There is beauty in His design and in His creative behaviour. “God is beautiful and loves beauty,” said the Holy Prophet. Lastly, the human soul has affinity with its source. God is His own image. So one can know God with all these attributes and also know where we stand in relation to Him, our love for Him becomes a necessity. And then He loves us too. “Verily Allah loves the repentant and those who purify themselves.”

But the lover who claims to love the Most Lovable must show some signs. The first sign, according to Al-Ghazâli, is that the lover has no fear of death, for it means meeting the Beloved face to face and having a direct vision of Him. This world is a hindrance and a barrier which obstructs the lover’s path. The sooner it is done away with, the better. Another mark of the true lover is that the remembrance of God ever remains fresh in his heart. Once the fire of love is kindled, it cannot be extinguished. It remains ever ablaze and the flames go on rising higher and higher. The lover, in fact, feels happy in this condition. That is why he often seeks undisturbed loneliness to brighten these flames by contemplation and onedined thought. Further, the lover sacrifices his will for that of the Beloved. His likes and dislikes, his behaviour and his ways of life are entirely directed and controlled by God. Lastly, the intensity of love for God demands that we should love all His activities. So also we should love our fellow-men for they are all His servants and creatures.

Love includes longing (ghanas), for every lover plans to see the beloved when absent. The lover of God craves for the vision of God which would be the noblest grace and the highest delight held out to him. Again, love results in affectionality (wasi), which, according to Al-Ghazâli, is one of the most glorious fruits of love and signifies the feeling of pleasure and delight consequent upon God’s nearness and the perception of His beauty and perfection. Thirdly, successful love means satisfaction (rifâ). This includes the satisfaction of

“Qur’an, ii. 222.”

C Influence
Al-Ghazâli’s influence within Islam has been both profound and most widespread: his works have been and still are being read and studied from West Africa to Oceania more than those of any other Muslim writer, and his teaching has been accepted and made a rule of life more than that of any other theologian. It has been claimed and rightly so that “al-Ghazâli’s influence, taken singly, on the Muslim community has been perhaps greater than that of all the scholastic theologians.”
But we hasten to add that, like any other original thinker in the world, al-Ghazâlî did not go without his share of criticism. The unprecedented attempt on his part to make orthodox mystical and mysticism orthodox, and both philosophical, naturally incurred suspicion and criticism from all schools of thought and all shades of opinion both before and after his death. Liberals have criticized him for his conservatism, and conservatives for his liberalism; philosophers for his orthodoxy, and the orthodoxy for his philosophy. Al-Ghazâlî's constant use of philosophical language and his mode of argument and prooemiation with Sufism led Tâjûddîn (d. 590/1193), al-Mârî (d. 526/1134), Ibn Jauzi (d. 597/1200), Ibn al-Salih (d. 645/1247), Ibn Taimîyyah (d. 728/1328), Ibn Quaym (d. 751/1349) and other famous theologians of the orthodox school to denounce him publicly as "one of the misguided." Ibn Jauzi is reported to have once exclaimed: "How cheaply has al-Ghazâlî traded theology for Sufism!"44 Ibn Taimîyyah, on the other hand, has accused him of having traded "theology" for philosophy. Qâdi' al-'Udâl Allah Musâmâd Ibn Hamîd of Cordova went so far as to issue a decree (fatwa) against al-Ghazâlî's works, with the result that all his books inciting the Ilhâm46 were burnt and destroyed throughout Spain and the possession of them was forbidden on the threat of confiscation of property or even on that of death. The destruction of his philosophical and even theological writings was also ordered in North Africa during the reign of the Marr'Êshkat Sultân 'Ali ibn Yusuf ibn Tâhâfîn (477/1084-537/1142), who was fanatically orthodox in his religious views. Both of these incidents, however, bear ample testimony to the fact that al-Ghazâlî's writings had gained a very wide circulation in the Muslim West even as early as that.

Amongst the philosophers, al-Ghazâlî's most renowned and bitterest critic was Ibn Rushd (529/1132-595/1198). He took up a point-by-point refutation of al-Ghazâlî's arguments against the philosophies as given in the Tarikhât and named his own work Tahâfût al-Tahâfût (576/1180). Ibn Rushd's defence of the philosophers is as subtle and vigorous as is al-Ghazâlî's attack against them. Ibn Rushd indeed handles his arguments with accomplished understanding and ingenious skill, yet, in the considered opinion of some who are competent to judge, al-Ghazâlî's arguments are in the final analysis more telling than those of his adversary.46 Ibn Rushd in the course of his discussion accuses al-Ghazâlî of hypocrisy and insincerity by saying that his polemics against the philosophers was merely to win the favour of the orthodox,44 there is nothing to substantiate this charge. He also accused al-Ghazâlî of inconsistence in his thought. He alleges, for example, that in the Miqâl al-'Amr al-Ghazâlî lends wholehearted support to the theory of emanation which he had so vehemently criticised in the Tahâfût.44 Al-Ghazâlî's teaching, according to him, is sometimes detrimental to religion and sometimes to philosophy and sometimes to both. It is said, on the report of Ibn Taimîyyah, that ibn Rushd was so struck by the duplicity of al-Ghazâlî's thought that he would often quote the following verse with reference to him. "One day you are a Yemenite when you meet a man from Yemen. But when you see someone from Mudâl you assert you are from 'Adân."44

The charge of inconsistency against al-Ghazâlî also has been made by another Muslim philosopher, namely Ibn Tufail (d. 501/1105), who says that in his works meant for general readers al-Ghazâlî is "boxed in one place and loosed in another and has denied certain things and then declared them to be true." In spite of his pointing out certain contradictions in al-Ghazâlî's works, Ibn Tufail had on the whole great admiration for his teaching, and the influence of it can be seen in his own greatly admired philosophical romance: Hayy Bin Yaqût. Indeed, the amount of criticism levelled against al-Ghazâlî is itself the proof of his widespread influence. The number of al-Ghazâlî's followers and admirers who accepted his teaching and spread it is immensely greater than that of his critics; it is neither possible nor useful here to give a long catalogue of names. One fact, however, becomes conspicuous that it includes mostly people of two types, namely, the orthodox theologians and the Sûfis, or those who were equally qualified as both. This makes it clear that the influence of al-Ghazâlî within Islam expressed itself simultaneously in two different traditions, i.e., those of mysticism and orthodoxy, and, thus, along with the other forces of history went a long way in determining the permanent attitudes in the religious consciousness of the Islamic community, namely, the attitudes of spiritualization and fundamentalism.

Of all the works of al-Ghazâlî it is in his Ilhâm that he tries to maintain an equivocal position between these two aspects of the religious consciousness. Ilhâm indeed is still the most widely read of all the works of al-Ghazâlî in all

---

46 For the theologians' various objections to Ilhâm and an answer to them, see M. Hasân Nadwâ, Ahdâr-i Qâhî, Lahore, 1966, pp. 61-73.
44 Cf., e.g., Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occidentalism, London, 1968, pp. 103 et seq.
46 Cf. also ibn Rushd, al-Kâtib 'am Mukhâshib al-Adîlî, Cairo, 1319/1901, pp. 57, et seq.

638

639 Al-Ghazâlî (Continued)
A History of Muslim Philosophy

sections of the community, if not in its entirety at least in the form of fragments and summaries which are available in large numbers. It has been so eulogized by some that they have not hesitated to call it the second Qur'an, and the theologians and traditionalists have not tired of writing voluminous commentaries on it.

But it is not within Islam only that al-Qāhīrī's influence exerted itself so strongly; it also had its impact on Western, particularly Jewish and Christian, thought, and indeed has flowed right into the most modern of our philosophical traditions. The influence of al-Qāhīrī on modern European philosophy is a fascinating subject. It will be dealt with in the next chapter in the book "The Influence of Muslim Philosophy on the West."

BIBLIOGRAPHY


In the three sections below an attempt has been made to list: (i) those of al-Qāhīrī's works which can be arranged in a chronological order with some measure of certainty; (ii) works the authenticity of which has been doubted by the professional scribes of al-Qāhīrī; (iii) for both these sections, cf. note No. 24 in the preceding chapter; and (iii) books (or sections thereof) and articles most of which have been referred to in the notes but which are not included in any of the sources mentioned above.

I. Majāz al-Falāshūḥ, 2nd edition, Egypt, 1355/1936 (statement of the teachings of the Muslim Peripatetics); Mughul al-Samā, Cairo, 1300/1911 (an elaborate treatise on logic); Talhaf al-Falāshūḥ, ed. M. Bouyges, S. J., Beyrouth, 1927 (against the philosophers); Mubāk al-Sinā, Cairo (a smaller work on logic); al-Mawāhib, Leiden, 1916 (against the Shi'ites); al-Mujadda al-Falāshūḥ, Cairo, 1327/1909 (on speculative theology); Ḥṣār al-Umār, 10 Vols, Cairo, 1350/1937-1352/1938 (magnificent opus on al-Qāhīrī's whole system); Ḥalfid al-Hitbūshī, Cairo, 1333/1934, 47 pp. (on religious conduct; the authenticity of the closing section, pp. 40-47, doubtful); al-Tulfis al-Muqaddis Alī Allāh, Cairo, 1321/1903 (on evidences of God's wisdom in His creation); al-Majd al-Amm al-Ṣawādī Allāh al-Dīn, Cairo, 1322/1904 (an exhortation to initiation in the divine qualities); al-Iβād "as Ḥṣākīl al-Ḥṣār" (reply to attacks on Ḥṣār), can be found on the margin of Sayyid Murtada's Inšālf al-Sūdāh, Vol. I, p. 41; 422; the definitions of the suffix terms in the introduction are perhaps not accurate); al-Majd al-Ṣawādī al-Dīn, Cairo, 1306/1928 (full of attacks on the Shi'ites of this sect); al-Ghazzalī's own brother, Ahmad al-Ghazzalī (d. 520/1126), under the title Ḥṣār al-Ḥṣār. A list of those may be found in Sayyid Murtada's Inšālf al-Sūdāh, Cairo, 1311/1892, p. 41.

610

al-Qāhīrī (Continued)

for it); Ḥṣākīl al-Ḥṣār, Egypt (an exposition of the faith of the orthodox in the sense of the Qur'an); Kāhīl al-Ārūšī, Cairo, 1326/1910 (a second part of the preceding work); Kāhīl al-Sāwādī (in Persian), lithograph edition, Bounay (a summary of Ḥṣār), to be distinguished from a spurious work of the same title in Arabic; al-Majd al-Muqaddis, Cairo, 1318/1909 (a smaller work against the Shi'ites); Ḥṣākīl al-Ārūšī, "an Ḥṣār al-Ḥṣār, Egypt, 1339/1921 (a work on the science of dogmatics); Ḥṣākīl al-Ārūšī, Egypt, 1343/1924 (advice in the sphere of ascetic theology); al-Majd al-Muqaddis, Egypt, 1343/1924 (on mysticism; an exposition of the light verse in the Qur'an; the authenticity of the veil-section at the end is questionable; cf. note No. 24 above).


611

"With the exception of al-Qāhīrī's own Kīmsā-i Ṣawādī (in Persian), the first of such summaries was written by al-Qāhīrī's own brother, Ahmad al-Qāhīrī (d. 520/1126), under the title Ḥṣār al-Ḥṣār. A list of those may be found in Sayyid Murtada's Inšālf al-Sūdāh, Cairo, 1311/1892, p. 41."


Chapter XXXII
FAKHR AL-DIN Razi

A LIFE, SIGNIFICANCE OF THOUGHT, AND WORKS

The intellectual life of Islam after the attacks of Ash’ari and Ghazali upon rationalistic philosophy can be largely described as the gradual transition from the rationalism of Aristotelian philosophy towards the intuitive and illuminative wisdom of the Ikhwan al-Safa and Sufis. Although Islam began to weaken politically and culturally during the later part of the Ahl al-Kalbe, Muslim thought especially in Shi’ah world continued the process of diversification from the categories of Peripatetic philosophy. One of the most influential and colourful figures in this movement, who played a major role in the attack against the rationalists, was Fakhr al-Din Razi, who is considered

1 For the definition and description of this term refer to chapter on “Shi’ah al-Din Suhrawardi Maqā‘il.”

642

Fakhr al-Din Razi

to be the revivaler of Islam in the sixth/seventh century as Ghazali was in the fifth/eleventh. Razi is in many ways a second Ghazali; in fact, he may without exaggeration be considered to be one of the greatest Muslim theologians.

Abu al-Fadl Muhammad ibn Umar, known as Fakhr al-Din Razi and also as Imam Fakhr, ibn al-Khatib, and Imam al-Ma’azkhabk, the Imam of the Doctoren, was born in Rayy in northern Persia in 543/1149 in a family of scholars who came originally from Tabaristan. His father, Dīl al-Dīn, was a well-known scholar in Rayy and was Imam Fakhr’s first teacher. Later, Fakhr al-Din studied philosophy with Muhammad al-Baghdadi and Muqta al-Din al-Jili (the latter being also the teacher of Shīkh al-Taqī Shīkh al-Din Suhrawardi) and theology with Kamal al-Dīn Simnay in Rayy and Maragha, and soon became a master of all the sciences of his time including even the mathematical, medical, and natural sciences.

Having completed his formal studies, Imam Fakhr set out for Khorāsān to combat the Mu’tazilites, and from there journeyed to Transoxiana and was warmly accepted at the Courts of the Ghur rulers, Ghīyath al-Dīn and his brother Shīkh al-Dīn. But this stay terminated soon due to the opposition and jealousy of certain scholars and courtiers. Consequently, Imam Fakhr left the Ghur Court for Ghomshah, where he taught for a while, and finally settled in Herat where, under the patronage of Khwārezm Shīkh, ‘Ala al-Dīn, a special school was built for him. There he spent the rest of his life as a teacher and preacher in comfort and honour among a large number of disciples and students who came from all over the Muslim world to study under him. He passed away at the height of fame and glory in 608/1210.

The career of Imam Fakhr is in many ways a repetition of that of Ghazali’s. Like his great predecessor, he was of the Shī’ah school, well versed in all the sciences and philosophy and yet opposed to many aspects of the Greek heritage, a critic of the Muslim philosophers, and drawn towards Sufism. In theology,

1 According to a hadith, in each century God sends a great sage and scholar into the world to strengthen Islam. Muslim historians, following this hadith, have searched during each century for the fittest person to receive this honor.

2 He was given this title because he doubted so many of the views of the previous philosophers and even of the theologians.


5 Although not a great Sufi figure like Ghazali, Imam Razi was nevertheless sympathetic towards Sufism, especially in the later period of his life. Shībī, op. cit., p. 35, writes that Razi was himself a Sufi, and some of his poems and frequent quotations from the Sufi masters like ‘Izzālī and also Suhrawardi certainly point in this direction.

643
A History of Muslim Philosophy

in which he followed the Ash'arite school, he was certainly influenced by Qushayli and Imam al-Haramain. In philosophy he came under the influence of his compatriot, Muhammad Zakariya Razi, as well as Ibn Sina, and in physics his master was without doubt Abu al-Barakāt al-Baghdādi. Like a series of anti-Aristotelian philosophers before him, Imām Fakhrī tried to reconcile religion and rational philosophy by reliance upon ideas derived from the Timaeus of Plato than the Physics of Aristotle.3

Imām Fakhrī's main role in the intellectual life of Islam was to support the orthodox policy of the Caliphate of his time to suppress rationalist philosophy in favour of theology. In the unified view of Islam, politics, religion, and intellectual life have never been divorced, so much so that the political struggle of minorities in the Caliphate, whether they were opposed to Arab domination or, like the Shi'a, to the Abū-Bākrid Caliphate as such, was reflected clearly in the intellectual and religious activities of the period. As the Caliphate supported the orthodox Sunni theologians against the rationalists, the philosophers sought refuge in the Cūrūq of the Shi'a, or, in some cases, in their own particular sects that were opposed to the central authority of the Caliph. So we see such figures as Ibn Sina and Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn ʿAṭīa seeking favour of rulers opposed to the authority of Baghdādi, and especially of Shī′a princes.4 And, on the other hand, there appeared a series of great scholars and sages, mostly theologians and Sufis, of whom the most important were Qushayli, Imām Fakhrī, and the Sufi masters like Khwājah al-Doṣayr Umāl Subkawar, who lifted their pen in support of the Caliphate and used both theology and Sufism in order to combat rationalistic philosophy.5 The works of Imām Fakhrī were above all else dedicated to this cause. Sunnī theology reached its height in his works and weakened considerably with the fall of the Abū-Bākrid Caliphate, which came to an end about fifty years after his death.

The writings of Fakhr al-Din Razi, of which nearly a hundred are known, deal almost with every aspect of Muslim intellectual life and include all the sciences of his time.6 Some of these, like the commentary on the al-Mīzāna wa-l-Tahāfah of Ibn Sina and upon his ʿUṣūl al-Dīnawār and the Maḥṣūs al-Maḥṣūs, are written as criticisms of Muslim philosophers,

4 For an outline of the ideas of the group of Muslim thinkers who were influenced by Platonistic physics, see S. Pines, Beziehungen zur neualtertümlichen Abendland, Berlin, A. Heine GmbH, 1910.

5 It is far from accidental that the philosophy and the sciences which were connected with the Greek heritage flourished especially in the fourteenth century when most of the Muslim world was governed by the Shi'itī Caliphates and the Mongols.

6 The opposition of this group to Greek philosophy was primarily against its rationalistic and syllogistic aspects. The cosmological and certain metaphysical doctrines of the Greeks were not only not criticized but were also openly accepted by them. So we see al-Qushayli using Hermetic symbolism or a Fakhrī Razi writing numerous treatises on the cosmological sciences.


644

645

Fakhr al-Din Razi

especially Ibn Sina, and on general problems of philosophy.7 Others deal with the many branches of the intellectual sciences including logic, mathematics, metaphysics, and the natural and the esoteric sciences.8 Still another set of books deals with theology, of which the most famous are the Kuft al-ʾArbaʿin ʿAṣāʾir al-Dīn, Lūʾaynī’s al-Bayyaʿīnī, and the Muḥāzra, a classic among writings on the Khūṣūʿ. Fakhr al-Din also wrote a large number of works on particular sciences, like the commentary upon the syntax of ʿAbd al-Barr, Rāʾiʿ al-Mīzāna on astrology and astronomy, Māṣīḥī’s on history, the commentary upon the Qādaʾ or Canon of Ibn Sina, and many other treatises dealing with medicine, geometry, physics, pharmacy, agriculture, theology, etc. Besides these writings, Imām Fakhrī composed a large number of works on the purely Islamic sciences of exegesis and jurisprudence, of which the most famous are the Māṣīḥī al-Mīzāna, the voluminous commentary upon the Qurʾān, and al-Maṣīḥī’s ʿAṣāʾir al-Dīn on the principles of jurisprudence. Throughout these writings the character of Imām Fakhrī as a critic and “doubter” is evident. He criticizes not only the philosophers, but also theologians like Ashāʾirī and historians like Shihābī, whom he accuses of plagiarizing Baghdādi’s al-Fārūq bi-anf al-Fārūq in his al-Mūṣīl wa-Allāh.9 Imām Fakhrī’s particular genius for analysis and criticism is evident in whatever field he turns his attention to, so that in the annals of Muslim thought he has quite justly become famous as one who is a master in posing a problem but not in solving it, in entering into a debate but not in concluding it.

B

THEOLOGY (KALĀM)

Muslim theology known as Kalam began as a reaction against the rationalistic school of the Muʿtazilites, and only gradually developed into a complete science. In the earlier centuries the theologians, following the lead of Abu al-Ḥasan al-ʾAshāʾī, tried to use logic, the instrument of their enemies, in order to defend the truths of revelation. From the fourteenth century onward, this defence itself became more subtle and systematic, reaching its height in the works of Imām al-Haramain al-ʿĀmīlī al-Maṣbūṣī, such as the Fakhruʿ and the ʿAbdīl. With Qushayli took a new
turn; opposed as it was from the beginning to the school of the philosophers, it now began to employ the synecologic method, intellectual ('apli) evidence, and certain phases of the philosophers, thus laying the foundations of the school of philosophical Kalam of the later theologians.

Imam Fakhr al-Din Rāzī is the greatest master of this later school of theology, surpassing in many ways even the most illustrious Ghazāli. With Imam Fakhr philosophical Kalam reaches its zenith of power and perfection; his works became consequently a continuous source of influence over the later theologians, whether they were Sufis like al-Jīrī and al-Taftazāni or Shi'a like Khwājah Naṣīr. Properly speaking, Rāzī must be credited with the foundation of a new school of Kalam, and certain writers have even considered him to be the Third Teacher after Aristotle and Fārābī. Actually, he composed works characteristic of both the first period of Muslim theology—marked by a revolt against the philosophers and yet by a dependence upon their methods and even some of their ideas—and the second period, after Ghazāli, in which theology became a more independent science in much of its defensive and apologetic quality. Among the first type of writings one may name Muḥṣaf al-Asbāḥ and al-ʿĀbd al-Ḍuʿāfī and among the second Ādāb al-Ṭarīqī and Lābānī al-Bayḍāwī. The theology of Imām Rāzī is marked by the integration of theological themes with other sciences. For example, in his Persian treatise, Andār al-Tūsī, he combines theology with ethics; and in the Lābānī al-Bayḍāwī, theology with Hadith, giving theology a fragrance of spirituality and a beauty not found in most writings. In the sixth chapter of the Lābānī he gives a detailed and profound discussion concerning ʾiskhār, the invocation of one of the divine names, which is the basic technique of Sufism. Concerning one of the interior forms of ʾiskhār he writes: “The third kind of ʾiskhār is that man should contemplate the creatures of God until each particle of the essence of creation becomes a polished mirror before the unmanifested world so that when he looks into this mirror with the eye of wisdom the eye of his soul will fall upon the world of Majesty. This is a station without end and a sea without limit.” In this way Imām Rāzī raises theology to a height approached only by Ghazāli, far surpassing the usual level of this study.

To understand Rāzī’s approach to theology, it is enough to analyse the structure of one of his treatises. We take as an example perhaps the most famous of his theological works, the Muḥṣaf al-Asbāḥ, which became a classic source-book on the Kalam almost from the moment of its composition. Here, Imām Rāzī divides theology into four parts (arkhīn): Preliminaries, Being and its divisions, rational theology (ilāhīgīyāt), and traditional questions (ṣawā＇īgīyāt). The preliminaries include the principles of logic, the sufficiency of demonstration (dallī) to prove the existence of God, and the obligation upon each believer to prove God’s existence. The section on Being and its divisions considers the questions of Being and Non-Being, attributes of Being, the negation of modes between Being and Non-Being, the relation of the One to the many, cause and effect, etc. Rational theology which is interlaced with passages from the Qur’ān concerns the Necessary Being. Its attributes and acts and the divine names. Finally, the traditional questions, which are exclusively scriptural, concern proophethood, eschatology, the Imāmate, the faith, and other related subjects. As a whole, therefore, Imām Rāzī’s theology combines the transmitted or traditional elements of revelation (ṣawā＇īgīyāt) and the intellectual and rational evidence concerning religious and metaphysical questions (ilāhīgīyāt) into a science which takes into account the problems of religion while participating in many of the discussions of philosophy.

In the method and problems of theology, Imām Rāzī followed the Aḥṣārites. As he writes in his Kihb al-ʿArba‘īn: “We (the Aḥṣārites) believe that God is neither body nor substance, and that He is not in space; yet, we believe that we can see God.” But to show his independence of judgment he goes on to assert: “Our companions (the Aḥṣārites) have given an intellectual reason for the possibility of seeing God, but we have brought twelve objections against it which cannot be answered. Therefore, we only say that we can see God by appealing to transmundane realities, the Qur’ānic text.”

Imām Rāzī also criticized Aḥṣāri on the question of atomism which is such an essential aspect of the Aḥṣāri theology. Rāzī rejected atomism in his earlier works like the Maḥbūb al-Maghāribī and wrote his Kihb al-Jāznār al-Fard to refute it, but in later works like the great Qur’ānic commentary, the Miṣnāth al-ʿĀbī, he accepted it once again. (Atomism does not play a major role in his theology as it does in the system of other Aḥṣārites like Bākhtīārī.) This change of position occurs also in the rejection of infinity, the void, and the plurality of worlds in the earlier writings and their acceptance in later works like the Miṣnāth. There are several points in Imām Rāzī’s theology which are of special interest in so far as his particular point of view is concerned. One relates to the

14 The theological masterpiece, the Tafṣīl, of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Ḍu‘l, who is the greatest of the Ẓahirī theologians, is to a large extent influenced by Imām Rāzī’s Nasb ʿAlī al-Khamsīn.

15 The title, however, is more commonly given to Mīr Dānīh, the master of theology and philosophy during the Safavid period.


17 Imām Rāzī, like the Christian theologians, considered Kalam to be the queen of the sciences and subordinated all other rational sciences like philosophy and the mathematical and natural sciences to it.

18 For a more detailed discussion of this work, see L. Garecht and M. M. Ananiad, pp. 19-45.

19 In all Muslim theology it is considered obligatory upon each Muslim to prove the existence of God according to his intellectual ability. See P. Schuon, “Nature et arguments de la foi,” Essais Traditionnelles, Vol. 54, Dac, 1923, pp. 344-45.

A History of Muslim Philosophy

question of faith in which he joins most theologians in regarding faith as the necessary and sufficient requirement for being saved. Hell is not for those who have committed evil acts accidentally but for the indecisive who have no faith. Man is of course responsible for his work but ultimately all is determined by the divine will. Imām Rāzī is very emphatic in his deterministic and overthrows even the theory of acquisition (išāb) of the Aqqūdists. His Qur'ānic commentary is full of arguments for determinism, which he defends more openly and ably than any other theologian. God is the creator of both good and evil, faith and impiety, benefit and injury; all these qualities are decreed by the determination of the divine will (iqād ʾuʾudh). Yet, none of the divine acts can be considered to be inappropriate or blamable since God is the creator and ruler of the world, and whatever He does in His kingdom is His own affair and is so appropriate.

According to Imām Rāzī, God's attributes and names must be interpreted symbolically (ʾiṣʿiyyāʾ) in order to be understood. He follows the method of Imām al-Haravī in applying ʾiṣʿiyyāʾ to the Qur'ān, especially to those verses in which God is attributed with such anthropomorphic qualities as sight, hearing, etc. This does not mean that Rāzī tries to overcome the rational difficulties of certain of the principles of faith by ʾiṣʿiyyāʾ, as did many of the philosophers. For example, on the question of resurrection, unlike the philosophers who believed only in the resurrection of the soul, Imām Rāzī asserts that at resurrection God will create for each soul the same body, made of the same elements as those it possessed in this life.

On the question of knowledge and the process of reasoning, Imām Rāzī is of the view that reason is neither the cause of which knowledge is the effect nor the source which produces knowledge. There is an intelligible succession between the two: God creates a reasoning which knowledge follows necessarily. He accords a definite value to the rational faculty; his aim in theology is in fact to create a science which combines and harmonizes reason and revelation, ʾaʾṣaʿ and ʾaʾṣaʿa. In his Qur'ānic commentary he calls those who have succeeded in integrating these two elements the Muslim sages (ḥafiẓuʾn ʾadlīyyaʾ). He praises them greatly. His own importance in Muslim theology lies in his success in establishing the school of philosophical Kevāna, already begun by Ghazālī, in which both intellectual and revelational evidence played important roles.

C

PHILOSOPHY

The importance of Imām Rāzī in philosophy lies more in his criticism of the philosophers than in the establishment of a new school. Influenced by the writings of Ghazālī, he studied philosophy to such an extent that he became

Many theologians before Rāzī considered this relation between reason and knowledge to be caution (ʾaʾrisiyya), but he explicitly rejects this notion.

a definite matter of it. Unlike the theologians who rejected Greek philosophy totally or the Peripatetics who followed it strictly, Imām Rāzī criticized many points of Greek philosophy while accepting certain others. In the introduction to the Muḥaddith al-Maṣḥūrīyyaṣṣ, the most important of his philosophical works, he writes: "Our associates belong to two groups: one consisting of those who imitate the Greek philosophers, permit no one to discuss their thought, and take pride in being able to understand their sayings, and the other comprising those who reject all of their ideas without exception. Both of these groups are wrong. We have delved deep into the writings of the previous philosophers and have affirmed the true and rejected the false. We have added certain principles to this philosophy and have put forth some new ideas."

The new ideas of which Imām Rāzī speaks are mostly those pertaining to the rejection of certain basic elements of Aristotelianism and in some cases of Platonism. In the Muḥaddith he rejects the Platonic ideas, since in the Aristotelian perspective all infinite modes of being are absorbed in the Absolute. He also criticizes the Platonic notion of knowledge as reminiscence and the idea held by certain Muslim philosophers that light is a body. One of his most important and penetrating discussions involves criticism of the principle that from Unity only unity can issue forth, or ʾaʾṣaʿ ʾuʾudh ʾnuʿ ᵐī ᵲ ᵲ, a principle held by nearly all medieval philosophers. Imām Rāzī puts this view to the test of his severe judgment and criticizes it with his usual genius for analysis. He asserts, on the contrary, that from Unity multiplicity can issue forth, but does not pursue the proof of this assertion very far.

The Muḥaddith deals with many other subjects treated in the well-known texts of Muslim philosophy like those of Ibn Sīnā. In each case it is the acute criticism of commonly held Peripatetic notions that is of interest. In his commentary upon the al-Iṣkārāt wu-Tashbīḥāt of Ibn Sīnā, which after the Muḥaddith is his most important philosophical work, this type of criticism and doubt about Peripatetic philosophy continues—doubts which his pupil, Naṣr al-Dīn Tūsī, tried to answer in his own commentary upon the Iṣkārāt. Ever since those works were written, nearly every student of Peripatetic philosophy in the Muslim world, especially in Persia, has reached this philosophy through the criticism of Imām Rāzī, so that the thought of Imām Rāzī has become a permanent heritage of Muslim philosophers. His other philosophical works, like the commentary upon the Ḫayān al-Ḥikāh, Lūdāl al-Iṣkārāt and many treatises on logic and metaphysics, are also significant, but his greatest philosophical importance lies in the criticisms and doubts cast upon the principles of Peripatetic philosophy, which not only left an indelible mark upon that school but opened the horizon for the other modes of knowledge like ʾaʾrisiyya philosophy and gnostics, which were more intimately bound with the spirit of Islam.
There have been very few Muslim theologians who have had as much knowledge of the mathematical and natural sciences as Imām Rāzi. His pre-occupation with the sciences is itself of great interest, because usually the Sunni theologians and doctors of Law shunned any discipline outside the sphere of the strictly religious sciences. Imām Rāzi, on the contrary, studied all the mod'ūl sciences, that is, the sciences inherited from the Greeks, and was considered by many of his contemporaries to be the greatest authority of his time on them. There is hardly a science in which he did not compose a treatise—although he never occupied himself with the study of nature in the manner of Ibn al-Haṣm or Bīrūnī. His main importance in the sciences was in considering their principles and their relation to theology and to the spirit of Islamic revelation.

A field in which Imām Rāzi excelled is medicine, a discipline the mastery of which one hardly expects from a theologian. He wrote several treatises on health, pulse, and anatomy, and a medical encyclopedia entitled al-Jami' al-Kabir or al-Tibb al-Kabir which he never completed. His most important medical work was his commentary upon the Ḍiwan of Ibn Sīnā, which he often criticized, basing himself on the opinions of Ṣāfin and the Muslim physicians, especially Muḥammad Zarkashī Rāzi. The commentary is sufficient evidence that Imām Rāzi did not learn medicine by reading one or two manuals but studied it thoroughly and was well versed in it. He was in fact famous in Herat for his ability and exactitude in diagnosis.

Imām Rāzi also wrote several treatises on geometry, astronomy, agriculture, politics, history, and comparative religion.51 Also of interest are his works on the esoteric sciences (ʿilm gharbī), to which he devoted much attention. There remain among his writings treatises on theology (fiḥrist), grammar (rāmūl), physiology (fīsik), and astrology, and other similar subjects. It is curious that Imām Rāzi wrote all these treatises, although he was opposed to certain of these subjects like astrology which he attacked throughout his writings.52 He was, however, more sympathetic to the study of esoteric sciences than either the theologians or the philosophers, as is illustrated by his defence of alchemy against the charges of Ibn Sīnā.53 Of particular interest to the history of Muslim sciences is the scientific

51 His historical works include Kātb Fajr al-Qaidab and Kātb Musammat al-Iṣna al-Sila, and his work on comparative religion, the Ḍuqāṣat Fāry al-Musālimin w-al-Madhūlık...  
54 See Muḥammad. . . . p. 114.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

which could equal the benefit I derived from the reading of the exalted Qur’an." 20

Imām Rāzī’s Qur’anic commentaries include the Taṣfīr al-Ṭurāk, Taṣfīr al-Ṭarīq al-Baqrūq, Aṣbāḥ Allāh al-Ṣawāma, and Riṣālah fi al-Tanzīh ‘alā huḍ al-Akrūr al-Mas’ūpāṣah fi al-Qur’ān, which last is a theological commentary combined with Sufi ideas in which metaphysics (šāhīdyyāt) is based on the chapter (Fathah) of Al-‘Abī, prophecy on the chapter al-‘Arwāḥ, resurrection on the chapter al-‘Nūr, and the recording of human actions on the chapter al-‘Arwāḥ. The most important of Imām Rāzī’s commentaries is the voluminous Maṣāfi‘ī al-Qāhīr, known as the “Great Commentary” (Taṣfīr al-Kabīr), which was collected and organized by ibn al-Khayy’ and Siyāsī after his death.

This work is the most important theological commentary ever written on the Qur’an. Imām Rāzī makes this also an occasion to expose his encyclopedic knowledge in that he intermingles history, geography, and other branches of knowledge with the commentary of the Qur’ānic text wherever possible. He mentions and praises often in this work the Muslim sages who combine intellectual principles with the principles of Islamic revelation. He also analyzes the stories of the Qur’ān and interprets their theological and metaphysical meanings. Despite its volume and the number of topics which do not seem very relevant to the immediate subject-matter, the Maṣāfi‘ī is an impressive theological Qur’ānic commentary. In its intellectual interpretation and the combining of ‘aqīdah and sahīh, of reason and authority, and in the understanding of the sacred Scripture it remains one of the major commentaries upon the Qur’an.

F

JURISPRUDENCE (FIQH)

Although primarily occupied with theology, Imām Rāzī occasionally devoted himself to jurisprudence as well. The few works like al-Maṣāfi‘ī al-‘Uṣūl al-Fiḥā, al-Muṣলām, and Ikhān al-Aḥkām bear evidence to his mastery of jurisprudence which he interpreted according to the school of the exegetes. As already mentioned, he belonged to the Ṣalah’s school of which he was considered to be one of the ‘alāsī and authentic interpreters. Imām Rāzī was particularly well versed in the principles of jurisprudence (‘Uṣūl), which he treated in a manner similar to theology. This subject has, in fact, never been able to divorce itself from Kalim, and is still studied almost as if it were one of its branches. The importance of Imām Rāzī in Ṣalah’s jurisprudence lies more in his contribution to the theoretical principles of Fīḥā than in their actual application embodied in the judgements of the various Ṣalah’s ‘alāsī.


652

G

DIALECTIC, RHETORIC, AND POETRY

Following the example of Ghazzali, Imām Rāzī became a dialectical theologian and, as his works testify, excelled in dialectics. He was famous for his eloquence in persuasion and argumentation, for the quickness of his intelligence and keenness of wit. These gifts were combined with a rhetorical power which made him the most famous preacher in Herat. Hardly would a scholar dare enter into debate with him; those who took sides against him would soon feel the thrust of his dialectical and rhetorical weapons. The Ṣalāḥīyyāt bears ample evidence of these traits. In its pages one sees Imām Rāzī as a tiger who pounces mercilessly upon his helpless adversary and has little regard for softness in discourse. Much of his energy throughout life was spent in attacking bitterly the small sects which arose against the main orthodoxy, such as the Karrāmīyyah, who probably finally poisoned him.21 As the Sūrāt al-‘Ijūn of Herat, his main duty was to preach and defend Islam; and he took the opportunity of using his remarkable gifts of rhetoric and dialectic in a manner which made him one of the most famous of Muslim preachers.

Imām Rāzī had also the gift of poetry, and many verses both in Arabic and Persian are attributed to him. As in the case of so many other sages like Ḥārīyyah, poetry became for Imām Rāzī the vehicle for the expression of his thoughts and the form of “ignorance” which lies above all formal knowledge. In a quatrains in Persian he writes:

“My heart was never deprived of science;
There is little of the mysteries that I did not understand.
For seventy-two years I thought night and day,
Yet I came to know truth nothing is to be known.”

H

SUFISM

There is little doubt that Imām Rāzī was sympathetic to Sufism, especially in later life, when he wrote most of his poems like the one mentioned above. Moreover, many of his works are, like his Qur’ānic commentary, full of Sufistic ideas, and in his Lawmī ‘al-Bayyān he outlines the degrees of knowledge.

21 There is a story told of Imām Rāzī’s opposition to the Ḥamīlah. He used to attack them bitterly in public, accusing them of having no proofs for their doctrines. One day one of their agents, posing as a student, found Imām Rāzī alone in his library, pulled out a knife and pointed it to his head saying, “This is our proof!” Henceforth, Imām Ṣafī never attacked the Ḥamīlah in public. One day the dis- ciples asked him why he no longer spoke against this group—the group which he had opposed so bitterly before. He replied, “Because I have seen their proof.” This story appears in nearly all the biographies of Imām Ṣafī which we have already mentioned and is characteristic of his wisdom in public life.

653
in a manner very similar to the Sufi treatise of Subravaeni, Sufi-r-i Shuwarq. He is altogether a theologian with sympathies towards Sufism. What is difficult for us to discover is whether Imam Razi was a practicing Sufi or not. Certainly Sufism is not so evident in his writings as in Ghazali’s, and his life, rich in worldly fame and wealth, had none of the ascetic elements of the life of his great predecessor. There is even an extant letter from the master of gnosia, the Andalusian Sufi, Shafii al-Albari, asking Imam Razi to leave dialectic and discursive thought and try to reach the stage of gnosia and contemplation, telling him that in heaven medicine and geometry will do him little good. Moreover, in his writings as in his life, Imam Razi displayed an aggressiveness and fighting quality hardly characteristic of the lives and writings of the Sufis.

Yet, despite all this negative evidence, some of his later writings do show the clear influence of Sufism upon him, and it may be that, because of his position even after joining the circle of the Sufis, he to a large extent hid his sympathies and affiliations in order to avoid any external opposition. His own poems and his great love for the blind Arab poet abu ‘Ala’ al-Ma’arri, the gnostic who often appears like a seer to the uncritical eye, on whose name he is said to have chanted, point to the fact that Imam Razi was not an ordinary theologian but knew that there is another form of knowledge, gnosia, which lies above all rational sciences like theology. Whether he actually participated in this knowledge in an effective way, is a question too difficult to answer from either historical evidence or internal evidence of his own writings. There is a poem of Imam Razi which is in itself almost sufficient evidence for his Sufism. In the original Arabic it is so beautiful and effective that hardly any of his biographers has failed to mention it. Written in old age by a man who was the leading scholar and theologian of his day and who enjoyed all the comfort and glory of the life of this world, it is a vivid reminder that beyond the sphere of all human life and knowledge there is another reality which man must seek in order to remain faithful to his own intimate nature. The poem begins with these verses:

“Our souls fear our bodies as if they want to separate from them.
The result of our life in this world has been nothing but pain to others and sin.

\[\text{See the chapter on “Shafii al-Din Subravaeni Magal.”}\]
\[\text{There is a story told that Imam Razi met the Sufi Naqib al-Din Kubra in a gathering and boasted of his religious knowledge and said that he knew a hundred proofs for the existence of God. Naqib al-Din answered, “Is it not certain proof that God has placed in the heart of the Sufi a light of certainty which dispels all doubt, so that he no longer has need of proofs.” Imam Razi hearing this answer surrendered himself to the Shafii and was initiated into Sufism.}\]

---

Fakhr al-Din Razi

For all the discussions and debates of our life
We have derived no benefit but senseless noise.
How often have we seen men and kingdoms
All perish quickly and cease to exist?
How were their glory once more exalted than a mountain,
Yet, men perish and the mountain remains the same!”

I

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND INFLUENCE OF IMAM RAZI

The many-sided genius of Imam Razi, to which the previous pages bear partial witness, makes him one of the most colourful figures in Islam. Following the example of Ghazali, by whom he was profoundly influenced and whose retreat in the isle he visited, Razi spent a life-time in combating the rationalistic aspect of Greek philosophy. Although not of equal stature to Ghazali in Sufism and ethics, he, nevertheless, exercised as much influence, especially in theology, as did his more famous predecessor. Possessed of a special gift for posing problems and for analysing philosophical questions, he left an indelible mark upon all later Muslim philosophers, especially upon Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi, his pupil, who was the reviver of Muslim philosophy after Imam Razi, and was also the most famous of Shi’ah theologians.

Imam Razi’s role in Muslim intellectual life, besides establishing the school of philosophical Kalam begun by Ghazali, was to intensify the attack against Peripatetic philosophy, thereby preparing the way for the propagation of the metaphysical doctrine of the Muqaddimah and Sufi who, like Imam Razi, opposed the rationalism inherent in Aristotelianism. With the method of doubt in which he was the greatest master in Islam, he analyzed and criticized Peripatetic philosophy in a way hardly ever equaled by anyone except Ghazali. Yet, he was a theologian also interested in the cosmological, natural, and esoteric sciences. Imam Razi played an important role in bringing theology closer to the sciences and even to Sufism, with which he flavoured his theological works. In the centuries when the Muslim world was turning away from Peripatetic rationalism toward modes of thought more akin to its own spirit, Imam Razi played a major role in this transformation. He remains as one of the most arresting figures among Muslim theologians, a figure the power of whose thought spread over the whole Muslim world at the very moment when the Mongol onslaught was putting an end to the Caliphate, to the survival of which his work was to a large extent dedicated.

---

4 This is of great interest that not only in the Muslim world but also in medieval Christianity and in China many of those who procured themselves with the science of nature, like the Tusi, Ibn al-Asfah, and the Franciscans, were opposed to philosophical rationalism and accepted some form of esoteric and metaphysical doctrine based on intellectual intuition and revelation.
Bibliography


Part 5. Political Thinkers

Chapter XXXIII

Political Thought in Early Islam

In this chapter we try to elucidate the political thought which held the foundations of society and State in the early days of Islam, and the changes that crept into it during the first century and a quarter of the Hijra.

A PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC POLITY

Muslim society that came into existence with the advent of Islam and the State that it formed on assumption of political power were founded on certain clear-cut principles. Prominent among them and relevant to our present discussion were the following:---

1. Sovereignty belongs to God, and the Islamic State is in fact a viceroyage, with no right to exercise authority except in subordination to and in accordance with the Law revealed by God to His Prophet. 1

1 Qur'an, iv, 50; v, 44, 45, 47; vii, 3; xii, 40; xxiv, 5; xxxii, 36.

Political Thought in Early Islam

2. All Muslims have equal rights in the State regardless of race, colour, or speech. No individual, group, class, clan, or people is entitled to any special privileges, nor can any such distinction determine anyone's position as inferior. 2

3. The Shar'iah (i.e., the Law of God enunciated in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, the authentic practice of the Prophet) is the supreme Law and everyone from the lowest situated person to the Head of the State is to be governed by it. 3

4. The government, its authority, and possessions are a trust of God and the Muslims, and ought to be entrusted to the God-fearing, the honest, and the just; and no one has a right to exploit them in ways not sanctioned by or abhorrent to the Shar'iah. 4

5. The Head of the State (call him Caliph, Imam or Amir) should be appointed with the mutual consultation of the Muslims and their concurrence. He should run the administration and undertake legislative work within the limits prescribed by the Shar'iah in consultation with them. 5

Footnotes:
1 "Muslims are brothers to one another. None of them has any preference over another, except on grounds of piety." (Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur'an al-'Arif, Madinah; Mu'jaddid, K. N. T.'s, p. 275).
2 "O men, beware, your God is one. An Arab has no preference over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab, nor a white over a black nor a black over a white, save on grounds of piety." (Al-Tabarani, Dhahabi, al-Dhahab; Mu'jaddid, K. N. T.'s, p. 275).
3 "Whatsoever declares that there is no god but God, and fasic our qiblah (direction of prayer), and offers prayer as we offer, and sets to the animal we slaughter, is a Muslim. He has the rights of a Muslim, and the duties of a Muslim." (Bukhari, Kitab al-Salat, Ch. xvi).
4 "An Arab's blood is like another Muslim's blood. They are one as distinguished from others; and an ordinary man of them can offer dhakwah (i.e., stand surety) on their behalf." (Abu Dawud, Kitab al-Uqayl, Ch. xi; Nasa'i, Kitab al-Qadimah, Ch. x-xiv).
5 "A Muslim is exempt from poll-tax."

Tradition: "Nations before you were destroyed because they punished those among them of low status according to law, and spared the high-ranking. By God, who holds my life in His hand, if Fathmah, daughter of Muhammad, had punished this thief I would have chopped off her hand." (Bukhari, Kitab al-Nawadir, Ch. xi).

Says 'Umar, "I myself have seen the Prophet of God allowing people to avenge themselves on him."

Abu Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, Madinah; al-Sakhafiyah, Egypt, 2nd ed. 1352/1933, p. 114; Mansur; Abu Dawud al-Tayyib, Tr. No. 56, Dirasat al-Ma'rif, Hyderabad, 1321/1903.

Qur'an, iv, 58.

Tradition: "Each one of you is a shepard, and each one is answerable in respect of his flock. And the chief leader (i.e., the Caliph) is answerable in respect of his subjects." (Bukhari, Kitab al-Ajdabs, Ch. i; K. N. T.'s, Ch. v).

Qur'an, xii, 38.

Tradition: "All reports that he asked the Prophet of God (on him be peace), 'What shall we do if we are faced with a problem after you die about which there is no mention in the Qur'an or have we heard anything concerning it from your life?' He answered, 'Collect those of my people (umma) that serve God"
Early Caliphate and Its Characteristic Features

The rule of the early Caliphs that followed the Prophet was founded on the foregoing principles. Each member of the community, brought up under the guidance and care of the Prophet of God, knew what kind of government answered the demands and reflected the true spirit of Islam. Although the Prophet had bequeathed no decision regarding the question of his successor, the members of the community were in no doubt that Islam demanded a democratic solution of the issue. Hence no one laid the foundations of a hereditary government, used force to assume power, or tried to have himself installed as Caliph. On the contrary, the people, of their own free-will, elected four persons one after another to this august office.

Effective Caliphate. - Abu Bakr was proposed Caliph by 'Umar, and accepted by the inhabitants of Madinah (who for all practical purposes represented the country) of their free-will and accord, and they swore him allegiance. Abu Bakr, hearing his end, wrote a will in favour of 'Umar: then, collecting the people in the mosque of Madinah, he addressed them thus: "Do you agree on him whom I am making my successor among you? God knows I have racked my brains as much as I could, and I have not proposed a relation of mine to succeed me, but 'Umar, the son of Khattaib. Hence listen to him and obey." Upon this the people responded, "Yes, we shall listen to him and obey." In the last year of 'Umar's reign a man declared during the pilgrimage that when 'Umar died he would swear allegiance to so and so. Abu Bakr's installation, he said, had also been so sudden, and succeeded well enough. When 'Umar came to learn of it, he resolved to address the people about it and "warn them against those who desired to impose themselves upon them." Alluding to it in the first speech he made on reaching Madinah, he gave a lengthy account of what had transpired at Bani Sjadh's Meeting House and explained how in the exceptional circumstances which then prevailed he had suddenly risen to propose Abu Bakr's name and offered allegiance to him. "If I had not done so," he said, "and we had dispersed that night without settling the issue, there was a great danger that people might take a wrong decision overnight; then it would be difficult for us to accept it, and equally difficult to reject it." "If that was successful," he continued, "let it not be made a precedent. Who among you is there to match with Abu Bakr in stature and popularity! Now, therefore, whoever will swear allegiance to another as their own is no one who has anything to do with me, nor have I anything to do with him."
A History of Muslim Philosophy

without consultation with other Muslims, he and the one whose allegiance is sworn, shall both stand to die.18

When 'Umar approached his end, he appointed an Elective Council to decide the issue of succession. Elucidating his principle enunciated above, he asserted that whoever attempted to impose himself as Amir (ruler) without the consultation of the Muslims deserved to die. He also barred his son from election,19 lest the Caliph's office should become a hereditary right, and constituted the Elective Council to comprise those six persons in whom his opinion were the most influential and enjoyed the widest popularity. This Council in the end delegated its power of proposing a person for the Caliph's office to one of its members, 'Abd al-Rahmân bin 'Auf. 'Abd al-Rahmân moved among the people to find out as to who commanded their confidence most and left no stone unturned to ascertain the people's verdict. Even the pilgrim parties returning home after the pilgrimage were consulted. It was after this "plebiscite" that he concluded that the majority favoured 'Uthmân.18

When 'Uthmân was killed, a few people tried to install 'Ali as Caliph. But he said, "You have no authority to do this. This is a matter for the Consultative Council (ahl al-dhîrât) and those that fought at Badr (ahl al-Badr). Whosoever the Consultative Council and the people of Badr will choose Caliph will be Caliph. Therefore we shall gather and deliberate."20 In a Tâbarî's version, 'Ali's words were: "I cannot be elected secretly; it must be with the consultation of the Muslims."19

When 'Ali lay dying it was asked of him, "Shall we offer allegiance to al-Hasan (your son)?" He replied, "I do not ask or forbid you to do as you can see for yourself."21 When he was addressing his last words to his sons, a person interposed saying: "O Commander of the Faithful, why do you not nominate your successor?" His reply was, "I will have the faithful in the condition in which the Prophet of God left them."18

It is evident from these facts that the early Caliphs and the Companions

18 Bâbâlî, Kitây al-Muhânûn, Ch. xi; Ahmad, Manal, 3rd ed., Dâr al-Ma‘arif, Egypt, 1949, I, 79. 391. According to this version, the words are as follows: "Whosoever swears allegiance to an Amir without the consultation of Muslims offers no allegiance, and he who receives allegiance from him receives no allegiance." In another version the following words are reported: "He who is offered allegiance without consultation, it is not lawful for him to accept it." (Ibn Tayyib, Fath al-Berî, al-Ma‘âzûn al-Khârijûn, Cairo, 1323/1905, Vol. II, p. 125.)


21 Ibn Qâtibah, op. cit., p. 41.


24 Al-Mas‘îlî, op. cit., p. 42.

660

Political Thought in Early Islam

of the Prophet regarded the Caliph's office as an elective one, to be filled with mutual consultation and consent of the Muslim community. They did not regard hereditary succession or one acquired by force of arms as anything valid.

Government by Consultation.—The first four Caliphs did not perform their administrative or legislative functions without consulting "the wise" (ahl al-dhîrât), those (who are able to give advice) of the community. They also realized that those consulted had the right to give their considered opinions without fear. 'Umar expressed the official policy in this regard in his inaugural speech before a Consultative Council in this way: "I have called you for nothing but that you may share with me the burden of the trust that has been reposed in me of managing your affairs. I am but one of you, and today you are the people that bear witness to truth. Whoever of you wishes to differ with me is free to do so, and whoever wishes to agree is free to do that. I will not compel you to follow my desires."24

The Reckoner—a Trust.—The treasury (Bayt al-Mîd) was to them a trust from God and the public. They did not consider it permissible to receive into it or expend from it a sum which the Law did not authorize. To use it for the personal ends of the rulers was, according to them, simply unlawful. 'Umar in a speech remarked: "Nothing is lawful for me in this trust of God save a pair of clothes for the summer and a pair of clothes for the winter, and subsistence enough for an average man of the Quraish for my family. And after that I am just one of the Muslims."20

In another speech he said: "I do not regard anything correct in respect of this trust of yours but three things: that it should be taken by right, that it should be expended by right, and that it should be withheld from wrong. My position regarding this property of yours is the same as that of an orphan’s guardian with the orphan's property. So long as I am not needy I will take nothing from it. When I am needy I shall take as it befits one to take from an orphan’s property under his care."20

When 'Ali was at war with Muz’îiyah he was exhorted by some to sue the treasury to win adherents against him who was drawing large numbers to his side by giving just rewards and gifts. But 'Ali declined to take that counsel saying, "Do you want me to win success by unfair means?"20 His brother 'Aqil wished to be helped from the Bayt al-Mîd, but he refused without consultation, it is not lawful for him to accept it." (Ibn Qâtibah, Fath al-Berî, al-Ma‘âzûn al-Khârijûn, Cairo, 1323/1905, Vol. II, p. 125.)
they followed—questions like those and others were answered in the various speeches addressed by them from the Caliph's pulpit. Abu Bakr, in the first speech he made following the oath of allegiance to him in the Masjid of Madinah, said, "I have been made a ruler over you though I am not the best of you. Help me if I go right, correct me if I go wrong. Truth is faultless and falsehood is treachery. The weak among you will be strong with me till I have got him his dues, if God so wills; and the strong one among you will be weak with me till I have made him pay what he owes, if God so wills. Beware, when a nation gives up its endeavours in the way of God, He makes no exception but brings it low, and when it allows evil to prevail in it, undoubtedly He makes it miserable. Obey me as long as I obey God and the Prophet; if I do not obey them, you owe me no obedience."

And ‘Umar in a speech said, ‘No ruler holds so high a position as to have the right to command obedience in defiance of God. O people, you have rights on me which I shall reiterate before you, and you may take me to task over them. I owe you this that I do not receive anything from your revenues. If the faithful (lands or possessions that accrue to Muslims in consequence of their collective dominance, not as booty in war) given to us by God except in accordance with the Law, and that nothing that accrues to us in these ways should go from the treasury but rightfully.' 26

Al-Tahari quotes ‘Umar giving instructions to all persons whom he sent out as governors in this wise: ‘I have appointed you governor over the followers of Muhammad (whom be peace) not to make you masters of their persons and properties but to enable you to lead them to establish prayer, dispense their affairs with justice, and dispense their rights among them with equity.' 27

‘Umar once declared in public: ‘I have not sent my governors that they may whip you and snatch your property, but that they may instruct you in your faith and the way of your Prophet. If there be any who has been treated otherwise, let him bring me his complaint. By God, I will see that his wrong is avenged.’ Upon this ‘Amr bin ‘As, Governor of Egypt, stood up and asked, ‘What, when a man is appointed ruler and he chastises someone, will you take revenge on him?’ ‘Umar replied, ‘Yes, by God, I will take revenge on him. I have seen the Prophet of God himself allowing people to take revenge on him.’

On another occasion ‘Umar collected all his governors at the annual pilgrimage and announced in a general congregation of people that if there was a person who had a charge of injustice against anyone of them, he should come forward to make his complaint. One person rose from the multitude and complained that he had been undeservedly given a hundred stripes by ‘Amr bin ‘As.

27 Abu Yazid, op. cit., p. 117.
28 Al-Tahari, op. cit., p. 273.
Political Thought in Early Islam

abu Bakr truly fit for that office. Therefore when he came to be Caliph he treated the Arabs and non-Arabs, gentlemen and poor-born, alike.

C

THEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND SCHISMS

The period of the "Right-going" Caliphate, described above, was a luminous tower towards which the learned and the pious of all succeeding ages have been looking back as symbolic of the religious, moral, political, and social orders of Islam par excellence. Abu Ḫālid, employed as elucidating the Islamic ideals in the fields of politics and law, as we shall presently see, also reverted to it as the ideal epoch to take instance from. We have, therefore, devoted a good deal of space to it, that the reader may be able to comprehend his work in the true background.

But before attending to his work we have also to take a brief view of the reactionary movement that had set in towards the end of the "Right-going" Caliphate and reached its height by the time abu Ḫālid appeared on the scene. As his efforts were mainly devoted to countering this reaction, it is necessary to take stock of it and the problems that sprang from it, to be able to grasp the true significance of his work.

Differences among Muslims had sprung up during the last years of Ḫūdān's reign, leading to his murder, but they had not yet assumed theological or philosophical shape. When after his death in the reign of Ḥārūn (386-386) these differences raged more fiercely than ever and led to a civil war resulting in bloodshed, as in the battle of the Camel (380/995), the battle of Siffin (377/987), the "arbitration" (383/995), and the battle of Nahrawān (383/995), questions like "Who is in the right in these battles, and how?", "Who is in the wrong and why?", "If some regard both sides as wrong, what is their ground for holding this?", naturally cropped up and demanded to be answered. These questions led to the framing of certain opinions and justifications that were essentially political in the beginning, but as each group sought to strengthen its position by calling theological support in aid of its particular stand, these political factions gradually changed into religious groups. Then, the bloodshed which accompanied these factional feuds in the beginning and continued during the rule of the Umayyads and the 'Abbāsid, did not allow these differences to remain only theological; they went on growing ever more acute and menacing till they threatened the national unity of the Muslims. Every house was a place of controversy, every conversation suggesting ever-new political, theological, and philosophical offshoots. Every new question that cropped up

74 Ibn 'Abī al-Barr, op. cit., p. 699.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

gave birth to a number of new sects which subdivided themselves into further sects over minute internal differences. These sects were not content to fill themselves with bias against one another; their polemics often ended up in quarrels and riots. Kufah, the capital of Iraq, where Abu Hanifah was born, was the chief centre of these quarrels. The battles of the Camel, Siffin, and Nahrawan had all been fought in Iraq. The heart-searing murder of Hussain (61, 680), the Prophet’s grandson, had also taken place here. It was the birthplace of most of these sects and the field where both the Umayyads and the ‘Abbasids used the maximum of coercion to repress their opponents. The time of abu Hanifah’s birth (80, 899) and growth coincided with these factional hostilities at their height.

The large number of sub-sects that grew out of these factions had their roots in four main sects: the Shi’ah, the Khawarij, the Murji’ah, and the Mu’tazilah. We shall give here a brief account of the doctrines of each of them before proceeding further.

The Shi’ah. — They were the supporters of Ali and called themselves the Shi’ahs (party) of Ali. Later (the word ‘Ali was dropped) and they began to be called only Shi’ahs.

Although a section of the people of Basra Hājīm and a few others regarded Ali as the best suited person to have succeeded the Prophet, and some regarded him superior to the other Companions, particularly to ‘Ummān, and others considered him to be more entitled for the Caliphate because of his relationship with the Prophet, yet up to the time of ‘Ummān those opinions had not assumed the form of a creed or religious belief. Nor were the people who held these opinions hostile to the first three Caliphs. On the other hand, they acknowledged and supported their succession. As a separate party with clear-cut views on these matters, they emerged in ‘Ali’s reign during the battles of the Camel, Siffin, and Nahrawan. Later, the cold-blooded slaughter of Hussain rallied them, fired them with a new wrath, and shaped their views into a separate creed. The indignation provoked among the general Muslim population by the vile deeds of the Umayyads and the sympathy excited in their breasts for the descendants of ‘Ali on account of their constant persecution in both the Umayyads and the ‘Abbasid regime, lent extraordinary support to Shi’ite propaganda. They had their stronghold at Kufah. Their beliefs were as follows:

1. The Imam’s office (particular Shi’ite term for Caliph’s office) is not a public office the institution of which may have been left to the choice of the public (annasak). The Imam is a pillar of the faith and the foundation-stone of Islam. Therefore, it is one of the main duties of the Prophet to institute somebody as Imam instead of leaving the matter to the discretion of the community.  

2. The Imam is impeccable, i.e., free from all sins, great or small. He is immune from error. Everything that he says or does is inviolate.  

3. The Prophet had conferred the Imamate on ‘Ali and nominated him as his successor. Thus ‘Ali was the first Imam by ordinance.  

4. As the appointment of the Imam is not left to be made by public choice, every new Imam will be appointed by an ordinance from his predecessor.  

5. All the Shi’ah sects are also agreed that the Imam’s office is the exclusive right of the descendants of ‘Ali. Beyond this general agreement, however, the various Shi’ah sects differed among themselves. The moderate among them held that ‘Ali was the best created man. He who fought or bore malice against him was an enemy of God to be raised among infidels and hypocrites, and destined to live in hell. “If ‘Ali had refused to recognize their Caliphate as legitimate and expressed displeasure with them, Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman who preceded him as Calipha would also have deserved that doom; but as ‘Ali recognized them and swore allegiance and offered prayers behind them, we cannot take exception to what he took as right. We do not differentiate between ‘Ali and the Prophet except that the latter was endowed with prophethood; for the rest ‘Ali was worthy of the same esteem as the Prophet.”  

The fanaticism among them held that the Calipha before ‘Ali were unprincipled and those who elected them were ill-guided and unjust, as they belied the Prophet’s will and deprived the rightful Caliph of his due. Some went further and pronounced anathemas against the first three Caliphas and declared them and their electors communists. The softest of them were the Zaidiyas, followers of Zaid (d. 122/740) son of ‘Ali, son of Hussain. They regarded ‘Ali as superior to others, but allowed the choice of those who were inferior to him. Moreover, they held that the Prophet’s decision in favour of ‘Ali was not unequivocal; hence they accepted the Caliphate of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. All the same, they preferred the choice of an able person among the descendants of Fatimah (the Prophet’s daughter) as Imam, provided he be claimed that position and challenged the title of “the kings” to it. Abu Hanifah was closely connected with Zaid, as we shall see in the course of this chapter, although he did not contribute to the Zaidite doctrine.

The Khawarij. — In direct opposition to the Shi’ahs the Khawarij stood at the other extreme. They suddenly grouped together during the battle of Siffin.

44 Al-Shabrani, op. cit., p. 109.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Till then they were among the staunch supporters of 'Ali, but when, during that engagement, he consented to submit his quarrel with Mu‘awiya to the decision of two arbiters, they abandoned him asserting that he had turned infidel by accepting to submit to the verdict of human arbiters instead of God. After that they drifted farther and farther away and being fanatical hot-heads, who believed in waging war against those who differed from them and against "unjust government" wherever one was found, they indulged in war and bloodshed for a long time till their power was finally crushed under the 'Abbásid rule. They, too, were most influential in 'Iraq, their camps being mainly centred in al-Baṣrah between Kifāfah and Baṣrah. Their beliefs briefly were as follows:

1. They acknowledged abu Bakr and 'Umar as Rightful Caliphs but 'Uthmān, in their opinion, had, towards the end of his reign, erred from the path of justice and right conduct and hence deserved to be deposed or killed. 'Ali also committed, according to them, a major sin when he accepted the "arbitration" of "one besides God." The two arbiters (Amr b. ʿĀ and Abu Mūsaa al-ʿAṣiq), their choices (Ali and Mu‘awiya), and all those who agreed to arbitration were sinners. All those who participated in the battle of the Camel including Tālib, Zubair, and A‘ṣāf, the Prophet’s wife, had been guilty of grievous sin.

2. Sin, with the Khawārij, was synonymous with infidelity. Anyone who committed a major sin (and did not repent and revert) was placed outside the pale of Islam. All the persons mentioned above were declared infidels. Anathema was pronounced against them, and they were considered fit to be censured. The Muslims in general were pronounced infidels, first, because they were not free from sin, and, secondly, because they not only regarded these persons as Muslims but also acknowledged them as reliable guides, and declared and verified the law from traditions reported by them.

3. The Caliph, according to them, should be elected by the free vote of the Muslims.

4. The Caliph need not be a member of the tribe of Quraysh. Whomever they elected from amongst the honest Muslims would be a rightful Caliph.

5. A Caliph was to be obeyed faithfully as long as he acted rightly and justly; but if he forsook the path of right and justice, he was to be fought against and deposed or assassinated.

6. The Qur'ān was recognized as the authoritative source of Law but their views on Ḳudālah (the Prophet's Tradition) and ʿimād (the agreement of Muslims in respect of a rule of Law) were different from those of the majority. A large group of them, which called itself al-Najjārīyyah, did not believe in the very need of a State. The Muslims, they said, should of themselves abide by the right. However, if they needed a Caliph to direct their affairs, there was no harm in choosing one. Their major sect, the Anṣāriyyah, dubbed all Muslims, excepting themselves, polytheists. The Khawārij, according to them, could not go for prayer in response to any but a Khārijite’s call. They could neither take the meat of an animal slaughtered by non-Khārijites, nor marry among them, nor could a Khārijite and a non-Khārijite inherit each other’s possessions. They considered war on all other Muslims to be a religious duty and sanctioned the killing of their women and children and the looting of their property. They declared those of their own sect as infidels if they shirked this duty. They allowed treachery with their opponents and were so malicious that a non-Muslim would find himself safer in their midst than an average Muslim.

The most tolerant of them were the Badā‘yyah who refrained from declaring the other Muslims as polytheists although they put them outside the pale of Islam and described them as unbelievers. Their evidence, the Badā‘yyah said, was to be accepted, marriages with them and inheritance to and from them allowed. Their territory too was not to be called dār al-bayr (the land of the infidels) or dār al-harb (the land of the people at war) but dār al-khayr (the land of the people of one God) although they excepted the centres of their government from it. They allowed secret amities on other Muslims, although open warfare with them was not repugnant.

The Murji‘ah. The conflicting principles of the Shī‘ah and the Khawārij were responsible for the birth of another sect, called the Murji‘ah.

Apart from the people who had flung themselves violently in support of ‘Ali or against him during his wars, there was a section which had remained neutral either wisely avoiding to indulge in civil war which they deemed a curse or being unable to decide which side fought for the truth. These people quite realized that it was a veritable curse for Muslims to indulge in bloodshed and mutual slaughter, but they were not prepared to blaspheme any of the beli¬gents, and left it to God to decide the affair between them. He alone would tell, on the Day of Judgment, which of them struggled for the right cause and which for the wrong. So far their ideas agreed with those of the Muslims in general, but when the Shī‘ah and the Khawārij raised questions as to what was faith and what constituted infidelity, arising in an era of doctrinal wrangling and polemical contests, this neutral group evolved some theological doctrines in support of its position. Briefly stated they were as follows:

1. Faith comprises belief in God and the Prophet. One’s action does not form an integral part of one’s faith. Hence a believer will remain a believer though he should eschew his duties or commit grave sins.

2. Salvation depends on faith alone. No sin will hurt one who has faith. It is enough for a man’s redemption that he should abstain from polytheism and die as a monochrest.

Some of the Murji‘ah, taking a step further, affirmed that short of

---

68

Political Thought in Early Islam

69
A History of Muslim Philosophy

polytheism all alike, even the worst, would be forgiven. A few, taking a further leap in that direction, asserted that if a man cherished faith in his heart but worshipped idols or adopted Jewish or Christian doctrines and spoke heresy in the Islamic State where he lived under no fear, he would yet be quite fast grounded in faith, remain a friend of God, and deserve to go to paradise.

Another view closely comparable with the one mentioned above was that if one's duty to uphold the right and stem the wrong (amr bi al-ma'ruf and nahi 'an al-munkar) required one to bear arms, it was a "trial" to be avoided. It was quite right to check others on wrong conduct, but to speak loud against the tyranny of government was not allowed. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ was very bitter on these things and asserted that they strengthen the hands of tyrants and greatly demoralize the Muslims' power of resistance against the forces of evil and wickedness.

The Mu'tazila.—This tumultuous period was responsible for the birth of yet another sect known to Islamic history as "the Seekers." Although it did not owe its origin, like the former three, to purely political factors, like them it contributed its share of opinions to the political issues of the day and entered the arena of theological disputes that raged in the Islamic world at that time, particularly in Iraq. The leaders of this group, Wāqīl bin 'Aṣa (80-131/699-748) and 'Amm bin 'Ubaid (d. 145/762) were two contemporaries of al-Hallāj, and Basrah was the centre of their religious contests in the beginning.

Their political views were briefly these:

1. The appointment of an Imām (or, in other words, the institution of the State) was a religious urgency. Some Mu'tazilites, however, opined that the Imām’s was a superfluous office. No Imām was needed if the community followed the right path.26
2. The choice of the Imām, according to them, rested with the community, and only the community’s choice validated his appointment.27 Some of them held that the choice should be unanimous, and in the event of differences and dissensions the appointment should be suspended and held in abeyance.28
3. The community could choose any morally qualified and efficient person as Imām. The condition of his being a Quraishite, an Arab, or a non-Arab was irrelevant.29 Some of them actually preferred the appointment of a non-Arab;

Political Thought in Early Islam

it was better still if he could be a freed slave, for he would have fewer devotes, and it would be easy to depose him if he turned out to be a tyrant.30 They would rather have a government which was weak and easy to depose than one that was bad but strong and firmly established.

4. According to them, the Fīrat or other congregational prayers could not be held behind an unrighteous Imām.31
5. Amr bi al-ma'ruf wa al-munkar (enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong) was among their fundamental principles. It was a duty with them to rise in arms against an unjust government provided they had the power to do so and hoped to raise a successful coup.32 Thus it was that they rose in arms against the Umayyad Caliph Walid bin Yazīd (r. 125-126/743-744) and tried to replace him by Yazīd bin Walid who espoused their doctrine of ascension.33

6. On the question of the inter-relation of sin and infidelity, over which the Khawārij and Murji'ah were at loggerheads, their verdict was compromising. A sinful Muslim was neither a believer nor an unbeliever, but one in the middling state.34

In addition to these principles, the Mu'tazilah pronounced bold verdicts upon the differences among the Prophet's Companions and upon the issue of Cullate. Wāqīl bin 'Aṣa declared that one of the two opponents in the battles of Camel and ‘Siffin was surely a "transgressor" although it was hard to say who. It was for this reason that he said that if 'Ali, 'Abd Allah, and Zobair came before him to give evidence on a vegetable knot, he would not accept it of them since there was a possibility that they had been guilty of transgression. 'Amm bin 'Ubaid pronounced both sides as "transgressors."35

They also attacked 'Uqayl vigorously and some of them did not spare even 'Umar.36 Besides this, many of them practically rejected Baytī (the Prophet's Tradition) and ijmā (the consensus of opinion) as authoritative sources of Islamic Law.

The Major Sects.—In the midst of these violent, warring groups the large majority of Muslims went along subscribing to the orthodox principles and doctrines, accredited as authoritative since the days of the "Right-guided" Caliphs, principles and precepts which the Prophet's Companions and their successors and Muslims in general had commonly regarded as Islamic. However, nobody, from the time of the inception of the schism down to the days of al-Hanafi, had vindicated the stand of the majority in these matters of

670

671
BIBLIOGRAPHY


master in the art of controversy and spent most of his time in debates. As Bayhaqī was the main venue of these contests, he had been there about twenty times, occasionally staying there for six months or so at a stretch, and remaining engaged in controversies with the different sects of the Khārijites, the Bālānīyyah, the Sunnīyyah, and the Ḥāfīzīyyah. It may be easily concluded from this that he was well versed in philosophy, logic, and theological divergences of the numerous sects without which a man cannot enter the field of controversy at all. The beautiful use that he later made of reason and common sense in the interpretation of Law and the resolving of abstract legal problems which won him immortal fame owed a great deal to the intellectual training which he had received earlier from these exercises of logical argumentation.

After keeping himself busy in polemical controversies for a long time and growing sick of them, he turned to Fiqh, i.e., Islamic Law. Here, with the bent of mind that he possessed, he could not interest himself in the Traditionalist school (Maslahat al-baqī’ah). He, therefore, joined the Iraqi school of reason with its centre at Kūfa. This school of law tracing its origin to ‘Ali and Ibn Mas’ud (d. 32/652), after whom their disciples Bayhaqī (d. 78/697), ‘Alī Ṭabarqānī (d. 62/ 681), and Mas’ud (d. 63/682) became its accredited leaders, followed in their turn by Ibāḍī ‘Alī (d. 95/714) and Ḥasan (d. 130/747). Abu Ḥanīfah took Ḥasanī for his master and kept him company for eighteen years till the latter’s death. Frequently he also consulted the other learned masters of Law and Tradition in the Hijāz on the occasions of pilgrimage, and acquainted himself also with the Traditionalist school of thought. On Ḥasanī’s death he was chosen to succeed him. He occupied that place for thirty years, delivering lectures and discourses, issuing legal verdicts, and doing the work which formed the foundation of the Hanfī school of law named after him. In those thirty years he answered some sixty thousand (according to other estimates, eighty-three thousand) legal queries, all of which were later compiled under different heads in his own life-time. Some seven to eight hundred of his pupils spread to different parts of the Islamic world and filled important seats of learning. They were entrusted with issuing legal opinions and guiding the education of the masses, and became objects of heartfelt veneration for the multitudes. About fifty of them were appointed judges after his death during the ‘Abbasid reign. The law as codified by him was adopted as the law of the great part of the Muslim world. The ‘Abbasids, the Sāliḥīs, the Ottomans, and the Mughals espoused it, and millions of people follow it today.

Abu Ḥanīfah, like his forefathers, earned his living by trade. He dealt in a kind of cloth, called ẖāl, in Kūfa. Gradually, his business prospered till he had a factory where this cloth was manufactured.1 The business was not

---

1 Ib., p. 59.
4 The business was not restricted to Kūfa; his goods had a good market in far-off places. The growing recognition of his integrity converted his firm into a bank where people deposited huge sums of money on trust. These deposits ran to fifty million dirhams at the time of his death.2 Extensive experience of financial and commercial matters gave him a deep insight into various aspects of law such as seldom falls to the lot of a theoretical lawyer. Later on, when he set himself to the task of codifying the Law of Islam this personal experience proved of immense help to him. A further testimony to his deep understanding and proficient handling of practical affairs is provided by the fact that when in 145/762 Muḥammad undertook the task of constructing the new city of Baghdad, he appointed Abu Ḥanīfah to supervise the work, and for four years it remained under his supervision.3

In private life he was most pious, a man of known integrity. Once, he sent out his partner to sell some merchandise. A part of the goods to be sold was defective. He instructed his partner to let the buyer know the defect. The partner, however, forgot to do so, and returned after selling the whole lot without apprising the buyer of the defect. Abu Ḥanīfah did not keep that money. He gave away the whole of it (and amounted to 35,000 dirhams) in charity.4 His chronicles have recorded occasions when ignorant persons would come to his firm selling goods at lower rates than what they were worth. Abu Ḥanīfah would tell them that their wares were worth more than what they put them at, and bought them at their actual rate.5 All his contemporaries speak highly of his honesty. The famous learned divine, ‘Abd Allāh bin Muḥarrak, said, “I have yet to see a more pious man than Abu Ḥanīfah. What will you say about the man to whom they offered the world and its wealth and he kicked it away, who was flogged and remained steadfast, and who never accepted those posts and honours which people hanker after.”6

Justice Ibn Jibrīn said, “The world followed him but he would have none of it. As for us, the world would have none of us and we run after it.”7 According to Ḥasan bin Ḫiyūl, Abu Ḥanīfah never accepted a gift or favour from the rich.8 He was also very generous, never sparing in spending, particularly on the learned and the scholarly. A part of his profits was earmarked for them and expensed throughout the year; and whatever of it was left over was distributed among them. Extending them such help he would say: “Be pleased to spend

---

1 Al-Makki, op. cit., p. 220.
4 For an instance of this see al-Makki, op. cit., pp. 219-20.
7 Al-Dhahabi, op. cit., p. 20.
it on your needs, and thank none but God for it. I don't give you anything of mine. It is God's bounty; He has given it to me for your sake." A number of his pupils entirely depended on him, particularly Abu Yusa'a. He met all the expenses of the latter's house since his parents were poor and wanted their son to give up studies and take to some work to earn a living.24

That was the man, who tackled in the first half of the second/eighth century the knotty problems arising from the awkward circumstances that followed the "Right-guided" Caliphate.

**Abu Hanifa's Pronouncements and Opinions.—**First of all we shall take those problems about which his opinions as recorded by himself are available to us. He was no prolific writer. Therefore, in order to know his views we have generally to resort to other reliable sources. But on certain issues, mainly raised by the above-mentioned sects (the Shafis, the Khairites, the Murtad'is, and the Mu'tazilites), he has written, against his will, with his own pen, drawing up in brief but eloquent words the creed and doctrine of the old al-Mas'udites, the Khairites, and the Restorers (the Companions' tradition) who formed (as they still do) by far the largest section of the Muslim community. Naturally, in an estimate of his work the first place must be given to what flows from his own pen.

Al-Fiqh al-Abkar.—We have already stated in the preceding chapter how the differences that cropped up among the Muslims during 'Ali's reign and the first years of the Unaeved regime led to the birth of four big sects in the community, which not only expressed but also adopted as tenets of faith contradictory opinions on certain vital issues affecting the constitution of Muslim society, the sources of Islamic Law and the decisions adopted by common consent in the earlier period, and the creed of the majority in regard to these matters was clear; it was embodied in the practice of the common man and not infrequently in the spoken word or behaviour of the great divines and men of learning. But nobody had drawn it up in clear-cut words and put it into the form of a treatise. Abu Hanifa was the first person to put down perspicuously in his famous work, *al-Fiqh al-Abkar, that the Sunni point of view respecting matters of divergence against the doctrines of other sects.

27 Before gaining currency as a term of the scholastics, the term Fiqh covered beliefs, general principles, law—in fact, everything under it. The differentiation was made by calling beliefs and general principles *Fiqh al-Abkar*, the fundamental or the main *Fiqh*, and also Hanfiah gave that name to his composition. Recently, some scholars have doubted the authenticity of some parts of this book; they believe them to have been included later. However, the authenticity of those parts which we discuss here is undoubted, as whatever other sources we tap to collect abu Hanifa's opinions on these matters, we find these tallying with him. For instance, abu Hanfiah's *al-Wuqayph*, *al-Fiqh al-Abkar* reported by al-Mukhlibi, and *'Abdul-Tahha* (p. 223-312/543-933) has described the doctrines reported from abu Hanfiah and his pupils, also Yusa'a and Muhammad bin Yusa'a al-Khathib.

The first question relevant to our discussion answered by him in the book is regarding the position of the "Right-guided" Caliphas. The dissenting sects had posed the question about some of them whether they were rightly raised to the office of the Caliphate. Some wanted to know who were superior to whom, and whether there was any among them who could not be called a Muslim at all. These questions were not merely queries regarding some personalities of old history; in fact, they mooted another fundamental question, viz., whether the way these Caliphs were elected to their office was to be recognized as the constitutional way of electing the Head of the Islamic State or not. Moreover, if the title of anyone of them proved doubtful, the question would be raised whether the decisions taken by "consensus of opinion" in his regime would form part of the Islamic Law or not; whether his own decisions would continue to form precedents in law or cease to operate as such. Besides that, the questions whether they were entitled to the Caliphate, whether they were endowed with faith at all, and whether some of them were superior to others, naturally gave rise to another question of a very vital import, and that was, whether the Muslims of later times could repute any trust in either the members or the collective decisions of the early Islamic community brought up under the direct care and supervision of the Prophet of God, the people through whom the teachings of the Qur'an, the Prophet's Tradition, and the Islamic Law came to be transmitted to later generations.

The second question related to the position of the Prophet's Companions. One of the sects, the Shafi, called the vast majority of these Companions sinners, gone astray, and even infidels, because they had selected the first three Caliphas to rule them; and a fair number was put outside the pale of faith or declared "transgressors" by the Khairites and the Mu'tazilites for reasons of their own. This, too, was not a purely historical question, for it naturally led one to ask whether the laws and traditions transmitted by persons of doubtful bona fide to posterity would remain authentic sources of Islamic Law or not.

The third basic question dealt with in the book relates to "faith," its definition and distinction from infidelity, and the consequences of an issue of grave controversy and debate in those days among the Khairites, the Murtad'is, and the Mu'tazilites. This again was not merely a theological question but one that was closely related to the constitution of Muslim society and its answer affected the civic rights and social relations of Muslims. A question that closely followed from it was whether in a Muslim State governed by the sinful and the wrong-doer it was possible to perform correctly such religious duties as the Friday and other prayers, or political functions like dispensing justice or participating in war.

Abu Hanfiah's answers to those questions embodying the Sunni creed are as follows:

1. The best of men after the Prophet of God (on whom be peace) was Abu Bakr. After him was 'Umar, after him 'Uthman, and after him 'Ali. They were
all just men and abided by the right."

It is a matter of interest to note that personally Abu Hanifah loved 'Ali more than Ulman, and believed that neither of them should be ranked above the other. Formulating the creed, however, he accepted wholeheartedly the decision of the majority of his day in choosing Ulman as Caliph after 'Umar, and agreed that in the ranking of the "right-guided" Caliphs the order of their Caliphat was also the order of their superiority to one another.

2. "The Companions of the Prophet are not to be spoken of with respect and reverence. They are the second-rank of all men, and any one who bears them malice or mentions them with disrespect. We mention them in none but a good way."

Abu Hanifah did not hesitate to express his opinion on the mutual war of the Companions, and said unambiguously that in the war between 'Ali and his adversaries (and evidently the participants of the battles of the Camel and Siffin are included among them) 'Ali stood by right more than they, yet he altogether refrained from inflicting reproach on the other side.

3. "Faith is to own and believe (in God and His Prophet)." In al-Waslaf, it is explained in these words: "To have faith in something is to own it with the tongue and believe in it from the heart," and further: "Faith is not owning alone, nor believing alone." In another place we find: "Action is something different from faith, and faith different from action. Often a man is exempt from a certain action but he is not exempt from faith. For instance, it may be said that a poor man is exempt from the payment of zakat (prescribed charity), but it cannot be said that he is exempt from bearing faith also." Thus Abu Hanifah refuted the Kharjite theory that action formed part of faith and hence sin was synonymous with disbelief, or, in other words, that a crime necessarily meant treason.

4. "We do not excommunicate a Muslim for any sin, however grave it may be, unless he affirms that it is "allowed." We do not divest him of belief. We call him a believer. A believer may be a transgressor, without being an infidel." In al-Waslaf he writes: "The sinners among the followers of Muhammad (on whom be peace) are all believers, not infidels." "Afshad Taqaddat" clarifies it further: "A man does not go out of the pale of faith except by denying the creed that has put him inside it." A discussion of the Kharjites with Abu Hanifah over this issue throws further light on this doctrine and its social consequences. A large party of them once came to him and said, "There are two tiers at the gate of the Moors. One is of a drunkard who died drinking, the other of a woman who got illicitly pregnant and took her own life in shame."

"To which community did they belong? Jews, were they?"

"No," they said.

"Christians, then, or Magians?"

"No," they answered again.

"Then, to which community did they belong?"

"To the community which bears witness to the creed of Islam," they replied. "Is that one-third of the faith, or one-fourth, or what?" asked he.

They said, "There is no one-third or one-fourth of faith."

"After all, what part of faith is this bearing witness to the creed of Islam?"

He replied, "If you ask me that, I will say about them what the Prophet of God, Abraham, said about sinners worse than they, 'O God, he who follows me is mine, and he who disobeys—Thou art the Forgiving, the Compassionate'; or what the Prophet of God, Jesus, said about sinners worse than they, 'If you punish them they are Your creatures, and if you forgive them, Thou art All-Powerful and Wise'; or what the Prophet of God, Noah, said, 'Their reckoning rests with God, would that you understood, and I do not wish to turn my back upon the believers.'"
Hearing this the Kharijites felt outwitted and avowed their mistake.\(^{21}\) 
5. "Prayers can be offered behind any of the faithful, good or bad."\(^{22}\) "Apūdā Zajhrīṣīṣṣ ēxcludēt it furthér like thīs: "Thē piligrimage and jīdh (war) will contīnuē to be perforessd thē Day of Judgement unдер thē rulers of thē faithful, whēther thēy bē or bōad. Nothīng will mēke thēm unlawsulf or discontīnuē thēm."\(^{23}\) 
Al-Jāṣīṣ hōs mōre clērrly explaine thē Hāṣīfāh's pōnt of vīew in thīs mātter. "Sōmē pople," wīrites hē, "suppose thēt hē Hāṣīfāh aprovēs thē Imaṃlāt īr Caliphate of thē corrupt. If hē hās nēt been dēlibērētly irrevers, thē mīnυ understænding pablly sprīngs frō thēt hēt Hāṣīfāh (and nēt bē alone, all thē lēarnd scholārs frō thēq sthē pople kōwn kōn one wīt hēm) thēt iīf ā jīgūh iī hēm īmājī, hē dēcisīōn s will bē accepsett, nō māw hōw corrupt ā māshēr hēs appoinṭēd hēm, ānd prayér māy bē lawsulf fōrbehīd corrupt māshērs dēspītē thēir: corruptīōn. Thēs atītude s absōltūre cōrrect in īt s plācē, bυt hē dōes nōt mēt thēt hēt Hāṣīfāh fīnds ā nōfalt wīt thē Caliphate of thē corrupt."\(^{24}\) 

These erudities mēke thēt clīer thēt Hāṣīfāh, unlikē thē Khārijīṣīṣs, dēfīrstīttēd bētween Calīphis dē jāre ānd Calīphis dē jācō. Ēn nēcessar corīsōlōry tō thē pōsītiōn takēn bē thē tōkēn sēctēd wās thēt in thē absēncē dē jāt ā dēpjīt rūle, i.ē., thē Calīph dē jāre, thēl sevenīon s Mūsīlīm sōciētē ād Stētē wōuld rēmān sūpērsīdēd. Thēre wōuld bē nō thē pilgrīmagē, ānd nō Frīdār ānd othēr ēnnōsēl prēgōrēs; thē crētē s wōuld stōp, ānd thēre wōuld bē nō othēr rēligious, sōciāl ār politicl prēsē. Hē Hāṣīfāh, ān thē hērd hēnt, cōntenīīd thēt if āt thē tīmēs Mūsīlīm s wērē dēprīved dē Calīph dē jāre, thē fēnctēs s sōciētē wōuld cōntenīē thēt to bē ēxercītēd lawsulf lēsēr ā Calīph dē jācō, thōugh hēs rīgt tō Calīphate māy bē dēpōsītīblē. Thē pōssē tō ēmē wēl lēt wē pōūnt wōt, accōrdīng tō hēm, wērē thē essēntiāl rēquīrēttēs dē thē lawsulf Calīphate anc thēt hēt thōught dē corrupt ānd ējīnt Calīphs. 
6. "Wē dōt nōt thēt sin dōt nōt dō a bēlīver nēt hām. Wē nēt thēt thēt bēlīver wēl nēt gō tō hēll, nōth āt thē hē lēt ēnlētīlī īn hēll ēf hē s ēn trāgērsīrī."\(^{25}\) "Wē ēlso dōt nōt thēt, līkē thē Khārijīṣīṣs, thēt oūd sēddēs wērē lītērrīēd ānd oūd sēddēs υndōublēlī fōrγīvēd."\(^{26}\) 

"Apūdā Tāhkūsīṣṣ s hās fūrthīrr addīttō dē thēt: "Wē cōtīēd ēn rēspōctō dē nō bēlīver thēt hē ṭē dēstīdō tō gō tō hēvēn ār tō hēll. Wē dōt nōt accūr any Mūsīlīm dē inīdvίty, υnlēsytē, ār hērīpērsī, unlēss hē wē kēs hē υssυrīlly."\(^{27}\)

\(^{22}\) Mulla 'Abd/Qārī, p. 95; al-Maghnūtī, p. 28.  
\(^{23}\) Ibn āshī al-Tāzī, p. 222.  
\(^{24}\) Akhīnī al-Qurʿān, Vol. I, pp. 80-81; al-Sanāṣībī has hōs explaine thēs thē Mādhūbī, Mādūbī, al-Salāshī, 1324/1906, p. 130.  
\(^{25}\) Mulla 'Abd/Qārī, p. 92; al-Maghnūtī, p. 28-29.  
\(^{26}\) Mulla 'Abd/Qārī, p. 95; al-Maghnūtī, p. 29.  

Abū Ḥanīfah and Abū Yūsuf engaged in them. As for intentions and motives we leave them to God to judge."\(^{28}\) 
Thus Abū Ḥanīfah steered a middle course through the opinions held by the Mādhūbīs, the Khārijīṣīṣs, and the Muʿātīṣīṣs, and formulated a doctrīne of balance which, on the one hand, preserves the Muslim society from disintegration through mutual hatred and violence, and, on the other, insures against its falling into moral indiscipline and getting emboldened to commit sins with impunity.

Abū Ḥanīfah on State and Caliphate.—The opinions mentioned above related to issues which had cropped up in consequence of the political turmoil of the day and vitally affected the legal system and the political and social orders of Muslim society. Now, let us examine Abū Ḥanīfah’s views concerning the State and Caliphate. Since there is no work of his own touching these matters, we have to resort to the following two kinds of sources for information: first, his opinions quoted in the traditions and books of the Ḥanāfī school; and, secondly, the attitude he adopted towards his contemporary governments of the Umayyads and the 'Abābildīs. The latter also includes a number of spoken words coming from his mouth during the course of his struggle with these governments, and those drawn further light on his points of view under discussion.

The Problem of Sovereignty and Legislation.—Abū Ḥanīfah’s views on sovereignty were identical with the generally known basic view of Islam on this issue, namely, (1) that the true sovereign is God, (2) that the Prophet is to be obeyed as God’s accredited viceroy, and (3) that the Shāfīʿī, i.e., the Law of God and His Prophet, is the supreme Law to which all must submit without demand or reservation. Abū Ḥanīfah, pre-eminently a jurist, has stated this doctrine rather in terms of law than of politics. He says: "When I find an order in the Book of God, I take it from there. When I do not find it there I take it from the accredited practice, word, or tradition of the Prophet, coming down to us through reliable sources. When I do not find it either in the Book of God or in the Prophet’s Sunnah, I follow the (agreed) opinion of the Prophet’s Companions. In case of difference of opinion among them I adopt the opinion I like and reject the one I do not like; but I do not reject them all to follow an opinion from outside. . . . As for others, I have as much right to sift and draw conclusions as they have."\(^{29}\) 

Ibn Ḥazīm states: "All his pupils are agreed that Abū Ḥanīfah’s practice was that even a weak tradition was to be preferred to (one’s own opinion formed by) analogical reasoning (qiṣṣās) or private judgment (ruʿyā)."\(^{30}\) 

This leaves absolutely no doubt that Abū Ḥanīfah regarded the Qurʾān and the Sunnah as the final authority. Legal sovereignty, according to him, rested with God and the Prophet; and reason and judgment (qiṣṣās and ruʿyā) were
to be employed in the service of legislation only in matters where they had given no instruction. The precedence given by him even to an "isolated" opinion of the Companions was also based on the possibility of their being aware of some instruction from the Prophet (about the matter under reference) which may have been the basis of that opinion. That was also why, when he saw a difference among the Companions, he accepted the opinion of someone of them rather than differ with all of them—he would avoid the danger of going against the Sunnah even inadvertently. In any case, he employed to the utmost his power of reasoning and judgment to find out whose opinion seemed best to approximate to the Sunnah.

The charge that he preferred his own discretion to a clear ordinance (ṣaḥīḥ) was laid at his door even in his lifetime but he refuted it saying, "God knows that he who stated that I preferred my own discretion to ordinance told a lie and accused me unjustly. How can we dare use our discretion when we have an ordinance?" The Caliph Manṣūr once wrote to him saying that he had heard that the aba Hanifah gave precedence to deductions from analogy over the Prophet’s tradition. In reply, he wrote: "O Commander of Believers, what you have heard is incorrect. I go first by the Book of God, then by the Sunnah of the Prophet, then the decisions of Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, and Ali, and then the decisions of other Companions; but when I find disagreement among them, I resort to discretion." Establishment of the Caliphate: Regarding the Caliphate his views were most clear-cut and unambiguous. According to him, to seize power by force and later regularize it by exacting allegiance under duress was no lawful way of being chosen for it. A Caliph should be chosen after consultation and in conference with the people who are entitled to give opinion (ahl al-nuṣūḥ). Abu Hanifah expressed this opinion in face of the peril of losing his life. Manṣūr’s Chamberlain, Rabī‘ bin Yūnus, relates that the Caliph summoned Mālik ibn Abī Dahr and Abu Hanifah before himself and asked, "What do you say about this power that God has given me over the people—am I deserving of it?" Mālik answered, "Had you not been deserving, God would not have conferred it on you." Said ibn Abī Dahr, "God grants the kingdom of the world to whom He pleases, but the kingdom of the hereafter is given to him who strives for it and is helped by God to make way to it. The help of God will attend you if you obey Him; in case you disobey, it will keep away from you. As for the Caliphate, the truth is that only a conference of the God-fearing can institute it, and one who seizes it by force has no righteousness in him. You and your associates are deprived of the help of God, and have turned aside from truth. Now, if you ask the Almighty to grant you peace and try to gain nearness to Him with deeds of piety, you may win His grace; otherwise you are only a self-seeker."  

Abu Hanifah and Abu Nu‘ayf

Abu Hanifah tells us that when ibn Abī Dahr spoke those words, Mālik and he folded their clothes about them expecting his head to go off his shoulders that very moment and his blood to fall on those clothes. But Manṣūr turned to Abu Hanifah and inquired, "What say you?" He replied, "The man who sincerely seeks the right path to guide himself eschews wrath. If you consult your conscience you will see that you have not invited us for the sake of God but to make us say, out of dread, something that suits you and that should reach the people. The truth is, you have become a Caliph without even a couple of men from amongst the al-Jāzīrīs (those whose opinion is respected in an authoritative) agreeing to it, whereas a Caliph should be chosen with the conference and concurrence of Muslims. You know, Abu Bakr refrained from making decisions for six months until the (news of the) Yama’itīs’ allegiance arrived. Then all the three rose and took their way. Manṣūr despatched Rabī’ after them with a bag full of coins for each with the instruction that if Mālik accepted it, it should be made over to him, but if Abu Hanifah or ibn Abī Dahr accepted it, he should bring their heads to him. When the gift was offered to Mālik he took it, but when Rabī’ offered it to ibn Abī Dahr he said that he did not consider it lawful for Manṣūr himself, how it could be lawful for him. And Abu Hanifah said, "I won’t touch it, not even if you cut off my head."” When Manṣūr heard it of him, he said, "Their contentment has saved their lives."  

A Caliph’s Qualifications:—Till Abu Hanifah’s time the qualifications which entitled a man to Caliphate were not described at length as they were compiled later by scholars like Māwardī and ibn Khaldūn. They were for the most part self-evident, for instance, he should be a Muslim, a male, free, and well versed in religion, and sound in body and mind. Two things, however, were doubtful and needed clarification: first, whether a ruthless or corrupt person could become a Caliph or not; secondly, whether it was necessary for a Caliph to belong to the tribe of Quraysh. Abu Hanifah’s opinion with regard to the first was that a Caliph must be a just person. One who is cruel and corrupt cannot be a Caliph, a judge, a governor, a procurer of legal verdict (muttah), or an arbitrator. If such a person comes to office, his Caliphate is null and void and the public owe him no obedience. However, notwithstanding his usurpation of power, all the social dealings and obligations executed by Muslims under him in accordance with the Shari‘ah will have legal sanction and the just decisions of the judges appointed by him will take effect. Abu Bakr al-Ja‘āṣaṣ, a well-known Hanafi jurist, has explained this point in greater detail. He observes: "It is not lawful that a cruel or corrupt person should be a prophet or his successor (khalīfah) or a judge or hold any office by virtue of which he should be in a position to impose his will on the people in matters relating to religion: he cannot, for example, be a Muttah or a witness or a rapporter of the Prophet’s traditions. The Qur‘ānīs..."
verse: "My covenant does not extend to the wrong-doers" shows that all those people who come to the helm of affairs in matters connected with religion must be just and virtuous. This verse categorically proves that the Caliphate of the corrupt is unlawful. No person of wicked reputation can be a Caliph. If any of that character should install himself in that office, the people are under no obligation to follow or obey him. The same was meant by the Prophet of God (on whom be peace) when he said that none among the created was entitled to command obedience in defiance of the Creator. The verse is also conclusive that no corrupt person can become a judge, a governor, or a magistrate; and if he becomes one, his orders will not be valid. Nor can his evidence be acceptable, nor his transmission of a report from the Prophet of God, nor the verdict (fatwa) of which he is the pronouncer.44

Al-Jawzi further affirms this was Abu Hanifah's opinion. He regrets how unjust it is to secure him of allowing the Caliphate of the corrupt. We have already alluded to that controversy and need not repeat it here. Al-Dhahabi also affirms this to be Abu Hanifah's view. According to him, Abu Hanifah held that the Caliph who misused public money (piyāj) or gave unjust orders was not entitled to remain Caliph and his orders were not valid.45 About the second question also Abu Hanifah's opinion was that the Caliph should belong to the tribe of Quraysh.46 Not this; it was the agreed view of all the Sunnis.47 However, they held this view not because the Caliphate was constitutionally the exclusive right of one tribe, but because in the particular circumstances of those days only a Qurayshite Caliph could hold all Muslims together. In other words, this opinion was based on political expediency of the time and not on any legal or constitutional right of the Quraysh. Ibn Kathir explains in detail that in those days the Arabs were the majority of the State and there were far more chances of the Arabs agreeing on a Qurayshite Caliph than on anyone from some other tribe. The chances of strife and rift that lay in the choice of a non-Qurayshite Caliph were so many that none could afford to put the Caliphate in that peril.48 That incidentally suits the wisdom and implications of the Prophet's timely instruction that the ink should be chosen from the Quraysh.49 Had the Caliph's office been for ever forbidden to the non-Qurayshites, 'Umar would not have said at the hour of his death, "If the Caliph's freed slave Skilm, were alive, I would have proposed him my successor."50 The Prophet, while instructing that the Caliphate should go to the Quraysh, had made it clear that this office would be held by the Quraysh as long as they retained certain merits.51 This clearly implied that when the Quraysh became bereft of those merits, the Caliphate should devolve on the non-Quraysh. This was the essential difference between the view of the Sunnis including Abu Hanifah on one side and that of the Kharijites and Mutazilites on the other. The latter allowed Caliphate for the non-Qurayshites irrespective of all conditions. Not only that; they went a step further and said that the non-Qurayshites had a better title to it. Their main anxiety seemed to be democracy, even though it might lead to confusion and disintegration. With the Sunnis, democracy and the stability of the State were equally important considerations.

The Exchequer and the Public's Right of Ownership.—The most repulsive habit of all indulgence of the Caliphs of his day in the eyes of Abu Hanifah were their reckless waste of public exchequer and their illegal seizure of people's properties. As we have already quoted al-Dhahabi according to Abu Hanifah, the oppression and illegitimate use of public money in a ruler rendered his title to Caliphate void. Not only that; he even did not allow the tokens of goodwill and presents received from foreign States to be made the personal property of the Caliph. These things also were to be deposited in the treasuries, not with the Caliph or his family, for the obvious reason that had he not been the Head of the State and thereby become conspicuous in the international world, none would have sent him those presents. He also objected to the Caliphs' squandering of public money and his giving gifts out of it. This was one of the main reasons why he himself accepted no gifts from the Caliphs.

Separation of the Judiciary from the Executive.—His views on the position of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive were unequivocal. If justice was to be ensured, he said, the judiciary must be independent of the executive. Not only that; the judge must also be able to enforce his decree against the Caliph if the latter encroached upon the rights of people. Towards the close of his life when he was sure that the Government would not let him live any more, he gathered his disciples and addressed himself to them. Among other important things, he gave them this instruction: "If the Caliph is guilty of encroachment upon the rights of the people, the judge next to him in rank (i.e., the Chief Justice) should make him submit to the rule of Law."52

The main thing which prevented him from accepting an official position, particularly that of a judge during the Umayyad and 'Abbasid rule was that he did not see the judiciary as independent. There was no chance of making the Caliph submit to the rule of Law; on the other hand, he feared that he would be made an instrument of injustice and asked to give wrong decisions.

44 Al-Qaṣiṣ, ii, 124.
46 Al-Dhahabi, p. 17; al-Makki has also quoted this opinion of Abu Hanifah, Vol. II, p. 100.
49 Al-Muṣannif, pp. 105-90.
51 684
52 685
and that not only the Caliph himself but also those attached to the palace would interfere with his work.

Yazid bin 'Umar bin Hubayrish was the first of the Umayyad governors of Iraq who pressed Abu Hanshaf to accept office. This was in 130/747 when the upsurge in Iraq against the Umayyad regime was rising with a speed that completely overthrew that Government within a couple of years. Ibn Hubayrish wanted to enlist the support of influential men of learning and use them to the advantage of the Umayyad cause. He invited ibn al-Lul, Dawud bin abu al-Hind, ibn Ijib Thumamah, and others and gave them lucrative appointments. Then summoning abu Hanshaf, he said, "Here I give you my seal. No order will be enforced here till you put the seal on it, and no money will be drawn from the treasury without your sanction." But abu Hanshaf declined to accept the responsibility. Yazid put him in prison and threatened him with whipping. Then the other learned men came around abu Hanshaf and requested him to take compassion on himself. "This service is as repugnant to us," said they, "as it is to you. But we have accepted it under duress; so should you." Abu Hanshaf replied, "Ab! had he asked me to count the gates of the mosque of Wast, I would not have done it for his sake. Then how can I agree that he should write the death warrant of an innocent person and I should put the seal on that order? By God, I will accept no share of his responsibility." Ibn Hubayrith then made him other offers but found him cold. At last he decided to appoint him the Chief Judge of Kifah and swore that if abu Hanshaf declined the appointment he would have him flogged. Abu Hanshaf swore in return saying that the flogging of this world was easier for him to endure than the flogging of the hereafter, renouncing that he would never accept it, even though that cost him his life. At last the tyrant dismissed him twenty, or (according to another report) thirty, blows of the stripe on the head. According to some accounts, he kept it up with ten stripes daily for about eleven days, but found his victim firm like a rock. Then someone informed him that he was likely to die. Ibn Hubayrith replied, "Is there none to counsel this man to ask me for a reprieve?" When abu Hanshaf heard of this he asked to be set free to consult his friends. Ibn Hubayrith set him free, at which he left Kifah for Makhah, not to return to it before the final wiping out of the Umayyad dynasty.

In the 'Abbasid period again Mansur insisted on his accepting the office of a judge. As we shall presently see, abu Hanshaf having openly participated in a revolt launched against Mansur by al-Nafs al-Zakятah and his brother Ibrahim, Mansur conferred such malice against him, that in al-Hashwah's words, he was all but consumed in the fire of wrath. However, it was not easy to lay hands upon a person of abu Hanshaf's eminence. Mansur knew how the murder of Husain had provoked feelings of wrath against the


668

Abu Hanifah and Abu Yusuf

Umayyads and how easily had they been uprooted on that account. Therefore, instead of killing him, he would rather lure him into a cage of gold and use him to advance his ends. With this in view he offered him the post of a judge again and again, in the end asking him to become the Chief Justice of the whole of the 'Abbasid Empire, but abu Hanshaf always put him off under one pretext or another. Ultimately, seeing him persist too much he told him frankly the reason why he was unable to accept these offers. On one such occasion he excused himself politely saying, 'None can be fit to become a judge unless he has strength enough to impose law on you, your princes, and your commanders. I have not that strength in me. I am so built that whenever you call me, I cannot breathe easily till I go out of your presence.' On another occasion the talk took a harsh turn. Addressing the Caliph he said, 'Even if I accepted this office willingly and not reluctantly, sure enough I would not prove worthy of your trust. For if I decided a case against your desire and you wanted me to alter the decision on pain of being pushed into the Euphrates to drown, I would rather be drowned than alter my decision. Then there are your courtiers, not a few of whom desire a judge to defer to their wishes to remain in your good books.' When talks like these led Mansur to conclude that this man could not be caught in the eage of golden baubles, he resorted to open persecution. He had him whipped and flogged, put him in jail where they subjected him to tortures of hunger and thirst. Later he was confined in a cell wherein he died, according to some, a natural death, according to others, of poisoning.

Freedom of Expression: A Right and a Duty.—According to abu Hanshaf, freedom of expression in a Muslim society and in an Islamic State is of as much importance as the independence of the judiciary. The Qur'an terms this freedom as an Gameplay, and in the sense of 'loose and free' (enjoying the right and forbidding the wrong). No doubt, an unqualified right of freedom of expression may sometimes assume an unbecoming, misleading, immoral, or even offensive form which no law can tolerate. But the Qur'an, by using the above-mentioned term for this freedom, clearly distinguishes it from all other kinds of freedom and, thus, circumscribing it within well-defined limits, declares it to be not only an inalienable right but also a duty of the public. Abu Hanshaf was particularly conscious of this right and duty, because the political order of his day had rid the people of this right to such an extent that they actually doubted if it had anything of the nature of a duty about it. We have pointed out elsewhere that the Murjites by preaching ultra-liberal doctrines were emboldening people towards sin. The Bashawiyah professed that 'enjoying the right and forbidding the wrong' where the government was involved was
miscellaneous and the Umayyad and 'Abbasid governments crushed the spirit of the people to raise a voice against the corruption and high-handedness of the ruling dynasty. Abu Hanifah, with both speech and action, attempted to resurrect this spirit amongst the people and discredited the extent to which it could be exploited. This is clear from Abu Hanifah's answer to a question from Ibrahim al-Saghir related by al-Jahiz:

Abu Hanifah asserted the right of freedom of expression against law courts also in the same manner. If any court of law gave a wrong decision he would not hesitate to point out whatever flaws of law or procedure he found in it. With him the respect of the courts did not mean letting the courts give wrong decisions. He was forbidden to pronounce verdicts on this account for a long time.46 He was so zealous in the matter of freedom of expression that he did not consider it lawful to implore or otherwise persuade a person who spoke ill even of a legitimate ruler or his just government, not even if he went to the extent of abusing the Caliph and expressing an intention to kill him, until there was a resolve on his part of an armed revolt or breach of peace. He argued this from an incident during the Caliphate of 'Ali. Five persons were arrested and brought before him on the charge of abusing him openly in the streets of Kufah. One of them was also accused of saying that he would assassinate him. 'Ali ordered their release. It was said, "But they intended to kill you." He asked in reply: "But should I kill them only for expressing the intention to kill me?" It was added, "But they also abused you." He said, "If you like you may also abuse them."

The Question of Rebellion against Tyrannical Rule.—Another important question that baffled the people of those days was whether or not it was lawful for the Muslims to rise in revolt against a ruler who perpetrated tyranny or transgressed the limits of 'Adl. The Saints themselves were divided on this. A large section of the Traditionsists (ahl al-hadith) allowed that they could raise voices against his tyranny and speak their mind before him, but they could not rise in rebellion, even though he should seize upon their lawful rights and indulge in unjust bloodshed and open transgression.47 But Abu Hanifah's creed in this matter was that the Caliphate of an unjust incumbent was basically wrong and insupportable, and deserved to be overthrown; that people not only had the right, but it was their duty to rise in rebellion against it; that such a rebellion was not only allowed but obligatory; provided, however, that it promised to succeed in replacing the tyrant or transgressor by a just and virtuous ruler, and not flare out in mere loss of lives and power.

Private Council and Codification of Islamic Law.—Abu Hanifah's greatest work which won him lasting eminence in the history of Islam was that he filled, on his own initiative, the vast gap caused in the Islamic legal system by the discontinuance of the qādī (the Consultative Council) after the "Right-guided" Caliphate. We have already alluded to the consequences that followed this ill-happening. The loss resulting from this state of affairs lasting over a century was a matter of grave concern to every thinking person. The State had extended its boundaries from Spain to Sind, taking in its fold scores of peoples with various cultures, customs, rites, and habits of their own. Facing it at home were problems relating to finance, commerce, agriculture, industry, marital relations, and the rest. There were civil and criminal cases to decide and ever-new constitutional, legal, and procedural problems to solve. Abroad, the relations of this large State with the other States of the world, and issues like war, peace, diplomatic relations, foreign trade, communications (by land and sea), customs, etc., demanded urgent attention. As the Muslims were a people with a distinct ideology, and claimed to guide themselves by principles and law of their own, it was necessary for them to solve their problems in the light of that ideology and those laws and principles. But the institution of qādī having been discontinued there was no other properly established body or institution in which the trusted scholars, jurists, and lawyers of the community should meet to deliberate and devise such an authentic solution of every outstanding legal issue, as should be recognized as the accredited and uniform law of the land throughout the State. Thus, Islam was faced with a mighty challenge and there was no machinery to meet it.

The loss was being felt all round, from the Caliph to the governors and judges. It was not easy for every judge, lawyer, or head of a department to decide the innumerable problems that rose every day, there and then, on the strength of his own knowledge or by dint of his own understanding. Not only that, such individual decisions also conflicted with one another and created confusion. But a body whose verdict carried authority could be established only by the Government which, unluckily, lay in the hands of such people as knew for certain that they enjoyed no esteem or confidence with the public, nor were they prepared to face, nay even endure, the learned, who, they feared, would confront them with things they would not like. They also knew that laws enacted under their patronage might never be accepted as parts of the Law of Islam. Ibn al-Muqaffa' proposed to Maṣūr that in order to stop this gap he should convene a council of the learned lawyers of all schools of thought who should sit together and express their opinions on the various problems in hand. After hearing these opinions the Caliph himself should pronounce his decision in every case and that decision should be adopted as law. But Maṣūr knew his own position too well to make this mistake. His decisions could not equal decisions of Abu Bakr and 'Umar. They could at best have lasted with his life. Even then he doubted whether he would find anyone in the whole realm who would respect and willingly follow a law enacted by him. He could make a secular law all right, but he could not make a law which would become incorporated in the Islamic juridical code.

In these circumstances it struck Abu Hanifah to try an entirely new path to
redeem the loss, and this was to institute a private legislative body, on his own initiative, independent of the Government. Only a far-sighted person like him could think of such a plan. And only he could dare the adventure who trusted his own resources, character, and moral prestige well enough to be sure that the laws passed by a body raised under his auspices would enforce themselves by dint of their excellence in sufficiency, precision, adaptability, and the moral influence of their devisers, even without any political sanction behind them, and that they would be adopted by the people of their own accord, and recognized by the different governments of their own free-will. Abu Hanifah was no seer of the hidden future to perceive the results which his effort produced within half a century of his departure, but he knew himself and his colleagues well enough. He knew the collective temperament of his community and had an eye on the circumstances of the day. With the perfect eye of a man of sharp intelligence and foresight he gauged that he could fill the yawning gap with his private endeavour if he would, and that surely it would be filled satisfactorily.

Abu Hanifah's own pupils, trained under his care and guidance in his college of law for years in deliberating over legal questions, looking into them in the proper scientific spirit, and arriving at conclusions with arguments, formed the members of this council. Almost all of them had learnt the law, literature, history, and Insha (biography of the Prophet) not only from Abu Hanifah but also from many other learned scholars of the day. Many of them had specialized in certain branches. Some had made a name in the field of "arguing conclusions by analogy," others for incomparable knowledge of the Prophet's traditions and precedents set by the Companions, judges, and Caliphs of old. Others yet had a reputation for interpreting the Qur'an or for being skilled in a particular branch of Law or in grammar or Insha. Abu Hanifah himself once described them saying: "These are thirty-six men of whom twenty-eight are fit to be judges, six to pronounce legal verdicts, and two good enough to teach judges and jurists."

The procedure of work adopted in this council as reported by the authentic chroniclers of Abu Hanifah should be described in their own words. Al-Mawawliyy bin Ahmad al-Mukki (d. 568/1173) writes: "Abu Hanifah framed his legal system with the consultations of his learned pupils. His passion to do all that he could for the sake of his religion, and his love of God, the Prophet, and the believers did not allow him to undertake this work by himself to the disapproval of his pupil colleagues. He put every problem before them, threw light on its various aspects, carefully heard all that each one of them had to say on it, and put forth his own point of view for their consideration. These deliberations and discussions were so exhaustive that some question took a month or even more to decide. At last when unanimity was achieved Abu Yusuf recorded it in the fundamental compilations of Hanafi Law." **


** Ibid., p. 123.

---

Ibn al-Bazzaal al-Kardari (d. 587/1292), author of Fatwas Bustanikhyah, says in his Manaqib al-Imam al-A'lam: "His pupils debated each question to their heart's content and discussed it from every point of view. Abu Hanifah, the while, sat quietly listening to the discussion. When it was his turn to speak, there was such a hush in the house as if there was none other present." **

Abd Allah bin Mulbarsk tells that once the discussion on an issue lasted three days. On the evening of the third day he heard cries of Allah-a sabilar (God is most great) from within and understood that a solution had been achieved. ** It is recorded by another pupil, Abu 'Abd Allah, that when Abu Hanifah got his views recorded on an issue, he had them afterwards read out to him to ensure their correctness. His own words are: "I read out the Imam's words to him. Abu Yusuf (in recording the proceeding) used to record his own views, too, therein. Hence, I tried to read out the Imam's words only, leaving out those of Abu Yusuf. Once I made a slip and read the other view also. The Imam at once cut in, 'Whose view is this second?" **

Another thing that we gather from al-Mukki is that the work of classification of this council's decisions under different heads and chapters also was completed in the life-time of Abu Hanifah. He says: "Abu Hanifah is the first man to gather the knowledge of the Shar'ah (Islamic Law). None before him had done this work—abu Hanifah compiled it in books, under different heads and chapters." **

This council recorded decisions on about 83,000 legal issues. These embraced not only those questions with which the public or the State was currently or had formerly been confronted but also others that might arise in future. Possibilities were conceived and discussed freely to ensure that if ever they turned into actualities there should be laws ready to meet them. They related to almost all branches of law, internal (covered under the term al-siyar), constitutional, civil, criminal, of evidence, of procedure, laws governing different aspects of economic life, marriage, divorce, and inheritance, personal, and those dealing with worship. We can find all these subject-heads among the contents of books compiled by Abu Yusuf and later by Mohammad bin Hassas al-Shaibini from the material provided by the deliberations of this "legislative council."

---


** People of the present day labour under the wrong impression that International Law is a thing of the modern times and its founder is Hiroshi of Holland (991-1055/1583-1643). But whoever has seen al-Siyar of Abu Hanifah's pupil Mohammad bin Hassas al-Shaibini (125-197/749-863) knows that the codification of this law was accomplished by Abu Hanifah 900 years before Grotius, and that if, on the one hand, his discussions hardly have any aspect of it untouched, on the other they encompass the forms and the most vital issues. This has recently been acknowledged by a group of scholars and a Shaibani Society of International Law has been founded in Germany.
This regular codification of law soon deprived individuals of the confidence which they enjoyed in its absence in their efforts at law-making. The opinions and verdicts of scattered individuals, be they doctors or judges of repute, could not carry weight before the wholly unexampled and precise decisions arrived at in a council of legisla presided over and guided by a man of abu Hanifah's foresight and culture, after thorough sifting of the Qur'anic injunctions and the Prophet's Tradition and keeping in view the precedents and the verdicts of the scholars of old, drawn as they were with thoughtful and steady labour, bearing in mind the principles of ijihād (discounting conclusions with thorough discretion) in the light of the qiyās, embracing all aspects of life, and able to meet all exigencies. Therefore, as soon as it came to light, the common people, the rulers, the judges, all felt forced to turn to it. It answered the demand of the day. As a matter of fact, it was the long-awaited help which everybody had been seeking. The famous legist Yahya bin Ahmad (d. 203/818) tells us that the opinions of other jurists paled into insignificance before those of abu Hanifah; his ideas spread far and wide; the judges, rulers, and officers of every place decided their cases in accordance with his law; in short, everything went according to it.\(^{44}\) By the time of al-Māmin (188-218/808-833) it had acquired such popularity that one day the Premier Faḍil bin Sahl was advised by a jurist who was hostile to abu Hanifah. He chose to specialize in law after completing his elementary education and took his lessons from ‘Abd al-Rahmān bin abu Laila. Then he joined the school of abu Hanifah and became permanently attached to him. His parents were extremely poor and did not like their son to continue his education. When abu Hanifah came to know of it, he undertook to defray all the expenses not of the boy alone but of the whole family. He himself said that abu Hanifah never gave him occasion to express his want before him. On and off he would send so much money to his family as would relieve him of worry on that account.\(^{45}\) From the very beginning abu Hanifah was very optimistic about his work. When his father wanted to withdraw him from the school, the Imam told him not to do so, for, if he pleased God, the lad promised to turn out to be a great man.\(^{46}\)

Apart from abu Hanifah, abu Yusuf learnt a good deal from other famous scholars of the day, and made himself well acquainted with Tradition, Qur'anic commentary, biography of the Prophet, history, language, literature, and scholastic theology. Particularly well versed in traditions, he knew them by heart, and men like Yahya bin Mu‘in, Ahmad bin Hanbal, and ‘Ali bin 38\(^{44}\) Al-Mālikī, Vol. II, p. 41.

of indifference towards authority. Thus, when after the death of abu Hanifah his great pupil Zufar bin Ḥudhayl (d. 158/775) was asked to accept the post of a judge, he flatly refused it and fled to find safety in concealment.\(^{48}\) On the Government's side also the tendency from the days of Mansūr to the early years of Hārīn's reign was to resist the influence of this school of thought. Mansūr and his successors earnestly desired that the gap in the legal system of the State, detailed in our previous discussion, should be filled by some other system of codification. Both Mansūr and Mahdī in their respective reigns endeavoured to bring Mālik to the fore.\(^{49}\) Hārīn also in 171/791, on the occasion of the pilgrimage, expressed his desire to make his book al- Musammil\(^{50}\) the law of the land.\(^{51}\) But at long last a man of great strength and character belonging to the Ḥanafi school of thought rose to bring this state of affairs to an end. With his great ability and personal influence he delivered the Empire from a continued state of legal chaos. The Ḥanafi code was made the law of the land which gave the whole Empire a uniform system of law. The man was abu Yūsuf, the eldest of the disciples of abu Hanifah.

Brief Life-Sketch.—Abu Yūsuf's (b.13/731) personal name was Ya‘qūb. His father came of the Arab tribe of Bajjāl, his mother of the Arba‘īs of Madīnah with whom his father was also connected by ties of alliance; hence his family was known as Ḥanāfī. He chose to specialize in law after completing his elementary education and took his lessons from ‘Abd al-Rahmān bin abu Laila. Then he joined the school of abu Hanifah and became permanently attached to him. His parents were extremely poor and did not like their son to continue his education. When abu Hanifah came to know of it, he undertook to defray all the expenses not of the boy alone but of the whole family. He himself said that abu Hanifah never gave him occasion to express his want before him. On and off he would send so much money to his family as would relieve him of worry on that account.\(^{45}\)

From the very beginning abu Hanifah was very optimistic about his work. When his father wanted to withdraw him from the school, the Imam told him not to do so, for, if he pleased God, the lad promised to turn out to be a great man.\(^{46}\)

Apart from abu Hanifah, abu Yusuf learnt a good deal from other famous scholars of the day, and made himself well acquainted with Tradition, Qur'anic commentary, biography of the Prophet, history, language, literature, and scholastic theology. Particularly well versed in traditions, he knew them by heart, and men like Yahya bin Mu‘in, Ahmad bin Hanbal, and ‘Ali bin...
forced him to look for employment. He made for Bagdad and reached there in 160/778, saw the Caliph al-Mahdi who appointed him judge of eastern Bagdad, which office he continued to hold till the end of al-Hadi’s reign. When Harun al-Rashid became Caliph, Abu Yusuf steadily gained such influence on him that he at last appointed him Chief Justice of the whole Abbasid Empire. This was the first occasion that such a post was created in the Muslim State. None before Abu Yusuf had held the post of Chief Justice of the State in either the “Right-guided” Caliphate or the Umayyad and “Abbasid rule. His position was not only that of the Head of the Supreme Court of the realm, as we may conceive from the practice of our modern institutions. It was also assigned him by the authority of the Minister of Law; that is to say, he did not merely have to judge cases and appoint judges for the lower courts, he had also to advise the Government on all legal matters, internal as well as external.

Abu Yusuf’s appointment to this office bore three far-reaching results. In the first place, instead of a college where he discovered students, or a study from which he issued books, a vast field of work now engaged his attention—a field in which he dealt practically with the affairs of the biggest empire of the day. This provided him with opportunities of applying the Hanafi law to the actual affairs of life, thus making it in fact a practical system of law. Secondly, as the appointment and removal of judges was now entrusted to his charge, scholars connected with the Hanafi school were appointed judges in most of the places, and through them the Hanafi law automatically became the law of the realm. Thirdly, with the help of his great moral and intellectual influence he converted the Muslim State, which had assumed an autocratic character since the time of the Umayyads and was going in, a way, without a constitution, into a State guided to a large extent by a constitution; nay, he actually wrote a book on constitution for it, which has luckily come down to us intact in the shape of Kunnab al-Kharji.

But before we speak of this work on constitution it is necessary to remove a widespread misunderstanding. Abu Yusuf’s biographers have described such stories about him as often present him to the reader as one given to flattery and skilled in wresting the law to suit the desires of kings. But if we mark the events recorded in history relating to Abu Yusuf’s attitude to the Caliphs and their ministers and generals, it becomes impossible for us to believe that a mere flatteror could dare have it. In Hadi’s time when he was the judge of eastern Bagdad he decided a case against the Caliph himself. In Harun’s time an old Christian filed a suit for a garden against the Caliph. Abu Yusuf not only heard the case, both confronting each other, but also asked the Caliph to decide on oath that he refused to accept the claimant’s title to it. Even after this he was sorry all his life why he did not make the Caliph

100 Ibn al-Nadim, al-Fihrist, al-Mahdi at-the-Umayyads ahl, Egypt, 1344/1929. Ibn Khallikin (Vol. V, p. 424) writes on the authority of Talbain bin Muhammad that Abu Yusuf was the first man to compile books on all fundamental branches of law in accordance with the Hanafi creed, and thus spread Abu Hanifa’s knowledge to all corners of the world.
101 It must be understood that the codification of Islamic Law according to the Maliki principles enabling it to serve the needs of a government took place later on the model of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Malik’s books.
stand side by side with the sulfur. 44 He declared ‘Ali bin ‘Ila, Prime Minister of Hārūn al-Raṣīd, an unreliable witness because, he said, he had heard him call himself the Caliph’s slave. "If he is a slave in fact," he contended, "his witness cannot be accepted. If he is not and calls himself so for flattery, he is a liar and cannot be trusted." 45 The same punishment he gave to a general of Hārūn’s forces. 46 Abd Allah bin Muḥarrak states that he used to go to Hārūn’s palace riding right up to the private quarters (where even the Premier must go on foot) and the Caliph was always the first to greet him. 47 Hārūn was once asked why he had raised Abu Yūnus so high. He replied, "In whatever branch of knowledge I tried him I found him perfect. Besides, he is upright and a man of solid character. If there is another like him I’d be pleased to see him." 48 When he died (182/798) Hārūn himself accompanied the funeral procession on foot, led the funeral prayer, buried him in his own family graveyard and said it was a bereavement on which all the believers should console with one another. 49 But nothing bears out all that has been said above so well as his work Kālid al-Khaṣṣāj. A perusal of the introduction alone will tell that it is just beyond an advisor to say such things as he did while addressing a king.

Kālid al-Khaṣṣāj.—In Hārūn’s time, Abu Yūnus found a king of the most confiding disposition and humanity, at once a fierce soldier, a luxurious monarch, and a God-fearing man. Abu al-Faraj Aḥsanī describes him in a sentence: "He would most easily melt into tears in response to an exhortation or admonition, but would be most unrelentingly cruel in response to something that kindled his wrath." 50

Abu Yūnus, prudently avoiding to touch upon the Caliph’s failings, skillfully set to work on his religious sentiment bringing to bear his great moral and intellectual influence to the task, and pursued this steadfastly till the Caliph’s heart was won and he proposed for him the assignment of preparing a constitution for his government according to which he should guide the affairs of the State. This was how the Kālid al-Khaṣṣāj came to be written.

The name of this book misleads one into thinking that its scope is limited to matters of revenue only. As a matter of fact, it deals with almost all the affairs of the State. Leaving aside all other details, we shall here examine its contents only with a view to seeing its basic conception of the Islamic State and its constitutional character.

Revision to the "Right-guided" Caliphate.—The first thing that strikes the reader who follows Kālid al-Khaṣṣāj closely is that Abu Yūnus desires the Caliph to give up the Byzantine and Iranian traditions followed by the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids kings and revert faithfully to the traditions of the "Right-guided" Caliph. Although he has not directly asked him to give up following his forefathers, yet he has never lapsed even into quoting the conduct or the decisions of the Caliph’s forefathers as precedents worth following, much less those of his Umayyad predecessors. In every matter he bases his argument either directly on the Qur’an or the Sunnah or else quotes precedents from Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uṯmān, and ‘Ali. If he has ever quoted a precedent from a later period it is not from Mauẓẓir’s or Māhill’s but from that of the Umayyad Caliph ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-Azīz. In preparing this book, he completely ignored the conventions and precedents of the whole one hundred and thirty-two years of Umayyad and ‘Abbasid reign, except those of the two and a half years of ‘Umar II’s reign. Abu Yūnus’s work may not have meant much, had it been done by some ingenious lawyer in his private capacity as a holy sermon for those who might like to follow it. But done as it was by the Chief Justice-cum-Law Minister of the State in his official capacity, at the express instance and request of the Caliph, it becomes something extraordinarily significant.

In the beginning of the book Abu Yūnus lays down the basic conception of the State before the Caliph in those words: "O, Commander of Believers, God, the sole deserver of praise, has placed on you a heavy responsibility which carries with it a great reward and a great punishment. He has committed to your charge the affairs of this community, so that yours is the duty to work for a large number of people day and night. He has appointed you a guard over them, given you their trust, and tried you by them, for you are to conduct their affairs for them. An edifice founded on anything except fear of God does not take long to crumble. God shakes it to the foundation and makes it fall on its builders, and on them that helped in its construction . . . . Kings will be called to account by God as a shepherd is called to account by the owner of the flock . . . . Take not the crooked path, lest your flock should follow in your footsteps . . . . Treat everybody alike in the Law of God, whether one is akin to you or not . . . . Go not into the presence of God as one who has been committing excesses, for the Ruler of the Day of Retribution will judge men by their actions, and not by rank. Guard against wasting the flock entrusted to your care, lest the owner of the flock take you to task for every little sheep of it." 51

After this he continues to press on it in the Caliph everywhere in the book that he is not the owner of his kingdom but the Owner’s Caliph (lit. deputy). 52 and that if he proved a just ruler he would see the best imaginable end; but if he proved unjust he would meet with the worst punishment. 53 At one place he puts before him the words of ‘Umar wherein he says, "None who enjoys

696

Abu Ḫaṭṭāsh and Abu Yūnus

to give up the Byzantine and Iranian traditions followed by the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids kings and revert faithfully to the traditions of the “Right-guided” Caliph. Although he has not directly asked him to give up following his forefathers, yet he has never lapsed even into quoting the conduct or the decisions of the Caliph’s forefathers as precedents worth following, much less those of his Umayyad predecessors. In every matter he bases his argument either directly on the Qur’an or the Sunnah or else quotes precedents from Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uṯmān, and ‘Ali. If he has ever quoted a precedent from a later period it is not from Mauẓẓir’s or Māhill’s but from that of the Umayyad Caliph ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-Azīz. In preparing this book, he completely ignored the conventions and precedents of the whole one hundred and thirty-two years of Umayyad and ‘Abbasid reign, except those of the two and a half years of ‘Umar II’s reign. Abu Yūnus’s work may not have meant much, had it been done by some ingenious lawyer in his private capacity as a holy sermon for those who might like to follow it. But done as it was by the Chief Justice-cum-Law Minister of the State in his official capacity, at the express instance and request of the Caliph, it becomes something extraordinarily significant.

In the beginning of the book Abu Yūnus lays down the basic conception of the State before the Caliph in those words: "O, Commander of Believers, God, the sole deserver of praise, has placed on you a heavy responsibility which carries with it a great reward and a great punishment. He has committed to your charge the affairs of this community, so that yours is the duty to work for a large number of people day and night. He has appointed you a guard over them, given you their trust, and tried you by them, for you are to conduct their affairs for them. An edifice founded on anything except fear of God does not take long to crumble. God shakes it to the foundation and makes it fall on its builders, and on them that helped in its construction . . . . Kings will be called to account by God as a shepherd is called to account by the owner of the flock . . . . Take not the crooked path, lest your flock should follow in your footsteps . . . . Treat everybody alike in the Law of God, whether one is akin to you or not . . . . Go not into the presence of God as one who has been committing excesses, for the Ruler of the Day of Retribution will judge men by their actions, and not by rank. Guard against wasting the flock entrusted to your care, lest the owner of the flock take you to task for every little sheep of it." 51

After this he continues to press on it in the Caliph everywhere in the book that he is not the owner of his kingdom but the Owner’s Caliph (lit. deputy). 52 and that if he proved a just ruler he would see the best imaginable end; but if he proved unjust he would meet with the worst punishment. 53 At one place he puts before him the words of ‘Umar wherein he says, "None who enjoys

696

Abu Ḫaṭṭāsh and Abu Yūnus

to give up the Byzantine and Iranian traditions followed by the Umayyads and ‘Abbasids kings and revert faithfully to the traditions of the “Right-guided” Caliph. Although he has not directly asked him to give up following his forefathers, yet he has never lapsed even into quoting the conduct or the decisions of the Caliph’s forefathers as precedents worth following, much less those of his Umayyad predecessors. In every matter he bases his argument either directly on the Qur’an or the Sunnah or else quotes precedents from Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uṯmān, and ‘Ali. If he has ever quoted a precedent from a later period it is not from Mauẓẓir’s or Māhill’s but from that of the Umayyad Caliph ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-Azīz. In preparing this book, he completely ignored the conventions and precedents of the whole one hundred and thirty-two years of Umayyad and ‘Abbasid reign, except those of the two and a half years of ‘Umar II’s reign. Abu Yūnus’s work may not have meant much, had it been done by some ingenious lawyer in his private capacity as a holy sermon for those who might like to follow it. But done as it was by the Chief Justice-cum-Law Minister of the State in his official capacity, at the express instance and request of the Caliph, it becomes something extraordinarily significant.

In the beginning of the book Abu Yūnus lays down the basic conception of the State before the Caliph in those words: "O, Commander of Believers, God, the sole deserver of praise, has placed on you a heavy responsibility which carries with it a great reward and a great punishment. He has committed to your charge the affairs of this community, so that yours is the duty to work for a large number of people day and night. He has appointed you a guard over them, given you their trust, and tried you by them, for you are to conduct their affairs for them. An edifice founded on anything except fear of God does not take long to crumble. God shakes it to the foundation and makes it fall on its builders, and on them that helped in its construction . . . . Kings will be called to account by God as a shepherd is called to account by the owner of the flock . . . . Take not the crooked path, lest your flock should follow in your footsteps . . . . Treat everybody alike in the Law of God, whether one is akin to you or not . . . . Go not into the presence of God as one who has been committing excesses, for the Ruler of the Day of Retribution will judge men by their actions, and not by rank. Guard against wasting the flock entrusted to your care, lest the owner of the flock take you to task for every little sheep of it." 51

After this he continues to press on it in the Caliph everywhere in the book that he is not the owner of his kingdom but the Owner’s Caliph (lit. deputy). 52 and that if he proved a just ruler he would see the best imaginable end; but if he proved unjust he would meet with the worst punishment. 53 At one place he puts before him the words of ‘Umar wherein he says, "None who enjoys

696
the right of commanding obedience has risen so high as to ask anyone to obey
him in disobedience of God."  

Spirit of Democracy.—Abu 'Umar conceives the Caliph to be answerable
not only to God but also to the public, and has quoted at several places from
the sayings of the Prophet and the Companions to prove that the Muslims
have an unquestionable right to criticize their rulers, and that such criticism
contributes to the good of the people and the State. "Enjoining the right
and forbidding the wrong is an inalienable right and a duty and its negligence
in a community is equivalent to inviting the wrath of God upon its head."  
It is the duty of rulers to have forbearance for truth being spoken before
them, as nothing is more hurtful in a ruler than his being short-tempered and
intolerant of criticism, and the Muslims have a right to call him to account
in respect of their lawful rights on him and of their properties that have been
entrusted to his care.  

Duties of the Caliph.—The following duties of the Caliph have been
specifically mentioned: to establish the rights of God and enforce the limits
prescribed by Him; to determine correctly the rights of other right-holders
and ensure their enjoyment of these rights; to revive the conventions of
virtuous rulers (that have been discarded by the wicked rulers of late); to
check injustice and redress the grievances of people after proper scrutiny; in
pursuance of the orders of God, to command people to obey Him and stay
away from the commission of sins; to apply the Law of God on himself and
others alike, without regard to who suffers by it; and to make only lawful
exactions from people and expend them in lawful ways. 

Duties of Muslim Citizens.—As opposed to these, the duties of the Muslims
toward their rulers, as described in this book, are the following. They have to
obey them, not to commit acts of disobedience, nor lift a stone against them,
nor reproach them (unnecessarily), nor deceive them. They have to put up
with their excesses, to be sincerely helpful to them, to try to check them
from wrong things and to co-operate with them in all that is good.

The Exchequer.—He calls the exchequer a trust of God and the people
instead of its being the Caliph's property. Off and on he reminds the Caliph of
the words of 'Umar wherein he compares the Caliph's position in relation to the
exchequer to that of an orphan's guardian in relation to the orphan's proper-
erty, and states that if he is well-to-do, he should not tax anything from

---

Abu Hanifah and Abu Yunus

it, in deference to the advice of God, and manage it for Him without any
consideration; and if he is needy, he may take from it an amount which every-
body will recognize as just and proper.  He also draws his attention to
'Umar's example in spending from the exchequer more sparingly than one
would from one's private purse. He illustrates his point by reference to an-
other instance where 'Umar, appointing a judge, a governor, and a revenue
officer for Kufah, allowed them to take a goat every day for the expenses
of their board, adding at the same time that a land from which the officers
will pick up a goat every day would soon be impoverished.  The Caliph is also
asked to forbid his officials to spend public money for their private needs.  

Principles of Taxation.—Abu Yunus prescribes the following principles of
taxation: Only the surplus wealth of people should be taxed and the burden
of taxes should fall upon the people with their consent. The tax should vary
according to the capacity of the tax-payer. Nobody should be taxed more
than he can pay. The tax should be collected from the wealthy and spent on
the poor. Rates of tax should not be fixed so as to suck the blood of the
people, nor should the tax be realized by overzealous methods. Government
should refrain from extorting taxes which are not warranted and also forbid
its officers and landlords to make such exactions. Non-Muslims who accept
Islam should not be charged the poll-tax. The practice of the "Right-guided"
Caliph is quoted as authority in this connection. He refers, for example, to
the incident related to Ali that while in public he advised his officials to realize
every penny of revenue from the payers and not to be at all lenient to them
in this matter, but calling them apart he instructed them to be careful not to
beat anybody or make them stand in the sun or press them so hard that they
should be obliged to sell their cattle or clothes or utensils to pay the tax. Or
the fact that 'Umar used to examine thoroughly his revenue officers to satisfy
himself that the farmers were not dealt with too harshly in the exaction of
revenue, and when the collections actually came in, the representatives of
the common people were summoned to bear witness that no Muslim or non-
Muslim peasant was unjustly made to pay the tax.  

Rights of non-Muslim Subjects.—With regard to the rights of non-Muslim
subjects in the Islamic State, three principles are quoted again and again on
the authority of 'Umar:  

1. Whatever agreement is made with them has to be faithfully observed.

---

---

---
2. The responsibility for the defence of the State does not lie on them, but on the Muslims alone.

3. They should not be burdened with excessive poll-tax and land revenue.

Then it is said that the poor, the blind, the old, the recluse, workers at the houses of worship, women, and children are exempt from poll-tax; that there is no zakat (presented charity) chargeable on the wealth and cattle of the non-Muslims; that none is allowed to resort to beating or inflicting other physical tortures on them for exacting the capitulation, as the maximum punishment for its non-payment is only simple imprisonment. To realize more than the fixed amount from them is unlawful, and the poor and the cripple among them are to be supported from the State exchequer. Historical incidents are related to make the Caliph see that it is for the good of the State to be kind and generous to the non-Muslim subjects. It was, according to him, magnanimity of the Muslims that in the days of 'Umar won for them the hearts of the Syrian Christians to such a degree that they loved them more than their co-religionists, the Romans.

Land Settlement.—Abu Yusuf disdains the feudal system of settlement in which the government, in order to realize the revenue from the farmers appoints a person to overlord them, allowing him to exact from them whatever he likes and as he likes so long as he guarantees the payment of government dues. He condemns it as the most tyrannous system that is bound to lead to the ruin of the country and vehemently advocates that it must be shunned at all costs. He also calls it unlawful for the government to appropriate somebody’s land and bestow it upon another. He says: “The Caliph is not authorized to dispose of any person, Muslim or non-Muslim, of anything that belongs to him unless a proved or valid right stands against him in law. To snatch from one to make over to another is like committing robbery for the sake of distributing alms. Gifts of land are allowed only if uncultivated, unowned, or uninherited pieces of land are distributed within reasonable measure for purposes of cultivation or as rewards for some real, useful social service. Such donations too are to be withdrawn if the donee fail to cultivate such land within three years.”

Redress of Wrong.—After this he tells Harun al-Rashid, that it is not lawful for him to appoint tyrants and corrupt people to offices of State or to employ them as officers of departments or governors of districts. If he did so, he would surely share the retribution for the wrongs that they do. He asks him again and again to employ honest, righteous, and God-fearing people to State services. He emphasizes that in addition to their efficiency the government should also satisfy itself with regard to the moral character of its servants, and constantly keep a watch on them through its intelligence department, and if they tend to be corrupt or fall into cruel or cunning ways the Caliph should know of their conduct and call them to account. He also tells Harun that the Caliph should listen regularly to the grievances of the people himself, and that the occurrence of injustice could be made to stop if he has open court even once a month, where every grieved person is allowed to put his grief before the Caliph and the officers are made to realize that what they do may one day reach the Caliph’s ear. The judiciary. The judiciary, according to him, is meant to dispense justice, pure and unblemished. To punish one who is not guilty or to let one who is guilty go unpunished are alike unpalatable. But none should be punished on doubts. To go wrong in forgiveness is better than going wrong in punishing wrong. There should be no interference in the course of justice, nor should anybody’s recommendation, position, or status count.

Personal Liberty.—Abu Yusuf also maintains that nobody can be inquired on a mere accusation. The accused person must be given a regular trial, and witnesses examined. If he proves guilty, he may be imprisoned; otherwise he should be set free. He advises the Caliph that the cases of those who lie in prison should be examined and those that are found to have been put there without sufficient proof or witness should be released. For the future all the governors should be instructed not to imprison anybody on the basis of mere allegation or suspicion without giving him a fair trial. He also holds that it is illegal to beat or flog an accused person. Every person’s back is immune from punishment unless a court declares him worthy of the lash.

Jail Reforms.—In the reforms that he has suggested for the improvement of prisons, he affirms that every prisoner has a right to receive his board and clothing from the Government Exchequer. He severely condemns the Umayyad and Abbasid practice of daily taking out the prisoners handcuffed and in chains to beg for their food and clothes. He requests the Caliph to put a stop to it and proposes that clothes suited to the season and sufficient food should be given to every prisoner by the Government. The practice of burying the deceased helless prisoners without wash and coffins, or without the funeral prayer, is also condemned in vigorous terms. “It is a matter of great shame for the Muslims,” says he. The proper wrapping and burial of these prisoners should be a Government charge. He has also recommended
A History of Muslim Philosophy

that no prisoner except those guilty of murder should be kept in fetters inside the prison.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 140, 151.}

These are, in brief, the constitutional proposals which Abu Yusuf, as Law Minister and Chief Justice of the realm, placed before an aristocratic twelve centuries ago. Placed beside the basic principles of an Islamic State and the traditions of the “Right-guided” Caliphathe, or compared with the teachings of his master AbuJa'far, they look far short of them indeed. There is no trace in them of the ideal way of choosing a Caliph. There is no mention of the advisory body, called the shura, guiding the administration of State affairs, nor of the idea that the wicked and the corrupt have no right to rule and if they come in, the public have a right to rise in revolt against them. Not only that; many other important things also are missing and, judged from these and other such considerations, these proposals fall short of the true conception of an Islamic order. But this should not lead us to infer that Abu Yusuf’s conception of the Islamic State was restricted to the limits of these proposals of Riddâl al-Kharaj and that he did not want anything more than what he put down there. On the contrary, we find here what he, as a practical thinker, conceived as the maximum that was possible and worthy of achievement in the particular circumstances of that period of the Abbadid regime. In fact, the idea was not to present a theoretically perfect plan without regard to whether it was capable of being translated into practice or not. His intention was to draw up a constitutional plan which, in addition to satisfying the minimum conditions required for the mixing of an Islamic State, should promise to be workable in the circumstances.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


A History of Muslim Philosophy
Chapter XXXV

AL-FARABI

A SOCIETY AND ITS GOAL

An account of the life and philosophical thought of Abu Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Ṭaqqān al-Farābī (d. 339/950) has been already given in a previous chapter. The reader must have noted that, while recasting the philosophical views of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek thinkers, al-Farābī always keeps in view the Islamic tenets which have formed the inner links of his writings. In his political philosophy, he has followed the same line. Under the influence of Plato and Aristotle he evolves his own system which markedly differs from the system of the Greeks, the Iranians as well as the Indians. This will be shown in these pages which have been prepared in the light of his (1) Kitāb Ārāʾ Akh al-Madīna al-Fāṭihah (Book on the Views of the People of the Excellent State), (2) Kitāb al-Shaykh al-Madāmatyakh (Book on the Civic Administration), (3) Kitāb Taṣawwuf al-Sa’dādah (Book on the Achievement of Happiness), (4) Kitāb al-Taswīb ‘alā Subā’al Sa’dādah (Book on Caution on the Path of Happiness), and (5) the Baghdad manuscript of his Fusūl al-Madīna (Chapters on the Civilian).

The City-State.—According to al-Farābī, the City-State (madīnah) and the family State (masūl) are places that contain inhabitants, no matter whether their dwellings are constructed of wood, mud, wool or hair.

The house or family is limited to only four relationships: husband and wife, master and slave, father and son, and property and proprietor. He who makes them unite in co-operation and aims at providing for them an abode with best facilities and maintenance, is called the master of the family. He is in the house what the administrator of the city is in the city.⁴

Necessity of Society.—Men are naturally so constituted that they need many things for their best achievements. Hence, they need mutual help and co-operation—everyone doing his best for obtaining a particular kind of object. Thus, by uniting their individual efforts for different objects they organize different societies.⁵

The greater the society, the better are the facilities it achieves for its individuals. The grouping of men is not confined to a house. It extends to lanes, localities, villages, towns, and cities. Men work for the welfare of society and in the long run serve the State. The people living in a State are allied a

---

⁴ Kitāb al-Shaykh al-Madāmatyakh, p. 39.
⁵ Ibid., p. 30.
⁶ Kitāb Ārāʾ Akh al-Madīna al-Fāṭihah, p. 61.
⁸ Ibid.
⁹ Kitāb Taṣawwuf al-Sa’dādah, p. 2.
are neither bodies, nor are they contained in bodies. The other three: soul, form, and matter are not bodies, but exist in bodies. As for bodies, they are of six types: the heavenly bodies, rational animals, irrational animals, plants, minerals, and the four elements. All these six bodies as a whole form the universe. The first to be believed in is God, the Almighty, who is the immediate cause of the existence of the secondary causes and the active intellect. The secondary causes are the causes of the existence of heavenly bodies and their substance. The secondary causes should be called the spirits, the angels, and so on.

The function of the active intellect is to attend to the rational animal, man, and to enable him to attain to the highest perfection he can reach. The highest perfection of man consists in his highest happiness which he achieves when he raises himself to the stage of the active intellect by abstracting himself from bodies, matter, and accidents, and continues to enjoy this perfection perpetually. In essence, the active intellect is one but in gradation it includes all that is purified from the rational animal and attains to happiness. The active intellect should be called the Holy Spirit (al-Rūḥ al-Aʿmān or al-Rūḥ al-Qudus) or the like, and its grades be called the spiritual realm (al-mulakāt) or the like.

Souls have three grades: souls of celestial bodies, souls of the rational animals, and souls of the irrational animals. The souls of the rational animals are the rational faculty, the appetitive faculty, the imaginative faculty, and the perceiving faculty. The rational faculty equips man with sciences and arts, and enables him to distinguish good from evil manners and actions. Through this faculty man inclines to do good and avoid evil and realizes the useful, the harmful, the pleasant, and the unpleasant. The rational faculty is either speculative or practical; the first is that through which man obtains the knowledge of all that he is not at all supposed to know by his own effort, and the second is that through which he knows all that he can know if he wills it so. The second is again divided into that through which arts and crafts are obtained (maṣāʾil ʿilm), and that through which imagination and insight concerning doing or not doing a thing are achieved (maṣāʾil ʿiql). The appetitive faculty manifests the human inclination of wanting something or running away from something, of desiring or not desiring something, of giving preference to something or avoiding something. All psychological feelings—happiness, sadness, anger, pain, anger, passion, mercy, etc.—are expressed by this faculty. The faculty of imagination retains the impression of the sensible objects after they have disappeared from sense-perception, unites some of them with some others, or separates some of them from some others both in wakefulness and sleep producing true or false propositions. This faculty also perceives the useful, harmful, pleasant, and unpleasant manners and actions.

(iii) The faculty of sense-perception obviously perceives the sensible through the five sense-organs—the pleasant and the unpleasant, without discriminating between the harmful and the useful, and without distinguishing good from evil.

The three faculties other than the rational faculty are available to animals, imaginative faculty serving them as the rational faculty serves man. Some animals, however, possess only the sensible and the appetitive faculties.

The celestial souls are different from the animal souls in so far as the former are actual souls that understand the intelligibles, whereas the latter are at first potential and then become actual.

Having explained the gradation of cosmos and the relation that the different stages have with the First, Al-Farābī emphasizes the point that the whole cosmos depends for its existence on God, the First Necessary Being. Man, however, understands and realizes happiness only through the speculative rational faculty. The imaginative and the sensitive faculties help the rational faculty in moving man towards those actions which lead to happiness. The good is characterized as "voluntary." But if the rational faculty feels happiness only by making an effort to perceive it, while other faculties do not perceive it, then sometimes man considers the pleasant and the useful to be the ultimate ends of life. Again, when one becomes indifferent or slow in accomplishing the sensitive rational part and does not feel happiness in doing so, one hastens to attain to it by exercising one's appetitive faculty in aiming at and making all effort to achieve things other than happiness; and in this effort one is assisted also by the faculties of imagination and sense-perception, and produces what may be rightly called voluntary evil.

Similarly, he produces only evil who attains to happiness which he does not recognize as his aim, does not desire it, or desires it with a faint desire, and adopts something other than happiness as his end, and exhausts all his faculties to achieve that end.

Since man has been created to achieve happiness which is the highest perfection that remains perpetually, it is possible to obtain it through the active intellect which gives primarily the first intelligibles or the first objects of knowledge. But men differ in their capacity to receive the primary intelligibles.

B

HUMAN NATURE

Human nature is not the same in all individuals; it varies in accordance with the physical qualities of individuals. Some can easily grasp the first

---

14 Khatūt al-Siyāḥ, pp. 2, 4.
15 Ibid., p. 5.
16 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

intelligibles or the first known things, some do not receive them directly. Again, some of them do not receive anything from the first intelligibles in a natural way at all and some others receive them in a way different from theirs. There are still others who receive them in respect of their own selves. Human beings in this third group are free from defect, their nature being homogeneous, prepared to receive intelligibles which are common to them and through which they advance to the affairs and actions that are common to them. After this stage, they differ from one another, as some receive those intelligibles which are peculiar to them, and are not common to others. Those belonging to this group endeavour towards a particular genus without allowing anything else to share it. Similarly, human beings excel one another in the faculties through which they derive the objects of one genus, some having the ability of deriving all the individuals of a genus and others perceiving only a few individuals thereof. Again, sometimes it so happens that two individuals do not prove to be equal in their capacity of deriving the external objects, one being swift and the other slow, or one being swift in deriving all the individuals of a genus, and the other perceiving only a few individuals thereof. Again, sometimes it so happens that two individuals do not prove to be equal in their capacity of deriving the external objects, one being swift and the other slow, or one being swift in deriving the genus of the greatest excellence and the other in deriving the basest of the genus. It is also possible that both are equal in power, but one is able enough to teach what one has derived, and can offer guidance to others; but the other has no such power of teaching and guiding others. They also differ in performing corporeal deeds.

Natural dispositions do not oppose one another, nor do they insist on action; but they facilitate performance, and are hindered by anything external towards opposite actions. Even if they are moved in opposite directions they resist and offer hindrance.

All these natural dispositions require a suitable teacher. Hence, they are trained in matters that prepare them to be in their highest or nearly highest perfection. Some are trained in mean things which produce excellent actions from a mean genus. People have different calibres by nature, and they vary in ranks in accordance with the ranks in genus, arts, and sciences for which they have naturally been prepared. They also differ in the capacity of training and giving guidance. Some are stronger than others, and, hence, they differ in receiving training. For, some can be trained for the whole of the genus of the work, and some can be trained for a part of the genus only. Now, who is an expert in imparting training and guidance is called the chief.  

---

13 Ibid., p. 40.  
14 Ibid., p. 47.  
708

---

Al-Fārābī

C

EDUCATION

Man has been created to attain to the highest happiness (sa'ādah). He should, therefore, know what happiness is and should make it the aim of his life. He, then, needs to know those arts and arts through which he can achieve happiness. He will have to exercises all those arts which will enable him to attain to it. But since it has been explained that human individuals differ in nature, it is not in the nature of every man to know happiness or those factors which enable him to reach it by himself. He, therefore, needs a teacher, a guide. Some people require less guidance and teaching, and some need more. It is also not necessary that one should learn all that one is taught, or receive all the guidance one is given. Hence, some people require constant teaching and guidance to urge them to do what they have been taught to do.  

Teaching (fu'tma) means creating speculative excellences in nations and cities, while upbringing (fadīh) is the method of creating and developing moral virtues and scientific arts in nations. Teaching is possible only by expression; fadīh or discipline is to make nations and citizens habituated to the deeds done through scientific habits. That is, their resolutions will move them to perform those actions, so much so that these resolutions will dominate their souls, and they will become devoted to those actions. To exert one's resolution to do something is possible either by expression or by performance. While al-Fārābī agrees with Plato in the system of education and in learning from childhood, he emphasizes that speculative sciences are learnt either by kings and leaders (mams) or by those who preserve those sciences and teach kings and leaders in several ways. First of all, they should know the primary axioms, and the first known object in every genus of speculative sciences, then they should know the various forms of premises and their arrangement through which they can lead to conclusions. After they have completed their education, and have accustomed themselves to logical methods, they will be made kings in each of the partial States, and will be promoted little by little till the stage of the great State is achieved.  

Speculative sciences must be taught through convincing methods. Men very often understand these sciences by a process of thinking, because they understand them after realizing many known principles which are not corporeal. The common people can understand their images by the method of convincing only. The teacher should also distinguish what should be imparted to a particular nation and how to make it common to all nations or to all the people of every city. He should also know what should be taught to the entire nation, or city, and what only to a particular group in the city. All these distinctions can be made by the imaginative virtue which enables one to achieve the speculative virtues.  

15 Ibid., p. 48.
As for practical virtues and practical arts, people must habituate themselves to practising them by two methods. First, the teacher should train them by convincing and effective expressions to engender the values of those actions and habits perfectly in their hearts so that their convictions may move them to perform them submissively. Secondly, he should use the method of force which is employed for the disobedient and revolutionary citizens, and those who do not move to righteousness mockingly on their own accord or by persuasion. The virtuous teachers and artists can be divided into two groups in respect of the above-mentioned two methods—one group teaching and training those who are obedient, the other group teaching the disobedient. In both respects the king is the teacher of nations whom he trains to achieve virtues, and the master of the house is the teacher of the people of the house. Similar is the case with one who is in charge of children or the youth. The Imaginative Virtue.—The imaginative virtue enables a man to think of an exceedingly useful purpose which is common to the county of nations, to a nation, or to a city. This virtue is called the civil imaginative virtue. But if this virtue is common to a group of citizens or to the members of a house only, then it is ascribed to that particular group and is called family imaginative virtue, or State imaginative virtue. Sometimes this virtue is further divided. Since it is derived from what is most useful and beautiful in respect of a particular art or profession for a limited time, it is divided into the various kinds of arts and professions. The most accomplished one in this virtue is the strongest one who succeeds in creating a great State. The imaginative virtue confined to different aspects of the State—finance, defence, and so on—is followed by moral virtue which is related to the imaginative virtue as the imaginative virtue is related to different arts, professions, or families. This virtue is first of all needed for organizing and maintaining the army. The moral virtue alone impels the warriors to display their bravery, and the best kind of valor. It also urges citizens to earn the wealth of the State with honesty and legal means. In fact, it plays a major role in all departments of the State.

D THE CHIEF

It is evident that every man cannot be the chief. People differ in their intellectual capacity, in physical strength, in the exercise of virtuous deeds, and in the acquisition of excellent habits of thinking, feeling, willing, and doing. In every department of life and arts the strongest person, of excellent manners, who also knows, acts, and directs, is the chief of that department, the rest...
what descends upon his passive intellect, becomes a wise philosopher and possessor of perfect understanding, and through what descends upon his imaginative faculty, a prophet, a warner against what is going to take place, and an informer of what particulars exist, as he understands them from God. This man is in the most perfect stage of humanity and in the highest place of blessing, his soul being perfect, united with the active intellect in the manner described. This is the man who is aware of every action that would enable one to achieve grace and is the chief, the leader, who cannot be led by anybody else.

E

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHIEF OF THE IDEAL STATE

The Imam or the chief of the ideal State is the chief of the ideal nation, and for the matter of that, of the whole inhabited part of the earth. This position is only attained by a man who naturally possesses the following twelve characteristics as his second nature:

1. Sound health, and perfect organs, performing their functions with ease and facility and in harmony with all faculties.
2. Intelligence and sagacity, so as to be able to grasp the intention of a speaker in his particular situations and circumstances.
3. Good memory, so as to retain in his mind all that he understands, sees, hears, and perceives.
4. Prudence and talent, to understand a problem from the perspective in which it has been presented to him.
5. Eloquence, so that his tongue may assist him in expressing in a perfect manner all that is in his mind.
6. Devotion to education and learning, and submission to receive knowledge with ease without feeling any annoyance.
7. No greed for food, drink, and sex; avoidance of play; and dislike of pleasures caused by those.
8. Friendliness towards truth and truthful persons and condemnation of falsehood and those who are inclined to falsehood.
9. Bigness of heart, loving nobility, and natural magnanimity without any trace of meanness.
10. Indifference to darkness and disorder and other forms of wealth.
11. Devotion by nature to justice and just people, abhorrence of injustice and oppression and unjust and oppressive people; offering half of one’s possessions and those of one’s family to help the oppressed, and urging others to do the same; helping everything good and beautiful; and being easy to bend to justice but difficult to oppression and evil.
12. Strong resolution, courage, and prudence without any sign of fear or psychological weakness.

712

F

THE IDEAL STATE

The sovereigns of an ideal State who succeed one another are all like one soul, as if there were one king who continued all the time. Similar is the case with a group of people who administer the State together at a time in one or more than one city. The whole group is just like one sovereign, their souls being like one soul. Uniformity is found in every stage and in every part of the State, and people flourishing at different times look as if they were one

18 Ibid., p. 67.

713
soul working all the time in the same way. If there is continuity and harmony at a particular stage, even different groups of people, whether of one or more than one State, would appear as one soul.  

The people of the ideal State have something common to all of them in their learning and acting. But different groups of people belonging to different ranks and stages have some sciences and deeds peculiar to them. Through both of these, people achieve happiness, and by displaying these they obtain an ideal psychical form. This form grows stronger and stronger and better and better by constant performance of those deeds. For example, the art of writing has some prerequisite performances. The more they are executed by the expert, the greater is the excellence of his art. Not only that. The scribe enjoys his art by repeating his exercises, and grows in love for it. The same is the case with happiness which increases with the constant practice of deeds that lead to it. The soul grows in happiness to such a degree that it becomes free from matter. It does not perish with matter, for it is no longer required for its existence. At this stage, being separated from matter, the soul frees itself from all corporeal qualities so much so that even movement and rest cannot be ascribed to it. As this state is very unusual, it is very difficult to form an idea of it.

G ARTS AND BLESSINGS

As arts have three grades, happiness or bliss is also divided into three grades in respect of species, quality, and quantity. There are such species of art as weaving, cloth-trading, perfumery, and sweeping or as dancing, jurisprudence, philosophy, and rhetoric. Thus, arts excel one another in different species. He artists of the same art excel one another in skill and efficiency. Two scribes, for example, differ in their skill, because besides a good hand, their art requires some knowledge of lexicon, rhetoric, and arithmetic. Now, one may be an expert in good hand and rhetoric, another in good hand, lexicon, and rhetoric, and yet another in all the four arts. Again, two scribes may differ in the quality of their art, for one of them may be better than the other. Similarly, happiness excels in species, quality, and quantity.

The people of an imperfect State have but little virtue. They have evil psychical forms and their actions are not good. The greater their activity, the more does their profession display defect and imperfection. In consequence they become ill inasmuch as they do not enjoy edible, and become annoyed with beautiful and excellent things. Some of them even regard themselves as healthy and perfect, though they are actually not so, and do not pay any heed to the advice of the physician or the well-wisher.

Al-Fārābī

II INHABITANTS OF THE IDEAL STATE

The excellent or the ideal State consists of five kinds of people: the excellent, the linguists, the secluded, the struggling, and the steady. The excellent people are the philosophers, the intellectuals, and the People of Opinion in great affairs. As for linguists, they are the orators, speakers, poets, musicians, writers, and the like. The secluded people are the mathematicians, statisticians, physicians, astronomers, and the like. The struggling people are the fighters, the defenders, and all those who take their places. The steady are those who earn money in the city, for example cultivators, traders, and those engaged in other pursuits.

I IMPERFECT STATES

The excellent State as explained above is the State administered by the best and most talented who aim at prosperity and happiness for all and sundry. If its constitution fails to provide the people with prosperity, and the rulers do not possess the qualities of ideal rulers, then the State ceases to be excellent and is called the evil-doing State (al-malādin al-filābīk), the ignorant State (al-malādin al-ğibālīk) or the astray-going State (al-malādin al-filāk). People in the evil-doing State are like weeds in a field. They are no better than savages and can have no organization worthy of a State.  

As for the people of the ignorant State, they possess their own constitution and culture. But their civic organizations vary. They look after the necessities of life in a necessary State, organize the society of the contemptible in the contemptible State, the society of the vile in the vile State, the society of the extravagant in the extravagant State, the society of the dominant in the dominant State, or the society of the free in the social State.

The necessary organization is the State which endeavors to earn what is evidently necessary for the constitution and the upkeep of the body.  
The State of the contemptible is the one which tries to achieve wealth in abundance; and the money which they hoard due to the love of wealth and niggardliness is spent only for the needs of the body. The vile State broods over sensuous pleasures and achieves the best means for the sake of pleasure only. This State is the most coveted one. The extravagant State is the organization of the profoundly generous in which the individuals help one another to reach nobility in expression and action. The people of this State are called generous either

89 Ibid., p. 70.
714

91 Ibid., p. 57.
92 Ibid., p. 58.
by themselves or by the people of other States. This is the best State among all the States of the ignorant.

The State of the dominant people tries to overpower others in power and wealth; they shed blood, subjugate others, and indulge in all sorts of pleasures. The State of the dominant excels the State of the generous in showing power.²⁹ As for the social State, everybody is free in it to do whatever he likes, and believes that no man has any superiority over the others by any means. But independence often leads to extremes, and, therefore, there arise in this State different rites and rituals, customs and manners; and people are misled by evil prophecies. Thus, this State splits into different groups and parties.

In all these States there is always unrest prevailing among the people, as everybody tries to become the chief and, by virtue of his wit, to lead the State to prosperity and happiness.

The evil-doing States differ from the States mentioned above in so far as the people of these States believe in the principles held and the forms of happiness conceived by the people of the excellent State, and also invite others to do the same, but they themselves do nothing to achieve their object, nor do they try by action to attain the happiness they believe in. On the contrary, they incline to their own whims and propensities, that is to say, they like to enjoy power, nobility, and dominion, and direct their actions towards their achievement. In activities these States are like the States of the ignorant.

In manners their peoples resemble the peoples of the said States. The peoples of these two sets of States differ only in belief. None of these States ever achieve happiness and prosperity.

The astray-going States are those whose people suffer from some delusion. They adopt such principles, actions, and deeds as appear to them to be those of the excellent State, but in fact are not. The same is true of their goal of happiness and prosperity which they conceive to be so but which actually is not so.

The offerings of the societies which develop in these States are of various types and all of them aim at personal gain and victory and no at real happiness and true prosperity.

J

CONCLUSION

According to al-Fārābī, the chief of the State should be physically free from all defects, and should have a sharp intellect, memory, and wit. He should be devoted to sciences, truth-loving, and not easily upset by difficulties, contented, without greed for things to eat, and inclined towards sensible pleasures. He should shun falsehood and lies, be ambitious with

---

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 39-40.
³⁰ Ibid., p. 64.
³¹ Ibid., p. 74.
appointment in the State service. As a judge he served at various places and was finally posted in Bagdad. In the year 429/1037 the Calif, al-Qadir, summoned four jurists representing the four schools of Islamic law to write a legal epitome. Al-Mawardi was chosen to represent the Shafi'i school and he wrote Kitab al-Iqra'. al-Qadir then produced his famous al-Mughni for the Hanafites. The other two books were of no importance. The Caliph, however, recognized al-Mawardi's work as the best and in appreciation of his merit appointed him as the Aga al-Qadi. This designation was objected to by many leading jurists like Abu al-Tayyib, al-Tahari, and al-Suyuti, who said that it did not become anyone except God. But al-Mawardi took no notice of these objections and retained the designation till his death in 450/1058, because the same jurists had previously approved the title of Malik al-Malik al-Fasih for Jadd al-Israhir, the Buwahid chief.

Although al-Mawardi was a staunch Sunnite and Shafi'i jurist, he had the good fortune of being equally favoured by both the Buwahids and 'Abbasids. But the Shafi'i Buwahids favoured him out of diplomacy, because he was often helpful in settling their everyday quarrels with the palace, for, writes Yaqtin, "He was held in great esteem by the Buwahid Sultan who deputed him to negotiate between them and their opponents, and were pleased with his mediation, and afforded his settlements."

Al-Mawardi was acclaimed as one of the ablest men of his age. He was not only a distinguished judge but also a distinguished author. He wrote mostly on law and politics. His well-known extant works are: Kitab al-Bush, al-Iqra', Siyasa al-Malik, Qawaid al-Wadah, Adab al-Dunya u-al-Din, and al-Ahkam al-Sulh(ayn). But it is this last work on which his fame chiefly rests. In Muslim history it is one of the first scientific treatises on political science and State administration. A detailed discussion of this will be taken up in the following pages.

Here a note of explanation seems to be necessary. Ibn Khalikan quotes a report that none of al-Mawardi's writings were published in his life-time because the author had grave doubts as to whether he was really honest and correct in his speculations. This report cannot be accepted as true, particularly with reference to al-Ahkam al-Sulh(ayn), because there exists another book with the same title by Abu Yaqo' al-Parej', who was a contemporary of al-Mawardi and who died in 458/1066. Abu Ya'qo' ibn's book is almost an exact replica of al-Mawardi's work so far as its pattern and subjects of discussion are concerned. Even the language and arguments are almost the same as in al-Mawardi in most places. It is, therefore, certain that abu Ya'kra' had seen the published work of al-Mawardi while the latter was still alive, because the dates of their deaths are so approximate to each other, and because it is not proved that Abu Ya'qo' had personal relations with al-Mawardi. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that Yaqtin, who died in 626/1229, does not mention this story, and the authority of Ibn Khalikan, who died in 681/1282, cannot be accepted in this matter.

2 Literally "the greatest Judge," but paradoxically enough the office was subordinate to that of the Qadi al-Qadib, the Chief Justice (Yaqut, Vol. V, p. 447).
in the beginning of the fifth/ninth century, because of internal conflicts and insurrections in the army and because of Muhmid of Qasim’s solicitations for the ‘Abbasids, made the Caliph al-Qadir and his son al-Qa‘im aspire to regain the lost glory of their forefathers. The first step in this direction was the legal definition and exposition of the powers and prerogatives of the Caliph which had well-nigh been forgotten and had fallen into oblivion.

The historical situation explains Al-Mawardi’s efforts to propound a theory of the Caliphate in which everything depends on the authority of the Caliph, in an age in which the prestige of the Caliphate had fallen to its lowest ebb. Al-Mawardi’s endeavours have been supposed to be directed to the theoretical discussion of an ideal State. This view is, however, untenable on account of the fact that al-Mawardi is, truly speaking, not a philosopher, and is least interested in abstract thinking. He is a jurist and builds on the opinions of his forbears, gives a wider scope to these opinions, and uses his own wisdom to apply them intelligently to the special conditions of his own times. His greatest merit, therefore, lies in the fact that he abstains from abstract speculation, and correlates the opinions of the jurists to the historical perspective of his age. Similarly, as already remarked, he is not a mere compiler or interpreter of the opinions of his predecessors, but often shows independence of opinion and expresses views opposed to the views of earlier authorities, or gives out opinions altogether original.

Now, it will be useful to pick up the main points in al-Mawardi’s theory and compare them with the contents of the ancient jurists, on the one hand, and with the contemporary political conditions, on the other. This will give us a true estimate of al-Mawardi’s achievements.

1. The institution of the Imamate is a necessary requirement of the Shari‘ah and a part of reason. The appointment of an Imam is the consensus of the Muslim community is obligatory. There is a similar passage in al-Baghdadi, who remarks that this is al-A’zam’s opinion and is opposed to the Mu’tazilite view.

2. The Imamate is instituted by means of election. The electoral college shall consist of persons with special qualifications. Also the candidates for the Imamate must fulfill certain conditions. This elective principle of the Imamate is obviously opposed to the Shi‘ite claim of bequestal or divine nomination. Al-Mawardi, however, does not discuss the election of a fictitious person as Imam. Al-Baghdadi says that his election will be void, even if it has taken place through a properly constituted electoral college. Al-Mawardi’s

Al-Mawardi’s omission is deliberate, being a concession to the Buwhids, who appointed the Caliphs to suit their selfish ends.

3. The right of franchise is enjoyed not only by the people living in the capital. The Caliph is, however, traditionally elected in the capital because the death of the previous Caliph is first known there, and political considerations require the immediate appointment of a new Caliph, and also because most of the people possessing the necessary qualifications for the Imamate generally reside there. This principle was hotly contested by the Khawarij who believed in complete democracy and universal franchise.

4. Among the seven conditions which according to al-Mawardi must be fulfilled by a candidate, the seventh one, that is, the Quranshi descent, is very important. Al-Mawardi lays great stress on it and says that if anyone objects to it on the ground that it excludes non-Quranshis from the Caliphate, such an objection would not be considered, because it was this Quranshi descent that was presented by Abu Bakr as an argument for preference in the election of Sufyân Bani Sa‘dah.

5. The Imam is elected in one of the two ways: (a) He may be elected by the electoral college; (b) he may be nominated by the ruling Imam.

In the first case some scholars say the Imam must be elected by all the members of the electoral college in all the cities. Others oppose this view and say that Abu Bakr was elected only by the citizens of Madinah. Still others assert that only five persons are sufficient to elect the Imam, as happened in the case of Abu Bakr and Umar. In al-Mawardi’s opinion, even one person is enough to elect the Caliph. He cites the tradition of ‘Abbas as evidence. ‘Abbas said to ‘Ali, ‘Stretch your hand, I will swear my allegiance to you, and when people come to know that the Prophet’s uncle has sworn his allegiance to his nephew, nobody would object to your Imamate.’ This opinion has also been corroborated by al-Ash’ari.

6. The above extreme opinion has been advocated by al-Mawardi to advance another important opinion given in the next section, where he discusses the case of two candidates equally qualified for the Imamate. He says that the electoral college may nominate anyone of the two as Imam without assigning any reason.

7. The election of a less qualified person in the presence of a more qualified person is perfectly legal, provided the former fulfills all the conditions of the Imamate. It was this principle under which most of the worthless Caliphs took refuge. It was also directed against the Umara, who believe that an
inferior person cannot have precedence over a superior one. They coined this theory to assert that since Ali and his descendants in the Fatimid line were superior to the rest of mankind, anyone who assumed the Caliphal power was a mere usurper. The refutation of this dogma was essential to establish the above doctrine. But al-Mawardi is not alone in this respect, for this is the agreed opinion of Sunni jurists and theologians.

8. If there is only one suitable candidate for the Imamate, he automatically becomes the Imam, and no election is required.24 Al-Mawardi seems to be inclined to this view; the jurisprudential scholars; however, assert that election must be held even if there is only one candidate for it, for otherwise the Imam cannot acquire legal status. This insistence on election is obviously directed against the Shi'ite theory of divine appointment.

9. The existence of two Imams contemporaneously is illegal.25 Al-Salari opposes this view and says that two Imams at a time are possible if their territories are far-flung and widely separated by a sea, which hinders easy communication between the two. But al-Mawardi insists in his view to rule out the Fatimids and the Umayyads of Spain.

**SUCCESSION**

1. The ruling Imam can nominate his successor. There is complete concurrence on this point in the Muslim community.26 The Muslims accepted 'Umar as Caliph not on the suggestion of abu Bakr but in obedience to his order as Caliph.27 Similarly, when 'Umar appointed a limited council to elect his successor, it was an order from the Imam and there was no choice for the Muslims to do otherwise.28

2. The Imam can nominate any suitable person as his successor, provided he does not happen to be his father or son. The concurrence of the adl al-bālāʾ al-dā'i is not necessary,29 but if he nominates his son, the concurrence must be obtained.30 Also, he can nominate any other relation without requiring the concurrence.31

It was this theory of nomination that cut at the very root of democratic ideals in Islamic polity. It has been persistently reasserted by every Muslim ruler after the days of the pious Caliphate, to perpetuate dynastic and despotic rule among the Muslim peoples. Thus, apparently the structure of the

---

24 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
25 Ibid., p. 11.
26 Ibid., p. 13.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 15.
31 Ibid.
Al-Mawardi's second argument in support of his thesis that the limited college of electors promised by 'Umar had the sole right of nominating the new Caliph, is nothing but a deliberate effort to interpose ancient practice to justify later historical phenomena. In fact, 'Umar did nominate the limited council at the suggestion of 'Ali to prevent civil strife after his death. He knew fully well that the probable candidates for the Caliphate were the very persons whom he had nominated for it. Not only that, he was perfectly sure that either 'Uthman or 'Ali would be elected. Therefore, to facilitate the new election he fixed a procedure that was least pregnant with evil and the best guarantee against civil discord. The stern warnings which he gave to the dissident members of the electoral council and the strict directions which he issued about the conduct of the election, were but the last symbols of his great overriding authority over the hearts and minds of people, by means of which he so wonderfully ruled half the world for twelve years. But he did not lay down a permanent principle of Islamic polity for this he could not do, since there was no warrant for it in the Qur'an or the Sunnah. Even Abu Bakr could not devise the theoretical foundations of the Caliphate, for during the last moments of his life he said that the one great regret he had was that he could not ask the Prophet to enlighten him on this problem. Regarding two of these, he said, "I should have asked: who would succeed him in political power after him? If he nominated anyone, nobody could challenge his nominee on this issue. And I should have ascertained whether the Ansars were entitled to any share in political power."

'Umar's arrangement was, therefore, dictated by purely prudential considerations. A proof of this assertion is that he categorically declared that the Ansars were not entitled to any share in the sovereign power, although Abu Bakr was doubtful on this issue, and although many of the later jurists did not accept 'Umar's ruling on this point. The truth is that 'Umar took this extraordinary step for the defence of the State and not for the defence of a principle, for there was no clear principle before him. Hence the construction of a political theory out of his ruling can be neither justified nor appreciated as an achievement in political thought.

But al-Mawardi was not very much concerned about theory. He was a leading Sunni legal doctor of the Shafi'i school, and was intimately associated with the 'Abbásids; hence his chief interest lay in emasculating the Sunnite therefore, if anyone of you swears allegiance to a person without consulting the general body of Muslims, each person shall not be deemed as elected; and the likelihood is that both those persons may be banished" (see Ummayyad, al-Shafii al-Nabawiyyah, Vol. IV, pp. 306-69).

89 Ibn Qurabi, Kitab al-Ma'arif, p. 23.
90 Ibn Qurabi, p. 35.
91 ibid., p. 19.
92 ibid., p. 24.

Caliphate from the 'Abidin tyranny of the Buwathids. This explains why he gave the stamp of validity to the monarchical system of the 'Abbásids. He had already before him the precedent of the Umayyads. Moreover, the jurists had, by the force of circumstances, reconciled themselves to the imperialistic order of the day, and given it the form and sanction of religious authority. Al-Mawardi, therefore, found no difficulty in taking his cue from the prevailing ideas of his time. His main contribution to Muslim political thought lies in the transformation of these ideas into a system, directly related to historical practice. He was not a visionary and idealist like the jurists or the scholars, and like them did not sit to speculate in vacuo. He was a man of the world; he tried to solve its problems as best as he could.

3. The nomination of a person as heir apparent becomes effective only when he declares his consent to it. The Imam cannot withdraw the nomination until there occurs in this heir apparent some important change which invalidates him legally. So also an Imam cannot be deposed until a similar change occurs in him. Now, these are only logical deductions from the fundamentals of the Sāhīh for there are no historical precedents to vouchsafe them.

4. The Imam can appoint the electoral college as well as the person who must contest for the Imamate. This opinion is based on the election of 'Uthman by means of a limited蓄 viz appointed by 'Umar. Whatever might have been the political consideration before 'Umar, the derivation of a general principle out of it is certainly most dangerous to sound polity and to the stability of a State. The petty, honesty, intelligence, and statesmanship of 'Umar could very well be relied upon. The same cannot be said of another personality after him in Muslim history. Notwithstanding this, historians have held that 'Umar was mistaken in taking this step. It is a well-known fact that most of the members of the 'Abidin, who came out unsuccessful in the contest, at once started plotting against 'Uthman and began to aspire for the Caliphate. Apart from this historical fact, if the right of nominating the electorate as well as the candidates is conceded to the Imam, it is bound to make him absolute and despotic. In truth, it was this theory that developed into divine right with the 'Alids and the 'Abidin. And it was this theory that throttled the growth of democracy in Islamic polity.

5. The Imam can nominate two or more heirs apparent to succeed him one after the other. The argument has been derived from the battle of Muta, in which the Prophet appointed Zaid bin Harb as the Commander of the Muslim forces and said that if he fell in fighting he was to be succeeded in command by Iqbal bin amr Thabit who was to be succeeded by 'Abd Allah bin Rawwah. If Ibn Rawwah also fell, then the Muslims could choose anyone from among themselves as their Commander. Apparently, the citation of this
incident in support of a fundamental issue like that of the Caliphate is but
false reasoning. 19

This practice of appointing two or more heirs apparent proved to be the
greatest political evil in Muslim polity. It often engendered palace intrigues
gave rise to internecine wars, and dynastic feuds.

D
DESIGNATION AND PRIVILEGES
1. When a person is duly elected as Imam the people should entrust all
their affairs to him and must give him their unquestioning obedience. The
Imam may not consult them in the affairs of the State, yet they must obey
him. 20

2. The Imam may be addressed as the Khaβlījat Allāh, but the majority of
jurists say that this title is forbidden, for no human being can represent God
on earth, since man is mortal and imperfect. Hence the Imam may either be
called a mere Khāβlījat or Khāβlījat al-Rasāl Allāh. 21 Once when Abu Bakr was
addressed as Khāβlījat Allāh he exclaimed, "Do not address me as Khāβlījat
Allah but as the Khāβlījat al-Rasāl Allāh."

E
DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE IMĀM
The Imam has the following ten principal duties to perform:
1. The safeguard and defense of the established principles of religion as
understood and propounded by the consensus of ancient authorities. If anyone
innovates an opinion or becomes a sceptic, the Imam should convince him of
the real truth, correct him with proper arguments, and make him obey
the injunctions and prohibitions of the Şerī'ah, so that the people at large
may be saved from the evil effects of heresy.

This is undoubtedly the foremost duty of the Imam under the Şerī'ah.
But unfortunately it is under the cover of this pretext that throughout the
last thirteen centuries, adventurers and self-seekers have striven to carve out
political fortunes for themselves. The second civil war of Muslims was fought
by the Umayyads, the Hashimites, and the Zabariites under this same pretext.
When the 'Abbasids, the Fāṭimids, and the Şafāvids came to power they
called themselves the Defenders of Faith, and crushed every political dissident
in the name of religion. Even today there can be evinced a great effervescence
for religious revival in all the Muslim lands, but everywhere the undertone
is political, not religious.

19 Al-Māwarī, op. cit., p. 22.
20 Ibid., p. 87.
21 Ibid., pp. 87-88.

726
of the State machinery is of basic importance to him. This explains why he devotes only one-tenth of his book to the exposition of the theory of the Caliphate, and uses the rest of his work to elaborate the detailed apparatus of government which hinges on the central authority of the Caliph. The nebulous nature of the dispersion of State power had led to the dreadful tussle between the Buwahids and the 'Abbasids. The Buwahids, who had no legal claim to sovereignty, and who had not clarified their position, had long been intriguing to overthrow the Caliphate outright. Al-Mawardi's attempt, therefore, at defining in detail the responsibility and scope of Caliphal powers in relation to normal administration, was most plausible and a direct hit at the Buwahids. Further, he made his treatise an inviolable document by reinforcing it with the argument of earlier historical practice, dating back to the time of the Prophet, and by basing it on the opinions of the leading jurists of Islam. It is significant to note that al-Mawardi hardly quotes anywhere any of these jurists, but since he was the greatest judge of Baghda'd, his declaration in the face was taken as sufficient guarantee of his veracity.

There is no ground to question his basis, faida, yet it would have been more commendable if he had given the actual authorities.

P

DEPOSITION OF THE IMAM

Al-Mawardi has given a detailed consideration to the subject of an Imam's deposition. In the first place, arguing on the basis of legal derivation from the fundamentals of the 'Umarak he says that once a person is elected as Imam, he cannot be removed from that office until there has occurred some definite change in him. Then, after discussing the duties of the Imam, he reverts to the subject and dilates on it at length. He says that the Imam loses his title and authority on account of one of the following reasons:

1. If there occurs a change in his moral status, technically known as a'dilah (sense of justice). The moral change is of two kinds:
   (a) The one connected with his body, that is, if he becomes a slave to his inordinate desires and flouts openly the prohibitions of the 'Umarak. In such an event, a person can neither be elected as Imam nor continue as such. Abu Ya'la rejects this opinion and holds the opposite view. (b) The one connected with his faith, that is, if a person holds opinions contrary to the established principles of religion, or holds such twisted opinions as amount to an abrogation of the accepted principles, he can neither be initiated as Imam nor continue to hold that office. In this there is a clear

2. If there occurs a change in the person of the Imam. It is of three kinds: loss of physical senses, loss of bodily organs, and loss of ability to supervise and direct the affairs of the State.

(a) Among the defects which occur in the physical senses, the two most important ones which preclude a person from election to the Imamate or make him unfit to continue in office are the loss of mental faculty and the loss of sight. The first case is obvious and needs no comment. But the second has had a profound bearing on the course of Muslim history. The practice of putting out the eyes with hot iron to prevent a person from wearing the imperial purple was undoubtedly borrowed from the Byzantine Empire; the opinion of the Muslim jurists on the issue, however, gave it an added importance as an instrument of tyranny in Oriental lands. The dreadful effect of such a foul practice can be gauged from the fact that about two dozen 'Abbasid Caliphs were thus blinded to be deposed from the Caliphal seat. The juridical opinion referred to above is that a blind person is disqualified to give witness or sit as a judge in a court of law; he is, therefore, much more disqualified to serve as the Head of the State.

(b) Loss of bodily organs. It is of various kinds. If it does not hinder the performance of normal duties, and does not disfigure the features or the external beauty of the body, it will be of no account.

In certain cases when the loss of organs renders a person helpless and makes him incapable of doing anything, he can neither be elected as Imam nor can he continue in that office. Such is the loss of the two hands or of the two feet. Al-Mawardi discusses the details of other losses too, but they are not pertinent to our purpose here.

(c) The loss of personal ability to supervise and direct is of two kinds:

(i) If the Imam is over-powered by one of his counsellors and assistants, who appropriates all authority to himself, but does not openly defy the Imam, the Imam will continue in his office, provided the usurper rules in accordance with the injunctions of the 'Umarak, and in deference to the accepted norms of justice. This is to ensure that the functions of the Imamate should continue to be performed, and that the people do not fall a prey to the ways of evil on account of the non-enforcement of the laws of the 'Umarak. But if his conduct is opposed to the principles of religion and justice, he will not be tolerated in that status, and the Imam shall have to seek the help of a person who can oust the usurper and restore supreme authority to the Caliph. This principle has been elaborated by al-Mawardi with great care and legal acumen. In the next chapter he takes it up again and discusses it in full
A History of Muslim Philosophy

detail. This principle which had no sanction in ancient authority or in the opinions of the jurists, was dictated by the force of circumstances in which the 'Abbasid Caliphate had been placed during the two centuries preceding the death of al-Mawardi. The Buwayhid usurpation in Baghdad and the falling of the Caliphal power into insignificance necessitated the evolution of a formula which suited the exigencies of the times and covered the de facto relation that existed between the Buwayhids and the 'Abbasids. This was a clear departure from the principle of the Caliphate enunciated by al-Mawardi in the earlier part of his book. But he devised a sly media to remove this glaring contradiction. If the absolute governor or the usurper ('Amir bi al-'itād) declares his allegiance to the Caliph and promises to maintain the unity of the Caliphate, enforces the laws of the Šī`a, and cooperates with the Imam against the foes of Islam, the Caliph shall recognize his absolutism by conferring on him the deed of investiture formally and publicly. Though this arrangement is opposed to the established tradition, it shall be deemed perfectly legal, because it envisages the safeguard of the injunctions of the Šī`a which cannot be set by default, and because of the unavoidable condition created by the act of usurpation. In this theory there is, on the one hand, an overt recognition of the situation prevailing it Baghkhil and, on the other, an unconscious warning to the Buwayhids that if they transgressed their limits they could be brought to book with the help of the Ghuravisid power which was an open ally of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. In a passage al-Mawardi says that in case the usurper shows an uncompromising and rebellious attitude, the Caliph can call in the help of one who can relieve him of the strain. The person referred to is none but Mahmod of Ghurav.

There is little doubt that al-Mawardi was influenced by the circumstances of his environment in the enunciation of this theory, but the deviation from the original principle completely nullified the true conception of the Imamate as demonstrated in the days of the Caliph 'Umar. Nay, it contributed directly to a political theory which encouraged adventurous and ambitious men to impose themselves on the will of the people with brute force and sheer might. Further, if it served as one of the main incentives for the clamourment of the 'Abbasid Empire, it also very greatly influenced the supression of demo-

cratie thought and practice in the Muslim world. Al-Mawardi may have been well-intentioned but the legacy he left completely changed the concept of Muslim polity in the centuries that followed. And the change that occurred was simply un-Islamic, undemocratic, and vicious.

(ii) If the Imam falls a prisoner into the hands of an enemy, it will be the duty of the entire Muslim people to endeavour to emancipate him, and as long as there is any hope of his deliverance he will continue as Imam, and another person may be elected to officiate in his absence. But if all hope is

Al-Mawardi

lost, he will be deemed to have relinquished his office, and a new election shall take place.

If the Imam is captured by a Muslim rebel army, and the rebels have not appointed an Imam of their own, the captured Imam shall continue to com-
mmand the loyalty of the people, and an acting Imam shall be appointed by him, if possible, or by the electoral college. But if the rebels have appointed an Imam of their own, the existing Imam shall forfeit his claim to the Imamate, and the responsible men (ash al-hall wa-al-adā`l) shall elect a new Imam according to their discretion. Al-Mawardi's wording in this passage is full of meaning. He means to say that a victorious rebel leader does not automatically become the Imam.

G

CONCLUSION

Al-Mawardi's great contribution to political thought was that he gave a detailed account of the administrative machinery of the Government of his time and in formulating his political theory he took full cognizance of historical facts and, unlike the jurists and the scholastics, did not indulge in empty speculation. But with all the good things that can be said about al-Mawardi, he had one shortcoming—he could not evolve a philosophic conception of the State. He did not discuss the meaning, scope, jurisdiction, and obligations of the State, gave no conception of sovereignty, and was completely ignorant of the idea of a constitutional democracy. Lack of constitutional theory not only reduced the value of his work, but also adversely affected the later develop-
ment of Muslim political thought.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


44 Ibid., p. 68.
45 Ibid., p. 68.
46 Ibid., p. 38.

730

731
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE SHI'ITES

The death of the Prophet of Islam ushered in an era which is known as the period of the Orthodox Caliphate (11–41/632–661). The supporters of 'Ali, the fourth Caliph in the chronological order (35–41/656–661), were known as the Shi'ah which literally means a faction, a supporting group in the sense that they supported 'Ali's claim to succession after the death of the Prophet, both as a temporal ruler and a religious leader. It may be stated authoritatively that 'Ali's claim to the Caliphate was not regarded by his supporters and adherents as a political ambition: on the contrary, it was considered that he had been ordained by Providence to succeed the Prophet and that the Prophet himself had placed the question of succession beyond any doubt by his testament, as it were, at Ghadir al Khumm.1

During the Caliphate of 'Uthman, ibn Sa'ab of Yemen, who had settled ultimately in Egypt, openly preached that the first three Caliphs were usurpers as distinguished from 'Ali who was divinely ordained to succeed the Prophet as his executor or plenipotentiary (wasi). The extreme Shi'ites (Ghailkhi) believed that the Prophet himself was reincarnated in the form of 'Ali and that the divine spirit which dwells in every prophet was transferred at Muhammad's death to 'Ali and from 'Ali to his descendants who succeeded him in the Imamate."

It would be pointless, so far as we are concerned, to assess and evaluate the truth of the claim made by the Shi'ites that 'Ali had been designated as the Prophet’s successor by the Prophet himself in accordance with the command of God, but it is necessary to point out that the Shi'ites, whether holding moderate or extreme views, refused, as it were, from the very beginning to concede that the 'imam' has any authority to confer on any person the right to govern a Muslim State. They maintained that at all times a living descendant of 'Ali, whether concealed (maske) or unconcealed, demands and receives allegiance from the Muslims and is in point of fact the only rightful Caliph (temporal ruler) and Imam (religious leader) of the Islamic peoples.

It may perhaps be added that the term Shi'ah was invested with all its dogmatic connotations after the coming into power of the Abbasids. In the beginning the word only meant a group which was in favour of the succession of 'Ali to the Caliphate.

With the rise of the Umayyads the pure Arabs found greater favour with the rulers than the clients of the subject races. This policy which, most probably,

---

1 A spring between Makkah and al Mas'ar where the Shi'ite tradition asserts the Prophet declared, 'whosoever I am lord of, his lord is 'Ali also.' Ibn Sa'ad, Vol. V., p. 235; Man'ulti, Tābīḥ, pp. 255–56; Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 471, note 1.

---
The 'Abbasid propaganda ultimately bore fruit and the House of 'Abbás, mainly with the help of the Iranians who had flocked to Abu Muslim, an Iranian leader of great courage and patriotic fervour, succeeded in their machinations. The Umayyads were overthrown: Marwán the last Caliph was slain on the 15th of Dh. 125/1 August 740, followed by a general massacre of the members of the Royal House of the Umayyads, and 'Abd al-Malik ascended the throne in 123/740.

After the revolution had become an accomplished fact the Shī'ites who had supported the 'Abbasids came with such sincerity were bitterly disillusioned and sadly disappointed: they were under the impression that a member of the House of 'Ali would be enthroned. The treacherous murder of Abu Muslim (136/755) further convinced the Shī'ites, if such conviction was needed, that their 'Abbasid cousins were no less hostile to them and their claim than the Umayyads, and it was during this period of bitter frustration, disappointment, and stark disillusionment that the term 'Shī'ah' was invested with its basic political and religious connotations.

The Shī'ites claimed that the House of 'Abbás had usurped the Caliphate as the Umayyads and the three Orthodox Caliphs had done. They contended that, although de facto sovereignty vested in the 'Abbásids, legal sovereignty remained with the descendants of 'Ali who were divinely ordained to be the temporal and religious leaders of the Islamic peoples.

734
assertedly and palpably wrong and, as a matter of fact, sinful. Sovereignty, with all responsibilities that it entails for its holder as a temporal ruler and duties that it entails for him as a religious chief, is a gift from God which is conferred only on those who have descended from Muhammad through `Ali and Fatimah. (The descendants of `Ali not born of Fatimah have no right to the Caliphate or the Imamate.) The Shi'ite theologians obviously contend that the divine right of the Imam to become the Commander of the Faithful depends on the word of God as conveyed by the Prophet to `Ali and by `Ali to his descendants.

It has been conjectured, however, that the theory of the divine right of the Imamate, which was analogous to the theory of the divine right of kings, was evolved and developed by the Persian supporters of the House of `Ali who had witnessed the rise and fall of great empires wherein the emperors more often than not laid claim to Godhead.

In all great Eastern empires of the remote past the kings at some time or another claimed to be gods or semi-gods at least, perhaps in order to stabilize the State and to keep the subject races unified through the worship of the sovereign. When we consider that the Shi'ite theologians and historians have accepted it as a fact that a daughter of the last Sassanian King of Persia was married to Husain (all Imams being descendants from her), it becomes easy enough to appreciate the position of the Persian adherents of `Ali in relation to the Caliphate and the Imamate. The fact that many of the Shi'ite sects believed in the Godhead of `Ali further lends support to the theory that the concept of the divine right of the Imam to succeed the Prophet had infiltrated into Arabia through Persian channels.

Once we accept that the Imams are divinely ordained to rule the Faithful, we must accept the fact that the State as envisaged by the Shi'ite theologians is a theocracy in the most rigid sense of the word, in which the ruler—a temporal head as well as religious chief—cannot be deposed even if he palpably commits sins and crimes of a most serious nature. This is the logical conclusion of the acceptance of the theory of divine right because the supporters of this theory would contend that "what our limited knowledge visualizes as a crime or as a sin is really virtue." We, with our limited knowledge and understanding, cannot appreciate or assess the significance of an act of the Imam. This logical conclusion was accepted by the Ismailites specifically and categorically, although the Orthodox Shi'ites contented themselves with saying that it is not possible for the Imam to commit a sin or a crime.

The concept of sinlessness is a logical corollary of the acceptance of the first precept.

It would follow, therefore, that in theocracy as envisaged by the Shi'ites, the Caliph who is also the Imam cannot be deposed or interfered with in any matter of administrative or religious nature. From the purely political point of view, this theocratic State has elements of stability and strength which are peculiarly its own, but it may not appeal to those who believe that sovereignty vests really in the people ultimately and that the negation of the right to depose, irrespective of the fact whether the ruler is just or unjust and cruel, is contrary to all principles of equity and justice inherent in all constitution-making.

The Shi'ite theologians may reply that the Imam, being divinely ordained, is incapable of committing a sin or crime and will exercise his authority in a benevolent manner, and although he will be sovereign in every sense of the word, he will be bound by the restrictions imposed upon him by the Qur'an, the traditions of the Prophet as narrated by the Imams, and the examples of the Imams' lives.

The belief that the twelfth Imam, Mahdi, is bound to return is most significant in the sense that the Shi'ite theologians are in a position to encourage their adherents whenever they are passing through dangerous or chaotic periods and ask them to stand fast since the advent of the Mahdi will be the end of all tyranny, despotism, suffering, misery, wretchedness, and sinfulness and the beginning of a new era of prosperity, bliss, happiness, and content never experienced before by humanity.

It is obvious that temporal and religious problems are to be solved during the concealment of the twelfth Imam. The ideal theocratic Shi'ite State envisages the existence of righteous, erudite, competent, learned, and virtuous persons who administer the Law and solve all theological problems and juristic questions by ijtihad (effort). These competent persons are known as mujtahids and are supposed to derive their wisdom and acumen from the representatives of the hidden Imam who is in contact with them.

The mujtahids have always exercised very great influence in the Shi'ite States and have been considered to be the Caliphs of the Imam. It is of course possible to visualize periods when wide powers are misused and unlimited authority is converted into tyranny. Human nature is frail and whenever human beings are vested with unlimited powers, they are apt to misuse them at some time or other.

It may be stated, therefore, that the Shi'ites envisaged their ideal State as a rigidly theocratic one, with the concealed Imam as the arbiter of the destinies of the Faithful working out a pattern of society through the mujtahids, who derived their power to adjudicate from the Imam himself or his representatives with whom they are in contact. All persons, sovereigns, rulers and pontiffs, wherever they may be, are usurpers if they do not derive their right to rule from the commands of the Imam or from his representatives.

The chaotic conditions which prevail will be set right by the advent or emergence of the Mahdi who will establish this ideal theocratic State, holding sway over the whole world and laying the law for all creatures who inhabit it.
day, found drinking wine and thus committing an action which is admittedly a sin. Imam Ja'far—so the story goes—thereupon repudiated Isma'il and designated his brother as his successor.

This repudiation of sanction or authority, technically known as nay, was not and could not be accepted by some of the Shi'ites because it negatived and falsified the fundamental postulates of the Shi'ites in general.

Those who would not accept this repudiation and revocation argue as follows:

The sinlessness of the Imam is an established fact. Isma'il was declared to be the Imam Designate by Ja'far. He, therefore, was incapable of committing any sin or perpetrating any crime. The allegation that he was found drinking wine was either incorrect or related to one of those mysterious acts of the Imam. Designate the significance of which is known to him only. Since he was incapable of committing a sin, his drinking must have been a cloak for some other activity: in other words, drinking was an appearance (fahren), the reality (tābīn) of which was known only to the Imam or to those in whom he confided.

The supporters of Isma'il also contend that he was appointed Imam Designate by Imam Ja'far in accordance with divine command. God is infallible. It is impossible to conceive that God was not aware that Isma'il one day would be found drinking. If, therefore, he allowed Isma'il to be declared as the successor of Imam Ja'far, the story that Isma'il was found drinking wine must either be untrue or must be considered and treated as an act innocent in itself, the significance of which is known only to God, the Imam, and his successor. They contend that it was quite possible that the wine-drinking of Isma'il may have been considered expedient by God and since all actions of the Imam flow from God, no action of Isma'il, however sinful it may have appeared, can be considered to be unjustified and condemned, since it is in fact an act performed as ordained by Providence. During the life-time of Imam Ja'far the controversy and the ferment consequent upon the revocation of authority remained subdued, but as soon as he died the supporters of Isma'il came forward and contested the succession of Imam Mūsā Kāsim. Since Isma'il had died during the life-time of his father, it was contended that the nay (sanction, authority) had been transferred from Isma'il to his son Muhammad who had from then on become the rightful Imam, the spiritual and temporal leader of the Shi'ites and the rightful ruler of all territorial possessions.

There were some who believed that Isma'il had not really died and was the last rightful Imam, but they were in a minority. Slowly but steadily the supporters of Muhammad the son of Isma'il gained ascendancy and laid the foundation of the Isma'ili sect which culminated in the establishment of one of the greatest Muslim empires of the East—the Empire of the Fatimids of Egypt.

De Goeje and Dowy have it "that a certain 'Abd Allah b. Maimūn, an
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Political Theory of the Shi'ites

that both these persons were not only supporters of the Isma'ilies’ cause but were the pivots and prope thereof.

After the death of Ja’far, Muhammad went into concealment adopting the name of Maimin. He spent some time at Kifāh and Rayy. The ‘Abbasid Caliphs being informed that Muhammad was laying the foundation of a powerful organization even in concealment and sending out preachers to different parts of Persia made some efforts to seize him, but it would appear that either those efforts were half-hearted or they failed.

Ultimately, ‘Abd Allah al-Mahdi in direct line of descent from Muhammad the son of Isma’il succeeded in laying the foundation of an everliving empire in Egypt, the rulers of which are known to history as the Fāṭimids or the descendants of Fītimid through ‘Ali.

At this juncture it is perhaps expedient to state in the most explicit terms that the Carmathians were not associated with the Isma’ilies, nor were they identical with them as it is sometimes wrongly supposed.

Holbester has ascertained their position as follows: “We find the word Carmathian used: (1) as an equivalent for Isma’ilis in general; (2) for the dissident groups of Isma’ilis who joined in the invasion of Syria and were very close to capturing Damascus and establishing there a Fāṭimid Kingdom somewhat earlier than that established in North Africa; (3) for the followers of ‘Abd al-Qādr, his brother-in-law, who succeeded from the Isma’ilis; and (4) for the Qarmatians of Bahrain. The more recent studies, supported by Isma’ili authorities, have made it clear that only this last group is really entitled to the name Qarmatian (Carmathian).”

The Fāṭimid Caliphs (297-507/900-1171), broadly speaking, tried to establish a theocratic State and were on the whole just rulers and efficient administrators. One of them, al-Ḥakim, however, claimed divinity for himself. In other words, he not only claimed to be the Isma’il, but further contended that the divine light had entered his body so that he had become identical with the Creator. His claim was laughed out of Egypt, but the Druzes of Lebanon up to this day believe in his divinity and look forward to the return of Lord Ḥakim. They do not believe that he was actually murdered and are confident that he merely disappeared as an Isma’il often does, and would reappear in due course as the herald of a new era of prosperity, righteousness, and godliness on the earth.

Amazingly enough the Isma’ilies were destined to be split again into two powerful groups. Al-Mustanṣir died in 428/1036 and the Isma’ilis should have been transferred to his eldest son Nisîr who, his supporters claimed, had been properly designated as Isma’il. However, he was not in Cairo when his father died, and before he could take effective steps his brother al-Musta’sir ascended the throne and Nisîr was faced with a fait accompli.

Nisîr never succeeded to the throne, but he found a very staunch supporter in Ḥusayn Sabhî who had come to Persia during the reign of al-Mustanṣir. This Ḥusayn Sabhî was really an amazing person, learned, erudite, ambitious,
outwardly pious, witty, and blessed with administrative ability and infinite capacity to work.

In order to further his own ends, he supported the cause of Iskandar as the rightfull Imam and the ruler of the Islamic world, and in his name took possession of many fortresses in Persia including the famous Alamut (the Eagle's Nest) which in due course of time became the centre of Hasan's activities.

The movement initiated by Hasan is known as Dawa'i Jadid or New Propaganda. The Nizari Imams of Alamut, beginning with Hasan Sabbah, held sway in certain parts of Persia until the last Imam Kharajshah was killed by the Mongols in the seventh/thirteenth century. The Nizari branch of the Isma'ilites recognizes the Aga Khan as its head and its members are known in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent as Khojas. The adherents of Muttahidi are known as Bohras.

According to the Isma'ilites as to the Orthodox Shi'ites, the only rightful Imam is the theocratic one which has as its Head the Imam who, as we have already emphasized, is divinely ordained to hold his office.

The Imam or the Head of the State never becomes functus officio in the sense that when he is concealed his representatives become operative and spread the light. As a matter of fact, both the sects, the Twelvers and the Isma'ilites, believe in the continuity of the office of the Imam. There can be no vacuum so far as the performance of the functions pertaining to the Imamate is concerned. There may be and sometimes is a long period between the death of one prophet and the birth of another, but during this period the Imam continues to perform his functions in the light of revelation. It is believed that every Prophet had an Imam to whom he revealed the truth. Technically, the Prophet is called nabiq and the Imam as gmi'il.

It is admitted that, although revelation is only vouchsafed to the prophet, it is interpreted and enforced by the Imam, since the esoteric meanings of the revelation are known to him alone. During the Fatimid period, 'Ali, the fourth Caliph, was given the place of aus or the foundation of the Imamate and was, thus, raised to a position above all other Imams.

In the theocratic State envisaged by the Isma'ilites every Imam has a chief minister who is termed Bib (the door, the gate). He is the intermediary between the Imam and the inner circle of preachers. All information sought to be conveyed to the Imam is conveyed through the Bib and all orders passed by the Imam are communicated to the person concerned by the same Bib. It is on record that Hasan Sabbah claimed that he had been refused permission to see the Imam on account of the fact that Radr, the Bib, and the minister of Mustanjar would not allow him to do so.

The Isma'ilite creed emphasizes the importance of cycles. Obviously, one source of revelation is not sufficient to lead humanity to the true path. Therefore, there have been cycles of revelation, each introduced by a prophet or nabiq succeeded by six Imams. The seventh initiates a new cycle and really ranks as a prophet.

This is the reason why Isma'il is held in such reverence by the Isma'ilites: he completes the cycle which began with the Prophet Muhammad and introduces a new one.

Salvation of mankind depends upon recognizing the basic principle that one must identify the Imam and take the oath of allegiance (bahi'ah) to him. Those who do not recognize the Imam remain in a state of sin.

It has been mentioned that the Shi'ites believe in the doctrine of the sinlessness of the Imam. It has also been stated that Isma'ilites, more than any other Shi'ite sect, accept unfavourably the conclusions which are attendant upon this belief. In other words, if he is proved beyond any shadow of doubt by unimpeachable evidence that Isma'il was observed drinking wine, the Isma'ilites would argue that since the Imam is incapable of committing a sin his wine-drinking must be considered to be an act which is capable of an esoteric interpretation (nu'mah).

As a matter of fact, the basis of the Isma'ilite creed, as it crystallized under Fakhr al-Din of Egypt, is the belief that there are two aspects of knowledge, namely, the apparent or manifest (zahir) and the esoteric or inner (bahr). The zahir of the Qur'an is Isma'il while the bahr is nu'mah. The outer meaning is known to the Prophet who imparts knowledge to his Imam. The Imam then spreads the light through his representatives: “every person who wishes to belong to the Da'wa enters into covenant with him (the Imam), on behalf of God. This is called ba'i'a. Man and woman must both take a like oath in a ceremony known as midjig. They must quite justly oppose everything that is unlawful… and keep secret those things and the religious knowledge which are entrusted to them. Obedience to all the dictates of religion is the most important duty of the Faithful. Salvation can be attained only through obedience completed in word, action, desire, and thought.”

Whereas the Imams and the Twelvers (Imam 'Abd al-Rahman) have commentaries relating to the meaning of the Qur'an, the Isma'ilites do not and cannot possess any such works.

Ivanov has laid that in Isma'ilism there is no such thing as a work of Ta'jil (commentary on the Qur'an). It would appear that the passages which seem obscure or ambiguous can only be referred to the Imam and whoever has the good fortune to learn the esoteric meaning from the Imam and his representatives is bound to keep such information confidential and secret on account of the oath of allegiance taken by him.

All subjects of a theocratic State, as envisaged by the Isma'ilites, therefore, are initiated into the mysteries of religion in accordance with their intelligence, capacity, integrity, and loyalty. It is needless to add that if a subject of this theocratic State breaks the oath of allegiance and becomes a convert to any other religion, he is severely punished (provided he is captured).

Until the Fatimid regime came into power the Isma'ilites, like the other Shi'ite sects, were anxiously waiting for the advent of the Mahdi who would bring peace and prosperity to the world. After the establishment of the Fatimids,
A History of Muslim Philosophy

the conception of a personal Mahdi as al-Masih was changed. Every Caliph of
the Fatimid dynasty was named al-Masih and thus "the idea of Mahdi became
merged, so to speak, in the Imamat, in the dynasty whose mission comes to
include the object which the Mahdi was to effect, if not uner an Imam, then
under one of his successors."

The theocratic State of the Ismailites enjoins upon all the subjects to
wage a holy war (jihadd) against the people "who turn away from religion."
The duty to wage war is obligatory, but it is restricted by an important con-
dition: it can be justified only under the guidance either of the Imam or of
his accredited representative.

All subjects of this theocratic State believed in the expediency of disas-
similation (tashqash), although its necessity was reduced almost to nothingness
during the regime of the Fatimids. Still tashqash is an accepted fact and when-
ever the Imam is in concealment his disciples are obliged to practise it so
that they may come to no harm. Before the Fatimid regime even the Ismailis
themselves practised tashqash, according to authentic evidence endorsed by
the Ismailites.

It has been mentioned that the sect of the Twelve as well as the Ismailis
believe that the only rightful ruler of all temporal possessions of the world
is the Imam. Since at a given moment a theocratic Ismailite State may or
may not exist, it is the duty of all Ismailis to encourage the preaching of
the creed. The Fatimids paid great attention to the intellectual equipment
of a preacher (al-wa'i). The al-wa'i was supposed to answer any question that
a pupil or an opponent might ask. He was, therefore, made to study jurispru-
dence, all branches of Tradition, the philosophical interpretation of the Qur'an,
الویل or allegorical meanings of the art of controversy and dialectics.

The theocratic State of the Ismailis established under the Fatimids
encouraged the acquisition of knowledge. In a way it aimed at rationalization
of the precepts of religion. It was by arousing the curiosity of the people that
the Ismaili preachers ultimately succeeded in winning them over. It is para-
doxical, indeed, that the Ismailis, who believed that mere knowledge is not
sufficient for the achievement of salvation and that one has to recognize an
Imam and follow him unstintedly in all matters, established seats of learning,
schools and universities where the students were encouraged to think for
themselves. The Azhar University of Cairo was built by the Fatimids and
has continued since then to be regarded as the outstanding educational
institution in the entire Muslim world.

The Fatimids also established observatories and libraries and these institu-
tions were accessible to all peoples and classes irrespective of race or creed.
Public gatherings were addressed by learned men in robes which may be
regarded as forerunners of the academic gowns worn by professors today. All
costs pertaining to these institutions were borne by the Government and
for the teaching of different sciences learned professors were imported from
Spain and from farthest parts of Asia.

744

Political Theory of the Isma'ilites

It may be said, therefore, that a theocratic State, rigid in its framework
and immutable in its convictions, gave birth to rational movements aimed
at the correlation of religious precepts with scientific and philosophic truths
as known at the time. It became the harbinger of rational thinking, and by
encouraging the pursuit of knowledge it gave to learning and letters a new
impetus. If we believe Nasir Khusraw, and we have no reason to disbelieve
him, the State which was established by the Fatimids had become the centre
of all learning and knowledge and from it radiated waves and movements
towards different parts of the Muslim world encouraging others to pursue
knowledge, to think for themselves, and to ponder over religious matters in
the light of reason.

It is an amusing coincidence of history that a theocratic State should give
birth to rational thought and should encourage the study of philosophy even
when it must have been aware that learning and education tend to produce a
collective mental state which is opposed to the rigidity of a truly theocratic
State. The Fatimids deserve all honour, therefore, for advancing the cause of
knowledge even with the lurking suspicion that it may end in the destruction
of their own State and sealing their own doom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Masouli Seyed Ahmed 'Ali Mohbati, Zafarul-i Kazlah, or the Progress of Imam
Shahin al-Shahid, 2 Parts, Macmillan at W. & N., London, 1931; Boyce Antar Ali,
Muhammadun Law, Tacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta and Simla, 1929; 2 Vols., 5th
ed.; The Spirit of Islam, Christopher, London, 1935; Sir Thomas W. Arnold,
The Caliphate, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913; also Masfui 'Abd al-Qahir al-
Na`ir al-Raghibi, al-Fard basi al-Furqay, tr. Kate Chambers Dodaly, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1929; al-Fary basi al-Furqay (Characteristics of Muslim
Sects), ed. Philip K. Hitti, al-Allmin Printing Press, Cairo, 1934; Na'il Bazili,
bin 'Abd al-Badalgorfi, Paris al-Raddan, pp. 113-20; Lit. Col. M. I. Court,
Malcolm's History of Persia, Civil & Military Gazette, Lahore, 1888; Dwight
Friedlander, The Historiography of the Sinaitic Papyrus, William Lovins Harris, Ed.,
Reli-
gions of the Deserts, Duckworth, London, 1925; Sir Muhammad Iqbal, The Recon-
novation of Religious Thought in Islam, Oxford University Press, London, 1934;
Wahidin Iwanov, Ismailism-Memories of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, The
Baptist Mission Press, the Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1922; A Guide to Ismaili
Literature, Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1933; Two Early Ismailis Treatises:
Hijri Ahsa Sayyidah and Tashqash al-Maw'inis by Thu, Islamic Research
Association, Bombay, 1932; Kahan-i Par: A Treatise on Ismaili Doctrine, Islamic
Research Association, Bombay, 1932; The Rise of the Fatimids, Oxford University
Press, 1947; Major H. S. Jarrett, History of the Caliphs, Stanley Lane-Poole,
1925; Bernard Lewis, The Origins of Ismailism, W. Heinemann & Son, Ltd., Cambridge, 1941;
Duncan B. Macdonald, Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and

745
A History of Muslim Philosophy


Political Theory of the Shi’ites

Chapter XXXVIII

NIZAM AL-MULK TUSI

Nizam al-Mulk ‘Tusi was born in 408/1018 and died in 435/1042. He was not only a minister of the Saljuk for the last thirty years of his life, a scholar,2 and a patron of arts and sciences, but also the founder3 of the famous University after his name the Nizamia.

He lived in an age which witnessed the lowest degradation of the Caliphate, following its transformation during a period of three centuries,4 from a democracy into an autocracy and from autocracy into a mere puppetry in the hands of powerful masters. That period also saw the fall of the Ghaznavid Empire and the Buwahid Kingdom, and the rise of the Saljuq after their victory over the Ghaznavids in 431/1040, when their nomadic life changed into a life of gigantic empire, extending from the Oxus and the Jazartos to the Bosphorus. It was also an age of change and fusion of social and political ideas and institutions, specially in that part of the Muslim world in which Nizam al-Mulk lived and worked. The rise of the Persian element in political power in the early period of the ‘Abaddids was followed by a gradual revival of the Persian political institutions under the patronage of the Shirbatids, the Ghurids, and then of the Saljuq. These institutions in their turn, together with their theoretical foundations, came to be assimilated by Muslim thought. For this assimilation no battle of ideas was ever fought; it came as a process of cultural development in which Nizam al-Mulk stood as one of the representatives of Persian culture, with a bias towards Islamic thought.

Nizam al-Mulk was not really his name. It was a title of honour conferred upon him by his Saljuq master, Alp Arslan, after his appointment as a minister. His name was also ‘Ali Hasan, and his father’s name was also ‘Ali Hasan, who belonged to a family of landowners (shapir)5 of Kirman, a small town in the suburb of Tus where Nizam al-Mulk was born. In the days

1 According to the Funduq ‘All b. Zaid al-Balbuzi, he was born in 470/1079-90, see ‘Alhak al-Haqqi, ed. Ahmad Bozhan-Yar, Shai Khushnia Qasmi, Tehran, 1317/1938, p. 76.

746
of the Qasamsiwa his father was appointed a tax-collector of Tis by Abu al-Fadl Suri, who was the Governor of Khuristan.7

His early education started with the study of Tradition (Hadith) and jurisprudence (Fiqh); and as his father wanted him to take up the legal profession for his future career, he was put under the care of `Abd al-Samad Firdausi,8 who was a renowned scholar of Law.8

In the famous "Tale of the Three School-Fellows," it is related that he in his school days in Najaf, where he was sent to attend the lectures of Imam Musaffaq, he made friends with two boys, who later became eminent personalities. One was Umar Khayyam, the great poet and astronomer, and the other Hassan b. Sabbah, the founder of the Batiniyah sect of the Assassins. Research by the late Sayyid Subhanih Nadawi makes it unnecessary to discuss this controversial point9 of Nizam al-Mulk's life. This tale, he proves, is a fabrication. From what the author of Tihrlik-i Bahaiyeh relates about Nizam's family on the reliable authority of his grandfather Shams al-Mamluk Amlak, who had seen Nizam al-Mulk in his boyhood, it may be concluded that it was after he had reached the age of maturity and not in his early years, and after his father had been relieved of financial worries10 that he was able to attend Imam Musaffaq's lectures in order to complete his higher studies.

His studies over, he travelled to Bukhara and Merv, and to a number of towns11 in Transoxiana, most probably in search of a post, and after 441/104912 he went to Qazwain, where he sought service with the Qasamsiwa, thus getting an opportunity to acquaint himself with their administration. When Sultan `Abd al-Rasul was murdered in 444/1052 and the political affairs were upset, he escaped to Balkh and entered the service of `Ali b. Shahid,13 who was then the governor of that province on behalf of the Sultan ruler

---

7 Ibn Fadlan, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
8 Not Firdausi as in the North-i Khwab-i Nizam al-Mulk (MS, British Museum, Or. 229, fol. 7a), or Qudati as in the Dastur al-Wasait (MS, B.M. Add. 26, 487, fol. 7a), but Firdausi as in Samkani, op. cit., fol. 432a, and so also Abu Alas 'Ali b. Hassan al-Bakri, Dampur al-Qur, ed. Muhammad Rahib Tabakhi, Aleppo, 1349/1930, p. 213.
11 Ibn Fadlan, op. cit., pp. 77-78.

---

11 Sabir al-Din, op. cit., p. 240.
13 Waqayati, p. 47.
16 'Abd al-Rasul Khumari, op. cit., pp. 72-73.
been set out in detail in the preface of the treatise. There is no need to revive this half a century old controversy as it has nothing to do with the study of his political thought. The Waqf-i Nisâm is not claimed to be the composition of Nisâm ul-Mulk himself in the sense in which the Saiyid Nâme is considered to be his work. It was compiled in the nineteenth century by an anonymous person whose family, as he claims in the preface, descended from Nisâm ul-Mulk. He compiled it partly from the books and partly from the oral traditions handed down in his own family. Therefore, the anecdotes cited in it begin invariable with the phrase, "To says Kâhwâjâ Nisâm ul-Mulk." The preface, which is one of the reliable sources of Nisâm ul-Mulk's life, is evidently from the pen of the compiler. But the other two chapters, which form the main part of the work and contain much valuable material on the political ideas of this famous vizier, are composed from his own authentic writings and utterances. It has been justly remarked that there is no internal evidence in the main part of the work to show that it does owe its contents to his pen. A large part of the Waqf-i Nisâm may be regarded as the actual utterances of Nisâm ul-Mulk.

We are fortunate in having these two important works of Nisâm ul-Mulk representing his thoughts on kingship and vizierate, which were the two political institutions of primary importance in his days. The Saiyid Nâme, which is the exposition of his theory of kingship, was originally written to serve as a "monarch's primer." It is said that in 484/1091 Sultan Malik Shah (r. 465/1072-485/1092) instructed some of his dignitaries to think over the state of affairs in his realm and write down the principles of conduct that were followed by monarchs in the past, and were required to be observed by himself. The treatise of Nisâm ul-Mulk among the works presented to the Sultan was the only one which he approved of and adopted as a guide (insâm). But it must not be treated as a mere handbook of day-to-day administration. Nor must it be regarded as containing simply practical suggestions for the improvement of an administrative system. It is more than that. It is, in fact, an expression of a realistic political theory which emerges out of an actual political situation, and, therefore, helps us to understand the stage in the development of Muslim polity reached in the fifteenth/seventeenth century.

The Waqf-i Nisâm is the exposition of his theory of vizierate. It consists of the counsels which he is said to have addressed in the "last days of his life" to his eldest son, Fâcjîr ul-Mulk, who also held the office of vizier under the Saljuq Sultan back in the fourteenth century. It is a short and direct analysis of the duties of the vizier, and he also provides some practical suggestions for the improvement of the administrative system. In the preface of the work, Nisâm ul-Mulk states that the vizier should be the agent of the king and should serve the king as a faithful servant. He should be obedient to the king and should not interfere with the king's affairs. He should be impartial and should not show favoritism to anyone. He should be just and should not be partial to anyone. He should be sagacious and should be able to judge rightly. He should be knowledgeable and should be able to understand the problems of the country. He should be energetic and should be able to take quick decisions. He should be capable and should be able to carry out the work efficiently.

In effect, he is arguing that history repeats itself, but instead of proceeding

88 Saif-ul-Mulk,ムスリム人の思想史. 89 Nisâm ul-Mulk: The Social Background of his Political Thought. 90 A. H. Sayyid, Studies in Indian Political Thought and Administration, 80, Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1943. 2nd ed., p. 131. 91 Ibid. 92 Waqf-i Nisâm, p. 52.
from the past to the present he follows a reverse course when he first draws conclusions from the observation of the conditions around him and then turns them back upon the past. History, for him, is not the solution of problems, but the endower of preconceived solutions. The essence of his approach to the political issue lies in the blend of the historical method and the method of observation. Though not very successful in following the historical method, he may be regarded as the most historically-minded writer on political topics both among his predecessors and his contemporaries.

This treatment of history squares well with the object with which he proceeds to formulate a particular political theory. He is concerned with theorizing those institutions and their principles and problems which had developed into an actual political constitution, resting mainly on the Sukaasta (kingship) and the vizierate, and to bring them to their possible perfection by suggesting practical reforms. He makes ample use of the past and contemporary history to give his personal ideas the appearance of historical facts.

The political institutions of which he speaks had real roots in the political life of the peoples who inhabited a large part of the eastern lands of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, mostly non-Arab races. Most of those institutions had existed there long before the Great Sulhajja came to adopt them, and still much earlier than they could find their theoretical exposition in the writings of Nisân al-Mulk. The absolute monarchy, for instance, the office of vizierate, the monarchical form of administration of justice, the feudal system, the order of courtiers, the system of espionage, etc., were the institutions handed down by ancient Persia to the successive generations. Though modified in some respects under the influence of the new Muslim political theory, those political institutions had, nevertheless, succeeded in preserving much of their original Persian character, and existing in their turn, a good deal of influence both on the political thought of the indigenous people even after their conversion to Islam as well as on the political system, largely of Persian origin, that Nisân al-Mulk seeks to set out. This makes us look upon its writings as the earliest exposition of what is called the Periopolitait theory.

Side by side with this political theory, but with different notions and with a different approach to political problems, there existed the constitutional theory of the Arab jurists of whom Mawardi, (c. 364/974-450/1068), the author of the Akbaen al-Sulhujjajh, was the most eminent. Among this small group of jurists mention must be made of Abu Ya'la (380/990-458/1066), a contemporary of Mawardi, and another Akbaen al-Sulhujjajh, and of Imad al-Harasmian al-Jawwani (419/1028-478/1088), an intimate friend of

50 Waqaya, p. 13.
to lose sight of his sovereign powers, which he enjoyed independently of the Caliph's assent.

This limitation of the juristic approach to contemporary politics was bound to arise from the fact that its exponents were building their argument on the foundations of the political order of the Caliphate, which had ceased to exist as a real force for about two hundred years. Deprived of any real power to shape the political life of the Muslims, the Caliphate, as a political system, continued, however, to exist in a theory which found its elaborate exposition in the writings of the juristic school of the fifth/eleventh century. But by interpreting the political fiction of the Caliphate in terms of political realities of their times, these jurists, regardless of the actual facts, were indoctrinating the people with the belief that the Caliph was still the real source of all authority. They were, thus, unable to appreciate the fact that it was the autocratic rule of the independent prince, and not that of the 'Abbasid Caliph, under which the people had actually been living; and they failed to see that by legitimizing the authority of the Sultan, the Caliph only recognized his de jure sovereignty; and that this in practice did not render him subservient to the Caliph. Their juristic theory could not take into full account the growth of absolute monarchy in the Muslim polity upon which a formulative political structure had come to rest.

It is this monarchial system of government developing under the autocratic rule of the prince, as against the constitutional structure of the Caliphate, that Nizam al-Mulk attempts to study. His political theory represents a particular phase of the development of the Muslim polity which was characterized by kingship. As such, it is an essential part of his contribution to Muslim political thought.

The first thing remarkable about his exposition of the institution of kingship is that he is careful to make no reference to the Khaṭifāt as the head of the Muslim political community, and to say nothing about the constitutional relations of the Sultan with the 'Abbasid Caliph. He rarely uses the title of Sultan for the Saljuq King, and as for the term āmil mustawfi (governor by usurpation), it does not occur at all throughout his writings, both being the terms of the constitutional law employed by the jurists to denote the legal superiority of the Caliph over the prince. Instead, he generally calls his ruler pādshāh—Persian term for the king. All this may reasonably be taken as a conscious effort on the part of Nizam al-Mulk to avoid any discussion or even a phrase which might involve any reference to the legal relations of the Caliph and the prince, for his object in studying the monarchial constitution of the Saljuq Empire is to represent his royal master in his full independent position. To this political objective his Sīḥat al-Nāmūs was expressly dedicated, for it was composed at the instance of the great Saljuq ruler, Malikshah, as the Akhtān al-Saljuqīyya, the earliest treatise on the constitutional

---

48 Sīḥat al-Nāmūs, pp. 65, 85; Wajdi, pp. 43, 44, 46.  
49 Nizam al-Mulk Ts'arı theory of the Caliphate had been written by Māwārid only forty years before at the instance of an ‘Abbasid Caliph44 to vindicate his claim to sovereign authority. This indicates the existence of a theoretical conflict between the powers of the Caliph and the king, which of course had been prompted by the historical events which preceded it. Conscious of the growing weakness of the Buwadhī dynasty in the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century, the ‘Abbasid Caliph Qādir (581/991–620/1031) and his successor Qāsim ‘Abd al-Malik (622/1021–627/1037), during whose reign the juristic theory of the Caliphate was formulated, attempted to achieve independence from the tutelage of the Buwadhīs. On the other hand, the Saljuq, too, who had succeeded both the Buwadhīs and the Ghurids after overthrowing their power, were no less keen to assert the authority they had established at the point of the sword. In spite of acknowledging the nominal authority of the Khālidshāh, who, in turn, had legitimated their rule and confirmed upon them titles of honour, the Saljuqs did not hesitate to inflict humiliation upon him whenever it was demanded by the political situation. Kusrawī, the vizier of Tughlūq Beg (d. 655/1257), is said to have withheld the pension of the Caliph on his refusal to marry his daughter to the Saljuq prince. On another occasion, Malikshāh is said to have intended to banish the Caliph al-Mustawfi from Baghdad. Under this situation it was not possible for Nizam al-Mulk to make any mention of the Khālidshāh without recognizing him as the supreme authority over his Saljuq prince. This would have been inconsistent with the objective he had in mind in writing his treatise.

His effort to avoid any discussion of the legal or political relations of the Caliph and the king is significant. He is seeking to defend his prince against the theoretical encroachment on his independent position by the advocates of the Caliph's authority.

From the outset Nizam al-Mulk seems to have taken it for granted that the royal source from which the king derives his authority, in theory or in practice, is not the institution of the Caliphate. That point has been removed from the plan of discussion. The reason is not far to seek. As it was inconsistent with his political ends to recognize the Caliph as the supreme authority, so an explicit refutation of his claims in this respect would have made Nizam al-Mulk
A History of Moslem Philosophy

unnecessarily provoke a controversy about the powers of the two offices. To this dilemma he finds a solution in what may be called in modern language the theory of divine right—the theory that the king enjoys the right to rule over his subjects by virtue of divine appointment. This becomes obvious from the study of the first chapters in the Siyāṣa Nāṣir, which mainly explain the divine nature of this institution, and its functions ordained by God. He puts it in very clear words when he says: “In every age God selects one from amongst mankind and endows him with princely skills, and entrusts him with the affairs of the world and the comfort of the subjects.” This is the remarkably simplified hypothesis of his theory of kingship; he does not argue to prove it, but simply states it as a self-evident truth. This proposition, as advanced by Niẓām al-Mulk, suffers the logical weakness common to all the expositions of the divine right theory which set out this hypothesis as a fact accomplished, to be simply accepted rather than to be argued. It is indeed a dogmatic belief rather than a rational proposition. It is, however, important for our purpose, because it serves to explain how Niẓām al-Mulk comes to expound a political theory which is cut out and out a vindication of absolutism, and how he is led from the outset to reject the demonstrative principles enunciated by the advocates of the Caliphate.

After explaining the nature of the king’s appointment, Niẓām al-Mulk discusses the purposes of kingship in a political community. He argues the reasons d’être of this institution, and throws more light on its divine nature. The essential function which the king has to fulfill in human society is to bring order out of chaos, and to maintain peace and justice. This is what he means when he says, “If the people show any sign of disobedience or contempt towards the Shari‘ah (the Canon Law), or if they fail to obey God and to comply with His commands, then he intends to inflict punishment on them for their conduct. . . . Due to their sin they bring their wrath upon themselves. Benevolent kings, instead of deserting them, turn to them, and bloodshed follows; and whosoever is powerful does as he pleases, till the sinners are perish in those calamities and bloodshed. . . . Ultimately, power goes to one of the people whom God by His grace blesses with success according to his worth, and endows with wisdom and knowledge.”

Then Niẓām al-Mulk goes on to say that the ultimate object to which the king should direct his efforts is to create and maintain wholesome conditions so that the people may live with comfort under the shadow of his justice.

It amounts to a sort of “mythical” interpretation of historical changes, bringing about the rise and fall of rubies. The king has been represented here as an instrument of God’s will, fulfilling a divine function in political upheavals. It is as a punishment for their disobedience that people are first deprived by the Almighty of the benevolent king. Then His wrath takes the shape of calamities and upheavals. And it is again by His mercy that a man rises to the position of a sovereign and brings about peace and order. Thus, in this divine order of political society all things proceed from God’s will, and it is from His supreme authority that the king derives his powers. While speaking of the monarch who succeeds in establishing his rule by subduing the warring elements and in exacting God’s will by bringing peace and tranquillity to the people, Niẓām al-Mulk is not unmindful of the victorious career of the Saljuq dynasty, which had risen to sovereign position by its own strength and successfully established an orderly government. This becomes clear when he says that it is by divine providence that his Saljuq master has been destined to rule his subjects.

This implies that the king’s authority rests, in the first place, on direct authorization from God and, in the second place, on his own ability to gain political power in which he is helped by God the Almighty. He is equally emphatic on the principle of hereditary kingship, which is always an essential part of the divine right doctrine. According to him, the kingly office is essentially of divine origin as well as hereditary, and should pass, like the kingship in ancient Persia, from father to son. And it is according to this principle that his Saljuq prince, he claims, has inherited this dignified office from his great ancestors. Niẓām al-Mulk’s vindication of the claims of the king to sovereign powers is based on a three-fold justification, namely, the divine sanction, the conquest of power, and the hereditary succession. He later states this more clearly in an anecdote in which Naqīshbān, the Persian king, has been shown as asserting his eligibility to the throne in a royal speech delivered to his feudatories: “First, this kingship has been bestowed upon me by God the Almighty; secondly, I have inherited it from my father; thirdly, . . . I have captured the kingdom by the sword.” It is obvious now that in explaining the nature of the supreme authority in the political community, he takes the position of a “legitimist” who believes in human choice, but in divine appointment and hereditary succession.

This exposition of kingship is significant from yet another point of view. There is more in it than the mere explanation of the divine origin of the king’s powers. It may be regarded as an effort of Niẓām al-Mulk to seek moral justification for the passive obedience which the monarch has the right to demand from his subjects, and also for his unlimited authority to control the administration and political life of the people. The two are correlative to each other and follow as corollaries from this legitimist doctrine. This helps us to understand the relation between ruler and subjects as envisaged in his political theory.

He lays great emphasis on obedience as the most essential duty of the people.

59 Siyāṣa, p. 5.
60 Ibid., pp. 3–6.
61 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
62 Ibid., p. 151.
63 Ibid., p. 7.
64 Ibid., p. 29.
towards the ruler, since he brings them peace and prosperity after they have been deprived of it as a punishment for their disobedience to God. This has been stated more explicitly in another work, the Waqf, in which he discusses the question of obedience to royal authority. "No doubt," he says, "it is but obligatory to worship the Almighty, and to obey the king. The common people generally, and the royal favourites and courtiers particularly, are under the obligation of such obedience, and more especially one who has been entrusted with authority in the matters of administration and finance." The king is entitled to receive obedience from his subjects as a divinely appointed authority. Niqām al-Mulk asserts that the very fact that the king succeeds in establishing his rule is sufficient to make us regard his authority as resting on the divine sanction. "Without the aid of God Almighty," he argues, "an individual can never become a ruler, nor can he bring the world into the bondage of subjugation. Though there might be several causes of his rise to political power, they all refer unfailingly to the same divine help." The gist of this remarkably simplified contention is that it is the duty of the people to obey the prince without questioning the validity of his authority: it is valid because it is de facto. A de facto ruler may be unjust and may put the country into disorder, but Niqām al-Mulk, like a true legitimist, is careful to avoid this question as it ultimately involves the right of the people to resist a ruler who is doing wrong to them. If confusion and disorder ever take place in a political society, he attempts to interpret it as resulting not from the miscalculation of the monarch but from the sinful acts of the people themselves. It is, therefore, by remaining obedient to the king that they can enjoy peace and prosperity which is restored to them under his rule. The king can rightly inflict punishment upon those who, "not realizing the value of security and comfort," might revolt against his authority. There is no doubt that Niqām al-Mulk believes in the principle of passive and unconditional obedience on the part of the people, and leaves them without any moral right to resist the royal authority.

A political theory like this, with the belief in the divine appointment of the king, coupled with the principle of passive obedience by the people, can exist only in the advocacy of absolute monarchy. The prince of whom Niqām al-Mulk is speaking here is surely an absolute monarch in that his powers are unrestricted by any human power. The only authority which could claim, at least in theory, a certain amount of legal right to impose any obligations on a Muslim prince was the 'Abbasid Caliph, to whom, we have seen, Niqām al-Mulk avoids making any reference in this respect. It is obvious from his attempt to explain the administrative system with constant reference to the royal office that the monarch is the sovereign authority in his realm, and, as such, is the source of all political power; all are subordinate to him, and are endowed by him with powers and privileges according to their capability. In spite of representing the king as directly responsible for the welfare of the whole country, Niqām al-Mulk does not regard him as accountable to the people for his political conduct. On the question of the kings' responsibility in public affairs he seems to take again the position of a supporter of the divine right of Kings, and holds them responsible, not before the people, but before God. That, however, has not been laid down expressly, and has to be concluded only indirectly from the statements in which, for example, he says that on the Day of Judgment the king will be summoned before God to answer for his conduct towards his subjects, and that the government officials are accountable to the king, and the king in his turn is responsible to the Almighty.

What Niqām al-Mulk is attempting to set out here is indeed the concept of an absolute monarch. At this point he comes much nearer to the Persian idea of kingship and to the Shī‘ite doctrine of imāmat (the leadership of political community), both founded on the divine right of the Head of the State, than to the constitutional theory of the Sunni Arab jurists, which was based on democratic principles. An absolute monarch claiming direct authorisation from God to manage the affairs of a political society was an idea quite foreign to Arab thinkers. The Kāmil had always been regarded by them, at least in theory, as an elected functionary to whom powers were delegated, not directly by God, but by the electors. They, therefore, hold that the Kāmil was subject to certain legal restrictions. This democratic idea of Caliphate is in striking contrast with the Persian notion of absolute monarchy revived in Niqām al-Mulk's political theory. It would not be wrong to suppose that this concept of a divinely appointed ruler came to him mainly from the political system of ancient Persia, and not from the contemporary Shī‘ite doctrine, which, as systemically evolved under the Fātimid rule in Egypt, was definitely a much later development in comparison with the Persian concept. This is obvious from his repeated references to the political principle on which the monarchial constitution in ancient Persia was based, but he makes no such references to the political ideas of the Shī‘ites, of whose political activism in the form of Fātimi movement he is, on the contrary, vehemently critical. But it must be admitted at the same time that his exposition of divine right is lacking both in philosophical depth and systematic treatment with which this doctrine was set out in the Fātimid dogmatis. The reason for

785

786

787

788

789
imitating the Persian model of kingship is to be sought in his contemporary historical conditions. On the one hand, he is expressing, as pointed out before, the popular idea of kingship prevailing in the territories conquered by the Seljûqs, and, on the other hand, he is seeking to replace the Turkish concept of tribal leadership by the Persian ideal of absolute monarchy.

The peculiar conditions under which he had to work out his political theory made the adoption of autocratic rule inevitable. The institution of Khaṭā'at, that is, the tribal leadership among the Seljûqs, had largely become inconsistent with the stage of political development which they had reached by this time. Though invested with political power under tribal customs, their Khān was far from having any territorial basis for his authority, with the result that their tribal system of government was found inadequate to cope with the problems of the large territorial empire which they had come to rule. The empire they had inherited from the Ghassanids and the Buwayhids was far vaster than the territory hitherto known to them, and more advanced in political principles as compared with their own tribal customs. Despite the large powers that were conferred upon the Khān by the tribal system, he was regarded much more as the leader of a large tribe, than as a sovereign in the proper sense. There were other "minor leaders" of small groups of families who, at least in the early stage of their political career, could lay claim to political power derived not from the "major" tribal leader but from the tribal customary law. It was not until the reign of Malikshah, the third ruler of the great Seljûq dynasty, that the Seljûq prince could become a real autocratic sovereign. And it was Nīṣām al-Mulk, the all-powerful vizier and the directing mind in all state affairs throughout the reign of Alp Arslân and Malikshah, who was mainly responsible for altering their nomadic tribal political organization to harmonize with the requirements of a territorial empire. He converted their power into a centralized autocratic authority essential for successful government in his time.

What he is attempting now in his writings by theorizing about kingship and its institutional organization is to provide the Seljûq monarchy with a theoretical basis. In seeking, moreover, to shape it on the model of Persian kingship about which he had read in the "works of the ancients" (khatūn-i pīghāsanūn),44 and had seen revived in the monarchial constitution of the Ghassanids. To him this Persian monarchy, with its autocratic principles, was more adaptable to the new circumstances than any other type of institution which was founded on democratic principles. Only an absolute monarch, he thinks, can vigorously deal with the nomad Türkman tribes and the petty leaders of the Qhûz tribes in subduing their power to a centralized authority. Therefore, he advises his prince that "God Almighty has created the king most powerful of all people, and all are subordinate to him. It is from him that they take their subsistence money and their position. He should treat them in such a way that they always realize their position, and may not throw off the bondage of allegiance; and, moreover, they should not be allowed to do whatever they like; they should do only what they have been ordered to do."45 His aim in stressing the absolute superiority of the king is to introduce a central authority with autocratic powers in the political system of the Seljûqs, the majority of whom had not yet got fully accustomed to this principle of government and administration.

To imitate the Persian absolute monarchy was also useful in tackling the problems of the growing "feudal system" in the Seljûq Empire. The Persian institution of kingship had a record of feudal traditions, and could furnish the Seljûqs with the laws applicable in many respects to their relation with the feudatories and the subjects. The system of land assignment—what Nīṣām al-Mulk calls the iṣqā' divān46—may be regarded undoubtedly as the Eastern form of feudalism as against the foundation of medieval Europe. To a great extent, Nīṣām al-Mulk may be considered responsible for developing, if not for introducing, it in systematic lines within the political structure of the Seljûq Empire. It was due to the military organization of the Seljûqs, on which their political structure ultimately came to rest, together with the problems of revenue administration, that the practice of assigning fiefs (iṣqā'īs) to the military chieftains, soldiers, to other private persons was adopted. There were also the qālūn, the old Persian land-owners, who continued to exercise proprietary rights as before. This system, in brief, was designed as a means of paying the soldiers and of collecting the revenues.

The principles on which Nīṣām al-Mulk suggests that the iṣqā' divān should be based developed it into a feudal system very different from the Western feudalism, both in character and in social and political consequences. It is basically different in the tenure of the feudatories, in their legal rights over the land and the rajā'āt (rajaat) as well as in the relation of the king as the overlord with the rajā'āt (feudatories), on the one hand, and with the subjects, on the other. The iṣqā' system, as envisaged by Nīṣām al-Mulk, is by no means strictly hereditary as a general rule. There is nothing in his writing to suggest that he is in favor of assigning lands to an individual with a specified legal right to transmit it by inheritance. On the other hand, in his system the feudatories come to occupy a position more akin to that of the tax-collectors with large administrative powers than that of the "feudal lords," in the medieval sense. In their relations with the vassals they are like the khaṭā'at (guards), and in case a feudatory fails to treat them well, the state, if it is suggested, must be

44 Ibid., p. 163.
45 For the iṣqā' system under the Seljûqs, see W. Barthold, Türkistan to the Mongol Invasion, tr. H. R. Gibb, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1928, pp. 363-369; A. R. Lashkarband, Landlord and Peasant in Persia, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London, 1933, Chap. III.
withdrawn from him.** Besides, the officials and the feudatories must be changed every two or three years so that they may not get strong in their fortifications.***

It appears that side by side with developing the sīyās al-Mulk attempts to enlarge the powers of the king as a means of checking the centrifugal tendencies which tend to appear in feudalism. This leads him to put forward a theory of land-ownership which goes well with his idea of absolute monarchy. He holds that "the feudatories who hold the fief must know that they have no other right over the subjects than to extract from them with civility and courtesy the lawful amount which has been assigned to them, i.e., to the feudatories, and when that has been taken, the subjects shall be secure in their persons, property, wives, and children, and in their goods and estates. . . . They must know that the land and the subjects all belong to the king, and the feudatories and the governors (salṭah), set over their head, are like the guards to the subjects, as the king is to others.**

In entertaining such a view regarding land-ownership, Nīṣābūrī al-Mulk departs from what may be regarded as the Islamic theory, which attributes the absolute ownership of land, not to the Head of the State, but to the State itself, as entrusted to it by God. It is also a clear departure from the traditional concept of the Ghurid tribe, who looked upon the land that they would come to occupy as the common property of their families. It was this tribal concept of land-ownership that Nīṣābūrī al-Mulk was seeking to modify basically, as it was out of tune with the administrative principle of a centralized empire which had now passed into their hands. To him it was essential to bring both the land and the subjects under the central authority of the king.

A good deal of his theory, it appears, has come to him from the old feudal Persia. This is evident from his attempt to explain this principle by an anecdote from Persian history in which the famous visier Burājunīsīh has been represented as advising Nūgārāwūn, that "the kingdom (sālih) belongs to the king (salṭah), and the king has the dominion, and not the subjects, to the military. When the military is not well wishing unto the kingdom, and kind to the people . . . and takes the power to arrest and imprison . . . and to appoint and dismiss, what difference then remains between the king and the military, for that power really belongs to the king, and not to the military." On another occasion Nūgārāwūn exhorts his feudatories to treat the people well, and only to take from them what is just and just; and he stresses the fact that the dominion belongs to him, and it is by him that the estates have been assigned to them.**

Nīṣābūrī al-Mulk's feudal theory takes away much of the powers from the hands of feudal lords which they enjoyed, for instance, in Western feudalism. It leaves them with limited power to collect the revenues, and to have only "a fixed amount in their hands." Moreover, it removes them from the position of being the sole intermediaries between the king and the subjects, preventing the latter from getting into direct contact with him.*** In his system, the direct responsibility for the well-being of the subjects rests, not with the feudatories, but with the king, and, therefore, he suggests that the king should send spies (fāsikān) and special confidants (şākīs) to inquire secretly about administration in the fief in order to get reliable information about the condition of the subjects, and urges him to dismiss a feudatory who forbids subjects to represent their cases to the king in order to seek redress for grievances.**

All this results in the concentration of all the political and administrative powers, as sought by Nīṣābūrī al-Mulk, in the central authority of the king which was once enjoyed by the Persian autocrat.

Though his idea of kingship is in essence of Persian origin, it differs in certain respects from the old Persian prototype, and has been refashioned in other respects under the influence of Muslim political theory and practice. It is, on the whole, an attempt to readjust the Persian model with the contemporary social and political structure.

The most important point of difference is that Nīṣābūrī al-Mulk is not an asceticist. Unlike the ancestors who could look upon their Persian monarch as the Incarnation of Divinity,*** he treats his ruler as a simple human being. In spite of once calling the prince the "shadow of God on earth" (Allah al-fārād) in the Wąqaya, a phrase which does not occur at all in the Nīṣāpuri Nīṣābūrī—he does not go to the extent of clothing him with divine attributes so as to make appear an embodiment of Divinity. The phrase is devoid here of any mystical meanings, and has been used in the ordinary sense of a metaphor, to mean that the exalted office of the king is like a shadow provided by God on earth under which mankind may find peace and security. No doubt, he speaks of this monarch as "adorned with the virtues and excellencies which were lacked by kings all over the world," yet there is in him no tendency to regard the king as a superhuman being in any metaphysical sense. Among those excellent virtues with which his prince is adorned, he counts, for example, good appearance, justice, courage, generosity, etc.* But they are all divinity—*

---

*9 Ibid., p. 25.
**9 Ibid., p. 33.
***9 Ibid., p. 29.
****9 Ibid., p. 29.
*****9 Ibid., p. 28.
******9 Ibid., p. 28.
*******9 Ibid., p. 28.
********9 Ibid., p. 28.
*********9 Ibid., p. 28.
**********9 Ibid., p. 28.
***********9 Ibid., p. 28.
************9 Ibid., p. 28.
*************9 Ibid., p. 28.
**************9 Ibid., p. 28.
***************9 Ibid., p. 28.
***************9 Ibid., p. 28.
***************9 Ibid., p. 28.
*****************9 Ibid., p. 28.
***************9 Ibid., p. 28.
******************9 Ibid., p. 28.
***************9 Ibid., p. 28.
******************9 Ibid., p. 28.
***************9 Ibid., p. 28.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

gifted qualities, not divine attributes. Therefore, his prince is by no means an incarnation of God.

Far from attaching any "mythical" or metaphysical sense to the concept of kingship, he believes that "the king is endowed by God with wisdom and knowledge so that he can treat each of his subjects according to his worth and can give each a position according to his value."

He is, again, "His (i.e. the king's) wisdom is just like a lamp that gives off abundant light. People can find their way in its light and can come out of darkness," and he does not need himself to be guided by others." We can see his prince bearing a small resemblance both to the Platonic philosopher-king and to the Shi'ite teacher-Imām, but suffering from an innate inability to become the true image of either. This seems mainly due to the fact that Nīṣāṁ al-Mulk is by temperament much more a master-of-facts exponent of popular ideas than a real philosopher, unable to develop his thoughts into philosophical concepts.

It may be taken as possibly expressing a general belief about kingship prevailing in his day, in which the old Persian idea of the divinely-appointed monarch—in its moderate form—and not the concept of the divine monarch—was superficially intermingled with the Neo-Platonic interpretation of the philosopher-king as an embodiment of perfect wisdom. His concept of the king is that of a statesman who is primarily concerned with general beliefs rather than with philosophical generalizations.

His Persian ideal is modified also in another respect, obviously under the direct influence of Muslim thought. Though he treats his prince as a divinely-appointed ruler, invested with unlimited powers, he does not regard him by any means as a law-giver. A human authority with absolute legislative powers has never existed in Muslim polity, because legislation in this sense of the term has never been recognized as a human function in the Muslim legal theory. According to this theory, there is already existing a divine Law (Sharī'ah) supreme, eternal, and perfect, which is theoretically as binding on the ruler himself, however autocratic he may be in practice, as on his subjects. This is what seems to have prevented Nīṣāṁ al-Mulk from attributing any legislative power to his prince. His king, on the other hand, is subject to the supreme Law of God, and is moreover, an instrument for enforcing that Law, and for making people abide by it. He emphasizes that "it is obligatory for the king to seek knowledge of religious matters, and to comply with, and make arrangements to carry out, the commands of God and the traditions of the Prophet, and to pay respect to religious scholars." Therefore, it is the
duty of the ruler to appoint judges (qādīs) to execute the Sharī'ah as his deputies (nażī'īn).

This discussion of the ruler's responsibility in enforcing the Sharī'ah, apart from explaining a principle of Muslim policy, is also interesting for its historical significance in respect of the Safavid. This shows Nīṣāṁ al-Mulk's attempt to teach the Safavids the principles of the Muslim legal system and to familiarize them with the law of the more civilized people of whom they had become the rulers. But his royal masters were altogether strangers to all culture, and there is no reliable information to prove that they could even read and write. Therefore, books, as the direct source of knowledge of religious Law, were out of their reach. This seems to be the reason why Nīṣāṁ al-Mulk advises his prince to get himself acquainted with the teachings of religion through the debates of the scholars (talabīs) which he should cause to be held conversally in his presence, once or twice a week. "Thus, one day he will become conversant with most of the laws of the Sharī'ah, the commentary of the Qur'ān, and the traditions of the Prophet; and, thus, the methods of dealing with temporal and religious affairs would become easy for him." This discussion leads us at this point to another important question, namely, the place that religion must have, according to Nīṣāṁ al-Mulk, both in the conduct of a ruler and in the political life of a people. It is of course a question of the relation between religion and politics, where we can see again that his concept of kingship is modified by the influence of Muslim thought. In spite of his love for the political principles of pre-Islamic Persia, he is essentially a religious-minded man who can believe only in the religious values of social life as enunciated by Islam, and can look upon a political community as dedicated cult and out to religious ends. His political theory is made up of a reconstruction between the old Persian ideals and the Muslim political ideology. To him, in the first place, religion and politics are inseparably joined together, and, as such, are complementary to each other. "The State (and kingship) and religion," he believes, "are like two brothers." And throughout his writings, the two have been treated in the same spirit. In dealing with them, he closely follows the spirit of Muslim polity which is largely based on the concept of the indivisible unity of religion and politics.

The principles of conduct which he lays down for his king under the influence of this religious trend are in striking contrast with those prescribed by Machiavelli for his prince. Unlike the Machiavellian prince who is advised to handle religion merely as a useful instrument for achieving political ends, and who is taught to appear rather than become religious, Nīṣāṁ al-Mulk's

---

81 Ibid., p. 6.
82 Ibid., p. 7.
83 Plato, Republic, Bk. Y.
84 For the expositions of teacher-Imām, see Ahmad Hamzah al-Dīn Kumānrūdī, Ruhāl al-'Aqīl, ed. Kamāl Husain and Mustafa Husain, Maqālāt wa-ṣiḥḥat al-Fātihān, Caire, 1963, pp. 60-60.
85 Syllabot, p. 54.
prince is taught to believe sincerely in religious truths, and to exercise political power as an essential means of attaining them. According to him, both the State and religion are dependent upon each other for their existence; therefore, the king must treat them both alike. "Whenever there is any disorder in the State," says Nisām al-Mulk, "there is confusion in the religion of its people also, and the heretics and mischief-makers make their appearance. And whenever religious affairs are disturbed, the State is thrown into disorder, the mischief-makers grow strong, and heresy makes itself manifest." He believes that "the most virtuous thing for the king is to uphold the right faith."95 To him a wise and just ruler is one who follows the tenets of religion faithfully, and eradiates heresy from his realm.96

It is obvious that the conscience of his prince with religion is not more polite; it is rather a matter of genuine faith in the religious values of social life. It is an instrument to preserve the State as well as a means of salvation in the life to come.94 "The ruler who strives to uphold the faith successfully is extracted by God with temporal and religious affairs, and his wishes are granted in both the worlds."95

This shows how Nisām al-Mulk is at pains to make his prince a religious as well as a mundane authority. It is, however, no artifice with him to blend the religious and temporal powers in one and the same office. With a religious man like him, looking to faith for guidance in the spiritual as well as in the worldly affairs, it is more natural to combine them than to treat them as separate. Besides his own outlook about the relation of religion and politics, which led him to attribute religious function to kingship, there arose a historical situation in which the king came to be regarded not only as a temporal authority but also as a religious functionary. The age of the Caliph, when he was the undisputed leader of the Muslim community, had practically come to a close by this time, giving rise to the power of the independent autocratic monarch to whom the people now looked for leadership in all temporal and religious affairs. It will not help much towards appreciating the role this autocrat came to play in the social life of the Muslim people, to suppose about this historical change that, "politically, the Khulūq gave place to the Sultan, the political, that is, a religious executive was replaced by an explicitly independent mundane power."94 It must be admitted that the Muslim world, far from thinking in terms of the separation of State and religion, was definitely at a

observe them is dangerous, but to appear to possess them is useful" (Niccolo Maffiavelli, The Prince, tr. L. Reo, 1903, New American Literary, New York, 5th ed., 1965, chap. XVIII, p. 1025).

95 Ibid., p. 55.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., p. 126.
98 Ibid., pp. 8, 20, 37.
99 Ibid., p. 310.

766

stage of political development in which, as we have seen, it could still easily believe in their ultimate oneness. The Caliph, therefore, was not held to be simply a religious executive; he was a temporal authority as well, and both functions were intricately interwoven in his office. The autocratic prince, who came to fill the void left by the Caliph in the Muslim life with the latter's downfall, was his heir in both capacities. He was a replica of the Caliph, in almost every respect, save that, like the Caliph, he was not an elected functionary, and, therefore, unlike him, he was in practice an absolute sovereign with no constitutional limitations on his authority, and under no constitutional obligation even in fulfilling his religious functions. Had he been regarded as simply a mundane power, the Muslims living under his rule would have been left without a leader to organize their religious life, especially after the Caliph had practically been removed as a real force from the scene of their spiritual and political life.

It is this practical necessity that has led Nisām al-Mulk to insist on the essentially religious character of the king's authority. This special emphasis on the religious character is also important on account of the fact that it tones down the autocratic temper of his monarch. The moral obligations he sets on the absolute authority of the king prevent it from growing into an oppressive despotism. His is basically the idea of a paternostic State in which the king is held responsible for the security and well-being of all subjects. The first and foremost moral obligation of the king towards his subjects is to do justice. He believes it to be a religious duty, for it has been ordained by God. Justice, as a principle of good government, occupies a predominant place in his concept of kingship, and time and again he lays emphasis on its importance for State and society. But, in spite of all its significance, he does not attempt to formulate any systematic theory of justice; nor does he make any effort to define it exactly. This much, however, can be concluded from his statement that, like almost all his ideas, justice, too, in a practical maxim or a social rule rather than a social philosophy. Everyone should be given what is due to him, or what has been legally recognized as his right in a given social order. To him justice is a moral principle which is also usable as an effective means to preserve a political society and to promote peace and prosperity among the people. "The kings should strive," he says, "to seek the favour of God, which can be attained through the kindness with which they treat the people and through justice which they administer to them. When the people pray for the welfare of the king, his State grows stable and prospers every day."100 To stress its significance for the prosperity of the State he quotes the saying that "a State can continue to exist notwithstanding insipidity, but it cannot exist with tyranny."100 Therefore, he believes that an auspicious age is one in which a just prince comes to rule.98 He quotes

97 Ibid., p. 8.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 44.

767
several anecdotes from history to demonstrate the material advantages of justice, and to show that justice is the outstanding moral virtue of a king. He lays equal emphasis on its moral and material aspects as inseparably joined together, and stresses the point that as justice brings prosperity and good reputation in this world, it helps a ruler “to attain salvation in the next world.”

In his notion of justice he is influenced again both by Islam and by Persia. It is under the Islamic influence that he comes to realize the religious and moral significance of justice, and goes to the extent of linking its worldly aspect with the deliverance of the soul in eternity. To illustrate this point he quotes from the Holy Qur’an, the Tradition of the Prophet, and statements about the practice of the pious Muslim rulers, and says that the virtuous prince is one “whose heart is the seat of justice.”

From ancient Persia he learns the methods of the administration of justice and the principle of direct responsibility of the king in matters relating to it. He is so much impressed by the Persian standard of justice that he believes that “the Sassanian kings, especially Narseh the Just, have surpassed all other monarchs in justice, generosity, and courage.” He says that the Persian kings used to strive so honestly to live up to the principle of impartiality in justice that they could even allow themselves to appear as respondents before the Chief Justice who heard complaints against their royal person. They held it as their personal duty to see that the others also treated the people with the same impartiality and justice; and, in order to hear the complaints personally, they used to hold public audiences twice a year, to which everyone was allowed free access, and whoever prevented anyone from going to the king to obtain redress for grievances was sentenced to death.

Besides justice, which is essential for good government, there are some other moral duties, which, as Nizam al-Mulk says, a ruler has to perform for the well-being of his subjects. His idea of benevolent despotism involves the notion that a good monarch must rule, not for his own good, but for the good of the whole country. He is responsible for the welfare of his subjects, and is personally accountable to God, not only for his own conduct, but also for the conduct of his officials towards the people. It is, therefore, an essential part of his duty that he should appoint as government officers only those who are God-fearing, learned, pious, and righteous, and should instruct

them to treat the people well, because as justice brings prosperity, oppression leads to the devastation of a country.

This autocratic but benevolent sovereign, depicted for the first time in the writings of Nizam al-Mulk, is a typical Muslim prince who came into existence with the downfall of the Caliphate and continued to live for centuries in the Muslim polity. Equally typical is his vizier, who stands next to him in rank and power in the political hierarchy of the kingdom. Like the king, he is also of Persian origin; he is, in fact, the Muslim heir of the pre-Islamic Persian grand vizier, called the wazir-khāneh, who made his way into the constitutional system of the Caliphate when the Abbasids came to copy the administration of Sassanian Empire. This grand vizier was next to the king; and what he was in his relation to the Persian king, the Muslim vizier was to the Caliph.

Nizam al-Mulk himself a Persian and Grand Vizier, it is quite natural to aspire to model this institution as closely as possible on the traditional line of the Persian vizierate, which had once worked so successfully under the Sassanian rule. But he is not the first writer to speak of this institution, for Mawardi and others had already discussed it in some detail. There is, however, a sharp distinction between the theory, for example, of Mawardi and that of Nizam al-Mulk. What Mawardi speaks of is, in fact, the constitutional position of the vizier in his relation to the Caliph, and, therefore, it is what may be called the constitutional theory of vizierate. With this aspect of the vizierate, Nizam al-Mulk is less concerned, and he seldom refers to it. What really interests him more, or rather exclusively, is the political and moral aspect of this institution. There is yet another difference: unlike Mawardi, who is primarily concerned with discussing the question what the vizier’s functions are in a constitutional set-up, Nizam al-Mulk attempts to show what he ought to have in order to attain perfection in ministerial ethics. He deals with the vizierate on a plane of thought which is nearer to that of the Qādī Nāṣir al-Dīn Khaqān (412/1021-475/1082). Indeed, his field of study is the art of ministrship, but, compared with Amir Khaqān, he treats it on a wider scale and with a touch of personal experience which obviously could not be claimed by the Amir.

To Nizam al-Mulk the vizierate is the most important and the most excited
office, not only to that of the Sultanate. Though this glorification of the ministerial office is not without a tinge of exaggeration, it serves to give an idea of the importance the vizier once had in the Eastern monarchial States, including the Saljuq Empire, in which he played a significant part in politics, and actually shared a good deal of power with the king. In most of the achievements which were attributed to the royal person he had a real hand. Therefore, there is a certain basis of truth in regarding the vizierate as "an institution on which depend the State and the people, the religion and the kingdom." This indicates Nişām al-Mulk's belief about the vizierate as an indispensable part in the machinery of a monarchial government. He is also conscious of the historical role it played in bringing so much credit to kingship in the long course of its career. "All the kings," he says, "who have left their good names in the pages of time, owe it to the fidelity of the righteous vizier," and again, "...a good minister brings to the king a good name and leads him to adopt a good conduct. All the princes who had been great, and whose name shall be held in honour till the Day of Judgment, were those who had good ministers." Throughout his arguments about the importance of ministerialship, he is insistent on the point that the welfare of both the king and the kingdom depends upon the sagacity of the vizier, and that a bad vizier always leads them to destruction.

What Nişām al-Mulk is attempting here by stressing the importance of the vizierate is not to represent the vizier as a mere intermediary between the king and his subjects, but to show him as the representative of the king and actually responsible to him for the whole administration. That is to say, the vizier, as conceived by him, is in a sense a shaper in the king's real powers. This was actually the position which Nişām al-Mulk had himself enjoyed in his own life-time as the vizier of the Saljuq. That in elevating this office to such an exalted position he is mainly encouraged by the Persian tradition, is evident from his statement in which he asserts that since the origin of the State up to the days of Yaqubid all administrative affairs had been exclusively in the hands of the viziers. The vizier was the counterpart and deputy of the king. He is influenced again by the Persian tradition in advocating the hereditary principle of the vizierate, of which his Persian forebears, the Barmaqids, were the first exponents in Islam. To him it seems most desirable that both the kingship and the vizierate should be hereditary, as was the regular practice in ancient Persia from the days of Ardashir, the son of Bâbakan, to the reign of Yazdgird. He regrets that "when the kingship...

Nişām al-Mulk Tînî came to an end in Persia the vizierate also departed from the house of the viziers." Nişām al-Mulk presents a picture of the typical minister serving at the Court of an Oriental monarch, when he comes to enumerate the dangers with which this important office was fraught, and the noble qualities which were supposed to be the prerequisites of the vizierate. He gives a detailed account of them, supported by his personal experiences, or by illustrations taken from contemporary history. It gives an idea of the state of politics and administration in the medieval Orient in which a vizier had to discharge his duties with so many powers to conduct the government, and, at the same time, with so many risks of being suddenly overthrown from office for any mistake. The dangers in accepting this office, as he enumerates, are five:

(a) The minister may do injustice to the people as he has to issue numerous orders every day.
(b) He may please one man and displease thousands of others, high and low, rich and poor.
(c) He may displease the princes of the royal household by his acts and may consequently incur the displeasure of the king.
(d) He has always to deal with the nobles and grandees of the empire whose hostility and hate might turn the king against him.
(e) There is a large number of officials of high and low ranks upon whom he has to depend in discharging his duties, and their disloyalty may undermine his reputation and career.

All this renders the office of the vizier a difficult one, requiring a man of sharp intellect and outstanding abilities. Nişām al-Mulk attempts to lay down at length the essential conditions of this office which were regarded in his days as the qualities of an ideal vizier. The duties of a vizier, he says, are determined by his four-fold relations: First, he is under the obligation of obedience to God; secondly, he owes allegiance to his royal master; thirdly, he has to care for the favourites of the king; and, fourthly, he is concerned with the common people.

One cannot fail to note that his whole discussion of the institution of vizierate, like that of the office of kingship, is pervaded again by a religious and moral outlook, arising out of his sincere regard for religion. In the office of vizierate, as he treats it, diplomacy and morality have been blended together, but emphasis is altogether on its moral ends. To acquire merely worldly pomp and power, he says, should not be the ultimate end of the vizier; what...
A History of Muslim Philosophy

really befits this exalted office is to seek real prestige and a good name in religious and worldly matters.\(^{118}\) This can be achieved through upholding the right faith and following the dictates of God faithfully.\(^{119}\) It is the duty of the minister that he should strive hard to revive and propagate the faith of Islam and try to attain the excellent moral virtues without which divine favor is impossible. He comes to preach to the viceroy a sort of SuFi-like attitude towards political life when he says that he should believe in the divine providence, and should regard his success not as the fruit of his own efforts but as the result of the divine will.\(^{120}\)

Then comes the king who is, according to Niṣān al-Mulk, a livelily-appointed authority. He is at pains to make him a point of focus for the loyal sentinels of the whole political society and especially of the official community among whom the viceroy has a greater obligation to pay homage to the king than anyone else.\(^{121}\) In order to prove himself a truly obedient servant of his master, he says, the viceroy must refrain from seeking any sort of worldly pleasure, because the greatest pleasure for a minister really consists, not in satisfying his own desires, but in pleasing his royal master.\(^{122}\) Therefore, he should direct all his efforts towards reforming the affairs of the kingdom\(^{123}\) and increasing the wealth of the State,\(^{124}\) which is the only way to please the king.

Finally, he advises the minister to have special regard for the compassions, courtesies, and other favours of the king and the nobles and high officials of the kingdom.\(^{125}\) They are always influential figures in a feudal society headed by an absolute monarch, and have an important role in its politics. As their friendliness has great advantages for the viceroy, their antagonism may turn all against him;\(^{126}\) therefore, he advises the viceroy to be careful in handling them. It is, however, remarkable about Niṣān al-Mulk that, in spite of dealing with the problems of an office of a diplomatic nature within the framework of feudalism, which is always tainted with constrictions, he does not incline the viceroy to follow cunning methods. Instead, he believes in the moral standards of political conduct and insists that the viceroy 'should steadily follow the path of truth and righteousness in State affairs'; and this would serve to protect him from the vanity of his foes and would ultimately convince them of his integrity.\(^{127}\)

Niṣān al-Mulk's importance as a political thinker must rest, not on the

---

118 Ibid., p. 35.
119 Ibid., p. 30.
118 Ibid., p. 42.
118 Ibid., p. 44.
118 Ibid., pp. 45–46.
118 Ibid., p. 47.
118 Ibid., pp. 55, 56, 63, 68.
118 Ibid., p. 60.
118 Ibid., p. 55.
is the best law for the time for which it is laid down. It is claimed that the Islamic Law is laid down for all times to come. It is elastic only in the sense that some parts of one of its sources (the Qur'an) are given in such general terms as are capable of different interpretations at different times, and the validity of some parts of another source (Hadith) depends upon historical authenticity. Human beings may not change the laws laid down by the Qur'an but they may know them or not know them, interpret them or not interpret them, obey them or disobey them. The prerequisite for the knowledge of the Qur'an is acknowledgment of the established sources of the Qur'an, i.e., "wahd al-din."

The prerequisite for obedience is belief.

The ultimate source of authority is God. It is only the good that God commands and only the evil that He forbids. The principal differences between the Sunni and later Shi'ite persuasions is the Sunni doctrine that the last and definitive revelation is the Qur'an, and Muhammad is the last human being to be endowed with revealed knowledge of right and wrong. The successors of Muhammad may only know the Qur'an by reference to the Qur'an, to the behaviour of Muhammad, and, wherever these sources are not explicit, to the consensus of Muslims—or indeed by reference to analogical judgment. Thus, the proximate sources of authority are the Qur'an, the Sunnah, i'tidal, and qiyas.

The immediate source of authority is somewhat more difficult to ascertain. Learning, or 'ilm, is necessary for the discovery of what the Qur'an is, and this qualification is the source of the title 'asal. The Sunni 'asal are distinguished from others by their acknowledgment of the 'canonical' sources of the Qur'an. However, since there is no priesthood in Islam, the 'asal formed an undefined and unwieldy body. The business of discovering the law is at times very much like legislation, but the non-officialized body of the 'asal tended to convert their function to that of a huge, unwieldy board of judicial review. Obviously such action as might be undertaken by such a group must come after the political fact, and because of the nature of the institution the time-lapse between deed and decision might be generations. It would be wrong to deny the 'asal any authority at all, for the 'Abbasid dynasty went to great lengths to secure the support of the 'asal and to display respect for their judgments. The pattern of political behaviour thus established was carried on by subsequent Islamic rulers. Nevertheless, it was characteristic of the Caliphs to claim the more remote authority for their government.

In a sense the Muslim community, because of its intimate connection with the principle of 'imam', may be reckoned a source of authority. However, since 'imam' is a source of the Qur'an, and since it is a process rather than an institution, it cannot satisfy the requirements of an immediate source of authority. As a source of the Qur'an it is theoretically anterior to it, and, thus, a more remote source of authority. In any case it is still subject to "discovery" and interpretation by the 'asal. As a process its legislative efficacy is similar.
to that of custom in Roman and Canon Law, so the time-lapse is necessarily great. The Muslim community is not only the Islamic Church, but it is also the personal sphere of validity of Islamic government. Membership in the community is the result of belief, and belief is the basis of obedience to the Shari'a. The purpose of Islamic government is to see to it that the Shari'a is obeyed. In other words, the part the community plays in political affairs is primarily passive, although Islamic government is clearly established for the benefit of the Muslims.

Regardless of the degree and kind of authority attributed to the 'alim and the community, neither group ever wielded real political power to transform their political function into that of an institution authorizing the day-to-day acts of government. Theoretically, the Muslim system all but disregards the question of power; practically, it is another question. Ibn Khaldun is the most outstanding Islamic theorist of those few who dealt with the problem of power. He asserts that power and authority were joined in the Orthodox Caliphate. Ideally, of course, power should reside with the immediate source of authority in the community. The relation of the Caliphate to the Shari'a is more difficult to define than that of the 'alim or the community. During the whole of the Umayyad and the early part of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the Caliph is much more the exponent of power than of authority. In the last centuries of the 'Abbasid Caliphate the Caliph could hardly be considered the exponent of power either. Was he then the most immediate representative of authority? With the exception of the Qur'anic Law, the Caliphate and the Shari'a developed pari passu. The Sunnah of the Prophet did not become constitutive until treated as such by the successors of the Prophet. Hadith and qiyas are certainly later accretions. This historical fact has tended to complicate the relationship of the Caliph and the Shari'a. In the main the Caliph is the executive of the Shari'a, the commander-in-chief of the Muslim army, and the leader in formal religious observances prescribed by the Shari'a. Above all, the Caliph is the head of the religious institution in Islam, only of the formalized part of it. Since religion was an all-inclusive concept, he was also the political institution. The subordination of the Caliph to the Shari'a was most clearly expressed as a by-product of early political controversy in the attacks on the pietistic and personal behavior of the Umayyad Caliphs. That the political behaviour of the Caliph must be in accordance with the Shari'a, was implicit in 'Abbasid religious policy. The theoretical implications of this policy were limited only to the function of the Caliph once appointed and as a consequence fail to define the authority for the appointment of a particular Caliph, or the authority for the institution itself.

1 Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, Beirut, 1960, pp. 203 ff.
2 Goldhammer has set forth the arguments of the early political factions in Volume II of his Mohammedanische Studien.

776

Al-Mawardi

The circumstantial authority arising out of the contention that the Caliphs were properly executing the function of the Caliphate did not exhaust the 'Abbasid theory. Their personal claim to the office itself was based both on agnate descent from the Prophet and the action of divine Providence. This theory of constitutive authority was never denied by Sunni theorists, but it was certainly omitted in the heavy canonic overlay which attempted to camouflage the fact of dynastic succession. In time the Sunni theory of the constitutional process came to be a composite of the actual circumstances of the historical appointment of various Caliphs. These various circumstances were codified in detail, and with some juridical expansion by al-Mawardi, but the Shari'a nature of the constitutional process had already been established. Thus, the Shari'a was recognized as authority for the acts of the Caliph and for the manner of appointment of a particular Caliph, but there remains the problem of the authority for the institution itself. Al-Baghdâdi's answer that the Caliphate is required because there are certain explicit Shari'a duties incumbent upon the Caliph merely begs the question. We must be satisfied then with the conclusion that the authority of the Caliph is primarily circumstantial, i.e., he has authority for what he does rather than for what he is. What the Caliph depends rather upon historical events, and this is not surprising since the institution developed along with the Shari'a. History has a legislative character in Sunni Islam, and the Caliphate is the prime example of the legislative efficiency of history. On the other hand, the effect of historical legislation is primarily retrospective. As a result we are told what the Caliph was and what he should now be. Clearly, Sunni theories of the Caliphate are not slavish descriptions of the obtaining conditions; but in so far as they deviate from the merely descriptive, they also concentrate on the function rather than the institution of the Caliphate.

So long as sufficient measure of power was attached to the Caliphate, this question did not agitate Muslim theorists. We might say the institution of the Caliphate was almost taken for granted. However, when the Caliphs lost control of affairs, circumstantial authority no longer applied to the Caliphate. Al-Mawardi is very much aware of this problem, but his treatment of it is entirely inadequate. He insists on the legitimacy of the Caliph who is constrained by one of his military aides, even though he expressly states that the "obligatory" character of the Caliphate is derived from the Caliph's duties as executor of the Shari'a. Nevertheless, al-Mawardi has not necessarily contradicted himself—he has simply failed to state explicitly the source of Caliphal authority. It was this omission which permitted theorists of the post-'Abbasid period to apply the criteria of circumstantial authority to the actual but "unconstitutional" holders of power. The inevitable corollary was the establishment of power as the constitutive authority of the Caliph.

6 Al-Mawardi, al-Abhâl al-Sulâjîyâs, Cairo, 1909, Chapter I.
8 Al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 16.
Regarding the theory of al-Mawardi, our inference is that he considered the constrained Caliph legitimate because of the validity of the constitutional process by which he was appointed. The resulting situation is pure anomaly; the authority of the Caliph is his "constitutuionality," while the authority of his commander is circumstantial (derived from his ruling in accordance with the Shari'a); and the sum total is legitimate government.

Al-Ghazali's attempt to solve this problem is much more serious than that of the preceding theorists. In many important respects his theory differs from the well-established pattern of Sunni theory. On the other hand, these divergences are carefully couched in terms calculated to maintain the essentials of traditional Sunni theory. While remembering that the classification of authority as functional, constitutional, and institutional is only an analytical construction, which finds no place in Islamic theory, we may find this classification helpful in analysing al-Ghazali's theory.8

In referring to Islamic government al-Ghazali uses the same term as his predecessors. However, it is almost immediately clear that he has something else in mind, and not the traditional Caliphate of even al-Mawardi. He avoids the prejudice in favour of one-man government, but his implication is clearly that of a multilateral rather than a unitary government. Most important of all is his association of the Caliph with the Sultan. We shall return to this problem, but it is necessary to realize that he assumes the co-operation of the Caliph and the actual holder of power in his discussion of the obligatory character of the Caliphate.

In keeping with the then traditional treatment of the question of the obligatory character of the Caliphate, al-Ghazali first directs his arguments against those who deny the Shari'a character of the Caliphate, and then against those who deny its obligatory nature altogether.9 The first argument is a positive one, and concerns the institutional authority for the Caliphate. The second is a negative argument, and sheds light on the nature of the Caliphate and the duties attached thereto. After dealing with these two arguments we shall discuss his treatment of the constitutive process with special reference to the qualifications of the Caliph and the constituent power.

The Mu'tazilah asserted that the obligatory character of the Caliphate was based on "reason" and not upon the Shari'a. The Sunni jurists insisted upon the Shari'a as the basis of the Caliphate. Al-Ghazali follows the accepted Sunni line, but he develops his argument in a more logical fashion, adding

8 Functional authority is that which authorizes each separate act of the Caliph, without regard to the manner of his appointment. Institutional authority is that which provides that there shall be such an institution as the Caliphate. Logically, institutional authority must precede functional authority, though the office and its duties are conceptually joined. Constitutional authority provides for the manner in which a Caliph should be appointed. It will usually be found that the question of legitimacy in Islamic political theory relates to the constitutive process, while functional lapses are regarded as disqualifying and not illegitimizing.


new elements. First, he states that the Caliphate does indeed have utility, but he traces the proof of the Shari'a obligation of appointing an Imam first to ijma' and, second and more importantly, to the deduced will of the Prophet. He contends that the will of the Prophet was the source of the consensus of the community. His argument is that the Prophet's purpose was the formal establishment of the religion of Islam. To secure this end both life and livelihood must be protected. The appointment of an Imam is therefore obligatory. He also indicates that only through the performance of formal religious observances may the bliss of the hereafter be achieved.

We have found the usual Sunni insistence upon the Shari'a character of the Caliphate inadequate for the definition of the institutional authority of that office. In supporting this view the Sunni theorists point to no specific provisions of the Shari'a. Instead they reason from the prescribed duties, deducing the executive institution.8 The weakness of their argument is manifest, for as we have seen, the Caliphate existed in fact before any of its duties were defined. By the addition of new elements to this argument, al-Ghazali goes much further towards a definition of the institutional authority of the Caliphate. The most important innovation is his reference to the consensus of the community, which is no less than the historical practice of the community. Evidently, this is historical legislation.

Technically, the consensus by which the community has authorized the institution of the Caliphate has reference to the consent of the Companions of the Prophet to the establishment of the Orthodox Caliphate. The phrase "consensus of the community" is sufficiently vague to include the consensus of other generations as well. However, the consensus of the community is not actually a legislative process, but merely evidence of the fact that what has been approved by the community is actually provided for in the Shari'a. Despite this legal detail, we must conclude that the authority for the institution of the Caliphate is derived from the community of the Muslims. By the time al-Ghazali wrote, the consensus of the community had become a source of the Shari'a in its own right. The community at large has been endowed by the grace of God with a special character, summed up in the words of the Prophet, "My community will never agree in error." The important thing to note is that consensus implies unanimity, or very nearly that. The community as a source of authority is then considered collectively. Ijma' is, as has been said, primarily a conservative principle, tending to approve and perpetuate existing phenomena. But it is correlative to a dynamic principle, expressing in a way the historical continuity of the Islamic community. The institution of the Caliphate is intimately bound up with the collective unity of the community, as well as with its historical continuity.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

Al-Ghazali’s logical bent of mind will not allow him to be satisfied with the mere evidential fact of *ijma*. Clearly, *ijma* itself contains no logic, while al-Ghazali’s intention is to frame the requirements of the *Shari’ah* in a manner best calculated to convince the protagonists of reason. Therefore, he goes back to the source of the *ijma* which is, he says, the intention of the Prophet to organize the establishment of Islam. Primarily, he is referring to the establishment of external observances of the religion such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage; the execution of the *hadd* punishments for such transgressions as drinking and adultery; the maintenance of the *Shari’ah* law in civil matters as marriage and inheritance; and the administration of Islamic justice by means of the *Qadhs*. Under these headings come the collection of taxes and the government administration, for these are included either directly or indirectly in the *Shari’ah* requirements concerning them. The Prophet may have desired to accomplish other, less concrete things as well, but here the main point is his purpose of organizing the administration of the (Sunni) religion.

Although it is here presented in slightly different terms, this is the same old argument leading to the functional or circumstantial authority of the Caliphate. Al-Ghazali’s argument goes on to show that the requirements of the *Shari’ah* imply the requirement of an institution of some sort to execute them. That institution, the form of which has been authorized by the consensus of the community, is the Caliphate.

Though al-Ghazali rejected the argument of the Mutazilah that the obligatory character of the Caliphate is based upon reason, he agrees with them that it does have utility. Utility is a concept with a minimum of religious connotation. We have seen that the *Shari’ah* contains very many material provisions, but none of these could be classified by a Muslim as merely utilitarian. Obviously, al-Ghazali is referring to governmental functions common to all centralized coercive orders, such as the maintenance of order and the security of life and property. This utility can only exist where power is present.

The subject of utilitarian power comes into al-Ghazali’s argument again when he attempts to prove that the Imamate is necessary for the realization of the Prophet’s goal. It enters when he says that material security is a prerequisite for the carrying out of the *Shari’ah*. The concrete character of so many of the *Shari’ah* provisions necessitates, in the establishment of the *Shari’ah*, the setting up of a civic religious institution. Obviously, this implies the existence of a favourably disposed political power. This is provided by the Sultanate. His conclusion is that the Caliphate (execution of the *Shari’ah* because of its relationship with the Sultanate (coercive power) is required as a result of the objective of the Prophet (the establishment and institutionalisation of the *Shari’ah*). In the progress of this argument the Sultanate is brought in without any explanation of the relationship of the bearer of power to the

---

Caliph; we only know that the function of the Sultanate is an essential element of the authorized Caliphate.

In a later argument al-Ghazali opposes those who deny the obligatory character of the Caliphate altogether. Here we get into some confusion of terms. The contention of al-Ghazali’s opponents is that the Caliphate has lapsed because there is no qualified person to serve in that capacity. The implication of their statement is that the Caliphate is not, therefore, a rigid requirement of the *Shari’ah*. At least this is in some measure the way in which al-Ghazali chooses to understand their argument. In his own approach al-Ghazali definitely confuses the terms obligatory (moral) and necessary (natural).

The argument is simply: there ought to be a Caliph; therefore there must be a Caliph; therefore there is a Caliph. From this we are probably justified in deducing that the opposing argument runs: there is no Caliph, therefore there need not be a Caliph, therefore there is no obligation to appoint a Caliph.

Al-Ghazali’s final argument on this question is his asking what would become of those religious, social, economic, and political phenomena which are regulated by the *Shari’ah* if there were no Caliph. He contends that without the existence of the Caliphate no judgment of a Qadi, no contract, no testament would be valid. In other words, the power of all Qadhs and government officials is derived from the Caliph. In theory, Islamic government is perfectly centralized. The authority which any individual Qadi has is completely derived from the Caliph, and not from the task he performs, as is the case of the Caliph’s own authority. It is inconsistent, but there is no circumstance, authority for subordinate officials; their authority is only constitutive (derived from the manner in which they were appointed). Thus, the absence of the Caliphate would turn every normal human relationship into sin, and lead to disorder and strife. He does not say what effect such social disintegration might have on the chances of the individual Muslim for salvation; but from other indications we may conclude that they would be considerably reduced.

We are now much clearer on the nature of the Caliphate in al-Ghazali’s theory: (A) The Caliphate comprehends the necessary power to accomplish the maintenance of order. (B) It represents or symbolizes the collective unity of the Muslim community and its historical continuity. (C) Deriving its functional and institutional authority from the *Shari’ah*, it is the only legitimate form of government in Islam. The legitimacy of the Caliphal form of government validates all acts of a legal and political nature, and it establishes the Caliphate as the focal point of the *Shari’ah* in the community as well as the symbol of the divine guidance of the Sunni community by virtue of its obedience to the *Shari’ah*. It is not coincidental that these three aspects of the Caliphate correspond to al-Ghazali’s three sources for the obligatory character of the Caliphate: (a) utility, (b) *ijma*, (c) and the objective of the Prophet.

---

8 Al-Ghazali, op. cit., p. 105.
11 Ibid., p. 107.
12 Ibid.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

So much for the Caliphate, but what about the Caliph himself? Al-Ghazâlî joins the earlier theorists in giving a long list of qualifications required for the office. Ideally, al-Ghazâlî’s qualifications are the same as those of al-Mâwarî’s. The Caliph must be without physical as well as mental defects. He must be honourable, courageous, wise, and so on. It must not be thought that these qualifications are mere words. They do not represent abstract qualities, but rather their concrete equivalents. Thus, he must be able to defend the Muslims against their enemies and maintain internal order. He must be able to make judgments in accordance with the Sharî‘ah. He must be able to administer the affairs of the State. Finally, he must be of Qurashite descent. Al-Ghazâlî adds that he must be an ‘Abdân.18

These requirements are very great, and it is not surprising that they were in reality never completely fulfilled. The only stipulation which had been fulfilled was that of Qurashite lineage, and for three hundred and more years before al-Ghazâlî the Qurashite Caliph had been an ‘Abdân. This fact more than anything else represented the unity and historical continuity of the Sunnî community.

The inconsistency in al-Mâwarî’s theory stems from the fact that he insisted upon these qualifications in the Caliph, while permitting the Caliph to be inactive. On the Caliph’s inactivity he clearly contradicts his own words. At one point al-Mâwarî insists on the personal activity of the Caliph, while at another he validates his being constrained by one of his military aides.

The reasons which might have justified al-Mâwarî’s equivocation were no longer effective in al-Ghazâlî’s time. We find al-Ghazâlî facing the problem of the inactivity of the Caliph, and the related problem of his qualifications.19

To understand al-Ghazâlî’s treatment of this problem we must bear in mind his insistence upon the obligatory, even necessary, character of the Imamate. We are not concerned with “an irresistible force” and an “immovable object.” Al-Ghazâlî tells us frankly that the necessity of having an Imam is so great that it compels the allocation of the qualifications when there is no other way out.20 The licence of durance had, indeed, been applied previously by al-Mâwarî to validate the rule of “Amr by Conquest,”21 but he does not seem to have been able to bring himself to do the same for the caliphate itself. At any rate, al-Mâwarî did not permit, even in a case of durance, the lowering of the qualifications of the Imamate. Perhaps al-Mustâhir was obviously unqualified, or it might be that al-Ghazâlî was more honest than al-Mâwarî; anyway al-Ghazâlî is willing to concede many of the qualifications in order to maintain the Caliphate. About the only concrete thing that he

18 Al-Ghazâlî, Ḥiyâʾ ‘Umm al-Din, Vol. 11; al-Qurain w-al-Ḥiyâ, p. 188.
19 See Goldscheider, Streitgeschichte des Islam gegen die Babiyya-Stache, Leningrad, 1916, pp. 80 ff., for analysis and pp. 58 ff. text for al-Ghazâlî’s early, detailed views, referred to in both Ḥiyâ’ and the much later Ḥiyâ’

Al-Ghazâlî

insists upon is that the Caliph be of Qurashite lineage. As a result, the personal qualifications of the Caliph are hardly applicable to the nature of the Caliphate. On the other hand, the symbolic character of the Caliph could not be more sharply drawn. In other words, the Caliph himself represents only one of the three major aspects of the Caliphate.

The qualifications of the Caliph are probably the most well-developed part of the constitutive process in the hands of Islamic theorists. But they are very vague in their description of the constituent power. Al-Ghazâlî says there are three ways in which one of those who is qualified for the Caliphate may be chosen: by designation of the Prophet, by designation of the ruling Caliph, or by designation of the holder of actual power. Al-Ghazâlî tells us that only the last alternative applies to his time.22 Designation alone is not sufficient for appointment, for there must be the kān’ as well. The kān’ must be performed by the great men and the people of “loosening and binding” (kah al-balāl w-al-‘ajj).23 It is not easy to ascertain who these people are, but we take the great men to be those with some measure of power; and the people of loosening and binding to be the ‘ulama’; in concrete terms this means that the most powerful ἅbd al-‘ālam leader appoints the Caliph, then the appointee is recognized by the lesser ἅbd al-‘ālam, local princes, and the chiefs of the bureaucracy; and finally the appointment receives the consent of the ‘ulami’. There is probably a fourth stage in which the appointment is announced in the mosques, and the people accept the decision handed down from above.

In view of al-Ghazâlî’s statement to the effect we must look upon the holder of power, or the Sultan, as the constituent power. The whole of the constitutive process beyond the bare fact of appointment by the Sultan is a formality.

Al-Ghazâlî’s treatment of the constitutive process by no means contravenes the accepted requirements of the Sharî‘ah in this matter. It is true that al-Mâwarî sets up special qualifications for those who choose the Caliph, as well as for the Caliph himself. But, generally speaking, the Sunnî theorists are sufficiently vague about the question of selectors to allow al-Ghazâlî’s theory to meet their standards, particularly since some of them at least insist that there need not be more than one selector. On the other hand, it is quite possible that he belittles the importance of the kān’ of the ‘ulama’ too much. His reason for this is probably that the important question for him was whether or not the Sultan would choose anyone at all. But, of course, the Sultan’s primary concern was that his choice should be acceptable to the ‘ulama’ and the people. Were he not concerned with the attitude of these groups, and perhaps his own salvation, the Sultan might dispense with choosing a Caliph

17 Ḥiyâ’, loc. cit. 18 Ḥiyâ’, p. 107. The kān’ is important, even essential, but not constitutive. Thus, according to al-Ghazâlî, if a qualified Qurâni is an actual holder of power, he may appoint himself as Imam. (This is denied by al-Ghazâlî, al- ‘Umdâh, p. 180, and so may not be taken as a generally accepted Sunnî theory.) Nevertheless, the kān’ remains necessary, having only a declarative effect.
altogether. Having chosen a Caliph, he has gone so far towards preserving law and order and the "establishment of Islam" that al-Ghazālī cannot conceive of the repudiation of his choice by the 'ulama' or the people.

The constitutive process is then, loosely speaking, a Shari'ah process, but the constituent power is the Sultan. The limitations upon the Sultan's choice are real, as is the importance of the general ba'il, but since these have much greater reference to the functional and institutional authority of the Caliphs, we shall do no more than make a mental note of them here. Our conclusion is that the constituent authority for the appointment of the Caliphs is the Sultan. There is no contradiction between this conclusion and our previous statement that the source of all authority in Islam is the Shari'ah, for the Shari'ah has a tendency to recognize existing power in the constitutive process. Besides, so long as the Caliph had no power to do anything, the most important aspect of Shari'ah authority, i.e., functional authority, does not become operative. As a result the constituent authority of the Sultan is the critical political factor. One might argue that the Sultan derives this authority from the Shari'ah, but that would not be what al-Ghazālī himself has argued.

From the foregoing we see that the Caliph is different from the Caliphate, and that the authority for one differs from the authority for the other. We must now examine the relationship of the Caliph to the Caliphate, and of the Sultan to them both.

If the Caliph does not satisfy all the requirements of the Caliphate in himself, it is at least clear that he is its principal personal representative. We have already established that the Caliph himself has a special connection with the authoritative source of ijmā'. On the other hand, we know that he cannot possibly be the personal subject of functional authority, since he has no power. Contrariwise, no governmental act, unless performed directly or indirectly by the Caliph, has any validity.

We have already seen that the Sultan is in some measure the authority for the Caliphate. However, the actual government in the world of Islam is carried out by the Sultan. Circumstantial authority is not considered sufficient to legitimize the government of the Sultan, even if it is not in conformity with the Shari'ah. The only way in which the government of the Sultan is valid and authorized is through its recognition of the Caliph. As we have already stated, no government other than that of the Caliph is valid under the Shari'ah, and subordinate officials have only delegated authority, not functional. Thus, the validity of the government of the Sultan is established only upon the Sultan's oath of allegiance to the Caliph, and the Caliph's appointment of the Sultan. By his exercise of the constitutive authority, the Sultan recognizes in fact the institutional authority of the Caliphate, which rests primarily in the Islamic Sunni community, and in theory the functional authority which rests with the Shari'ah proper.

---

18 Ijmā', loc. cit.

Al-Ghazālī

The fact that al-Ghazālī accepts this compromise sheds some light on the political objectives of Sunni theorists. The total achievement of this arrangement is the recognition by the holder of power that the Shari'ah is the organizing principle of the Sunni community, and, in more concrete fashion, the establishment of Sunni Islam. The element of compromise enters when al-Ghazālī argues for the legitimacy of this arrangement, even though the Sultan actually ignores many provisions of the Shari'ah. Recognition of the Shari'ah by the Sultan without obedience to its provisions is form without content. This leads us to the second objective of the Sunni theorists, that is, the establishment of order and the maintenance of discipline. The governmental scope of the Sultanate included very few of the interests which concern modern governments. By the establishment of order and the maintenance of discipline the Sultanate merely provided a favourable field for the activity of the established Islamic institution. Al-Ghazālī, therefore, felt justified in validating the government of such a Sultan. He was willing to make concessions regarding a limited number of Shari'ah regulations in order to preserve the religious life of the community.

Just as the Caliphate comprehends the function of the Sultan, so does it also comprehend the religious and legal duties imposed by the Shari'ah. As we have said, the Caliphate is a religious as well as a political institution of Islam. We have also seen that al-Ghazālī does not insist upon the qualifications which the Caliph must have in order to carry out his religious duties. If necessary, the Caliph may enlist the aid of the most outstanding learned people of the day. The principal political function of the 'ulama' is the interpretation of the Shari'ah in terms of the problems facing the community. In short, by their approval of the Sultan's choice of the Caliph (ba'il), and by their fatwas, the 'ulama' express the functional authority of the Shari'ah.

The term Caliphate stands for the whole of Islamic government. Although al-Ghazālī seems to follow the traditional prejudices in favour of autocracy, it is obvious that his is a multilateral conception of the Caliphate. In it there are three main elements: the Caliph, the Sultan, and the 'ulama', each corresponding to some aspect of the authority behind Islamic government, and each performing a function required by that authority. The greatest virtue of al-Ghazālī's theory is its political realism, and yet he has maintained the essentials of the traditional theory. Each of the parts of the Caliphate represents not only an aspect of authority and a function of Islamic government, but also one of the major elements of political power in the Sunni community.

Was al-Ghazālī's theory an accurate description of the government of his time? Such a development of the Caliphate was the result of many diverse and fortuitous events. Nevertheless, the roots of this development may be traced back to the calculated policy of the early 'Abbāsidī. The early 'Abbāsidī based their government upon the power of troops imported from Khurāṣān.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

and not upon local Iraqi levies. They asserted their own legitimacy upon the circumstantial fact that they were ruling in accordance with the shari‘ah. They went out of their way to honour the ‘alimah’ and give them a place at Court.

Ultimately, the success of the system depended upon the maintenance of a delicate balance of power, and upon the continued co-operation of those forces. The fact of the matter was that when the relative power of each element of the government changed it was not supported by the others. Al-Ghazali argued for the independence of the ‘alimah’ and he urged them to resist the blandishments of the Sulṭān. When the Sulṭān was powerful he interfered with the succession to the Caliphate in a manner calculated to lower the influence and prestige of that office. When the Sulṭān grew somewhat weaker, the Caliph was eager to exercise local power himself. Al-Ghazali’s theory notwithstanding, the existence of the Caliph alongside the Caliphate was an ever-present temptation to re-establish the old order.

The multilateral conception of the Caliphate was not opposed to al-Mawardi’s ideal construction. Al-Ghazali did not reject the traditional Sunni theory. In fact, al-Ghazali sought only to explain the political conditions of his own time in terms acceptable to traditional Sunni thought. If he ground any axe at all, it was for the Sunni ‘alimah’, who were certainly a more conservative body. Nevertheless, once the Caliphate could be resolved into its component parts, it became possible for the rest of the parts to hobble along without the Caliph himself. In this sense al-Ghazali paved the way for the post-Ahlabi development of the Sunni political theory.

The original inspiration for al-Ghazali’s theory of the Caliphate seems to have come from his early interest in Hellenistic thought. We find an interesting statement of the same principle in no less an exponent of the opposing ‘philosopher-king’ theory than Naṣr al-Dīn al-Tūsī. Al-Tūsī says that the second possible variation of the supreme government of the Virtuous City arises when all the qualities required of a philosopher-king do not exist in one man, but are produced in several men collectively.

More significant than the parallel passage in ‘Abd al-Malik’s Naṣir in the reflection of al-Ghazali’s theory in the writings of Ibn Taimīyyah. If anything, Ibn Taimīyyah was more enamoured of the past than al-Mawardi, but by the time he wrote the ‘Ahbāṣi Caliphate was no more. Ibn Taimīyyah argued that legitimate Islamic government in his days was composed of the Amir and the ‘alimah’ acting in co-operation with one another. Ibn Taimīyyah’s principle of “co-operation” leads him to repeat al-Ghazali’s theory of divided authority in accordance with the qualifications of various persons in opposition to the theory which accorded complete authority to the ruling war-lord.

The origin and development of this principle present many difficulties, but

—


BIBLIOGRAPHY


—

[20] Ibid., p. 100, note 1.

786

787