PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY IN ARABIC AND PERSIAN

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PREFACE

This study grew out of the Woodward lecture which the author
delivered before the Oriental Society of Yale University on January
13th 1962. It purports to give an outline of the manner in which
philosophical terminology was created in Arabic and Persian. In
that respect it breaks fresh ground though it is by no means a
comprehensive review of the field. Much remains to be done along
that line.

Although addressed primarily to the western reader, it is hoped
that the discussion will prove instructive to Arabs and Persians
bent upon the development of their respective languages. They
have before them the task of forging an instrument sufficiently
precise and at the same time adaptable to express the intricacies of
modern thought. This attempt at analysis raises far more problems
than might appear at first sight. For them no solutions have been
suggested, no principles have been laid down. Yet by noting the
measure of success and the points of failure in the past something
could be learnt for the future.

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INTRODUCTION

The creation of philosophical language and terminology was an important development in the history of Arabic. A review of the manner in which it took shape can be of guidance to those who are committed to its modernization. And the measure of success accomplished in that field helps to demonstrate its resources as well as limitations.

The study of Islamic philosophy which dates in the West from the eighteenth century, gained increasing attention towards the middle of the nineteenth. Modern scholarship had taken it up where the men of the Middle Ages had left it. At present in both the Orient and the Occident it is the subject of intensive research. Despite the monumental work of Assemani on the Syriac texts, the early tendency was to write general histories. In the quest after the genesis of European thought and its development, Western authors were led back to the Scholastics and Christian philosophy in medieval times. It was soon found that these were much indebted to Latin translations of Arabic books and commentaries on the works of Plato and Aristotle. They reflected at the same time the Neoplatonic synthesis elaborately constructed in the Hellenistic age. Gradually the importance of the original texts was realised. A number of scholars took to editing some of them. Finally they were compelled to go still farther back and seek the direct translations from Greek and Syriac into Arabic; since the treatises of the various Arab, Turkish and Persian philosophers were all based upon them.

Among the first to undertake such tasks was Zenker with his edition of the Arabic translation of the Aristotelian Categories. He was followed some forty years later by Margoliouth who edited the Arabic version of the Poetics. Yet neither of them noted the importance of the terms as such, and their correspondence with

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1 Cf. Bibliotheca orientalica Clementino-Vaticana, Roma, Vol. I. (1710) deals with Orthodox authors. Vol. 2. (1721) deals with Monophysite authors. Vol. 3. (1725) and (1728) deals with the Nestorian authors.
2 Cf. the works of Schmolder, Usterici, Bronnie, Mehran, Forget, etc.
3 Categorias cum versione Arabica... Lipsiae. 1846.
4 Analytica Orientalis ad Poeticam Aristotelicum. Londini. 1887.

APMAN, Philosophical Terminology, 1

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the Greek equivalents. No glossary was deemed necessary to their respective editions. On the other hand Hoifman who in the intervening period published the Syriac translation of the De Interpretatione 1 added a short list of the terms to the Syriac text. Not long after Asin Palacios 2 attempted a recording of Arabic philosophical and theological terminology. And Max Simon in his edition of the Arabic translation of Galen On Anatomy 3 added a glossary in Greek and German. But here a dangerous precedent was set. Inasmuch as the original Greek texts of Galen’s book are not extant, the editor chose a purely a priori method of finding the equivalents. Pohlak, however, in his edition of the Arabic translation of the De Interpretatione had both texts before him 4. He was thus in a position to add an authentic glossary in Greek, Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew and German though unfortunately it is not complete. Gonzales Palencia in his edition of the work of Abū ʿAlī al-Dului (450-529 A.H.) on logic 5 followed the a priori method of Simon and attempted a correspondence between the Arabic and Greek terms, getting himself thereby into error. And Asin Palacios in his edition of the first volume of an introduction to logic 6 by Ibn Tūnailī (d. 620/1223) dropped everything of the kind.

At about this time terminology was being stressed and studied in another field. Massignon began publishing his doctorate thesis on Ḥallāj. In his edition of al-Ṭawāṣṣil 7 he gave a short list. And after his main work on the life and teachings of Ḥallāj 8 he undertook a complimentary thesis a detailed listing of mystic terminology in general 9. Then Nicholson added a glossary to an edition of al-Sarrāj 10. Yet Taktash who devoted almost a lifetime to his edition of the Poetics in Arabic 11 with a highly instructive introduction, did not concern himself much with the terms. And those

who after his death edited the second volume of his work, overlooked the matter completely 12. Bouygues in his edition of the commentary of Averroes on the Categories 13 gave a good list of the technical terms. Unfortunately they are not exhaustive and do not bear direct references to the Greek text. Mlle Goichon following the example of Massignon devoted the second part of her doctorate thesis to a useful study of the philosophical terminology of Avicenna 14. But when in a subsequent work 15 she undertook to supply the Greek equivalents, the a priori method was carried to the extreme. With no other authority save the Index of Bonitz, she indulged in a series of guesses with results that are sometimes far from happy. She did, however, discuss in an elementary way the origin of philosophical terminology in Arabic in the course of her London lectures on Avicenna 16. Nor did Bergstrasser who published notable works on the translators in general and Ḥunain in particular devote much attention to terminology 17. In our rendering of the Poetics into Persian 18 there is a long list of the technical terms with their equivalents in Arabic, English, French and Greek, giving direct references to the text of Aristotle. Yet that is by no means complete. The list which Georr added to his edition of the Syriac and Arabic translations of the Categories 19 is not exhaustive either. Perhaps the most comprehensive glossary so far attempted is that which Ḥaddād has given to his edition of the three different translations of the Sophistics found in the Paris manuscript 20. To an early Arabic translation of a work by Galen 21 the editor has wisely refrained from adding a glossary, since the original Greek text is not available. In the first volume of the Plato Arabus series 22 there are Greek-Arabic and Arabic-Greek indices of great interest; but naturally with no direct references to the Timæus of Plato except where the correspondence seems unquestionable. In the second

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1 De Hermenaeusico apud Syras Aristotelis, Berlin, 1886.
2 Husoario de un diccionario técnico de Filosofía y Teología musulmana. Revista de Aragon, 5, 1903.
4 Die Hermeneutik in der arabischen Übersetzung... Leipzig, 1913.
comment upon it within the translation of the commentary of the learned Yuniş Photius, the Greek”. In other words the text of Aristotle, his own commentary and that of Photius are combined together. The same thing is said of his Arabic version of the Organon. It is interesting to note that he appears well acquainted with Latin Scholastic commentators of the Aristotelian corpus, quoting Thomas Aquinas frequently, and claiming to have read Averroes only in a Latin translation because the original Arabic books were not available to him. Furthermore in his introduction to Logic he produces materials which are of interest to students of the post-classical period. The dispute as to whether logic was a science or not is discussed at length. There are three schools of thought, he says. The first maintain that “the logic which is taught” (i.e. the theoretical principles) cannot be considered a science in any sense. It is simply an instrument for and a method of studying it. Applied logic on the other hand is a science; but no different from any other because it is dependent on the science with which it is combined. When applied to mathematical materials “rendering them thereby verifiable”, it becomes mathematical logic. And when incorporated with the natural sciences, it becomes the logic of the natural sciences. Thus every discipline has its own specific logic. We are told that this was the view of the early commentators of Aristotle. The second school believed that logic was an art and no more. While the third insisted that it was a science. In the opinion of Yunişawi the Latin philosophers (including Thomas Aquinas) upheld the view of the third school.

Aside from a few cases the terminology employed in these translations is derived from the Shifā of Avicenna, and has therefore nothing notable to offer. The manner of transcribing Greek proper nouns, however, is frequently different. He departs from the traditional system. The *toûr*, for instance, is transcribed with a simple *t*, instead of the *fak* which his predecessors had used from the earliest days. There is no reason to believe that the renderings of Yunişawi attracted much attention outside of Turkey. Yet he deserves to be remembered along with those early translators who helped to present Greek learning in Arabic.

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4. Cf. Kitâb al-Ṣaidanah of Bêrûnî. The libraries of Istanbul have more than one such lexicon awaiting an enterprising editor.
5. A curious volume at Aya Sofya (No. 4769) contains among other things a short glossary of the terms of logic in Arabic and Greek derived from some Stoic work. Unfortunately it is in some three folios only.
CHAPTER ONE

When Arabic philosophical writings first appeared the language had already undergone considerable development. Classical Arabic had been different from the spoken tongue from the earliest days. Among its oldest specimens are Jâhiliyah poetry composed in a literary koïd understood but not spoken by the respective tribes. Although the authenticity of these poems has been challenged on the basis that they “could never have been written before the appearance of the Qur’ân”¹, it may be assumed that a good part is genuine. The expressions are naturally of a concrete and local character depicting nomadic life. There is a marked lack of abstract terms except for such notions as love, honour, bravery, generosity and the like. Yet the vocabulary already betrays the presence of foreign words. This was the result of infiltration and due to contact with neighbouring peoples. North of them were the Arameans. It has been observed that “almost all the concepts related to civilization are expressed in Arabic by Aramean words”⁵. In the Yemeni-Persian garrisons had been stationed for long. At about the same time words of Greek origin started to percolate into Arabic, though to a decidedly less extent. The trilingual inscriptions of Syriac, Greek and Aramaic at Zabad, and a bilingual one of Greek and Arabic at Harrân⁶ are evidences of the languages prevalent in the region. The local dialect of Palmyra was intermixed with Greek. Public acts were set up in both Aramaic and Greek. The Nabateans who were Arabic in speech and Aramaic in writing, assumedly spoke Greek also. And later at the court of the Ghassânids Arabic and Greek-speaking merchants using the trade routes that passed through the kingdom associated freely.

² First by Margoulis and then by Tâhâ Hussain.
⁴ Cf. S. Fränkel, Die aramäischen Formelsprüche in arabischer. 1886.
⁶ Ibid. p. 58.
Arab sources frequently refer to the cultural influences which reached them through Hijrah. Notwithstanding these channels, the general opinion is that what Greek words entered Arabic in the early days were mostly by way of Aramaic and Syriac.

Of pre-Islamic classical prose not much is known. It has been supposed that the origin goes back to public exhortations and speeches at inter-tribal gatherings. The first and greatest work of classical prose is and will remain the Qur’an. Its intrinsic merits with an unquestioned status as the language of religious revelation, make it the supreme model and the source of profound influence on Arabic literature. The foreign words found in it aroused bitter controversy among Muslim philologists. The numerous treatises on the subject some of which are still in manuscript form prove that it continued to be a live issue. But the sober-minded rightly reached the conclusion that these terms had entered the language from pre-Islamic times and were already assimilated. A modern study devoted to a careful scrutiny of the vocabulary states that “the Greek words in the Qur’an seem nevertheless with few exceptions to have come into Arabic through Syriac”. Thus at the beginning of the Islamic era classical Arabic literature consisted of the highly parochial Jâhiliyyah poetry in addition to the textual verses of the Qur’an. But the social and political order which followed soon after, helped the development of language and literature in various fields. The exigencies of the religious life produced Qur’anic commentaries and devotional writings. The number of non-Arab Muslims who did not always speak or write Arabic correctly created the necessity for the establishment of grammar. The garrison-towns of Basrah and Kifah became twin centres of the science. Lexicography was carefully undertaken. And the cultivation of literary gifts and polished language mostly under the influence of Iranian authors) produced the art of rhetoric (al-balaghah). This well-sustained urge enriched Arabic immensely.

Fresh forces introduced important changes in style as well as vocabulary. Prose took forms as yet unknown in the language. Three different genres may be distinguished in this respect.

1. Religious Prose

This covers all forms connected with the religious life. Its Arabic is in comparison more pure. Nor has it altered much throughout the centuries. Among its best specimens are mystical writings. Under the same heading may be placed the speeches and declarations of the early leaders with their racial and religious appeal. Although these deal with matters of conquest and rule, they have more in common with religious prose than with other varieties.

2. Secular Prose

This form first appeared in the late Umayyad period. It was created by Muslims of foreign extraction and chiefly Iranians. The style was to a large extent inspired by and modelled after Sassanian literature. It differed from the religious not only in aim and object but in the manner of expression also. Its use of terms entirely unknown or rarely employed in the former genre was extremely resolute. This secular prose could be conveniently divided into three varieties:

a. Epistolary

From the Umayyad period onwards the administration of the newly-conquered empire necessitated the organization of secretarial offices known as alwânh (a word of Persian origin). The occupants were called kâthib which some have thought it to come from a non-Arabic root. These kâthib formed a small but exclusive and powerful class. Men of rare accomplishment in their days, they combined Islamic knowledge with foreign learning and culture. This was because they were often of non-Arab extraction who in places like Iran and Syria had to deal with people of a high cultural standing. The work had a permanent effect upon themselves as well as upon those they were serving. In a letter addressed to his fellow-scribes “Abd al-Hamid” who was among the earliest and

4. Istanbul libraries have many of them.
most renowned reminds his colleagues that they are placed “in the most exalted of posts”. They should consequently be “men of 

dab and manliness and knowledge”. He calls upon them to 
“emulate one another... in the varieties of dab; and study 
religion... then Arabic... then penmanship... and the recitation 
of poetry... and the accounts of the early days of the Arabs and 
Iranians and their sayings and their annals...”.

Arabic epistolary literature gradually merged with rhetoric and 
degenerated into bombast. But in its early form it was terse and 
vigorous. The sentences were short and direct; while the vocab-
ulary came to include some of the happiest terms later incorpo-
rated into philosophical prose6.

b. Court-literature

In regulating their association with the communities they now 
had to rule, and in seeking a model on which to organize their court, 
the Caliphs turned to the erstwhile Sassanians. Although they had 
conquered the empire rather easily, their opponents’ system of 
government had deeply impressed them. The secretarial class of 
hālīḥs were therefore charged to supply the necessary guides by 
translating books specifying the duties of a monarch and the proper 
procedure at court.4 Mas’ūdī claims to have personally seen a 
translation made for the Umayyad Hishām (together with other 
Persian works) of a history of the kings of Iran. They were known 
as Siyar al-Furs, or the Annals of the Iranians. The writings of Ibn 
Qutaybah abound in references to books on court-life prepared for 
the Caliphs. Jāḥiẓ strongly affirms that it was from the Iranians 
that they learnt the methods of administration.5

c. Belles-lettres

Side by side with epistolary and court-literature were compo-
sitions of purely literary merit meant more to entertain than to 
instruct. Its chief exponent, if not the actual originator, was Ibn 
-al-Muqaffa’. As a genre of dab we have the testimony of Jāḥiẓ 
that it grew directly out of Iranian literature. In style and voca-

2 Ibid. p. 225.
4 Mas’ūdī. Al-Tashāb... pp. 66, 94-95.
6 bulbary it had much in common with the epistolary, though event- 
ually it degenerated into verbiage in a similar manner.1

3. Mu’tazelite literature

The third variety may be called Mu’tazelite with a style and 
terminology which stand intermediate between the religious and 
the secular. The Mu’tazelites who were trained in theological 
language and literature employed certain philosophical terms also 
for their particular purpose. As a result their writings overlap, 
betraying the influence of both religious and secular works. Actually 
it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether a specific term origin-
ated in their circles or was merely adopted by them. A good 
example is the word ‘ayl in the precise meaning of intellect.5 Their 
works nevertheless constitute a definite genre easily distinguishable. 
Admittedly not many specimens of their writings have survived; 
and of these not all have been published.6 Yet there is enough to 
establish a claim.

1 Al-Baydan... Vol. 3, p. II.
2 Cf. Appendix II.
at Topkapi-sarayi. Reyan Kuyku. No. 2030, and also Al-Qadi’ Abd al-Jabbar 
III. No. 1872.
CHAPTER TWO

The search after the genesis of Arabic philosophical prose and terminology leads ultimately to secular literature. There were good reasons why the Translators should choose it as their model in their attempt to put Greek works into Arabic.

1. Ibn al-Muqaffa' aside, they were almost all of the Christian faith. A few came from the Sabaeans of Harrân. As members of the Aramean community they persistently maintained their traditions. And in addition, the confessional disputes which forced the Nestorians to establish their own educational institutions and drive eastward to Iran, helped to Persianize them to a good measure. Consequently theology, mysticism, or the religious speculation of the Mu'tazilites were none of their concern. Except in rare cases as in that of Yahya ibn 'Abdy who earned his living for sometime as a copyst, there is no reason to believe that they had read any of it.

2. The patrons who ordered the translations were in most cases men of foreign extraction chiefly occupied with the secular life and thought of Baghdad. Good Muslims individually, the new learning had fired their imagination and aroused enthusiasm. To be sure the pace was set by the Caliph and some of his courtiers. But with one or two exceptions as with members of the Nowbakht family, theologians and mystics stood openly afool and honestly hostile. The translation of a number of medical manuals was requested by Christian physicians and colleagues.

Internal evidence confirms these considerations. The simple and direct mode of expression; a neglect of the stilted construction of sentences; the almost total absence of sajâ' or internal rhyme; and the change in tone from the evocative to the didactic and narrative, were characteristics of secular prose. Terminology offers a still more fertile field for comparisons. Here we find non-Qur'anic words, first introduced by authors of epistolary literature and belles-lettres, gaining common usage among the Translators and becoming technical terms of philosophy. Or genuine Qur'anic derivatives, but in different grammatical forms, are charged with meanings and connotations which they did not possess in the original.

A scrutiny of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's vocabulary discloses a series of terms which were later adopted in philosophical language. In his extant writings we find:

1. Examples of non-Qur'anic words:
   - adâb, tâdîb, al-mu'addabîn, al-tajribah, rawîyyah, simiât, jauhar, ghâyah, mûdâhîn, al-dhînîh, ghârîshân.

2. Examples of Qur'anic words, but in different forms and sense:
   - idrîhî, idrâhî, al-âlah, al-infârâd, fihr, ma'nâ, mu'tâhâyiyyâz, ma'âlah, al-mu'ârîfâh, al-lâfîs.

In the works of Ibn al-Muqaffa' we find:

1. Examples of non-Qur'anic words:
   - adâb, ghâyahâ, ghârâ'îz, dhîhn, na'âtû, ra'ûyyah.

2. Examples of Qur'anic words, but in different forms and sense:
   - idrîhî, i'tîqâd, al-muhabbîn, al-muhabâdîn, al-tâfîr, al-lubb, al-muqâbaruân, ma'rîfâh, al-tâzâhabîh, ma'nâ, mawdâ'î, ta'llîm, wajhuh min wa'dik al-ra'yîy, al-munîqîn.

3. Examples of words that became technical terms of Arabic and Persian logic:

The vocabulary of Katîlah wa Dinnaflah shows Ibn al-Muqaffa's linguistic resourcefulness at its best. It is replete with happy phrases and expressions either entirely new or extremely rare in his days. Here the link connecting the language of the Translators with Arabic secular prose can be definitely established. Furthermore, in spite of the doubts raised by certain scholars the fact that Ibn al-Muqaffa' had translated parts of the Aristotelian Organon or paraphrases of it presumably from Pahlavi into Arabic can no more be disputed. The Fihrist clearly states that "the Persians had in the early days translated some of the books on logic and medicine into the Persian language. These were translated into Arabic by 'Abd Allâh ibn al-Muqaffa' and others". Qitî adds that Ibn al-Muqaffa' "was the first in the Islamic nation to occupy himself

3 ed. Tâba 'Uussain and A. Azâmî. Cairo 1941.
5 p. 242.
with the translation of the books on logic for Abū Ja'far al-Mansūr ... he translated three of the Aristotelian books on logic ... and it is said that he translated the *Eisagoge* ... 1. He also says that Ibn al-Muqaffa’ had made compendia of the *Categories* and of the *De Interpretatione* 2. Ibn al-ʿUṣbit ibn al-ʿUṣbah 3 repeats something to the same effect with the remark that “his renderings in translation were fluent, easy to seize.” Sād al-Andalusī 4 gives the statement of the *Fihrist* almost verbatim. While Jāhiz 5 definitely places Ibn al-Muqaffa’ among the different translators of Aristotle.

As far as terminology is concerned by far the most valuable work that has survived from the extensive corpus of this extraordinary man is his treatise on Aristotelian logic. Of this two manuscripts are known to exist. One is at the St. Joseph University Library in Beirut 6, and the other in Mashhad in Persia 7. Here we wish to express our gratitude to the St. Joseph University for allowing us to consult their copy on a number of occasions. The manuscripts, however, pose serious problems. The Mashhad copy is supposed to conclude thus: “Ended are three books on logic translated by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Muqaffa’ 8.” Yet the Beirut copy which we have examined, and which (because fairly modern) may well be a copy of the Mashhad manuscript, is not a literal translation of the Aristotelian text. In certain passages Aristotle is followed very closely. In others there are materials clearly derived from elsewhere. There is a discussion, for instance, of sōr representing the *Quantification of the Predicate* which is not of Aristotelian origin. It may therefore be concluded that the manuscripts are the translation of a commentary on the *Eisagoge* of Porphyry, the *Categories* of Aristotle, his *De Interpretatione* and *Analytics*. Furthermore, because it is definitely stated to be a translation, it could not be a commentary of Ibn al-Muqaffa’ himself. Who then could have been the original commentator or compiler? And since the source-books all agree that the translation was made from the Persian which in this case means Pahlawi, can we venture to suppose that whether in whole or in part this was one of the compendia which Paulos Persa had prepared for the benefit of Chosroes I, the Sassanian king of Iran? The further complication that in both manuscripts the treatise is attributed to Muhammad son of Ibn al-Muqaffa’ has been resolved by the explanation that the correct reading was Abū Muḥammad; and that copyists were in the habit of dropping the word ʿabd meaning father 9.

The personal and literary connections of Ibn al-Muqaffa’ with ‘Abd al-Hamīd have been well known. They were close friends. By one account 10 the two were in the same house when the first was arrested to be put to death. A modern biographer 11 traces the origin of ‘Abd al-Hamīd to the captives of Qādiṣiyah. His position as the father of Arabic epistolary and literary style is commemo- rated in the oft-quoted remark that “epistolary literature (al-hidam) began with ‘Abd al-Hamīd and ended with Ibn al-ʿAmīd 12.” Abī Hūlī al-ʿAskarī is quoted 13 to the effect that “‘Abd al-Hamīd al-Ḥāthib derived the models of epistolary literature ... from the Persian language; then turned it into the Arabic language”. The *Fihrist* 14 supplies the added information that he was the brother-in-law and student of Sālim—a secretary of Ḥishām who had translated the pseudo-Aristotelian letters addressed to Alexander. Practically nothing more is known about Sālim; nor of the language from which he translated into Arabic. It should also be remembered that ‘Abd al-Hamīd was for sometime in Armenia as the envoy of Ḥishām. Hellenistic influence was just as strong in that country as in Syria. All this was well known to the Arabs. Jāhiz has much to say on the subject 15; though he never liked the khattāb and wrote a whole volume against them 16. Modern Arab authors have been more favourable in their comments 17.

But to go back to Ibn al-Muqaffa’, the libraries of Istanbul contain over ten manuscripts attributed to him. These are mostly

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1 Tārīkh al-Iftikār, ed. Lippert. p. 220.
2 ibid. pp. 35, 36.
6 MS. No. 338.
9 Cf. Qazwīnī, *Sīs al-Maqlūb*, op. cit. p. 188.
12 ibid. p. 519.
13 ibid. p. 516.
14 P. 117.
15 Cf. Al-Bayyān ... pp. 47-48; 49-52; Al-Ruddīlī ... Vol. 2. p. 40.
17 Cf. Z. Mīhrān, *Al-Nādir al-Fauntii*.

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copies of minor treatises which may not be all authentic. Some are quite different from those already published. One is even in Arabic poetry. Unfortunately it is on the Greek solar months and what they represent. Of more importance is a treatise on ethics and politics which has been known to the western world through Brockelmann. Separate copies of it with slightly altered titles may be found in Istanbul. The more correct title seems to be Risālat al-Άkhkāf f. al-ÁΩdak. Although one manuscript heads the treatise with the statement that this is a very rare work of Ibn al-Muqaffa, there are quite a few copies available. When compared to his better known books this essay conforms in vocabulary. Terminology establishes authenticity. Style points out its affiliation with the language of the Translators. Most of the terms already noted in Kalīlah wa Dimnaḥ occur here. And the style bears all the characteristics of secular prose which we have enumerated. It begins rather nostalgically with a reference to his forebears. “People before us”, he says, “were superior in body, and with such bodies they had more abundant dreams... and in their lives they chose things of higher merit. The man of religion from among them was more accomplished... in knowledge and in practice... and the man of the world was similar in eloquence and virtue... with these they wrote books which we declared infidelities... the utmost learning of our savant in this age is to take from their [store of] knowledge; and the ultimate benefaction of our bounteous man is to follow the example of their conduct; and the best discussion that our racconteur can find is by looking into their books”.

The contents of this treatise leave little doubt that Ibn al-Muqaffa had at least some knowledge of Aristotelian ethics. This means that his acquaintance with the works of the Stagirite extended beyond logic. Just in what form and to what extent and from what source this knowledge was derived there seems no way of determining until further information comes to light. But more intriguing is the fact that the treatise appears closely related to the letters alleged to have been exchanged between Alexander of Macedon and Aristotle. Again there are numerous copies of this correspon-

dence (which of course is pseudo-Aristotelian) in the libraries of Istanbul. Perhaps the best and the most complete manuscript of it is found at the Süleymaniye Library. These letters which are not very numerous but fill a fair sized volume patiently await a competent editor. They appear to antidate most if not all the Arabic versions of Platonic and Aristotelian works executed at Baghdad by the regular Translators. They definitely belong to the early pre-ÁΩsun period and constitute an important link between the secular prose of the khiāl and Arabic philosophical language. Who the author of these letters was may be left for the classical scholar to determine since they were originally in Greek. Their translator into Arabic is of greater concern to us here. As already noted the Fihrist states that they were put into Arabic by Sālem. And yet in a manuscript copy of a Persian rendering of the correspondence we find the following lines. “The letter of Alexander... to the great philosopher Aristotle which he wrote in Greek. And Ibn al-Muqaffa had translated this letter and the reply to it into Arabic; and Adīb Mkhātir Zīzānī translated it into Persian”. This is a startling bit of information. If true it means that Ibn al-Muqaffa had translated more things than certain parts of the Aristotelian Organon or commentaries upon or compendia of it. And from what language could he have translated it? Surely he did not know Greek—at least there is no evidence of that at all. Nor is it said anywhere that he knew Syriac. The only possible supposition is that there was a Pahlavi version of the correspondence which Ibn al-Muqaffa put into Arabic. But the authority of the Fihrist cannot be flouted so easily. When Ruska challenged its statement that Khālid ibn Yazīd was the first to order the translation of Greek books on alchemy into Arabic, he was completely at fault. Two manuscripts (and there may be more) relate in full how he became interested in alchemy, the Greek monk with his name specified who was brought to him, and what he translated. Circumstantial evidence is overwhelming in favour of the Fihrist account.

1 Cf. Agir No. 440.
2 Cf. G.A.L.
4 Cf. Esat Efendi. No. 3600.

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Further research is required to resolve the apparent discrepancy between the statement of the Fihrist as to the person who translated the letters into Arabic and the above-quoted assertion of Zuzani. But who is this Zuzani? If the first two names are only titles, and he is the philologist and judge who wrote the Kitāb al-Maṣādir, then his testimony is worthy of consideration. A Persian with a good knowledge of Arabic linguistics, he was well qualified to undertake translations of this kind.

Nor are factual evidences lacking to the effect that the Translators learnt their Arabic at the feet of secular and not religious teachers. The little that is known of Ustādh specifies that he was a Christian monk who associated with Kindi and his circle. If indeed he became a Patriarch of Alexandria he would hardly be expected to have gone to Muslim theologians to learn the language. It is said that he was not very strong in Arabic. The translations which he made "for Kindi" were generally considered mediocre in style and vocabulary. The same was true of Ibn Nā'imah whose versions were polished up by Kindi. Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq of Hirah (the most versatile of the whole group and the most prolific in works) entered Baṣrah and kept the company of al-Khallībīn Al Ahmād until he was proficient in the Arabic language; and he brought the Kitāb al-Arin to Baghdad. Hence he learnt his Arabic from a notable representative of secular prose when teachers of religious language must have been available in large numbers. The source-books state that Isḥāq was much stronger in Arabic than his father. Who his teacher was has not been recorded, but it is very unlikely that he came from among the theologians. Māttā who was educated in a monastery remained attached to his Aramean community even more than some of his companions. His disputations with Abū Saʿīd al-Saʿīrī betray his meagre knowledge of religious literature. The same may be said of most of the other translators.

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1. The Milieu

The awakening which began during al-Manṣūr’s Caliphate and reached its height under al-Ma’mūn was a natural result of the racial intermingling that was such a marked feature of the ‘Abbāsīd age. The association between Arabs, Arameans and Iranians was not always very happy; yet it proved surprisingly opportune and abundantly fruitful. The encouragement of successive Caliphs gave the movement force and legitimacy. A liberal outlook and a receptive attitude granted an opportunity to men of different races and religions to participate on equal terms. Discrimination was discouraged in learned circles although it may not have ceased to operate completely. The Translators came to enjoy at least some measure of social status. Their work was appreciated by a growing class of men. Literary gatherings brought them into contact with high state functionaries. It also introduced them to men of letters and kept them abreast of the work of fellow-translators. Travel took them to centres of learning in the Hellenistic world. From there they brought back the Greek manuscripts.

2. Patronage

Al-Manṣūr was lavish in rewards. Ḥārūn al-Rashīd “thoroughly understood the noble art of patronage”. Al-Ma’mūn had the distinction of being personally and profoundly interested in the new learning, especially where philosophy was concerned. His financial
assistance allowed some to devote their full time to translation. Then came the courtiers with members of illustrious families—the Barmekids, the Nowbakhts, the Munajims, the Zayyits, and various others. It should be remembered in this connection that the nature of the work, and the specific authors chosen for the purpose were determined by the taste of the patrons. They were chiefly interested in medicine; philosophy and the natural sciences came next. If no translator occupied himself with Greek belles-lettres; if poetry, tragedy and comedy were almost completely neglected just as much as history, the choice belonged to the patrons in practically every case. This factor should not be overlooked.

3. CULTURAL BACKGROUND

Since they were of Aramean origin the hybrid culture represented by the Syriac language was naturally strongest among the Translators. Their education had been at monasteries, whether Monophysite or Nestorian; or in schools attached to such institutions. As the Aramaic dialect of Edessa, Syriac had developed through direct contact with Greek which was also the language of the Church. Its grammar was fashioned after it, and vocabulary enriched by loan-words or literal translations from Greek. This applied to literature as well. Although distinctly Christian, classical learning was introduced in large measures. Religious problems were argued in Greek terms and along philosophical lines. At the School of the Persians in Nisibis which was primarily a religious seminary the students and teachers were mostly of Iranian origin. This, added to the fact that they lived in close proximity to Christian communities in Iran, made Persian influence inevitable. Priests and scholars trained at Edessa and Nisibis must have had a fair acquaintance with the Persian language. The form of Arabic education which the Translators had received, and the extent to which they were familiar with Arabic literature, varied in each case. It is impossible to generalize. But for reasons already stated we believe that the Translators were much more familiar with secular literature than with the works of theologians and mystics.


Syriac was their mother tongue, and the influence of Greek and Persian only indirect, Arabic was the common speech of the people among whom they lived and worked, and the language into which they translated. It constituted therefore a vital element in their cultural make up.

Linguistic and literary influences aside, the method of translation and the conventions adopted in that form of exercise followed the Syriac renderings of Greek works, whether classical, scientific or religious. These were of an earlier date in most cases, and represented a regular tradition to which the Translators felt themselves somewhat bound. There were practical as well as sentimental reasons to make them follow the system of their predecessors in that field. Even Hunain who was the most competent and enterprising of them all thought it proper to abide by the same rules. The resulting effect on the Arabic versions was inescapable. It is sometimes possible to determine from the order of the words and the tournure of the sentences whether the translation was made directly from Greek or by way of Syriac.

Attempts at assessment in evaluating the work of individual translators are obviously not easy. There are many elements involved. Nor are the renderings all of the same standard. Ishag's translation of the De Anima appears different in language and terminology from some of his other works. The abundant number of transcriptions, for instance, are difficult to explain. As a general rule the pre-Hunain school show more courage and linguistic resourcefulness. Their originality lies in the terms which they coined or adopted. Hunain and his set present a more polished language. Hardly a single new term can be attributed to them, but their prose is more fluent and clear. They were in a position to pick and choose equivalents without contributing any themselves. These remarks of course apply only to philosophical works. When the mathematical and medical translations (of which the Istanbul libraries have many manuscript copies) are edited we may have to modify our views. The post-Hunain school naturally benefited from the work of their predecessors. Although the renderings of Hunain, his son, and pupils were the most prized and

1 At Topkapı-sarayı (Sultan Ahmet III. No. 3362) there is an old manuscript copy of the Arabic translations of the Organon, with red rubrics and curious illustrations. Unfortunately it is not complete and probably not as old as that in Paris.
relied upon, the Fāḍiṣfah never felt completely confident of the work of any of the Translators. Kindl and Fārābī were so closely associated with some of them that they hesitated to cast doubt on the correctness of the translations. Avicenna, however, grumbles continuously. He is frankly suspicious. But because he did not know Greek or Syriac himself, he could not openly challenge the faithfulness of the Arabic renderings. The fact that Averroes in his commentary on the Metaphysica quotes from the versions of three separate translators, and sometimes of the selfsame passage, is ample proof of the dissatisfaction if not distrust of the Fāḍiṣfah.

A good deal of it was because they did not realize the difficulties involved when putting Greek into Arabic.

CHAPTER FOUR

It did not take the Translators long to realize that in the creation of a philosophical idiom the Arabic language presented advantages as well as limitations. Some of the points had already been noted when putting Greek into Syriac. Aside from the specific terms coined by the Greek philosophers, the peculiarities of Indo-European morphology and syntax stood in marked contrast to those of Semitic tongues. In certain cases the sentences seemed to gain clarity and conciseness in the process of transposition. In others they failed to convey the precise meaning. Arabic which is supposed to be the nearest to the original mother tongue of the Semites, and which never had the close association of Syriac with Greek, appeared still more distant. Its ways and its means of expressing thought were different.

As a feature of a more advanced stage of culture, abstract terminology grows out of the concrete in all languages and to whatever group they may belong. Nor is it infrequently borrowed. Iowan-words denoting abstract concepts actually have a habit of travelling far beyond their original confines. But among sister languages it is more easily assimilated. Furthermore some have a better way of forming them than others. It has been remarked that "much indeed remained to do before Latin could function as an instrument for the higher intellectual activities. Perhaps Cicero's greatest contribution to the Latin language came with his enforced retirement from politics when he devoted himself to the translation of Greek philosophical works. In so doing he largely created the vocabulary of abstract philosophical thinking. . . By such prolonged experiment in the translation of Greek terms, Cicero introduced into Latin many new words . . . and in so doing hammered out the fundamental vocabulary of abstract thought which has become the common possession of western European peoples 1.

In forging a philosophical idiom of its own, Arabic was compelled to take on features which were never fully approved of by purists passionately devoted to their language and its avowed sanctity 2. Because it was not the result of a natural growth as in

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2 Cf. The dispute of Matta and al-Sairī. Tawḥīd. op. cit.
the case of Greek, it suffered in addition from an artificiality which was difficult to overcome. With very few abstract terms to begin with, it had to grapple with conceptual and linguistic problems that were not always satisfactorily solved. The immense richness of vocabulary where concrete objects were concerned, had nothing to equal it in abstract terminology. The innumerable synonyms which linguists were fond of emphasizing stood in direct contrast to terms of speculative thought. The late E. G. Browne has gone on record to the effect that “Arabic is on the whole well adapted for providing a suitable technical terminology”. To determine whether this statement requires qualification or not, a review of the resources and limitations of the tongue could be useful.

I. THE RESOURCES

The literary resources which the Translators could exploit in both prose and poetry have already been outlined. Grammar may be added to them; though this branch developed rather late in their literary history and the origin of its terms is not very clear. Greek grammar was also a late development. It was taken up by the Alexandrians mainly as an aid to the study and understanding of Homer. The rules of Arabic grammar were laid down and systematized on the basis of a correct reading of the Qur’an. But opinions are divided regarding some of its classifications. Greek influence in that respect has yet to be more fully substantiated. Vocabulary lends itself better to specialized scrutiny. New terms were soon found necessary; and the Translators had to make the best use of the ways open to them.

a. They gave new meanings and connotations to some of the common words in the language, making them thereby technical terms of logic or philosophy. This method had been previously employed by Plato and various other Greek philosophers. It seemed perfectly proper and quite helpful. Ex. ṣiddah, ṣḥālsh, taḥštī, tamsīsh, etc.

b. There was direct borrowing of loan-words from various languages. These were sometimes left in their original form, at other times suitably arabicised. Mi‘mār was taken from Syriac. The Persian gōhar became jawār, and nāysh was turned into mādākh.


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Attempts at determining the period in which the coining of new terms (jaw'īd or naḥḥ) took place most, have produced somewhat similar results. According to one opinion it began after the second century of the Hijrah in the more populated areas. After the fourth century, "that is to say when the Arabic taste had been corrupted 1", it extended out into the desert. Another opinion puts it more generally, claiming that it first started with the establishment of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate. And that the Arabic language reached its zenith in the third century. Thus both estimates cover the period of the Translators, at a time when Persian, Greek, Syriac and even Indian books were being put into Arabic as recorded in the Fihrist.

2. THE LIMITATIONS

Side by side with such resources as we have tried to enumerate here, there were serious limitations to cope with in the formation of an Arabic philosophical vocabulary.

a. The first and most intractable was the complete absence of the copula. Like all other Semitic tongues, and in marked contrast to the Indo-European group of languages, the auxiliary verb 'to be' corresponding to the Greek 'to einai' does not exist in Arabic. In common speech and composition the meaning may be left sous-entendu. In grammar the lack of a specific term to that effect is at best rather awkward. In logic the deficiency becomes a formidable obstacle. In the simple statement that if A is B, and B is C, then A is C, the reasoning has to be expressed by the pronoun huwa instead of the verb is. When metaphysics is reached the translator can easily find himself helpless. The precise concept of being as distinct from existence proves impossible to express. The Falsafah became conscious of this fact early in their work. Fārābī refers to this handicap at some length 2, pointing out the advantages of Greek and Persian in that respect. And so actually does Avicenna 3. There had to be recourse to improvisations and approximations, none of which adequately served the purpose. The Translators had chosen the use of the verb waṣjāda knowing full well that that denotes existence and not being. Fūribī observes 4 that

3 Ibid. pp. 346-348.

1 Ibid.
2 Cf. Commentary on... De Interpretatione. ed. Kutsch and Marrow. FP. 57, 42, 46. 103.
3 Al-'ishārāt.
though such verbs as ādīna, ādīna, aṣẖāba, āmsa, palla and others of the same sense could be sometimes employed to convey the meaning, ṭajāda was probably the most applicable. Yet he was aware that that was not the exact equivalent. The Translators seem to have made the point perfectly clear to those who like him did not know any Greek. The fact that they had used six different words in various forms to represent the copula and the meanings conveyed by it was sufficient proof of the difficulties involved. They were al-ulayyih, al-ulayyih, al-ulayyih, al-ulayyih, al-ulayyih, and al-ulayyih. Of these three were specially coined for the purpose. The others were adapted to fit into the text. Not all the translators followed the same practice. The philosophers preferred some to others. Arab purists were horrified. The term which may have come from Syriac, and its abstraction in the form of al-ulayyih, were set against laiwa and laiwa as contraries. These appeared no less objectionable, though many adopted them. Ibn Khallīyih wrote a book entitled Kitāb al-Laisa fi Kādīm al-Arāb. There are in almost all the libraries of Istanbul manuscript copies of a series of essays on philosophical subjects by a Turkish scholar and student of philosophy known as Ibn Kamāl Pāshī (d. 940, A. H.). Among them is one entitled Risālat fi Mā'na al-Laisa wa al-Laisa. But there is no linguistic analysis of the terms, nor any discussion of their origin. The subject is treated philosophically in connection with the concept of creation ex nihilo and the Aristotelian thesis of the eternity of the world. Again some may be tempted to speculate as to whether the absence of the copula denotes any significant difference in the method of thought between Semites and Indo-Europeans. If such distinctions existed in the past, they have certainly disappeared as a result of western education. Yet Semitic languages are still unable to express the thought adequately.

The second serious obstacle was the inability to form compound words. This is characteristic of Indo-European languages highly developed in Greek, Sanskrit, Persian and various others. Of this problem also Fārābī makes mention in his commentary on the De Interpretatione. As already noted new terms in Arabic are coined according to specific patterns or paradigms laid down on the basis of the early classics and common usage. This surely makes them in many ways more meaningful, conveying the significant in a more precise manner; but they constitute a restriction on linguistic innovations. Although Suyīṭī likes to tell us that “Ibn Fāris says in his Fīqīh al-Lughah, ... that the Arabs coin out of two words a single one”, actually this was contrary to the rules as well as nature of the language, except where it is done by involution. To be sure there were some rare attempts at constructing compounds against all protests. Māliyyih was one of them. After a protracted fight with māliyyih it became a technical term of speculative thought. Theologians and mystics felt compelled to adopt it. Yet it was not well received by purists. Incidentally it supplied comic poets anxious to ridicule the Fārsīdāfī with something on which to pour their scorn. Aristophanes had brilliant colleagues among the libertines of Baghdad.

c. The third limitation is the inability to use prefixes and suffixes to convey shades of meaning or precisions of thought. These are different from the augmentations found in some of the paradigms. In Greek, Sanskrit and Persian they prove very useful. This will be seen in discussing Persian philosophical vocabulary. A simple example is the lack of the privative a so convenient in the above-mentioned languages, and so awkward in Arabic with its use of il, ghair, or laiwa which actually make the word a compound. Not that Arabic cannot express the opposition of contraries. In fact it is very rich in that respect. It has prompted the observation that “T’Arabī n’est pas tant la langue du dād que la langue du addād”. This was a favourite subject with lexicographers and philologists, illustrated by such works as that of Abū Hīlāl al-‘Aṣkārī where words are divided into contrary couples. Abū Ḥātim al-Sajjānī wrote a whole volume which he called Kitāb al-Addād or Book of Contraries. But to express the negation of a notion was not as easy as in Greek. For example:

1 Ed. Kutsch and Marnow, p. 51.
3 Cf. Appendix II.
5 Mansi, op. cit. p. 10.
6 Al-Furūq al-Lughahīyyah, ... Cairo, 1355 A.H.
7 MS. copy at Reisskatalog Mustafa Efendi. No. 874.
The fourth difficulty was the almost total absence of abstractions in the language. Again this is characteristic. The limitation was remedied by the coinage of a whole series of terms ending with the suffix *yyah, such as *wūlautyyah, *gharīyyah, etc. This form is extremely rare in early classical Arabic. Where it does occur as *ahlautyyah, and *al-rabūntyyah in the Qurʾān, they are not abstractions in the strict sense of the term. In the verse in which it appears, rabūntyyah stands for the practice of priesthood and not for the concept of it. Some scholars ¹ have suggested that the form was copied from Syriac, which in turn adopted it from the Greek λάθα, the common suffix denoting an abstraction. This may well be so, though the assertion requires further proof. The inclination towards the use of abstractions may come from another source also. It is quite likely to have been influenced by Pahlavi and Persian. The reason for this supposition is that we find abstractions far more frequently coined and used by Persian philosophers than those of Arab stock. They are first met with in the versions of the early translators like Uṣṭāth. These were versant in Greek and Syriac, and possibly copied it from one of the two languages. But among the Falāṣīfah Kindī uses abstractions sparingly with no apparent desire to coin new ones. Fārābī has more of them. Avicenna adds still more to those of his predecessors. And when we reach the works of late Persian philosophers such as Muʾallā Shārā, we are struck by an amazing profusion of abstractions never seen elsewhere. This is not surprising when it is recalled that in Persian the mere addition of the suffix -f makes a perfectly good abstraction out of almost any word in the language.

Whether in the terms already existing in the language, or in those newly coined for the purpose, there were dangerous sources of confusion involved. A modern Egyptian scholar discussing the question remarks that “rich in synonyms and homonyms, Arabic can express an idea in various terms or various ideas in one term. But they are vague and equivocal and lack clarity and precision for a scientific vocabulary. This was felt by the Arab philosophers in their writings” ². And a western scholar adds in agreement that “les termes fondamentaux de la culture arabe sont ambivalents”. ³ Furthermore the necessity or convenience of using the same term in Qurʾānic exegesis, Mutʿazilite literature, mystical writings and philosophical tracts with separate meanings in most cases has led many astray. A typical example is the word mawlūyaḥ as used by theologians and mystics on the one hand, and by the Falāṣīfah on the other ⁴. The Ḩadīth or Traditions presented problems of their own ⁵.

3. Cf. Appendix II.


Arman, Philosophical Terminology, 3
of the language was very much less. He did not create new meanings for terms as did Plato... He found his terminology ready at hand and he made little impress upon the language 1. The shortcomings of the *Faldasifah* in this respect are not altogether surprising. They did not know Greek and hardly any Syriac. Consequently they had no recourse to the original texts. Nor did they feel they could improve upon the terminology of the Translators. Furthermore their primary object was to produce the synthesis to which they had addressed themselves. That left little scope for individual contributions except within the limits of the principal themes. Hence the reason why some are so reluctant to call them creative thinkers; and why their language usually appears stiff and stereotyped.

To the above-mentioned limitations many more of a minor nature could be added. There was the inability to employ the infinitive with an article in the place of a noun in exactly the same manner as in Greek and Persian. Again Farabi makes mention of that. Occasionally they found happy solutions for such inadequacies. The absence of the neuter in Arabic is usually matched with an equivalent adjective used as a noun. As for example:

\[\text{ve dēkār} (\text{D. An. 413 b 27}) \quad \text{al-khāliy} (\text{Ishāq}).\]

\[\text{ve ṣeydār} (\text{Cat. II b 35}) \quad \text{al-khāir} (\text{Ishāq}).\]

Nor were the difficulties confined to terminology. Under the influence of the original Greek (or the Syriac version from which the translators sometimes worked) there was a persistent temptation to follow the same construction of the sentences. This was particularly marked when they attempted to be faithful to the text at all cost and at any sacrifice. In practice verbatim translations proved easier to execute—as they still do nowadays. It took generations for such peculiarities to disappear. In the writings of the early *Faldasifah* they are conspicuous by their frequency. Later they tend to be eliminated. Ghazālī has much less of it. In Avrevoss and Ibn Taimiyyyah the sentences regain their genuine Arabic ring. The barbarisms which they called *waššhiyyūt al-kalām* and which Avicenna refers to as *al-ṣawāšhiyyūt al-ğharibas* are dropped out as the language reasserts itself with force and authority.


CHAPTER FIVE

We have undertaken so far a short historical review of philosophical terminology in Arabic. The linguistic genesis or parentage has been determined as far as possible. Its lexical and grammatical equation with the Greek texts has been traced. And finally its adoption and usage by the *Faldasifah* has been noted.

The subject may be viewed from still another angle. As distinct from the linguistic and grammatical aspects which entail history, there is the semantic side involving the meaningfulness of the terms employed in the process of communication, and their place in the development of thought. The former is primarily associated with the work of the Translators. The latter is of special importance in the study of the individual *Faldasifah* when an assessment of their contributions is attempted. Actually this deserves a separate inquiry and may be considered an independent topic by itself.

In a semantic appraisal of the language of the *Faldasifah* the temptation to apply the methods of the modern school of philosophy should be resisted. Formal logic in its traditional form may now be chiefly of historical interest. Russell’s assertion that the “logic which trusts in language to any degree is likely to lead to the verbalism of a false metaphysics” 2, may be a sound statement. And Whitehead’s remark that “philosophy redesigns language in the same way that in a physical science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned” 3, may command wide acceptance. But the writings of the *Faldasifah* were openly Aristotelian in substance. The influence of the different Hellenistic schools such as the Stoics and Neoplatonists did not alter the basic relation between logic and language which Aristotle had assumed. If anything the Stoics emphasized it still more. Consequently the criteria established in modern studies of the subject 4 are hardly applicable to the works of the *Faldasifah* written centuries ago.

The logic of the *Faldasifah* just like that of their Greek and

2 Ibid. p. 304.
Hellenistic predecessors was a subject-predicate \(^1\) logic. And their metaphysics was a substance-accident \(^2\), and universal-particular \(^3\) metaphysics. Hence the insights of modern schools of philosophy could hardly be expected of them. It has been maintained that for the employment of the subject-predicate principle is language and logic there is “a sound pragmatic defence. But in metaphysics the concept is sheer error \(^4\). Perhaps for that reason it is easier to pick at their metaphysics than at their logic; though that may have been superceded also. In any case the methods of linguistic analysis as developed in modern times, and the form in which correct logical statements or philosophical questions need to be couched, cannot be applied to the works of the Fatāsīfah with justice. Language and thought have been progressively changing in the Occident for centuries. They have been stagnant in the Orient for almost the same period. “Philosophy must . . . involve the exercise of systematic restatement \(^5\); not the tedious repetitions practiced in the East for so long.

What might be more rewarding is an inquiry into the correlation between language and thought of individual philosophers whether Arab, Turk or Persian. Ibn Khaldūn’s assertion \(^6\) that the two are entirely separate activities; and that language is only an acquired habitus (mašlaḥ) similar to an art or craft, represented the general opinion in the Islamic world. To-day, on the other hand, it is believed that intuition and expression are inseparable. Croce considered them identical. Ayer says “in any case in which the thought is a thought of anything, the process of thought is not distinct from the expression of it \(^7\).” To accept therefore a philosopher’s language and vocabulary as an index of his thought and of his method of reasoning appears perfectly justified.

The relation between grammar and logic is more controversial. A French author begins the preface of his book with the open declaration that “yet courage a pour but de dénoncer l’erreur doctrinale la plus grave qui ait posé sur les destiné de la logique et de la philosophie, a savoir en un parallelism logico-grammatical”. This concerns the view sometimes held that Arabic syntax is much influenced by Aristotelian logic, and his Categorías in particular. It is now conceded that the division of the parts of speech into iṣm (noun), fa‘l (verb), and khabar (particle) as undertaken by the philologists \(^8\) can be easily traced back to Greek sources. The original division was into asl, farā, mutāda, and khabar \(^8\). But there is not enough evidence to suppose that Arabic grammar is actually based on Greek logic, as some have claimed. In fact Aristotelian logic cannot be fully applied to other languages besides Greek. One scholar has gone as far as asserting that “if Aristotle had spoken Chinese or Dacotan, he would have had to adopt an entirely different logic or at any rate an entirely different theory of categories \(^9\).”

However that may be, we return to the language and vocabulary of the Fatāsīfah as a means of determining originality of thought. Of course they are not the only criterions. New ideas could possibly be expressed in traditional terminology as well, though it would be at great sacrifice. By a process of elimination the writings of Fārābī and Avicenna may be chosen for that purpose. Not enough of the works of Kindī have survived to justify an empirical judgement—and semantics is empirical. The vocabulary of Avrèroes offers nothing whatsoever that could be rightly called his own. Just as his commentaries do not reveal any new insights in our view, though some seem to think otherwise. And Ghazālī who was a profound and resourceful thinker is difficult to judge because he is inconsistent, employing the terminology of the Fatāsīfah at one time and those of the theologians at another. Even between Fārābī and Avicenna the comparison is unequal. We have most of the works of the latter \(^6\), and certainly not enough of the former. Judging from what we have of him, Fārābī’s vocabulary is derived entirely from the Translators. But a comparison between any of his works and the corresponding renderings from the Greek into Arabic shows occasional differences. Clearly this is a case of not only attempting to understand the texts which were often obscure and sometimes-inch

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2. Al-jauhar wa al-‘urāq.
3. Al-khaliyya wa al-fa‘līyya.
5. Gilbert Ryle, op. cit. p. 36.
comprehensible, but of thinking over the problems anew and in his own particular manner. We know that he did not always succeed to our satisfaction. Yet his language reveals the independent efforts of a thinker. His books have the merit of undertaking a restatement of the problems in clear and comprehensible Arabic. And that has always been a legitimate task for a philosopher. The fact that everyone of the principal Falsafiah undertook a special treatise on definitions called Risalah al-Hashid is evidence of the need for precise language felt by them all. Unfortunately they copied one another in most definitions.

Yet whoever tries to translate Farih into a European language will find the work difficult if not impossible. Nor is the reason far to seek. The literal and almost mechanical translations from Greek or Syriac on which he worked frequently failed to disclose the careful reasoning of Aristotle or the philosopher whom he happened to be reading. The terms chosen or coined by the Greeks did not convey exactly the same ideas to him. The interpretations therefore which he placed upon them through his own process of thought turned out sometimes quite different. If indeed the "key-word of the problem of Metaphysics is interpretation," no wonder that Farih is occasionally vague; why Avicenna had to read his commentary on the Metaphysics forty times before he could understand it; and why he defies those who attempt to translate him into a western idiom. Working on unhappy and sometimes definitely erroneous renderings of Platonic and Aristotelian texts, Farih figures out a notion of his own regarding their object and meaning. The modern scholar by a purely a priori method, and under the influence of his own reading of Plato and Aristotle, undertakes to transpose Farih into a European language without due regard to the intervening work of the Translators. The result is often far from satisfactory.

As an illustration more than one scholar has used the term 'holy war' when translating Farih or discussing his political views. Surely it needs some stretch of the imagination to attribute to Plato and Aristotle any interest in the holy war; or to the shy and retiring Farih (when only expounding the theories of the Greeks) any particular enthusiasm for such enterprises. The source of the

error is the word jihih which the Translators used as the equivalent of the Greek agônos. For example:

ε ἄγων  (Poet. 1450 b 18)  al-jihih (Mattia).
ἀγωνιστικής  (Soph. 165 b II)  jihâdiy Yahya, Ibn Zur'ah).

ος πολεμικός κοινός  (Top. 151 a 12)  muqaddat al-ḫaraib  (Dimashqî).

Nor did this muddle of the Translators remain undetected. Jâhiz has some scathing remarks in that connection. He does not spare his national literature either. When assessing the value of the different renderings, he says "the books of India have been translated... and the Greek philosophies... and the literature of the Persians... if you translate the wisdom of the Arabs that magic which is in the rhythm [of it] disappears, otherwise... they would not find in the meanings anything which the Persians have not stated in their books... indeed when was... Ibn al-Battûq, and Ibn Nâmîmah, and Abî Qurrah, and... and... and Ibn al-Maqadîf like Aristotle, and even Khalîl 1 like Plato? 2". He complains bitterly of "the agony of correcting the books".

In view of the above considerations the logic propounded by the Arabs and Persians can be more easily equated with the Greek texts than their metaphysics. The terms were more definite even when literally translated whether through some happy equivalent or sheer improvisation. But such terms did not always convey to the Falsafiah exactly the same meanings. In metaphysics where the terminology is much more abstract it becomes extremely risky to equate the terms with the original Greek in spite of the apparent semblance. Furthermore they were as a rule unaware that certain terms were of Peripatetic origin, others came from the Stoics and still others from the Neoplatonists. They knew for instance that entelechy was a word coined by Aristotle, but that was only a rare case.

Avicenna's copious works permit us to study in greater detail the relation between language and thought among the Falsafiah. This is nowhere better found than in the Sûâd which was obviously

1 This is an expected confirmation of the story of the Fihrist regarding Khalîl Ibn Yahyâl's interest in Greek books.
3 ibid. p. 79.
written for students and philosophers, not for patrons and amateurs. Here he is more discursive and argumentative than in small tracts. Nor is it merely a commentary on the Aristotelian corpus as might appear at first sight. A comparison between the section on metaphysics and the commentary of Averroes on the *Metaphysics* is sufficient to establish his position as an independent thinker. He begins by taking exception to the very title of Aristotle's treatise.

"The name of this science is of what is after nature . . . but what it deserves to be called . . . is the science of what is before nature," he remarks. The whole of this section is a critical study of the problems posed by Aristotle. He repeatedly takes issue with the Stagirite as well as his successors. Conscious of the lack of the copula in Arabic and the difficulties involved, he points out that "the term existence is used . . . to denote various meanings." In another passage he complains that "up to now this has not been made clear to me except by analogy," which he does not consider conclusive. His predecessors are accused of arguing in a circle. Then comes a general censure with the observation that "most philosophers learn logic but do not use it. At the end they revert to their natural versatility (qarîbah)".

Avicenna constantly expresses dissatisfaction with the established terminology by which he could only mean that of the Translators. Although he rarely mentions Kindi by name, and rightly considered him more of a natural philosopher than a metaphysician, he had undoubtedly studied him carefully. A manuscript copy of Kindi's scientific treatises at Aya Sofya is marked as having been one of the personal belongings of Avicenna. His designation of original creation by the term *ta'yis* is obviously derived from his predecessor. The debt that he owed to Fârâbî is conceded on more than one occasion. Yet he is not satisfied with the language of either of them. In thinking over the problems anew he is anxious to offer a restatement of his own. For that he would have wished to read the texts in their original form. Ignorance of Greek hampers him. There is reason to believe that others shared his lack of confidence in the versions produced by the Translators. He never felt certain that his understanding of Plato, Aristotle or the others was strictly correct. It was probably through the help of Masihî, the Christian physician and philosopher who died by his side in the desert, that he learnt something about the peculiarities of Greek grammar to which there are references in his books. That was hardly sufficient for his purposes. Nevertheless he could be outspoken in disagreement. "The time has come for us to withdraw ourself in order to contradict the views expressed regarding the Forms . . . and the elements of the separate [entities], and the Universals, which are contrary to the principles that we have established . . . even though we do not hope that any appreciable benefit may come from it . . . philosophy in ancient times was what the Greeks occupied themselves with . . . it was later intermixed with error and argumentation . . . and there were transpositions from some to others which were not sound". He likes to distinguish between 'the early teaching (al-ta'tîm al-awwal)' by which he means the works of Plato and Aristotle, and the commentaries of Helenistic authors including Stoic and Neoplatonic writings which he knew to be of later date. Some of these commentators are violently denounced. "Their words are full of hypocrisy and confusion".

The language of the *Shi'fâ* as a typical specimen of Avicennan writing could be studied (a) with reference to the vocabulary of the Translators, (b) with relation to the referents in his philosophical system, and (c) as symbolic of his individual manner of thought.

It was noted that though conscious of its defects Avicenna's terminology was inescapably based on that of the Translators. One peculiarity in this connection is his frequent use of two or less synonymous terms together. Some have thought this a mark of originality and independence of thought. Actually they are the alternative terms of the one and same translator when translating different passages; or of different translators when putting the same treatise into Arabic. Sometimes they are derived from the translation

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5. No. 4832.
of different works. The source could also be one of the numerous commentaries which when put into Arabic offered alternative terms. An illustration may be observed in Avicenna's discussion of the Poetics of Aristotle as found in the Skhāf. A number of terms occur there which do not correspond to those employed in Matta's version of the text. This could be explained by the supposition that he had before him some translation besides that of Matta, or a rendering of a commentary like that of Themistius which we are told was in fact put into Arabic. In any case the synonyms constitute yet another proof that he did not have complete confidence in the Arabic versions. Nor did he particularly approve of all the established terms. The practice was followed by Averroes in his commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus. Avicenna was in like manner aware of the linguistic limitations of Arabic in conveying the precise meaning of the text. "We do not have the terms for such notions", he says, "except these words. He who finds them inappropriate may use others." This statement betrays his attitude towards the neologisms forced upon the translators and philosophers alike. To some he took strong exception, others he used reluctantly. Unlike kind, for instance, he did not coin verbal formations out of the pronoun ِبِبِسِب. The terms ِبِبِس and ِبِبِبِسَ do not occur except rarely in his writings. He does not share Kind's relish for these terms. His discriminating use of what he himself calls barbarisms denote that he was not particularly enthusiastic about them. What he feared was the feeling that the terminology of the translators may have failed to convey the exact meaning of the Greek texts. Like Fārābī he hardly ever uses ِبِبِس as an equivalent of ِبِبِس, though Kindi had given currency to that word long before him. Curiously enough he did not attempt to introduce any Persian words into Arabic philosophical vocabulary. There are numerous features in his writings which we have called Persianisms, but no direct loan-words which the Translators had not already borrowed. When writing in Arabic he seems to have wished to remain faithful.

The referent in Avicenna's language was the grand synthesis to the construction of which he devoted himself from the very beginning. Its components included the interpretation of the Arabic renderings executed by the Translators together with the resulting attitude towards Greek philosophy and its Hellenistic commentators. Although his style never attained the polished perfection of a true Arab, its vocabulary reflects the highest and most mature stage to which the intellectual development of the Falsafīyah ever reached. It left a permanent impress upon the language of his successors; not excluding the theologians and mystics who poured calumny over all that his name stood for. The key-words to this philosophical system were 'the necessary being (al-حَقَّال-حَقَّ)', then 'the possible being (al-مَمْلَكِينَال-حَقَّ)', and then 'the impossible being (al-مَمْلَكِينَال-حَقَّ)'. This threefold division was not strictly speaking original, in the sense that they had already been adumbrated by Fārābī, and indirectly by Aristotle himself. To this principally logical distinction Avicenna gave an ontological significance which was upheld for centuries after him. It may be therefore rightly considered his own. Symbolical of his manner of thought and expression Avicenna's language has its distinct peculiarities. A man of Iranian origin, brought up on Islamic teachings, well versed in Arabic from early youth, and deeply absorbed by Greek learning in both medicine and philosophy, his intellectual background was more varied if not vastly richer than that of Kindi and Fārābī. In contrast Kindi had been a pure Arab whose style and vocabulary had been determined by Mu'tazelite writings and the works of the Translators. He belonged to the formative age of Arabic secular literature which possessed all the necessary elements of vitality. But as far as we know he knew no other language. Fārābī was a Turk whose mother-tongue was of little help in his work. How much Persian he knew is a matter of pure conjecture. Greek and Syriac must be definitely ruled out—at least for any useful purposes. Because he came later and could therefore exploit the books of his predecessors, Avicenna had a decided advantage. To that must be added a fair familiarity with Iranian cultural values. There is no reason to believe that he knew Pahlavi. And post-Islamic Persian literature was still in its infancy in his days. But culture had survived conquest. It was being

1 Cf. Margoliouth. Analectas Orientalia...  
2 Cf. the comparative tables in the Appendix to our translation of the Poetics into Persian.  
3 Cf. Fīkrist.  
4 Skhāf. Cambridge MS. Fol. 131.  
5 Istanbul libraries have MS. copies of Avicenna's replies to some of these personal attacks.
revived at the court of the Sāmānids to which Avicenna owed allegiance. And he was a leading figure in the national and literary renaissance which they were trying to bring about by every means at their disposal. He certainly shared their determination in that respect. Finally we have the fact that as a personality he was more colourful and intellectually more versatile than either Kindī or Fārābī. The advantages and disadvantages which these conditioning elements entail are all reflected in his writings. Because he was not a pure Arab, his prose lacks the genuine ring of Arabic. It is Persian Arabic which non-Arabs can easily recognize, and which no Arab would want to imitate to-day. This is a characteristic which western scholars have not always noted. Kindī had already parted from the style of the theologians with its profusion of evocative terms; or that of the rhetoricians with its metaphors and internal rhyme (ṣā’ā). His sentences may now seem long. But they remain genuinely Arabic. In his days Arabic philosophical prose was still in its early stages. He can therefore claim to have been among the pioneers in that field. The early translators were certainly indebted to him. Fārābī’s language, on the other hand, may be considered less polished than that of Kindī, but more Arabic than that of Avicenna. Although of Turkish origin he seems to have learnt to think and write in Arabic to the exclusion of any other. Qīšī describes his books as “correct in expression” which was a subtle way of saying that though a non-Arab he wrote correctly. His vocabulary shows hardly any peculiarities. He keeps to the terminology established by Ḥunain and his school. Occasionally he uses two words in the place of one. They represent different translations of the same Greek term. For instance he speaks of al-baṣ wa al-dhikr, or al-arbah wa al-iridād. Western opinion has been divided on his style of writing. De Boer thought that he wrote “clearly and with a certain grace”. Carra de Vaux maintained that “his style is somewhat obscure”. In our view it is fairly clear and to the point, though it may not be as methodical in thought and expression as that of Avicenna. He indulges in aphorisms like many others in his days. Aphorisms were highly relished in Arabic literature. Nor did the Greeks dislike their geomsai. But they have nothing to recommend them in philosophical expositions. An inquiring mind has little use for such practices. In his works as in his life Fārābī did not possess the unquestioning self-confidence of Avicenna. This might have made him a better philosopher, yet not as effective in his influence on posterity.

By the time of Avicenna philosophical language had advanced to an appreciable extent. Its vocabulary had been permanently established. What he could offer in that field was very limited. He tried to make the terms more precise by means of definition. Kindī and Fārābī had done the same thing before him but in a less comprehensive manner. This may not be a sign of originality. It denotes at least the necessity for clear thinking. A more characteristic mark is the ability to think in the abstract far more competently than Kindī or Fārābī. A symptom of that is the excessive number of abstractions which he coins himself. These may be attributed to the influence of his mother-tongue and as such he counted among the Persians which characterize his prose. But they are at the same time symbolic of his manner of thought. The fact that they were criticised by literary men and generally frowned upon by purists, in no way deterred him. Some gradually fell out of use. Others became permanently incorporated into philosophical terminology. The ideas may not be original. They are evidence of an improvement in the vehicle of thought. We find such words as al-zamānīyyah, al-mahānīyyah, al-‘adadiyyah, al-shu‘bīyyah, al-‘udbīyyah, al-‘amākīyyah. Another point in this connection is his classification of certain Aristotelian terms into subdivisions which help to make the notion more precise. This was one way of distinguishing shades of meaning where the term appeared equivocal. Unless these be the work of Stoics and Neoplatonic commentators before him, they constitute a feature of Avicennian terminology. With grammar and syntax he wisely refrains from taking liberties. As a non-Arab he was conscious of his limitations.

The above observations concern terms of logic and metaphysics. With ethics the situation was somewhat different. Here an important distinction should be made. Ethics should not be confused

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1 Cf. specimens of bombastic ṣā’ā given in Jamā‘at Rasūlīl’-Arab... ed. A. Z. Sa‘awas. Vol. 4. p. 17, and falsely attributed to Kindī.
2 Abū Ǧīlā. Rasūlīl’-Kindī... pp. 21-45 refute the claim of Masqim that Kindī is vague and obscure.
5 Art. Enclop. of Islam.
6 Cf. Risālat al-Ḥudūd.
with religious teachings. The first is governed by rational principles determining good and evil in human conduct. The second is based on conformity with religious injunctions and way of life. The basic concepts are entirely separate, though they soon got mixed up together. To the early theologians and philosophers the differences were real and considerable. Each had a terminology of its own. It was only later authors who began to use them interchangeably unaware or unconcerned with the original distinctions. Ethics claiming the greatest good of the greatest number as an object of inquiry grew out of Greek discussions on the subject. Guides to the religious way of life reflecting divine authority and promising reward and punishment stemmed from Holy Writ. Examples of ethical treatises may be found among the works of the Fādāsifah. Specimens of the religious genre have always been numerous. We may cite the Kitāb al-Abhādī of Abū al-Layth al-Samarqandi 1, and the Sīf al-Sa’dadh of Majd al-Din al-Shirāzī 2. But as in the field of metaphysics a synthesis had been attempted in the domain of ethics also. It was then that the terminology of the two distinct disciplines got intermixed. Theologians found it appropriate to use some ethical terms. Philosophers considered it wise to borrow from religious language. By the time we reach an eminent author like Ghażālī the different set of terms is carefully and competently combined. Yet to trace back the origin of Arabic terms of ethics, we have to go to the early translators. For the Greek dīkhos there was a perfectly good Qur’anic word which they readily adopted. Thus:

\[ \text{dīkhos} \quad \text{(Metaph. 1025 a 12)} \quad \text{abkhād (Uṣūthāth).} \]

\[ \text{dīkhā} \quad \text{(Rhet. 1359 a 3)} \quad \text{abkhād (unknown).} \]

But they were forced to use some non-Qur’anic forms of the word also. Thus:

\[ \text{dīkhān čow čow čy} \quad \text{(Rhet.)} \quad \text{al-khādā al-ku’tiy (unknown).} \]

\[ \text{dīkhā} \quad \text{(Metaph. 934 b 1)} \quad \text{abkhādyayy (Naṣīr).} \]

Again for agabkhās there was a very suitable Qur’anic word. Thus:

\[ \text{agabkhās} \quad \text{(Categ. II b 35)} \quad \text{al-khāir (Iḥṣāḥ).} \]

\[ \text{agabkhā} \quad \text{(Top. 117 a 15)} \quad \text{al-khairāt (Dīmashqī).} \]

1 Cf. MS. Aya Sofya. No. 2817.
2 Cf. MS. Fatih. No. 2601.

But they used alternatives also. Thus:

\[ \text{dīkhos} \quad \text{(Metaph. 1025 a 12)} \quad \text{šāliḥ (Uṣūthāth).} \]

\[ \text{dīkhā} \quad \text{(Rhet. 1362 a 21)} \quad \text{jawād (unknown).} \]

\[ \text{dīkhā} \quad \text{(Top. 107 a 5)} \quad \text{al-mahmūd (Dīmashqī).} \]

And in Ibn Nā‘īmah’s version of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle* which was polished up by Kitābī we find the non-Qur’anic expression of al-dhawar al-mahdī as the equivalent of the *summum bonum* of which Avicenna speaks in Persian as khaʿir awwal, and khaʿir hull, and khair mahdī.

Without wishing to exaggerate the role of Ibn al-Mugaffa 3, here also we have to go back to him and consider his *Treatise of Ethics and Politics* 4 to which reference has already been made. This is by no means a translation from Greek ethical texts. It therefore lacks the authenticity of direct translations. There is an element of religious teachings, though to a very limited extent. The main substance of the work could be probably traced back to one of those manuals of moral conduct and worldly wisdom known in Pahlawi literature as *Pand-nimeh*. But there are certain Greek ideas as well, directly or indirectly derived from Aristotle. Of special interest in this connection is his terminology. We find interspersed in the text quite a few ethical terms which are either wholly non-Qur’anic or different in grammatical form. Whether these were actually coined by him cannot be determined with certainty. Yet they antedate the Arabic renderings of the regular translators. There is a reference to darr al-akhwādī by which he means the various facets of human character. He speaks of al-’alâr aṣp wa al-ṣayyid wa al-nawwārawd. This last word could also be read al-mardāt in the absence of vocalisation to mean manliness. In either case it is a useful term of non-Qur’anic origin denoting a specific ethical value. He also has al-khawar-awdat. The word jārī which he frequently uses was adopted by the Translators thus:

\[ \text{dīkhos} \quad \text{(Metaph. 1025 a 12)} \quad \text{al-jārī (Mattā).} \]

\[ \text{dīkhā} \quad \text{(Metaph. 1013 a 24)} \quad \text{al-jārī (Uṣūthāth).} \]

Avicenna defines it in his *Ta’līqāt* 5 as “the dispensing of the good without the expectation of a reward”. More characteristic is the

1 Cf. MS. East Efendi. No. 3560.
2 Cf. MS. Aya Sofya. No. 2369.
term 'afṣif and 'iffah, the Qur'anic form of which was al-ta-'afṣif'.

The Translators used 'iffah for the almost untranslatable sophrosyne thus:

- ḥωροφονή (Categ. 8 b 34) al-'iffah (Išbān).
- σωφροσύνη (Top. 107 a 7) 'afṣif (Dimashqī).

though there was also

- μεγαλοφύσις (Rhet. 1366 b 2) al-'iffah (unknown).

Then comes al-ṭarawjud, al-mas'ulah, al-qurand wa al-uṣūrā't, al-wuṣur, al-arb, and al-sabbā'h. Of these some are entirely non-Qur'anic; others only in form. Sakkātaw naṣf al-raṣul and safrā' al-hjiq are among the phrases met with. The Translators used sakkā'h in the sense of liberality thus:

- ἡ λαμβανόμενη (Rhet. 1366 b 2) al-sabbā'h (unknown).

When and where the term actually originated is difficult to determine.

Not all the ethical terms of Fārābī and Avicenna have been published. The Istanbul libraries contain quite a few. And those of their successors have not yet been carefully studied. But as far as terminology is concerned they have little that is new or notable to offer. They generally follow the terms found in the Arabic renderings of Aristotelian Ethics just as in the case of logic and metaphysics. The Nichomachean Ethics had been put into Arabic 3. Perhaps more widely read and therefore of greater influence was Galen's commentary on the subject. An author whose name has long been associated with ethical essays is Miskawath. His books offer a happy blending of Greek ethics, Islamic manuals of morals, Indian wisdom and Islamic teachings. The most representative is his ḟadīdān Khirād 4. He also depended entirely on the Translators, and consequently adopted the established terminology.

A comprehensive study of the manner and form in which Greek technical terms were rendered in Arabic has to include the medical, mathematical, scientific and alchemical works which were translated. Of these highly interesting books which vary in size and importance there are a whole series of manuscripts in the Istanbul libraries. Not until they are carefully edited and compared with the original Greek texts can any definite idea be formed with regard to their terminology. Because of the greater interest in logic and metaphysics they have been so far neglected. A few attempts have indeed been made in connection with medical and mathematical treatises, but much more remains to be done in this field.

The subject cannot be dismissed without reference to two other sources of terminology. Neither has much to offer yet they both belong to the relevant literature. The first is represented by the numerous pseudo-Platonic and pseudo-Aristotelian treatises manuscripts copies of which may be found in the Istanbul libraries 5. We have the testimony of a number of authors to the effect that some of these were extremely popular in their day, and therefore of widespread influence. This was probably true more among amateurs and literary men than with the better informed philosophers. Not because the Falādisfah were in every case aware that their attribution to Plato and Aristotle was doubtful; but due to the fact that their materials were either unimportant or contrary to the fundamental principles of Greek philosophy as they knew it. And when the language is scrutinized we find hardly any new terms in them which the Translators had not already utilised. The treatises are known to be of Hellenistic authorship, though the Greek text of most of them have been lost. Nor is the translator specified in every case. It may be assumed, however, that they were executed by the regular translators. For that reason they conform with the established terminology. In one or two the names of Ḥuṣain and Thābit ibn Qurrah are added as the persons who put the work into Arabic. Since an eminent physician and naturalist like Rāzī quotes from one of them 6, and traces of others may be found in the writings of noted authors, they cannot be wholly disregarded. But as sources of terminology they are of secondary interest. To them may be added translations of Hermetic literature of which there are numerous specimens at Istanbul; particularly those of Bālänūṣ, or

1 Cfr. G. Flügel, Concordanza Corani Arabices, Lipsiae, 1842.
4 Cfr. Miss. East Foeni, Nos. 124, 1804, 3724, 3688, 3690; Aya Sofya, Nos. 2455, 2457, 2460, 2819, 2820, 2822; Ragip Paşa, Nos. 1282; Kütüphane, Nos. 1601, 1608; Suleymaniye, No. 872; Sultan Ahmed, No. 3107; Naqshimand, No. 2598, 4924; Universite, Nos. 7458, 6777; Damat Ibrahim Paşa, No. 1159; Haci Reşit Ağası, No. 640; Manisa, Nos. 1171, 5847; etc. etc.
Apollonius of Tyana. When it is noted that Ḫuṣaín was the translator of some of these, we are not surprised to find that the terminology has nothing uncommon to offer. The case of Kitāb Sīr al-ʿĀrāb known to the Latins as Secretum Secretorum is different in that the translator was Yabīṣa ibn al-Baṭrīq who was among the earliest to put Greek books into Arabic. Yet there also the terms are not sufficiently different to be of any significance.

Mention may also be made of the Kitāb al-Iqlīs, or Book of Causes, of Apollonius as found in Istanbul; as well as the allography of Salāmān and Abūl Ḥalīl under the title of Ḥijāb al-Ṣalāmān wa al-ʿAbāl. The introduction to the latter states that these two personages "lived in the days of Hermannus, the king, son of Heracias, the Sophist". It also confirms that the tale was translated by Ḫuṣaín ibn Ṣabīḥ from Greek into Arabic.

The terminology of medical, alchemical and mathematical works is of course a subject apart. But it might be emphasized that the Istanbul libraries are far richer on these matters than is generally supposed. Of Galen's medical books there are numerous specimens, and practically all put into Arabic by Ḫuṣaín himself. These include the compendia produced and taught in the medical school of Alexandria. Ḫuṣaín had studied them there then translated them under the title of Tawdīsī al-Ṯaḏārāḏǎnīyyīn li Kitāb Jaḏrān. Aside from those which Meyerhof edited a good many treatises await a patient and competent editor. Alchemical works are fewer in number and importance, but as far as terminology is concerned they are not any less interesting. This is because the terms are derived from Greek, Syriac, Arabic and Persian. Sometimes you find a strange medley of them all. Mathematical books are naturally more numerous and important than the alchemical.

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CHAPTER SIX

When compared to the Arabic language and the history of its philosophical terminology, Persian presents a lamentable picture indeed. The acknowledged richness of the first and the systematic manner in which it forged its technical vocabulary stand in marked contrast to the stunted state of the second and its haphazard formations. Yet no great knowledge of Persian is required to show that its potentialities far surpass those of Arabic.

The course which Persian philosophical terminology took was different from the very beginning. And in tracing it back to its original sources a distinction needs to be drawn between Pahlawi or Middle Persian and the New Persian which grew up after the Arab conquest. This is convenient although no hard and fast line divides the two periods. Furthermore because they represent states and stages of the same tongue, the linguistic problems which they pose are generally similar.

The specimens which have survived in Pahlawi literature extend over a relatively long stretch of time from before the conquest to centuries after it.

Translation of Greek philosophical works in some form or other appears to have started early, though it is not easy to determine the exact date. Of late Achaemenian times there are no records in that respect. The conquests of Alexander and the rule of the Diadochi introduced numerous Greek words into the Iranian language of the time, but there is no reason to believe that any of the philosophical works were translated. Such activities may have begun in a tentative way under the Parthians whose interest in Greek tragedy and Hellenic culture in general is well authenticated. Things clear up a little when the reign of the Sasanian dynasty is reached. According to the Fihrist Greek works were translated into Pahlawi as early as the rule of Ardashir.

Here we are met with a semi-historical figure by the name of Tansar described in the Denkart as abroh, or blessed. In two separate books Mas‘ūdi records that Tansar was a prince who became an

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3 p. 239.
4 Mərdj... Baghdad ed. p. 210; and Al-Tamih... Baghdad ed. p. 87.
ascetic and a Platonist "following the teachings of Socrates and Plato". There is also the treatise attributed to him called The Epistle of Tarsus. Western scholars have given little credence to this statement of Mas'udi. Others have tried to identify him as a person with Karit whose inscriptions at Ka'be-ye-Zartosht has aroused much interest. Of Ardashir himself there is a curious treatise at Istanbul entitled Nushkat ‘Ahd Ardeshir ibn Bâbâh. However that may be no doubts can be cast on the fact that during the reign of Shapir I, the son of Ardashir, and apparently by his directions, certain Aristotelian writings were translated and added to the collection known as Aπασιακ. The Fihrist relates these activities "until all those books were transcribed into Persian". This is confirmed by a lengthy statement in the Denkart which is the most important of extant sources on Zoroastrian theology, and dates in subject-matter from the late Sassanian period. Corroboration evidence comes from Barhebraeus and other minor sources, although in the view of an authority on the subject "it is somewhat difficult to believe that Aristotle's philosophy had received a Persian dress so early". With the illustrious rule of Chosroes I (531-578) we are on even firmer ground. There is the testimony of Agathias that the king was able to read Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides and Demosthenes in his own language. And that he had a Syriac physician by the name of Uranius who taught him Greek philosophy. Of the group of philosophers who betook themselves to the court of Chosroes when Justinian closed their school at Athens, Simplicius was the best known to the Persians and Arabs. His works were later translated into Arabic. From Damascius a treatise has survived. And from Priscianus there is a Latin version of the discussions which he had with king Chosroes on the subject of the soul and the views of Plato and Aristotle on its nature. Since Priscianus probably knew no other language than Greek, and there is no reason to believe that Chosroes knew much of that tongue, it may be supposed that the discussions were translated into Pahlavi or perhaps Syriac for the benefit of the monarch. Then comes Paulos Perva who on the authority of Barhebraeus translated Aristotle's Prior Analytics (whether into Syriac or Pahlavi) at royal request. Of him a general compendium on Aristotelian logic has survived in Syriac. This has been published with a Latin translation. In confirmation of all this, the Fihrist attests that in Sasanian times the Iranians had two separate scripts for writing down books on medicine and philosophy. Various Pahlavi texts in which Greek philosophical influence is beyond doubt have been adequately treated. Some have been transcribed and translated in extenso. Others have been edited and translated in whole. There is therefore sufficient material at hand to form some opinion of philosophical terminology in Pahlavi; particularly since extensive glossaries have been added in almost every case.

The first point to notice is the fact that as an Indo-European language Pahlavi suffers from none of the limitations pointed out with regard to Arabic, Syriac and the other Semitic tongues. It enjoys at the same time all the resources which Arabic benefited from in coming its technical terminology. This is not to say that the terminology of the two languages bear any comparison in extension, adequacy, or in the subjects treated. In Pahlavi there is nothing to equal Arabic terms in number, in significance, and in the varieties of thought. It is only to point out the potentialities which in its New Persian form equal those of any other language including Greek. The copula is there lending itself to every variety of ontological statement. Compounds abound in ever increasing numbers, such as
äššāšān, yataš-bihārih, abhar-dld, etc., etc. Prefixes n hū- and in dūs-, corresponding to the Greek en- and dus-, together with many others give precision to the thought or act, such as hùmēšmîn, hûkûţmîn, hûkâmîn, or hûdâhîn and hûtâdânîn. The privative a- expresses negation in the easiest of manners, such as amarqîn, abun, abīn, ađâshîn, though New Persian commonly employs other prefixes for that purpose. Suffixes describe process or activity in exactly the same way the -sîs does in the Greek pōleis. An example is dâtstān. Abstractions are constantly used especially those ending in -iš, dāntâh, gâvâth, vištâhûthîrîh, etc., etc. And the use of the infinitive as a noun, in the way that Greek does, is common. Finally the construction of the sentences with the copula coming often at the end is very similar to that of Greek. Again this is not to say that this form of construction is superior to the Arabic form which in fact is much more compact and terse. But it lends itself more easily when translating a Greek text.

The resources exploited when translating Greek terms into Pahlavi were no different from those of Arabic. New meanings were given to old words such as in the case of sahah, gûth, and dihur. Of loan-words zamân is particularly intriguing. Transcriptions are in the form of sofistāsh as sophist, or fûkošâsh as philosophers. An example of literal renderings is zamân-fasínânsh coming from the Greek geometria. Of words specially coined for the purpose, competent scholars have specified quite a few.

And yet Pahlavi philosophical terminology, as has come down to us in the various Zoroastrian books, cannot be studied with any degree of accuracy. The translators are not known by name. Nor can it be determined whether the renderings were from Greek directly or by way of Syriac, though the latter is much more probable. Hence the reason why those who have attempted to equate some of these Pahlavi terms with their original Greek equivalents have been forced to use the a priori method which we have deprecated in the case of Arabic. The conjectures may be quite correct, but there is no way of verifying them. Because the passages are fragmentary, the terms scattered here and there, and the method of translation appears hap-hazard, no definite judgements can be passed. As a guide they are of no help to those who may wish to follow their example.

1 Cf. Noldiche, Beiträge zur Gesch. des Alexzandervorlands.
CHAPTER SEVEN

With the Arab conquest which made Arabic the language of government administration for an extended period of time, and established it permanently as the medium of religious instruction and learned literature, New Persian emerges. This did not mean a complete break with the past. Pahlawi works continued to be written for centuries after among the remaining Zoroastrian community. Dialects and local speech persisting in little pockets of outlying districts preserved their archaic forms almost intact. And what the Iranians designated as "Zabîn-i-Darîh" came to occupy an intermediate stage between Sâsánian Pahlawi and the language generally current in the land. The elements of this "Zabîn-i-Darîh" which was so openly encouraged under the Sâsánians² still await careful study. But the New Persian that followed and which henceforth we shall call simply Persian, emerged with a wholesale admixture of Arabic words and phrases varying only in degree at different epochs and under specific rulers.

The genesis of philosophical vocabulary in this new medium appears far less fortunate when compared to that of Arabic. Aside from what took place in the Sâsánian period in the way of translations from Greek or Syriac into Pahlawi, there is no record of any Greek text (literary or philosophical) directly translated into Persian until modern times ⁴. Even the Diadessaron as a Christian text was put into Persian from a Syriac version ⁵. All that the Iranians possessed were the Arabic renderings of "Abâsîd times. To them should be added one or two translations made later exclusively from the Arabic versions ⁶. There was no solid basis therefore on which to build up the required terminology—no direct contact (as in the case of Arabic) with the primary sources which of course were Greek. However much Iranians may regret

¹ Cf. The introduction to Ta'wâmek-ye-Tafsîr-i-Tabari. ed. H. Yağmûr. P. 2

it, Persian philosophical language was handicapped from the beginning. It may be said to have started at second hand. Yet like its mother tongue Persian enjoys all the resources of Indoeuropean languages. The capacity to coin compounds gives it a theoretically unlimited field for development. This is important when recalled that in Greek the increase in compounds constituted a distinct feature in the creation of abstract vocabulary. "From Hesiod onwards there is no recognizable fundamental change. There is simply the adaptation of the language to various literary needs, a common factor throughout being the prolific formation of compounds ⁶. The same was true in Sanskrit. "In Bhagavadgîtâ ... various potentialities are accentuated by compounds ⁷." In Persian there is an added facility for such formations in that a term could be compounded out of a Persian and an Arabic word put together, or of two Persian words combined. For instance gosam-paśâr and baureh-paśâr mean exactly the same and were used as the equivalent of the Greek diæiretôs; except that the first is formed out of an Arabic and a Persian word, whereas in the second they are both Persian. Where the concept is not elementary but a complex thought the separate parts of these compounds have a significant way of expressing the idea.

Together with such developments went an excessive use of synonyms put side by side where one term was Arabic and its equivalent in Persian. This occurred chiefly in literary prose and sometimes in the philosophical as well. The peculiarity probably dates from the time when the people of Iran had became in a sense bilingual by submitting to the overwhelming influence of Arabic. Some understood and used the Arabic words. Others still adhered to the Persian equivalents. Consiously or otherwise literary men came to use both set of terms as synonyms putting one beside the other. This seemed one way of making themselves properly understood. Actually the practice persists to this day though the necessity for it has long disappeared.

Among the compounds formed to denote philosophical concepts we may note:

\[\text{andâzeh-girîn} \quad \text{i'tidâl} \quad \text{moderation} \quad \mu\text{tazâ'ib.}\]

The significance of prefixes in Sanskrit philosophical terminology has been discussed at length. In Persian it is not as highly developed though there is no reason why it should not be so. This method of coinage of new terms may be pursued with profit by those who undertake such tasks. It will be seen how Avicenna took the initiative along this path. These prefixes when added to the verbal root may be independent bearers of meaning, or could act as illuminants of the meaning inherent in the verb. They could also be cooperators with the verb in conveying the intended notion. Privation which was expressed in Pahlawi through the addition of the prefix a- just as in Greek, takes usually the form nā- in Persian. We thus have:

nā-dānīh jahāl ignorance ḫiyma
nā-gardandeh ghair-fāsid incorruptible ḫihratīs
nā-maḥbūd ghair-maḥfūd unlimited ḫamīstus.

Another common prefix is ham- to mean together: with, and corresponding to the Greek sun- or sun-, Sanskrit sun-, and Latin cum-. Example:

ham-finštīh mujādisah homogeneity σωρωνεια.

Strictly speaking Persian philosophical literature begins with Avicenna. The attempt to produce a treatise in the form and style of his Arabic al-Najāf is apparently the first book to be written in Persian on philosophy after the Arab conquest. It was called Dānish-Nāmeh-ye-'Ālīf in honour of the patron at whose request he undertook the work. In fact it is composed in what Iranians designated as sabān-i-darāh. As a tour de force the work arouses profound admiration. The creation of an as yet non-existent technical terminology could not have been an easy task. He applied himself to it with a zeal and ability which should prove a sufficient answer to those who cast doubt on his Iranian origins. By this bold act he was flouting the exclusive claims of Arabic in a manner which amounted almost to heresy. Unlike Berūnī who had insisted that Persian was definitely incapable of expressing scientific and philosophical thought adequately (since it lacked the linguistic potentialities for the purpose), 1 he affirmed his full faith in the language of his forebears. The fact that on completion of the work his patron failed to understand the terms, must have made him realize poignantly the sad state to which Persian had fallen. Not that he ever gave up writing in Arabic. His chief works are all in that tongue. Yet by the Dānish-Nāmeh and some minor treatises which may not all be authentic, he ably refuted the thesis of his contemporary scholar. What Berūnī said was correct as a statement of fact. Persian in his days was not sufficiently developed to express logical discussions or abstract reasoning. No equivalent terms existed in the field of medicine or mathematics. But to say that nothing could be done about it because of certain linguistic deficiencies was a surprising view from a man of his accomplishments. Consequently the study of philosophical terminology in Persian must begin with the Dānish-Nāmeh and needs to be based on a close analysis of its terms, verbal formations and expressions.

The first impression on the reader is the deliberate attempt of the author to reduce the Arabic words to the bare minimum. For that purpose the different methods noted in connection with Arabic are fully employed. Common words are given technical meanings. Loan-words are introduced from various sources. Transcriptions are adopted. And the existing vocabulary is enriched by constant coinage of new terms and phrases not met with elsewhere. Here it would be well to stress the fact that Avicenna was seriously handicapped in this work, in the sense that he did not know Greek or Syriac, at least for useful purposes. All he could do was to translate from the Arabic versions which had been made from the Greek, and in some cases from Syriac renderings of the Greek text. Hence what he produced was twice removed from the original. No wonder therefore that he was not always successful. As a literary exercise with the avowed object of replacing the Arabic terms by words derived from Persian roots, his work may be compared to the Shāh-Nāmeh of Firdowsī. There is nothing in the Dānish-Nāmeh 2

1 B. Heimann, op. cit.
on logic, metaphysics or the natural sciences which the author had not said far more precisely in his Arabic books. It cannot be doubted that his efforts in this connection were primarily linguistic and literary. But whereas Firdowsi could always fall back on the Pahlawi text of the Khodar-Nāmeh or what other amals he may have used for his sources, Avicenna could find no such help except in Arabic. Firdowsi had the possibility of enriching his vocabulary by borrowing freely from Pahlawi writings in prose and perhaps in poetry, or by coinage on the model of his predecessors. No such ways were open to Avicenna as far as is known. Finally Firdowsi was in a position to incorporate the introduction of Daqiqi which proved quite useful in the circumstances.

1. The common words to which Avicenna gives a technical meaning in his efforts to produce the necessary terminology for logic, metaphysics or the natural sciences are varied and numerous. They are sometimes in their usual form, at other times in the form of an abstraction, an adjective or an infinitive verb. They could be a single word or a compound. A few of the more felicitous may be tabulated here, remembering always that the Greek equivalents are given on an a priori basis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic Term</th>
<th>Greek Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agakik</td>
<td>αἰσθήσεως</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bāyast</td>
<td>ἀνάκεφα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barābar</td>
<td>ἀλ-άκσ,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ἀλ-μυθωγάδιλ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khāst</td>
<td>ἀράδα</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gamān</td>
<td>ψαμίμ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>afak Batch</td>
<td>ἀλ-νομος</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kakesh</td>
<td>ἀλ-νεύπαν</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kunesh</td>
<td>ἀλ-φι'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burinesh</td>
<td>ἀλ-γα'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gardesh</td>
<td>ἀλ-εστῆβαλαθ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geravādān</td>
<td>ἀλ-ταστίγη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nīsth</td>
<td>ἀλ-αδαμ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bāz-nemādan</td>
<td>ἀλ-σαρή</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bāyastēgh</td>
<td>ἀλ-ανυφή</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barābarīh</td>
<td>τασπόλου</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>birūnīth</td>
<td>ἀλ-ταράδη</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shīdak-nūnād</td>
<td>ἀλ-μομμίκον</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shnākkhetgh</td>
<td>ἀλ-μα'ρίσαθ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An illustration of Avicenna’s method of work may be gathered from the manner in which he treats the term for speculation. In his rendering of the Aristotelian Metaphysic Geoffrey of Viterbo had translated the Greek word thus:

**θεοπλασία.** (Metaph. 993 a 30) *nazar.*

All the other translators had done the same. Avicenna basing himself on the Arabic (which comes from the verb *nazar* meaning to see) translated it into Persian as *negareskh.* From it he formed a title to represent the science dealing with speculative problems. We thus have:

- *negareskh* *nazar* *speculation* **θεοπλασία.**
- *ilm ingāresh* *al-ilm al-nazar* *the speculative science* θεωρητική

In fact he treated the names of many of the sciences in a similar manner. Ex.

- *ilm-i-tarāz̄ah* *al-ilm al-nizān* *logic.*
- *ilm-i-harīn* *al-ilm al-ālā* *metaphysics.*
- *ilm-i-fishīn* *al-ilm mā qabl* *al-fašlīth* *economics.*
- *ilm-i-taḏbir-i-šāhshah* *manzil* *economics.*
- *ilm-i-taḏbir-i-šāhshah* *manzil* *ethics.*
- *ilm-i-taḏbir-i-šāhshah* *manzil* *ethics.*

**AfNar.** *Philosophical Terminology,* 5
II. Loan-words taken from other than Arabic are not very numerous in Avicenna’s Persian writings. But a good example is the term 甜甜 to mean the elements and their opposition to one another as such. What the origin of this term is, and from what language it entered into Persian, we are unable to say.

III. Avicenna’s transcriptions are taken from the Arabic and have nothing to recommend them. In fact they are apt to deteriorate in the process of transcription. His chief merit lies in the words that he coined, and these take different forms. The most conspicuous are the abstractions hitherto unknown in the language or extremely rare, though in perfect conformity with the linguistic rules of Persian. Examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Persian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>andakhi</td>
<td>al-aqalliyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biddhik</td>
<td>al-akhairyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pachik</td>
<td>al-taqaddum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>passik</td>
<td>al-ta’Abbik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baschik</td>
<td>al-ta’dul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behamani</td>
<td>al-tatiqiq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peyvasagh</td>
<td>al-itiqiq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dochik</td>
<td>al-ihtmaimiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juzwik</td>
<td>al-qairiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cherakik</td>
<td>al-lima’iyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chandik-yet</td>
<td>al-kam al-aqalliyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>peyvasach</td>
<td>al-ka’al al-ihtmaimiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chandik-yet</td>
<td>al-ka’al al-ka’al</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chegungik</td>
<td>al-ka’al al-ihtmaimiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kojik ²</td>
<td>al-a’in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kodamik</td>
<td>ayya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Cf. the Aristotelian Categories in Persian. Appendix 1.

IV. In coined new words Avicenna shows remarkable ability in the use of prefixes. This is particularly helpful in expressing some precise thought or action. Examples:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Persian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>andar-raidan</td>
<td>al-ta’awun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>andar-yafit</td>
<td>al-tidhik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ba-burden</td>
<td>al-tahill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Suffixes are much less used probably because there are not so many of them. One example which could equally well be counted a compound is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Persian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jaghir</td>
<td>al-mutamakkik</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Verbal forms employed as nouns are more frequent. Of these we have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Persian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>palayesh</td>
<td>al-tahiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tawenshe</td>
<td>al-qiwa’ah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>junbehe</td>
<td>al-hurukh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zayesh</td>
<td>al-ta’ullud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shayad-baden</td>
<td>al-tisamil, al-tamlik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parwaresh</td>
<td>al-tarbiyah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For an active agency we have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Persian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>junbaindeh</td>
<td>al-mubarruk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pazaindeh</td>
<td>al-qabil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amaindeh</td>
<td>al-munsiq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some words are kept in their Pahlavi form, such as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Persian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hatish</td>
<td>al-siayat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jdn</td>
<td>al-ruh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. The compounds coined by Avicenna are not as numerous as one would like or expect. This may be due to the fact that he was not translating directly from the Greek which would have surely influenced such formations but from Arabic which had none of it. Nor was he thinking out things in Persian. Examples:
CHAPTER EIGHT

Avicenna’s attempt to write philosophy in zabān-i-darīh found support from a not very distant source. Soon after him two Ismā’īlī philosophers produced works along their particular line of thought. But they made a similar and concerted effort to write in darīh Persian—perhaps with even greater consistency than Avicenna. They used as few Arabic terms as possible, coinings at the same time some of their own. They were not writing for patrons. It could not have been ordered that they should choose that idiom. Nor can we be sure that they were directly influenced by Avicenna’s initiative in that field although they were probably familiar with his writings. Nāṣir Khorrow specifically mentions his name in one connection. It might be supposed that Iranians in the eastern provinces of Persia were less learned in Arabic. Yet that was by no means a general rule. Some have claimed that Ismā’īlīs were more attached to Persian than others. Nevertheless we find some of their leaders writing in Arabic. However that may be, the contributions of these two men should be placed side by side with those of Avicenna in the creation of a distinctly Persian philosophical terminology.

Unfortunately only one book has survived from the pen of Ḡūr Ya’qūb-i-Sajastānī (fl. 360/971) 5. The Ismā’īlī heterodoxy which eventually grew into an Arabian, an Iranian and an Indian branch had its own special contributions to Persian literature. And for reasons more easy to imagine than ascertain most of the Iranian adepts chose to write in as pure a language as any in the land. As a result they left some valuable specimens of a comparatively chaste and remarkably clear prose. Theirs was not only attempt at this form of writing. Yet none was as consistent. We thus find Sajastānī coining new abstractions or reviving some of the old ones in very much the same fashion as Avicenna. A typical example is hūdēgīh to express the process of being.

Nāṣir Khorrow (b. 394/1004) was the more accomplished man and the greater thinker. Fortunately also more of his works have

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survived. We are consequently in a better position to assess his contributions to terminology. In number and resourcefulness what he coined are second only to those of Avicenna. It is interesting to observe that although he visited Arab lands and wrote a delightful book on his travels among Arabs he never wrote anything in Arabic as far as is known. Furthermore he tried to make his style and language as purely Persian as he could. All that must have been deliberate. Avicenna on the other hand never had direct contact with the Arab world and yet wrote his chief works in that tongue. Of course a distinction needs to be drawn between the ultimate purpose of each. Avicenna was primarily a philosopher with no particular desire to press his religious views on anyone. He could write with detachment and without much concern for the taste of his readers. Naṣīr Khosrow was openly a religious teacher. His interest in philosophy may be said to have been incidental. Consequently in Avicenna the terms are specifically philosophical. In Naṣīr Khosrow they border on the theological, and can therefore be ambivalent. For this reason his terminology has its dangers for those who wish to adopt them. M. Corbin has given is what is so far the best exposition of Naṣīr’s thought and language. Yet when he tries to equate them with Greek terms on a purely a priori basis he is often far from the mark. There is naturally no question of Naṣīr having known Greek. But he is well acquainted with Greek learning which he read in Arabic, sometimes giving the name of the actual translator. He owes in addition a great debt to Stoic philosophy the Arabic renderings of which have long been lost. Hence the reason why some of his terms are of Stoic origin.

Naṣīr’s prose is quite attractive and well worth copying with certain modifications. It never was the style commonly admired in Persia but it modernised it could become a model for authors of philosophical literature. He has many terms in common with Avicenna. Whether he owes these to his predecessor is very difficult to ascertain. His mode of expression is more relaxed and discursive and appears far more engaging than the stiff presentation of Avicenna’s Dānish-Nāme. He is also more argumentative, especially where he tries to refute Rāzī. That gives his Zad al-Munafīrin a liveliness and force which is not met with in the tedious repetitions of subsequent commentators.

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1 Cf. His introduction to Fadwa’ al-Iṣḥāmatān.

His personal contributions to terminology are what concern us most here. They are varied and sometimes remarkably to the point. Of course just like Avicenna he has no contact with the original Greek and translates from the Arabic. But even then he shows great understanding. He had obviously thought things for himself. There is no question of following his predecessors blindly. Among his abstractions we find:

Drastegeth  al-kamal  entelechy  ἐντελεχεία.
Deshdarta’th  guhār  manifestation.
A’th  kuwa’yyah  hennas a  a mystic term.
Chassandegih  biss al-madhāq  sense of taste  τὸ γευστήρ.
(Avicenna had said chashadeth):
Biyā’th, basaat-  biss al-shamm  sense of smell.
i-bayandeh  khasandegih  biss al-shams  sense of touch  ἐπίστημ.
Basawandeh  biss al-lams  (Avicenna had said biss-i-basawdih):
Kashsadegeth  al-muddah  extension of time κόσμος.
Chatish  al-shai’yyah  thinginess.
Chatish  al-mahyyah  quiddity, essence  τὸ ὁ ἐπιστήμ.
‘Im-i-agesh-bi-  al-im al-  innate know-
tanath  gharebīzī ledge.
Angisest  stimulation.

Among his compounds we have:
Fard-awardan  gawwama  to constitute δογματ.
Fard-awardan  taquil  constitution ἡ δογματ.
Hār-hard,  al-f ’il,  the process,  ἡ Ἀνίσως.
Hār-kunn,  al-f ’il  the active  ἡ δογματ.
Hār-fasir  al-manfa’il  agent, the  ἡ ἔνα.
Nā-chis-  al-fāṣid  the corruptible τὸ φαινόν.
Shawandeh

Among his use of prefixes we have:
Bāz-bastan  al-idfāvah  correlation  ἡ ἀναφορ.
Bāz-bastah  al-mudāf  correlated.
Bāz-justan  bābath, taʃābhus  investigation  τὸ οὐσία.
Bar-khūstan  al-fadawa  annihilation.
Nāṣir Khosrow is at his best when expressing different aspects of the concept of being for which Arabic had no terms, and also of existence. We thus have a whole series some of which are not met with in Avicenna nor elsewhere as far as we know. Examples:


For creation ex nihilo he has bādēsh-i ma-az-chīz. He has also the more common expression of afārinesh. We thus find hīn distinguishing between afārinesh-i taqīfīhī and afārinesh-i ʾibādātī. Not many of these terms were copied by his successors. They fell out of use when Persian philosophers for reasons not easy to explain reverted to the Arabic terminology of the ’Abbasid age. Attempts to write anything on or related to philosophy in zabān-i dārūr found little encouragement. Few if any continued the practice. What has survived from subsequent periods is saturated with Arabic terms and expressions. By the time we reach Nāṣir el-Dīn-i Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) it is observed that he deliberately abandons Avicenna’s Persian terms and adopts those he had used in his Arabic books. Nor does he pay any attention to the terminology of Sajastānī or Nāṣir Khosrow. In this manner he re-establishes the authority of the Arabic terms based on the early translations of Baghdad. There were, however, two distinct periods in the life of Ṭūsī. While still an Ismāʿīlī he wrote in a fairly pure Persian 2. He appears to follow the practice of earlier Ismāʿīlī authors. And when he became a Shiʿīte he abandoned all that and took to Arabic terminology with a definite consistency. His style remained clearly Persian but the terms were those of the Fālāsīfah. As a student and defender of Avicenna he had not much to offer himself. His Arabic commentary on the Ishaṣātī is full of Persianisms yet the terminology is conventional. The style becomes at times highly involved and obscure. Ṭūsī was a prolific author who wrote on a variety of subjects. Theology, philosophy, mathematics and astronomy engage his attention. On all these topics he discourses consummately and instructively without much claim to originality. In spite of recent efforts in Iran to revive his memory through a systematic study of

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The language of Afḍal el-Dīn-i Kāshānī (fl. 9/11 cent.) represents an intermediate stage between the darith idiom of Nāṣir Khosrow and the conventional Arabic terminology of Ṭūsī. Not much is known about this philosophical author and commentator. An increasing number of his books are coming to light 3. More remain in the libraries of Istanbul 4; not to mention other repositories of ancient manuscripts. It is believed that like Ṭūsī to whom he was closely related, he was originally an Ismāʿīlī. Whether he likewise renounced his affiliation to this heterodoxy later in life is not definitely known. On the basis of his extant writings Afḍal el-Dīn (better known as Bābā Afḍal) may be considered among the few who wrote philosophy in a mixture of darith and modern Persian. He persists in using terms of Iranian origin and roots in the fashion of Avicenna, Sajastānī and Nāṣir Khosrow but not so rigorously and consistently. In consequence he does not sound so archaic to the modern reader. That is why so eminent a poet like the modern editor of his commentary on the Aristotelian De Anima 4 has such high praise for his style. He is not in any sense original in his choice of words. No new terms were coined by him as far as we know. What makes his writings appear more engaging and comprehensible is the fact that he frequently gives the darith expression and its equivalent Arabic term side by side. This is of special value in this discussion. It helps to trace the history of philosophical language in Persian. In fact he is explicit in distinguishing between the darith idiom and the Arabic. In one connection he says “rasa ... is termed chūsh in the darith language 5”. This statement puts us in a position to assert that at his time darith was still a distinctly specified genre fully recognised in literary estimations. Furthermore it helps us to form some idea of what constitutes darith, at least as far as philosophical language is concerned. The measure of purity(by far which we mean the percentage of Persian words as compared to the Arabic) is not in itself a definite criterion. It can easily

vary in different cases without necessarily departing from the original genre. It would perhaps be more correct and convenient to base our judgement on the technical terms concerned. Where they are of pure Persian origin as coined by Avicenna, Nisj Khosrow and others, the language may be considered zabani-darsh; and where the terminology is Arabic as established by the Baghdad translators and the Falsafah who followed them, the language may be taken as modern Persian. To call it farsh is not quite correct because farsh is sometimes applied to darsh as well.

In his works on logic, psychology and metaphysics Bihâj Afdal repeatedly resorts to the practice of giving the darsh and Arabic terms together as equivalents. We thus have:

fesâd wa tabdilâh — ra'y-i-sultânâh wa al-ra'y al-mubahâd — beham âmâdan wa i'tilîf — nâmîs wa fazâyânâd — az quwwâtâsânây yâ az kâr-khardânâm — pâyânâzgân wa baqâ — bâldân wa nâmow — nâmow wa fazâyânâs.

Although his modern editors have produced good elisions of his chief philosophical works, he awaits a competent scholar ready to make a thorough study of him. By giving him his due in both the literary and philosophical fields he might grow in stature. We believe he will come to occupy a more important position than he is generally given nowadays. His writings abound in happy phrases. The fact that he was rationally inclined is testified by such statements as: "Har quwwati he be-harrad yâfeh shauad adâb wa farhang khânamâd 1."

If Suhrawardi (d. 598/1191) drew freely on the religion of ancient Iran in propounding his Hijamât al-Ishâqî, his style was no less influenced by the language of that country. Yet he adopted Arabic terminology in almost all of his philosophical works. His vocabulary abounds in abstractions which are the direct result of Persian, but he does not attempt to write in darsh. This is because his chief works on logic and metaphysics are in Arabic and there was no occasion for him to use the darsh terms coined by his predecessors. He perhaps much more than Avicenna is a Persian writing in Arabic. If his philosophy never took root on genuine Arab soil his language was just as responsible for that as his thought. Aside from uncommon abstractions he employs adjectival forms 'arely if ever met with in classical Arabic. We thus have: "Al-jauhariyyah

1 Íbid. p. 95.

handilîyyat qa'unî al-mûhîfîyyah wa hîya i'tîbârîyyah". And again "al-syurât al-idrâhîyyah 2.

Curiously enough he was anxious to develop a logic of his own to be known as Ishâqî logic. Not that he rejected Aristotelian and Stoic logic, but he suggested various modifications and additions. For these he had special terms which we have not seen elsewhere and are presumably of his coinage. As for example al-qâdiyat al-battâtah and al-qâdiyat al-muddâthah. In his discussion of syllogisms he repeatedly speaks of the Ishâqî principles (ga'idat al-Ishâqî-qiyyas) as distinct from the Aristotelian. In one section he tries to prove that the Peripetric views on conversion (al-`abî) are false.

The special terminology of Suhrawardi (i.e. what differed from those of Avicenna) had hardly an echo in the Arab world. But they were copied by the Ishâqîs who followed him in supporting this distinctly Iranian trend in Islamic thought. Not least among them is Shahrzâd whose works await publication and study. The Istanbul libraries have more than one manuscript of his Fâridh al-Ishânâd 3, of his Nusht al-Arâsh 4, of the Al-Sijjassat al-Ishîhîyyah 5, and of the Kitâb al-Rumûz wa al-Amâth 6.

The allegorical tales of Suhrwardi 7 stand in a class apart. They are in a fairly pure Persian, but their terminology belongs to the literature of mysticism which does not concern us here.

Although learning and scholarship managed to exercise influence, originality of thought and expression suffered a severe setback from Suhrwardi onwards. A number of minor logicians and philosophers continued to appear here and there in Iran. These either wrote exclusively or chiefly in Arabic. There was Athir el-Dîn el-Abharî (d. 669/1274); then 'Adad el-Dîn el-Tîbî (d. 736/1335); then Qub el-Dîn el-Shirâzî (d. 766/1365); then Sad el-Dîn el-Târlâzî (d. 791/1386); then Seyyid Sharif el-Jurfânî (d. 816/1413). Their works are well represented in the manuscript libraries of Istanbul. Some works have been repeatedly published 8. Perhaps the most interesting among them as far as this study is concerned was 'Umar ibn Sahlân el-Sâwi who as a devoted disciple of Avicenna rated him far

1 Cf. Yeni Cevir, No. 468; Basij Paşa, No. 799.
2 Cf. Ayûn Sûfîn, No. 717; Université, No. 936.
3 Cf. East Ezîndî, No. 1191; Université, No. 2824; Sultan Almât III.
4 Cf. Yeni Cevir, No. 2182, 3149.
6 Cf. Brockelmann, G.A.L.
7 Cf. Yeni Cevir, No. 468; Basîj Paşa, No. 799.
8 Cf. Yeni Cevir, No. 717; Université, No. 936.
above everybody else. In a special treatise apparently as yet unedited he attacks Abū al-Barākāt in the strongest terms for failing to understand Avicenna properly. Sahlān al-Sāwī wrote on logic and metaphysics in both Arabic and Persian. He has also a continuation of the history of the philosophers first begun by the Saqādat of Baghdad and later completed by Bihāqī. Although the manuscripts are not specific on that point, the authorship of this continuation of the history may be confidently attributed to Sahlān al-Sāwī. Some of his Arabic works and especially the al-
Baṣīrī were published long ago. Now his Persian treatises on logic are being carefully edited. As the list at the end of Dr. Dānish-Pajūsh’s edition shows, Sahlān adopted the Arabic terminology of Avicenna rather than the darīh terms of his Dānish-Nāmeh. This was because by that time Arabic had asserted its supremacy for various reasons. Yet his style is remarkably clear. The sentences are short and precise. Occasionally he has happy terms of Persian origin but they are not his own. They are obviously derived from his predecessors.

In the field of ethics the quest after terms of Iranian origin is far less rewarding. The different works on the subject stemmed from three separate sources. First came the pand-nāmeh of which there were various specimens in Pahlawi literature, and which we find so ably reflected in the ḥaṣād khwārī of Miskawayh. Then they had the Arabic translations of Aristotelian ethics supplemented by Stoic, Neoplatonic and Peripatetic treatises. And third were manuals of Muslim religious teachings. The last two seem to have imposed their Arabic terminology in a manner that left little scope for any Persian terms which may have come by way of the pand-nāmeh. Consequently almost all Persian works on ethics abound in Arabic terms. Occasionally we find departures from the general rule but they are not consistently maintained. Books like the K̲imšt̲-ye S̲aʿādí-d̲āt̲ of Ghażālī, the Aḥk̲aḥi-yi N̲ār̲i of Ẓ̲ūs̲̄i,

and the subsequent renditions of Dawwānī almost invariably employ Arabic terms whether philosophical or of religious provenance. The libraries of Istanbul contain numerous Persian treatises on ethics and morals yet the terminology is practically the same. Linguistically a little more interesting are mathematical, astronomical and alchemical works. In these the terminology is generally Arabic but not without stray contributions from Persian. In a treatise on Indian arithmetic we find a few useful terms and expressions which could easily be revived to-day. The mathematical manuals of people like Tusi are predominantly Arabic in terminology because they are based on Greek mathematics in the form in which they were translated in ‘Abbasid times as well as Arabic books on the subject written by Iranians. These are believed to contain new and original materials as in the mathematical tracts of ‘Umar Khayyām but there was obviously no attempt to write mathematics in the darīh idiom if that indeed were possible.

On astronomy a prize work has apparently escaped us. In a manuscript collection at Nur-osmaniye library there is an interesting treatise on the subject. In the introduction we find it stated that “this is a book which Mīhānķurd translated. He who translated the astronomical books of Zoroaster in the days of Abū Muslim the possessor of rule. He said I translated this book from among the books of Zoroaster . . . and I did not come across any . . . containing the philosophical sciences . . . For when Alexander conquered the kingdom of Darius the king, he had them all translated into the Greek language. Then he burnt the original copies which were kept in the treasure-houses of Darius, and killed everyone whom he thought might be keeping away any of them. Except that some books were saved through the protection of those who safeguarded them. And he who could escape from Alexander by running away to the islands of the seas and the mountain tops. Then when they returned to their homes after the death of Alexander they put into writing those parts that they had memorized. What they wrote down from memory was fragmentary.

Cl. ed. of Muhammad Shafi’ and Kerm ‘Ali separately.
Cl. Aya Sofya. No. 2483; Lalağür. No. 2360.
Tabārā, ed. Muḥammad Taqī Dānish-Pajūsh. Tehran, 1337. A.H.
Cl. ibid.
Cl. Aya Sofya No. 1747 and other copies; ed. Badawi.
ed. J. Humdâr.
Cl. Fathâb. No. 5417 and other copies; various editions.
No. 2860.
Much of it had passed away and little had remained. So Mähânkârd translated what still survived by his time—when the rule of the Persians fell to the Arabs. And the translations which he made from these were from the language of the din-tarih to the language of Persian darih (al-lughat al-farsiyyah al-darîyyah). Then later Sa‘îd ibn Khuršûn-khurrrc translated them into the Arabic language in order that this science should not fall into desuetude and its outlines should not be wiped away... Mähânkârd translated it for Mâhîyeh ibn Mâhânâhîh al-Marzîn... When Sûmbâl the Isphârîn saw that the language of the Persians had lost its usage and the language of the Arabs had outstripped other languages... he wished that this mystery [i.e. of astronomy] should be exposed in the Arabic language in order that its knowledge may be rendered more easy... and these two books used to be handled by the treasure-keepers and read in the din-nâmîh 14.

Various historical facts may be deduced from this passage. What concerns us is the further evidence that Persian darih was a specific idiom known as such to Iranians and Arabs alike. And that there were books on astronomy in that idiom containing presumably its own darih terminology. Of this, however, little seems to have survived for in the Arabic rendering of Khuršûn-khurch there are few terms of Persian origin. The more commonly used are al-nemnâd which in plural becomes al-nemnâdür; then al-nilîy; and al-hâdhdhôl which in an adjectival form become al-nilîyîyah and al-hâdhdhôlîyîyah. One category of stars are designated as al-kharâbî al-bîyâbânîyîyah. This may refer to the planets which the translators of Baghdad had rendered into al-mutahhâyiyyah. And al-rishâhîn is given as the name of the largest of the fixed stars. In the majmû‘ which is herein this treatise is found the first is in Persian and also on astronomy yet the terminology is almost invariably in Arabic. The fourth is a curious Arabic treatise entitled Kitâb al-Darâjât al-Ma‘rîfah be Dini Mâsî ibn Sâhîr. Whether it was executed by a member of this famous family of ‘Abbâsid Baghdad or simply translated at their command is not clear. It purports to be mangibân min bûhûmîh al-Hind wa bûshîhim. The contents could be more correctly described as astrological; and were copied at a much earlier date than the rest of the volume. The paper and script are older and seem to have been accidentally bound up with

the other treatises in one single tome. The introduction to astronomy commonly called Maddhâl Kâshîyeh 1 by a man whose name betrays an Iranian origin 2 is in Arabic though it employs the Persian astronomical terms mentioned above. And if Bûrûnî feels compelled to resort to Persian in certain parts of his Qânîn al-Mu‘rîdî 3 it is because the astronomical terms had been already established. In the Kitâb al-Ta‘fîmî fi al-Nujâmî 4 the tables are in his mother-tongue. He was only following the general practice. Otherwise he insisted that Persian was linguistically incapable of developing a scientific language of its own 5. There is, however, a Persian translation of the Kitâb al-Ta‘fîmî well worthy of publication 6.

Of Persian works on alchemy there is a representative collection in the library of Haci Beşir Ağa 7. Here we have a number of treatises by Tansalîshîh-i Bâbulî referred to in the Fihrist, and by various others. Though the contents are somewhat intriguing the terminology is generally in Arabic and of no great novelty. The subject is treated in prose as well as in poetry.

Scientific and medical books in Persian also deserve some attention although this study is not directly concerned with them. Of the voluminous collection of Dioscorides on plants there had been more than one Arabic translation. The libraries of Istanbul contain a number of manuscript copies of the early translation executed in ‘Abbâsid Baghdad 8. Among them is a copy of particular interest to us 9. Aside from the fact that it is beautifully written with some remarkable hand-painted illustrations, it is immediately followed by a Persian version of the book. The copy of the Arabic translation is dated 866 A.H. and the Persian rendering is said to have been made in 896 A.H. i.e. one year later. The terminology is worthy of note. While Arabic terms predominate Greek and Syriac names are frequently introduced. The translator admits that he knew neither of these two languages and that he

3 Cf. Yunus Ağa, Qoyun Müsûlim, No. 160.
4 Cf. Sultan Ahmet, H. I. No. 3477, 3478.
6 Cf. Nursumâniyî, No. 2780.
7 Cf. No. 949, Sîleymaniye Library.
8 Cf. Aya Sofya Nos. 3702-3704; Sultan Ahmet, Nos. 2337, 2147.
9 Sultan Ahmet, No. 2147.
met with many difficulties in his work. He obviously relied on the Arabic rendering, but seems to have attempted some acquaintance with either the original Greek text or with a Syriac version of it. Furthermore he does make a serious and consistent effort to use as many terms of Iranian origin as possible. He happens to find some happy equivalents for the Arabic terms and plant-names. This, however, could hardly justify considering the work as a whole in the darīh idiom. Having chosen terminology as a criterion it might be more correct to call it a good and rather chaste specimen of New Persian.

Persian books on medicine are numerous. Perhaps the most interesting from the purely linguistic point of view is the Dakhīr̄- xe-Khārazmshāhī (written in 504/1110) by Ismā'īl al-Jurjānī. In copies of this work also the libraries of Istanbul are quite rich. The introduction to this encyclopedia of medical science leaves little doubt that the author was making a deliberate attempt to write in the darīh idiom. Modelled on the Qānūn of Avicenna, and with frequent quotations from him, Rāzī, Ibn Ḥindī and various others, he clearly states that “it was written in Pārsīh n order that by the blessings of his rule [i.e. of his patron Qutb al-Dīn-i Khārazmshāh] the usefulness of this book may be extended to everyone”. This clearly indicates that in his time at least there were men in the medical profession who were not sufficiently conversant with Arabic. The book is followed by a Qaraβădin and a Tatīnme-h-xe-Dakhīr̄. It is further added that “although this service came to be rendered in Pārsīh there are [in it] Arabic terms which are well-known, and the meaning of which most people understand, and which in Arabic it is more easy to express. Such a term was recorded in Arabic so as to avoid a laboured style, and in order that it should be more fluent to the tongue . . . The majority of the terms, however, have been stated in Pārsīh so that nothing should remain undisclosed”. In this context and on the basis of the work as a whole the designation Pārsīh can be justifiably equated with the darīh idiom. In fact it may well be supposed that the author had a personal preference for it with an inner desire to help its propagation. He at the same time found it convenient. The language is fairly pure and therefore of linguistic value. Since he frequently gives both the Arabic term with its Persian equivalent, useful comparisons can be made. We have not gone through the entire work, but judging from those parts which we have read it is doubtful that the author contributed any terms of his own. He cannot be credited with any, though he shows a marked preference for the darīh forms. He speaks of the “gouhar-i-lan, cheh-chesh, che-gaengh, narīh wa mãdeeqīh, gūneh, nā-sadandeh, nā-saadendegīh, tabāh-cha-wandeh, jīyghā, hūshandeh, peyvaandeqīh, yek-sān wa mutahsīshīh”. Although he uses both mâddāh and mâyēh, he prefers the latter which is historically the earlier form. He says “in chahār mâyēh-rā be tālī arēn gāyand wa ‘anārīr”. We also find archaisms such as zafān for zabān. Of these a few may be due to the influence of some special dialect.

Another medical book in the library of Aya Sofya can claim a place in the history of Persian technical terminology. There are two books on anatomy lying there. The first is in ordinary New Persian and not of great linguistic significance. The second is a unique manuscript which deserves careful study. Its existence was announced to the learned world a few years ago. Although the title is simply given as The Book of Anatomy it appears to be a compendium of Chinese medicine translated into Persian. Chinese terms appear in abundance. The method of their transcription into Persian should be of added interest to specialists. The terminology, however, is mainly in Arabic yet in some cases the darīh is preferred. Since a careful edition of this work is being definitely planned we need not go into further details. The introduction to the book is particularly instructive. It throws light on the cultural relations between China and Iran.

In literary and historical works attention is naturally directed to the vocabulary. Generally speaking there is no technical terminology involved. We have in this connection come across what seems to be another unique manuscript this time lying in the library of Topkapi-sarayi. It is a translation of the Kalilah wa Dimnah in what is specifically stated to be darīh Persian. It is different from the version of Abī al-Ma‘ālī Naṣr al-Ālāh ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd executed at the order of Bahārān Shīḥ of Ghzānah in the 14th. century; or

2 Aya Sofya. No. 3596.
3 Khūth al-Tasbūkh.
4 Xeniler No. 4774.
5 Of this book there are numerous MS. copies at Istanbul.

Aynān, Philosophical Terminology, 6
the much later and far less faithful rendering of Ḥussein Wāḥīd-i Khāsfeh in the 16th. century under the title of Amdwār-i Subeili. As far as we know this little volume has escaped the attention of scholars so far. The translator gives his name as Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah al-Bukhāri and the work was undertaken at the request of Atābak Abū al-Maṣūfa Gūṣū ibn Zangi ibn Aṣqunṭar, the Seljuk prince of Damascus. Since this ruler came to power when his father 'Imād al-Dīn Zangi ibn Aṣqunṭar was killed in 544/1146 A.D. and he himself died in 544/1149 A.D., the translation must have been completed sometime between these two dates. The princes were among the Atābaks of Mawjil whose sway extended over Damascus and Aleppo. The manuscript is dated 642 H. i.e. almost exactly a hundred years after the completion of the work. Little is known about the translator himself but he claims to have written other books as well. In the introduction he explains the circumstances in which the work was undertaken. 'The translator . . . looked into the state of this book which had been rendered into the language of Pers from the language of the Greeks; and to the beginning of which the story of Burāzhayh, the physician, was added. And since it had been interpreted from the language of Pers which is an obscure language into the Arabic tongue which is the most accomplished of languages . . . the sovereign ordered me to translate it into the darīkh tongue. I also added an introduction to it'. From the above remarks it is gathered that to the translator the original text was believed to be Greek and not Indian, though he later describes the manner in which it was brought from India to Iran. Furthermore reference is made to the language of Pers which in this context means Pahlavi. He admits that that had become ghudmād i.e. obscure and difficult to understand. This describes the state of Pahlavi in his days, as well as the esteem in which Arabic was held presumably because of its religious associations. Finally we have yet another evidence of the existence of darīkh as a specific idiom, and of its propagation at the court of a Seljuk ruler in Damascus. Hence the geographical limits of darīkh

extended beyond the strict boundaries of Iran, whether to the East or the West. It was appreciated by kings and courtiers who never claimed an Iranian origin.

This rendering of the Kābūlah wa Dimmāh might be edited in all its archaisms and peculiar orthography. Once the work is completed it can be profitably compared with the better-known and highly valued rendering of Nāṣr Allah ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd of which there are some beautifully illustrated copies at Istanbul. Should a list of its special vocabulary be drawn up as expected, we shall be in a position to determine what constitutes a darīkh text as distinct from the ordinary New Persian which is the language of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd's version. Even a hasty glance can disclose phrases couched in pure Persian worthy to be revived amidst the confusion and uncertainty which are made marked features of literary Persian to-day. And when compared to the pompous verbosity of Amdwār-i Subeili we are made painfully aware of the sad decline in taste.

In Qur'ānic exegesis we have the translation of Tabari's well-known work. Of this the first volume has been edited under the title of Tarjumah-y Ta'fsīr-i Tabarī. The introduction to this valuable specimen of early Persian prose specifies that it was a joint undertaking embarked upon in compliance with the wish of the Sāmānī prince Mansūr ibn Nūh. The names of the translators are given. It may be supposed that they represent the leading literary figures of their part of the country and epoch. What is important to note here is the fact that it is expressly stated to be in the darīkh idiom. There is a consistent attempt to use as few Arabic words as possible, though it is by no means in pure Persian. We thus have a genuine example of darīkh prose emanating from Transoxiana for our consideration.

The translation of Tabari's monumental history, on the other hand, executed on the orders of the same Sāmānī prince Mansūr ibn Nūh by Abū ʿAli al-Bal'ami, is not specifically stated to be in darīkh. The work ends with the plain remark that "this book was compiled by Abū Ja'far ... al-Ṭabarî in Arabic, and was translated
into Pārsik by Abū ‘Ali... ‘Abd Allāh al-Bā‘amī, the vizier of Abū Śāhī Manṣūr ibn Nābū... al-Sāmānī’ 1. Hence the translation of this history of which there are excellent manuscripts in the libraries of Istanbul is said to be in the Pārsik style and language. Here again Pārsik must be equated with darīsh. This should not be considered a general rule. The two terms are not synonymous in every case. There seems, however, little doubt that their effort to revive Iranian life and letters the Sāmānids chose the darīsh idiom and openly encouraged its propagation. They must have had good reasons for this deliberate act of choice. None was better than the fact that it was the nearest and most faithful to the spirit and letter of the original tongue of the Iranians. To that may be added the constant fear that Arabic should eventually eliminate Persian completely as a medium of serious literature.

Having cast a rapid glance at Persian technical terminology and a corresponding literary and historical vocabulary, we return to philosophical literature. This is in order to assess a series of treatises attributed to Avicenna and written not in the darīsh idiom like his Dānish-Nāmah but in ordinary New Persian. These writings as found in the Istanbul libraries 2 pose a definite problem. Are they to be accepted as authentic works? And if so does that mean that he wrote in both darīsh and New Persian what he chose to translate from his chief Arabic books? They contain little that is new. In fact they are mostly paraphrases from the Shahīd with elaborations meant to clarify and explain different points. It is hard to believe that Avicenna deemed it advisable or convenient to write in both idioms. There was no special reason for that. He had already established his position as the leading philosopher of the time by his numerous Arabic works. At the request of the ruler of Ispahān he had produced a rendering of the Nādīr in darīsh Persian. This was also the chosen idiom of the Sāmānids in Transoxiana. For whom then did he wish to write in New Persian? Such considerations incline us to the belief that the abovementioned treatises were never written by himself. They are the work of students and disciples falsely attributed to the master in order to gain authority and acceptance. There have indeed been many such cases. And

because there was nothing in them that was contrary to the teachings of Avicenna, they could easily pass as his own. Only occasionally do we find the name of the translator specified 3.

Side by side with these miscellaneous treatises bearing the name of Avicenna are a host of others written by minor authors without any claim to originality 4. The point to stress in this connection is that they are all in New Persian, employing the established Arabic terminology with hardly any alterations. All attempts to write in darīsh appear to be permanently discarded. This is best exemplified in the writings of Dawdānī of which there are numerous manuscripts in Istanbul 5. Literary historians may be tempted to explain the reasons which brought about the total eclipse of darīsh. For our purpose it is sufficient to take note of this unexpected development which must have disappointed the enthusiasts at the court of the Sāmānids dynasty. But neither they nor their patrons lived to witness this important change in style and language.

Reference should be made in this connection to yet another work found in the Aya Sofya library. 6 This is a voluminous compilation entitled Kīṭāb Aqṣārād al-Sīrāfī fī ʻIm al-Risālah. Although the title is in Arabic the book itself is in a pleasant style of New Persian. The author gives his name as Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī... al-Zahrī, al-Kāṭūb al-Samārqandī; and states that he undertook the work at the request of his patron Abū al-Muṣaffār Qaḥš Jumgāžī. The manuscript which may well be unique is unfortunately incomplete. It is, however, quite old and fairly legible at the same time. Whoever the author or his patron may have been, the compilation contains useful and interesting materials which are of worth study and publication. The language is not in darīsh though there is frequent use of terms derived from pure Persian roots.

Muḥammad b. Qaḥš Jumgāžī was by common consent Persia’s outstanding philosopher in modern times. Yet he chose to write most of his books in Arabic. In these he employs the already traditional terminology of the Translators and the Falāṣīfah. What distinguishes his writings from those of his predecessors is the excessive use of abstractions some of which are not met with elsewhere. As in the case of Avicenna this was due to the direct influence of Persian.

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1 Cf. MS. Aya Sofya, No. 3054.
3 Cf. Aya Sofya, Nos. 4562, 4829; Fatih, No. 5117.
4 Cf. Topkapı-sarayi, Sultan Ahmet III, No. 3063.
5 Cf. Aya Sofya, No. 4561; Fatih, No. 5207; Ragip Paşa, No. 1774.
6 Cf. Ragip Paşa, No. 1478.
7 Cf. Ragip Paşa, No. 2844.

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APPENDIX ONE

1. The different equivalents coined for the copula:

τὸ ἐλάνων (Metaph. 1019 a 4) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ ἐλάνω (Metaph. 998 b 23) καθιστήμα (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ ἐλάνω (Metaph. 993 b 31) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ ἐλάνω (Metaph. 1042 b 26) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ ἐλαύνων καὶ μὴ ἐλαύνω (Metaph. 1006 a 4) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ ἐλαύνω (Metaph. 991 a 2) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ ἐλαύνω (D. An. 412 b 8) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ ἐστι (Metaph. 1042 b 25) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ μὴ ἐλαύνω (Metaph. 1043 a 1) καθιστήμα (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ μὴ ἐλαύνω (Metaph. 1010 a 17) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ δὲ (Metaph. 1005 a 13) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ δὲ ἀνακώνω (Metaph. 994 a 2) αἰτία (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ δὲ (Metaph. 1003 a 30) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῳ)

τὸ δὲ (Metaph. 1027 b 29) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῃ)

τὸ ἐλαύνω (Top. 121 a 21) ἀληθῆ (Ἀστάτῃ)

2. Different renderings of the Aristotelian Categories:


The earliest rendering into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffa: ١

١ According to the MS. of the St. Joseph University, Beirut.
APPENDIX TWO

A review in some detail of a few of the more important terms of logic and philosophy. This shows the manner in which they were tentatively chosen, then gradually approved and accepted by other translators. In the final stage they were established through their usage by the Falsafah, resulting in almost universal adoption by successors.

1. ADAB

This happy term which is not of Qur'anic origin appears to have found its way into philosophical language at an early date. Among the translators we have:

\[
\text{الاب} (\text{نبع}) \\
\text{الأدب} (\text{مقدسة}) \\
\text{الاب} (\text{بلاغة})
\]

Among the early kāmilās who actually may have been the first to introduce it into the language, 'Abd al-İhamīd \(^1\) uses: ‘ادب - الدوين - الدب

Ibn al-Maqaffa' says \(^2\) that the adab is clearly the highest of the arts.

Among the Falsafah the word is hardly ever used by Kindi. But Fārābī states \(^3\) that in Falsafah the adab is clearly the highest of the arts again. In the Ṣanad of the Brethren of Sincerity \(^4\) it is remarked that the adab is the highest of the arts... It is used by al-Farabi and by al-Farabi and by Ibn al-Maqaffa. Subsequent to these authors, and in the works of Avicenna particularly adab becomes an established term of philosophy. A parallel development brought about its use...

until it came to represent belles-lettres in general, together with various other connotations. To-day its meanings are varied as they are numerous.

In Persian it first had the sense of learning. In the Ḥādīs-Nāmeh, written when Iran was still bilingual, آثار و نامه are used as synonyms. Later it came to mean education and culture in the broadest sense. Bābā Afḍāl asserts that: مروق قد به خور داشته شود، which of course he took to mean Adb or Afḍāl himself.

2. AL-IRĀDAH

This is a Qur'ānic word which was given a specific connotation in philosophical language that it did not possess in the original. The Translators used it for the following Greek equivalent: 

الآثار (تلمذ) (Top. 146 b 6)
الآثار (تلمذ) (Top. 126 a 13)
الآثار (تلمذ) (D. An. 424 b 2)

It already appears in the sense of will-power in the writings of ʻAljālānī and Ibn al-Muqaffa’ā. The Translators who were generally much indebted to these two authors may have copied this special meaning of the word from them, though there is no direct evidence to that effect.

Among the Fāḍālāfīkh we find Kindi defining it thus: ʻالآثار هم گویید می‌پیامدها، پیامدها گویید می‌پیامدها، در این کیمیاء از دیگر که حاصل از این که. Fārābī enlarges upon that: statement: "الآثار هم گویید می‌پیامدها، پیامدها گویید می‌پیامدها، در این کیمیاء از دیگر که حاصل از این که. Fārābī goes further saying: "الآثار هم گویید می‌پیامدها، پیامدها گویید می‌پیامدها، در این کیمیاء از دیگر که حاصل از این که. Averroes is vague when saying: "الآثار هم گویید می‌پیامدها، پیامدها گویید می‌پیامدها، در این کیمیاء از دیگر که حاصل از این که. Averroes likes to specify 14 that the phrase is equivalent to مروق قد به خور داشته شود, but likes to specify 18 that the phrase is equivalent to مروق قد به خور داشته شود.

3 Cl. Musaaffa’. Cl. Minowil, p. 95.
4 Cl. Rūṣtī’s al-Bulāgha, p. 178.
6 Muṣnūt al-Fāḍīla, p. 300.
7 Tāḥfīz, p. 9.
8 Shibād, p. 438.

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Suhrāwādī distinguishes between: ʻالآثار هم گویید می‌پیامدها، پیامدها گویید می‌پیامدها, Mullā Shadrā tells of the differences in opinion when viewed as a religio-philosophical problem. مروق قد به خور داشته شود, فلسفه، أثرات و نامه, فلسفه، أثرات و نامه, and مروق قد به خور داشته شود, مروق قد به خور داشته شود, and Tāḥfīz, Ch. 18 and Tāḥfīz, I, p. 552 ff. give detailed explanations.

In a metaphorical form there is the case of:

ابراز (عیب) (Nich. Eth. IX, 9)

افراز (عیب) (Metaph. 1032 a 28)

Avicenna gives the Persian equivalent 9 and Nāṣīr Khusrow 5 follows him saying: ʻالآثار و نامه, ʻالآثار و نامه.

3. ANA, ANIY, ANIYYAH, ANA‘IYAH, ANA‘IYYAH

These are a set of mystic terms which have been often confused with philosophical terminology somewhat similar in orthography though entirely different in sense.

For the first, Sarrāj says: "لا تؤثر مات لاإن السو" and Suhrāwādī adds: "لا تؤثر مات لاإن السو." It stands for the distinctive self, the ego, 'I am myself'. The second connotes a state pertaining to self. It is mostly if not exclusively used by Ḥallāj. In one place he remarks: "لا تؤثر مات لاإن السو". In another he states: "لا تؤثر مات لاإن السو" and Mullā Shadrā quotes his well-known verse.

1 Ḥibmat al-Iṣṭırād, ed. H. Corbin, p. 47.
2 Al-Iṣṭirāʾ al-Ashbāh, ed. H. Corbin, p. 47.
3 Cl. Dīnīk-Nāme, p. 116.
5 Kūhī al-Iṣṭirād p. 131.
7 Kūhī al-Fāḍīla, ed. Massignon, p. 18.
8 Al-Iṣṭirāʾ al-Abūl, ed. Badawi.
9 Al-Iṣṭirāʾ al-Abūl.
The third is an abstraction from the pronoun which could be rendered inos, *egoit*. Again Sarraj asserts that *αντι* and Jill gives further explanations.

The Persian equivalent as given by Nasir Khosrow was *man* on the analogy of the Arabic term.

The fourth is only a different form of the abstraction, frequently used by Suhravardi as in the case of *سُمَّرَ* and again *سُمَّرَ* Bastami says *تَلَفََّيْت* عَلَيْهِ الْمَذْنَةَ. The fifth is yet another variant of the abstraction commonly found in Ibn al-Arabi and other mystics. Bastami invoking the Deity asks: *إِنْ كَانَ الْمَلْكَ لَسَمْعٍ* In modern secular literature it has the sense of egoism, selfishness.

**4. ANNA, ANNIY, ANNIYYAH**

These are philosophically terms completely different from the mystical. Because in orthography the *shaddah* is frequently left out, scholars are sometimes led astray.

The Translators used the first term for two specific purposes which should not be confused. One was as the equivalent of the Greek *to holi* thus:

\[\text{τὸ ἄνθρωπος} \quad (\text{Metaph. 1047 b 32})\]

\[\text{τὸ ἄνθρωπος} \quad (\text{A. Post. 78 b 7})\]

The other example stands for what Kant called the "asserterische W"; and Ross has explained in like manner. 10

The other use of the term *anna* was to represent the copula which the Arabic language does not have. It was one of the numerous attempts to find an equivalent for that purpose. We thus have:

\[\text{τὸ ἐὰν} \quad (\text{Metaph. 1042 b 28})\]

\[\text{τὸ ἀλήθεια} \quad (\text{A. Post. 1043 a 1})\]

\[\text{τὸ ἐὰν} \quad (\text{D. An. 424 a 25})\]

\[\text{τὸ ἐὰν} \quad (\text{Top. 135 a 11})\]

\[\text{τὸ ἐὰν} \quad (\text{Metaph. 1075 b 5})\]

2. Al-Istak al-Kamis, Chapt. 27.
4. Hafiz at-Ishar, p. III.

In logic the assertoric came to be known as *αλήθεια* among the *Falasifah*. This was rendered into Persian by Avicenna. In metaphysics it connoted the concept of being for which they had no word. And Avicenna says *αλήθεια* (truth) to mean the term *Jūrjīnī* says *γινώσκω* and Mulla Sadra has *διάκρισις*.

By far the most common in philosophical writings is the term *anniyyah* to express in the form of an abstraction the concept of being. It also connotes the thatness of a thing in contrast to its whatness (*mahiyah*) and whyness (*timlīfya*). Not of Qur'anic origin, it is met with in the Arabic versions of the Translators. And of these Ustāth appears to be the first to adopt it. Actually he was presumably the person who coined it, either independently or in association with Kindi who although did not know Greek polished up the renderings of some of the Translators. Again this was used as the equivalent of more than one Greek term. Hence the necessity of making the proper distinctions which scholars have not always observed. Thus we have:

\[\text{τὸ αὐθαίρετο} \quad (\text{Metaph. 1044 b 28})\]

\[\text{τὸ αὐθαίρετο} \quad (\text{A. Post. 1043 b 1})\]

\[\text{τὸ} \quad (\text{D. An. 424 a 25})\]

\[\text{τὸ} \quad (\text{Top. 135 a 11})\]

\[\text{τὸ} \quad (\text{Metaph. 1075 b 5})\]

1. Cf. Fārīchi, Tahāṣṣī al-Gar'dah; Avicenna, Ishara, p. 84.
7. Tārīṣfat, p. 45.
8. Al-Aṣfār...
then:

ное 30
(D. An. 413 a 13)

ثر (عثم).
(D. An. 410 a 14)

الإِبْلُ (عثم).
(Metaph. 1070 a 11)

and then:

الإِبْلُ (شُعْرِ)
(D. An. 402 a 17)

and finally:

الإِبْلُ (شُعْرِ)
(Metaph. 1024 b 29)

ما هو الأَبْلُ (شُعْرِ)
(Metaph. 1038 b 17)

الإِبْلُ (شُعْرِ)
(D. An. 412 b 11)

قُمِّر (شُعْرِ)
(Top. 133 a 11)

and also:

الإِبْلُ (شُعْرِ)
(Metaph. 1017 a 31)

Above from the illustrations it is seen that as the equivalent of a number of Greek terms, ُانْفُُ (شُعْرِ) has more than one connotation in Arabic philosophical texts.

a. In the sense of the concept of being in abstraction, we have in the so-called Theology of Aristotle 6

b. To mean the state of being which, unable to express in Arabic, they described as existing, Ghazâlî says 6:

c. In the sense of a separate entity independent in itself, there is in the above-mentioned Theology 6:

The first appearance in philosophical literature occurs in the Arabic version of the Metaphysics by Ustâfî. Whether he took it from the Syriac, or revived its usage in Arabic on the suggestion of Kindi who betrays an extraordinary fondness for it, is not easy to determine. Thus:


by Ishâq ibn Hunain who does not seem to have approved of ُانْفُُ. For the negative layya which apparently is a compound of la and asya we have:

2. Iblîmût, p. 404.
3. Al-Ashîr, p. 437.
5. Tâhêfî, p. 302.
6. Dînîsh-Nâmûh.
The word had been already in use in the works of 'Abd al-Hamid al-Kātib 1 and Ibn al-Muqaffa' 8. The credit may go to them, though it is not certain. Among the Fādsifāh, it is hardly used by Kindi. Fārābi defines it thus 2: 

"... مَجَارَبَةَ التَّمْلِيْطَ فِي كُلِّ مَهْدٍ وَأَكْمَلَ مَلَكَتُهُ..."

Mujarrābāt becomes a specific term of logic to denote empirical data. Avicenna says 4: 

"... اَلْمَهْدَ وَأَكْمَلَ مَلَكَتُهُ ...

In Persian he has exactly the same Arabic term 5. But the Lexicon of Asadī of Tūs has an interesting equivalent. It says 7: 

"ابَنَاء:..." 

This is corroborated by a verse from the Stūb-nāmeh of Firdawsi:

7. JAWHAR, DHĀT, 'AIN

These three terms need to be reviewed together because their Greek equivalents have been often confused. Jawhar is not of 'Arabic origin. Dhāt as the feminine of dhāt, and 'ain, though of 'Arabic origin, are not used in the same sense in philosophical terminology. For jawhar we have:

- جَوْهَر (مَثَلَةُ)  
- جَوْهَر (مَثَلٍ)  
- جَوْهَر (مَثَلٍ)  

The word is believed to come from Pahlavi gohe 8, and derived from the root gav which means to grow. This interpretation, however, has been challenged 9. In any case it already had the sense of substance in Pahlavi represented by modern Persian goshā. Kraus thought that the scholars of Gundishpūr were the first to choose

1. Rašīl p. 182.
2. ibid. p. 215.
8. Cf. Radul...  
10. Nasūmill...  
11. Yadavī...  
12. Naṣīḥī...  

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and introduce it into Arabic. But he produced no authority to support the view. Actually this may not be true. As far as the records go, its use as the literal equivalent of oswia began with Usākh but we find the word already in the works of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, who had no apparent connection with Gundishāpūr. Then comes Ibn al-Muqaffa' saying

أَنْ أَنْ تَرَّكَ النُّكْرَةَ الأَمْرَةَ بِالْحَيَّةِ فَلَمْ يَنَقْلِ عَنْ مُؤْرِخِهِ

Admittedly in his enumeration of the Aristotelian categories he gives 'ain as the equivalent of oswia. But he also uses javahr in the very same work. Among the Fādifsāfah it is found in Kindi, and extends to all the rest. It soon, however, developed different connotations. Ghazālī remarks that “the philosophers mean one thing by javahr, and the Sūfis something else, and the Mu'takallimūn still another thing”. This has not been noted by all modern scholars. Tahānawi discusses the distinctive meanings in greater detail. The Epistles of the Brethren contain a classification of the different kinds of javahr which is not found elsewhere.

For primary and secondary substances we have:

 signUp lūsia

(Metaph. 1005 a 35)

الجَهْرُ الْأَلِينَ (النَّسَائِينَ)

(Categ. 2 b 30)

جَوَابُ بَلَدَهُ (النَّسَائِينَ)

For the adjectival form javahrī, we have seen no textual renderings to show the Greek equivalent. But for the abstraction to denote substantiality there is:

lūsia

(Metaph. 1002 a 4)

الجَهْرُ (النَّسَائِينَ)

The actual Greek substantive from oswia does not appear to be of Attic provenance. There is oswiōs from the corpus of the Hermetic writings. And oswiōs in the works of Proclus. In Arabic jawzsya was immediately adopted by philosophers and literary men alike. Although it may be found in Kindi, we have seen it from Fārābī onwards. Among the literatūres it is in Jāhilī and Tawhīdī.

For the verb lūsīshūr, no Greek equivalent has been noted in the translated texts. It corresponds to owisiatūsh which again seems to date from Hellenistic literature.

The term dhat was sometimes used as the equivalent of oswia also. Hence:

dhat

(A. Pr. 46 a 36)

owisīshūr

(Top. 146 b 2)

But in most cases and as a general rule it stood for lūsīshūr. Thus:

lūsīshūr

(Metaph. 1022 a 25)

الجَهْرُ فَيْخِهِ (النَّسَائِينَ)

(A. Pr. 24 b 22)

lūsīshūr

(D. An. 406 a 5)

But in most cases and as a general rule it stood for lūsīshūr. Thus:

lūsīshūr

(Metaph. 1002 a 35)

الجَهْرُ فَيْخِهِ (النَّسَائِينَ)

(A. Pr. 24 b 22)

lūsīshūr

(D. An. 406 a 5)

On the evidence of Sīrūs, dhat was first used by the Mutakallimūn, particularly in its adjectival form dhatāt. Among the Fādifsāfah its usage begins with Kindi and extends all along the line. To draw the distinction between the two terms, Avicenna says:

كَانَ فِي نُسَائِينِ جَهْرٍ فَيْخِهِ وَنَعْجُ وَنَسْلُ بِنِّ النَّاسِيَاتِ وَالنَّسَائِينَ

Ghazālī explains that 'ain was the equivalent of javahrīyshūr, on the other hand, rules that the term 'ain shares with dhat in being the equivalent of lūsīshūr.

Thus:

'Oswiātūsh

(Categ. 1 a 6)

al-lūsīshūr

(Categ. 1 b 21)

But we also have

'lūsīshūr

(Top. 110 a 16)

الجَهْرُ (النَّاسِيَاتِ)

As the term gained usage among philosophers, Sūfis and theologians in the non-Qur'ānic sense of a specific entity, it is difficult to tell how and when it first originated. In any case it is not usually the equivalent of oswia as some scholars have thought. Kindi has used it. Fārābī defines it thus:

And Ibn al-Cīrāqī writes:

الجَهْرُ (النَّاسِيَاتِ)

2 Cf. Rashīd, p. 95.
3 Cf. Appendix I Part. II.
4 Al-Kišās al-Ladnamyshūr, p. 15.
7 Cf. Lexicon. Liddell and Scott.
8 Ibid.
9 Kithā al-'Ilmāmīn... Vol. I. p. 4.
10 Al-Imāmī... Vol. I. p. 123.
In the *Epistles of the Brethren* it is stated that:

السباع بن الدين إصلاح.

Al-Ash'ari and Suhravardi distinguish between:

السباع بن الدين إصلاح.

and Suhravardi speaks of:

السباع بن الدين إصلاح.

Of the abstraction 'ainfyya, Fārābī says:

السباع بن الدين إصلاح.

جعفر بن محمد بن علي بن أبي طالب وحدثه: موسيقى الصوت، وعندته:

And in Persian it is usually found in the plural form *ta'ayyunāt*. The adjectival form *mātayyan* is of common occurance. Avicennā says:

السباع بن الدين إصلاح.

Further illustrations can be cited to establish the fact that

السباع بن الدين إصلاح.

and again

السباع بن الدين إصلاح.

This is a rather interesting term of non-Qur'ānic origin. In a

2. *Naṣīf*. p. II.
4. *Al-Aṣfār*...
12. *Cl. MS. St. Joseph University*.
13. *Cl. Appendix I. Part. 2*.


10. HÄL

For this sense of time with relation to the agent, there is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مَرَضَتْ (Categ. 3 a 15)</td>
<td>had his time (تغمر)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مَرَضَتْ (Top. 108 b 12)</td>
<td>had his time (تغمر)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jurjâni 4 defines it as: "حال ... نهاية الفاتي و بلوغ المفصل.
To mean a state and disposition, we have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>حَالِتَهُ (Metaph. 1019 b 5)</td>
<td>state (حالة)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حَالِتَهُ (Categ. 6 a 30)</td>
<td>state (حالة)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>تَرَاضَتْ (Top. 114 a 32)</td>
<td>state (تراضي)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibn al-Muqaffa' 8 had said: "... not that Fârâbi had it in that sense. And so does Avicenna 9.
In the sense of reduction there is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>أَبْعَرَ (A. Pr. 20 b 5)</td>
<td>before time (تفرغ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أَبْعَرَ (A. Pr. 28 b 20)</td>
<td>before time (تفرغ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The exact expression had appeared in Ibn al-Muqaffa' 9 who speaks of: "Before the time of the agent.

In the sense of alteration we have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>أَلْكَوَّدَتْ (Metaph. 989 a 27)</td>
<td>altered (أَلْكَوَّدَتْ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أَلْكَوَّدَتْ (Categ. 15 a 15)</td>
<td>altered (أَلْكَوَّدَتْ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أَلْكَوَّدَتْ (Top. 121 a 32)</td>
<td>altered (أَلْكَوَّدَتْ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Madnânat al-Fiqâh, p. II.
2 Hilûk at-Idhâr, p. 17.
3 Al-Asâfî, p. 85.
4 Twâjîf, p. 85.
5 Cf. MS. of St. Joseph University.
6 Madnânat al-Fiqâh, p. II.
7 Najât.
8 op. cit.
9 op. cit.
10 Cf. Rasûl.
11 op. cit.
12 Al-Asâfî, p. 85.
13 Twâjîf, p. 85.
14 op. cit.
15 Cf. Rasûl, p. II.
16 Twâjîf, p. II.
17 Twâjîf, p. II.
18 Twâjîf, p. II.
19 Twâjîf, p. II.
20 Twâjîf, p. II.
21 Twâjîf, p. II.
22 Twâjîf, p. II.
23 Twâjîf, p. II.
24 Twâjîf, p. II.
25 Twâjîf, p. II.
26 Twâjîf, p. II.
27 Twâjîf, p. II.
28 Twâjîf, p. II.
29 Twâjîf, p. II.
30 Twâjîf, p. II.
31 Twâjîf, p. II.
32 Twâjîf, p. II.
33 Twâjîf, p. II.
34 Twâjîf, p. II.
35 Twâjîf, p. II.
36 Twâjîf, p. II.
37 Twâjîf, p. II.
38 Twâjîf, p. II.
39 Twâjîf, p. II.
40 Twâjîf, p. II.
41 Twâjîf, p. II.
42 Twâjîf, p. II.
43 Twâjîf, p. II.
44 Twâjîf, p. II.
45 Twâjîf, p. II.
46 Twâjîf, p. II.
47 Twâjîf, p. II.
48 Twâjîf, p. II.
49 Twâjîf, p. II.
50 Twâjîf, p. II.
51 Twâjîf, p. II.
52 Twâjîf, p. II.
53 Twâjîf, p. II.
54 Twâjîf, p. II.
55 Twâjîf, p. II.
56 Twâjîf, p. II.
57 Twâjîf, p. II.
58 Twâjîf, p. II.
59 Twâjîf, p. II.
60 Twâjîf, p. II.
61 Twâjîf, p. II.
62 Twâjîf, p. II.
63 Twâjîf, p. II.
64 Twâjîf, p. II.
65 Twâjîf, p. II.
66 Twâjîf, p. II.
67 Twâjîf, p. II.
68 Twâjîf, p. II.
69 Twâjîf, p. II.
70 Twâjîf, p. II.
71 Twâjîf, p. II.
72 Twâjîf, p. II.
73 Twâjîf, p. II.
74 Twâjîf, p. II.
75 Twâjîf, p. II.
76 Twâjîf, p. II.
77 Twâjîf, p. II.
78 Twâjîf, p. II.
79 Twâjîf, p. II.
80 Twâjîf, p. II.
81 Twâjîf, p. II.
82 Twâjîf, p. II.
83 Twâjîf, p. II.
84 Twâjîf, p. II.
85 Twâjîf, p. II.
86 Twâjîf, p. II.
87 Twâjîf, p. II.
88 Twâjîf, p. II.
89 Twâjîf, p. II.
90 Twâjîf, p. II.
91 Twâjîf, p. II.
92 Twâjîf, p. II.
93 Twâjîf, p. II.
94 Twâjîf, p. II.
95 Twâjîf, p. II.
96 Twâjîf, p. II.
97 Twâjîf, p. II.
98 Twâjîf, p. II.
99 Twâjîf, p. II.
100 Twâjîf, p. II.
101 Twâjîf, p. II.
102 Twâjîf, p. II.
103 Twâjîf, p. II.
104 Twâjîf, p. II.
105 Twâjîf, p. II.

Again Ibn al-Muqaffa' 1 had said before them:... This is followed by all the Falâsîfah. Then there is as well:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مَتَّعَ (Metaph. 997 a 11)</td>
<td>enjoyment (تعت)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the sense of substitution which is Qur'anic in form, there is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مَتَّعَ (A. Pr. 45 b 17)</td>
<td>enjoyment (تعت)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. IDRÄK

This non-Qur'anic term meaning perception or apprehension has a very wide use in the Arabic language. How and when it originated remains obscure. It is already found in the writings of ‘Abd al-Hamîd 8 and Ibn al-Muqaffa' 9. But when we come to the Translators we find that in the form of idrâk, and with the sense of perception or mental apprehension, its use appears to have begun with the school of ‘Isârâm and his son Usâth. Usâth who belonged to an earlier group does not have it in that form nor with that sense. Thus ‘Isârâm translates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نَظَرَ (D. An. 409 b 13)</td>
<td>saw (نظرة)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

when before him Usâth had translated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نَظَرَ (Metaph. 989 a 23)</td>
<td>saw (نظرة)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only uses we have seen in the renderings of Usâth of words from that root are the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نَظَرَ (Metaph. 1001 a 14)</td>
<td>saw (نظرة)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In ‘Isârâm on the other hand it has a very wide use:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نَظَرَ (D. An. 409 b 32)</td>
<td>saw (نظرة)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نَظَرَ (D. An. 425 b 13)</td>
<td>saw (نظرة)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نَظَرَ (D. An. 425 b 15)</td>
<td>saw (نظرة)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>نَظَرَ (D. An. 428 a 7)</td>
<td>saw (نظرة)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term was immediately adopted by the Falâsîfah from Kindî onwards. Avicenna defines it thus thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نَظَرَ (Metaph. 999 a 9)</td>
<td>saw (نظرة)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

... It may also be seen in the work of the Tâhânwî states:...
This was taken from the Stoic division 3 into: ἀληθινό, φαινόμενα, πραγματικά, νόημα and is yet another proof of the influence of Stoicism on the Falsafah. A happy phrase from Fārābī 4 remarks that:

"Πιστεύετε τον Νίκη μόνον... Αλήθεια Ουδεμία Ουδεμία" (A. Pr. 75 b 4)

But there is also:

tά απότομα (A. Pr. 63 a 9)
tά στατικά (A. Pr. 42 b 34)
tά καλά μέτρησις (A. Pr. 42 b 38)

It is already found in Ibn al-Muqaffa’s work on logic 1. Among the Falsafah it is used from Kindi onwards. Ibn al-Muqaffa speaks of:

"καλλίτεχνη... καλλίτεχνη"

14. SHAKL

This was a good Qur’anic term chosen to denote the figures of a syllogism. It is already found in the renderings of Ustāth. Thus:

η σχήμα (D. An. 445 b 18)
η σχήματος (D. An. 414 b 21)
η σχήματος (D. An. 412 b 7)

But iskhīm which was only a transcription soon dropped out. Shakl was adopted by all Falsafah, becoming the established term of logic. We have:

tά πράττων σχήμα (A. Pr. 65 b 3)
tά δύοστον σχήμα (A. Pr. 26 b 36)
tά μέδων σχήμα (A. Pr. 44 b 35)
tά τρίτον σχήμα (A. Pr. 28 a 12)
tά ἔγχυτον σχήμα (A. Pr. 63 b 3)

Shakl was also used in the ordinary sense of form. Thus:

το ιλακτικό (A.t. 10 a 12)
το ιλακτικό (Metaph. 999 b 10)

1 MS. St. Joseph University.
though there is also

\( \text{μυρωδὴ} \) (Metaph. 1042 a 29)

The abstraction \( \text{σκαλισθέω} \) we have seen only from Avicenna onwards. He says: 1

15. \( \text{ΣΔΡ, ΣΔΡ, ΜΧΔΡΑ} \)

The first of these is a Qur' \( \text{αν} \) term adopted to mean a preamble in rhetoric. We have:

\[ \text{τδ \ προοίμιον} \quad (\text{Rhet.}) \quad \text{τδ \ προοίμιον} \quad (\text{Categ. 14 b 2}) \]

and Avicenna says: 2

When Fārābī took up the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation the derivative \( \text{σδρ} \) came into usage to connote emanation and procession. He probably took the word from one of the translations, though no text is available in that connection. It corresponds presumably to \( \text{η \ προοίμιον} \) of Proclus 3. Through Avicenna and all the others who followed Fārābī it became an established term of Islamic metaphysics. Muḥammad Ṣadrā coined some curious formations from the root \( \text{σδαρ} \). He has in his works:

\( \text{αύτος \ αυτοῦ} - \text{αυτοί τοῦ αυτοῦ} \)

As a term of logic we have:

\[ \text{τδ \ αύτη} \quad (\text{A. Post. 76 b 32}) \quad \text{τδ \ αύτη} \quad (\text{A. Post. 86 a 34}) \]

Avicenna says: 4

When \( \text{πληρώνεω} \) is used in a philosophical sense it is not a word de minimis but is used in the Greek \( \text{πληρώνεω} \) sense of making something perfect or completing it. Avicenna defines it thus: 5

1. \( \text{Al-Shafrī} \).
2. \( \text{Cl. Al-Asfar} \).
3. \( \text{Cl. Al-Shafrī} \).
4. \( \text{Cl. Elements of Theology} \). p. 34.
5. \( \text{Ishbārī} \). p. 83.
6. \( \text{Najāj} \). p. 56.

16. \( \text{Ṭāb}, \text{Ṭāb}, \text{Ṭāb} \)

The term \( \text{ṭab} \) which is non-Qur' \( \text{αν} \) in form and sense, seems to have been introduced into philosophical language from an early date. We have:

\[ \text{ṭ人在} \quad (\text{Metaph. 1054 a 10}) \dot{\text{ṭ}} \quad \text{ṭ人在} \quad (\text{Metaph. 992 a 31}) \quad \text{ṭ人在} \quad (\text{A. Pr. 70 b 10}) \]

In his list of definitions 1 Avicenna says:

In the form of \( \text{ṭḥāb} \), we have:

\[ \text{ṭḥ人在} \quad (\text{D. An. 402 a 7}) \quad \text{ṭḥ人在} \quad (\text{D. An. 406 a 23}) \quad \text{ṭḥ人在} \quad (\text{D. An. 421 a 24}) \]

This occurs in Ibn al-Muqaffa 8 thus:

And among the \( \text{Falāṣifah} \) we see it from Kindī onwards. In Avicenna 8 it is frequently in the form of \( \text{ṭḥāb} \). Muḥammad Ṣadrā used it in the sense of impressionistic, says 9

The term \( \text{ṭḥāb} \) is a noun from the root \( \text{ṭḥāb} \).

In the common form of \( \text{ṭḥāb} \), there is:

\[ \text{ṭ人在} \quad (\text{Metaph. 1014 b 16}) \quad \text{ṭ人在} \quad (\text{Top. 100 b 30}) \quad \text{ṭ人在} \quad (\text{A. Pr. 32 b 6}) \]

We have first seen this term in a quotation from Ibn al-Muqaffa 8, though there is no proof that it originated with him. Among the \( \text{Falāṣifah} \) Kindī says:

All his successors use it. There is a definition in the \( \text{Epistles of the Brethren} \); and another in \( \text{Jurjānī} \).

For \( \text{ṭḥāb} \) to mean natural, we have:

\[ \text{ṭḥ人在} \quad (\text{Metaph. 995 a 16}) \]

---

1. \( \text{Risālat al-Ḥudād} \). p. 59.
2. \( \text{Kallāḥ} \). p. 530.
3. \( \text{Rasa'il} \). p. 89.
4. \( \text{Cl. Najāj} \).
5. \( \text{Cl. Al-Asfrī} \).
6. \( \text{Cl. Miskawayh} \), \( \text{Al-Hikmat al-Khālidah} \). p. 312.
7. \( \text{Rasa'il} \). p. 105.
8. \( \text{Rasa'il} \). Vol. 2. p. 112.
9. \( \text{Tawāfiq} \). p. 145.
It already appears in Ibn al-Muqaffa’s treatise on logic where he says. Among the Finisitkah we find it from Kindi onwards. Avicenna has a definition of it. The theologians, however, explained accident in a different way from the philosophers. The two parties did not agree as to what constitutes accident. That led to controversy; and a good deal of confusion among modern scholars.

As the contrary of ja’war, the accidental was termed ‘‘aradīyyah. There is also:

Kindi uses ‘‘aradīyyah frequently. And Ghazālī divides it into: **islam** and **islam**. The abstraction ‘‘aradīyyah we have not seen in anyone before Avicenna. Suhravardī speaks of al-ja’warīyyah and al-‘aradīyyah. Arab purists never appreciated such formations. It is said in the sense of objection is very common in Avicenna and Averroes. In the version of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* by an as yet unknown translator, we have:

This term is Qur’ānic in form but not in sense. It appears at an early date in the writings of theologians and philosophers alike to denote accident. In which circles it first originated, is not easy to determine. Among the Translators we have:

This term and its numerous derivatives pose some interesting
problems. If we accept the statement of Ibn Taimiyah, in the sense of intellect as a specific entity, it is not of Qur’anic origin.

He says: قائل لله أن نبئه، وأهله، وأنه عرض من الأعراض يكون من الأعراض، يقبل عليه... والعقل في نافذة الإنسان، فإنك تقابلته.

Not all theologians subscribed to such views. Bulhān 2 remarks that

قائل لله أن نبئه، وأنه عرض من الأعراض، يكون من الأعراض، يقبل عليه...

Among the Translators we have:

(1) ψυχή (Metaph. 1009 b 13) (العقل) (عَلَق)

(2) νοῦς (Metaph. 1049 a 5) (« )

(3) καρδιά (Metaph. 993 b 11) («)

(4) θεοθέπω (Cat. 5 b 28) («)

Hence the Greek equivalent is not always the same—an important point. Then comes:

(5) συνείδησις (Metaph. 1074 b 36) («)

(6) γνώση (Metaph. 1074 b 20) («)

(7) τὸ νοετάκι (Metaph. 1074 b 37) («)

Then comes:

(8) νοητόν (Metaph. 999 b 2) («)

(9) τὸ διανοητόν (Metaph. 1021 a 30) («)

(10) νοοτροπος (Metaph. 1074 b 30) («)

(11) νοημα (Metaph. 990 b 25) («)

(12) τὸ νοητόν (Top. 125 a 31) («)

العقل (العقل) (al-‘aql)

From the statement of Ibn Taimiyah it is evident that ‘aql meant one thing to the theologians and another thing to the Fakārīyyah. But in which camp did the term as such originate? As a term of theology and mysticism, Massignon has dated it before ‘Alā‘ī and Naṣīrān. And there is an extant treatise by al-Muhā-

sib (d. 1435/857) entitled 1

ه. 1

However that may be, we take the view that the Translators took the term from Arabic secular literature. And in their turn passed it on to the Fakārīyyah. ‘Abī al-Ḥamīd 2 makes frequent use of it, occasionally referring to ahī al-‘aql. Ibn al-Muqaffa 3 has that expression also. He uses the word ‘aql still more in his writings. In the case of rationalists Ibn Taimiyah 4 has al-‘aqlīyyān which is even more expressive. Thus the term had already been established when Kindi and the other philosophers embarked on their works. Yet it was soon realised that there was more than one connotation to it. And in his treatise On Definitions Avicenna points out 6 that:

Perhaps the earliest echo of the Aristotelian concept that the seat of the intelligence is the heart may be found in Ibn al-Muqaffa’s statement that 7 سلطة الأثر الكفتية في مدرسة قائل لله أن نبئه، وأنه عرض من الأعراض. Nor did they agree as to the nature of the intellect. Kindi believed that 8 العقل هو عقل مدرك لإدراك تقديمه. This was in accordance with the so-called Theory of Aristotle which states that 9 العقل هو عقل مدرك لإدراك تقديمه. But the Epistles of the Brethren 10 maintained that العقل هو عقل مدرك، وهو عقل مدرك. And Avicenna says 11 العقل هو عقل مدرك لإدراك تقديمه. Averroes 12 has العقل هو عقل مدرك إدراك تقديمه.

The adjectival form ‘aqlīyā is very common beginning with Kindi. But the abstraction al-‘aqlīyyāh we have seen only in Avicenna, Ghazālī and Mu‘allā Ṣadrā. Arab purists do not seem to have approved of it. Averroes scrupulously avoids it. The form ‘aqlī goes back to Ibn al-Muqaffa 13, and perhaps even earlier. Among the Translators we have:

1) Cl. MS. Curullah. No. 1101. The different interpretations of the term ‘aql are given in a treatise found at Atif Elendi Library. No. 2045.
2) Cl. Rashidī.
3) Cl. At-Adab al-Kabīr.
4) Kitāb al-Radd (Metaphysics).
5) Majālis al-Ḥusainī.
6) Al-Adab al-Kabīr.
8) Rashīdī, p. 165.
9) ed. Badawi.
11) Naṣīrān, p. 87.
13) Cl. Kāmil.

AFRAN, Philosophical Terminology, 8

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Again Suhrawardi has the adjectival al-ma'ālīyya. And Avicenna has the abstraction in the shape of al-ma'ālīyya.

In Persian Avicenna uses the Arabic term without attempting to produce a Persian equivalent. The Pahlawi word was vahanāhārī from which the abstraction vahanānāhārī was derived. But these have not survived in modern Persian.

20. MANA

This is another word of non-Quranic origin which apparently entered the language at an early date. It is already found in 'Abd al-Hamid and Ibn al-Muqaffa. It is presumed that the Translators took it from them, using it thus:

The philosophers all used it from Kindi onwards. Avicenna defined it thus:

The term is employed by the Fālāsīfah from Kindi onwards. Kha- wārizmi explains that:

5. Kollāh.
For the adjectival form there is: 

\text{انجام الميلودية} (\text{Metaph. 980 a 21})

The abstraction \text{الحيلية} may be found in \text{Farrābī}, Averroes and all the rest. Even \text{Tawḥīd} has it in his literary works.

The term \text{مَدّة} is not of Qur'ānic origin. Furthermore it does not appear in the translations of the \text{Organon}. But in the fragments of the \text{Metaphysica} which should be rightly attributed to \text{Abū Bihār} Matta we have:

\begin{equation}
\begin{align*}
\text{ام} & \quad (\text{Metaph. 1069 b 14}) \\
\text{ام} & \quad (\text{Metaph. 1069 b 24})
\end{align*}
\end{equation}

Avicenna suggests that it is an Arabicised form of the Persian word \text{مدیه}. It is already found in the writings of \text{Abū al-Ḥāmid} and must therefore have entered the language at an early date. Ibn \text{Nūr}īmah uses it in his rendering of the so-called \text{Theology of Aristotle}. Among the philosophers we have seen it from \text{Farrābī} onwards.

It should be noted, however, that it means one thing in metaphysics and another thing in logic. As a metaphysical expression it stands for matter, or that which exists potentially. Avicenna speaks of 

\text{النيرة} (\text{Najīt}). In logic when Avicenna speaks of 

\text{مَدَّة} he means the modalities of judgement. \text{Tahānawi} explains that 

\text{نيرة} is also of non-Qur'ānic origin. Among the translators we have:

\begin{equation}
\begin{align*}
\text{ام} & \quad (\text{Metaph. 1029 a 9}) \\
\text{ام} & \quad (\text{Metaph. 1049 a 25}) \\
\text{ام} & \quad (\text{D. An. 423 b 29})
\end{align*}
\end{equation}

The philosophers used it from \text{Kindī} onwards. In the writings of the \text{Brethren} we have:

\begin{equation}
\begin{align*}
\text{مَدَّة} & \quad (\text{Metaph. 1049 a 30})
\end{align*}
\end{equation}

\text{Ibn Khaldūn} speaks of \text{الحيلية} and of \text{الحيلية}. \text{Tīnah} is not a very frequent term, but it already exists in \text{Ibn al-Muqaffa} among the Translators we have:

\begin{equation}
\begin{align*}
\text{تینه} & \quad (\text{D. An. 403 b 18})
\end{align*}
\end{equation}

Some attempt has been made to enumerate the authors who have used it without knowing that \text{Ibn al-Muqaffa} had done so before them. \text{Kindī} says:

\begin{equation}
\text{قد نَفْرَمَ} (\text{عَرَابَة} \\
\text{المتنهية} \\
\text{والمنتهية} \\
\text{والنبرة} \\
\text{والنبرة})
\end{equation}

\text{Strictly of course this is not correct.} \text{Jawhar} whether as essence or substance is different from matter.

22. \text{Māhiyyah}

This term is one of those rare word compounds introduced into the Arabic language perhaps by the Translators first. Adopted and established by \text{Fallāṣīf} and theologians alike, it became current among authors of speculative writing. Its origin as the equivalent of the Aristotelian \text{τὸ ἔν εἰ} and the Stoic \text{τὸ ἔν} has led to disagreements. Mīlī \text{Goichon} assumed that it was a compound of \text{μέ} and \text{αὶδα}. This was challenged by the reviewer of her \text{Lexicon} who was inclined to believe that it came from the Syriac. In a later work \text{Mīlī} \text{Goichon} quoted \text{Tahānawi} in support of her view, though she seemed at a loss to explain why the second part of the word was in the feminine form \text{ινηα}. To note the tentative manner in which the term was first introduced, and the forms it subsequently took, we have to return to the Translators. Thus:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \text{Passages giving the masculin form:}
\begin{equation}
\begin{align*}
\text{τὸ τὸ} & \quad (\text{Metaph. 1026 a 4}) \\
\text{μα} & \quad (\text{Metaph. 1069 b 9}) \\
\text{μα} & \quad (\text{D. An. 402 a 13})
\end{align*}
\end{equation}
\end{enumerate}

\text{1} \text{Al-Musāqaddamah.}
\text{8} \text{MS. St. Joseph University.}
\text{8} \text{Cf. S. Plous, Beiträge zur islamischen Atomlehre, p. 30.}
\text{8} \text{Risālih, p. 166.}
\text{8} \text{Al-Bādū wa al-Tarīkh, p. 39.}
\text{8} \text{Lexique, p. 380.}
\text{8} \text{Cf. Rev. d. Ét. Islamiques, 1938, pp. 291-295.}
\text{8} \text{Vocabulaire, p. 33.}
of that work. But we do find it in Ishāq’s version of the De Anima. After that it is almost regularly used in the translations of Abū Bishr Matta, Dimashqī, Taṣārī, and Ibn Zur’ah. And Naẓīf who was one of the latest has

It should be noted here that the same translator renders the Greek term in different fashions, thus showing that as an equivalent maḥīyyah had not yet been universally accepted.

e. As the equivalent of the Greek:

But an interesting variant is

The above citations permit us to draw certain distinctions. The form maḥīyyah does not appear in Ṣuṭṭāth’s rendering of the Meta-

physica. Nor is it to be found in Ishāq’s translation of certain parts

1 Cf. Kh. Gacevic. Les Categories...
2 ed. Hoffman. 1886.
3 Kitāb al-Radd . . . p. 65.
4 Cf. Rastīj. . . .
seen that form. RâzÎ had a treatise called " in Avicenna and particularly in his Shîfâ, the two forms appear without any appreciable difference of connotation. But in his commentary on the Theology he says: "Fi Îmân Bayân Allah Ta'âlâ" among the early mystics, is attributed with a treatise entitled " which is still extant. And in his Tahfizh this form is used by Ghazâlî.

In Persian both forms are used from Avicenna onwards without any specific attempt at differentiation. The exception, however, is Sajistânî who says: "Sâmîk bi-Râzî râmî, bârî mânî, bârî mânî, bârî mânî." It may therefore be concluded that mâhîyyah was the early form which we like to believe originated with Ustâthî in association with Kindî. What Hûnain thought of it we do not know. It is not found in his works. But his son Isâbîq used it in his early versions as in the case of the De Anima; then later changed to mâhîyyah. For differentiation in sense and connotation there is no textual justification.

23. AL-MIRĀ' This is another term non-Qur'ânic in form or sense. Among the Translators we have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Greek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>دمّری (Soph. 166 a 6)</td>
<td>مر (Soph. 166 a 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دمّری (Soph. 169 b 10)</td>
<td>مر (Soph. 169 b 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دمّری (Soph. 172 a 2)</td>
<td>مر (Soph. 172 a 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دمّری (Soph. 165 a 30)</td>
<td>مر (Soph. 165 a 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دمّری (Soph. 175 a 39)</td>
<td>مر (Soph. 175 a 39)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both al-mirā' and al-mamādiyy are found in Ibn al-Maqaffa'1; and it is probable that the Translators took the words from him. We have not seen them in Kindî whose logical works have not survived. It becomes common from Fârâbî onwards down to Averroes who in his commentary on the Rhetorica speaks of the "al-mirâ' wa-l-mamâdiyya."

As a syllogism there is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Greek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>دمّری (Soph. 171 b 8)</td>
<td>مر (Soph. 171 b 8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jûrjānî says: "Al-adâb al-Kabîr."

24. NAJW In the sense of grammar we have

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Greek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مّن (Metaph. 1026 b 17)</td>
<td>من (Metaph. 1026 b 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (Categ. 11 a 20)</td>
<td>من (Categ. 11 a 20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a term of logic to mean the mode of a proposition, we have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>Greek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>مّن (Metaph. 993 b 17)</td>
<td>من (Metaph. 993 b 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (Metaph. 992 a 14)</td>
<td>من (Metaph. 992 a 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (Metaph. 1013 b 29)</td>
<td>من (Metaph. 1013 b 29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (Metaph. 1022 b 15)</td>
<td>من (Metaph. 1022 b 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (Rhet. 1366 a 31)</td>
<td>من (Rhet. 1366 a 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (Soph. 168 a 20)</td>
<td>من (Soph. 168 a 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (Categ. 4 a 20)</td>
<td>من (Categ. 4 a 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (A. Fr. 32 b 5)</td>
<td>من (A. Fr. 32 b 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (A. Post. 71 b 10)</td>
<td>من (A. Post. 71 b 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مّن (A. Post. 83 a 10)</td>
<td>من (A. Post. 83 a 10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These examples show the different Arabic terms used as equivalents for the same Greek word. But the more common and correct which gained acceptance among the Fârâbîyah are naâb, darâb, jihat, and waqîb. These are all found in Ibn al-Maqaffa'1. They are not only in his literary works like the Ka'llah, al-Adâb al-Kabîr, and al-Adâb al-Sagîr. But what is far more important is that they are to be seen in his rendering of those parts of the Aristotelian Organon (as found in the manuscript of the St. Joseph University) which we believe suggested to the Translators many of the terms which they later employed. There may be no conclusive proofs available. There is, however, great likelihood.

In the absence of the logical works of Kindî, the above terms are found in Fârâbî onwards. Avicenna says: "Al-Adâb al-Kabîr."

25. AL-HUWA HÜ, AL-HUWİYYAH

These are two different terms coined from the pronoun huwa. They are to be found in theological and mystical writings on the one hand, and in philosophical works on the other. It is difficult to
determine in which camp they originated first. But what needs to be stressed is that they had entirely different connotations for each group.

For the *Fālsafah* the first term meant identity. Among the Translators we have:

- تَوَهُّ دِنْ (Metaph. 1054 a 31) **(Metaph. 994 a 28)**
- تَوَهُّ دِنْ (Metaph. 1059 b 22)
- أَوْقَـتُ (Metaph. 1054 b 2)
- هِيَ (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ)
- لَوْ (Metaph. 1054 b 21)
- هِيَ (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ)
- **(Metaph. 991 a 5)**

It is also seen in Ibn Nā'imah’s rendering of the so-called *Theology*. We have not seen it in Kindi, though he had polished up the Arabic version of Ibn Nā'imah. Farḥāb says 1 Alvisenna says in the *Śīfāt*:

The same is repeated by Suhrwardi 2 and Averroes 3. And in his passion for abstractions, Mullā Ṣadrā 4 comes with...The mystical usage of the term may be noted in Hallaj 5 and in the book of Sarrāj 6, though in both cases the editors appear to confuse the mystical with the philosophical sense.

Tahāwī says 8...then goes on to discuss what the mystics understood by it. In philosophical texts it meant the identity of a thing.

The term *huwāyyah* was coined as the equivalent of the Greek *copula* to express the concept of being, to denote an entity in itself, and to connote ipseity. Among the Translators we have:

- تَوَهُّ دِنْ (Metaph. 1019 a 4) **(Metaph. 994 a 28)**
- هِيَ (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ) (ٞ)
- لَوْ (Metaph. 994 a 28)
- **(Metaph. 994 a 28)**

1 *Ta'āqīf* p. 21.
2 p. 224.
3 Hitmat al-Isbaq p. 27.
4 Tafsīr ma ba'd al-Tafsīr p. 1403.
5 Al-Asfār.
6 Kichāt al-Tauṣūn ed. Maimon. pp. 102, 120.

2 Raschīd p. 142.
3 Madīnat al-Fārsīyah p. 15.
4 Vol. 2. p. 250.
Like *al-hawa bī*, the term *huwwiyah* has a mystical sense entirely different from the philosophical. It can be seen in Jīlī Ḥīdārī, in Sarraj, Ḥūrī al-'Arabī, Bastami states. It connotes He-ness in contrast to I-ness. This is corroborated by the Persian rendering of Nasir Khosrow as *aṣrī* (إِسْرِي). Again Mullā Ṣadrā indulges his passion for abstractions by speaking of ḥīdārī  rarity. Jāmi does the same.

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2. *op. cit.* p. 81.
4. *Shafahā*... 
6. *Al-Asfār*...