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opposition to it is the cause of all disasters. Hindu sādhus or ascetics undergo much privation but all in vain, for it is not in accordance with the true Law. The most that such ascetics can achieve is some material gain which is transitory. The devotees of the religious Law are like dealers in diamonds who work less but gain more. 34

On the completion of a Sufi’s life, real pleasure is derived from the performance of obligatory prayers, while in the beginning non-obligatory prayers are more pleasant. 35

The states of ecstasy, gosips, and “illumination” are good if they are subservient to the Law; otherwise they are misleading. If not weighed in the balance of the Law, they are worthless. 36

The Sufistic conduct helps one to abide by the divine Law. It controls one’s lower passions and undermines their influence. It is neither antagonistic nor equivalent to the religious Law. It is rather subservient to it. 37

Some people pontificate in the observation of the form of Law, but they ignore its intrinsic truth and worth and regard salvation as their only aim. Some people achieve the truth but assert that they have achieved it through their own effort and not through the help of the divine Law, which for them is merely formal. They think only of the form of the Law and not of the spirit of it. Either group is ignorant of its intrinsic virtues and is deprived of the divine guidance. True theologians alone are heirs to the prophets. 38

Those who regard a saint (sulṭan) superior to a prophet are senseless and are not fully aware of the attributes of prophethood which is superior to saintship (sulṭan) in all respects. 39

The Muḥaddid was a great religious enthusiast. The movement that he started in religion is still continued by his followers in various parts of the Muslim world. His heritage is indispensable for a modern reconstruction of religious thought in Islam. He was a Sufi but he did not think Sufism as the sole aim of life. For him it was merely a means to an end, the end being complete and unconditional adherence and fidelity to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. For an essentially just estimate of his teachings one must consider him with reference to his times. His books are a valuable record of his practice and thought. He gave us a treatise on Sufistic perfection, but the best of him is found in three volumes of his letters. The total number of letters in all these volumes is 535. With some exceptions, these are arranged in their chronological order. Five of his letters have been lost. They prove beyond doubt the encyclopaedic knowledge he had, and make a pleasant and enlightening reading.

34 Ibid., Letter No. 114.
35 Ibid., Letter No. 177.
36 Ibid., Letter No. 207.
37 Ibid., Letter No. 216.
38 Ibid., Book II, Letter No. 18.

Jalāl al-Dīn Dāwānī

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Part 4. The “Philosophers”

Chapter XLV

JALĀL AL-DĪN DAWĀNĪ

A LIFE AND WORKS

Muhammad bin As‘ad Jalāl al-Dīn was born in 830/1427 at Dāwānī in the district of Kāsrānī, of which his father was the Ḍād. Having received early education from his father and then from Maḥfūz al-Arī and Ḥāfīz al-Dīn at Shīrāz, he ultimately became professor at the Maḥfūz al-Arī. In a short time he became famous for his knowledge and learning, attracting students from far and wide. It was in recognition of his literary and academic fame that he got admission into the Court of Ḥasan Beg Khān Bahādur (Uṣūl Ḥasan), the then Turkish ruler of Mosul and Persia. He ultimately rose to the eminent position of the Ḍād of the Court, which position he retained under Sulṭān Ya‘qūb as well. He died in 907/1501 or 908/1502, and was buried in his native village Dāwānī.1

Ṭūst revived the tradition of philosophical disciplines during the Mongol period; Dāwānī did the same during the Ottoman period. Whereas the former gave a fresh impetus to the study of Ibn Sīnā by writing commentaries on some of his works and by defending him against his detractors, the latter reinstated the study of Ṣīnā dīn Maṣṭūl by writing a commentary on his Ḍād Nār and elaborating his illuminative philosophy (bīkūmū-i ṭīrā) in his own works. Both are revitalists, but they differ in their approach to the truth. The one in a true Avicennian, the other a faithful Subrahmanian. Broekelman has enumerated seventy of his extant works,3 of which the important ones are listed below:


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3. Al-Zanjī, Qairo, 1226/1808.
5. Rīḍālāh fi Thakīq Nafs al-Am.
7. Rīḍālāh fi 'Adīlādī.
10. Anwārul-Abīn.*

**ETHICS**

Dawwānī was commissioned by Sulṭān Ḫasan Beg to revise the ethical treatise of Ṭūnī with the express aim of “correcting and completing” it from the illuminative (∝hārūz) point of view. The structure of *Akhbār-i Jalālī* is basically the same as that of *Akhbār-i Nāṣrī*, but in the execution of the work Dawwānī has artistically ornamented it with the Qur’ānic verses, precepts of the Prophet and his Companions, and the moving utterances of the mystics. He not only abbreviated and simplified Ṭūnī’s treatise but also amplified and elaborated it at places in the light of the philosophy of illumination; besides he added much by way of literary adornment.

Following Ibn Miskawayh, Jalālī regards ultimate happiness (nāshidāt-i quvān) as the *summa bonum* of life. His concept of ultimate happiness, because of its reference to the heavenly (qudāi) element, is intrinsically different from the Aristotelian concept of happiness. Dawwānī goes a step further and identifies the moral with the religious ideal. It is with reference to God-intended vicegerency that the Qur’ān distinguishes right from wrong, evaluates knowledge and appreciates power; therefore, vicegerency of God (kalīfāt-i ʿalāk) and not ultimate happiness should be the inspiriting ideal of the “noblest of the creation.” His moral theory, in other words, is based on the place or position of man in the universe as determined by God and not by man himself, which is that of the vicegerency of God.

What entitled man to this high office of responsibility? Dawwānī finds the answer in a saying of the Caliph ‘Alī. Man, according to this saying, occupies a middle position between the angels and the brutes. The former have intellect without desire and iri. They have no temptations, nor freedom of choice; being perfect by nature, they are above morality. The latter, on the other hand, have desire and iri without intellect, and, thus, being incapable of controlling their irrational impulses, are below morality. Man has both. He

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3. Qur’ān, ii, 190; v. 2.

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mind of the Muslims, who classified ethics as a "part of practical philosophy." With Ibn Miskawayh, the first Muslim moralist, the emphasis shifted from broad generalizations to individual differentiation and specification of virtues. He not only determined seven, eleven, twelve and sixteen species of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice respectively—the four cardinal virtues of Plato—but also developed an attractive theory of the causes and cures of mental diseases, a process which culminated in al-Ghazâli with a shift from an intellectual to a mystic outlook.

Ibn Miskawayh had worked out the details of Plato's theory of virtue, but with Tâsi the problem was that of improving and completing the Aristotelian theory of vice. He emphasized for the first time that deviation from the equipoise is not only quantitative but also qualitative, and, thus, added per version (radi'at) as the third generic cause of vice to the Aristotelian excess and deficiency of a State. Tâsi also set the seal of completion on practical philosophy by including domestic and political ethics in his ethical treatise in order to meet the deficiencies of the ethical work of Ibn Sina (Kâbul al-Farâs) and of that of Fârâbî. Lastly, Tâsi revolted against the aesthetic ethics of al-Ghazâli. Asceticism, for him, is the negation of moral life, for man is by nature a social being as is indicated by the word for man in Arabic, islaâ (associating), and body is not an obstacle but an instrument of the soul for attaining the perfection it is capable of. Nevertheless, he recognizes asceticism as a necessary stage in the development of mystic consciousness, of which he has had no personal experience. Inspired by the illuminative philosophy of Shâhâb al-Din Mattû, Dawânî finds complete harmony between philosophy and mysticism. What the mystic "sees," the philosopher "knows," and what the latter "knows," the former "sees." He, therefore, gave a Qur'ânic bias to the ethics of Tâsi.

C POLITICS

Following Tâsi, Dawânî too has used Siyâsat-i Mûsûn more in the sense of the science of civics than in the modern sense of politics. The origin, function, and classes of society and the need of a government headed by a just king are the same for Dawânî as for Tâsi. Monarchy is held to be the ideal form of government, in which king is the second arbiter of justice, the first being the divine Law. After reproducing the general principles of distributive and corrective justice from Âhbabî-i Nâpirî, Dawânî adds ten moral principles of his own, which ought to be observed by a king in order to ensure efficient administration of justice.

15 _Âhbabî-i Nâpirî_, p. 114.
16 _Istânî_, Topâvârî, p. 92. 886

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In the first place, the king should invariably consider himself to be the aggrieved party while deciding a case, so that he may not wish for the aggrieved what is abhorrent to himself. Secondly, he should see that the cases are disposed of quickly, for justice delayed is justice denied. Thirdly, he should not indulge in sensual and physical pleasures which ultimately bring about the ruin of a State in their wake. Fourthly, royal decisions should be based on elemental and condescension rather than on rashness and wrath. Fifthly, in pleasing people he should seek the pleasure of God. Sixthly, he should not seek the pleasure of the people by displeasing God. Seventhly, he should render justice if decision is left to his discretion, but forgiveness is better than justice if mercy is begged of him. Eighthly, he should associate with the righteous and lend ears to their counsels. Ninthly, he should keep every one to his rightful place and should not entrust high office to the low-born people. Lastly, he should not be content with personal abstention from injustice, but should so conduct the affairs of the State that none under his authority is guilty of this offence.

D METAPHYSICS

Like Tâsi and others, Dawânî’s cosmology consists of the gradual emanation of ten intellects, nine spheres, four elements, and three kingdoms of nature. The active intellect, the intellect of the sphere of the moon, bridges the gap between the heaven and the earth.

Quoting the Prophet’s saying that intellect is the noblest of all the created things, Dawânî identifies the first intellect (’aql-i aswâl) with the original essence of Muhammad. It conceives the idea of all things past, present, and future, just as a seed potentially contains roots, branches, leaves, and fruit. The spheres which are stationary in nature, but changeable in qualities, control the destiny of the material world. Fresh situations come into being through the revolutions of the spheres, and every moment the active intellect causes a new form into existence to reflect itself in the mirror of elemental matter. Passing through the mineral, vegetative, and animal states, the first intellect finally appears in the form of acquired intellect (’aql-i mustafâd) in man, and, thus, the highest point having coalesced with the lowest, the circle of being is completed by the two arcs of ascent and descent.

The first intellect is like the seed which, having sprouted into twigs, branches, and fruit, reverts to its original form of unity possessing collective potentiality. This circular process takes the form of motion (berkât-i uṣâdiyyî), in growing bodies of increasing or decreasing their magnitude, and in the rational soul that of the movement of thought. All these motions are, in fact, shadows of the divine motion proceeding from God’s love for self-expression, which in mystic terminology is called the flashing of Self upon Self. 18

18 _Âhbabî_ Jâhâl, pp. 588–590.
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Dawwānī’s metaphysical treatise, *al-Zawā'ir* is a critical evaluation of *Ka’ilim* and of the teachings of the spiritual leaders, the philosophers, and the mystics, from the illuminative (sighshī) point of view. He fully appreciates the utility and importance of the first three disciplines but takes a serious notice of the inconsistency with Islam of some of the issues raised by them. He believes that philosophy and mysticism both ultimately lead to the same goal, yet he cannot shut his eyes to the eminence and superiority of the latter over the former. Mysticism, in his view, is free from doubt and uncertainty because it is due to divine grace and is, therefore, nearer to prophethood.11

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Chapter XLVI

IBN KHALDŪN

A

Ibn Khaldūn wrote no major work in fields accepted in the Muslim philosophic tradition, or which he himself considered to be the proper fields of philosophic investigation—logic, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics—politics, ethics, and economics.1 Consequently, he was not regarded by his contemporaries, or by subsequent Muslim students of philosophy, as a philosopher (*fiqhūlli*) in the sense in which al-Fārābī, Ibn Sina, and ibn Ṣaḥhāl were identified as such. Nevertheless, both his contemporaries and later Muslim students of history and society were aware that Ibn Khaldūn had made the most significant contribution to those specialized fields through his

undertaking a scientific investigation of them. It was, however, the enhanced interest in the study of history and society in modern times which led to the devolution of increased attention to Ibn Khaldūn’s thought, to the recognition of his rank as a major Muslim thinker, and to the judgment that he was equal, if not superior, to the other well-known Muslim philosophers. This was in part the result of the higher prestige, and of the peculiar theoretical importance, which history and the science of society (as compared to the theoretical part of traditional philosophy) have come to enjoy in modern times. But the more important reason for the singular interest in Ibn Khaldūn in modern times lies in the conclusions of his investigations in history and society.

To the moderns, these conclusions appear to be more scientific than either the conclusions of the legal investigation of Muslim jurists or the political-philosophic investigations of Muslim philosophers. Perhaps on the analogy of the revolt of modern science against traditional philosophy, and especially of modern political science and social science against traditional political science, it has been assumed that Ibn Khaldūn must have attempted a similar, or parallel, revolt against traditional Muslim philosophy in general, and against traditional Muslim political philosophy in particular.

Because of its important implications for the understanding of Ibn Khaldūn’s thought, this crucial assumption deserves critical examination. The larger context of the present work seems to warrant an inquiry into the precise relationship between Ibn Khaldūn’s new science and the Muslim philosophic tradition. This relationship has been for the most part viewed in the perspective, and under the influence, of the modern philosophic and scientific tradition. In the present work, in contrast, the reader comes to Ibn Khaldūn through the preceding Greek and Muslim philosophic tradition, which Ibn Khaldūn knew and in relation to which he can be expected to have taken his bearing. The reader, thus, must be shown, on the basis of Ibn Khaldūn’s conception of philosophy and science, and of his conception of the relation between his new science and the established philosophic science, whether he was in fundamental agreement with that tradition (in which case it must be shown what the specific character of his contribution to that tradition was), or in fundamental disagreement with it, and hence was the teacher of, not only a new, but a novel doctrine. That this procedure is the sound historical procedure is usually admitted. But what has not been seen with sufficient clarity is that, in addition to providing the proper historical perspective for the understanding of Ibn Khaldūn’s thought, it is of fundamental importance to elicit the basic principles or premises of his new science, and thus contribute to the understanding of its true character.

B

Ibn Khaldûn’s place in the history of Muslim philosophy, and his contribution to the Muslim philosophic tradition, must be determined primarily on the basis of the “Introduction” (*Muqaddimah*) and Book One of his “History”