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Chapter LXXXIII

RENAISSANCE IN INDONESIA

A

INTRODUCTORY

The three centuries during which it was ruled by the Portuguese, the Spaniards, and the Dutch form the dark age of Indonesia's history. All the energies of the Indonesian leaders were concentrated during these years on the problems of political emancipation on one side and social and religious reform on the other. This account of the modern renaissance in Indonesia is, therefore, an account of the political renaissance of that country and of the modernist movements which indirectly influenced the course of that long-drawn and bitter struggle. The memories of that conflict and the experience gained during this period influenced the present generation in its religious

and cultural outlook and its approach to social and economic problems. As religion played an important part in the movement for political emancipation, reference will also be made here and there to religious reforms.

At present ninety per cent of the population of Indonesia professes the religion of Islam but it took several centuries for Islam to become the main religion in that country. As it has been shown in an earlier chapter, the credit for the spread and popularization of Islam in Indonesia goes to the Sufis of various orders.¹ The Sufi interpretation of Islam very well suited the cultural background of the Indonesians in whose life and thought the deep influences of Hinduism and Buddhism, which had at one time been the principal spiritual forces in Indonesian society, were deeply embedded.

The commercial intercourse between Indonesia and other Islamic countries, particularly India, Arabia, and Egypt, led to a closer cultural collaboration with the Muslims in other parts of the world. Many Indonesians went to holy places for the annual pilgrimage and some of them stayed there to complete their studies or to settle down there permanently. It was these Indonesians who imbibed deeply the tenets of Islamic religion and later on tried to combat the un-Islamic practices which had crept into Islam in their home country. This led to a purist movement in the country insisting on a closer conformity with Islam. "Mecca," says Snouck Hurgronje, "has been well said to have more influence on the religious life of these islands than on Turkey, India, or Bukhara."² How deeply attached to their old customs and traditions even the modern educated Indonesians are is well illustrated by the statement of a prominent Indonesian lady who, while addressing the members of the British Women Association, remarked "that the Indonesians were indeed proud of their old customs and traditions and wished to preserve them in spite of their Islamic religion adopted about seven centuries ago."³

The Indonesian national movement is of recent origin. Before the beginning of the fourteenth/twentieth century, there had been isolated and sporadic outbursts of armed resistance to the rapacious exploitation of the Indonesians by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British, such as those of Dipa Nagara, in the province of Djocjkarta,⁴ Tenku 'Umar,⁵ Imām Bondjol,⁶ etc. The first organized political movement started in the first decade of this century. There were many factors responsible for the development of Indonesian nationalism and political consciousness which materially affected the course of the Indonesians' struggle as also the political structure of Indonesia after it had been won.

¹ For the role of *ṭariqahs* in general, see H. A. R. Gibb, *An Interpretation of Islamic History*, p. 11; *Muslim World*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, January 1955, p. 130.

² Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, Shirkat-i-Qulam, Lahore, p. 407.

³ *Indonesia Today*, Vol. II, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1959, p. 19.

⁴ For details, see Vlekke Nusantara, *A History of the East Indian Archipelago*, pp. 1, 265-69, 281.

⁵ Nūr Aḥmad Qādri, *Tamaddun-i Indonesia*, Vol. I, pp. 464-68.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 449-52.

Of the modern Islamic reform movements in other countries that of Muḥammad 'Abduh in Egypt had a very deep influence on Indonesian thought and way of life. The Dutch tried to prevent the inflow of books and newspapers published in Egypt and other Arab countries as they were afraid of the "dangerous pan-Islamic ideas" which these writings contained. In spite of their vigilance the Egyptian periodicals *al-Manār*, *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*, *al-Mu'yyad*, *al-Siyāṣah*, *al-Liwa*, and *al-'Adl* were smuggled into Indonesia and were widely read. Scholars like Imām Bondjol, H. Jalāl al-Dīn Ṭayyib, Mukhtār Luṭfi, H. H. Amarullah brought back with them modern Islamic ideas current in Islamic lands and particularly those introduced by Muḥammad 'Abduh and Jamāl al-Dīn Afghānī in Cairo. Indian modernist writings were equally welcome and widely read.⁷ The main aim of the Indonesian Muslims who were caught up in the current of modern reformist movements in Islamic countries was to purify Indonesian Muslim society from the indigenous unorthodox practices. They had to combat at the same time the Dutch educated intelligentsia who were gradually becoming indifferent towards religion, and regarded Islam "as a religious and cultural anachronism and an obstacle to progress." The Christian missionary activities and the large number of missionary schools subsidized by the Dutch posed another difficult problem for the Indonesian religious and educational reformers. "Every new period in the history of civilization obliges a religious community to undertake a general revision of the contents of its treasury," remarks Snouck Hurgronje, "and the situation in Indonesia called for the establishment of religious, social, and political organizations to rehabilitate Islam and combat the contaminating influences of Western impact." The "pesantren" or *madrasah* which followed the traditional Muslim pattern of education played a very important role in building up the Islamic character of the Indonesian Muslims, while the Western system of education which touched only the upper stratum of Indonesian society did much to broaden their outlook, rationalize their thought, and prepare them morally and intellectually to fight for the liberation of their country from centuries of colonial exploitation.

One of the most active and popular organizations for socio-religious reform was Muḥammadiyah founded by Kiaja Ḥāji Aḥmad Dachlan in November 1912 at Jogjakarta, which met with a relatively wide response. It rapidly grew in popularity as is shown by the large number of its branches in various parts of the country. The objectives of the organization were similar to those of the Salafiyyah in Egypt—the purification of Islam as practised in Indonesia of the customs, rituals, and beliefs which were derived from the Hindu and Buddhist religions and also from the debased Sufi doctrines; a rationalized

⁷ Concerning the influence of the West upon Indonesian Islam, see C. C. Berg, "Indonesia" in H. A. R. Gibb, *Whither Islam?*, London, 1939; Harvey S. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, Cornell University Press, 1955; W. F. Wertheim, *Effect of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society*, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1950, and also his *Indonesian Society in Transition*.

interpretation of orthodox Islamic doctrines; the reformation of Muslim educational system; and the defence of Islam against external attacks. This movement aiming at a rationalist interpretation of orthodox Islamic doctrine built up a network of schools. The organization later included a wide range of social services—free clinics, relief for the poor, orphanages, and publication of the Qur'ān. The organization, as a matter of policy, did not take active part in the political problems with which the Indonesians were faced. In practice, however, "the progressive Muslim social concepts which it sought to advance could not be divested of the political consciousness of its members and of the pupils taught in its many schools. It was a still, but deep, tributary of the stream of political nationalism and quietly but substantially nourished and strengthened that stream."⁸

B

NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

The degree of religious homogeneity in Indonesia which Islam had brought about was an important factor in the growth of national movement. Islam served both as a symbol of social unity and as an ingroup solidarity against imperialistic foreign aggressors in a country where, in spite of diversity of race, language, and religion, the national feeling was strong. While the Dutch Government and the Christian organizations in Holland gave moral and material assistance to the Christian missions established in Indonesia, the Government did not allow the purely Muslim societies or organizations to propagate freely the principles of Islam. Besides the Muslims, there are in Indonesia about two million Chinese Buddhists, two million Christians, one million Hindus especially in the Island of Bali, and a large number of animists. According to Wertheim, "it was possible to sustain the paradox that the extension of Islam in Indonesian Archipelago was due to the Westerners. The arrival of Portuguese power in the area made the princes embrace Islamic faith as a political move to counter Christian penetration."⁹

Islamic modernist movements, especially in Cairo, as already mentioned, found ready response in Indonesia. In 1929/1911 the Indonesians studying in the international Islamic milieu of Mecca and Cairo came back saturated with pan-Islamic ideas which made them ill-disposed towards the European administrative system and the European way of life. The Dutch Government, too late in the day, decided to give the Indonesians the benefit of Western education and greater association with the government of the country in the hope of neutralizing the influence of Islamic revivalist movements. By giving

⁸ G. M. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, New York, pp. 87–88. See also Bousquet, *A French View of the Netherlands Indies*, pp. 2–5.

⁹ Quoted by M. Eostein, *Statesman's Year Book*, 1937, p. 1176.

the Indonesian population, at least its *élite*, a Western education, it was hoped, the new generation would turn away from Islam towards cultural association with the Dutch. It was hoped that "the pan-Islamic idea which has not yet taken a great hold on the native aristocracy of Java and the other islands will lose all the chance of existence within this *milieu* when those who compose it have become the free associates of our civilization."¹⁰

The struggle of the Philipinos, the success of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey against Western military powers, the activity of the Congress party in India, the rising tide of anti-Western Chinese nationalism represented by Dr. Sun Yet Sen, the industrialization of Japan and that country's victory over Russia in 1905, all combined to quicken the rising tide of national movement in Indonesia. Indonesian students studying in the Netherlands in particular and in Europe in general were strongly impressed by Dutch political ideas of civil liberties and the democratic flavour of the government there. The writings of Bukharin, Karl Marx, Hegel, and Stalin influenced the handful of Indonesian students studying in continental Europe. The American Revolution of 1776/1778, the French Revolution of 1789, and the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a profound effect on the Indonesian people and shook them out of their apathy and complacency.

C

EFFECT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR
ON INDONESIA

The First World War considerably strengthened national consciousness in Indonesia. Numerous national organizations and parties throughout the country took a leading part in giving shape to their latent aspirations and canalizing the pent-up discontent in a nation-wide struggle for freedom. The organizations included the Budi Utomo (1908), Minahasa Association (1912), Nena Muria Organization (1913), Muhammadiyah Movement (1918), National Indies Party (1919), Indonesian Social Democratic Association or N.I.V.B. (1916), Sumatra Association (1917), Society of Students (1919), the Christian Ethical Party of Miao (1922), and the Nationalist Party of Indonesia (1927). The Jember revolution of 1926, the Padang Congress of 1922, the Pan-Islamic Congress of 1925 at Bandung, the Budi Utomo Congress of 30th July 1924, and the Indonesian Students' Association in the Netherlands—all struggled for national emancipation. Freedom from economic stranglehold of the colonial government was the common objective of most of these organizations.

The war led to the loosening of the ties which had formerly bound Indonesia to Europe and consequently Indonesia formed mercantile connections

¹⁰ G. M. Kahin, *op. cit.*

with other countries round the Pacific Ocean. Even before and during the war, demand for political freedom of Indonesia was openly voiced by the Indonesian leader, Tjokroaminoto, at the first National Congress of 1916. The war compelled the Dutch Government to change its policy towards Indonesia. In 1916, the Netherlands Parliament passed a bill for the institution of the Volksraad at Jakarta. In May 1918, van L. Stirum remarked, "... the road has been taken, never to be abandoned, toward the goal of responsible government in Indonesia itself which, in concert with the Volksraad, shall have the right to take final decisions in all matters which are not of general imperial [State] concern. In proper time and degree, so far as is compatible with due appreciation of the consequences of each new step, we must proceed directly toward this end."

The National Indonesian Party and the Budi Utomo demanded the convocation of a provisional parliament to frame a new democratic constitution. For this purpose, the Revision Commission was appointed by the Government on 17th December 1918. In June 1920, the Commission submitted its report to the Government and the following main proposals were made to be included in the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: —

- (1) Recognition of Indonesia as an independent part of the kingdom, the centre of gravity of the government being shifted to Indonesia itself.
- (2) Elevation of the Volksraad to the status of a general co-legislative representative body to be constituted by election.

In the military field, the World War had increased the importance of the defence problem in Indonesia. Compulsory military service was introduced in Indonesia in 1920, but, by the regulations of 1941–42/1922–23, it was imposed only upon Europeans and not upon natives or foreign Orientals. As a result of the war, an energetic propaganda for an Indonesian army was carried on by an Indonesian Committee of Defence.

Economically, the war had far-reaching consequences in the economic life of the country. In Indonesia the price of food-stuffs rose and this made the Government intervene to prevent the rising spiral of prices.

D

FACTORS PROMOTING NATIONAL SENTIMENTS

The adoption of Malay as the national language was another important factor in the development of national movement. The extensive use of the Indonesian language as the medium of expression throughout Indonesia was made progressively. Kia Hadjar Dewantoro, the founder of Taman Siswa, introduced it first in his school curriculum. In 1928, the Indonesian youth at their Congress swore to have one country, Indonesia; one nation, the Indonesian; and one national language, the Indonesian language. In 1925, the Indonesian members of the Volksraad demanded the recognition of Indonesian as

the official language of the country. In October 1942, an Indonesian Language Commission headed by Dr. Muhammad Hatta, was founded by the Japanese. In August 1945, the Indonesian language was formally declared the State language.¹¹ The national Red and White flag of Indonesia became the symbol of the patriotic liberation movement.¹² The Indonesian Raya (Indonesian National Anthem) acted as an inspiring and unifying factor.

The proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia in 1364/1945 was made an official national movement and its visible symbols—the national flag and the national anthem—helped to join the Archipelago's many local patriotisms together into an all-embracing patriotism.

The discriminatory policy employed by the Dutch in the political, economic, social, and cultural fields and the consequent resentment against colonialism fanned the flames of discontent.¹³ Discrimination in the economic sphere was even more galling and filtered down to the masses. The economic exploitation of the national wealth of the country by the Dutch capitalists and the increased poverty of the vast population living on rich soil provided another source of discontent.

In education, the Indonesians were provided with far fewer facilities than European children, for in the quick growth of Western education amongst the masses the Dutch saw a potential danger to the continuance of their dominant position.

The nationalistic educational institution, commonly known as Taman Siswa (Children's Garden School) established by Kia Hadjar Dewantara on 3rd July 1922, served as the training ground for the ideological preparation for the popularization of the Indonesian national movement. Kia Hadjar Dewantara maintained that the culture of a nation could be bent but could never be broken. Wisdom, beauty, art, and science from abroad were welcome. Everybody, he said, who learns a foreign language gains access to a new world, but foreign elements should be absorbed into native life, enriching the already existing treasures of national civilization. He built up at least 250 schools all over Indonesia without any government or foreign help.

Muhammadiyah institutions developed the political consciousness of its members and its pupils. The Muhammadiyah movement, founded by H. Ahmad Dahlan on 18th November 1912, had established 29 branches with 4,000 members and built about 55 schools in 1925; 150 branches with 10,320 members in 1928; 209 with 17,550 members in 1929; 267 with 24,383 members in 1931;

¹¹ Ubani, "On Indonesian Language," *Merdeka*, No. 17, I. S. I., New Delhi, 12th November 1947, p. 8.

¹² The hoisting of the Red and White Flag was prohibited by the Dutch, but it was flown publicly in Jakarta in October 1928 during the Indonesian Youth Congress.

¹³ In 1939, there were 400 Indonesians and 100 Dutch who took the examination for entrance to the Government School of Civil Service: 23 Dutch and 3 Indonesians were accepted.

and 750 (316 in Java, 326 in Sumatra, 79 in Celebes and 29 in Borneo) with 43,000 members in 1935. It had set up 126 schools and as many clinics in Java which treated 81,000 patients in 1929. In 1930, there were considerable Muhammadiyah schools and colleges in Sumatra. The Dutch colonial government tried to hamper the development of national educational institutions by issuing an Ordinance in 1342/1923 under which the Government assumed control of all privately-owned schools, numbering about 2,000–2,500 in 1357/1938 with 100,000 to 500,000 pupils.

The Dutch administration had deliberately starved the educational system. "This tended," says John Gunther, "to keep the people in subjection, and to prevent the normal growth of political aspirations. Dutch policy, it has been said, was 'to keep the bellies of the people full, their minds empty.' Indeed, the record of the Dutch in education was indifferent, and illiteracy reached ninety-five per cent."¹⁴

The growth of the national press and radio was the chief means for the propagation of the ideals of nationalistic struggle for freedom and emancipation of the fatherland.

The appearance of the newspaper *Madan Pryayi* (Civil Servants' Paper) at Bandung was indicative of the desire of the Indonesians to have their own periodicals and dailies as vehicles of expression of their desire for independence.

In 1340/1921, when the National Movement made itself felt in Sumatra (west coast), appeared the newspapers *Banih Merdeka* (The Seed of Freedom) at Medan, and *Sinar Merdeka* (The Ray of Freedom) at Padang Sidenpau. The *Apirakjat* (The Fire of the People), *Sinar Hindia* (The Ray of Indonesia), the *Api* (Fire), the *Njala* (Flame), and several other newspapers made their appearance. The very names of these papers were symbolic of the passionate and all-absorbing desire for freedom.

The Indonesian journalists like R. M. Titoadisuyo, right down to young journalists like Hatta, Subardjo, Nazir Pamontjak, Mustafa, were pioneers in the fight for national emancipation and independence. Articles on the Indonesian struggle for independence were published by them in European newspapers and magazines, while the Indonesians abroad served as foreign correspondents of Indonesian newspapers. During the Japanese occupation (1361/1942–1364/1945) the national press was involved in the Japanese propaganda machine. It played an important role during the national revolution against Dutch imperialism and inspired the masses with the spirit of self-determination and national self-respect.

The development of transport, communication, and the increased geographical mobility of the people as well as ideas of modern economic organization in Indonesia were equally helpful in the spreading of the national movement. Frequent contacts with the nationalist leaders of different countries in international conferences and the League of Nations had stimulating effects

¹⁴ John Gunther, *Inside Asia*, 1942, p. 349.

in promoting discontent among Indonesian intelligentsia and patriots. In 1341/1922, the Sarekat Islam (S.I.) led by 'Abd al-Mu'iz and H. Salim established close relations with the Indian National Congress and adopted the policy of non-co-operation. The S.I. also sent delegations to the World Islamic Conference at Mecca in 1343/1924 and at Cairo in 1345/1926.¹⁵

E

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARTIES

(1345/1926-1361/1942)

Nationalist Party of Indonesia.—The Persatuan National Indonesia (P.N.I.) was founded in July 1927 by Dr. Soekarno at Bandung. This party was essentially nationalistic, with a definite aim—*Indonesia Merdeka*, that is, the liberation of Indonesia from the colonial yoke through a popular movement deriving its strength from indigenous force and ability. The moving spirits behind the P.N.I. were the repatriated members of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Union)¹⁶ in Holland and other members of General Study Club at Bandung. Soekarno was the leader of the propaganda activities of the party and he soon made his mark not only as a great orator but also as the natural leader of the masses.

In 1347/1928, the propaganda activities of the P.N.I. were extended to cover small towns and villages, and leaders were sent out to remote places to meet and talk with the masses at their native haunts. For this purpose, the P.N.I. set up a sort of People's University, in which members were given courses in propaganda work. Within one year the party had as many as 600 members.

The P.N.I. leaders now stressed the idea of Indonesian unity in their speeches, using the Indonesian language and adopted for their party the white and red flag with the symbol of a bull's head on it.

The P.N.I. endeavoured to form a national front. For this purpose, they took the initiative in the organization of a federation of nationalist societies, composed of political parties, in December 1927, in order to unify and co-ordinate the activities of the member societies. The Indonesian Association in Holland was meanwhile appointed as their advance post for foreign propaganda.

In May 1928, in his speech before the Volksraad, the Governor-General alluded to the propaganda carried on by the P.N.I., calling it "a revolutionary nationalistic propaganda," and hinting that its revolutionary nature would hurt its own cause. In December 1929, the Government searched the houses

¹⁵ Members of the Communist Party attended the Pan-Pacific Labour Conference under the Comintern auspices at Canton in June 1924. The Indonesian nationalists were represented at the Conference of the League against imperialism in Brussels in February 1927. It coincided with large-scale arrests and deportations of the nationalist leaders of the revolution in 1926-27 in Java and Sumatra.

¹⁶ G. M. Kahin, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

and offices of the P.N.I. leaders. Eight persons were arrested, four of whom including Soekarno were later prosecuted.

The members of the P.N.I. split up into two groups after the official dissolution of the party. Those rallying around Sartono organized a new party called the Partai Indonesia (Partindo) at the end of April 1931. The Partindo had the same aim as the dissolved P.N.I., that is, to strive for a free Indonesia.

Other members formed the Indonesian National Education Party (New P.N.I.) in November 1931, under the leadership of Muhammad Hatta. Soetan Sjahrir joined the party in 1351/1932. Early in 1357/1938, Soekarno was re-arrested and interned, and this was followed by the arrest of both Hatta and Sjahrir.

Communist Party of Indonesia (P.K.I.).—After the failure of the Sarekat Islam (S.I.) to accept the extreme proposals of Semaun's faction, he and other leaders of the Social Democratic Association converted their organization into the Communist Party of Indonesia in May 1920.

The P.K.I. developed a close relationship with the Comintern which it joined at the end of 1339/1920. In August 1923, Semaun was arrested and forced to leave the country or face exile to Timor. By the end of the year all Dutch leaders of the party had also been forced to leave. According to Semaun, the departure of the Dutch leaders from the party raised the prestige of the party in the eyes of the masses, because of the popular prejudice against the Dutch, whatever their attitude towards colonialism. Due to his failure to wrest control of the organization from the S.I., Semaun was successful in setting up a rival association of the trade unions, the Revolutionary Trade Union Central, in June 1921. Within four years the communists could control most of the local branches of the S.I., but most of their large peasant membership melted away. This was due to two reasons: (i) the Government's effective barring of contact between the leaders and peasantry and (ii) the communists' alienating of the peasant members by violating their religious sensitivities. During 1344/1925, the extreme elements within the Indonesian Communist Party came under the control of Dahalan Sukara. The leaders of this party refused to take orders from the regular party leadership and continually agitated for revolution. They resorted to terroristic methods in order to dominate the party.

The failure of the communist revolutionary effort was due mostly to the great schism in the ranks of the Indonesians. Tan Malaka, a prominent member of the party, founded a new organization, Partai Indonesia. The Republic Party (Indonesian Republic Party) was established by him and his two lieutenants, Tamin and Subakat, in Bangkok in 1346/1927. Partai's immediate objective was the training of Indonesian underground workers in Bangkok, who were to return to Indonesia and there train more members and build up underground cadres.

The Communist Party was forced by the vigilance of the Government to operate more and more underground, while it was deprived of its ablest leaders.

During the first ten month of 1345/1926, more and more of the communist leaders were arrested. Intra-organizational contact was progressively disrupted, as was attested by unco-ordinated sporadic outbreaks of violence at widely isolated places throughout Java.

With the failure of the revolutions of 1345-46/1926-27 the communist organization was crushed, as a large number of communist, nationalist, and religious leaders were arrested and deported to a concentration camp in New Guinea. After their arrest the power of the communists was broken for the remainder of the period of Dutch rule.

Partai Indonesia Raja (P.I.R.) (The People's Party of Indonesia).—The Indonesian Study Club, formed by Dr. Sutomo in October 1930 at Surabaya, was changed to the Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia or P.B.I. (Indonesia Association) in January 1931. At its congress of April 18-21, 1935, at Surabaya, the P.B.I. decided to form the Budi Utomo. As a result of the Solo Conference, Partai Indonesia Raja or P.I.R. (Greater Indonesia Party) came into being on December 26, 1935, at Surabaya, under the presidency of Sutomo. The P.R.I. was founded by Tabrani in September 1930 at Jakarta, aiming to achieve the independence of Indonesia through a parliamentary system and dominion status for her.

Sarekat Islam.—The name of the Islamic Chamber of Commerce (S.D.I.), founded in 1329/1911 by H. Samanhudi, was changed into the Sarekat Islam in 1330/1912 under the leadership of H. 'Umar Sa'id Tjokroaminoto. In the years 1331/1913 and 1332/1914, the people joined *en masse* this party based purely on Islamic principles. By 1333/1915 it had established fifty branches and later, by June 1916, it claimed eighty branches with 360,000 members. In 1334/1916, it became a fully fledged political party struggling for free Indonesia (dominion status) and adopted a policy of co-operation with the colonial government.

In order to achieve Muslim unity, a pan-Islamic movement, al-Islam, was organized by H. A. Salim. The second congress which al-Islam held from May 19 to 21, 1924, at Carut, was attended by most of the Muslim leaders of Islamic organizations, except the Nahdat al-'Ulamā'.

The S.I. formed a Majlis 'Ulamā'-i Indonesia in January 1928 which in 1929 was changed into Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia or P.S.I.I. (Indonesian Islamic Party).

On account of disagreement with Dr. Sukinan's group at the Jakarta Congress, Partai Islam Indonesia (P.I.I.) was founded in December 1928 at Solo under the presidency of K. M. Misono.

The Muslim Union of Indonesia (Parmi) was founded in 1349/1930 in central Sumatra on the initiative of Mukhtār Luṭfi Jalāl al-Dīn Ṭayyib; it was based on Islam and nationalism with the ultimate object of achieving independence for Indonesia.

The Nahdat al-'Ulamā'.—The Nahdat al-'Ulamā' (Islamic Conservative Party) was formed in January 1926 at Surabaya. It organized its first Congress

in October 1928 at Surabaya and was opposed to the modernist movement. The Congress of 1359/1940 set up a Women Organization (Nahdat al-'Ulamā'-i Muslimāt or N.U.M.) and a Youth Movement (Anṣār) in 1354/1935, under the leadership of Tohir Bokri. Among the most outstanding leaders of the N.U. were Hasjim Asjari, 'Abd al-Wahhāb, Maḥfūz Ṣiddiq, and Wāḥid Hasjim.

Budi Utomo (High Endeavour).—The Budi Utomo formed in 1326/1908 had established forty branches with 10,000 members by 1332/1914 and held a congress in August 1915.

Indonesian Youth Movement.—The formation of the Student Association in 1330/1912 was followed by Tri Koro Darmo (Student Movement) in March 1915 based on "strength, character, and service." In 1337/1918, its name was changed to the "Young Java" under the presidency of R. Satiman Wiryojoyo. Its objective was to promote solidarity among the students.

The third Indonesian Youth Congress of December 1939 decided to pursue a literacy campaign with a view to helping the farmers, fighting youth unemployment, and promoting rural uplift and reconstruction.

Indonesian Women Movement.—The first women's organization was started by R. A. Kartini in 1319/1901. The first school for women was founded in 1319-20/1901-02 and another in 1321/1903. R. A. Kartini became the pioneer of female education, and though she died young her influence has lived after her. This school was followed by Puteri Merdeke (1330/1912) and Keutamaan Isteri Minangkabau (1330/1912).

A Women's Congress, the first of its kind, was held from December 22 to 25, 1928, at Jakarta. The Congress was attended by thirty Indonesian women's organizations. The main aim of the Congress was to co-ordinate the working of several Indonesian women's associations and promote the interests of the Indonesian women.

Co-operation and Non-Co-operation Movements.—The year 1349/1930 marks the lowest ebb of national movement in Indonesia, as expressed in a general mood of depression both in economic and in social life. The communist revolution of 1345-46/1926-27, made the Government adopt repressive measures which forced the Indonesian political movements to go underground; prominent leaders were either imprisoned, interned, or exiled. The demand for responsible government and for parliamentary self-government for Indonesia had been the main demand of the political leaders. On 15th July 1936, Mr. Sutardjo along with many other representatives of the Volksraad asked for an Imperial Conference to discuss the best method by which self-government for Indonesia within the limit of Article I of the Netherlands Constitution of 1341/1922 could be realized and to fix a time-limit within which this self-government could become effective.

When the Nazi armies invaded the Netherlands on 10th May 1940, the Dutch Government fled to England and the States General ceased to function. The exiled Government continued to direct the international relations of

Indonesia from London. All power in Indonesia was vested in the hands of a Governor-General, who carried on the government in a despotic fashion.

During this international crisis, the Dutch Government promised to consider constitutional changes in Indonesia at the end of the war on the ground that the situation in the world was undergoing a change and the shape democracy would take after the war was not known. Further, there had to be introduced changes in the law of the Netherlands in order to alter the constitution in Indonesia.

F

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

The Second World War marks a turning point in the history of Indonesia. As in other belligerent countries it brought great misery and suffering to the people but at the same time it loosened the colonial grip and ushered in a new era of revolutionary struggle for freedom.

Soon after the capitulation of the Dutch in March 1942, the Japanese military authority was established in Indonesia. The Japanese were anxious to completely eradicate the Dutch influence in Indonesia and to win over public opinion in Indonesia in order to utilize its manpower for forced labour as well as for food supplies for their armies. Political concessions to the nationalists were, therefore, regarded by the Japanese as the means to achieve the main economic goal and to enlist popular support for total economic mobilization. The principal leaders who were either in exile or had been interned were given considerable freedom of movement, but all political parties and political meetings and propaganda were banned by the Japanese authority.

The Japanese realized, however, that an outlet must be created for absorbing the political tensions and passions. Within two months after all political activity had been prohibited, a Peoples Movement was initiated on 29th April 1942. This was intended to unite all political forces into one powerful movement, directed towards the elimination of the pernicious Western influences which had corrupted the Eastern soul and also towards the indoctrination of the entire population of the Archipelago with the slogans: "Asia for the Asiatics" and "Japan as the mother of Asia." They, however, proceeded cautiously and avoided giving rise to any premature independence movement. They wanted to Japanize Indonesia under the slogan: "Japan the leader of Asia, Japan the protector of Asia, Japan the light for Asia, and Asia for the Asiatics."

In order to influence the Indonesian people, the Japanese made a friendly approach to the "four-leaved clover" of the Indonesian leaders—Soekarno, Hatta, Dewantara, and Maṣṣūr. These four men accepted the new role, as, in the words of Sjahrir, "it gives the nationalist struggle a broader legal scope and presses the Japanese for political concessions."¹⁷

¹⁷ Sulṭān Shahrīr, *Out of Exile*, Jakarta, 1936, p. 88.

The Pusat Tenaga Rakjat or Putera was organized by the Japanese in March 1943. Dr. Soekarno was made president of the new organization (Central People's Power). The Japanese policy, thus, indirectly encouraged contact between nationalist leaders and the masses which the repressive government of the Dutch regime had so severely limited.

In September 1943, a volunteer army of "Defenders of the Fatherland," a Japanese trained but Indonesian officered military organization, was created to help the Japanese defend Indonesia against the Allied invasion. By the middle of 1964/1945, it numbered about 120,000 armed men. This was the "Peta" which was to become the backbone of the Indonesian Republic's army. By 1963/1944, the average "Peta" member was consciously a strong nationalist, anti-Japanese, and anti-Dutch, but for the most part favourably disposed towards the other allies, particularly the United States.

The Japanese also established several youth organizations. They were given political indoctrination and some military training. The first of them, the "Seinendan," was established at the end of 1961/1942, as a mass youth organization based particularly on the village.

The Japanese military command dissolved the "Putera" and replaced it with a new organization called Djawa Hokakai (People's Loyalty Organization) on 1st March 1944. To help neutralize and limit the force of the nationalists the Japanese insisted that it should represent the Chinese, Arab, and Eurasian community as well as the Indonesians, and forced it to submit to a much closer supervision and control than had been the case with the "Putera."

The Japanese attempted simultaneously to win the support of Indonesian Islamic leaders. They established towards the end of 1962/1943 a large Islamic organization subsuming all the existing ones of a non-political nature, including Muḥammadiyyah, Nahḍat al-'Ulamā' and M.I.A.I. (Council of Indonesian Muslim Association). Thus, they welded the Indonesian Muslims into a greater unity, bringing the Muḥammadiyyah and the Nahḍat al-'Ulamā' into a single Muslim mass organization, Masjumi. At the same time they sharpened the long-standing divisions between the active Muslim community and the less positively Muslim social groups who found political leadership in aristocratic and secular nationalist elements. But soon the 'Ulamā' refused to lend themselves as instruments of Japanese aims, frightened as they were by the clumsy handling of religion by the Japanese. The Japanese order to the Indonesians to bow towards Tokyo rather than Mecca and to exalt the Emperor to a religious plane were particularly odious to them.

In June 1943, Tojo, the Japanese Premier, in a speech to the Diet, promised to allow the people greater participation in their government. The first concrete steps to carry out this promise were announced in Java on 5th September 1943. An advisory system was introduced whereby Indonesians were appointed as advisers to the various departments of the Government, advisory councils were established and Vice-Governors appointed in eight of the provinces. Under increasing pressure both from the Indonesian national-

ists and deteriorating military situation in the Pacific, the Japanese made the first formal promise of independence to the Indonesians in September 1944.

In March 1945, the Japanese, realizing the urgency of a compromise with the leading national organizations in order to stabilize their rule in Indonesia and mobilize the rich resources of the country for their war effort against the Allies, appointed a committee representing various political and ethnic groups for political and economic organization of an independent Indonesia. Soekarno was the leading exponent of the hopes and aspirations of his countrymen. By careful enunciation of his own "ideological synthesis" he succeeded in bringing about a measure of agreement amongst the various groups, particularly the leaders of the doctrinaire Islamic group. His principles of Pantjasila were accepted as the official Indonesian national philosophy. The five principles were, "Nationalism, internationalism (or humanitarianism), representative government, social justice, and belief in God in the context of religious freedom."

On 7th July 1945, the Japanese military administration announced the decision of the Supreme War Council to the effect that the Indonesians should be given their independence as soon as possible. Soekarno, Hatta, and Wediodiningrat were flown to Tarauchi headquarters to receive the Imperial decree directly.

On 7th August 1945, the Japanese appointed an All-Indonesia Independence Preparatory Committee with Soekarno as Chairman and Muhammad Hatta as Vice-Chairman to make preparations for the transfer of government authority to the Indonesians. When the Japanese finally decided to surrender, Soekarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesia's independence on 17th August 1945. The Indonesians proudly and justly claimed that the Republic was neither a gift from Japan nor from any other foreign country. "It is the reward," it was claimed, "of the great sacrifices in blood and material suffered by the Indonesians before and during the Second World War."¹⁸

Effects of the Japanese Occupation.—The Japanese interlude ended as abruptly as it had begun. The harsh and arbitrary rule of the Japanese and their crude attempts at conciliation affected almost the entire population. It aroused a consciousness of common suffering and humiliation and a common resentment against the Japanese. Further, it enormously strengthened the already existing national consciousness of the Indonesians. As Soetan Sjahriar observed: "During the three and a half years of Japanese occupation, the foundation of rural society was shaken and undermined by forced regulations, kidnapping from homes for conscription as labourers abroad or as soldiers, compulsory surrender of harvest crops, compulsory planting of designed crops, all imposed with limited arbitrariness."

¹⁸ Letter to the British Foreign Secretary by the Indonesian Association for Independence, quoted by Kaushak, *The Indonesian Question*, Thacker & Company, Bombay.

As a reaction of and in order to resist the heavy demands of the Japanese, the peasantry became much more politically conscious than it had ever previously been.

The Indonesians gained experience in administration during the occupation. Dr. Hatta correctly pointed out that "while under the Japanese, we laid plans for achieving our independence and when, on 17th August, the last Japanese surrendered and were unable to act effectively, we declared our independence."

The Japanese established special schools for the training of political leaders from among whom were to be recruited native officials for political affairs. A training institute was set up at Jakarta to give three-week courses to the "Kias" and the 'Ulamā' in order to enable the Japanese to choose those who were willing to co-operate with them and were also promising propagandists.

In 1363/1944, shock brigades, the Hizb Allah, numbering 50,000 were organized from amongst the Muslim youth (ranging between 17 and 25 years in age). The purpose of the Hizb Allah was two-fold. "It was a military organization, training reserves for the home defence army and it was also a religious vanguard to propagate Muhammadan doctrine."

The policy of Japan in Indonesia affected the educated youth. The introduction of the Japanese language coupled with their harsh and autocratic administration of the schools antagonized the students. Takdir Alishahban observed: "Because the Japanese were determined to enlist the energies of the entire Indonesian population in the war efforts, they [the students] penetrated into the villages in the remotest backwater of the islands, using the Indonesian language as they went. Thus the language flourished and imbued the people with a feeling new to most of them. As more and more of them learnt to speak it freely, they became aware of a communal unity in opposition to the effort of the Japanese ultimately to implant their own language and culture. By the time, therefore, of the Japanese surrender, the position of the Indonesian language had improved enormously, both in strength and in prestige, over not only Dutch but also over the various regional languages of the Archipelago which had no opportunity to develop during the occupation."¹⁹ The increased use of mass communication media by the Japanese contributed to the progress and development of Indonesian language. The disappearance of the Dutch Press led to a sharp rise in the circulation of the Indonesian newspapers.²⁰

The Japanese developed a policy of decentralized administration based on the so-called historical and cultural differences of the Indonesian society. They did away with the provincial isolation and traditional ways of life of the Indonesian people. The severance of economic relations between the islands and outside brought suffering to all sections of communities and hence led to the breakdown of provincialism and sectarianism.

¹⁹ Takdir Alishahban, "The Indonesian Language—By-Product of Nationalism," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XXII, No. 4, Dec. 1949.

²⁰ "The Press Under the Japanese," *Merdeka*, 15th May 1947.

The effect of the army as a unifying agent by providing a common experience to different social groups was described as follows by a Japanese training officer assigned to it: "Since the army is made up of volunteers from all walks of life, it had resulted in the unification of the Indonesian social strata towards the realization of its ideals. In fact, the Indonesian race had never seen such a huge comprehensive system to promote its own racial well-being." He added that the promise of independence had inspired the members of a fully fledged modern, independent Indonesian army.

The Japanese had intended to make a nation-wide purge of the Indonesian political, social, and religious leaders in order to make Indonesia a second Korea. They prepared a plan, known as "black fan" and "black list," in which were written the names of all the Indonesian leaders who were to be massacred immediately.

Van Mook, the former Dutch Governor-General in Indonesia, summarized the effects of the Japanese occupation in the following words: "The official and civil servants mostly swallowed their discontent. They were more and more impoverished by inflation; they were pushed back to lower posts by an increasing number of Japanese officials. Many of them were genuinely concerned about the slow ruination of their once excellent services; others gave up and retired till better days. Quite a number of incompetent upstarts filled their places."

Sultān Shahriar, in his political Manifesto issued in 1364/1945, observed as follows: "When the Netherlands Indies Government surrendered to the Japanese in Bandung in March 1942, our unarmed population fell prey to the harshness and cruelty of Japanese militarism. For three years and a half our people were bent under a cruelty which they had never before experienced throughout the last several decades of Netherlands colonial rule. Our people were treated as worthless material to be wasted in the process of war. From the lowly stations of those who were forced to accept compulsory labour and slavery and whose crops were stolen, to the intellectuals who were forced to prepare lies, the grip of Japanese militarism was universally felt. For this Dutch imperialism is responsible in that it left our 70,000,000 people to the mercies of Japanese militarism without any means of protecting themselves since they had never been entrusted with fire-arms, or with the education necessary to use them.

"A new realization was born in our people, a national feeling that was sharper than ever before. This feeling was also sharpened by the Japanese propaganda for pan-Asianism. Later attempts by the Japanese to supersede the nationalist movement were of no avail."

The Netherlands Government in exile in London directed Indonesian international relations and planned the political future of Indonesia. The plan provided for the formation of a Netherlands Commonwealth, consisting of the kingdom of the Netherlands and Indonesia as well as the Dutch West Indies, based on absolute equality, fraternity, mutual co-operation, and

mutual understanding and goodwill. As soon as the southern part of the Netherlands was liberated in September-October 1944, a call was issued for volunteers to serve in the armed forces. In order to restore Dutch imperialism and colonialism in Indonesia, on 24th August 1945, the British and the United States Governments concluded the Civil Affairs Agreement with the Dutch Government.

The Nazi aggression in Europe and the Japanese fascist invasion of China found an immediate reaction in Indonesia. The whole Indonesian national movement became anti-fascist. The leftists especially were clear in their political attitude. The anti-Japanese attitude of the Surabaya section of the Gerindo, formed in 1356/1937 in Jakarta under the leadership of Amir Sjarif-oeddin, former Prime Minister of Indonesia, and Dr. A. K. Gani, attracted much attention.

Dr. Soekarno along with other colleagues and leaders chose to co-operate with the Japanese only to turn the battle against them because he very well knew that the Japanese imperialism was no better than that of the Dutch.

The Dutch colonial power accused Soekarno of being an unprincipled pro-Japanese collaborator.²¹ Regarding Soekarno, van Mook stated in 1367/1948, from documents later discovered, "it is very clear that in all his objectionable activities he [Soekarno] was always governed by the objective of an independent Indonesia."

Shahriar, who was anti-Japanese, regarded the Japanese as pure fascists and felt that the Indonesians must use the most subtle counter methods to get round them. Both Soekarno and Hatta, he continued, agreed to do everything legally possible to give the nationalist struggle a broader legal scope and at the same time secretly support the revolutionary resistance.

Through two exceptionally skilful underground workers at first Djohan Sjaruzah and later 'Abd al-Halim, Hatta was able, throughout the Japanese occupation, to keep in contact with principal Indonesian underground organizations.²²

Most of the underground leaders agreed with Shahriar that Indonesia's bargaining position with the Allies for her independence would be strengthened if there were a powerful Indonesian uprising against the Japanese coincident with the Allies' landings.

²¹ In 1943, Soekarno went to Tokyo to offer thanks at the Yusukuni Shrine to the spirits of the Japanese who fell in the course of Indonesia's liberation. He was decorated by Hirohito.

²² Hatta, because of his relationship with the underground leaders, had come to be considered dangerous by the Japanese authorities in Java.

G

THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE
(1364/1945-1368/1949)

Just after the capitulation of the Japanese to Allied forces in 1364/1945, the independence of Indonesia was proclaimed, as already observed, by Soekarno-Hatta on 17th August 1945. The proclamation was supported by all youth organizations, underground movements, former civil servants, police, army (except the Royal Amboynese), and the vast mass of the population.

The Japanese ordered the disbandment of the Peta, and all other armed Indonesian organizations. The Peta units in Java resisted the Japanese orders to disarm, kept their arms, clashed with the Japanese, made them surrender their arms, and proceeded to control government buildings, post and telegraph offices, airfields, and harbours. The Indonesian flag was flown from all public buildings. The cry *merdeka* (freedom), the words *bung* and *saudara* (brother) were heard as symbols of national revolution and fraternal love all over the country.

In Borneo, Celebes, and the lesser Sundas, where the Peta had not been properly organized, the Allies reinstalled Dutch civil administration without much difficulty. The British in Java and Sumatra were faced with a difficult situation. Without heavy reinforcements in men and material, for which the Home authorities were not prepared, the British troops could not reinstate the Dutch in authority. They proceeded to deal with the Republic of Indonesia as a *de facto* government and insisted on the Dutch doing the same. The latter under pressure of events entered into an agreement, the Lingaadjati Agreement, with the Indonesian Republic. The ultimate object of the Dutch imperial policy was not the grant of complete independence to Indonesia but to work for a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The agreement was only a makeshift arrangement to form an interim working plan with the Indonesian Republic and to utilize the time to crush the national movement by a policy of divide and rule, as military victory was beyond their means. The Indonesians offered to give complete co-operation to the Allied forces provided they were prepared to leave Indonesia when their work was done. Soekarno advised his exuberant compatriots through his radio broadcasts not to shoot *now* and not to waste their bullets on the British.

The Dutch broke the agreement and overran the richest districts in Java and Sumatra. The intervention of U.N. resulted in stopping hostilities, and a new agreement, the Renville Agreement, was signed in January 1947. The Dutch violated this agreement also, and the failure of the United States and the European democracies to force the Dutch to carry out the terms of the agreement considerably strengthened certain elements in Indonesia and made them break into open rebellion against the Republic.

The Dutch, taking advantage of the difficult and explosive domestic situation, launched an all-out military campaign against the Republic. The Indonesians

resisted with stubbornness, and backed as they were by world opinion in favour of their righteous cause and the pressure exerted by the U.S.A. they forced the Dutch to accept the realities of the situation. At the Round Table Conference, held at the Hague in 1368/1949, the Dutch accepted Indonesia's claim to independence. "In essence the Dutch exchanged their claim to sovereignty all over Indonesia except Western New Guinea . . . for the preservation of their economic stakes in Indonesia."²³

Out of the four years' revolutionary struggle against the Dutch, the Indonesians emerged victorious. The struggle, long and bitter, demonstrated the necessity of a close unity of interests and concerted action amongst various political parties and ethnic groups, and inculcated the habit of making sacrifices for the national cause. The struggle materially effected the development of political institutions and political integration. The fact that they had won their freedom without the assistance of any foreign power strengthened the Indonesians' confidence in their own ability to manage their house and also their determination to follow an international policy without aligning themselves with any power group.

The Independence Preparatory Committee at its first meeting on 18th August 1945 elected Soekarno and Hatta as President and Vice-President respectively and appointed a Commission of Seven to make a final draft of the national Constitution. The new Constitution was promulgated within a week and, though considered provisional, was not replaced till the end of 1949. According to the new Constitution, the power in the State was vested in the President, the Consultative Assembly, and the Chamber of Representatives. As the last two bodies were not elected, all power was concentrated in the hands of the President. On 29th August, Soekarno replaced the Independence Preparatory Committee by the Central Indonesian National Committee (K.N.I.P.). As a result of the growing resentment against the concentration of power in the hands of the President, the retention of the officers appointed by the Japanese in key posts in the Government, and the pressure of the armed youth organization and the K.N.I.P., the President was compelled to agree to sharing his legislative power with the K.N.I.P. which body delegated its power to the newly constituted Working Committee with Sjahrir and Sjarifoeddin as Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively. A further loss of authority by the President came as the result of an insistent demand by the party of Sjahrir who, dissatisfied with the "fascist and opportunistic mentality of many members of the Government," demanded the introduction of the principle of Cabinet responsibility to Parliament. The President accepted the demand and established on 14th November 1945 a new Cabinet headed by Shahriar responsible to the representative body of the Government. The new Cabinet proceeded to encourage the creation of political parties representing diverse groups "to obviate the possible growth of a totalitarian political order" and the rise of a "monolithic" political

²³ G. M. Kahin, *Major Governments of Asia*, p. 501.

organization, for it was felt that "if democratic principles are to be observed it is not permissible that only one party should be allowed to function."

In spite of the restrictions gradually placed on the independent exercise of authority by the President, violent conflicts either with the Working Committee or with the K.N.I.P. were avoided by the tactful handling of difficult problems by Soekarno and the good sense of the members of the above body. President Soekarno explained his position to Kahin thus: "Theoretically I can veto any law of the Parliament. However, I have never done so, because my system was to keep in very close contact with Assaat (chairman of both the Working Committee and the K.N.I.P.) and to influence the Working Committee. Agreements were worked out ahead of time, and thus collisions between the Presidency and the Working Committee were avoided."²⁴

The efficiency and comparative stability of the Indonesian Government during the difficult revolutionary years was mainly the result of the habit and practice that had developed because of close collaboration between different groups and the feeling of solidarity and community of interests it had developed; the Working Committee, a small compact body consisting of some of the ablest and most trusted men together with the attitude of the President and the Vice-President, afforded a quick agency for taking decisions and assuring the smooth working of the political machine. These conditions were not to be found during the post-revolutionary period (1949). The growing sense of national solidarity and national identity and the universally felt hatred of colonial rule were the factors assuring the success of the Revolutionary Government.

The memories of the Japanese occupation and the revolutionary struggle for final freedom from colonial rule tremendously increased the political consciousness of the Indonesian people and their passionate desire to guard their newly-won freedom jealously. The post-revolutionary period has created new problems and posed new challenges, but the natural resilience of the people and their determination and eagerness to face these problems with courage and equanimity after having buffeted many storms have been the secret of their success during this difficult period.

The Hague Agreement of 4th May 1949 provided for the establishment of an independent, sovereign, and legal democratic federal State known as the United States of Indonesia.

The official flag of the R.I.S. (Republic of Indonesia) was to be *sang merah putih* (red and white); the Indonesia Raya, the national anthem; and Jakarta, the capital of the State. The State was free to decide its own official emblem.

A great majority of Indonesians, both in the old republic of Indonesia and in all the fifteen Dutch created States, were profoundly dissatisfied with the federal system of government.

After several weeks of negotiations between the leaders of the R.U.I.S.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

(Republic of the United States of Indonesia) and the Government of Indonesia, an agreement on the formation of a unitarian State was finally reached on 19th May 1950. The country, after years of experimentation in the field of constitution-making, has reverted to the constitution of 1964/1945 still clinging to the Pantjasila enunciated by Soekarno in 1964/1945 in a speech which will go down in history as "one of the great pronouncements of democratic principles" and which the Indonesians cherish as their Bill of Rights. The Pantjasila has become a national document in the sense that it is quoted as the authority for the principles behind action and is pictorialized in the Indonesian coat of arms. "Indonesians understand their coat of arms; it came into being out of the experience of living men; it links their past with their present; and to hear any school-boy describe it is to realize that it also speaks out their hope for the future. The bearer of the coat of arms is a mythological eagle, the *garuda*; its flight feathers are seventeen and its tail feathers eight, signifying the date of Indonesian independence, the seventeenth of the eighth month. The shield portrays the five principles of the Pantjasila: the central field with the star stands for faith in God; the head of the native bull for the principle of sovereignty; the banyan tree for nationalism; the sprays of rice and cotton for social justice; the linked chain for humanitarianism; while the black line across the centre represents the equator; and the device bears the old Javanese words meaning unity in diversity."

From the above account it will be clear that Indonesia has been, right down to the recent past, struggling for political independence and that from the time she succeeded in achieving it, she has been going through the traumatic experience of her own rebirth. It is for this reason that philosophical and scientific thought has hardly had any chance for development. It is only now that the country is showing signs of settling down and attending to her social and intellectual renaissance.

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CONCLUSION

It is hazardous to foretell the future of peoples, nations, and cultures. This is particularly true in a world torn asunder by ideological conflicts and constantly under the shadow of a total war. As it is, the fate of the whole human race is hanging in the balance and one spark of folly may set the whole world ablaze, thus falsifying all normal conjectures.

However, unless such an all-pervading calamity befalls mankind, one could make a guess about the future of Muslim culture and philosophical thought. The trends we have traced in the life of different Muslim countries in Book Six should give us a fair idea as to what the future may have in store for Muslim thought and culture.