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Itself. The other beings are generated by this Intellect. Through speculation and contemplation man can commune with the celestial world and attain the utmost happiness. No spiritualism is so closely related to idealism as that of al-Farabi.

Although al-Farabi’s doctrine is a reflection of the Middle Ages, it comprises some modern and even contemporary notions. He favours science, advocates experimentaion, and denies augury and astrology. He so fully believes in causality and determinism that he refers to causes even for those effects which have no apparent causes. He elevates the intellect to a plane so sacred that he is driven to its conciliation with tradition so that science and philosophy and religion may accord.

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B. Works

C. Philosophy

Miskawaih

Chapter XXIV

MISKAWAIH

A

LIFE

Abd al-Muhammad ibn Ya'qūb, surnamed Miskawaih, is also called abu 'Ali al-Khāzin. It is yet undecided whether he was himself Miskawaih or the son of (ibn) Miskawaih. Some like Margoliouth and Bergsträsser accept the first alternative; others, like Broekelmann,1 the second. Yaqút says that he was first a Magi (majūṣ) and was later converted to Islam. But this might be true of his father, for Miskawaih himself, as his name shows, was the son of a Muslim father, Muhammad by name.

He studied history, particularly al-Ṭabari’s "Annals," with abu Bakh Ahmad ibn Kāmil al-Qādī (350/960). Ibn al-Khāmīr, the famous commentator of Aristotle’s, was his master in philosophical disciplines. Miskawaih engaged himself too much in the study of alchemy, together with abu al-Ṭayyib al-Rāzi, the alchemist. From certain statements of ibn Sīna2 and al-Taḥhālī,3 it seems that they had a poor opinion of his aptitude for speculative philosophy. Iṣḥāq, on the other hand, regarded him as one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, moralists, and historians of Persia.4

Miskawaih lived for seven years in the company of abu al-Ṯaqf ibn al-'Amāl as his librarian. After the death of abu al-Ṯaqf (300/970) he served under his son abu al-Fath 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn al-'Amāl, surnamed Dhu al-Kifāyatain. It seems that he also served 'Abd al-Daulah, one of the Buwayhid’s, and later some other princes of that famous family.

Miskawaih died on the 9th of Şafār 421/16th of February 1030. The date of his birth is uncertain. Margoliouth gives it to be 330/941, but we think it should be 320/932 if not earlier, because he used to be in the company of al-Muhallabi, the vizier, who rose to the office in 339/950 and died in 352/963, by which time he must have at least been nineteen.

B

WORKS

Yaqút5 gives a list of thirteen books attributed to Miskawaih. These are:

1. Al-Fāw' al-'Abbār.
2. Al-Fāw' al-'Agghār.

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1 Gāl (S), I, p. 582, n.1
2 Al-Qifti, Tarikh al-Hukûmat, ed. Lippert, p. 332.
Miskawiah

encouraged in subduing the ferocious self, and wisdom in regulating the irrational impulses were the highlights of this code. He himself speaks of his moral transformation in his Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, which shows that he practised a good deal of what he wrote on ethics.

D

PHILOSOPHY

First Philosophy.—The most important part of Miskawiah’s philosophical activity is dedicated to ethics. He is a moralist in the full sense of the word. Three important books of his on ethics have come down to us: (1) Tarhib al-Saadah, (2) Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, and (3) Jauadun Khatir.

Miskawiah’s Al-Fawz al-Azgar is a general treatise similar in conception to the earlier part of al-Farabi’s Ars’ Aka’ al-Madimat al-Falih. It is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the proofs of the existence of God, the second with soul and its modes, and the third with prophethood. For his treatment of philosophy, he owes much to al-Farabi, particularly in his effort to conciliate Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. His historical turn of mind has been of benefit to him, for he generally refers precisely to his sources. For instance, at the end of Chapter V of the first part of Al-Fawz al-Azgar he expressly acknowledges his indebtedness to Porphyry. He also quotes the commentaries of Plato and Aristotle. His is the best exposé (pp. 53–55) of Plato’s proof concerning the immortality of the soul. He benefits especially from the book of Proclus entitled Kitab Sharh Qawl Plato’fi al-Nafs Sharh Maiat. The first part of Fawz al-Azgar dealing with the demonstration of the existence of God is clear, terse, and solid. His argument here is that of the First Mover, which was most popular at the time. In that he is thoroughly Aristotelian. The fundamental attributes of God are: unity, eternity, and immateriality. Miskawiah devotes the whole of Chapter VIII to the problem of defining God affirmatively or negatively, and concludes that the negative way is the only possible way. He also shows Neo-Platonic tendencies noticeably in Chapter IX. He says that the first existent which emanates from God is the first intelligence which (so says Miskawiah rather strangely) is the same as the active intellect. It is eternal, perfect in existence, and immutable in state, because “emanation is connected with it in a continuous way eternally, the source of emanation being eternal and wholly generous.” It is perfect in comparison with beings inferior to it, imperfect in comparison with God. Then comes the celestial soul, inferior to intelligence; it needs motion as expression of desire for perfection in imitation of intelligence. But it is perfect in relation to

C

MISKAWIHA’S PERSONALITY

Miskawiah was essentially a historian and moralist. He was also a poet. Taubah blame him for his miserliness and hypocrisy. He indulged in alchemy not for the sake of science, but in search of gold and wealth, and was most servile to his masters. But Yaqui mentions that in later years he subjected himself to a fifteen-point code of moral conduct. Temperance in appetites,

* Al-Qifsi, loc. cit.
* Al-Fawz al-Azgar, p. 120.

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natural bodies. The sphere comes into being through the celestial soul. In comparison with the soul, it is imperfect and so needs the motion of which the body is capable, i.e., the motion in space. The sphere has the circular motion which assures it of the eternal existence assigned to it by God. Through the sphere and its parts our bodies come into being. Our being is very weak because of the long chain of intermediaries between God and us. For the same reason it is changeable and not eternal. All classes of beings come to be through God, and it is His emanating being and permeating might which conserve order in the cosmos. If God abandons this emanation, nothing will come into existence.

As a true religious thinker, Miskawayh tries to prove that creation comes *ex nihilo*. He mentions that Galen said something against this view, but was refuted by Alexander of Aphrodisias in a special treatise. The argument given by Miskawayh is as follows: Forms succeed each other, the substratum remaining constant. In this change from one form to another, where do the preceding forms go? The two forms cannot remain together because they are contrary. Secondly, the first form cannot go elsewhere, because motion in place applies only to bodies, and accidents cannot go from one place to another. There remains only one possibility—the possibility that the first form goes into nothing. If it is proved that the first form goes to Non-Being, then the second form cannot and so on from nothing. Therefore, all things generated are generated from nothing.

Aristotle conceived of the universe as a process of becoming. The “nature” of each thing is a potentiality which moves through a process of development to an actuality which is its final nature. The movement is towards an end immanent from the first in the subject of movement. An altogether different theory appears in the fiftieth “Epistle” of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-Ṣafa), where the process of evolution has been shown to advance from the mineral to the human stage under the guidance of the spiritual urge for return to God. The Brethren of Purity used this theory to determine the status of prophet-hood. Miskawayh goes further and finds in it a stable basis for his moral theory as well. Like Aristotle he does regard happiness (sa‘ādah) as the chief human good, but unlike him he identifies it in the end with the realization of the icoherence of God, the place which man occupies in the cosmic evolution by virtue of his specific attribute of rationality.

Miskawayh’s theory of evolution is basically the same as that of the Brethren of Purity. It consists of four evolutionary stages: the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and the human. Coral (marjūn), date-palm, and ape (qivd) mark the transition from the mineral to the vegetable, from the vegetable to the animal, and from the animal to the human kingdom, respectively. The prophet,

13 *Tahdhib al-Akhlâq*, pp. 64-60; *Al-Fawz al-Aqghar*, pp. 78-83.

in the end, completes the circle of Being by imbibing the celestial soul within him.

Psychology.—Miskawayh’s psychology is based on the traditional spiritualistic doctrine laid down by Plato and Aristotle, with a predominant Platonic tendency. He treats the subject in *Al-Fawz al-Aqghar* and *Tahdhib al-Akhlâq*. In the first of these works he discusses the problems more thoroughly. But he repeats himself on many points in both the books; in both we have the same arguments, the same examples, and nearly the same words.

Against the materialists he proves the existence of the soul on the ground that there is something in man which admits different and even opposed forms at the same time. This something cannot be material, for matter accepts only one form in a determinate moment.

The soul perceives simple and complex things, present and absent, sensible and intelligible. But does it perceive them through one and the same faculty, or through many faculties? Soul has no parts; divisibility applies only to matter. Does the soul, in spite of being one and indivisible, perceive different things with different faculties and in different ways? In answering this question, Miskawayh gives two different solutions: that of Plato, who says that similar perceives similar, and that of Aristotle who says that soul has one faculty that perceives complex material things and simple non-material things, but in different ways. In this connection Miskawayh mentions Theopistius and his book “On Soul.”

On the question of the immortality of the soul, Miskawayh gives at first Aristotle’s doctrine. Then he gives (Chapter VI) three arguments of Plato; referring first to Plato himself, then to Proclus’ “Commentary on Plato’s Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul,” and finally to something that Galen said on this question. Miskawayh says that Plato’s doctrine is too long and needs a commentary; therefore, he attempts to summarize it as clearly as possible, with the help of Proclus’ “Commentary.” In this and the following chapters (VII, VIII) he is a thorough Platonist and makes a special mention of Plato’s *Laws* and *Timaeus*. Plato says that the essence of the soul is motion, and motion is the life of the soul. Miskawayh explains and says: This motion is of two kinds: one towards intelligence, the other towards matter; by the first it is illuminated, by the second it illuminates. But this motion is eternal and non-spatial, and so it is immutable. By the first kind of motion, the soul comes near to intelligence which is the first creation of God; by the second it descends and comes out of itself. Therefore, the soul comes nearer to God by the first motion, and goes farther by the second. The first leads to its salvation, the second to its perdition. Quoting Plato he says that philosophy is an exercise of voluntary death. There are two kinds of life: life according to intelligence, which is “natural life,” and life according to matter, which is

11 *Al-Fawz al-Aqghar*, Part II, Chap. V.
13 Plato, *Timaeus*, pp. 61, 64, 67.

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voluntary life. The same applies to death; therefore, Plato says. If you die by will, you live by nature. Here "will" is taken in the sense of "passion."

But Miskawaih at once corrects himself by saying that this voluntary death does not mean renunciation of the world; that would be the attitude of those who know nothing about the objects of this world and ignore that man is civil by nature and cannot live without the help and service of others. Those who preach renunciation are iniquitous, because they want the services of others without rendering any service to them and this is complete injustice. Some pretend that they need very little, but even this very little needs the services of a great number of people. Therefore, it is the duty of every human being to serve others fairly: if he serves them much he can demand much, and if he serves them little, he can ask for little.

This is an important aspect of Miskawaih's philosophical view, and explains his great interest in ethics.

Moral Philosophy.—Moral philosophy is so connected with psychology that Miskawaih begins his big treatise on ethics Takhdib al-Akhlaq, by stating his doctrine of the soul. Here his exposition is less philosophical but richer in detail.

The point of transition from psychology to ethics is given on pages 18 to 21 where, following Plato, he draws a parallel between the faculties of the soul and the corresponding virtues. Plato has three faculties: rational, courageous, and appetitive, and correspondingly three virtues: wisdom, courage, and temperance. By the harmony of these three virtues, we have a fourth one, namely, justice. The Greek temperament being theoretical and speculative, Plato could go no farther than this. Equipped with a personal code of moral conduct, Miskawaih determined seven species of wisdom, viz., acuteness of intelligence, quickness of intellect, clearness of understanding, facility of acquirement, precision of discrimination, retention, and recollection; twelve species of courage, viz., magnanimity, collectedness, loftiness of purpose, firmness, coolness, steadiness, boldness, endurance, constancy, zeal, and mercy; twelve species of temperance, viz., shame, affability, righteousness, conciliatoriness, patience, contentment, sedateness, piety, regularity, integrity, and liberality (which is further divided into six sub-species); and nineteen species of justice, viz., friendship, union, faithfulness, compassion, brotherhood, recompense, good partnership, fair-dealing, cordiality, submission, resignation, devotion to God, forgetting of enmity, abstention from speaking ill of others, discussing the character of the just, ignoring the account of the unjust, and abstention from trusting the ignoble, the mischiefmonger, and the flatterer. We, however, cannot determine exactly whether these sub-divisions and distinctions are all Miskawaih's own. Surely he benefited himself much from his predecessors, and especially from the school of

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abi Sulasim al-Sijistâni al-Manṭiqi, the echo of whose works we find in Taushid's Muye basit.

So far Miskawaih has been Platonic, but from page 29 onward he begins to be Aristotelian, and takes virtue as a mean between two vices. He applies this doctrine of the mean to the four cardinal virtues, and with this he ends the first chapter.

In the second chapter, Miskawaih goes on to discuss the question of human nature and its original state: whether it is born good or bad. He states the opinion of the early Greeks who say that nature can never be changed, but rejects it. He takes up the view of the Stoics who think that men are created good but become bad by their inclination to bad appetites and by keeping bad company. There is also a third opinion that men are created bad and they become good only by education. Galen rejects the last two views and says that men are of three kinds: some are good by nature, others are bad by nature, and a third class is intermediate between the two. Finally, Miskawaih states the opinion of Aristotle as given in the Nicomachean Ethics, and gives his own view that "the existence of the human substance depends on God's will, but the amelioration of it is left to man and depends on man's will." (p. 46).

Perfection attainable by man is of two kinds: the first is theoretical and the second practical. By the first he attains perfect science, by the second perfect character. Human faculties are three; the highest is reason, the lowest is appetite, and between the two lies courage. Man is man by the first. Therefore, perfection belongs especially to the rational soul. In each faculty there are many degrees, which Miskawaih enumerates in detail. Here (pp. 67-78) we find a long chapter on the education of children and youth.

The essential part of Miskawaih's ethics begins from the third chapter (pp. 90 et sqq.). In the first place he follows Aristotle as commented upon by Porphyry. It seems that he depends entirely on the commentary of Porphyry on Aristotle's 'Nicomachean Ethics', which was translated into Arabic by Ishâq ibn Ḥunain, in twelve books. Unfortunately, this commentary is lost both in Greek and its Arabic translation. But we can gather something of its form from Miskawaih's Takhdib al-Akhlaq.

Following Aristotle, Miskawaih says (p. 90) that the good is that at which all things aim. This definition, which is supposed to be perhaps that of Eudoxus (c. 25 B.C.), is given in the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics. Miskawaih goes on then to say that what is useful to this end may also be called good, i.e., the means as well as the end can be called good. But happiness or well-being is a relative good—good for an individual person. It is only a kind of good and has no distinctive and autonomous essence.

Miskawaih, like Aristotle, gives a classification of happiness but adds more

28 Republic, Book IV.


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of his orders. Man should do his best to please his friends and to be always on good terms with them without hypocrisy and flattery.

Miskawiah’s treatment of justice (‘adl) is largely Aristotelian, although for him this virtue is a shadow of divine unity, the true equipoise. The knowledge of the mean or the limit that moderation would set in each particular case is a prerequisite of justice, but, unlike Aristotle, he assigns this function to the divine code rather than to reason or prudence. The king as the deputy of God can exercise royal discretion in minor details according to the exigencies of time and place, without violating the spirit of the divine code. Aristotle recognized benevolence vaguely in the imperfect form of liberality which for him meant giving to “proper persons, in right proportion, at right times.” With Ibn Miskawiah, it is such an excess over the just award as would eliminate all possibility of under-estimation in justice, provided that its prejudicial effects are confined to the rights of the benevolent person himself only and the recipient himself is a worthy choice for it. Charity, thus, is a form of justice which is safe from disturbance. Similarly, love, according to him, is not an extension of self-love, as held by Aristotle, but a limitation of it and love for another. He regards affection (mahabbah) as an inborn capacity for associating with mankind in general, but confines friendship (padqah) to a few individuals, basing it on the considerations of profit, pleasure, or good as conceived by Aristotle. Love (‘ishq) being the excessive desire for pleasure or good—the consideration of profit is alien to love—cannot extend beyond two individuals. The object of animal love is pleasure and that of the spiritual love is virtue or goodness. The former is condemnable, the latter praiseworthy. He makes a specific mention of the love of man for God, of disciple for teacher, and of son for his parents in a graded series, as pointed out earlier. Justice, he concludes, is brought about through fear and force, but affection is a natural source of unity, so that justice is not required where affection reigns supreme. Affection, thus, is the sovereign; justice is the vicegerent.

As in al-Fauz al-Aqbar, so in Tahdib al-Akhlaq (pp. 195–96) Miskawiah is against all forms of ascetic life, because ascetics “sever themselves from all the moral virtues mentioned above. How can he who retires from men and lives in isolation be temperate, just, generous, or courageous? Is he anything other than something inorganic and dead?” Divine happiness is the ultimate goal and the good of man. It belongs to man’s divine part. It is pure good, while reason is the first good.

Spiritual Medicine.—The last two chapters of Tahdib al-Akhlaq are devoted to what may be called spiritual medicine, a phrase which we find for the first time as the title of Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi’s famous book: al-Tibb

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26 Ibid., p. 95.


31 Ibid., p. 114.

31 Ibid., p. 198.
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al-Rāzī. Miskawaih uses the phrase ُتَبِيب الْأَنفُسُ (p. 200), but the resemblance in the general treatment of the subject is obvious. This implies that Miskawaih is undoubtedly acquainted with al-Rāzī’s treatise, although he does not mention him by name. The two begin by saying that the mastering of one’s passion is the essential foundation of spiritual hygiene. Both refer to Galen’s book “On Knowing One’s Own Defects.” (This work was translated into Arabic by Thuma and revised by Ḥumain. But, whereas al-Rāzī contents himself with what Galen says in this respect, Miskawaih contends it by saying that there does not exist a friend who can find for you your defects, and that an enemy is more useful in this respect than a friend (p. 200) because he is more aware of your vices and would have no hesitation in revealing them to you. In this connection Miskawaih recommends the study of another of Galen’s treatises: “That Good People Benefit from Their Enemies,” which deals with this topic and is also mentioned by al-Rāzī. Miskawaih then refers to al-Kindī, who, in effect, said that the man who is in search of virtue should realize that the images of his acquaintances are mirrors in which are reflected the evils arising out of pains and passions.

In the end, Miskawaih speaks of remedies for the diseases of the soul. He enumerates the most important diseases—anger, vanity, contentiousness, treason, cowardice, vainglory, fear, and sadness—and deals with their treatment. Some of his chapters correspond with some chapters in al-Rāzī’s ُتَبِيب، namely, those on vanity, sadness, and fear of death. He also reproduces some passages from al-Kindī’s treatise “On the Rejection of Sadness” (p. 256).

Why does not Miskawaih mention Muḥammad ibn Zakariya al-Rāzī? It is because al-Rāzī’s conclusions and method of treatment were quite contrary to his own. Al-Kindī, on the other hand, was a kindred spirit. Al-Rāzī was bold, rationalistic, and abstruse, whereas al-Kindī was moderate, pious, and more accessible.

We have all along been showing what Miskawaih owes to his Greek predecessors, but we should not forget that Islamic culture also has an important influence on him. In supporting some ideas which he expounds, he very often quotes the Qur’ān, traditions (بِعْثُه) of the Prophet, sayings of ibn abi Ṭālib and al-Hasan al-Baṣri, besides Arabic poetry.

Philosophy of History.—Miskawaih is essentially a historian and moralist. His ethics is genetic (being based on the place and position of man in the cosmic evolution), religious, and practical in character. He even felt it necessary to reform himself morally before writing his ُتَبِيب الْأَنفُسُ. In history, his point of view is philosophical, scientific, and critical. Anticipating the modern outlook, he determines both the function of history and the duties of the historian as follows.

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25 It was translated into Urdu by Ḥukman Sayyid Zafar Mahdi in 1815.
27 Ibid., p. 272.
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