|
FAÚRAÚBÈ,
ABUÚ
NAS®R,
Muslim
philosopher
of
the
4th/10th
century.
i.
BIOGRAPHY
The
sources
for
the
life
of
Fa@ra@b^
are
such
as
to
make
the
reconstruction
of
his
biography
beyond
a
mere
outline
nearly
impossible.
The
earliest
and
more
reliable
sources,
i.
e.,
those
composed
before
the
6th/12th
century,
that
are
extant
today
are
so
few
as
to
indicate
that
no
one
among
Fa@ra@b^'s
successors
and
their
followers,
or
even
unrelated
scholars,
undertook
to
write
his
full
biography,
a
neglect
that
has
to
be
taken
into
consideration
in
assessing
his
immediate
impact.
His
fame,
however,
began
to
grow,
apparently
in
association
with
and
as
a
result
of
the
renown
of
Avicenna
(q.v.)
who,
through
his
explicit
recommendation
and
endorsement
of
Fa@ra@b^
in
his
writings,
presented
himself
as
Fa@ra@b^'s
successor
in
philosophy.
When
major
Arabic
biographers
came
to
write
comprehensive
entries
on
Fa@ra@b^
in
the
6th-7th/12th-13th
centuries,
the
period
of
the
greatest
expansion
of
philosophical
studies
in
Islamic
lands,
there
was
very
little
specific
information
on
hand;
this
allowed
for
their
acceptance
of
invented
stories
about
his
life
which
range
from
benign
extrapolation
on
the
basis
of
some
known
details
to
tendentious
reconstructions
and
legends.
Most
modern
biographies
of
the
philosopher
present
various
combinations
of
elements
drawn
at
will
from
this
concocted
material.
The
extant
original
sources
are
of
two
basic
kinds,
documentary
and
narrative.
The
documentary
sources
consist
of
notations
and
other
incidental
information
in
manuscripts
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
works
relating
to
his
biography;
few
though
these
may
be,
they
are
our
most
reliable
sources.
The
narrative
sources
also
fall
into
two
major
categories,
those
written
before
the
6th/12th
century
and
those
after.
The
sources
prior
to
the
6th/12th
century
consist
of:
(1)
an
autobiographical
passage
by
Fa@ra@b^,
preserved
by
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
(II,
pp.
134-35),
tracing
the
transmission
of
the
instruction
of
logic
and
philosophy
from
antiquity
to
his
days.
Fa@ra@b^
situates
himself
also
in
this
process
at
the
very
end
of
it,
which
would
appear
to
be
the
purpose
behind
his
otherwise
quite
tendentious
account
(Gutas,
1999),
but
there
is
little
reason
to
doubt
the
specific
statements
about
his
immediate
predecessors
and
himself.
(2)
Reports
by
Mas¿u@d^
(Tanb^h,
p.
122),
Ebn
al-Nad^m
(ed.
Flügel,
p.
263,
ll.
8-14),
and
Ebn
H®awqal
(pp.
510-11),
all
younger
contemporaries
of
Fa@ra@b^,
as
well
as
by
S®a@¿ed
Andalos^
(d.
462/1070),
the
first
biographer
to
have
devoted
an
entry
to
him
(pp.
53-54).
These
reports
are
implicitly
reliable
though
of
limited
extent.
This
is
significant
in
the
case
of
the
Andalusian
tradition
represented
by
S®@a@¿ed,
for
it
can
be
assumed
that
it
would
contain
all
accessible
information
on
Fa@ra@b^
because
of
its
almost
exclusive
adherence
to
his
philosophy.
S®@a@¿ed,
however,
though
he
summarizes
a
number
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
books,
knows
nothing
more
about
his
life
than
the
preceding
sources
other
than
the
mere
fact
of
his
association
with
the
Hamdanid
Sayf-al-Dawla
(r.
333-56/944-67).
The
sources
from
the
6th/12th
century
and
later
consist
essentially
of
three
biographical
entries,
all
other
extant
reports
on
Fa@ra@b^
being
either
dependent
on
them
or
even
later
fabrications:
(1)
the
Syrian
tradition
or
collection
of
biographical
narratives
on
Fa@ra@b^
represented
by
the
entry
by
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
(II,
pp.
134-40),
and
to
a
lesser
extent
by
Ebn
al-QeftÂ^
(pp.
277-80);
(2)
the
pro-Turkish
tradition,
compiled
and
composed
as
a
continuous
narrative
by
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
with
the
purpose
of
documenting
a
Turkish
ethnic
origin
for
Fa@ra@b^
(ed.
¿Abba@s,
V,
pp.
153-57;
tr.
de
Slane,
III,
pp.
307-11);
and
(c)
the
scanty
and
legendary
Eastern
tradition,
represented
by
Z®ah^r-al-D^n
Bayhaq^
(pp.
16-20,
no.
17).
Of
these,
the
Eastern
tradition
of
Bayhaq^
(q.v.;
d.
565/1169)
can
be
discounted:
the
few
accurate
data
derive
from
the
earlier
sources,
whereas
the
added
material
is
obviously
fabricated.
Ebn
al-QeftÂ^
(or
the
extant
epitome
of
Zawzan^,
compiled
in
647/1249)
actually
offers
a
combination
of
the
Andalusian
and
Syrian
traditions,
for
he
copies
S®a@¿ed
for
the
most
part
and
has
additional
material
only
on
Fa@ra@b^'s
association
with
Sayf-al-Dawla.
This
leaves
the
Syrian
and
pro-Turkish
traditions
of
the
biographical
entries
in
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a's
¿Oyu@n
(final
recension
completed
in
667/1268)
and
in
Ebn
K¨alleka@n's
Wafaya@t
(completed
in
669/1271)
respectively.
These
present
themselves
as
our
most
extensive
and
detailed
sources
though
they
date
a
good
three
centuries
after
Fa@ra@b^'s
death.
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a's
entry,
which
is
the
earlier
one,
consists
of
a
collection
and
patching
together
of
all
the
diverse
pieces
of
information
that
were
available
to
him
in
Syria
at
that
time.
It
includes
much
legendary
material,
but
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
also
quotes
Fa@ra@b^
where
he
can.
Ebn
K¨alleka@n's
entry,
by
contrast,
is
a
response
to
that
of
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a:
the
latter
had
mentioned
at
the
beginning
of
his
entry,
and
for
the
first
time
by
any
extant
biographer,
that
Fa@ra@b^'s
father
was
of
Persian
descent;
Ebn
K¨alleka@n's
entry
is
completely
animated
by
the
effort
to
prove
that
Fa@ra@b^
was
ethnically
Turkish.
To
this
end,
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
first
gave
Fa@ra@b^
an
additional
nesba,
one
he
never
had,
al-Tork^.
Abu'l-Feda@÷,
who
copied
Ebn
K¨alleka@n,
corrected
this,
and
changed
the
word,
al-Tork^
"the
Turk,"
which
reads
like
a
nesba,
to
the
descriptive
statement,
wa-ka@na
rajolan
tork^yan
"he
was
a
Turkish
man"
(Mokòtasáar
II,
p.
104).
Second,
at
the
end
of
his
entry,
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
spent
considerable
time
giving
the
correct
spelling
and
vocalization
of
all
the
names
which
he
says
are
Turkish
and
are
associated
with
Fa@ra@b^:
the
names
of
his
alleged
grand-
and
great-grandfather,
T®arkòa@n
and
Awzalag@
(adding
explicitly,
wa-homa@
men
asma@÷
al-tork,
"these
are
Turkish
names"),
and
the
toponymics
of
his
origins,
Fa@ra@b,
OtÂra@r,
Bala@sag@u@n,
and
Ka@œg@ar
(the
information
on
the
toponymics
is
derived
from
Sam¿a@n^,
under
the
nesba
al-Fa@ra@b^,
though
Sam¿a@n^
does
not
refer
to
the
philosopher).
In
between,
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
offers
a
continuous
narrative
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
life
as
reconstructed
by
him.
LIFE
Since
almost
every
detail
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
life
found
in
one
source
is
contradicted
by
that
in
another,
it
will
be
helpful
to
list
first
those
items
from
the
documentary
and
earlier
narrative
sources
which
are
certain
and
to
present
the
dubious
and
legendary
material
on
the
later
sources
in
the
next
section.
His
name
was
Abu@
Nasár
Mohá®ammad
b.
Moháammad
Fa@ra@b^,
as
all
sources,
and
especially
the
earliest
and
most
reliable,
Mas¿u@d^,
agree.
In
the
famous
passage
about
the
appearance
of
philosophy
preserved
and
reported
by
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
(II,
p.
135
ll.
20-21),
he
is
quoted
as
having
said
that
he
had
studied
logic
with
Yu@háanna@
b.
H®ayla@n
up
to
and
including
Aristotle's
Posterior
Analytics,
i.e.,
according
to
the
order
of
the
books
studied
in
the
curriculum,
Fa@ra@b^
said
that
he
studied
Porphyry's
Eisagoge
and
Aristotle's
Categories,
De
Interpretatione,
Prior
and
Posterior
Analytics.
His
teacher,
Yu@háanna@
b.
H®ayla@n,
was
a
Christian
cleric
who
abandoned
lay
interests
and
engaged
in
his
ecclesiastical
duties,
as
Fa@ra@b^
reports.
His
studies
of
Aristotelian
logic
with
Yu@háanna@
in
all
probability
took
place
in
Baghdad,
where
Mas¿u@d^
tells
us
Yu@háanna@
died
during
the
caliphate
of
al-Moqtader
(295-320/908-32).
This
is
further
indicated
by
the
entire
approach
and
contents
of
his
logical
work,
which
is
imbued
with
the
thought
world
of
Alexandrian
Aristotelianism
as
resuscitated
in
Baghdad
by
Abu@
Beœr
Matta@
and
his
teachers
(Zimmermann,
pp.
lxviii-cxxxix;
see
also
below,
section
on
Fa@ra@b^
and
Greek
philosophy).
Fa@ra@b^
apparently
stayed
on
and
worked
in
Baghdad.
Yaháya@
b.
¿Ad^,
a
resident
of
Baghdad
according
to
Ebn
al-QeftÂ^
(p.
361
ll.
9-10),
was
among
his
students,
and
he
composed
at
least
two
of
his
works
for
Baghdad
personalities:
a
treatise
on
the
validity
of
astrology
for
the
Christian
scholar
and
translator
Abu@
Esháa@q
Ebra@h^m
b.
¿Abd-Alla@h
Bag@da@d^
(Mahdi,
1975-76,
p.
265)
and
his
great
book
on
music
for
the
vizier
of
the
caliph
al-Ra@zµ^,
Abu@
Ja¿far
Moháammad
b.
Qa@sem
Karkò^
(Keta@b
al-mu@s^q^
al-kab^r,
pp.
30
and
35,
n.1).
We
know
that
he
was
definitely
in
Baghdad
until
the
end
of
the
year
330/September
942.
As
we
learn
from
notes
in
some
manuscripts
of
his
Maba@de÷
a@ra@÷
ahl
al-mad^na
al-fa@zµela,
he
had
started
to
compose
the
book
in
Baghdad
at
that
time
and
then
left
and
went
to
Syria.
He
took
the
book
with
him,
and
he
finished
it
in
Damascus
the
following
year
(331),
i.e.,
by
September
943
(cited
in
Fa@ra@b^'s
Keta@b
al-mella,
p.
79
and
by
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
II,
pp.
138-39;
tr.
in
Mahdi
1990,
pp.
721-22).
In
Syria
Fa@ra@b^
also
lived
and
taught
for
some
time
in
Aleppo;
Ebn
al-QeftÂ^
mentions
that
he
went
to
Aleppo
to
Sayf-al-Dawla,
a
report
that
is
corroborated
by
another
manuscript
note,
copied
by
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
(II,
p.
139
ll.
19-20),
which
says
that
he
had
dictated
a
commentary
on
the
Posterior
Analytics
to
Ebra@h^m
b.
¿Ad^,
a
student
of
his
in
Aleppo
(and
Yaháya@'s
brother).
Later
on
Fa@ra@b^
visited
Egypt;
the
note
in
the
manuscripts
of
the
Maba@de÷
also
informs
us
that
he
wrote
the
six
sections
(fosáu@l)
summarizing
the
book
in
Egypt
in
337/July
948-June
949.
He
must
have
returned
to
Syria,
however,
soon
thereafter,
for
we
are
certain
of
his
place
and
date
of
death:
Mas¿u@d^,
writing
barely
five
years
after
the
fact
(955-6,
the
date
of
the
composition
of
the
Tanb^h),
says
that
he
died
in
Damascus
in
Rajab
339
(between
14
December
950
and
12
January
951).
His
stay
in
Syria
was
somehow
associated
with
Sayf-al-Dawla,
though
we
do
not
know
precisely
how,
how
long,
and
in
what
capacity.
S@a@¿ed
al-Andalos^,
the
first
to
report
this
connection,
simply
says
(p.
54
l.
19)
that
Fa@ra@b^
"died
in
Damascus
in
339
under
the
protection
(f^
kanaf)"
of
Sayf-al-Dawla.
Later
biographers
greatly
embellish
this
association.
STORIES
AND
LEGENDS
The
above
is
all
that
can
be
said
with
certainty
about
Fa@ra@b^'s
biography.
The
remaining
reports
in
the
later
sources
are
dubious
at
best
and
legendary
at
worst,
beginning
with
his
pedigree
and
origins.
There
is
confusion
and
uncertainty,
first
of
all,
about
the
names
of
his
grandfather
and
great-grandfather,
which
are
given
variously
by
the
sources.
The
consensus
in
secondary
literature
is
to
list
T®arkòa@n
as
the
grandfather's
name,
but
this
is
not
supported
by
the
sources,
some
of
which
do
not
have
it
at
all
(most
of
the
earliest
sources),
while
others
have
it
as
the
name
of
the
great-grandfather
(Fehrest;
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a),
and
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
has
it
as
the
name
of
the
father
(a
discrepancy
which
was
remarked
upon
by
the
careful
S®afad^,
I,
p.
106).
Actually,
it
would
seem
none
of
them
is
right.
In
some
manuscripts
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
works,
which
must
reflect
the
reading
of
their
ultimate
archetypes
from
his
time,
his
full
name
appears
as
Abu@
Nasár
Moháammad
b.
Moháammad
al-T®arkòa@n^,
i.e.,
the
element
T®arkòa@n
appears
in
a
nesba
(Fa@ra@b^,
Keta@b
al-mu@s^q^
p.
35,
note
1;
Aháka@m
al-noju@m,
p.
46).
This
indicates
that
T®arkòa@n
was
not
necessarily
the
name
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
grandfather
but
rather
that
of
a
more
distant
relative
from
whom
his
family
claimed
descent
(cf.
Sam¿a@n^,
ed.
Yama@n^,
IX,
p.
63,
s.v.
the
nesba
al-T®arkòa@n^).
Moreover,
if
the
name
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
grandfather
was
not
known
among
his
contemporaries
and
immediately
succeeding
generations,
it
is
all
the
more
surprising
to
see
in
the
later
sources
the
appearance
of
yet
another
name
from
his
pedigree,
Awzalag@.
This
appears
as
the
name
of
the
grandfather
in
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
and
of
the
great-grandfather
in
Ebn
K¨alleka@n.
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
is
the
first
source
to
list
this
name
which,
as
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
explicitly
specifies
later,
is
so
to
be
pronounced.
In
modern
Turkish
scholarship
the
pronunciation
is
given
as
Uzlug@
(ËA
V,
p.
451),
without
any
explanation.
The
first
appearance
of
this
distinctly
Turkish
sounding
name
in
the
later
sources
in
the
context
of
attempts
to
claim
a
Turkish
ethnic
background
for
Fa@ra@b^
is
accordingly
questionable.
The
nesba,
universally
given
as
al-Fa@ra@b^,
would
indicate
a
place
of
ultimate
origin
in
the
district
of
Fa@ra@b
(the
older
Persian
form
Pa@ra@b
is
given
in
Háodu@d
al-¿a@lam)
on
the
middle
Syr
Darya
(Jaxartes).
This
is
corroborated
by
the
geographer
Ebn
H®awqal,
a
younger
contemporary
of
Fa@ra@b^
who
was
also
somehow
associated,
like
Fa@ra@b^
later
in
his
life,
with
the
Hamdanid
Sayf-al-Dawla,
since
the
first
edition
of
his
famous
S®u@rat
al-arzµ
was
dedicated
to
that
prince.
Ebn
H®awqal
notes
from
his
travels
in
Transoxania
that
Fa@ra@b^
was
"from"
(men)
the
town
of
Vas^j
in
Fa@ra@b
(EstÂak@òr^
does
not
mention
Fa@ra@b^
in
association
with
Vas^j).
This
has
been
taken
to
mean
that
Fa@ra@b^
himself
was
born
there,
but
this
need
not
be
necessarily
the
case.
Ebn
H®awqal
is
contradicted
by
no
less
an
authority
than
Ebn
al-Nad^m,
who
was
also
a
younger
contemporary
of
Fa@ra@b^
and
had
close
personal
contacts
with
Yaháya@
b.
¿Ad^,
Fa@ra@b^'s
most
successful
student,
from
whom
he
received
a
significant
amount
of
his
information
about
philosophical
studies
for
his
Fehrest.
Ebn
al-Nad^m
states
(ed.
Flügel
p.
263
l.
9)
that
Fa@ra@b^'s
origins
(asáloho)
lie
in
Fa@rya@b
in
Khorasan
(men
al-Fa@rya@b
men
arzµ
Kòora@sa@n),
that
is,
the
town
half
way
down
the
road
from
Marv-al-ru@dò
to
Balkò.
Bayhaq^
in
his
Tatemmat
Sáewa@n
al-háekma
(p.
16.7)
conflates
the
two
traditions
and
says
that
Fa@ra@b^
was
"from
Fa@rya@b
in
Turkestan."
These
variants
in
the
basic
facts
about
Fa@ra@b^'s
origins
and
pedigree
indicate
that
they
were
not
recorded
during
his
lifetime
or
soon
thereafter
by
anyone
with
concrete
information,
but
were
rather
based
on
hearsay
or
probable
guesses.
When
in
the
7th/13th
century
Fa@ra@b^'s
ethnic
origin
was
made
into
an
issue
by
the
biographers,
dogmatic
statements
without
acknowledgment
of
source
begin
to
appear.
We
thus
hear
for
the
first
time,
from
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a,
that
Fa@ra@b^'s
father
was
a
commander
of
the
army
and
of
Persian
(fa@res^)
descent,
to
which
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
responded
as
described
above.
Ultimately
pointless
as
the
quest
for
Fa@ra@b^'s
ethnic
origins
might
be,
the
fact
remains
that
we
do
not
have
sufficient
evidence
to
decide
the
matter.
There
was
also
no
information
about
Fa@ra@b^'s
early
life
and
studies,
other
than
the
mere
fact
that
he
had
studied
logic
with
Yu@háanna@
b.
H®ayla@n.
The
fabricated
stories
accordingly
proliferated.
In
this
case,
as
perhaps
in
others,
these
stories
may
have
started
as
plausible
extensions
of
the
little
that
was
known
about
him
or
as
well-intentioned
elaborations
of
elements
in
his
works.
Since,
as
his
nesba
indicated,
he
was
supposed
to
be
from
the
East,
he
was
said
to
have
come
to
Baghdad
as
a
young
man
and
to
have
studied
there.
Almost
every
source
mentions
Yu@háanna@
b.
H®ayla@n
as
his
teacher,
except
that
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
adds
Abu@
Beœr
Matta@,
plausibly
because
by
Ebn
K¨alleka@n's
time
Abu@
Beœr
had
gained
the
reputation
of
having
been
the
master
logician
before
Fa@ra@b^
himself,
and
Fa@ra@b^
could
not
but
have
studied
with
the
best.
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
(II,
p.
136
ll.
23-24)
also
mentions,
citing
an
otherwise
unidentified
History
(Ta÷r^kò),
that
Fa@ra@b^
used
to
take
grammar
lessons
from
the
famous
Baghdadi
grammarian
Ebn
al-Sarra@j
(d.
316/928)
in
exchange
for
logic
lessons,
a
report
which
would
appear
to
be
based
on
the
numerous
references
to
grammar
in
Fa@ra@b^'s
works
as
well
as
on
Ebn
al-Sarra@j's
reputation
of
having
introduced
logic
in
his
grammatical
analyses
(cf.
the
discussion
and
references
in
Zimmermann,
pp.
cxviii-cxxii).
A
similar
basis
in
Fa@ra@b^'s
works
would
seem
to
lie
also
behind
the
legends
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
talent
for
languages.
As
is
well
known,
in
his
incessant
efforts
to
differentiate
between
universal
logical
structures
of
thought
and
particular
grammatical
structures,
Fa@ra@b^
has
in
a
number
of
his
works
references
and
glosses
in
Persian,
Sogdian,
and
Greek
(but
no
Turkish;
cf.
Walzer,
1985,
p.
3),
and
this
apparently
gave
rise
to
his
reputation
as
a
polyglot
(Zimmermann,
p.
lxxvii
n.
2).
There
are
variations
on
this
theme,
depending
on
the
purposes
of
the
author
using
it.
Ebn
K¨alleka@n,
in
line
with
his
pro-Turkish
bias,
makes
the
outlandish
claim
that
Fa@ra@b^
knew
no
Arabic
when
he
came
to
Baghdad
but
only
"Turkish
and
numerous
other
languages,"
and
that
he
mastered
Arabic
only
afterwards.
Later
on,
in
his
story
about
Fa@ra@b^
at
the
court
of
Sayf-al-Dawla
(see
further
below),
he
has
Fa@ra@b^
say
that
he
knew
more
than
seventy
languages.
Related
to
this
would
appear
to
be
an
interpolated
statement
in
a
manuscript
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
account
of
the
appearance
of
philosophy
preserved
in
Kabul
(Library
of
the
Ministry
of
Information,
Arabic
MS
217,
fol.
154r;
cf.
S.
De
Laugier
de
Beaurecueil,
Manuscrits
d'Afghanistan,
Cairo,
1964,
p.
293,
no.
40).
The
Arabic
text
from
this
manuscript
remains
unpublished,
but
according
to
Mahdi
(1971,
pp.
523-24),
after
the
report
that
Fa@ra@b^
studied
with
Yu@háanna@
b.
H®ayla@n
(i.e.,
after
what
corresponds
to
the
end
of
the
passage
quoted
by
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a,
II,
p.
135
l.
24),
the
Kabul
manuscript
adds,
"After
this,
he
traveled
to
the
land
of
the
Greeks
and
stayed
in
their
land
for
eight
years
until
he
completed
[the
study
of
the]
science[s]
and
learned
the
entire
philosophic
syllabus."
If
this
is
accurate,
it
would
be
another
instance
of
the
legend
of
the
polyglot
Fa@ra@b^,
this
time
also
based
on
his
reputation
as
expert
of
the
Greek
syllabus.
This
is
further
corroborated
by
a
statement
reported
by
S®afad^
(I,
p.
106)
which
presents
the
gist
of
the
legend
of
the
polyglot
Fa@ra@b^:
"It
is
said
that
he
learned
philosophy
from
the
Greek
language
because
he
knew
it
as
well
as
other
languages."
Qazv^n^
(d.
682/1283),
a
later
representative
of
the
Eastern
tradition,
invents
yet
another
accomplishment;
he
says
that
Fa@ra@b^
translated
Aristotle
into
Arabic
from
Greek
(AÚt¯a@r,
p.
548).
From
the
Syrian
tradition,
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
reports
two
romantic
stories
about
Fa@ra@b^'s
youth.
The
first,
reported
personally
to
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
(háaddat¯an^)
by
the
famous
theologian
AÚmed^
(d.
631/1233),
says
that
Fa@ra@b^
was
a
warden
in
a
Damascus
orchard
in
his
early
life
and
that
he
used
to
read
philosophy
at
night
by
the
light
of
the
watchman's
lamp.
The
other
story,
apparently
a
variant
of
the
first
and
reported
anonymously
by
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
("from
the
manuscript
notes
of
some
shaikh"),
has
it
that
Fa@ra@b^
was
a
judge
(qa@zµ^)
in
early
life
but
gave
it
all
up
for
philosophy,
which
he
would
study
by
the
light
of
watchmen's
lamps.
The
same
anonymous
source
also
adds
that
Fa@ra@b^
took
up
philosophy
when
he
accidentally
read
some
books
by
Aristotle
left
with
him
for
safekeeping.
As
is
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a's
wont,
he
does
not
try
to
harmonize
these
stories
with
the
others
about
his
education
in
Baghdad.
With
regard
to
Fa@ra@b^'s
education
and
early
life,
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
makes
up
yet
another
story
on
the
basis
of
what
he
read
in
the
available
literature.
In
the
parallel
account
by
Mas¿u@d^
of
the
transmission
of
philosophical
instruction
from
Alexandria
to
Baghdad
(Tanb^h,
pp.
121-22;
cf.
Stern;
Gutas,
1999),
Mas¿u@d^
says
that
the
teaching
of
philosophy
was
transferred
"in
the
days
of
al-Motawakkel
to
H®arra@n
and
then
in
the
days
of
al-Mo¿tazµed
it
eventually
got
to
Qowayra@
and
Yu@háanna@
b.
H®ayla@n,
who
died
in
Baghdad
during
the
reign
of
al-Moqtader.
.
."
From
the
context,
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
apparently
inferred
that
Yu@háanna@
was
still
in
H®arra@n
when
he
taught
Fa@ra@b^—since
Mas¿u@d^
does
not
explicitly
mention
that
the
teaching
was
transferred
to
Baghdad
but
only
that
Yu@háanna@
had
died
there—and
thus
has
Fa@ra@b^
take
a
side
trip
from
Baghdad
to
H®arra@n
to
study
with
Yu@háanna@
and
then
return
to
Baghdad.
Fa@ra@b^'s
association
with
Sayf-al-Dawla,
understandably,
figures
prominently
in
the
Syrian
tradition.
Ebn
al-QeftÂ^
first
mentions
that
Sayf-al-Dawla
honored
Fa@ra@b^
and
offered
him
protection.
The
anonymous
source
(œaykò)
of
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a
adds
that
he
would
accept
as
stipend
no
more
than
four
silver
dirhams
per
day—a
paltry
sum,
in
contrast
with
the
notorious
liberality
of
Sayf-al-Dawla—and
that
upon
his
death
funeral
services
were
led
by
Sayf-al-Dawla
himself.
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
repeats
these
stories
and
adds
that
he
was
buried
outside
the
Ba@b
al-S®ag@^r
in
the
south
of
Damascus.
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
is
also
the
only
source
to
mention
that
Fa@ra@b^
was
eighty
years
old
when
he
died.
Bayhaq^
finally,
has
the
romantic
story
of
Fa@ra@b^
being
killed
by
highway
robbers
on
his
way
from
Damascus
to
Ascalon.
As
A.
Adnan
Adévar
suggests
(ËA
V,
453a),
this
would
appear
to
be
in
imitation
of
the
story
of
the
death
of
the
poet
Motanabb^.
The
personal
qualities
which
these
stories
in
the
later
sources
are
designed
to
convey
are
single-minded
devotion
to
study
accompanied
by
frugality
bordering
on
asceticism,
or
what
was
then
regarded
as
the
ideal
philosophical
way
of
life.
He
is
said
to
have
had
no
care
for
possessions
or
gainful
employment
and
to
have
subsisted
on
little
more
than
soup
and
wine.
Ebn
al-QeftÂ^
adds
that
he
would
go
around
in
"Sufi
garb"
(be-zeyy
ahl
al-tasáawwof).
Understandably,
as
already
discussed,
this
detail
in
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
becomes
"Turkish
garb"
(be-zeyy
al-atra@k).
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
also
adds
that
Fa@ra@b^
liked
solitude,
and
that
he
would
compose
his
works
and
meet
with
students
in
parks
by
the
pond.
As
for
his
accomplishments,
other
than
his
alleged
knowledge
of
languages
mentioned
above,
and
universal
praise
as
philosopher,
mention
is
also
made
of
his
musical
talent,
obviously
deriving
from
his
massive
work
on
musical
theory
and
practice.
This
occurs
most
prominently
in
the
story
told
by
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
about
how
Fa@ra@b^
entered
the
court
of
Sayf-al-Dawla
unannounced
and
unrecognized
and,
after
exhibiting
an
astounding
knowledge
of
languages,
made
people
laugh,
reduced
them
to
tears,
and
put
them
to
sleep
by
playing
on
his
lute
that
he
would
tune
differently
for
each
purpose.
Interestingly,
a
similar
story
about
Fa@ra@b^
is
reported
by
Bayhaq^
from
an
unidentified
work
"Morals
of
the
Philosophers"
(Akòla@q
al-háokama@÷),
only
this
time
it
occurs
in
the
court
of
the
S®a@háeb
b.
¿Abba@d
(q.v.)
in
Ray.
Bayhaq^
appears
to
be
oblivious
to
the
anachronism:
the
S®a@háeb
was
about
twelve
when
Fa@ra@b^
died
and,
as
far
as
we
know,
Fa@ra@b^
never
went
to
Ray.
Qazv^n^
repeats
the
story
about
Fa@ra@b^
and
the
S®a@háeb,
and
adds
another
one
of
his
own:
Fa@ra@b^
would
go
from
city
to
city
in
disguise
because
the
kings
were
looking
for
him,
and
in
each
city
that
he
liked
he
would
buy
a
house
and
orchards
and
slaves
and
slavegirls.
When
he
tired
of
them,
he
would
marry
off
the
girls
to
the
slaves,
give
them
the
real
estate
as
a
present,
and
leave
and
never
come
back.
One
can
see
how
with
each
retelling,
here
as
in
the
previous
stories,
the
legendary
material
snowballs
with
more
colorful
additions.
As
for
the
real
Fa@ra@b^,
beyond
the
idealized
image
of
abstemious
philosopher
of
the
later
biographers
and
of
the
Turkish
philosopher
of
Ebn
K¨alleka@n,
we
have
no
direct
means
of
knowing.
Indirectly,
it
can
be
observed
that
Fa@ra@b^
went
through
life
unnoticed
(epitomizing
the
Epicurean
precept
la‚the
bio@sas),
which
would
explain
the
lack
of
general
information
about
him.
Even
his
senior
colleague
in
Baghdad,
Abu@
Beœr
Matta@,
engaged
in
social
activity
and
debated
the
grammarian
S^ra@f^,
but
there
are
no
such
reports
about
Fa@ra@b^,
not
even
by
Tawhá^d^,
the
great
gossip
of
philosophical
gatherings.
After
all
those
years
of
teaching
and
writing,
we
hear
only
of
two
disciples,
the
brothers
Ebn
¿Ad^,
Yaháya@
and
Ebra@h^m.
Yaháya@
eventually
headed
the
Aristotelian
school
in
Baghdad,
and
Ebra@h^m
apparently
accompanied
his
teacher
to
Aleppo.
These,
and
the
few
patrons
for
whom
he
wrote
some
works,
are
the
only
traces
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
social
life.
Indirectly
also,
we
are
left
with
his
works,
but
they
reveal
very
little,
if
anything,
of
his
personal
circumstances.
There
have
been
attempts
to
read
into
his
philosophical
works
his
life
and
religious
beliefs—like
Walzer's
suggestion
(1975,
p.
5)
that
he
was
an
Imami
Shi¿i
on
the
basis
of
his
statements
in
the
Maba@de÷,
or
Mahdi's
conjecture
(1971,
p.
524a)
that
he
studied
in
Constantinople
(!)
in
order
to
explain
his
allegedly
particular
brand
of
Plat
onism—but
these
are
speculative
in
the
extreme
and
are
best
avoided.
We
must
be
content
with
Fa@ra@b^'s
philosophical
legacy
in
his
works.
WORKS
Fa@ra@b^'s
works
have
been
listed
in
a
conventional
and
uncritical
way
a
number
of
times
(see
the
Bibliography).
There
is
no
critical
inventory
on
the
basis
of
the
manuscripts
that
will
identify
double
listings
under
different
titles
and
eliminate
misattributions,
much
less
are
there
historical
and
philological
studies
of
the
transmission
of
individual
works.
These
are
tasks
for
the
future.
A
first
attempt
at
analyzing
the
transmission
of
the
Maba@de'
was
made
by
Mahdi
1990.
The
narrative
biographies
present
some
interesting
information
in
this
regard
that
should
be
kept
in
mind.
Ebn
al-Nad^m,
first
of
all,
knows
surprisingly
few
titles
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
works—essentially,
some
commentaries
and
paraphrases
of
Aristotle.
This
fact
needs
to
be
explained
in
studying
the
transmission
of
his
works.
The
report
by
Bayhaq^,
whose
credulity
for
legends
is
compensated
for
by
his
bibliographic
acumen,
complements
that
of
Ebn
al-Nad^m.
He
says
that
in
his
time,
i.e.,
the
middle
of
the
6th/12th
century,
few
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
books
were
available
in
Khorasan;
most
of
them
were
to
be
found
in
Syria.
In
addition,
he
says
that
he
saw
in
the
library
of
the
chief
Shi¿ite
leader
(naq^b
al-noqaba@÷)
in
Ray
autograph
manuscripts
by
Fa@ra@b^
as
well
as
works
of
his
copied
by
his
student
Yaháya@
b.
¿Ad^
(who
was,
incidentally,
a
scribe
by
profession).
The
availability
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
books
in
Syria
is
to
be
expected;
some
of
these
would
be
the
redactions,
or
clean
copies,
prepared
by
the
other
brother,
Ebra@h^m
b.
¿Ad^
who
was,
according
to
Bayhaq^
again,
Fa@ra@b^'s
redactor
or
editor
(modawwen).
On
the
other
hand,
the
copies
in
Ray
were
by
the
hand
of
the
other
brother,
Ya@háya@,
and
these
would
have
come
there
from
Baghdad.
The
detail
about
the
Shi¿ite
leader's
library
also
needs
to
be
taken
into
consideration
in
studying
the
dissemination
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
works
among
Shi¿ites.
Furthermore,
this
report
indicates
two
additional
things:
first,
that
there
was
no
interest
in
his
works
in
Khorasan,
and
perhaps
in
the
East
generally,
right
after
his
death
and
until
the
appearance
of
Avicenna;
and
second,
that
when
Avicenna's
work
made
philosophy
a
popular
subject
in
the
East,
Fa@ra@b^'s
works
were
overshadowed
by
those
of
Avicenna,
at
least
until
Bayhaq^'s
time.
This
is
to
be
contrasted
with
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
who,
writing
in
Syria
and
Egypt
about
a
century
after
Bayhaq^
says
that
most
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
works
were
transmitted
in
the
form
of
disconnected
paragraphs
and
notes,
and
that
some
of
them
were
found
incomplete
and
dispersed
because
he
used
to
compose
on
loose
pieces
of
paper
and
not
in
(bound)
quires.
Though
the
reason
adduced
by
Ebn
K¨alleka@n
is
apparently
fictitious
(it
proves
Fa@ra@b^'s
frugality
and
lack
of
interest
in
worldly
matters),
the
state
of
preservation
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
works
that
he
describes
for
his
time
and
place
has
to
be
verified
against
extant
manuscripts.
Bibliography
(for
cited
works
not
given
in
detail,
see
"Short
References"):
Sources
(texts
of
all
the
Arabic
sources
reporting
on
the
life
and
activities
of
Fa@ra@b^
and
known
to
the
editor
have
ben
collected
in
one
volume
by
H®.
¿A.
Maháfu@zá,
Al-Fa@ra@b^
f^
mara@je¿
al-¿arab^ya,
Baghdad,
1975).
Abu@'l-Feda@÷,
Al-Mokòtasáar
f^
ta÷r^kò
al-baœar,
Istanbul,
1286/1869-70.
S®a@¿ed
Andalos^,
Keta@b
tÂabaqa@t
al-omam,
ed.
L.
Cheikho,
Beirut,
1912.
Z@áah^r-al-D^n
Bayhaq^,
Tatemmat
Sáewa@n
al-háekma,
ed.
M.
ˆaf^¿,
Lahore
1351/1932.
Ebn
Ab^
Osáaybe¿a,
¿Oyu@n
al-anba@÷
f^
táabaqa@t
al-atáebba@÷,
ed.
A.
Müller,
Cairo,
1299/1882.
Ebn
al-QeftÂ^,
Ta÷r^kò
al-háokama@÷,
ed.
J.
Lippert,
Leipzig,
1903.
Abu@
Nasár
Fa@ra@b^,
Aháka@m
al-noju@m
in
J.
AÚl
Ya@s^n,
ed.,
al-Fa@ra@b^:
Resalata@n^
falsaf^yata@n^,
Beirut,
1407/1987.
Idem,
Keta@b
al-Mella
wa
nosáu@sá
okòra@,
ed.
M.
Mahdi,
Beirut,
1968.
Idem,
Keta@b
al-mu@s^q^
al-kab^r,
ed.
GÚ.
Kòaœaba
and
M.
Háefn^,
Cairo,
1967.
Zakar^ya@÷
b.
Moháammad
Qazv^n^,
AÚt¯a@r
al-bela@d
wa-akòba@r
al-¿eba@d,
ed.
Beirut,
1380/1960.
K¨al^l
b.
Aybak
S®afad^,
Al-Wa@f^
be'l-wafaya@t
I,
ed.
H.
Ritter,
Istanbul
and
Leipzig,
1931.
Secondary
literature.
A.
Adnan
[Adévar],
"Fa@ra@b^,"
ËA
V,
pp.
451-69.
D.
Gutas,
"The
Alexandria
to
Baghdad
Complex
of
Narratives,"
Documenti
e
Studi
sulla
Tradizione
Filosofica
Medievale
10
(forthcoming).
I.
Madkour,
La
place
d'al-Fa@ra@b^
dans
l'e‚cole
philosophique
musulmane,
Paris
1934.
M.
Mahdi,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^,"
in
C.
C.
Gillispie,
ed.,
Dictionary
of
Scientific
Biography
IV,
New
York,
1971,
pp.
523-26.
Idem,
"al-Ta¿a@l^m
wa'l-tajreba
fi'l-tanj^m
wa'l-mu@s^qa@"
in
al-Fa@ra@b^
wa'l-háazµa@ra
al-ensa@n^ya
(Mehraja@n
al-Fa@ra@b^,
1975),
Baghdad,
1975-76,
pp.
260-80.
Idem,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Imperfect
State,"
JAOS
110,
1990,
pp.
691-726.
M.
Steinschneider,
al-Farabi
(Alpharabius)
des
arabischen
Philosophen
Leben
und
Schriften,
St.
Petersberg,
1869,
pp.
1-11
(the
first
critical
discussion
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
biography;
although
Steinschneider
had
only
the
later
sources
at
his
disposal,
his
analysis
is
still
valuable).
S.
M.
Stern,
"Al-Mas¿u@d^
and
the
Philosopher
al-Fa@ra@b^,"
in
S.
M.
Ahmad
and
A.
Rahman,
eds.,
Al-Mas¿u@d^
Millenary
Commemoration
Volume,
Aligarh,
1960,
pp.
28-41.
R.
Walzer,
Al-Farabi
on
the
Perfect
State,
Oxford,
1985.
Idem,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^,"
in
EI2
II,
pp.
778-81.
F.
W.
Zimmermann,
Al-Farabi's
Commentary
and
Short
Treatise
on
Aristotle's
"De
Interpretatione,"
London,
1981.
Fa@ra@b^'s
works
(bibliographies
listed
in
chronological
sequence).
A.
Ate¶,
"Fa@ra@b^'nin
eserlerinin
bibliyografyasi,"
Belleten
15,
1951,
pp.
175-92
(apparently
a
[revised?]
reprint
of
the
author's
bibliography
which
first
appeared
in
Fa@ra@b^
tetkikleri,
Istanbul,
1950,
pp.
111-26).
K.
¿Awwa@d
and
M.
¿Awwa@d,
"Mo÷allafa@t
al-Fa@ra@b^,"
al-Mawred
4/3,
1975,
pp.
223-68.
M.
Cunbur,
Ë.
Binark,
and
N.
Seferciog¡lu,
Fa@ra@b^
Bibliyografyasé,
Ankara,
1973.
H®.
¿A.
Maháfu@zá
and
J.
AÚl
Ya@s^n,
Mo÷allafa@t
al-Fa@ra@b^,
Baghdad,
1395/1975.
J.
Ja@wuœ^,
"AÚt¯a@r
Abu@
[sic]
Nasár
al-Fa@ra@b^,"
in
Abu@
Nasár
al-Fa@ra@b^:
faylasu@f
al-Esla@m
wa'l-mo¿allem
al-t¯a@n^,
Damascus,
1409/1989,
pp.
117-55.
N.
Rescher,
Al-Fa@ra@b^:
An
Annotated
Bibliography,
Pittsburgh,
1962.
In
addition
to
these
bibliographies
which
deal
with
all
the
works
of
Fa@ra@b^,
inventories
of
his
logical
work
alone
were
drawn
in
two
other
publications
by
N.
Rescher,
al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Short
Commentary
on
Aristotle's
"Prior
Analytics,"
Pittsburgh
1963,
pp.
12-17,
and
The
Development
of
Arabic
Logic,
Pittsburgh,
1964,
pp.
122-28,
no.
26.
None
of
these
bibliographical
surveys
is
completely
reliable,
and
each
should
be
used
with
caution.
(Dimitri
Gutas)
ii.
LOGIC
Most
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
extant
writings
deal
with
logic
and
the
philosophy
of
language.
Many
of
these
writings
take
the
form
of
commentaries
on,
or
summaries
of,
the
Aristotelian
Organon,
which,
following
the
tradition
of
the
Alexandrian
commentators
of
late
antiquity,
included
Porphyry's
Isagoge
as
well
as
Aristotle's
Rhetoric
and
Poetics.
Fa@ra@b^
also
produced
a
number
of
independent
treatises
in
the
fields
of
logic
and
linguistic
philosophy,
such
as
the
Keta@b
al-háoru@f,
Keta@b
al-alfa@zá
al-mosta¿mala
fi'l-mantáeq,
and
parts
of
Keta@b
al-tanb^h
¿ala@
sab^l
al-sa¿a@da
and
Ehás®a@÷
al-¿olu@m.
Throughout
these
works,
Fa@ra@b^'s
perspective
on
the
nature
of
logic
remains
constant:
logic
is
defined
principally
as
an
instrumental
science
that
safeguards
the
mind
from
error.
It
includes
both
syllogistic
and
non-syllogistic
branches,
and
it
culminates
in
the
study
of
demonstrative
science,
which
Fa@ra@b^
often
identifies
as
the
method
of
philosophy
itself.
The
most
important
general
theme
in
Fa@ra@b^'s
writings
on
logic
may
be
the
relationship
between
logic
and
grammar.
Fa@ra@b^
upholds
the
concept
that
logic
is
a
form
of
universal
grammar
which
provides
the
human
mind
with
rules
that
it
must
follow
in
order
to
reason
correctly
in
any
language,
whereas
grammar,
according
to
Fa@ra@b^,
provides
only
those
rules
that
have
been
established
by
convention
for
speakers
of
some
particular
natural
language
such
as
Arabic
or
Greek.
A
passage
in
his
Ehásáa@÷
al-¿olu@m
describes
this
succinctly:
"This
art
[of
logic]
is
analogous
to
the
art
of
grammar,
in
that
the
relation
of
the
art
of
logic
to
the
intellect
and
the
intelligibles
is
like
the
relation
of
the
art
of
grammar
to
language
and
expressions.
That
is,
to
every
rule
for
expressions
which
the
science
of
grammar
provides
us,
there
is
a
corresponding
[rule]
for
intelligibles
which
the
science
of
logic
provides
us"
(ed.
Am^n,
p.
68).
In
the
Keta@b
al-h®oru@f,
Fa@ra@b^
attempts
to
flesh
out
in
more
detail
the
exact
nature
of
the
relationship
between
philosophical
logic
and
the
ordinary
grammar
of
Arabic.
The
work
opens
with
an
extended
classification
of
Arabic
particles
and
explores
how
their
popular
meanings
in
everyday
usage
are
transformed
into
technical
philosophical
terms
expressing
ideas
related
to
the
ten
Aristotelian
predicaments
or
categories
(ed.
Mahdi,
pp.
61-130).
The
second,
better
known,
part
of
the
text
discusses
the
origins
of
language,
the
history
of
philosophy,
and
the
relationship
between
philosophy
and
religion.
It
offers
a
broad
picture
of
how
human
language
in
general
originates
and
how
it
develops
technical
terms
from
popular
usage
(ibid.,
pp.
131-61).
In
the
final
part
of
the
Keta@b
al-h®oru@f,
Fa@ra@b^
returns
to
his
consideration
of
the
technical
uses
of
philosophical
terminology,
this
time
through
a
classification
of
interrogative
particles
based
upon
their
uses
in
different
types
of
philosophical
inquiry
and
their
relationship
to
the
four
causes
of
Aristotelian
philosophy
(ibid.,
pp.
162-226).
Fa@ra@b^'s
commentaries
on
the
Organon
itself
are
not
simple
summaries
of
the
original
texts,
nor
do
any
but
the
long
commentary
(œarhá)
on
the
De
interpretatione
attempt
an
exhaustive
line-by-line
exegesis
of
Aristotle's
work.
Instead,
Aristotle's
writings
are
used
as
a
focus
around
which
Fa@ra@b^
can
offer
his
own
interpretations
of
Aristotelian
logic
and
the
school
tradition
that
had
grown
about
it,
sometimes
incorporating
non-Aristotelian
elements
such
as
Stoic
logic.
In
keeping
with
his
interest
in
the
relations
between
logic
and
grammar,
Fa@ra@b^
is
conscious
of
the
need
to
adapt
Aristotelian
logic
to
an
Arabic
context,
a
need
he
openly
acknowledges
in
his
discussion
of
the
Prior
Analytics,
where
he
promises
to
"strive
to
express
[Aristotelian
syllogistic],
as
much
as
possible,
by
means
of
words
familiar
to
people
who
use
the
Arabic
language"
(Keta@b
al-q^a@s
al-sáag@^r,
tr.
Rescher,
p.
49).
In
the
area
of
syllogistic
theory,
Fa@ra@b^
upholds
a
broadly
hierarchical
conception
of
the
syllogistic
arts,
which
for
him
include
rhetoric
and
poetics.
He
considers
the
purpose
of
the
syllogism
to
be
fulfilled
primarily
by
the
method
of
demonstration,
as
articulated
by
Aristotle
in
the
Posterior
Analytics.
As
he
states
in
Ehásáa@÷
al-¿olu@m,
"logic
seeks
its
principal
intention
only
in
this
part,
and
the
remainder
of
its
parts
have
been
invented
only
for
its
sake"
(ed.
Am^n,
pp.
87-89).
The
non-demonstrative
syllogistic
arts
are
relegated,
in
this
broad
scheme,
to
the
role
of
supplementary
skills
with
the
primary
purpose
of
preventing
philosophers
from
falling
into
error
by
using
insecure
methods.
Despite
this
broadly
hierarchical
view
of
the
syllogistic
arts,
expressed
in
works
like
Ehásáa@÷
al-¿olu@m,
Fa@ra@b^
elsewhere
shows
a
greater
appreciation
for
other
logical
methods
used
in
the
pursuit
of
philosophy.
A
fine
example
of
this
recognition
is
found
in
his
presentation
of
the
role
of
dialectic
in
the
opening
of
his
epitome
of
Aristotle's
Topics,
the
Keta@b
al-jadal,
where
Fa@ra@b^
identifies
five
important
roles
for
dialectic
within
philosophy:
(1)
offering
training
in
argumentative
skills,
(2)
providing
the
student
of
philosophy
with
a
first
glimpse
of
the
principles
of
the
special
demonstrative
sciences,
(3)
alerting
the
philosopher
to
the
innate
self-evident
principles
of
demonstration,
(4)
helping
to
develop
the
ability
to
communicate
philosophical
conclusions
to
non-philosophers,
and
(5)
cultivating
the
tools
by
which
sophistry
can
be
combated
(in
¿Ajam
and
Fakòr^,
III,
pp.
29-38).
Fa@ra@b^'s
interpretation
of
the
Aristotelian
theory
of
demonstration
is
most
completely
articulated
in
Keta@b
al-borha@n,
the
part
of
his
epitome
of
the
Organon
devoted
to
the
Posterior
Analytics.
A
parallel
consideration
of
the
epistemological
foundations
of
the
theory
of
demonstration
is
also
provided
in
an
independent
treatise
on
the
nature
of
certitude,
the
Keta@b
œara@÷etÂ
al-yaq^n.
Both
works
offer
extensive
analyses
of
the
logical
and
epistemic
conditions
that
must
be
satisfied
in
order
to
attain
true
science
or
knowledge
(¿elm
=
Greek
episte@me@).
Fa@ra@b^
begins
the
Keta@b
al-borha@n
by
distinguishing
between
the
two
basic
cognitive
acts
that
characterize
human
thought,
namely,
conceptualization
(tasáawwor)
and
assent
(tasád^q).
Conceptualization
applies
to
any
act
of
knowing
by
which
we
apprehend
simple,
discrete
concepts.
Its
ultimate
aim,
when
complete,
is
to
allow
us
to
grasp
the
essence
of
the
object
conceived
so
as
to
formulate
its
proper
definition.
Assent,
by
contrast,
names
an
act
of
knowing
which
is
by
its
very
nature
complex
and
involves
a
judgment
of
truth
or
falsehood.
Perfect
assent
is
the
act
that
yields
certitude
of
knowledge,
and
hence
it
is
the
aim
of
a
demonstrative
syllogism.
Since
Aristotle's
Posterior
Analytics
considers
both
the
proper
way
of
discovering
definitions
and
the
construction
of
demonstrative
syllogisms,
the
couplet
of
perfect
conceptualization
and
perfect
assent
becomes
the
organizing
theme
for
Fa@ra@b^'s
interpretation
of
the
Aristotelian
theory
of
science
(Keta@b
al-borha@n,
in
¿Ajam
and
Fakòr^,
IV,
pp.
19-22,
45).
In
developing
his
views
on
the
perfect
act
of
assent
that
produces
demonstrative
certitude,
Fa@ra@b^
offers
a
detailed
analysis
cast
in
modal
terms.
Most
significant
is
Fa@ra@b^'s
explicit
articulation
of
the
view
that
absolute
certitude
must
be
understood
as
a
form
of
what
contemporary
philosophers
call
second-order
knowledge.
According
to
Fa@ra@b^,
then,
it
is
not
sufficient
for
certain
knowledge
that
the
knower
(the
person
possessing
that
knowledge)
believe
that
the
true
statement
to
which
assent
is
given
cannot
be
otherwise:
"And
certitude
is
for
us
to
believe,
concerning
the
truth
to
which
we
have
assented,
that
it
is
not
possible
at
all
for
what
we
believe
about
this
matter
to
be
different
from
what
we
believe;
and
that,
in
addition
to
this
we
believe,
concerning
our
belief,
that
another
belief
is
not
possible—to
the
extent
that
whenever
some
belief
about
the
first
belief
is
formed,
it
is
impossible
for
it
to
be
otherwise,
and
so
on
ad
infinitum"
(Keta@b
al-borha@n,
in
¿Ajam
and
Fakòr^,
IV,
p.
20).
Thus,
certitude
for
Fa@ra@b^
requires
both
that
we
know
some
proposition
to
be
true
and
that
we
know
that
we
know
it.
Having
defined
certitude
by
these
criteria,
the
way
is
open
to
Fa@ra@b^
to
develop
a
distinction
between
necessary
certitude,
which
applies
only
to
beliefs
that
can
never
be
otherwise,
and
non-necessary
certitude,
which
is
certitude
that
holds
"only
at
a
particular
time."
Only
necessary
certitude
requires
an
object
of
belief
that
is
itself
necessary
and
unchangeable:
"Necessary
certitude
and
necessary
existence
are
convertible
in
entailment,
for
what
is
verified
as
necessarily
certain
is
necessarily
existent"
(Keta@b
al-borha@n,
in
¿Ajam
and
Fakòr^,
IV,
p.
22;
cf.
Keta@b
œara@÷etÂ
al-yaq^n,
in
ibid.,
pp.
97-104).
Necessary
certitude,
then,
is
the
goal
of
scientific
demonstration
in
its
strictest
sense;
and
in
keeping
with
the
Aristotelian
view
of
strict
demonstration,
it
can
be
applied
only
to
a
limited
range
of
subjects
which
are
in
their
very
natures
eternal
and
unchanging
such
as
separate,
immaterial
substances
and
universals.
But
non-necessary
certitude
can
apply
to
a
much
broader
range
of
subjects
and
propositions,
thereby
allowing
Fa@ra@b^
to
take
into
account
the
possibility
of
attaining
some
form
of
certitude
about
variable
and
contingent
phenomena
as
well.
The
overall
spirit
and
inspiration
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
logical
teachings
thus
remains
thoroughly
Aristotelian,
but
the
details
of
his
own
presentations
of
basic
Aristotelian
logical
themes
introduce
nuances
and
distinctions
which
are
not
explicit
in
Aristotle
himself.
In
particular,
Fa@ra@b^'s
desire
to
make
Aristotelian
logic
compatible
with
expression
in
the
Arabic
language
forced
him
to
develop
Aristotle's
rather
brief
and
scattered
teachings
on
the
relationship
between
logic
and
language
in
new
directions
that
would
address
the
challenge
created
by
the
introduction
of
Aristotelian
logical
theory
into
a
very
different
linguistic
and
cultural
milieu
from
the
one
in
which
it
originated.
Bibliography
(for
cited
works
not
given
in
detail,
see
"Short
References"):
Works
by
Abu@
Nasár
Fa@ra@b^.
Ehásáa@÷
al-¿olu@m,
ed.
¿O.
Am^n,
3rd
ed.,
Cairo,
1968.
Keta@b
al-alfa@zá
al-mosta¿mala
fi'l-mantáeq,
ed.
M.
Mahdi
as
Al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Utterances
Employed
in
Logic,
Beirut,
1968.
Keta@b
al-borha@n,
ed.
in
¿Ajam
and
Fakòr^,
IV,
pp.
19-96.
Keta@b
al-eba@ra,
ed.
in
¿Ajam
and
Fakòr^,
I,
pp.
133-63;
tr.
in
Zimmermann.
Keta@b
al-háoru@f,
ed.
M.
Mahdi
as
Alfarabi's
Book
of
Letters,
Beirut,
1969.
Keta@b
al-jadal,
ed.
in
¿Ajam
and
Fakòr^,
III,
pp.
13-107.
Keta@b
al-q^a@s
al-sáag@^r,
part.
ed.
in
¿Ajam
and
Fakòr^,
II,
pp.
65-93;
tr.
N.
Rescher
as
Al-Farabi's
Short
Commentary
on
Aristotle's
"Prior
Analytics,"
Pittsburgh,
1963.
Keta@b
œara@÷etÂ
al-yaq^n,
ed.
in
¿Ajam
and
Fakòr^,
IV,
pp.
97-104.
Keta@b
al-tanb^h
¿ala@
sab^l
al-sa¿a@da,
ed.
J.
AÚl
Yas^n,
Beirut,
1985.
ˆarhá
al-Fa@ra@b^
le-Keta@b
Arestáu@táa@l^s
fi'l-¿eba@ra,
ed.
W.
Kutsch
and
S.
Marrow,
Beirut,
1960;
tr.
in
Zimmermann.
Studies.
S.
B.
Abed,
Aristotelian
Logic
and
the
Arabic
Language
in
Alfarabi,
Albany,
N.Y.,
1991.
R.
¿Ajam
and
M.
Fakòr^,
eds.,
al-Mantáeq
¿end
al-Fa@ra@b^,
4
vols.,
Beirut,
1986-87
(editions
of
several
texts
by
Fa@ra@b^).
R.
Arnaldez,
"Pense‚e
et
langage
dans
la
philosophie
de
Farabi
(aà
propos
du
Kitab
al-huruf),"
Stud.
Isl.
45,
1977,
pp.
57-65.
Th.-A.
Druart,
"Substance
in
Arabic
Philosophy:
al-Farabi's
Discussion,"
Proceedings
of
the
American
Catholic
Philosophical
Association
61,
1987,
pp.
88-97.
D.
M.
Dunlop,
"Al-Farabi's
Introductory
Sections
on
Logic,"
Islamic
Quarterly
2,
1955,
pp.
264-82.
Idem,
"Al-Farabi's
Eisagoge,"
Islamic
Quarterly
3,
1956,
pp.
117-38.
Idem,
"Al-Farabi's
Introductory
Risa@lah
on
Logic,"
Islamic
Quarterly
3,
1957,
pp.
224-35.
Idem,
"Al-Farabi's
Paraphrase
of
the
Categories
of
Aristotle,"
Islamic
Quarterly
4,
1958,
pp.
168-97;
5,
1959,
pp.
21-54.
A.
Elamrani-Jamal,
Logique
aristote‚licienne
et
grammaire
arabe
(e‚tude
et
documents),
Paris,
1983.
P.
E.
Eskenasy,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Classification
of
the
Parts
of
Speech,"
Jerusalem
Studies
in
Arabic
and
Islam
11,
1988,
pp.
55-82.
M.
Galston,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^
on
Aristotle's
Theory
of
Demonstration,"
in
P.
Morewedge,
ed.,
Islamic
Philosophy
and
Mysticism,
Delmar,
N.Y.,
1981,
pp.
23-34.
Idem,
"Al-Farabi
et
la
logique
aristote‚licienne
dans
la
philosophie
islamique,"
in
M.
A.
Sinaceur,
ed.,
Aristote
aujourd'hui,
Toulouse,
1988,
pp.
192-217.
Idem,
Politics
and
Excellence:
The
Political
Philosophy
of
Alfarabi,
Princeton,
1990.
H.
Gätje,
"Die
Gliederung
der
sprachlichen
Zeichen
nach
al-Fa@ra@b^,"
Der
Islam
47,
1971,
pp.
1-24.
A.
Hasnawi,
"Fa@ra@b^
et
la
pratique
de
l'exe‚geàse
philosophique
(remarques
sur
son
Commentaire
au
De
interpretatione
d'Aristote),"
Revue
de
Syntheàse,
3rd
ser.
117,
1985,
pp.
27-59.
J.
Lameer,
Al-Fa@ra@b^
and
Aristotelian
Syllogistics:
Greek
Theory
and
Islamic
Practice,
Leiden,
l994.
J.
Langhade,
"Grammaire,
logique,
e‚tudes
linguistiques
chez
al-Fa@ra@b^,"
Historiographia
Linguistica
8,
1981,
pp.
365-77.
G.
Vajda,
"Langage,
philosophie,
politique
et
religion,
d'apreàs
un
traite‚
d'al-Farabi,"
JA
258,
1970,
pp.
247-60.
F.
W.
Zimmermann,
Al-Farabi's
Commentary
and
Short
Treatise
on
Aristotle's
"De
Interpretatione,"
Oxford,
1981
(contains
translations
of
Keta@b
al-¿eba@ra
and
ˆarhá
al-Fa@ra@b^
le-keta@b
ArestÂu@tÂa@l^s
fi'l-¿eba@ra).
(Deborah
L.
Black)
iii.
METAPHYSICS
The
question
of
determining
the
subject
matter
of
metaphysics
has
always
been
a
matter
of
dispute.
Aristotle's
Metaphysics,
with
which
metaphysics
as
a
discipline
originates,
exhibits
ambiguities
and
oscillates
between
two
main
projects:
(1)
a
study
of
what
is
common
to
all
beings,
i.e.,
being
as
such
and
other
universal
notions
such
as
oneness,
and
(2)
a
study
of
the
ultimate
causes,
i.e.,
God
and
other
immaterial
beings.
The
two
projects
later
became
known
as
general
metaphysics
and
special
metaphysics
respectively
(Frede,
pp.
81-95).
This
ambiguity
led
to
the
well-known
different
positions
taken
by
Avicenna
and
Averroes
on
this
issue.
Avicenna
gives
primacy
to
general
metaphysics,
whereas
Averroes
assigns
priority
to
the
study
of
God.
Recently,
Dimitri
Gutas
has
shown
(Gutas,
pp.
238-54)
that
Avicenna's
position
stems
from
his
reading
of
a
brief
treatise
by
Fa@ra@b^
on
the
purposes
of
metaphysics
(Ag@ra@zµ
ma@
ba¿d
al-tÂab^¿a,
ed.
F.
Dieterici
in
Alfa@ra@b^'s
philosophische
Abhandlungen,
Leiden,
1890,
pp.
34-38
[repr.
Osnabrück,
1982];
part.
tr.
by
D.
Gutas
in
Gutas,
1988,
pp.
240-42;
tr.
Th.-A.
Druart
in
Druart,
1982,
pp.
38-43).
This
text
presents
a
rather
complicated
introduction
in
which
Fa@ra@b^
explains
the
purpose
of
Aristotle's
Metaphysics
(tr.
Gutas,
pp.
240-42),
followed
by
a
presentation
of
the
purpose
of
each
book
(ed.
Dieterici,
pp.
34-38;
tr.
Druart,
pp.
40-43).
In
this
introduction
Fa@ra@b^
carefully
distinguishes
metaphysics
from
kala@m,
denying
that
the
purpose
of
the
Metaphysics
is
to
examine
God,
the
Intellect,
and
the
Soul.
The
real
concerns
of
the
Metaphysics
are
with
common
notions,
i.e.,
being
as
such,
oneness,
their
"species
and
consequent
properties,
things
which
are
not
specific
accidents
of
each
individual
object
studied
by
the
particular
sciences
(like
priority,
posteriority,
potentiality,
actuality,
perfection,
imperfection,
and
similar
things),
and
the
common
first
principle
of
all
beings,
which
[alone]
ought
to
be
called
by
the
name
of
God"
(tr.
Gutas.,
p.
241).
God,
then,
far
from
being
the
subject
matter
of
the
Metaphysics,
is
only
part
of
it
and
this
only
in
an
indirect
manner
as
the
common
first
principle
of
all
beings.
General
metaphysics
is
so
central
that
special
metaphysics
becomes
included
in
and
subordinated
to
it.
"Theology
ought
to
belong"
to
metaphysics
simply
"because
God
is
a
principle
of
absolute
being,
not
of
one
being
to
the
exclusion
of
another"
(ibid.).
This
constitutes
Fa@ra@b^'s
understanding
of
Aristotle's
own
project
and
purpose,
thus
distinguishing
it
from
the
enterprise
and
purpose
of
kala@m
and
from
the
conception
of
many
others
who
remain
unspecified.
Here
Fa@ra@b^
follows
Aristotle
rather
strictly,
but
he
is
well
aware
that
the
Metaphysics
leaves
many
questions
unanswered.
In
working
out
his
own
conception
of
metaphysics,
the
"second
master"
(al-mo¿allem
al-t¯a@n^)
hints
that
Aristotle
made
short
shrift
of
special
metaphysics
and
neglected
relevant
aspects
developed
by
the
Neoplatonists.
This
may
explain
why
in
his
Falsafat
Arastáu@táa@l^s
(ed.
M.
Mahdi,
Beirut,
1961;
tr.
M.
Mahdi
as
"The
Philosophy
of
Aristotle"
in
Mahdi,
1962,
pt.
3)
Fa@ra@b^
says
little
about
the
Metaphysics.
On
the
one
hand,
he
limits
himself
to
stating
that
full
understanding
of
natural
and
human
science
cannot
be
achieved
"without
completing
the
inquiry
into,
and
investigation
of,
the
beings
that
are
above
things
natural
in
their
rank
of
being"
and
that
Aristotle
in
a
book
called
Metaphysics
proceeded
"to
inquire
into,
and
to
investigate,
the
beings
in
a
manner
different
than
natural
inquiry"
(tr.
Mahdi,
p.
130).
On
the
other
hand,
a
few
lines
further
down,
he
does
not
hesitate
to
claim
that
"we
do
not
possess
metaphysical
science".
This
last
claim
cannot
mean
that
Fa@ra@b^
does
not
have
Aristotle's
text,
but
rather
that
in
his
opinion
this
text
remains
unsatisfactory;
while
developing
a
general
metaphysics,
its
presentation
of
special
metaphysics
remains
far
too
narrow,
confined
as
it
is
to
book
lambda
(la@m).
It
is
a
simple
assent
to
a
principle
of
motion
rather
than
of
being
and
does
not
include
a
descent
grounded
in
emanationism
(Druart,
1987).
In
order
to
understand
better
Fa@ra@b^'s
own
approach
to
metaphysics,
we
need
to
examine
other
texts
purporting
to
offer
his
own
views:
1.
Keta@b
tah®sá^l
al-sa¿a@da
(ed.
J.
AÚl
Ya@s^n,
Beirut,
1981;
tr.
M.
Mahdi
as
"The
Attainment
of
Happiness"
in
Mahdi,
1962,
pt.
1).
This
text
is
fundamental
for
understanding
Fa@ra@b^'s
philosophy.
Its
presentation
of
theoretical
virtue,
i.e.,
the
sciences,
explains
what
Fa@ra@b^
expects
from
metaphysics
and
provides
it
with
a
program,
albeit
a
rather
sketchy
one.
The
text
reveals
that
Fa@ra@b^'s
own
conception
of
metaphysics
includes
much
more
than
the
content
of
the
Aristotelian
text.
As
Fa@ra@b^
makes
clear,
his
aim
is
to
search
for
the
principles
of
being.
The
physical
inquiry
into
the
heavenly
bodies
shows
that
they
require
principles
that
are
neither
natures
or
natural
things
nor
bodies
or
something
in
bodies
(tr.
Mahdi,
p.
21).
In
contrast,
metaphysics
will
provide
these
principles,
since
it
is
"the
science
of
what
is
beyond
natural
things
in
the
order
of
investigation
and
instruction
and
above
them
in
the
order
of
being"
(ibid.,
p.
22).
In
the
same
way,
the
inquiry
into
the
rational
animal,
its
soul
and
intellect,
leads
to
a
discernment
of
those
principles
for
the
sake
of
which
such
entities
are
made.
These
principles
are
metaphysical
beings
which
possess
no
matter
at
all;
hence
investigating
them
will
bring
us
to
the
discovery
of
a
being
which
"is
itself
the
first
principle
of
all
[these]
beings,"
since
it
is
their
efficient,
formal,
and
final
cause
(ibid.,
p.
24)
whereas
Aristotle's
unmoved
mover
was
only
a
final
cause
of
motion.
Once
the
ascent
to
a
first
principle
of
being
has
been
achieved,
one
must
then
set
out
on
a
descent
which
investigates
"what
properties
the
other
beings
possess
as
a
consequence
of
their
having
this
being
as
their
principle
and
the
cause
(sabab)
of
their
being"
(ibid.,
p.
24).
The
descent
should
begin
"with
the
being
whose
rank
is
higher
than
the
rest
(that
is,
the
one
furthest
from
the
first
principle).
One
will
thus
come
to
know
the
ultimate
(aqsáa@)
causes
of
the
beings.
This
is
the
divine
inquiry
(al-nazáar
al-ela@h^)
into
them.
For
the
first
principle
is
the
divinity,
and
the
principles
that
come
after
it—and
are
not
bodies
or
in
bodies—are
the
divine
principles"
(ibid.,
p.
24).
The
Tahásá^l
al-sa¿a@da
provides
only
a
partial
view
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
overall
metaphysics,
neglecting
the
perspective
on
general
metaphysics
to
focus
almost
entirely
on
the
ascent
to
the
ultimate
principle
and
the
subsequent
descent
from
it.
Fa@ra@b^
may
have
thought
that
Aristotle
had
given
us
the
essentials
of
general
metaphysics,
while
curtailing
any
full
account
of
complete
ascent
to
an
ultimate
principle
of
being
and
completely
neglecting
any
account
of
the
ensuing
descent.
Beings
are
hierarchically
organized,
and
this
requires
a
proper
explanation.
An
emanationist
descent
would
offer
such
an
explanation,
and
this
is
the
theme
explored
by
Fa@ra@b^
in
the
first
part
of
both
Maba@d^÷
a@ra@÷
ahl
al-mad^na
al-fa@zµela
(Opinions
of
the
people
of
the
virtuous
city)
and
al-S^a@sa
al-madan^ya
(Political
regime).
2.
In
his
own
metaphysical
works,
Keta@b
al-wa@háed
wa'l-waháda
(ed.
M.
Mahdi
as
Alfarabi's
On
One
and
Unity,
Casablanca,
1989)
and
the
Keta@b
al-háoru@f
(ed.
M.
Mahdi
as
Alfarabi's
Book
of
Letters,
Beirut,
1990),
Fa@ra@b^
does
not
merely
offer
refinements
on
Aristotle's
general
metaphysics
but
also
develops
a
full
blown
special
metaphysics,
thereby
completing
Aristotle's
project.
Yet
scholars
still
encounter
significant
difficulties
in
their
attempts
to
comprehend
the
details
of
al-Fa@ra@b^'s
metaphysical
views,
since
they
are
scattered
in
various
texts
whose
chronology,
intended
audience,
and
purpose
remain
obscure.
The
emanationist
texts
seem
to
be
among
the
last
of
his
writings.
The
Keta@b
al-wa@háed
wa'l-waháda
is
firmly
rooted
in
the
tradition
of
general
metaphysics,
with
emphasis
on
a
common
notion,
oneness.
It
illustrates
a
point
Fa@ra@b^
himself
makes
in
his
introduction
to
Ag@ra@zµ
ma@
ba¿d
al-tÂab^¿a:
"The
primary
object
of
this
science
is
absolute
being
and
what
is
equivalent
to
it
in
universality
[¿omu@m],
namely,
the
one.
But
since
the
knowledge
of
contrary
correlatives
[motaqa@bela@t]
is
one,
theoretical
inquiry
into
privation
and
multiplicity
is
also
included
in
this
science"
(tr.
Gutas,
p.
242).
So
the
text
begins
and
ends
with
some
elaboration
of
the
many
ways
a
thing
can
be
said
to
be
one,
as
in
Aristotle's
Metaphysics
5.6,
10.1.
The
central
part,
on
the
other
hand,
completes
Aristotle's
own
contribution
in
dealing
with
the
many
ways
in
which
things
are
said
to
be
many,
"the
elaborate
account
of
the
various
types
of
opposition
between
'one'
and
'many,'
the
'many'
generated
from
each
one
of
the
classes
of
'one,'
and
the
various
ways
in
which
'one'
and
'many'
are
related
to
one
another"
(Keta@b
al-wa@háed,
tr.
Mahdi,
preface).
Mahdi
remarks
that
the
elaborate
discussion
of
the
generation
of
'many'
from
'one'
does
not
refer
to
the
origination
or
emanation
of
many
things
from
the
First
One,
as
is
the
case
in
the
emanationist
texts
(ibid.).
This
observation
is
perfectly
true
but
not
surprising,
since
the
origination
or
derivation
in
question
is
of
the
logical
order
and
not
of
the
ontological
order.
The
Keta@b
al-wa@háed
wa'l-waháda
limits
itself
to
general
metaphysics.
The
Keta@b
al-háoru@f
is
a
difficult
and
unusual
book
which
gives
us
further
clues
about
Fa@ra@b^'s
conception
of
metaphysics.
The
Arabic
title
is
rather
ambiguous.
It
may
mean
"the
book
of
letters,"
i.e.,
a
traditional
name
in
Arabic
for
Aristotle's
Metaphysics
(since
each
of
its
books
is
designated
by
a
letter
of
the
alphabet).
Mahdi
adopts
this
translation
and
even
adds
a
subtitle,
"Commentary
on
Aristotle's
Metaphysics"
(Keta@b
al-háoru@f,
ed.
Mahdi,
English
title
page).
However,
the
title
may
also
mean
"the
book
of
particles"
referring
to
the
parts
of
speech
called
particles
(háoru@f)
in
classical
Arabic
grammar
(prepositions,
conjunctions,
etc.),
since
several
sections
of
the
book
focus
on
interrogative
particles.
The
latter
title
reflects
more
accurately
the
content
of
the
book,
which
contains
far
more
explicit
references
to
Aristotle's
logical
works
than
to
the
Metaphysics.
The
main
focus
of
the
Keta@b
al-háoru@f
seems
to
be
a
reflection
on
the
categories
(maqu@la@t)
and
their
relation
to
the
various
disciplines,
including
rhetoric
and
poetry
as
well
as
the
demonstrative
sciences.
The
categories
themselves
appear
to
be
derived
from
questions
about
the
various
ways
something
can
be
said
to
be.
This
explains
the
importance
given
to
interrogative
particles
(háoru@f
al-so÷a@l)
and
to
the
ways
of
answering
them.
The
categories
state
in
how
many
ways
sensible
material
things
can
be
said
to
be.
After
distinguishing
the
primary
intelligibles
(ma¿qu@la@t),
which
refer
to
things
outside
the
mind,
from
secondary
intelligibles
(ma¿qu@la@t
t¯awa@n^)
which
refer
to
things
inside
the
mind
(such
as
our
cognition
of
the
primary
intelligibles)
Fa@ra@b^
then
applies
this
distinction
to
separate
the
categories
as
objects
of
logic
from
the
categories
as
objects
of
metaphysics.
The
logical
categories
refer
to
the
"utterances
qua
utterances"
of
the
primary
intelligibles,
e.g.,
genera
and
species.
In
contrast,
the
properly
philosophical
categories
deal
with
the
intelligibility
of
things
existing
outside
the
mind.
This
interpretation
explains
why
Aristotle
treats
the
categories
both
in
logic
and
in
the
Metaphysics
(5.7).
The
relation
to
the
categories
underpins
the
examination
of
the
section
on
the
primary
subjects
of
the
arts
and
sciences
(Keta@b
al-háoru@f,
pp.
66-70).
Physics
deals
with
natural
things
inside
the
categories;
yet
in
studying
their
causes
it
discovers
an
ultimate
efficient
cause
of
being
as
well
as
an
ultimate
final
cause,
both
of
which
are
outside
the
categories.
Metaphysics
deals
with
things
that
lie
outside
the
categories;
it
is
this
science
which
"examines
such
things,
tries
to
know
them,
and
examines
what
is
comprised
by
the
categories
in
as
much
as
those
things
are
their
causes,
including
what
mathematics
and
politics
comprise
as
well
as
the
practical
arts
encompassed
by
politics"
(ibid,
p.
69).
This
brief
description
of
metaphysics
reveals
a
lively
interest
in
"metaphysical
beings"
and
in
special
metaphysics
generally.
Then
from
such
beings
considered
as
causes
it
derives
what
concerns
the
categories,
mathematics,
and
even
politics
broadly
constructed
and
so
provides
principles
for
the
sciences,
be
they
theoretical
or
practical.
This
derivation
is
linked
to
the
descent
accomplished
in
the
more
formal
and
detailed
first
part
of
the
emanationist
texts.
While
the
beginning
of
Part
I,
the
Keta@b
al-háoru@f
highlights
issues
in
special
metaphysics
and
the
descent
from
the
ultimate
principles,
subsequent
sections
develop
aspects
of
general
metaphysics
by
studying
universal
notions
that
cut
across
the
categories,
such
as
"being"
(al-mawju@d;
ibid.,
pp.
110-28)
"itself"
(al-dòa@t;
ibid.,
pp.
106-10),
and
"thing"
(al-œay÷;
ibid.,
pp.
128-29).
Interrogative
particles,
such
as
"wherefore"
(alladò^
men
¿ajlehe;
pp.
129-30)
and
"wherefrom"
(¿an;
p.
130),
are
also
considered,
leading
to
the
affirmation
of
the
existence
of
beings
outside
the
categories.
The
section
on
being,
for
instance,
explains
why
the
Arabic
term
mawju@d
was
chosen
to
reflect
the
Greek
"on,"
lists
its
various
philosophical
meanings
(as
in
Metaphysics
5.7),
and
states
the
possibility
of
the
existence
of
a
being
outside
the
categories.
On
the
other
hand,
the
chapter
on
substance
(jawhar;
Keta@b
al-háoru@f,
pp.
97-105;
Druart,
1987,
pp.
88-97)
inquires
whether
one
can
properly
speak
of
a
substance
existing
outside
the
categories,
all
the
while
recognizing
that
such
a
substance
would
be
more
substance
than
any
other.
This
last
question
remains
unresolved,
although
in
the
emanationist
texts
Fa@ra@b^
applies
the
term
substance
to
the
first
cause.
Part
II
leaves
aside
general
notions
in
order
to
focus
on
the
origins
of
words,
of
philosophy,
and
of
religion,
across
various
cultures
and
languages
(tr.
Berman,
pp.
171-78).
Part
III
returns
to
an
examination
of
interrogative
particles.
The
whole
text
exhibits
striking
attempts
at
adapting
general
metaphysics
to
the
Arabic
language,
and
at
developing
such
metaphysics
in
an
original
fashion.
3.
The
emanationist
texts:
Maba@de÷
@a@ra@÷
ahl
al-mad^na
al-fa@záela
(ed.
and
tr.
R.
Walzer
as
Al-Fa@ra@b^
on
the
Perfect
State:
Abu@
Nasár
al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Maba@di÷
a@ra@÷
ahl
al-mad^na
al-fa@dáila,
Oxford,
1985)
and
the
Keta@b
al-s^a@sa
al-madan^ya
(ed.
F.
Najja@r
as
Keta@b
al
s^a@sa
al-madan^ya
al-molaqqab
be-Maba@de÷
al-mawju@da@t,
Beirut,
1964).
In
their
first
half,
both
texts
follow
the
program
laid
down
for
metaphysics
in
the
Keta@b
al-h®oru@f.
They
study
the
metaphysical
beings
which
are
beyond
the
categories
and
are
neither
bodies
nor
in
bodies
(the
First
Cause
and
the
Ten
Intelligences)
as
well
as
the
principles
of
natural
beings,
thereby
providing
principles
for
physics.
The
latter
principles
are
not
bodies
but
are
in
bodies
(nafs,
"soul";
sáu@ra,
"form";
and
ma@dda,
"matter").
They
also
offer
a
metaphysical
descent
from
such
principles
to
all
beings.
The
second
half
of
each
book
presents
a
political
science
derived
from
the
study
of
these
principles.
The
focus
here
will
be
on
the
Keta@b
al-s^a@sa
al-madan^ya,
which
is
metaphysically
more
sophisticated.
The
Keta@b
al-s^a@sa
al-madan^ya
begins
abruptly
by
stating
that
there
are
six
principles
for
all
beings.
These
are
listed
in
descending
order:
the
First
Cause,
the
Secondary
Cause
(the
first
nine
intelligences),
the
Agent
Intellect
or
Tenth
Intelligence
(al-¿aql
al-fa¿¿a@l),
soul,
form,
and
matter.
The
secondary
principles
emanate
from
the
First
Cause
either
directly
or
indirectly—directly
in
the
case
of
the
First
Intelligence,
indirectly
for
all
the
others.
Each
of
the
secondary
causes
emanates
directly
from
the
one
above
it
or
from
the
First
Cause,
and
through
intelligizing
the
First
Cause,
originates
another
Intelligence
and
through
intelligizing
itself
originates
an
ensouled
celestial
sphere.
The
number
of
intelligences
and
celestial
spheres
are
in
accordance
with
Ptolemy's
astronomical
system.
As
for
the
last
Intelligence,
or
Agent
Intellect,
it
only
originates
the
sphere
of
the
moon
and
the
intelligibles
for
human
intellects,
thereby
actualizing
this
lower
rung
of
intellect.
The
celestial
spheres
are
a
kind
of
intermediary
between
the
metaphysical
beings,
which
exist
beyond
the
categories,
and
the
realm
of
nature,
which
is
within
the
categories.
Although
these
spheres
have
neither
form
nor
matter
in
the
proper
sense
and,
therefore,
are
not
subject
to
the
hylomorphic
composition,
they
nevertheless
have
both
a
substrate
and
a
form-like
soul.
Consequently,
"only
the
most
excellent
categories
belong
to
them"
(al-S^a@sa
al-madan^ya,
p.
54).
From
the
motions
common
to
all
celestial
spheres
emanates
matter,
and
from
the
motions
proper
to
each
and
their
combination
emanate
the
various
forms.
The
hylomorphic
or
possible
sublunary
beings
emanate
from
forms
(including
souls)
and
matter.
This
constitutes
special
metaphysics
and
includes
a
descent
that
derives
the
various
principles
from
one
another
as
well
as
from
the
various
beings.
The
First
Cause
is
the
ultimate
efficient
and
final
cause
of
all.
Yet
the
perspective
of
general
metaphysics
is
not
entirely
neglected.
The
examination
of
the
First
Cause
or
God
reveals
that
the
universal
notions,
being
and
oneness,
which
cut
across
the
categories,
belong
primarily
and
perfectly
to
the
First
Cause,
since
all
other
beings
receive
from
the
First
Cause
their
own
derivative
and
limited
being
and
oneness.
The
focus
is
no
longer
on
the
ways
things
can
be
said
to
be,
but
on
the
ways
they
are
and
why
they
are.
Unfortunately,
we
do
not
possess
a
complete
presentation
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
metaphysics
in
which
the
relations
between
general
metaphysics,
special
metaphysics,
and
the
descent
would
be
carefully
explored
and
developed.
Bibliography
(works
by
Abu@
Nasár
Fa@ra@b^
are
given
in
the
article):
R.
Arnaldez,
"L'âme
et
le
monde
dans
le
systeàme
philosophique
de
Fa@ra@b^,"
Stud.
Isl.
43,
1976,
pp.
53-63.
L.
V.
Berman,
"Maimonides,
the
disciple
of
Alfarabi,"
Israel
Oriental
Studies
4,
1974,
pp.
154-78
(contains
a
partial
translation
of
Keta@b
al-háoru@f).
C.
D'Ancona
Costa,
La
casa
della
sapienza,
Milan,
1996,
pp.
122-32.
Th.-A.
Druart,
"Le
traite‚
d'al-Fa@ra@b^
sur
les
buts
de
la
Me‚taphysique
d'Aristote,"
Bulletin
de
Philosophie
me‚die‚vale
24,
1982,
pp.
38-43.
Idem,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^
and
Emanationism,"
in
J.
Wippel.
ed.,
Studies
in
Medieval
Philosophy,
Washington,
D.C.,
1987,
pp.
23-43.
Idem,
"Substance
in
Arabic
Philosophy:
Al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Discussion,"
in
J.
Wippel,
ed.,
The
Metaphysics
of
Substance,
Washington,
D.C.,
1988,
pp.
88-97.
Idem,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^,
Ethics,
and
First
Intelligibles,"
Documenti
e
Studi
sulla
Tradizione
Filosofica
Medievale
8,
1997,
pp.
403-423.
M.
Frede,
"The
Unity
of
General
and
Special
Metaphysics:
Aristotle's
Conception
of
Metaphysics,"
in
his
Essays
in
Ancient
Philosophy,
Minneapolis,
Minn.,
1987,
pp.
81-95.
D.
Gutas,
Avicenna
and
the
Aristotelian
Tradition,
Leiden,
l988.
M.
Mahdi,
Alfarabi's
Philosophy
of
Plato
and
Aristotle,
Ithaca,
N.Y.,
1962.
S.
Pines,
"Les
limits
de
la
me‚taphysique
selon
al-Fa@ra@b^,
Ibn
Ba@jja
et
Maïmonide,"
in
J.
P.
Beckmann
et
al.,
eds.,
Sprache
und
Erkenntnis
im
Mittelalter
I,
Berlin
and
New
York,
1981,
pp.
211-25.
A.
Rachid,
"Dieu
et
l'être
selon
Al-Fa@ra@b^:
le
chapitre
de
l'être'
dans
le
Livre
des
Lettres,"
in
Dieu
et
l'être,
Paris,
1978,
pp.
179-90.
R.
Ramo‚n
Guerrero,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^
y
la
Metafísica
de
Aristo‚teles,"
Ciudad
de
Dios
196,
1983,
pp.
211-40.
(The‚reàse-Anne
Druart)
iv.
FAÚRAÚBÈ
AND
GREEK
PHILOSOPHY
Fa@ra@b^'s
philosophical
moorings
and
direct
affiliation
lie
in
the
Greek
neo-Aristotelian
school
of
Ammonius
in
Alexandria,
in
the
form
in
which
it
survived
and
was
revived
after
the
Islamic
conquest
among
Syriac
Christian
clerics
and
intellectuals
in
the
centers
of
Eastern
Christianity
in
the
Fertile
Crescent.
This
school,
traditionally
but
inappropriately
called
Neoplatonic,
was
essentially
Aristotelian
in
its
basic
orientation,
structure,
and
contents.
It
had
been
transformed,
however,
in
a
number
of
ways
along
Neoplatonist
lines,
most
notably
in
its
acceptance
of
Plotinian
emanationism
(for
various
aspects
of
this
transformation
see
Sorabji,
passim).
By
Fa@ra@b^'s
own
account
(cf
i.
biography),
the
Nestorians
Yu@háanna@
b.
H®ayla@n,
his
immediate
teacher,
and
Matta@
b.
Yu@nus,
his
older
contemporary
and
colleague
in
Baghdad,
were
direct
descendants
in
this
tradition.
To
Matta@
apparently
belongs
the
credit
for
reviving
Aristotelian
studies
in
Baghdad
and
establishing
both
a
curriculum
of
school
texts
and
a
method
for
their
study
(Endress,
1989,
pp.
844-45).
Fa@ra@b^'s
claims
about
his
philosophical
pedigree
are
independently
substantiated
by
the
demonstrably
numerous
points
of
actual
doctrinal
congruity
with
the
Alexandrian
tradition
(Mahdi,
1967,
pp.
233-37;
Gutas,
1983,
p.
255);
the
scholastic
tradition
of
both
philological
and
philosophical
commentary
on
the
core
texts
of
Aristotle
survives
in
Fa@ra@b^'s
commentaries
and
in
the
Paris
MS.
(Arab.
2346)
of
Aristotle's
Organon
(Zimmermann,
1972
and
1981;
Hugonnard-Roche,
1990
and
1993).
Equally
as
important
as
Fa@ra@b^'s
educational
background
for
an
assessment
of
his
relation
to
Greek
philosophy
is
the
intellectual
climate
during
his
time
in
Baghdad.
When
Fa@ra@b^
was
studying
in
the
¿Abbasid
capital
at
the
end
of
the
9th
century,
the
translation
and
study
of
the
Greek
sciences
were
almost
as
old
as
the
city
itself
(founded
in
145/762).
The
translation
movement,
which
was
generated,
funded,
and
promoted
by
almost
all
the
upper
strata
of
early
¿Abbasid
society,
had
provided
Arabic
versions
of
the
majority
of
Greek
philosophical
and
scientific
works,
and
had
reached
such
a
state
of
maturity
where
the
translations
of
certain
fundamental
works
(e.g.,
Aristotle's
Physics,
Euclid's
Elements,
or
Ptolemy's
Almagest)
were
repeatedly
done
anew
or
revised
(Gutas
1998,
ch.
6).
The
intellectuals
who
sponsored
these
translations
championed
the
authors,
methods,
and
ideas
of
their
liking,
and
in
some
instances
had
created
schools
of
thought.
In
philosophy,
particularly
notable
was
the
circle
of
philosophers
and
scholars
around
al-Kend^
(d.
870s)
and
his
successors,
as
well
as
the
sui
generis
work
of
the
autodidact
Abu@
Bakr
Ra@z^
(d.
925
or
935),
Fa@ra@b^'s
older
contemporary.
Fa@ra@b^
thus
experienced
in
Baghdad
a
fertile
environment
of
pluralist
philosophical
thinking
at
least
a
century
old
and
at
an
advanced
stage
of
sophistication.
The
prevailing
atmosphere
of
intellectual
fermentation
and
experimentation
was
unchecked
by
political
authority,
particularly
after
the
abortive
attempt
by
al-Ma÷mu@n
and
his
two
successors
to
impose
a
centralized
ideology
(the
mehána,
833-49).
As
a
result,
the
center
stage
for
ideological
supremacy
was
contested
by
many
groups
in
competition
with
each
other,
for
the
different
trends
of
thought
had
not
yet
coalesced
into
established
doctrines
with
sufficient
social
backing
to
impose
themselves
upon
the
rest.
The
period
from
850
to
950,
covering
Fa@ra@b^'s
entire
life,
saw
attempts
to
bring
order
to
the
intellectual
disarray,
consolidate
and
systematize
the
various
disciplines
and
establish
methodological
and
doctrinal
uniformity,
e.g.,
Ebn
Moja@hed's
(d.
936)
reforms
of
Kokanic
readings
(qera@÷a@t),
Ebn
Ab^
H®a@tem
Ra@z^'s
(d.
938)
formulation
of
the
principles
of
Hadith
criticism
(al-jarhá
wa'l-ta¿d^l),
etc.
(Gutas
1998,
pp.
101-104).
The
revival
of
Aristotelian
studies
represented
by
the
translations
and
commentaries
of
Matta@
and
brought
to
fruition
by
the
entire
oeuvre
of
Fa@ra@b^
must
be
seen
in
this
light
as
performing
a
similar
function
in
the
field
of
philosophy.
Fa@ra@b^
sought
to
present
philosophy
as
a
coherent
system,
promulgate
neo-Aristotelianism
as
the
one
true
philosophical
doctrine,
and
rationalize
its
practice
and
show
its
validity
for
contemporary
¿Abbasid
society.
It
seems
also
that
he
wished
to
emancipate
philosophy
from
subordination
to
medicine,
a
position
it
occupied
in
early
¿Abbasid
times
for
historical
reasons,
and
establish
it
as
an
independent,
and
possibly
even
leading,
intellectual
discipline
(Zimmermann,
1976,
pp.
407-8,
412-14).
To
begin
with,
his
conception
of
true
philosophy
was
that
it
"was
handed
down
to
us
by
the
Greeks
from
Plato
and
Aristotle
only
.
.
.
.
In
what
they
presented,
their
purpose
is
the
same,
and
.
.
.
they
intended
to
offer
one
and
the
same
philosophy"
(The
Attainment
of
Happiness,
in
Mahdi,
1969,
pp.
49-50).
However,
his
understanding
of
the
identity
of
the
philosophies
of
Plato
and
Aristotle
is
not
doctrinaire,
as
in
Porphyry,
but
nuanced
in
favor
of
Aristotle,
as
espoused
in
the
school
of
Ammonius
(Endress,
1991,
pp.
242-43).
Fa@ra@b^'s
Concordance
of
the
Opinions
of
Plato
and
Aristotle
(Jam¿
ra÷yay
al-háak^mayn)
presents
Plato
as
a
respected
precursor
of
Aristotle
whose
main
achievement
was
to
provide
moral
exhortation
for
the
purposes
of
social
education.
He
presents
Aristotle
as
the
philosopher
who
began
where
Plato
left
off,
perfected
philosophy,
and
put
it
on
a
demonstrative
basis
(Endress,
1991,
pp.
249-51).
Given
this
understanding
of
true
philosophy,
Fa@ra@b^'s
teachings
and
writings
fall
into
different
categories
(cf.
Druart).
First,
at
an
elementary
level
and
apparently
for
a
wide
audience,
he
edited
and
adapted
certain
existing
translations
of
Greek
texts;
(he
did
not
know
Greek
and
had
no
access
to
Greek
works
other
than
those
translated
into
Arabic.)
He
worked
by
slightly
rewording
the
argument,
adding
explanatory
details,
and
clarifying
syntactical
and
semantic
obscurities
of
the
Arabic
of
the
translation
(Gutas,
1983,
p.
252
and
note
51,
p.
256
and
note
61).
Such
editorial
reworkings
by
Fa@ra@b^
include
his
recasting
of
(1)
the
late
Alexandrian
introductions
to
the
study
of
Aristotle
in
his
Prolegomena
to
the
Study
of
Aristotle's
Philosophy
(Ma@
yanbag@^
an
yoqaddama
qabla
ta¿allom
falsafat
ArestÂu@;
Gutas,
1985,
pp.
115-16);
(2)
similar
prolegomena
by
Elias(-David)
in
the
logic
part
of
his
Enumeration
of
the
Sciences
(Ehásáa@÷
al-¿olu@m;
Gutas,
1983,
pp.
231-38,
255
),
and
(3)
Galen's
Synopsis
of
Plato's
Laws
in
his
Precise
Exposition
of
the
Synopsis
of
Plato's
Laws
(Talkò^sá
jawa@me¿
nawa@m^s
Afla@tÂu@n;
Gutas
l997).
Second,
Fa@ra@b^
wrote
school
commentaries
on
the
works
of
Aristotle,
as
well
as
paraphrases
and
other
popularizations
(Gutas,
1993,
pp.
47-50).
Third,
and
most
importantly,
he
created
a
philosophical
system
of
his
own
on
the
basis
of
principles
and
orientations
which
he
inherited
from
neo-Aristotelianism
and
by
using
as
his
material
the
entire
array
of
Greek
philosophical
thought
that
was
available
to
him
in
translation.
These
crucial
principles
and
orientations
were:
(1)
a
procedural
tool
of
analysis
by
division,
(2)
the
"tree"
of
Porphyry,
(3)
the
classification
of
the
sciences,
and
(4)
the
theory
of
language.
The
neo-Aristotelian
school
of
Ammonius
had
developed
these
procedures
and
positions
for
the
purposes
of
philosophical
pedagogy
and
in
the
process
of
exegesis
of
Aristotle's
works,
in
particular
the
initial
books
of
the
Organon:
Porphyry's
Eisagoge
and
Aristotle's
Categories
and
De
Interpretatione.
Fa@ra@b^
fully
followed
these
practices,
but
he
used
them
in
a
way
which
resulted
in
a
philosophical
system
that
went
far
beyond
the
scholastic
interests
of
his
Greek
and
Syriac
predecessors.
1.
Analysis
by
division
(diairesis,
qesma).
Analysis
by
division
was
introduced
by
Plato
into
the
discussions
of
scientific
method
(Phaedrus
265,
Politicus
263,
Sophist
221-231)
and
firmly
grounded
as
a
procedure
in
definitions
by
Aristotle
(Topics
and
Categories,
Metaphysics
Z
and
Posterior
Analytics
B13,
96b25-97b6,
and
Parts
of
Animals
i).
For
an
analysis,
particularly
relevant
for
Fa@ra@b^'s
understanding
of
the
theory
and
practice
of
scientific
method
in
Aristotle,
the
articles
by
Balme,
Lennox,
Bolton,
and
Gotthelf
(Gotthelf
and
Lennox,
pp.
65-198)
should
be
consulted.
Division
became
the
standard
method
of
analysis
through
its
detailed
exposition
by
Porphyry
in
his
commentary
on
Plato's
Sophist,
and
from
him
it
passed
into
the
works
of
all
subsequent
philosophers
writing
in
Greek
and
Syriac
(Hein,
pp.
131-45).
From
the
works
in
particular
of
David,
Elias,
Ps.-Elias,
and
their
reproduction
by
Paul
the
Persian,
analysis
by
division
appears
in
the
earliest
extant
Arabic
work
on
logic,
Ebn
Behr^z's
H®odu@d
al-mantÂeq,
and
constitutes
one
of
the
fundamental
analytical
tools
of
Fa@ra@b^.
2.
Hierarchical
classification.
Closely
related
to,
and
ultimately
derived
from
the
above,
is
Porphyry's
elevation
of
the
division
of
genera
and
species
into
a
hierarchical
classification
of
being
that
ranges
from
the
highest
genera
(the
ten
categories),
which
are
not
species
to
any
superior
genus,
to
the
lowest
species,
that
are
not
genera
to
any
lower
species.
Every
level
between
these
extremes
constitutes
a
genus
to
its
inferior
and
a
species
to
its
superior
levels
(Eisagoge,
ed.
Busse,
pp.
4ff.;
MantÂeq
ArestÂu@,
ed.
Badaw^,
pp.
1027ff.).
Fa@ra@b^'s
systematization
of
all
reality,
both
ontological
and
social,
into
a
hierarchical
whole
in
which
each
level
is
governed
by
the
one
above
it,
and
governs
the
one
beneath
it,
follows
precisely
such
a
classification.
3.
Classification
of
the
sciences.
In
the
two
centuries
before
the
advent
of
Islam,
Alexandrian
scholars
in
the
school
of
Ammonius
erected,
by
means
of
a
rigorous
application
of
analysis
by
division,
an
elaborate
schema
of
classifying
Aristotle's
works,
in
which
each
individual
treatise
came
to
denote
a
single
field
of
study.
The
result
of
this
approach
was
that
the
classification
of
Aristotle's
works
became,
in
effect,
a
classification
of
all
the
sciences,
and
hence
of
all
human
knowledge.
The
function
of
this
classification
was
initially
descriptive
and
pedagogical,
used
in
the
introduction
to
the
philosophical
curriculum
to
elucidate
the
definitions
and
divisions
of
philosophy
or
all
knowledge.
Eventually,
however,
it
also
acquired
two
further
interrelated
values:
a
normative
value,
in
that
the
precise
classification
of
Aristotle's
works
and
hence
of
all
knowledge
was
assumed
to
reflect
ontological
reality,
the
way
things
are;
and
a
historical
value,
in
that
the
classification
of
the
sciences
also
purported
to
reflect
historical
reality
or
the
chronological
sequence
of
the
development
of
the
sciences
in
human
history.
Both
the
classificatory
schema
and
all
of
its
functions
were
adopted
by
Fa@ra@b^,
mainly
through
the
Arabic
translation
of
Paul
the
Persian's
treatise
on
the
subject,
and
made
into
the
cornerstone
of
his
philosophical
system
(Gutas,
1983,
pp.
256-60).
4.
Theory
of
language.
Alexandrian
neo-Aristotelianism
engaged
in
an
intensive
cultivation
of
the
preliminaries
to
the
study
of
Aristotle's
Organon.
Both
Porphyry's
Eisagoge
and
other
related
introductory
material
formed
the
focus
of
much
philosophical
study.
The
issues
treated
were
predominantly
related
to
the
philosophy
of
language
and
meaning,
if
only
because
Aristotle's
Categories
and
De
Interpretatione
deal
with
these
subjects.
This
heightened
preoccupation
with
semantics,
syntax,
and
semiotics,
and
in
particular,
with
concepts
such
as
homonymy,
synonymy,
and
paronymy
at
the
beginning
of
the
Categories,
and
name,
verb,
and
sentence
at
the
beginning
of
De
Interpretatione,
put
linguistic
analysis
at
the
center
of
philosophical
practice.
Fa@ra@b^
exhibits
a
similar
preoccupation
both
because
of
his
philosophical
training
in
the
neo-Aristotelian
tradition
which
cultivated
these
studies
and
because
of
the
central
position
of
linguistic
studies
in
contemporary
Baghdadi
intellectual
life
(cf.
Abed).
Two
of
his
works
are
entirely
devoted
to
the
subject:
al-Alfa@zµ
al-mosta¿mala
f^
l-mantÂeq
(Vocables
Employed
in
Logic)
and
Keta@b
al-h®oru@f
(Book
of
Particles);
and
even
his
essay
on
the
intellect
(Resa@la
f^'l-¿aql)
is
concerned
with
differentiating
the
various
meanings
of
the
homonymous
term
"intellect"
(¿aql).
On
the
basis
of
these
principles,
and
with
a
wide
variety
of
Greek
philosophical
and
scientific
texts
in
Arabic
translation
at
his
disposal,
Fa@ra@b^
created
an
original
and
compelling
philosophical
system.
A
pre‚cis
of
that
system
is
offered
in
his
Maba@de÷
a@ra@÷
ahl
al-mad^na
al-fa@zµela
(The
Principles
of
the
Opinions
of
the
People
of
the
Excellent
City).
At
the
heart
of
the
system
lies
the
theory
of
the
intellect,
or
noetics,
which
animates
and
lends
coherence
to
Fa@ra@b^'s
entire
philosophy.
This
is
the
natural
extension
of
late
Greek
neo-Aristotelianism,
which
combined
on
the
one
hand
a
long
tradition
of
commenting
on
and
extrapolating
from
the
few
and
cryptic
statements
by
Aristotle
on
the
nature
of
the
intellect
(both
the
unmoved
mover
and
that
of
humans),
and
on
the
other
an
ontological
enhancement
of
the
status
of
the
intellect
that
was
developed
in
particular
in
the
Neoplatonic
school
of
Athens
(Walzer,
1957,
pp.
229-30,
201-2;
Walzer,
1974;
Finnegan;
Jolivet).
Following
standard
neo-Aristotelian
doctrine,
Fa@ra@b^
considered
the
"noblest"
part
of
logic
to
be
apodeictic
demonstration,
the
primary
function
of
the
intellect.
Accordingly,
Aristotle's
Posterior
Analysis
forms
the
centerpiece
and
culmination
of
the
entire
Organon,
while
the
four
preceding
books
(Porphyry's
Eisagoge,
Aristotle's
Categories,
De
Interpretione,
and
Prior
Analytics)
are
said
to
introduce
demonstration
and
the
final
four
to
"protect"
it,
by
disclosing
the
ways
in
which
apodeictic
certainty
can
be
derailed
by
arguments
that
are
dialectical
(Topics),
sophistic
(Sophistici
Elenchi),
rhetorical
(Rhetoric),
or
poetic
(Poetics).
Fa@ra@b^
accepts
this
fivefold
division
of
arguments
or
propositions
(i.e.,
demonstrative,
dialectical,
sophistical,
rhetorical,
and
poetical)
not
only
on
the
level
of
description
or
analysis,
but
also
grants
it
ontological
status
by
claiming
that
the
human
mind
can
think
only
in
these
five
ways
(Gutas,
1983,
pp.
256-57,
265-66).
Thus
in
the
final
analysis
even
logic,
originally
a
methodological
discipline,
is
made
subservient
to,
and
dependent
on,
ontological
noetics.
In
cosmology
Fa@ra@b^
accepted
Plotinian
emanationism,
which
he
combined
with
Ptolemy's
planetary
system
from
the
Hypotheses
(Walzer,
1985,
pp.
363-65)
to
create
the
rigidly
hierarchical
"tree
of
Porphyry"
system
of
the
supralunar
cosmos.
Noetics
is
at
the
center
of
this
system
insofar
as
the
emanation
of
the
spheres,
with
their
intellects
and
souls,
depends
on
the
creative
act
of
intellection
of
the
superior
sphere.
The
same
hierarchical
structure
of
constituent
elements
is
reproduced
in
the
world
of
nature
on
earth
(humans,
animals,
plants,
minerals),
within
the
human
body
(limbs
and
organs),
within
the
human
soul
and
its
ranked
faculties,
and
within
the
rational
part
of
the
soul
(the
intellect
itself).
Contact
between
the
supralunar
and
the
sublunar
realms
is
effected
through
the
emanation
of
the
intelligibles
from
the
active
intellect
(the
intellect
of
the
tenth
sphere,
that
of
the
moon)
to
the
human
intellect,
which
is
then
actualized,
and
on
occasion
to
the
imaginative
or
representative
faculty,
bringing
about
prophecy
and
divination.
In
his
philosophy
of
the
individual
and
society,
noetics
is
again
central
to
Fa@ra@b^'s
hierarchical
system.
He
sees
human
happiness
in
the
life
of
the
intellect,
or
in
the
actualization
of
the
human
intellect,
which
is
to
be
understood
as
the
life
of
philosophical
reflection.
As
he
states
in
the
closing
paragraph
of
his
exposition
on
Aristotle's
philosophy,
"Investigation
and
theoretical
inquiry
into
the
intelligibles
which
are
of
no
benefit
for
the
soundness
of
the
body
and
the
soundness
of
the
senses
are
necessary
for
the
perfection
of
man,"
which
he
goes
on
to
define
as
the
actualization
of
man's
intellect.
Of
the
various
sciences
studied
in
philosophy,
Fa@ra@b^
continues,
metaphysics
is
"necessary
for
the
development,
as
a
city-dweller,
of
his
intellect,
for
the
sake
of
which
man
is
made,
while
all
other
sciences
are
investigated
.
.
.
in
order
for
the
human
intellect,
for
the
sake
of
which
man
is
made,
to
be
made
perfect"
(translated
according
to
the
sounder
text
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
Falsafat
ArestÂu@
quoted
in
¿Abd-al-LatÂ^f
Bag@da@d^'s
Keta@b
al-nasá^háatayn,
MS.
Bursa,
Hüseyin
Çelebi
823,
f.
87r;
cf.
Mahdi,
1969,
p.
130).
The
human
intellect,
for
the
sake
of
which
man
is
made,
is
specified
in
this
passage
as
belonging
to
a
"city-dweller"
(madan^)
because
man
needs
the
social
organization
of
a
city
in
order
to
meet
his
physical
needs
and
to
attain
perfection
(Maba@de÷
in
Walzer,
1985,
p.
229).
In
the
Maba@de÷
Fa@ra@b^
describes
the
man
who
has
reached
perfection
as
he
who
"has
become
actually
intellect
and
actually
being
thought"
(Walzer,
1985,
p.
241).
This
is
in
accordance
with
Aristotle's
description
of
human
happiness
as
the
contemplative
life
(Nicomachean
Ethics
X)
or
of
the
divine
as
intellect
engaged
in
perpetual
self-intellection
(Metaphysics
XII)
but
it
is
particularly
close
(especially
with
its
emphasis
on
the
lack
of
practical
benefit
in
philosophical
reflection)
to
Aristotle's
theory
of
leisure
as
the
end
of
both
individual
and
social
activity
(Politics
VII.15,
1334a11-b28).
Within
that
context,
it
is
also
close
to
his
statement
that
intellect
is
the
end
of
nature:
"In
men,
reason
(logos)
and
mind
(or
intellect:
nous)
are
the
end
towards
which
nature
strives,
so
that
the
birth
and
training
in
custom
of
the
citizens
ought
to
be
ordered
with
a
view
to
them"
(Politics
1334b15-17,
in
Jowett's
translation
in
Barnes,
p.
2117).
Consequently,
human
communities,
which
Fa@ra@b^
classifies
hierarchically
in
accordance
with
the
principles
of
the
"tree
of
Porphyry"
listed
above
(Maro‚th
1978;
in
greater
detail,
Maro‚th
1994,
pp.
215-22;
cf.
Pines,
pp.
156-60;
Rosenthal),
attain
or
fall
short
of
perfection
to
the
extent
to
which
their
rulers
and
inhabitants
are
able
to
actualize
their
intellects,
receive
the
intelligibles,
and
hold
the
correct
opinions
as
required
by
the
philosophical
sciences
and
revelation
(Maba@de÷,
chaps.
15-19
in
Walzer,
1985,
pp.
229-329,
and
esp.
pp.
277-85).
Fa@ra@b^'s
discussion
of
human
communities
is
subordinate
to
his
noetics
and
intended
to
complete
it
by
working
out,
in
the
interests
of
a
classificatory
comprehensiveness
also
exhibited
in
other
parts
of
the
Maba@de÷,
all
the
details
of
a
highly
hierarchical
system;
there
is
no
question
here
of
an
independent
political
philosophy.
The
always
perspicacious
Ebn
K¨aldu@n
(q.v.),
as
the
conscious
originator
of
political
philosophy
in
Islam,
recognized
that
Fa@ra@b^'s
discussion
was
based
on
noetics;
he
says
that
by
s^a@sa
madan^ya
(the
title
of
one
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
works)
"the
philosophers
mean
the
disposition
of
soul
and
character
which
each
member
of
a
social
organization
must
have,
if,
eventually,
people
are
completely
to"
have
no
need
of
"rulers."
They
call
the
social
organization
that
fulfills
these
requirements
the
'ideal
city'
(al-mad^na
al
fa@zµela,
part
of
the
title
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
Maba@de÷).
The
norms
observed
in
this
connection
are
called
'political
utopias'"(s^a@sa
madan^ya).
Accordingly
Ebn
K¨aldu@n
dismissed
the
theory
as
irrelevant
to
real
life
and
as
something
"rare
and
remote"
(Moqaddema
II,
tr.
F.
Rosenthal,
p.
138).
The
absence
of
an
independent
political
philosophy
in
Fa@ra@b^'s
work
is
to
be
expected.
In
neither
Athenian
Neoplatonism,
nor
Alexandrian
neo-Aristotelianism,
the
twin
sources
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
philosophy,
was
Plato's
and
Aristotle's
political
philosophy
an
integral
part
(Walzer,
1985,
pp.
425-26),
while
the
actual
political
ideas
in
the
Byzantine
world
from
Justinian
to
Fa@ra@b^'s
time
(Dvornik,
chaps.
11,
12)
are
completely
alien
to
Fa@ra@b^'s
analysis.
Besides,
the
focus
on
noetics
is
also
reflected
in
the
title
of
the
Maba@de÷:
it
is
not,
as
it
is
often
elliptically
but
misleadingly
referred
to,
the
"excellent
city,"
but
"the
principles
of
the
opinions
of
the
people
of
the
excellent
city."
Subsequent
philosophical
tradition
in
Islam
well
understood
the
noetic
basis
of
the
work;
philosophers
who
adopted
Fa@ra@b^'s
system
dispensed
with
his
classification
of
human
communities
as
an
inconsequential
appendage.
It
was
only
in
the
tradition
of
the
akòla@q
(q.v.)
books
written
in
Persian
and
Turkish,
which
followed
the
Aristotelian
tripartition
of
practical
philosophy
into
ethics,
oeconomics,
and
politics,
that
Fa@ra@b^'s
classification
of
human
communities
found
a
place
to
fill
in
the
section
on
politics.
This
tradition
was
inaugurated
by
Nasá^r-al-D^n
T®u@s^'s
Akòla@q-e
na@sáer^
(q.v.),
which
was
followed
in
both
Persian
and
Turkish
by
similar
works
of
Dava@n^
(q.v.),
Wa@¿ezá
Ka@œef^,
Qena@l^za@da
¿Al^,
etc.
This
apart,
Fa@ra@b^'s
classification
of
communities
had
no
influence
either
in
Islam
or
the
West
(Gutas,
1990,
pp.
357,
354).
The
various
discrete
Greek
sources
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
philosophical
system
and
of
the
Maba@de÷
in
particular
have
been
identified
and
analyzed
by
Walzer
(1971
and
1985),
but
this
work
as
a
whole
and
especially
its
conception
must
be
regarded
as
original
to
Fa@ra@b^
himself
(cf.
Mahdi,
1990).
Within
Islam,
Fa@ra@b^'s
system
was
taken
up
by
Avicenna,
who
further
developed
and
refined
it
to
create
a
philosophy
that
was
to
remain
dominant
in
the
East.
In
the
West,
it
influenced
both
Arabic
Andalusian
(Jewish
and
Muslim)
and
Latin
European
philosophy.
Fa@ra@b^'s
achievement
is
that
he
was
the
first
philosopher
who
succeeded
to
internationalize
Greek
philosophy
by
creating
in
a
language
other
than
Greek
a
complex
and
sophisticated
system
far
surpassing
the
elementary
efforts
of
both
the
early
medieval
Latins
and
his
Syriac
predecessors.
As
such,
he
stands
at
the
head
of
all
subsequent
philosophers
who
made
Greek
philosophy
Western
philosophy.
Bibliography
(Apart
from
references
cited
in
the
article,
the
bibliography
also
lists
works
which
deal
with
Greek
antecedents
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
philosophy.
For
cited
works
not
given
in
detail,
see
"Short
References"):
S.
B.
Abed,
Aristotelian
Logic
and
the
Arabic
Language
in
Alfa@ra@b^,
Albany,
N.Y.,
1991.
¿A.
Badaw^,
ed.,
MantÂeq
ArestÂu@
III,
Cairo,
1952.
J.
Barnes,
The
Complete
Works
of
Aristotle,
Princeton,
1984.
C.
S.
F.
Burnett,
ed.,
Glosses
and
Commentaries
on
Aristotelian
Logical
Texts,
London,
1993.
Th.-A.
Druart,
"Al-Farabi
and
Emanationism,"
in
J.
F.
Wippel,
ed.,
Studies
in
Medieval
Philosophy,
Washington,
D.C.,
1987,
pp.
23-43.
F.
Dvornik,
Early
Christian
and
Byzantine
Political
Philosophy,
Washington,
D.C.,
1966.
Ebn
K¨aldu@n,
The
Muqaddimah,
tr.
F.
Rosenthal,
Princeton,
1967.
G.
Endress,
"Matta@
b.
Yu@nus,"
in
EI2
VI,
pp.
844-46.
Idem,
"«La
Concordance
entre
Platon
et
Aristote»,
l'Aristote
arabe
et
l'e‚mancipation
de
la
philosophie
en
Islam
me‚die‚val,"
in
B.
Mojsisch
and
O.
Pluta,
eds.,
Historia
Philosophiae
Medii
Aevi,
Amsterdam
and
Philadelphia,
1991,
pp.
237-57.
J.
Finnegan,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^
et
le
Peri
Nou
d'Alexandre
d'Aphrodise,"
in
Me‚langes
Louis
Massignon
II,
Damascus,
1957,
pp.
133-52.
A.
Gotthelf
and
J.
G.
Lennox,
eds.,
Philosophical
Issues
in
Aristotle's
Biology,
pt.
II
on
'Definition
and
Demonstration:
Theory
and
Practice,'
Cambridge,
1987,
pp.
65-198.
D.
Gutas,
"Paul
the
Persian
on
the
Classification
of
the
Parts
of
Aristotle's
Philosophy:
A
Milestone
between
Alexandria
and
Bagµda@d,"
Der
Islam
60,
1983,
pp.
231-67.
Idem,
"The
Starting
Point
of
Philosophical
Studies
in
Alexandrian
and
Arabic
Aristotelianism,"
in
W.
W.
Fortenbaugh,
ed.,
Theophrastus
of
Eresus:
On
His
Life
and
Work,
New
Brunswick,
N.
J.
and
Oxford,
1985,
pp.
115-23.
Idem,
"Ethische
Schriften
im
Islam,"
in
W.
Heinrichs,
ed.,
Neues
Handbuch
der
Literaturwissenschaft
V:
Orientalisches
Mittelalter,
Wiesbaden,
1990,
pp.
346-65.
Idem,
"Aspects
of
Literary
Form
and
Genre
in
Arabic
Logical
Works,"
in
C.
S.
F.
Burnett,
ed.,
Glosses
and
Commentaries
on
Aristotelian
Logical
Texts,
London,
1993,
pp.
29-76.
Idem,
"Galen's
Synopsis
of
Plato's
Laws
and
Fa@ra@b^'s
Talª^sá,"
in
R.
Kruk
and
G.
Endress,
eds.,
The
Ancient
Tradition
in
Christian
and
Islamic
Hellenism,
Leiden,
l997,
pp.
101-19.
Idem,
Greek
Thought,
Arabic
Culture,
London,
l998.
C.
Hein,
Definition
und
Einteilung
der
Philosophie,
Frankfurt,
Bern,
and
New
York,
1985.
H.
Hugonnard-Roche,
"Les
traductions
du
grec
au
syriaque
et
du
syriaque
aà
l'arabe,"
in
Rencontres
de
cultures
dans
la
philosophie
me‚die‚vale:
Traductions
et
traducteurs
de
l'antiquite‚
tardive
au
XIVe
sieàcle,
Louvain-la-Neuve
and
Cassino,
1990,
pp.
131-47.
Idem,
"Remarques
sur
la
tradition
arabe
de
l'Organon
d'apreàs
le
manuscrit
Paris,
Bibliotheàque
nationale,
Ar.
2346,"
in
Burnett,
1993,
pp.
19-28.
J.
Jolivet,
"L'intellect
selon
al-Fa@ra@b^:
quelques
remarques,"
Bulletin
d'Études
Orientales
29,
1977,
pp.
251-59.
M.
Mahdi,
"Alfarabi
against
Philoponus,"
JNES
26,
1967,
pp.
233-60.
Idem,
Alfarabi's
Philosophy
of
Plato
and
Aristotle,
Ithaca,
N.
Y.,
1969.
Idem,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Imperfect
State,"
JAOS
110,
1990,
pp.
691-726.
M.
Maro‚th,
"Griechische
Theorie
und
orientalische
Praxis
in
der
Staatskunst
von
al-Fa@ra@b^,"
Acta
Antiqua
26,
1978,
pp.
465-69.
Idem,
Die
Araber
und
die
antike
Wissenschaftstheorie,
Budapest
and
Leiden,
l994.
S.
Pines,
"Aristotle's
Politics
in
Arabic
Philosophy,"
Israel
Oriental
Studies
5,
1975,
pp.
150-60.
E.
I.
J.
Rosenthal,
Political
Thought
in
Medieval
Islam,
Cambridge,
1968,
pp.
122-42.
R.
Sorabji,
ed.,
Aristotle
Transformed,
London,
1990.
R.
Walzer,
"New
Studies
on
al-Kind^,"
Oriens
10,
1957,
pp.
203-32,
repr.
in
idem,
Greek
into
Arabic,
pp.
175-205.
Idem,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Theory
of
Prophecy
and
Divination,"
Journal
of
Hellenic
Studies
77,
1957,
pp.
142-48
(repr.
in
idem,
Greek
into
Arabic,
pp.
206-19).
Idem,
Greek
into
Arabic,
Oxford,
1962.
Idem,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^,"
in
EI2
II,
pp.
778-81.
Idem,
"L'e‚veil
de
la
philosophie
musulmane,"
REI
38,
1970,
pp.
7-42,
207-42.
Idem,
"Early
Islamic
Philosophy,"
in
A.
H.
Armstrong,
ed.,
The
Cambridge
History
of
Later
Greek
and
Early
Medieval
Philosophy,
Cambridge,
1970,
pp.
652-66.
Idem,
"Lost
Neoplatonic
Thought
in
the
Arabic
Tradition,"
in
Le
Ne‚oplatonisme,
Paris,
1971,
pp.
319-28.
Idem,
"Aristotle's
Active
Intellect,
nous
poie@tikos,
in
Greek
and
Early
Islamic
Philosophy,"
in
Plotino
e
il
neoplatonismo
in
Oriente
e
in
Occidente,
Rome,
1974,
pp.
423-36.
Idem,
ed.
and
tr.,
Al-Farabi
on
the
Perfect
State:
Abu@
Nasár
al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Maba@di÷
a@ra@÷
ahl
al-mad^na
al-fa@dáila,
Oxford,
1985.
F.
W.
Zimmermann,
"Some
Observations
on
al-Farabi
and
Logical
Tradition,"
in
S.
M.
Stern,
A.
Hourani,
V.
Brown,
eds.,
Islamic
Philosophy
and
the
Classical
Tradition
[Festschrift
Richard
Walzer],
Oxford,
1972,
pp.
517-46.
Idem,
"Al-Farabi
und
die
philosophische
Kritik
an
Galen
von
Alexander
zu
Averroes,"
Akten
des
VII
Kongresses
für
Arabistik
und
Islamwissenschaft,
Göttingen,
1976,
pp.
401-14.
Idem,
Al-Farabi's
Commentary
and
Short
Treatise
on
Aristotle's
"De
Interpretatione",
London,
1981.
(Dimitri
Gutas)
v.
MUSIC
In
the
history
of
Middle
Eastern
music
Fa@ra@b^
remains
unequalled
as
a
theorist,
but
this
aspect
of
his
manifold
achievements
has
been
obscured
by
his
more
widely
known
writings
on
philosophy.
Scholars
of
medieval
European
music
are
seldom
aware
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
importance
for
music
theory
or
the
significance
of
his
commentaries
on
the
works
of
the
ancient
Greek
music
theorists.
At
the
same
time,
his
contributions
to
musical
theory
are
often
entangled
in
legendary
accounts
which
bestow
a
supernatural
dimension
on
his
powers
as
a
musician,
relating
that
he
could
make
his
audience
laugh,
cry,
and
sleep
against
their
will
(Bayhaq^,
pp.
30-35;
Ebn
K¨alleka@n,
tr.
de
Slane,
III,
p.
309).
Of
the
approximately
one
hundred
and
sixty
works
attributed
to
Fa@r@a@b^,
eight
are
on
music,
but
only
four
have
survived
(Sawa,
1983-84,
p.
3).
The
first
and
least
significant
is
the
very
short
chapter
on
music
in
Keta@b
ehásáa@÷
al-¿olu@m.
Paradoxically,
it
was
this
sketchy
work
alone
that
was
available
in
medieval
Europe
through
several
Latin
translations
(Farmer,
1934).
Fa@ra@b^'s
masterly
and
comprehensive
Keta@b
al-mu@s^q^
al-kab^r,
as
well
as
his
Keta@b
al-^qa@¿a@t
and
Keta@b
ehásáa@÷
al-^qa@¿a@t
(on
rhythms)
remained
unknown.
Fa@ra@b^
wrote
Keta@b
al-mu@s^q^
al-kab^r
for
Abu@
Ja¿far
Muháammad
b.
al-Qa@sem
Karkòò^,
the
vizier
of
the
caliph
al-Ra@zµ^
(d.
329/940),
who
wished
to
learn
about
the
science
of
music
according
to
the
ancient
Greek
theorists.
Fa@ra@b^
agreed
to
the
request
because
he
had
found
serious
shortcomings
in
the
Greek
works
available
to
him
in
Arabic
translation
(through
Syriac).
He
blamed
the
shortcomings
on
the
poor
quality
of
the
works
chosen
for
translation
or
that
of
the
translations
themselves.
He
also
found
shortcomings
in
the
Arabic
writings
of
his
predecessors
(al-Mu@s^q^,
ed.
K¨aœaba,
pp.
35-37;
Sawa,
1989,
p.
14),
including
the
philosopher
Kend^
(d.
after
256/870)
and
the
singer,
lutenist,
composer
and
theorist
Esháa@q
Mawsáel^
(q.v.;
d.
235/850).
As
a
philosopher,
rather
than
a
practicing
musician,
Kend^
uncritically
followed
Greek
musical
theories
(in
Arabic
translation)
that
were
unrelated
to
Middle
Eastern
practice.
On
the
other
hand,
Esháa@q
Mawsel^
lacked
the
necessary
philosophical
training
to
apply
a
rigorous,
logical
approach
to
his
writings
on
the
science
of
music.
In
contrast,
Fa@ra@b^'s
training
as
a
logician
and
a
practicing
musician
meant
that
his
theory
reflected
practice
in
a
clear
discourse.
He
did
indeed
expound
Greek
music
theory
but
he
also
made
his
readers
aware
of
those
aspects
not
applicable
to
music
in
the
Middle
East.
In
addition
to
the
Greek
theories
he
also
described
the
musical
practices
of
his
own
time
and
provenance,
i.e.
the
early
¿Abbasid
era
from
Iraq,
Persia,
and
Transoxiana,
as
well
as
the
reported
practices
of
the
Omayyads
and
early
Islamic
era
in
Mecca,
Medina,
and
Damascus
(Sawa,
1989,
pp.
14-17).
As
the
vizier
was
not
knowledgeable
in
the
art
and
theory
of
music,
Fa@ra@b^
explained
music
by
borrowing
terms,
concepts
and
paradigms
from
the
Greek
sciences
and
contemporary
disciplines
such
as
arithmetics,
Euclidean
geometry,
Aristotelian
logic,
architecture
and
textile,
civil
and
mechanical
engineering,
politics,
Arabic
grammar,
phonology,
prosody,
poetics,
rhetoric,
and
koranic
sciences
(Madian;
Sawa,
1981,
p.
80;
idem,
1990).
The
Keta@b
al-mu@s^q^
al-kab^r
was
supposedly
composed
of
two
books.
The
second,
which
was
intended
as
a
commentary
on
the
works
of
previous
writers,
is
lost
and
perhaps
was
never
finished.
The
first
book
is
in
two
parts.
Part
one
is
an
introduction
(madkòal)
to
the
art
of
music,
consisting
of
two
discourses,
one
dealing
with
the
philosophy
of
music
and
the
other
with
elementary
acoustics.
Part
two
deals
with
the
craft
(sáena@¿a)
of
music,
arranged
according
to
three
arts
(fann).
The
first
art
comprises
basic
theoretical
elements
such
as
acoustics,
music
intervals,
and
melodic
and
rhythmic
modes.
Fa@ra@b^
reports
that
the
Greeks
as
well
as
the
early
writers
in
the
Middle
East
confined
their
investigation
to
this
art
alone
(al-Mu@s^q^,
ed.
K¨aœaba,
pp.
38-39;
Sawa,
1989,
p.
15).
In
contrast,
the
discussion
of
the
second
skill
is,
in
Fa@ra@b^'s
words,
his
own
innovation
(al-Mu@s^q^,
ed.
K¨aœaba,
pp.
38-39;
Sawa,
1989,
p.
15).
It
deals
at
length
with
the
description
of
common
musical
instruments
and
how
the
tone
systems
discussed
in
theory
could
be
obtained
on
them.
These
instruments
include
the
¿u@d
(lute),
the
Baghdadi
as
well
as
the
Khorasani
tÂonbu@r
(pandore),
the
mezma@r
(flute
or
reed
pipe),
the
sorna@y
(oboe),
the
raba@ba
(rebec),
the
me¿zafa
(lyre)
and
the
sáanj
(harp).
The
discussion
of
the
third
art
deals
with
musical
composition,
consonances
and
dissonances,
melodic
movements
and
rhythmic
modes
used
in
practice,
and
specific
details
regarding
vocal
and
instrumental
performance
practice,
the
relation
between
language
and
music,
classification
of
voice
types,
and
the
purpose
of
music.
Thanks
to
Fa@ra@b^'s
lucid
description
of
musical
practices,
we
can
see
how
much
has
survived
to
our
own
time
(Sawa,
1981).
The
treatise
exists
in
a
number
of
manuscripts
(Farmer,
1965,
pp.
27-28;
Sawa,
1989,
pp.
18-20;
Shiloah,
1979,
pp.
104-07),
as
well
as
in
an
Arabic
edition
(K¨aœaba)
and
a
French
translation
(D'Erlanger).
However,
more
work
is
needed
to
elucidate
the
ambiguous
and
obscure
passages
in
the
book.
Part
of
the
problem
is
inherent
in
the
subject
itself:
music
being
a
non-verbal
and
non-visual
art,
Fa@ra@b^
had
to
resort
to
many
disciplines
to
express
his
thoughts.
The
modern
reader
must
therefore
be
familiar
with
these
disciplines
in
their
10th
century
context
and
must
be
equally
aware
that
at
times
Fa@ra@b^
freely
borrows
technical
terms
from
a
discipline
and
applies
them
to
music,
distorting
their
original
meaning
in
the
process.
One
of
the
difficult
areas
in
the
Keta@b
al-mu@s@^q^
al-kab^r
is
the
treatment
of
rhythm.
The
outstanding
German
scholar
Eckhard
Neubauer
rightly
considers
the
two
chapters
on
rhythm
as
an
impenetrable
thicket
and
thinks
that
Fa@ra@b^
himself
realized,
or
perhaps
was
persuaded
by
friends,
that
a
revision
was
needed
(Neubauer,
1968-69,
pp.
196-97).
This
was
done
in
two
subsequent
treatises,
the
Keta@b
al-^qa@¿a@t
and
Keta@b
ehásáa@'
al-^qa@¿a@t
(Sawa,
1989,
pp.
20,
36-37).
The
latter
was
discovered
only
recently
(in
1951)
by
Ahmet
Ate¶
in
Manisa,
Turkey
(Sawa,
1983-84,
p.
4;
1989,
p.
20).
In
these
two
treatises
Fa@ra@b^
perfected
his
rhythmic
theory
and
rhythmic
notation
system.
He
developed
general
formulae,
which
he
named
the
basics,
and
codified
sixteen
contemporary
ornamental
techniques
which
altered
and
beautified
rhythms
and
allowed
for
an
infinite
number
of
rhythmic
variations.
Of
immense
value
are
his
notated
examples
of
rhythms
in
their
basic
and
ornamented
forms,
as
well
as
meticulous
captions
supplied
under
the
notated
examples
explaining
the
arrangement
of
the
basic
rhythmic
attacks
and
ornamental
additions.
With
this
kind
of
accuracy
the
problem
of
understanding,
deciphering,
and
transcribing
the
medieval
rhythmic
modes
was
at
last
solved
(Sawa,
1983-84;
1989,
pp.
35-71).
Additionally,
the
Keta@b
ehásáa@'al-^qa@¿a@t
is
of
great
importance
for
the
early
history
of
rhythms:
in
a
section
of
the
treatise
Fa@ra@b^
quotes
and
comments
on
the
writings
of
Esháa@q
Mawsáel^
and
Kend^
(fol.
79b-81b,
88a-89b;
Sawa,
1989,
pp.
235-36),
thus
preserving
for
us
unique
documents
from
the
3rd/9th
century.
As
mentioned
above
Fa@ra@b^
twice
revised
his
theory
of
rhythm
and
rhythmic
modes
after
he
wrote
the
Keta@b
al-mu@s^q^
al-kab^r.
Unfortunately
no
such
revision
was
made
in
the
case
of
his
work
on
the
melodic
modes,
which
to
this
day
have
resisted
decipherment.
For
this
reason,
the
focus
here
will
be
on
his
rhythmic
theory.
He
defined
rhythm
as
"the
motion
through
the
notes
within
durations
well
defined
as
to
their
length
and
proportions"
(al-Mu@s^q^,
ed.
K¨aœaba,
pp.
435-36).
He
explained
that
musical
sounds
are
produced
by
the
action
of
an
attack
(naqra)
as
in
the
striking
of
the
membrane
of
a
drum,
the
plucking
of
a
string,
the
impact
of
the
air
pushed
out
of
a
wind
instrument
or
a
singer's
throat.
The
attack
is
further
defined
as
being
timeless,
that
is,
it
carries
no
time
in
itself,
and
it
occurs
in
the
present
(a@n)
which
separates
the
past
from
the
future.
He
imagined
the
attack
as
the
striking
of
a
solid
body
by
a
very
thin
body,
the
thinner
the
better,
so
that
the
contact
is
imagined
as
a
point.
This
led
Fa@ra@b^
to
borrow
Euclid's
postulate
in
geometry:
as
a
point
has
no
length,
as
the
line
has
no
surface,
as
the
surface
has
no
volume,
the
attack
has
no
duration;
furthermore
as
a
point
is
separated
from
another
by
a
line,
as
a
line
is
separated
from
another
by
a
surface,
as
a
surface
is
separated
from
another
by
a
volume,
an
attack
is
separated
from
another
by
a
duration.
Then
he
defines
the
durations
starting
with
the
shortest
perceivable
time
as
the
standard
of
measurement,
a
concept
he
borrowed
from
Greek
music
(chronos
protos).
He
refers
to
this
shortest
time
by
the
symbol
ta,
and
double
the
shortest
time
by
the
symbol
tan,
and
double
that
by
the
symbol
tann.
By
naming
and
defining
these
durations
and
their
proportions
he
created
a
very
precise
tool
to
describe
as
well
as
define
the
rhythmic
modes
which
were
current
in
his
time
and
before
his
time.
Side
by
side
with
measured
music
built
on
rhythmic
modes,
which
is
comparable
to
poetry,
there
existed
unmeasured
types
of
music
comparable
to
speech.
In
the
latter
music
the
proportions
of
the
durations
are
not
integer
numbers.
It
is
significant
to
note
that
these
genres
of
music
still
exist
to
this
day
in
the
Middle
East:
the
unmeasured
is
comparable
to
the
Persian
a@va@z
(q.v.);
the
Arabic
mawwa@l,
laya@l^
and
taqs^m;
and
the
Turkish
gazel
and
taksim;
whereas
the
measured
is
comparable
to
the
Persian
tasán^f,
the
Arabic
mowaœœahÂ
and
the
Turkish
pe¶rev
and
semaî.
Fa@ra@b^'s
work
is
of
interest
to
musicologists
doing
research
on
Ancient
Greece
or
medieval
Europe,
but
for
the
history
of
music
in
the
Middle
East
it
is
absolutely
crucial.
His
terminology,
concepts,
and
methodological
approach
have
had
a
lasting
impact
on
later
music
theorists,
be
they
Arab,
Persian,
or
Turkish.
Furthermore,
because
of
strong
continuity
in
the
musical
traditions
of
the
Middle
East
from
the
medieval
to
the
modern
era,
Fa@ra@b^'s
writings
continue
to
offer
useful
models
for
music
analysis
in
the
region
today.
Bibliography
(for
cited
works
not
given
in
detail,
see
"Short
References"):
Works
by
Fa@ra@b^.
Keta@b
ehásáa@÷
al-^qa@¿a@t,
in
MS
Manisa,
Turkey,
Genel
Kütüphanesi,
no.
1705,
fol.
59-90a.
Keta@b
al-^qa@¿a@t,
in
MS
Istanbul,
Topkapé
Sarayé
Kütüphanesi,
Ahmet
III,
no.
1878,
fol.
160b-167a.
Keta@b
al-mu@s^q^
al-kab^r,
MSS
Istanbul,
Süleymaniye
Kütüphanesi,
Ragép
Pa¶a,
no.
876;
Köprülü,
no.
953;
MS
Leiden,
Universitätsbibliothek,
Or.
651;
MS
Madrid,
Bibliotheca
Nacional,
Res.
241;
MS
Milan,
Biblioteca
Ambrosiana,
no.
289;
MS
Princeton,
N.J.,
University
Library,
Garrett
1984;
ed.
GÚatÂtÂa@s
¿Abd-al-Malek
K¨aœaba
(with
revisions
and
introduction
by
M.
A.
Hefn^),
Cairo,
1967;
tr.
R.
d'Erlanger
as
Grand
traite‚
de
la
musique:
Kita@bu'
l-Mu@s^q^
al-Kab^r,
La
Musique
arabe,
2
vols.,
Paris,
1930-35.
Other
sources
and
studies.
Abu'l-H®asan
¿Al^
b.
Zayd
Bayhaq^,
Tatemmat
S®ewa@n
al-háekma,
ed.
M.
Kord
¿Ali
as
Ta÷r^kò
háokama@÷
al-Esla@m,
Damascus
1946;
repr.
Damascus,
1976.
M.-T.
Da@neœpa‘u@h,
Moda@wamat
dar
osáu@l-e
mu@s^q^-e
Èra@n,
Tehran,
2535=1355
ˆ./1976,
pp.
54-62
(with
further
bibliographical
information).
H.
G.
Farmer,
ed.,
Al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Arabic-Latin
Writings
on
Music,
Glasgow,
1934.
Idem,
The
Sources
of
Arabian
Music,
Leiden,
1965.
¿A.
¿A.-H®.
Madian,
"Language-Music
Relationships
in
Al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Grand
Book
of
Music,"
Ph.D.
diss.,
Cornell
University,
1992.
E.
Neubauer,
"Die
Theorie
von
Èqa@¿
I:
Übersetzung
des
Kita@b
al-Èqa@¿a@t
von
Abu@
Nasár
al-Fa@ra@b^,"
Oriens
21-22,
1968-69,
pp.
196-232.
Idem,
"Die
Theorie
von
Èqa@¿
II:
Übersetzung
des
Kita@b
Ihásáa@'
al-Èqa@¿a@t
von
Abu@
Nasár
al-Fa@ra@b^,"
Oriens
34,
1994,
pp.
103-73.
G.
D.
Sawa,
"Al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Theory
of
the
Èqa@¿:
An
Empirically
Derived
Medieval
Model
of
Rhythmic
Analysis,"
Progress
Reports
in
Ethnomusicology,
11/9,
1983-84,
pp.
1-32.
Idem,
Music
Performance
Practice
in
the
Early
¿Abba@sid
Era
132
A.H./750
A.D.-320
A.H./932
A.D.,
Toronto,
1989.
Idem,
"Paradigms
in
al-Fa@ra@b^'s
Musical
Writings,"
in
N.
van
Deusen
and
A.
E.
Ford,
eds.,
Paradigms
in
Medieval
Thought:
Applications
in
Medieval
Disciplines,
Lewiston,
N.
Y.,
1990,
pp.
81-92.
Idem,
"The
Survival
of
Some
Aspects
of
Medieval
Arabic
Performance
Practice,"
Ethnomusicology,
25/1,
1981,
pp.
73-86.
A.
Shiloah,
The
Theory
of
Music
in
Arabic
Writings
(c.
900-1900):
Descriptive
Catalogue
of
Manuscripts
in
Libraries
of
Europe
and
the
U.S.A.,
Munich,
1979.
(George
Sawa)
vi.
POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY
The
central
theme
of
Fa@ra@b^'s
political
writings
is
the
virtuous
regime,
the
political
order
whose
guiding
principle
is
the
realization
of
human
excellence
by
virtue.
Fa@ra@b^
conceives
of
human
or
political
science
as
the
inquiry
into
man
insofar
as
he
is
distinguished
from
other
natural
beings
and
from
divine
beings,
seeking
to
understand
his
specific
nature,
what
constitutes
his
perfection,
and
the
way
through
which
he
can
attain
it.
Unlike
other
animals,
man
is
not
rendered
perfect
merely
through
the
natural
principles
present
in
him,
and
unlike
divine
beings
he
is
not
eternally
perfect
but
needs
to
achieve
his
perfection
through
the
activity
proceeding
from
rational
understanding,
deliberation,
and
choosing
among
the
various
alternatives
suggested
to
him
by
reason.
The
initial
presence
of
the
power
of
rational
knowledge
and
of
the
choice
connected
with
it,
is
man's
first
or
natural
perfection,
the
perfection
he
is
born
with
and
does
not
choose.
Beyond
this,
reason
and
choice
are
present
in
a
human
being
to
use
for
realizing
his
end
or
the
ultimate
perfection
possible
for
his
nature.
This
ultimate
perfection
is
identical
with
the
supreme
happiness
available
to
him.
"Happiness
is
the
good
desired
for
itself,
it
is
never
desired
to
achieve
by
it
something
else,
and
there
is
nothing
greater
beyond
it
that
a
human
being
can
achieve"
(Maba@de÷,
ed.
Dieterici,
p.
46:
cf.
Keta@b
al-s^a@sa,
pp.
72-75,
78).
Yet,
happiness
cannot
be
achieved
without
first
being
known,
and
without
performing
certain
orderly
(bodily
and
intellectual)
activities
useful
or
leading
to
the
achievement
of
perfection.
These
are
the
noble
activities.
The
distinction
between
noble
and
base
activities
is
thus
guided
by
the
distinction
between
what
is
useful
for,
and
what
obstructs,
perfection
and
happiness.
To
perform
an
activity
well,
with
ease,
and
in
an
orderly
fashion
requires
the
formation
of
character
and
the
development
of
habits
that
make
such
activities
possible.
"The
forms
and
states
of
character
from
which
these
[noble]
activities
emanate
are
the
virtues;
they
are
not
goods
for
their
own
sake
but
goods
only
for
the
sake
of
happiness"
(Maba@de÷,
ed.
Dieterici,
p.
46;
cf.
Keta@b
al-s^a@sa,
pp.
43-44).
The
distinction
between
virtue
and
vice
presupposes
knowledge
of
what
human
perfection
or
happiness
is
as
well
as
the
distinction
between
noble
and
base
activities.
The
virtuous
regime
can
be
defined
as
the
regime
in
which
human
beings
come
together
and
cooperate
with
the
aim
of
becoming
virtuous,
performing
noble
activities,
and
attaining
happiness.
It
is
distinguished
by
the
presence
in
it
of
knowledge
of
man's
ultimate
perfection;
the
distinction
between
the
noble
and
the
base
and
between
the
virtues
and
the
vices;
and
the
concerted
efforts
of
the
rules
and
the
citizens
to
each
and
learn
these
things,
and
to
develop
the
virtuous
forms
or
states
of
character
from
which
emerge
the
noble
activities
useful
for
achieving
happiness.
The
attainment
of
happiness
means
the
perfection
of
that
power
of
the
human
soul
that
is
specific
to
man,
of
his
reason.
This
in
turn
requires
disciplining
the
lower
desires
to
cooperate
with
and
aid
reason
to
perform
its
proper
activity
and
also
acquiring
the
highest
arts
and
sciences.
Such
discipline
and
learning
can
be
accomplished
only
by
the
rare
few
who
possess
the
best
natural
endowments
and
who
are
also
fortunate
to
live
under
conditions
in
which
the
requisite
virtues
can
be
developed
and
noble
activities
performed.
The
rest
of
men
can
only
attain
some
degree
of
this
perfection;
and
the
extent
to
which
they
can
attain
that
degree
of
perfection
of
which
they
are
capable
is
decisively
influenced
by
the
kind
of
political
regime
in
which
they
live
and
the
education
they
receive.
Nevertheless,
all
the
citizens
of
the
virtuous
regime
must
have
some
common
notions
about
the
world,
man,
and
political
life.
But
they
will
differ
with
regard
to
the
character
of
this
knowledge,
and
hence,
with
regard
to
their
share
of
perfection
or
happiness.
They
can
be
divided
broadly
into
the
following
three
classes:
(1)
the
wise
or
the
philosophers
who
know
the
nature
of
things
by
means
of
demonstrative
proofs
and
by
their
own
insights;
(2)
the
followers
of
these
who
know
the
nature
of
things
by
means
of
the
demonstrations
presented
by
the
philosophers,
and
who
trust
the
insight
and
accept
the
judgment
of
the
philosophers;
(3)
the
rest
of
the
citizens,
the
many,
who
know
things
by
means
of
similitudes,
some
more
and
others
less
adequate,
depending
on
their
rank
as
citizens.
These
classes
or
ranks
must
be
ordered
by
the
ruler
who
should
also
organize
the
education
of
the
citizens,
assign
to
them
their
specialized
duties,
give
them
their
laws,
and
command
them
in
war.
He
is
to
seek,
by
persuasion
and
compulsion,
to
develop
in
each
the
virtues
of
which
he
is
capable
and
to
order
the
citizens
hierarchically
so
that
each
class
can
attain
the
perfection
of
which
it
is
capable
and
yet
serve
the
class
above
it.
It
is
in
this
manner
that
the
city
becomes
a
whole
similar
to
the
cosmos,
and
its
members
cooperate
toward
attaining
happiness.
The
virtuous
regime
is
a
non-hereditary
monarchical
or
an
aristocratic
regime
in
which
the
best
rule,
with
the
rest
of
the
citizens
divided
into
groups
that
(depending
on
their
rank)
are
ruled
and
in
turn
rule—until
one
arrives
at
the
lowest
group
that
is
ruled
only.
The
sole
criterion
for
the
rank
of
a
citizen
is
the
character
of
the
virtue
of
which
he
is
capable
and
that
he
is
able
to
develop
through
his
participation
in
the
regime
and
obedience
to
its
laws.
Like
the
regime
itself,
its
citizens
are
virtuous,
first,
because
they
possess,
or
follow
those
who
possess,
correct
similitudes
of
the
knowledge
of
divine
and
natural
beings,
human
perfection
or
happiness,
and
the
principles
of
the
regime
designed
to
help
human
beings
attain
this
happiness;
and,
second,
because
they
act
in
accordance
with
this
knowledge
in
that
their
character
is
formed
with
a
view
to
performing
the
activities
conducive
to
happiness.
Once
the
main
features
of
the
virtuous
regime
are
clarified,
the
understanding
of
the
main
features
and
the
classification
of
all
other
regimes
become
relatively
simple.
Fa@ra@b^
divides
them
into
three
broad
types:
(1)
The
regimes
whose
citizens
have
had
no
occasion
to
acquire
any
knowledge
at
all
about
divine
and
natural
beings
or
about
perfection
and
happiness.
These
are
the
"ignorant"
regimes.
Their
citizens
pursue
lower
ends,
good
or
bad,
in
complete
oblivion
of
true
happiness.
(2)
The
regimes
whose
citizens
possess
the
knowledge
of
these
things
but
do
not
act
according
to
their
requirements.
These
are
the
"wicked"
or
"immoral"
regimes.
Their
citizens
have
the
same
views
as
those
of
the
virtuous
regime;
yet,
their
desires
do
not
serve
the
rational
part
in
them
but
turn
them
away
to
pursue
the
lower
ends
pursued
in
ignorant
regimes.
(3)
The
regimes
whose
citizens
have
acquired
certain
opinions
about
these
things,
but
false
or
corrupt
opinions,
that
is,
opinions
that
claim
to
be
about
divine
and
natural
beings
and
about
true
happiness,
while
in
fact
they
are
not.
The
similitudes
presented
to
such
citizens
are,
consequently,
false
and
corrupt,
and
so
also
are
the
activities
prescribed
for
them.
These
are
the
regimes
that
have
been
led
astray
or
the
erring
regimes.
The
citizens
of
such
regimes
do
not
possess
true
knowledge
or
correct
similitudes,
and
they,
too,
pursue
the
lower
ends
of
the
ignorant
regimes.
The
regimes
in
error
may
have
been
founded
as
such.
This
is
the
case
with
the
regimes
"whose
supreme
ruler
was
one
who
was
under
an
illusion
that
he
was
receiving
revelations
without
having
done
so,
and
with
regard
to
which
he
had
employed
misrepresentations,
deceptions,
and
delusions"
(Maba@de÷,
ed.
Dieterici,
p.
63;
cf.
Keta@b
al-s^a@sa,
pp.
103-4).
But
they
may
also
have
been
originally
virtuous
regimes
that
had
been
changed
through
the
introduction
of
false
or
corrupt
views
and
practices.
All
these
types
of
regimes
are
opposed
to
the
virtuous
regimes
because
they
lack
its
guiding
principle,
which
is
true
knowledge
and
virtue
or
the
formation
of
character
leading
to
activities
conducive
to
true
happiness.
Instead,
the
character
of
the
citizens
is
formed
with
a
view
to
attaining
one
or
more
of
the
lower
ends.
These
ends
are
given
by
Fa@ra@b^
as
six,
and
each
of
the
general
types
mentioned
above
can
be
subdivided
according
to
the
end
that
dominates
in
it:
(1)
the
regime
of
necessity
(or
the
indispensable
regime)
in
which
the
aim
of
the
citizens
is
confined
to
the
bare
necessities
of
life;
(2)
the
vile
regime
(oligarchy)
in
which
the
ultimate
aim
of
the
citizens
is
wealth
and
prosperity
for
their
own
sakes;
(3)
the
base
regime
is
the
purpose
of
whose
citizens
is
the
enjoyment
of
the
sensory
or
imaginary
pleasures;
(4)
the
regime
of
honor
(timocracy)
whose
citizens
aim
at
being
honored,
praised,
and
glorified
by
others;
(5)
the
regime
of
domination
(tyranny)
whose
citizens
aim
at
overpowering
and
subjecting
others;
(6)
the
regime
of
corporate
association
(democracy)
the
main
purpose
of
whose
citizens
is
being
free
to
do
what
they
wish.
PHILOSOPHER-KING
AND
PROPHET-LEGISLATOR
To
combine
divine
and
political
science
is
to
emphasize
the
political
importance
of
sound
beliefs
about
divine
beings
and
the
principles
of
the
world.
Both
Islam
and
classical
philosophy
are
in
agreement
concerning
this
issue.
Muslims
believed
that
the
primary
justification
of
their
existence
as
a
distinct
community
was
the
revelation
of
the
truth
about
divine
things
to
Moháammad,
and
that,
had
he
not
come
to
them
with
his
message,
they
would
have
continued
to
live
in
misery
and
uncertainty
about
their
well-being
in
this
world
and
the
next.
It
was
also
because
of
such
considerations
that
Plato
thought
that
kings
must
become
philosophers
or
philosopher-kings.
Once
the
quest
for
the
best
regime
arrives
at
the
necessity
of
combining
divine
and
political
science,
it
becomes
necessary
that
the
ruler
should
combine
the
craft
of
ruling
with
that
of
prophecy
or
philosophy.
The
ruler-prophet
or
the
ruler-philosopher
is
the
human
being
who
offers
the
solution
to
the
question
of
the
realization
of
the
best
regime,
and
the
functions
of
the
ruler-prophet
and
of
the
ruler-philosopher
appear
in
this
respect
to
be
identical.
Fa@ra@b^
begins
his
discussion
of
the
supreme
ruler
with
the
emphasis
on
the
common
function
of
the
ruler-philosopher
and
the
ruler-prophet
as
rulers
who
are
the
link
between
the
divine
beings
above
and
the
citizens
who
do
not
have
direct
access
to
knowledge
of
these
beings.
He
is
the
teacher
and
guide
"who
makes
known"
to
the
citizens
what
happiness
is,
who
"arouses
in
them
the
determination"
to
do
things
necessary
for
attaining
it,
and
"who
does
not
need
to
be
ruled
by
a
human
in
anything
at
all"
(Keta@b
al-s^a@sa,
pp.
78-79).
He
must
possess
knowledge;
not
need
any
other
human
to
guide
him;
have
excellent
comprehension
of
everything
that
must
be
done;
be
excellent
in
guiding
all
others
in
what
he
knows;
have
the
ability
to
make
others
perform
the
functions
for
which
they
are
fit;
and
have
the
ability
to
determine
and
define
the
work
to
be
done
by
others
and
to
direct
such
work
toward
happiness.
These
qualities
evidently
require
the
best
endowments,
but
also
the
fullest
development
of
the
rational
faculty.
(According
to
Aristotelian
psychology
as
Fa@ra@b^
presents
it
in
his
political
works
the
perfection
of
the
rational
faculty
consists
of
its
correspondence
to,
or
"contact"
with,
the
Active
Intellect;
see
¿AQL.)
The
supreme
ruler
must
be
a
human
being
who
actualizes
his
rational
faculty
or
who
is
in
contact
with
the
Active
Intellect.
This
supreme
ruler
is
the
source
of
all
power
and
knowledge
in
the
regime,
and
it
is
through
him
that
the
citizens
learn
what
they
ought
to
know
and
to
do.
As
God
or
the
First
Cause
of
the
world
directs
everything
else,
and
as
everything
else
is
directed
toward
Him,
"the
case
ought
to
be
the
same
in
the
virtuous
city;
in
an
orderly
fashion,
all
of
its
parts
ought
to
follow
in
their
activities
in
the
footsteps
of
the
purpose
of
its
supreme
ruler
(Maba@de÷,
ed.
Dieterici,
pp.
56-57;
cf.
Keta@b
al-s^a@sa,
pp.
83-84).
He
possesses
unlimited
powers
and
cannot
be
subjected
to
any
human
being
or
political
regime
or
laws.
He
has
the
power
to
confirm
or
abrogate
previous
divine
laws,
to
enact
new
ones,
and
"to
change
a
law
he
had
legislated
at
one
time
for
another
if
he
deems
it
better
to
do
so"
(Keta@b
al-s^a@sa,
pp.
80-81).
He
alone
has
the
power
to
order
the
classes
of
people
in
the
regime
and
assign
in
them
their
ranks.
And
it
is
he
who
offers
them
what
they
need
to
know.
For
most
people,
this
knowledge
has
to
take
the
form
of
an
imaginative
representation
of
the
truth
rather
than
a
rational
conception
of
it.
This
is
because
most
people
are
not
endowed,
or
cannot
be
trained
to
know
divine
things
in
themselves,
but
can
only
understand
their
imitations,
which
should
be
made
to
fit
their
power
of
understanding
and
their
special
conditions
and
experience
as
members
of
a
particular
regime.
Religion
contains
such
a
set
of
imaginative
representations.
The
divine
law
is
legislated
for
a
particular
group
of
human
beings.
It
is
necessitated
by
the
incapacity
of
most
human
beings
to
conceive
things,
especially
the
highest
or
divine
things,
rationally.
Still,
they
need
to
know
these
things
in
some
fashion.
They
need
to
believe
in
the
imitations
of
divine
beings,
and
of
happiness
and
perfection,
as
presented
to
them
by
the
founder
of
their
regime.
The
founder
must
then
not
only
present
a
rational
or
conceptual
account
of
happiness
and
the
divine
principles
to
the
few,
but
also
adequately
represent
or
imitate
these
same
things
for
the
many.
All
the
citizens
are
to
accept
that
with
which
he
entrusts
them:
"the
ones
who
follow
after
happiness
as
they
cognize
it
and
accept
the
[divine]
principles
as
they
cognize
them
are
the
wise
human
beings;
and
the
ones
in
whose
souls
these
things
are
found
in
the
form
of
images,
and
who
accept
them
and
follow
them
as
such,
are
the
believers"
(Keta@b
al-s^a@sa,
p.
86).
Thus
far,
Fa@ra@b^
identifies
the
ruler-prophet
and
the
ruler-philosopher.
They
are
both
supreme
rulers
absolutely,
and
both
have
absolute
authority
with
regard
to
legislating
beliefs
and
actions.
Both
acquire
this
authority
in
virtue
of
the
perfection
of
their
rational
faculty,
and
both
receive
revelation
from
God
through
the
agency
of
the
active
intellect.
Wherein,
then,
does
the
ruler-prophet
differ
from
the
ruler-philosopher?
The
first
and
primary
qualification
that
the
ruler
of
the
virtuous
regime
must
possess
is
a
special
kind
of
knowledge
of
divine
and
human
beings.
Now,
a
human
being
possess
three
faculties
for
knowledge:
sensation,
imagination,
and
reason
(both
theoretical
and
practical),
and
these
develop
in
him
in
that
order.
Imagination
has
three
functions:
(1)
It
acts
as
a
reservoir
of
sensible
impressions
after
the
disappearance
of
the
objects
of
sensation.
(2)
It
combines
sensible
impressions
to
form
a
complex
sensible
image.
(3)
It
produces
imitations.
It
has
the
capacity
to
imitate
all
sensible
things
(human
desires,
temperament,
passions)
through
sensible
impressions
or
certain
combinations
of
them.
When
later
the
rational
faculty
develops,
and
a
human
being
begins
to
grasp
the
character,
essence,
or
form
of
natural
and
divine
beings,
the
faculty
of
imagination
receives
and
imitates
these
rational
forms
also,
that
is,
it
represents
them
in
the
form
of
sensible
impressions.
In
this
respect,
imagination
is
subordinate
to
the
rational
faculty
and
depends
on
it
for
the
"originals"
that
it
imitates;
it
has
no
direct
access
to
the
essence
of
natural
and
divine
beings.
Further,
the
imitations
that
it
fabricates
are
not
all
good
copies;
some
may
be
more
true
and
nearer
to
the
originals,
others
defective
in
some
respects,
and
still
others
extremely
false
or
misleading
copies.
Finally,
only
the
rational
faculty
that
grasps
the
originals
themselves
can
judge
the
degree
of
the
truth
of
these
copies
and
of
their
likenesses
to
the
originals.
The
rational
faculty
is
the
only
faculty
that
has
access
to
the
knowledge
of
divine
or
spiritual
beings,
and
it
must
exercise
strict
control
to
insure
that
the
copies
offered
by
the
imaginative
faculty
are
good
or
fair
imitations.
It
may
happen
in
rare
cases
that
this
imaginative
faculty
is
so
powerful
and
perfect
that
it
overwhelms
all
the
other
faculties,
and
proceeds
directly
to
receive
or
form
images
of
divine
beings.
This
rare
case
is
the
case
of
prophecy
(Maba@de÷,
ed.
Dieterici,
p.
52).
The
description
of
the
nature
of
prophecy
leads
to
the
distinction
between
the
faculty
of
imagination
and
the
rational
faculty.
It
explains
the
possibility
of
prophecy
as
the
perfection
of
the
faculty
of
imagination,
and
that
imagination
can
almost
dispense
with
the
rational
faculty
and
receive
the
images
of
divine
beings
directly
and
without
the
latter's
mediation.
There
are
two
powers
by
means
of
which
a
human
being
can
communicate
with
the
Active
Intellect:
his
imagination
and
his
rational
faculty
or
his
intellect.
When
he
communicates
with
it
by
means
of
his
imagination,
he
is
"a
prophet
who
warns
about
what
will
happen
and
who
informs
about
what
is
taking
place
now";
while
when
he
communicates
with
it
by
means
of
his
rational
faculty
he
is
"a
wise
human
being,
a
philosopher,
and
has
complete
intelligence"
(Maba@de÷,
ed.
Dieterici,
pp.
58-59).
LAW
AND
LIVING
WISDOM
Wisdom
or
philosophy
is
an
indispensable
condition
for
the
founding
and
survival
of
the
virtuous
city.
Prophecy,
on
the
other
hand,
is
indispensable
for
founding
a
virtuous
city,
but
not
for
its
survival.
In
enumerating
the
qualities
of
the
supreme
ruler
or
the
founder
of
the
virtuous
city,
Fa@ra@b^
stipulates
the
coincidence
of
excellent
rational
and
prophetic
faculties.
This
requirement
is
imposed
by
composition
of
the
virtuous
city
as
a
political
community,
that
is,
the
fact
that
it
must
be
made
up
of
two
broad
groups:
(1)
the
few
who
are
philosophers
or
can
be
addressed
through
philosophy,
and
who
can
be
taught
the
theoretical
sciences
and
hence
the
true
character
of
divine
and
natural
beings
as
they
are;
(2)
the
many
who
(because
they
lack
the
necessary
natural
endowments
or
have
no
time
for
sufficient
training)
are
not
philosophers,
who
live
by
opinion
and
persuasion,
and
for
whom
the
ruler
must
imitate
these
beings
by
means
of
similitudes
or
symbols.)
While
the
few
can
be
made
to
grasp
rationally
the
meaning
of
human
happiness
and
perfection
and
the
rational
basis
for
justification
of
the
virtuous
activities
that
lead
to
a
human
being's
ultimate
end,
the
many
are
incapable
of
such
understanding
and
have
to
be
taught
to
perform
these
activities
by
persuasion
and
compulsion,
that
is,
by
explanations
that
could
be
understood
by
all
the
citizens
regardless
of
their
rational
capacity,
and
by
prescribed
rewards
and
punishments
of
an
immediate
tangible
kind.
The
supreme
ruler
teaches
the
few
in
his
capacity
as
a
philosopher,
and
he
presents
similitudes
and
prescribes
rewards
and
punishments
for
the
many
in
his
capacity
as
prophet.
To
be
believed
and
practiced
by
the
many,
these
similitudes
and
prescriptions
should
be
formulated
by
the
prophet,
and
accepted
by
the
citizens,
as
true,
fixed,
and
permanent;
that
is,
the
citizens
should
expect
definite
rewards
and
punishments
for
belief
and
unbelief,
and
for
obedience
and
disobedience.
The
prophetic
faculty
culminates,
then,
in
laying
down
laws
concerning
both
the
beliefs
and
the
practices
of
the
many,
and
the
prophet
who
assumes
this
function
becomes
a
prophet-legislator.
The
rational
faculty,
on
contrast,
culminates
in
teaching
the
theoretical
sciences
to
the
few.
In
his
summary
of
Plato's
Laws,
Fa@ra@b^
also
understood
Plato
to
say
that
these
virtuous
few
"have
no
need
for
fixed
practices
and
laws
at
all;
nevertheless
they
are
very
happy.
Laws
and
fixed
practices
are
needed
only
for
those
who
are
morally
crooked"
(Talkò^sá,
p.
41).
It
is
only
as
viewed
by
the
subjects
that
laws
are
fixed
and
are
of
unquestionable
divine
authority.
The
supreme
rule
of
the
virtuous
regime
is
the
master
and
not
the
servant
of
the
law.
Not
only
is
he
not
ruled
by
any
human
being,
he
is
also
not
ruled
by
the
law.
He
is
the
cause
of
the
law,
he
creates
it,
and
he
abrogates
and
changes
it
as
he
sees
fit.
He
possesses
this
authority
because
of
his
wisdom
and
his
capacity
to
decide
what
is
best
for
the
common
good
under
given
conditions,
and
conditions
can
arise
under
which
the
changing
of
the
laws
is
not
only
salutary
but
indispensable
for
the
survival
of
the
virtuous
regime.
In
so
doing
he
must
be
extremely
cautious
not
to
disturb
the
faith
of
the
citizens
in
their
laws,
and
should
consider
the
adverse
effect
that
change
has
on
attachment
to
the
law.
He
must
make
a
careful
appraisal
of
the
advantage
of
changing
the
law
as
against
the
disadvantage
of
change
as
such.
Thus
he
must
possess,
not
only
the
authority
to
change
the
laws
whenever
necessary,
but
also
the
craft
of
minimizing
the
danger
of
change
to
the
well-being
of
the
regime.
But
once
he
sees
that
changing
the
law
is
necessary
and
takes
the
proper
precautions,
there
is
no
question
as
to
his
authority
to
change
the
law.
Therefore,
so
long
as
he
lives,
the
rational
faculty
rules
supreme
and
laws
are
preserved
or
changed
in
the
light
of
his
judgment
as
philosopher.
It
is
this
coincidence
of
philosophy
and
prophecy
in
the
person
of
the
ruler,
or
at
least
the
coincidence
of
philosophy
and
rulership,
that
insures
the
survival
of
the
virtuous
regime.
As
long
as
rulers
who
possess
such
qualities
succeed
one
another
without
interruptions,
the
same
situation
obtains
(Keta@b
al-mella,
pp.
49-50).
The
coincidence
of
philosophy
and
prophecy
is
extremely
rare,
and
chance
may
not
even
favor
the
virtuous
regime
with
the
availability
of
a
human
being
who
possesses
all
the
necessary
natural
endowments
and
whose
training
as
philosopher
proves
successful.
Thus
the
question
arises
as
to
whether
the
virtuous
city
can
survive
in
the
absence
of
a
human
being
with
all
the
qualifications
required
of
the
prophet-philosopher-ruler
or
of
the
philosopher-ruler.
Granting
that
the
best
possible
arrangement
demands
the
existence
of
such
qualifications
in
one
person
who
must
rule,
can
the
regime
originated
by
the
prophet-philosopher-ruler
survive
at
all
in
his
absence
and
in
the
absence
of
a
philosopher-ruler
as
his
successor?
Fa@ra@b^
is
willing
in
the
Maba@de÷
to
consider
the
possibility
that
this
city
can
survive
in
the
absence
of
both
such
rulers,
but
only
if
provisions
are
made
for
the
presence
of
proper
substitutes
for
prophetic
legislation.
These
substitutes
consist
of
(1)
the
body
of
laws
and
customs
established
by
the
"true
princes,"
and
(2)
a
combination
of
new
qualities
in
the
ruler
that
make
him
proficient
in
the
"art
of
jurisprudence,"
that
is,
knowledge
of
the
laws
and
customs
of
his
predecessors,
willingness
on
his
part
to
follow
these
laws
and
customs
rather
than
change
them,
the
capacity
to
apply
them
to
new
conditions
by
the
deductions
of
new
decisions
from,
or
the
discovery
of
new
applications
for,
established
laws
and
customs,
and
the
capacity
to
meet
every
new
situation
(for
which
no
specific
decisions
are
available)
through
understanding
the
intention
of
previous
legislators
rather
than
by
the
legislation
of
new
laws
or
by
any
formal
change
of
old
ones.
So
far
as
the
law
is
concerned,
this
new
ruler
is
a
jurist-legislator
rather
than
a
prophet-legislator.
He
must,
however,
possess
all
other
qualities,
including
wisdom,
that
enable
him
to
discern
and
promote
the
common
good
of
his
regime
at
the
particular
period
during
which
he
rules.
In
the
event
that
no
single
human
being
should
exist
who
possesses
all
these
qualifications,
then
Fa@ra@b^
suggests
a
third
possibility:
a
wise
man
and
one
other
human
being
(who
possesses
the
rest
of
the
qualities,
except
wisdom)
should
rule
jointly.
Were
even
this
to
prove
unobtainable,
he
suggests
finally
a
joint
rule
of
a
number
of
human
beings
possessing
these
qualifications
severally.
This
joint
rule
does
not,
however,
affect
the
presence
of
the
required
qualifications
but
only
their
presence
in
the
same
human
being.
Thus,
the
only
qualification
whose
very
presence
may
be
dispensed
with
is
prophecy.
The
substitutes
for
prophecy
are
the
preservation
of
old
laws
and
the
capacity
to
discover
new
applications
for
old
laws.
To
promote
the
common
good
and
preserve
the
regime
under
new
conditions
as
these
emerge,
neither
the
coincidence
of
philosophy
and
prophecy
in
the
same
human
being,
nor
the
coincidence
of
wisdom
and
jurisprudence,
proves
to
be
an
indispensable
condition.
It
is
sufficient
to
have
wisdom
in
the
person
of
a
philosopher
who
rules
jointly
with
another
human
being
or
a
group
of
human
beings
who
possess,
among
other
things,
the
capacity
to
put
old
laws
to
new
uses.
Unlike
prophecy,
wisdom
cannot
be
dispense
with,
and
nothing
can
take
its
place.
Unlike
the
presence
of
prophecy,
the
absence
of
wisdom
is
fatal
to
the
existence
of
the
virtuous
regime.
There
is
no
substitute
for
living
wisdom.
Bibliography:
Works
by
Fa@ra@b^.
Keta@b
al-mella,
ed.
M.
Mahdi
as
Alfarabi's
Book
of
Religion
and
Related
Texts
(Keta@b
al-mella
wa
nosáu@sá
okòra@),
Beirut,
1968.
Keta@b
al-s^a@sa
al-madan^ya,
ed.
F.
Najjar
as
Al-Farabi's
The
Political
Regime
(al-Siya@sa
al-Madaniya
Also
Known
as
the
Treatise
on
the
Principles
of
Beings),
Beirut,
1964;
part.
tr.
by
F.
Najjar
in
R.
Lerner
and
M.
Mahdi,
Medieval
Political
Philosophy:
A
Sourcebook,
New
York,
1963.
Maba@de÷
a@ra@÷
ahl
al-mad^na
al-fa@zµela,
ed.
F.
Dieterici,
Leiden,
1895;
ed.
and
tr.
R.
Walzer
as
Al-Farabi
on
the
Perfect
State,
Oxford,
1985.
Talkò^sá
nawa@m^s
Afla@tÂon,
ed.
F.
Gabrieli
as
Alfarabius
Compendium
Legum
Platonis,
London,
1952.
For
further
discussion
and
extensive
bibliography,
see
M.
Galston,
Politics
and
Excellence:
The
Political
Philosophy
of
Alfarabi,
Princeton,
1990.
(Muhsin
Mahdi)
|