conflict between the old and the new, the traditional and the modern, is bound to solve itself as the people of Iran recover from the first great impact of Western civilization. They have learnt through trial and error, and the time is not far when they will have resolved all their present conflicts, assimilated the best of Western thought, and upheld their own cultural and national individuality as a people of great gift.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

that the Hājī left Meshed as well and journeyed to Isphahān, as Mulla Ṣadrā had done two hundred and fifty years before him, to meet the greatest authorities of the day in Hikmat. Isphahān in that period was still the major centre of learning, especially in Hikmat. Hājī spent eight years in this city studying under Mulla Ismā‘īl Isphahānī and Mulla ‘All Šīrī, both of whom were the leading authorities in the school of Aḥḵānd.

Hājī Mulla Ḥādi, having completed his formal education, left Isphahān once again for Kirmān from where after five years of teaching he went on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Upon returning to Persia after three years of absence, he spent a year in Kirmān where he married and then settled down in Sabzwar where he established a school of his own. His fame had by then become so great that disciples from all over Persia as well as from India and the Arab countries came to the small city of Sabzwar to benefit from his personal contact and to attend his classes. Naṣr al-Dīn ʿAlī in his visit to Meshed in 1274/1857–58 came specially to the city of Hājī in order to meet him in person. In Sabzwar, away from the turmoil of the capital, Hājī spent forty years in teaching, writing, and training disciples, of whom over a thousand completed the course on Hikmat under his direction.

Hājī's life was extremely simple and his spirituality resembled more that of a Sufi master than just of a learned ʿIṣkāmī. It is said that along with regular students whom he instructed in the ʿIṣkām, he had also special disciples whom he taught the mysteries of Sufism and initiated into the Path. He was not only called the "Plato of his time" and the "soul of the Hikmat" (Khamsat al-Hikmat), but was also considered by his contemporaries to possess the power of performing miracles of which many have been attributed to him in the various traditional sources. By the time he passed away in 1290/1873, Hājī had become the most famous and exalted spiritual and intellectual figure in Persia and has ever since been considered one of the dominant figures in the intellectual life of the Shī‘ah world.

Unlike Mulla Ṣadrā all of whose writings with one exception were in Arabic, Hājī wrote in Persian as well as in Arabic. Moreover, he composed a great deal of poetry collected in his Dīvān which consists of poems in Persian of gnostic inspiration and poems in Arabic on Hikmat and logic. The writings of Hājī, of which a complete list is available, are as follows: Al-ʿIṣrāfi, Arabic poem on logic; Khamsat al-Fard‘d or the ʿIṣrāfī - Mauzūmā, Arabic poem with commentary on Hikmat; Dīvān in Persian written under the pen name ʿAṣrār; commentary upon the prayer Da‘w‘-i Kaḥīr; 4 commentary

8 Among his special disciples one may name Ṣaḥīḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Gumbāhī who later became the founder of the Gumbāhī brotherhood of Sufis which is one of the most widely expanded brotherhoods in Persia today. For the stages through which Hājī’s students had to pass before being able to participate in his courses on Hikmat, see E. G. Brown, op. cit., pp. 147–48.

4 There are many prayers composed by the various ʿIṣrāfīs Imāms, especially the fourth Imām Zain al-ʿAbidīn, like the Da‘w‘-i Kobra, Mauzūmā, and the ʿIṣrāfīs

Renaissance in Iran (Continued): Hājī Mulla Ḥādi Sabzwarī upon the prayer Da‘w‘-i ʿAṣrār; ʿArūr al-Hikmat, written at the request of Naṣr al-Dīn ʿAlī, on Hikmat; commentaries upon the ʿAṣrār, the Muṭṭāṭi al-ʿIṣrāfī, al-Mābo‘d ‘al-Mu‘āt, and al-Shaṣarīd al-Rabī‘īyyah of Mulla Ṣadrā; glosses upon the commentary of ʿAṣrār upon the Al-Fayyūm of Ibn Mālik, on grammar; commentary upon the Muṣannaf of Ṣahīḥ al-Dīn Rūmī; commentary upon the Nibrās, on the mysteries of worship; commentary upon the divine names; glosses upon the ʿArūr al-Tajriḥ of Līḥījī, Rāh Qorba and Rahīq in rhetoric; Ḧidāyat al-Tāḥfiz, as yet an unpublished treatise in Persian on prophethood and the imānate; questions and answers regarding gnosticism; and a treatise on the debate between Mulla Muḥsin Fārī and Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿĀlī. Of those writings the most famous is the ʿArūr al-Maṣṣūmī, which, along with the ʿAṣrār of Mulla Ṣadrā, the ʿArūr of Ibn Sina, and the ʿArūr al-Maṣṣūmī of Naṣr al-Dīn Tūsī, is the basic text on Hikmat. This work consists of a series of poems on the essential questions of Hikmat composed in 1239/1823 on which Hājī himself wrote a commentary along with glosses in 1290/1854. The book contains a complete summary of Hikmat in precise and orderly form. This work has been so popular that during the hundred years that have passed since its composition many commentaries have been written upon it including those of Muhammad Ḥiṣāji and the late Mirza Mehdi Aḥḵānī, and the Mulla Ṣadrā of Naṣr al-Dīn Tūsī, as well as that of Muhammad Taqī Ṭani, whose commentary called the ʿArūr al-Faṣūl‘d is perhaps the most comprehensive of all. The other writings of Hājī, especially the ʿArūr al-Hikmat which is of special interest because, as Hājī himself writes in the introduction, it is a book concerned with the Hikmat derived from the Islamic revelation (hikmat-i ʿīṣām) and not just with Greek philosophy (hikmat-i ʿādāmī), and the commentary upon the Muṣannaf is also of much importance, but the fame of Hājī is due primarily to his ʿArūr al-Maṣṣūmī.

B SOURCES OF HĀJĪ’S DOCTRINES AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS APPROACH

Hājī cannot be considered to be the founder of a new school; rather, he expanded and clarified the teachings of Mulla Ṣadrā without departing from the basic features of Aḥḵānd’s doctrines. The sources of Hājī’s writings are, therefore, the same as those enumerated in our study of Mulla Ṣadrā, viz., gnostic doctrines drawn mostly from the teachings of Ibn ‘Arabi, the teachings of the ʿIṣrāfī Imāms, ʿIṣrāfī theosophy, and Peripatetic philosophy.

Sajjīdīyyah (Ṣayjād being the title of the fourth Imām) which are read and chanted throughout the year, especially during Ramadān, as devotional prayers. Many of them, however, are not simply prayers of devotion but are replete with gnostic and metaphysical doctrines of highest inspiration and have been, therefore, commented upon by many of the Ḥikmatkāns and gnostics, who, like Hājī, have drawn out their inner meaning by the light of their own inspiration.

human soul while Hājj considers it to belong to its essence, like Being itself, above all the Aristotelian categories such as quality, quantity, etc.; and secondly, on Mulla Ṣadr's doctrine of the union of the intellect and the intelligible which Hājj accepts, criticizing, however, his method of demonstrating its validity. Otherwise, the principles of the teachings of Hājj in Ḥikmat are already to be found in the writings of ʿAbdān.

It must not be thought, however, that Hājj Mulla Ṣadr simply repeated the teachings of his predecessor verbatim. It is enough to glance at the voluminous writings of Mulla Ṣadr, in which one would surely be lost without a capable guide, and compare them with the precise form of ʿAbdān-i Manṣūmah to see what service Hājj rendered to Ḥikmat in general and to Mulla Ṣadr's school in particular. Hājj prepared the way for the study of Mulla Ṣadr, and his writings may be considered to be an excellent introduction to the doctrines of his master.

The ʿAbdān-i Manṣūmah depicts a complete cycle of Ḥikmat, containing in summary form all the basic elements of Mulla Ṣadr's teachings on the subject. In discussing its contents, therefore, one becomes better acquainted with Mulla Ṣadr as well as with Hājj himself, and one gains a glimpse of traditional philosophy as it is taught in the ʿAbdān today.

The ʿAbdān-i Manṣūmah, excluding the part on logic, is divided into seven books each of which is divided into several chapters, and each chapter in turn into several sections. The seven books deal with Being and Non-Being, substance and accidents, theology, natural philosophy, prophecy and dreams, eschatology, and ethics respectively.

The first book which is in a sense the basis of the whole work and is on general principles (al-amur al-dinmaw) treats of the various aspects of Being, its positive and negative qualities, its unity and gradation, necessity and possibility, time and eternity, actuality and potentiality, quiddities, unity and multiplicity, and causality. The second book treats of the definition of substance and accidents, and the third, which is called al-īdāqāt bi al-maʿāna al-akhbār, of the divine essence, the divine qualities and attributes, and the divine acts. The fourth book contains a summary discussion of natural philosophy (taḥqīqāt)—including the meaning of body (*fiām*), motion, time and space—astronomy, physics (in the Aristotelian sense), psychology, and the science of heavenly souls. The fifth book treats of the cause of the truth and falsehood of dreams, the principles of miracles, the cause for strange happenings, and prophecy; and the sixth book of the resurrection of the soul and the body and questions pertaining to the Last Day. Finally, the last book treats of faith and infidelity and the various spiritual virtues such as repentance, truthfulness, surrender to the divine will, etc., which are usually discussed in the books on Sufi ethics such as the Ḥidāʾ al-limmāʾu of Abu Naṣr al-Sarrāj.

Hājj divides reality into three categories: the divine essence which is at once above all determinations including Being and is also the principle of all manifestations of Being itself; extended being (sawāfī al-maʿānāt) which is...
the first act or word or determination of the divine essence and is identified with light; and particular beings which are the degrees and grades of extended being and from which the quiddities are abstracted. All these stages of reality are unified so that one can say that reality is an absolute unity with gradations, of which the most intelligible symbol is light.

The first feature of Being which Ḥājī discusses is that it is self-evident and undefinable. There is no concept more evident than Being, because all things, by virtue of their existence, are drowned in the ocean of Being. Moreover, the definition of a species in logic involves its genus and specific difference, but there is no genus of which Being is the species. Therefore, from a logical point of view there is no definition of Being; Being is the most universal concept since the divine essence or Being is the first determination and, strictly speaking, above all conception. Though the concept of Being is the most obvious of all concepts, yet the knowledge of the root or truth of Being, i.e., as it is in itself and not in its manifestation, is the most difficult to attain.

Existence, which is the extension or particularization of Being, is principal with respect to the quiddities. This view, which we have already mentioned in previous chapters, is one of the major points of contention among Muslim Ḥakīms. The Peripatetics gave priority to existence or Being over the quiddities, considering each being to be in essence different and distinct from other beings. Although Subhawardi Muqtār never speaks of the principality of the quiddities as understood by the later Ḥakīms, he can be interpreted to consider existence to have no reality independent of the quiddities. It was Mr. Dānākī who re-examined this whole question and reached the conclusion that either the quiddities or existence would have to be principal, and divided the philosophers before him into the followers either of the principality of existence or Being (ṣūrat-i wujūd) or of the principality of the quiddities (ṣūrat-i nakhṣabakhsī) while he himself sided with the latter.18 Mullā Ṣadrā in turn accepted his teacher’s classification but sided with the followers of the principality of existence. Ḥājī, likewise, follows Ṣadrā in accepting the principality of Being which he considers to be the source of all effects partaking of gradations.

Another question which arises concerning the concept of Being is whether it is just a verbal expression shared by particular beings or a reality which particular beings have in common. It is known that the Ashʿarīs considered the term “being” to be merely a verbal expression used for both the Creator and the creatures; otherwise, according to them, there would be an aspect common to both which is opposed to the idea of divine transcendence. Ḥājī, like the other Ḥakīms, rejects this reasoning and argues that in the statement “God is,” by “is” we mean either non-being in which case we have denied God or something other than what we mean in the statement “man is” in which case we have denied our intelligence the ability to attain a knowledge of God. Since both of these conclusions are untenable, “is” in the case of God must share a meaning in common with “is” in the case of this or that creature. The truth is that Being is one reality with degrees of intensity and not many realities from which the mind abstracts the concept of Being. 19 Another point on which Ḥājī criticizes the Ashʿarīs is that of the existence of the images of things in the mind which is one of the important aspects of his doctrine. The Ashʿarīs believe that in the mind the quiddity and existence of an object are one and the same; when we think of man, the quiddity of the concept of man in our mind is the same as its existence in our mind. Ḥājī opposes this view and distinguishes between quiddity and existence even in the mind. The world of the mind is the same as the external world with the same quiddity in each case. The difference between the two comes in their existence; each has an existence proper to itself. If external existence becomes mental existence, then the object as it exists externally becomes the image of that object in the mind. For example, when we think of fire, the concept of fire exists in our mind. It is the same quiddity as the objective fire that burns but its mode of existence differs. It has a mental existence which, although deprived of the power which makes fire burn and give off heat, is nevertheless a being. 20 Reality, then, consists of existing stages or grades of intensity. 21

18 The whole discussion concerning Being occupies the first section of the Ḥikāyat of Subhānī’s Muṣannaf, pp. 1-131.
19 The theologians (Muḥaddidūn) believed that each creature in the objective world is a quiddity including the divine essence which is an unknowable quiddity. Although this view is dialectically opposed to the view of the Ḥakīms, in certain passages Ḥājī interprets the view of the theologians symbolically to mean the same as the view of the Illuminations and, therefore, defends them even though attacking them for their literalism.
20 For this view Ḥājī is indebted partly to Mullā Ṣadrā and partly to Jaʿbd al-Dīn Dawūdī.
21 In his commentary upon the Maḥṣūs, Toheran, lithographed edition, 1298/1880, p. 8, Ḥājī names these stages as the divine essence or opacity; its first determination; the archetype (al-ʿayn al-dīhbat); the world of the spirits (fāḥish); the world of inverted forms or simulacra (rūḥiyyat); the world of bodics (ajātān); and, finally, the stage which is the summation of all those before it, i.e., the stage of the perfect, real man (al-māni al-lāmi). In other places Ḥājī considers the seven stages of universal existence to be the divine essence which is the Principle, the world of divinity, of the intelligences, of the angels, of the archetypes, of forms, and of matter. This descending hierarchy is also mentioned in E. G. Browne, op. cit., p. 150; A. M. A. Shibliy, op. cit., p. 454.
source of which is the divine essence that we may consider to be Pure Being without quiddity if by quiddity we mean the answer to the question quid est—“what is it?”—or identical with its quiddity if by quiddity we understand that by which a thing is what it is. Being has certain negative and positive qualities, the first such as the qualities of being neither substance nor accident, having no opposite, having no like, not being a compound and having no genus, species, and specific difference, etc.; and the second, the attributes of power, will, knowledge, and the like.

The quiddities, which accompany all stages of universal existence below Pure Being Itself, are abstracted by the mind from particular beings and are in fact the limitations of Being in each state of manifestation in all the vertical (fīlī) and horizontal (ūqūdī) stages in which Being manifests Itself.

It is, therefore, by the quiddities that we can distinguish between various beings and different levels of existence. Ḥājī divides the quiddities according to their association with matter or potentiality. Quiddities are either free from matter in which case they are called the forms of beings that are associated with matter and are then called the world of bodics. In the world of spirits, if the quiddities are by essence and in actuality free from all matter, they are the intelligences (ūqūdī), and if they are free but have need of matter to become actualized, they are the souls (maṣūmīn). And in the world of bodies, if the quiddities possess a subtle form of matter, they belong to the world of inverted forms (ālam al-mišfīl), which is the same as that of cosmic imagination, and if they possess a gross form of matter, they belong to the world of nature. All of these worlds are distinguished in this manner by their quiddities, but all of them are in reality stages of the same Being which manifests Itself in different manners according to the conditions at each stage of manifestation.

After a discussion of the various aspects of being, Ḥājī turns to a study of substance and accidents.10 There are three substances, the intelligences, souls, and bodies, and the nine categories of accidents as outlined by Aristotle and Porphyry. Of special interest in this discussion is the category of quality (kuṭūr) which is closely connected with that of knowledge. Dāwainai, the ninth/eighth-century philosopher and jurist, had considered knowledge (‘ilm) to be in essence of the category of the known (maṣūmīn) and in accident of the category of the quality of the soul. Mulla ʿṢadra, on the contrary, believed that knowledge belongs in essence to the category of quality and in accident to the that of the known. Ḥājī adds and modifies these views, considering knowledge to be an accident of the category of the known as well as that of quality but in essence beyond all categories like Being Itself.11

The third chapter of the Šerṭ-i Maṣūmah concerns theology, i.e., what

10 Šerṭ-i Maṣūmah, pp. 131-40.
11 Šerṭ-i Maṣūmah, pp. 183-84.
12 Šerṭ-i Maṣūmah, pp. 155-57.
13 Šerṭ-i Maṣūmah, pp. 140-51.
14 Ibid., p. 157. M. T. Amin, Durr al-Fauzi’l, Muṣafawi Press, Tehran, Vol. I, pp. 400ff. It is in this discussion that Ḥājī criticizes Mulla ʿṢadra for having proved the identity of the knower and the known in the Maṣūmah through the argument of relation (tawḥiq) which Ḥājī considers to be insufficient.
16 This knowledge, Ḥājī compares to the point of the Pen before writing which contains all the letters of the alphabet before they become distinct on paper. The Pen is the same as the reality of Muḥammad (al-baqiṣ al-Muḥammadyyah) and the first victorious light (farār al-khidr) of the Illuminationists.
17 Šerṭ-i Maṣūmah, pp. 183-84.
18 Refer to the chapter on Suhrwardi Maṣūlī. This seven-fold hierarchy is essentially the same as mentioned above with only a change in terminology which occurs often among the Ḥakimis.
A History of Muslim Philosophy

In the chapter on natural philosophy, Ḥājī briefly outlines the physics of the Muslim Peripatetics as contained in detail in the Shiji' of Ibn Sina and other similar texts, and the Phidemannian astronomy of epicycles as perfected by Muslim astronomers with the modifications made in it by Muḥammad Ṣadrī and the other later Ṣadrīs. The most important of these modifications is the introduction of the idea of substantial motion according to which the whole of the cosmic substance is in a state of becoming and the quantity of change is comprised in the measure of time. Ḥājī also displays the tendency—interpreted various aspects of the natural and mathematical sciences symbolically:—for instance, the water of Thales which he, like Muḥammad Ṣadrī, identifies with the breath of the Compassionate (nafṣ al-Rahmah) or the tetractys of Pythagoras which he regards as the symbol for the four principal stages of Being, intellect, soul, and nature.

After the discussion of natural philosophy, Ḥājī turns to the soul and its faculties and stages of development. There are three types of soul: vegetative, animal, and rational, the last of which consists of the human soul as well as the soul of the heavenly spheres. The vegetative soul has the three faculties of feeding, growth, and reproduction; and the animal soul, the five external senses, the five internal senses, and the power of motion. In man all of these faculties are developed to their fullness, but they are no more than the tools and instruments of the human soul which Ḥājī calls the šīfāt light and which is of the family of the lights of heaven.

The perfection of the soul is attained by revealing the stages of the intellect and finally unifying itself with God. The soul is given essentially two powers, theoretical and practical, for each of which there are four degrees of perfection. The theoretical intellect is comprised of the potential intellect which has the capacity merely of receiving knowledge, the habitual intellect by which acquaintance is made with simple truth, the active intellect by which knowledge is gained without the aid of the senses, and finally the acquired intellect by which the spiritual essence can be contemplated directly.

As for the practical intellect, it too consists of four stages: taḥṣīl, which consists in following the divine Laws revealed through the prophets; taḥṣīl, purifying the soul of evil traits; taḥṣīl, embalming the soul with spiritual virtues, and, finally, jauḍ or annihilation, which has the three degrees: annihilation in the divine acts, in the divine attributes, and finally in the divine essence.

18 Shari‘i Muḥhammād, pp. 238 ff.; Aḥrār al-Ḥikam, pp. 132 ff. These faculties are also outlined in Ḥalab, op. cit., and Būrūjīr, op. cit., p. 157.
19 For the meaning of this expression which is taken from the terminology of the Illuminationists, see the chapter on Suhrawardi Maṭtū‘ī.
21 These stages have already been discussed in the chapter on Muḥammad Ṣadrī whose terminology Ḥājī has adopted directly. See also A. M. A. Shuqairī, op. cit., p. 434.

Terminism in Iran (Continued): Ḥājī Muḥammad Ṣadrī

In the chapter on prophecy Ḥājī discusses the qualifications and characteristics which distinguish a prophet from ordinary men. The prophet is the intermediary between this world and the next, between the world of the senses and the spiritual essence, so that his being is necessary to maintain the hierarchy of Being. The prophet is distinguished by the fact that he has knowledge of all things which he has acquired by the grace of God and not through human instruction, by his power of action which is such that the matter of this world obeys him as if it were his body, and by his senses which are such that he sees and hears through them what is hidden to others. He is also marked by his immunity from sin and error ('īmāk) in all his acts and deeds.

Sainthood (wālīyyah) is in one aspect similar to prophecy in that the saint, like the prophet, has knowledge of the spiritual world. Yet every prophet is a saint while every saint is not a prophet. The prophet, in addition to his aspect of sainthood, has the duty of establishing laws in society and guiding the social, moral, and religious life of the people to whom he is sent.

Among the prophets themselves, a distinction is to be made between the sābi and the rāvī, the latter being distinguished by the fact that he possesses a divine Book in addition to his prophetic mission. Among those who are called rāvī there is a further distinction to be made between the sābi 'al-ʿażm, i.e., those whose Shari‘i abolishes the Shari‘i before theirs, and those with whom this is not the case. Finally, there is the Seal of the Prophets (Khulīs al-ṣaḥīḥ) the Prophet who envelopes all those stages within himself.

The mission of the Prophet Muhammad—upon whom he peace—by virtue of his being the Seal of Prophets is the summation of all previous prophetic missions; his spirit is the universal intellect which is the first theophany of the divine essence and which made the body of the Prophet so subtle that he was able to make the Nocturnal Ascent (mī‘rāj) to the highest heaven. That is why his light filled all directions and also that to whatever direction he turned he had no shadow. The direction of prayer (qiblah) of Moses was in the west or in the world of multiplicity and that of Jesus in the east or the world of unity. The qiblah of the Prophet Muhammad, on the other hand, is

17 Shari‘i Muḥhammād, pp. 318-29; also Aḥrār al-Ḥikam, pp. 307 ff.
18 Regarding the question of the relation of Islam to previous religions and the ascension of other religions, see F. Schuon, Transcendent Unity of Religions, Pantheon Co., New York, 1952, Chaps. V to VII.
19 Ḥājī considers the greatest miracles of the Prophet Muhammad is the Seal of Prophecy, to be the Qur‘ān, which in the beauty of language has no match in Arabic literature. He adds that in each period God gives those miracles to His prophets which conform to the mentality of the people of that age. That is why the miracles of the Qur‘ān lies in its language as the Arabs considered eloquence to be of such great importance; likewise, in the case of Moses his miracle was in magic which was at his time one of the basic arts, and in the case of Christ raising the dead to life because medicine occupied at that time an exalted position among the sciences.

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Renaissance in Iran (Continued): Hājī Molla Hädi Sabzivāri

and the acquisition of spiritual virtues such as purity, truthfulness, reliance upon God, surrender to the divine will, etc. When man acquires all of these virtues his soul becomes simple and pure; he then becomes the receiver of the divine theophanies which illuminate his being and finally unify him with the centre which is at once his own source of being and the origin of cosmic existence.

D)

POST-SABZIWĀRIAN HĪKMAT

The doctrines of Hājī which we have outlined and his influence are still very much alive in Persia. The school of those whose teachers learned the main ideas of Hikmat from Hädi Sabzivāri himself and narrated stories about life to them has been able to preserve itself in Persia, despite the anti-contemplative attitude adopted by the spirit of excessive modernism, chiefly because of the life which Hädi and to a certain extent some of the other Qājār Ḥakīms infused into it. Of the famous masters of Hikmat in Persia during the last decade we may name abu al-Ḥasan Jāhil, Muhammad Rādī Qumshā’ī, Jalālādīn Kāḥīn Qasqā’ī, Molla ‘Ali Zanjūnī, the author of Bāgī al-Ḥikam, and Mirzâ Tāhir Tānūkhānî, all of whom were contemporaries of Hädi, and those of a later date like the late Mirzâ Mōhīn Aḥṣāṭī, the author of Asrā al-Tauhīb, who passed away only recently. Of the masters living today there are several who are worthy of special attention like Sayyid Muhammad Rādī Aṣghar, Hädi Muhammad Husain Tahāštāb, the most prolific writer among the present Ḥakīms of Persia, and Sayyid abu al-Ḥasan Rāfī Qawwāl, a man who is a true master of all the traditional sciences and perhaps the greatest living authority on Hikmat and who lives in Qawwāl in meditation and training of a few disciples away from the tumults of modern life. One should also mention Muhājī al-Dīn Qumshā’ī, the author of Ḥikmat-i Hākī and a large Dāstān of Sufi poetry and the holder of the chair of Molla Sdrā in the Theological

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13 A list of some of these Ḥakīms is given by Gohînou, op. cit., pp. 116-20. See also Farnān al-Sabzvārī Muhammad Husain Khān, Kāthib al-Mu‘ājīr et al.-Aṣghar, Tehran, lithographed edition, 1306/1888, pp. 131-225.

14 This great authority on Hikmat and gnostics has trained a generation of students in Tehran University and the Sepahsalar mausoleum but has not written extensively on these subjects.

15 This latter type of commentaries on Hikmat contains the most important works of Arabic and Persian including the commentary of Hädi, Inshā’ al-Fādilat wa Nāshī’ al-Radā’ by Murtuza Majdibari, a book on the principles of Ḥikmat which came as answers to a set of questions posed by Hājī in a total of the two, one ecstatic and ecstatic. See also R. Schouw, op. cit., Chap. VI.

16 From the Hājī Molla’s own commentaries on Hikmat, both in Arabic and Persian, he has revised the study of Hikmat in Qum which is the most important centre of Hājī’s studies today and has produced many scholars who have themselves become authorities on the intellectual sciences.
Part 2. Renaissance in South and South-East Asia

Chapter LXXIX

RENAISSANCE IN INDO-PAKISTAN

SIHĀH WALI ALLAH DIHLAWI

A

INTRODUCTION

Of the two leaders of thought who appeared during the early decades of the 18th century, Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab of Arabia and Sīhah Wali Allah of Delhi, the latter occupies a more prominent position. He was a luminary who during the stormy period of Indian history showed the bewildered Muslims the right path—the path of peace and glory. He was possessed of deep insight, profound learning, and heroic nobleness. Not long after his death his thought gave rise to a mighty movement under the leadership of Sīhah Ismā'īl Shāhīd and Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi for liberating the Muslims from the clutches of Western imperialism.

B

LIFE AND WORKS

Qūth al-Dīn Ahmad, popularly known as Sīhah Wali Allah, was born in 1114/1703, four years before the death of Aurangzeb. His genealogy can be traced back to the family of 'Umar Fārisī, the great Caliph. It is difficult to ascertain the exact time when his forbearers left Arabia and settled down in India, but the circumstantial evidence indicates that it was about three hundred years after the great Migration (Hijrah). The historical records speak eloquently of the prominent position which Sīhah Wali Allah's grandfather occupied in the Moghul Court. It has been narrated that he played an important role in the struggle for power amongst the sons of Sīhah Jashn, and that he fought bravely against the Marathas of the Deccan. Sīhah Wali Allah's father, Sīhah 'Abd al-Rahim, was greatly loved and respected by the people for his great scholarship and piety. He was entrusted by the Emperor 'Aāmirgir with the delicate and important task of revising the Fatawā-i 'Ālamgīri. He acquitted himself creditably of the duty assigned to him and declined to accept any remuneration for the work.

In his booklet al-Jaw' al-Latif fī Tarjumāt al-'Abd al-Walī, Sīhah Wali Allah 2

1 Al-Fargis (Special Number on Sīhah Wali Allah), 2nd edition, Barelvi, 1941, pp. 203-204, 402.
2 Ibid., pp. 113, 170.