Charles E. Butterworth

TRANSLATION AND PHILOSOPHY: THE CASE OF AVERROES' COMMENTARIES

Tacere ultra non oportet; ne jam non verecundiae sed diffidentiae esse incipiat quod tacemus.

Cyprian, Against Demetrianus

Those experienced in translating difficult philosophic texts from one language to another with some degree of literal and stylistic accuracy know well how demanding such a task is. When they strive in addition to represent the thought of the author rather than their own presuppositions about that thought, the task becomes all the more arduous. To avoid prejudging the author, they take the text as it appears, on its own terms, and try to make sense of what the author actually says. They do so because they start from the premise that the author in question knows what he or she wishes to communicate and they thus set as their goal understanding what the author intends.

Opposed to this approach is one that views human thought as limited by the time and place, even the linguistic conventions, in which it is formulated and as susceptible to being grasped only by means of a framework established through historical and philological conjectures. Followers of this approach view their scholarly task as that of stipulating, on the basis of supposedly irreproachable historical investigation, what a given author could have known and then interpreting the author in light of that determination. Guided by such estimates or insights, they reconstruct and then translate particular texts.

Although reasoning leading to one or the other of these approaches lies behind almost all of the translations of medieval Arabic philosophical works to have appeared in the last quarter century or so, proponents of neither have ever fully articulated their positions. All concerned seem to have been content with offering a short prefatory statement, usually uttered by way of explanation, rather than in defense, of the considerations guiding a particular translation. Moreover, the few translations available were in such demand and the proponents of both approaches so eager to have any text at all that these differences were politely ignored. Now, however, we have reached a stage where a sufficient number of the basic texts

Charles E. Butterworth teaches at the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, Md. 20742, U.S.A.

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have been recovered and translated that we can afford to be circumspect. And precisely because the differences between these two approaches are so fundamental to the study of medieval Arabic philosophy, they warrant closer scrutiny.

HISTORICISM, PHILOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY

Opposition to the approach sketched out in the first paragraph of this essay begins with the denial that a text can be taken on its own terms. Heightened awareness of the limitations imposed upon an author by historical circumstances leads to the view that no author can write as a free agent or be fully aware of what he or she wishes to say. With particular reference to Averroes' Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, for example, it is urged that Averroes could not possibly have understood Aristotle's Poetics as we do. All that he could understand about that text "was circumscribed objectively by the semantic and ideational range of the Arabic translation in front of him and of whatever commentaries were available to him." And since human thought is restricted in this manner, one must have recourse to "historical and philological analysis [which] sets the framework within which normative evaluation and appreciation of the ideas involved can operate and . . . delineates the outermost limits to which they can extend."

The further reasoning is that, having thus established the horizon in which the text is to be viewed, the scholar can examine its philosophic teaching and form a judgment of its merit. But apart from the practical issue of whether such historical and philological analysis has ever been observed to bear such philosophic fruits, there is a more immediate concern. Simply stated, the reasoning put forth to justify this alternative approach is faulty on two counts.

First, scholars who allow that an author may be fully aware of what he or she thinks and satisfied with having exposed it clearly by no means assume the author has the same opinions they do. They see their task as one of finding out what in fact the author does think and doing so, as far as possible, without limiting themselves by preconceived notions. The purpose of such an undertaking is to learn what the author said and to grasp its significance, that is, its meaning and its importance.

Of course the text of Aristotle's Poetics to which Averroes had access differs from the one familiar to us. Surely he lacked the detailed knowledge about ancient Greece, its history as well as its politics and culture, now available. But these concerns are not at issue. Rather, taking Averroes' text as the only viable starting point, the task in the first instance is to determine what he said about Aristotle's Poetics. When his explanations do not make sense, it becomes necessary to inquire whether that is due to the text he was using, his inadequate understanding of Greek history and culture, or his desire to make a particular argument. Serious scholars simply cannot exclude a priori the possibility that Averroes, regardless of the cultural influences surrounding him, had a coherent and thoughtful position that merits elucidation. The task of the interpreter and translator is to identify that position and think through its implications.

Second, correct as it is to cite the differences of time, place, language, and culture that separate Averroes from Aristotle, awareness of them does not lead to knowledge—and certainly not "objective" knowledge—of what limits Averroes'
understanding of Aristotle. The myriad details about the way words are used at
different periods of time and about the state of the texts available to Averroes cited
by historically minded philologists notwithstanding, such evidence does not allow
prejudging what Averroes could have understood about Aristotle’s text. Indeed,
these details only provide conjectural factors to be considered when faced with a
perplexity in the text. The point can be stated more sharply: no matter how much
is now known about what influenced Averroes or about what Averroes knew about
Aristotle’s text, that information does not allow scholars to predetermine what
Averroes says or can say about the text.
The phrases cited above present the limited historical and philological learning
one normally possesses as a kind of science and those who pursue it as something
like scientists. It is implied that this learning permits a precise determination of
what Averroes could have known about Aristotle. In other words, it allows one to
understand Averroes not as, but better than, Averroes understood himself. Trum-
peting its contribution to progress in human thought, to the new awareness it ushers
in about all previous thought having been circumscribed by time and place, this
learning somehow exempts itself from the same limitations.
The other approach considers learning to be more in the service of philosophy.
Like the philosophers whom they study, its proponents start from an awareness of
the complexity of the problem raised in the text at hand and of the limits of their
own learning. They seek to achieve a better grasp of the major problem and the
many minor issues related to it in order to investigate the merits of the solution the
particular philosopher proposes. Thus, with respect to some problems, they find
themselves engaging in a dialogue that has been carried on successfully and with-
out significant distortions across times, places, languages, and cultures.
Lest this appear too abstract, it will be useful to present in what follows three ex-
amples of these two different approaches to textual exegesis and thus to translation.
They should make the differences more distinct and thus permit a fair-minded as-
seessment of the merits of each. The first focuses on how they seek to understand
the texts they read, especially the way they diverge in their interpretation of possible
influences on a given author. The second examines what the philological determin-
ist claims as the major accomplishment of that approach, the clarity achieved from
examining the changes that occur to a text as it is transmitted through time and
across cultural as well as linguistic traditions. Finally, attention is paid to what that
approach deems praiseworthy in translation and to why its standards must be
judged unsatisfactory.

POETRY AS A PART OF LOGIC

From that particular philological perspective, the recent translation and interpreta-
tion of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics is blameworthy be-
cause its author “stubbornly insists that it is Averroes who ‘considers the art of
poetry to be part of the art of logic,’ and . . . tries to explain why Averroes ‘adopts
such a position.’” The argument—namely, that because Averroes seeks in his
Middle Commentary on the Poetics “to lay the foundations . . . for an art of poetry
aimed primarily at encouraging virtuous actions and discouraging vicious ones . . .
it seems perfectly reasonable to consider poetry a part of logic”—is rejected on
the following grounds:

This is standing the facts on their head: it is not because he wished to give poetry a hortatory
function that Averroes considered it a part of logic, but it is because the tradition which
he followed considered it a part of logic that he had to justify this fact and therefore see a
hortatory function in poetry.

The controversy is not about whether the idea of making poetry a part of logic
originated with Averroes or not, the antecedents of this incorporation of poetry
within logic being in no way contested. Rather, the problem is that this peevish
explanation begs the more important question of why Averroes followed the tradi-
tional incorporation insofar as it presupposes that Averroes and his fellow philoso-
phers follow willy-nilly whatever innovative interpretation comes their way and
adjust their views to fit it. It allows authors only enough originality to be manipu-
ulative, but not enough to be instructive.

Differently stated, from this determinist perspective all major philosophical dis-
putes become insignificant in themselves. It insists that what must occupy the
scholar is not the attempt to understand the issue or the position taken by a given
philosopher, but the search for the genesis of a particular position. Rather than
viewing scholarship as serving to cast light on positions, to clarify what is not
fully stated or adequately argued—in sum, as ministerial to the philosophic
quest—the proponents of this approach believe it serves above all to show the limi-
tations of all prior thought. Once they can identify where a particular opinion
comes from, they see no reason to investigate its worth. All previous thought, un-
aware of its rootedness in history, is to be understood only in terms of what it tells
us about the intellectual climate of its age.

To reinforce the belief that Averroes was obliged to twist his reasoning to fit the
tradition he followed, one might turn to Ismail Dahiyat’s introduction to Avicenna’s
Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle. There, an attempt is made to set forth pre-
cisely the same kind of claim with respect to the way Avicenna interprets Aris-
totle’s Poetics. Dahiyat goes further and urges that all of those philosophers who
accepted the tradition that poetry was a part of logic had to endorse its hortatory
functions. Yet, though he explicitly acknowledges several times that the philoso-
phers deprecate poetry, he never pauses to consider their reasons for doing so. He
deems it sufficient to note that the Poetics is “‘placed’ at the very bottom of the
logical hierarchy,” that “it is implicitly considered rather less important than, say,
dialectic or demonstration,” and to conclude that “this explains the relatively in-
adequate care afforded to it by philosophers such as al-Fārābī whose primary inter-
est was logic proper and philosophy.”

Dahiyat’s explanation fails to grasp the central role of demonstration in logic for
al-Farabi and those who agreed with him in their understanding of Aristotle’s Or-
ganon. Because they held the demonstrative syllogism to be the highest form of
reasoning, they classified all other forms of reasoning according to the distance
each had from demonstration. Whether they were utterly convinced that demon-
strative reasoning was possible in all cases—especially practical cases—or not,
they made the argument as strongly as they could. They did so primarily in order
to counter the appeal of the poets. The fight between the philosophers, as putative legislators for the best regime, and the poets or those like them, who compete with the philosophers either by defending the status quo or by offering an alternative view of the best regime, was as lively an issue for an al-Farabi or an Averroes as it had been for Socrates in Plato’s Republic. Failure to appreciate the existence, not to mention the broader political implications, of this controversy keeps Dahiyat and those who share his presuppositions from grasping the full significance of the philosophers’ inclusion of poetry among the logical arts.

THE TRANSMISSION OF AVERROES’ TEXT

The assumption fundamental to the philological determinist’s approach is that those writing within the tradition of medieval Arabic philosophy were entirely dependent upon the versions of Aristotle’s texts then available. With respect to Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, it is asserted that the “reverberations” of the “underlying Arabic text of Aristotle’s Poetics . . . acted as a stimulus for and constituted the substratum of the commentary.” Hence, the tale of the way Aristotle’s text must have been transformed in being translated from Greek to Syriac and then from Syriac to Arabic becomes central to the elucidation and defense of that approach. To illustrate how “the meaning gets deformed at each successive stage of the transmission,” various versions of Aristotle’s definition of tragedy (Poetics 1449b24–28) and the commentaries on it are presented.

Thus, starting with his own English translation of the best extant version of the original Greek text, the critic moves to the Arabic text of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics and his own English translation of it, then to the Arabic translation of Abu Bishr Matta Ibn Yunus and his English translation of it. Next, a “slightly modified form” of Abu Bishr Matta’s text is presented. On grounds never elucidated, this is affirmed to be the form in which Matta’s original text “was understood by” Averroes; it, too, is accompanied by the critic’s English translation. He also provides the Arabic text of Avicenna’s al-Shifa commentary on the definition of tragedy along with his English translation of that passage. All of this is juxtaposed to what is deemed the “hardly intelligible, because unexplained, translation of the relevant passage” from Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics.

The whole procedure poses three problems. First, it does more to serve a presumptive historical and philological reconstruction of the transmission of Aristotle’s Poetics than to foster a translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics. Here, for example, to explain the translation of approximately 110 words from Averroes’ text, something over 3,000 words are expended. Were the practice to be followed systematically throughout, the potential reader—if such could be found—would be faced with a volume of some 600,000 words or 2,400 pages. But such practical considerations aside, the truly important question is whether the reconstruction advances the understanding of Averroes’ text in any significant manner.

What it brings to sight is that Averroes fails to comment upon certain words occurring in Abu Bishr Matta’s translation and understands some parts of it in a manner that goes against the surface appearance of the text. Both points are immediately
evident to anyone who reads Averroes' commentary against Abu Bishr Matta's translation or even against Aristotle's text—in Greek or in translation. Nor does the reconstruction permit one to account adequately for the changes introduced by Averroes. Invariably, the critic attempts to trace such changes to difficulties Averroes or his predecessors had in understanding Aristotle's text as it was passed on to them. He never entertains the possibility that these later authors might have been using the text for their own purposes, purposes that concur with Aristotle's ultimate goal but vary in detail because of the differences between their immediate audience and Aristotle's. Though the critic and some philologists he claims as allies acknowledge a link between poetics and rhetoric, they neglect the practical implications of such a link. Yet al-Farabi and Averroes are as much authors of books on political philosophy as they are authors of commentaries on Aristotle's writings. In their books on political philosophy, both are very precise about the guiding role of politics—and especially of political philosophy—in the well-ordered regime.

The second problem is whether the reconstruction or any of the evidence mustered by it allows the judgment that this translation of Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics:

as a whole is inexact and unrepresentative of what Averroes meant, because [the translator] fails to take into account the decisive influence which the garbled Arabic translation of the Poetics and earlier Arabic commentaries had on Averroes' understanding of the text.

One way to test the accuracy of this claim is to juxtapose the critic's translation (A) of the passage so extensively analyzed with the version at issue (B). A comparison of the two demonstrates that the critic's translation—one presumably benefiting from the light shed by awareness of these "decisive" influences—is inaccurate, verbose, and needlessly confusing:

A

The craft of poetry of praise is that it is a likening and imitation of a voluntary, virtuous, and complete action that has a universal potential [of application] with regard to virtuous matters, not a particular potential [of application] with regard to each one of the virtuous matters [separately]; an imitation whereby souls are moved to a temperate state through the mercy and fear which has been generated in them, this [coming about] through the images of purity and cleanliness which are evoked [as existing] in virtuous men.

B

The art of eulogy . . . is a comparison and representation of a complete, virtuous voluntary deed—one that with respect to virtuous matters is universal in compass, not one that is particular in compass and pertains only to one or another virtuous matter. It is a representation that affects souls moderately by engendering compassion and fear in them. It does this by imitating the purity and immaculateness of the virtuous.

The goal of translation being to render in one language what has been expressed in another, the translated text should be as comprehensible on its own terms as the
original. It is, above all, intended for readers not able to read the text in the original language. Explanations of unusual terminology or other textual problems should be communicated by means of footnotes. But these should not be so numerous or so lengthy that the text becomes overwhelmed with annotation and thus unreadable. And to the extent that the author of the original text was able to avoid square brackets, the translator should capture the sense of the translated text without reliance on such artificial aids. More importantly, the translator should neither add to nor take away from the translated text unless such interpolations are explicitly noted and defended. Finally, the translator must use terms consonant with the discussion at hand; there is no reason to render al-rahma as “mercy” here rather than as “compassion” or “pity.”

The final problem raised by the procedure of reconstruction explored here is whether it justifies the criticism of the following sentence:

Aristotle and Averroes infer the constituent parts of poetry from their understanding of what tragedy or eulogy is supposed to do, namely, to represent a complete or whole virtuous action in speech that is both metrical and harmonious.

At issue is whether it is reasonable to link Aristotle and Averroes in this phrase and to attribute to them the idea that tragedy—as in the case of Aristotle—or eulogy—as in the case of Averroes—“represent[s] a complete or whole virtuous action.” As evidence that neither is warranted, the critic asserts: “Aristotle says nothing about virtuous action in his definition of tragedy.” To be sure, there is no mention of virtuous action in the critic’s rendering of the passage from Aristotle: “Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude.” But the phrase in question admits of interpretation, a point the critic tacitly admits when he acknowledges having been guided in his translation by D. W. Lucas’s analysis of the passage.

Lucas explains that it is difficult to determine how the Greek term spoudaias, rendered as “serious” here, might best be translated. He does, however, note the following:

That tragedy is a mimēsis has been stated in Ch. 1, that it imitates prattontes in Ch. 2, and the main point of that chapter is that they are spoudaioi.

Noting further that “no one English word for spoudaios fits both men and action,” Lucas refers the reader to a note in his commentary on Poetics 1451b6. In that later passage, he explains that “spoudaios applied to things means what ho spoudaios would do or approve.” Then he refers the reader to Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, 1219b21, where Aristotle uses the adjective spoudaios in conjunction with the term aretē in order to observe that “if there is a shoemaking excellence [aretē skutikē] and a good shoemaker [spoudaios skuteus], then their work is a good shoe [spoudaios hupodēma].” Lucas might also have noted that Aristotle makes a similar conjunction in the Nicomachean Ethics when he claims that “it seems . . . virtue [aretē] and the virtuous man [or good man, ho spoudaios] are the standard of all things.”

In light of this discussion—one stemming, it must be noted, from a text cited by the critic to defend his translation of Aristotle’s definition of tragedy—the
contemptuous dismissal of the passage in question is unfounded. Philological investigation that is tentative and exploratory, rather than peremptory and dismissive, provides a clear idea of what Aristotle means when he speaks of tragedy imitating an action that is spoudaiai. He explains what such actions are about in chapter 2 of the Poetics. In addition, mere reflection on well-known tragedies brings to mind the kinds of actions intended by Aristotle: Oedipus’s killing of his father in anger and subsequent marriage to his mother, Antigone’s refusing to heed Creon’s proclamation that she should not bury her brother Polyneices, and Hippolytus’s haughty spurning of Phaedra. These are serious actions to be sure, but they are serious only because they involve major issues of right and wrong, that is, virtuous actions. Averroes did not have to await an Avicenna, nor Avicenna depend upon “earlier discussions in the Aristotelian tradition,” for this basic thrust of Aristotle’s text to be seen. All either had to do was to read Aristotle’s text attentively and to think for a moment about the subjects treated in poetry, whether tragedy or eulogy. And insofar as each—but especially Averroes—was intent upon explaining Aristotle’s text, a thoughtful interpreter must strive to link the two.

THE TRANSLATION OF AVERROES’ TEXT

The approach to translation defended here, that found in Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, is guided by the idea that scholars translate the texts of earlier thinkers because they think those earlier thinkers may have insight into problems that perplex later thinkers. It does not seek to prejudge Averroes by showing what influences the old Arabic translation of the Poetics may have had upon him or how it limited his understanding of Aristotle. The translator of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics provides a clear indication of how Averroes proceeds and strives to distinguish between his explanation or interpretation and his translating. He alerts the reader to his alterations of the text, his doubts about particular passages, and his reasons for such alterations and doubts. Above all, he offers the translation as a work that stands on its own. It is to be read as the next best thing to the original version of the text. The translation is meant to serve interpretation, and interpretation surely sheds light on translation. But neither takes the place of the other.19

For the critic, however, historical perspective overrides all other concerns. Thus, in another disparaging review of a translation of one of Averroes’ other commentaries, a review he deems highly illustrative of his approach, he claims:

A commentary on the text of Aristotle quoted in Arabic translation, like that of Av[erroes], is a composite intellectual construct that blends many disparate historical and conceptual elements and operates through the precise use of a terminology which acts as the skeleton that holds it together and lends it historical specificity. A translation of such a work into another language must of necessity maintain scrupulously the distinction among these elements and preserve fastidiously the terminological details. Otherwise the purpose of the translation is not served, for its potential beneficiaries, historians of philosophy without Arabic, will miss the very specific differences that will enable them to evaluate properly Av[erroes]’s work and assess its debt to predecessors and influence on successors.20
Surely, this reverses the order of things. It is the task of interpretation, one subsequent to translation, to note "specific differences" in terminology. And only interpretation based on careful attention to the arguments and determination of their validity will help "historians of philosophy without Arabic . . . evaluate properly A[verroes]'s work."

Yet the critic faults the translation of technical terms in *Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics* as "arbitrary and idiosyncratic" and cites the handling of the two terms *takhyīl* and *nazar* to prove the charge.\(^1\) The criticism relative to the translation of the first as "imitation" is threefold: first, "evoking images" renders its meaning more accurately; second, not enough is said about the reasons for rendering *takhyīl* as "imitation"; and, third, this rendering "deforms Averroes' understanding of the *Poetics* and defeats the very purpose of [the] translation." The major point here seems to be the translator's failure to defend adequately his decision to translate *takhyīl* as "imitation." As proof, one sentence from an extensive footnote offered in explanation of this decision is cited; then the translator is castigated for the absence of references to the secondary literature in defense of the decision. A better translation, it is claimed, is "evoking images," an English rendition of *Vorstellungsevocation*, set forth by Wolfhart Heinrichs in two works that it would seem to "illuminate the tradition in which Averroes' commentary was written and are indispensable for its interpretation."\(^2\)

The footnote referred to, but not fully cited, addresses the difficulty of capturing the different terms Averroes uses to express Aristotle's *mimēsis*. Because the translator's stated goal is to make Averroes' commentary intelligible in readable English, he alerts the reader to the potential difficulties with the translation of this sentence:

With respect to poetical statements, imitation and representation come about by means of three things: harmonious tune, rhythm, and comparison itself.

The footnote in question, of which only the third sentence is cited by the philological determinist, refers to the translation of *tashbih* as "comparison" and explains the significant problems in the following manner:

The term is *tashbih*, which was used in paragraph 2, above, in conjunction with *takhyīl*, "imitation," both serving to render the sense of Aristotle's *mimēsis*. Note, however, that in this sentence Averroes links "representation" (*muḥākāh*) with "imitation" and then replaces the term *tashbih* by *muḥākāh* and its derivatives in the rest of the paragraph. The term *takhyīl*, which I consistently translate as "imitation," is used by Averroes in a generic sense and thus captures perfectly the idea of *mimēsis* in Aristotle. The terms *muḥākāh* and *tashbih*, which I consistently translate as "representation" and "comparison" respectively, are used by Averroes as though they were species of *takhyīl* ("imitation" or *mimēsis*) to represent imitation in speech, in melody, or in meter. See also para. 24 with para. 22, below, for an example of how Averroes uses these terms interchangeably without confusing the issue.\(^3\)

Though succinct, this explanation—when presented fully, as here—is adequate. The translator's goal is to avoid burdening the reader of the translation with interpretation of the text through extensive footnotes. Indeed, his introduction seeks to alert the reader to how he understands the text.
Is it nonetheless correct to claim that the use of the term “imitation” for takhyil “deforms Averroes’ understanding of the Poetics and defeats the very purpose of his translation?” Surely not. The value of a term like Vorstellungsevokation is that it points to imitation as the projection of an image or arousing of an image in the mind of the reader or listener. But the translator’s goal being to find one English term that—along with its derivatives—will fit the different contexts in which takhyil and its derivatives occur, he makes the choice defended in the footnote just cited. It neither “deforms Averroes’ understanding of the Poetics” nor “defeats the purpose of his translation,” but renders intelligible what Averroes says about Aristotle’s text and permits the reader to reflect upon what is meant by “imitation” or its derivatives in any given context. Far from excluding the sense of “evoking images,” the term “imitation” embraces it—just as it embraces a number of other senses in which Averroes speaks of takhyil. Moreover, careful attention to the writings of al-Farabi used by Heinrichs to arrive at his understanding of takhyil as Vorstellungsevokation or “evoking images” and muḥākā as Nachahmung or “imitation” shows that al-Farabi uses muḥākā in the same way as Averroes does takhyil. That is, going back to the note in question, al-Farabi takes muḥākā in the generic sense of mimēsis and uses takhyil and tashbih as species of it.

What can be learned from the careful textual studies presented by philologists like Lucas and Heinrichs is important, even fundamental, for the translation and eventual interpretation of texts such as Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics. Their significance increases insofar as they are offered so tentatively by their authors, scholars who clearly recognize the limits of their learning. In the hands of scholars such as these, philological learning is neither deterministic nor a club by which to beat one’s opponents into submission.

But to return to the issue at hand: Similarly blamed is the translator’s recourse to the word “spectacle” to render Averroes’ use of the term naẓar when referring to this particular part of tragedy or, as Averroes would have it, eulogy. Although acknowledging a footnote that indicates the translator’s awareness of the ordinary use of the term as meaning “speculation or reflection,” the critic expresses astonishment that the term would nonetheless be translated as “spectacle” thereby “again giving a distorted picture of Averroes’ understanding of the Poetics.” Again, it is useful to quote the whole footnote:

Averroes uses the same term here as the old Arabic translation, naẓar, where Aristotle speaks of opsis. But as will become clear in the immediate sequel, and especially in paras. 24 and 31, he understands the term in its more usual sense of speculation or reflection.

In that immediate sequel, Averroes says:

There are also three things compared in eulogy: characters, beliefs, and spectacle—I mean, discovery of the correctness of a belief.

Here, as well as when the term “spectacle” occurs in paragraphs 24 and 31, the reader is referred back to the note just quoted. The term “spectacle” and not “speculation” or even “reflection” is used in all four instances to indicate that Averroes knows something more is at issue than “speculation” or “reflection,” but is not entirely certain what it is.
For example, in paragraph 24 Averroes observes:

Spectacle is what explains the correctness of belief. It is as though it were for them a type of argumentation for the correctness of the eulogized belief. None of this is to be found in the poems of the Arabs, though it is to be found in eulogistic scriptural statements.

Then, in paragraph 31, he adds:

The sixth part is spectacle—I mean, giving argument for the correctness of a belief or the correctness of a deed, not by means of a persuasive statement for that is not appropriate for this art, but by means of a representative statement. Indeed, the art of poetry and especially the art of eulogy, is not based on proving and disputing. That is why eulogy does not use the art of dissimulation and delivery the way rhetoric does.

Nothing would be gained in any of these cases by translating nazār as “speculation” or “reflection,” and certainly not as “theoretical investigation.” A translation is supposed to capture the sense of the translated text, its hesitancies as well as its certainties, and to do so in a manner that neither unjustly belittles nor aggrandizes the author. When it carries the additional burden of being a translation of a commented text, it must seek as well to convey to the reader the best, even the highest, understanding the author may have had of the text. The translation of nazār as “spectacle” here, given the explanation of the full footnote, accomplishes precisely these goals.

The critic’s objection to the translation of this term points to a deeper, and instructive, issue. This objection, like that concerning Généquand’s translation mentioned above, shows how fervently he desires a translation to present clearly and rigidly—given the evidence the translator has about the use of language at that period—the contemporary scholarly assessment of what the author could possibly have known about the text. But, apart from the patently false limitations this approach places upon the author (e.g., rendering al-raḥma as “mercy” because Averroes is a Muslim), it depends too strictly upon historical data that are by no means unequivocal. The translator of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, having admitted that he seeks to learn from Averroes rather than to place him within a predetermined circle, presented a text that leaves open the possibilities for interpretation just outlined. Moreover, as he has observed in the preface to another translation of Averroes, he is ever conscious of the traduttore, traditore pitfall.27 The critic, on the other hand, seems serenely confident that his science protects him from such a danger.

Such confidence also leads to overstatement with respect to the work of other scholars. For example, on the grounds that V. Cantarino “offers a translation of a significant portion” of Averroes’ commentary in his Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age, the critic insists that the translator “could have profitably consulted” it.28 Examination shows, however, that Cantarino’s translation is of little help for seeing how a translation of these two terms might look in context.

He omits chapter 4 (paragraphs 20–32) of the commentary—that is, the passage within which the discussion of nazār occurs—without a word of explanation.29 Nor does his translation provide guidance with respect to the question of takhýl. In the part of Arabic Poetics devoted to his discussion of the commentary, Cantarino labors
mightily over the problem of how to translate the derivatives related to takhyil and finally decides that it is "the mental process by which the poet can cause his mimetic representations to be imaginative, effective, and creative." Consequently, he opts for "imaginatively creating [yukhayyi],” then for “an imaginatively creative discourse [mukhayyi],” and finally, simply for "creative" (pp. 80–82), only to change again to “imaginatively-creative [mukhayyi]” in his longer translation (see p. 178). For the link discussed above that Averroes makes between tashbih and takhyil, Cantarino translates “creative and mimetic representation,” then about fifteen lines later renders takhyil as “imaginative creation” (p. 179).30

Moreover, because he pays insufficient attention to the philosophic vocabulary, Cantarino misses the basic point of Averroes’ treatise. For example, when Averroes discusses poems concerned with voluntary matters, it is the noble and the base that is at issue, not “beauty and ugliness.”31 This basic point is consistently mistranslated by Cantarino, as the following comparison of his text (A) with the one reviewed (B) illustrates:

A

Since all comparison and representation deal with what is beautiful and what is ugly, it is obvious that all comparison aims at embellishment (taḥṣin) or defacement (taqbiḥ).

B

Since every comparison and narrative representation is concerned only with the noble and the base, it is clear that in every comparison and narrative representation only praise and blame are sought.32

Cantarino is misleading on less complicated issues as well, for he fails to translate words in a consistent manner. Thus, however questionable his decision to render ṣidq and haqq as “subjective truth” and “objective truth,” respectively, he does not maintain that distinction when he subsequently translates taṣdiq as “objective representation.”33

In sum, the philological determinist’s censure of the translation of key terms as “arbitrary and idiosyncratic” proves, upon examination, to be unfounded. A closer examination of the authorities cited in defense of the criticisms reveals, moreover, that they provide no substantiation, for they can either be accommodated within the translation set forth—as is the case with Heinrichs—or are shown to be of no use for a proper translation of Averroes’ text.34

ON PUTTING AN END TO SILENCE

The differences between the two approaches considered here center on the way one is to judge the intellectual capacities of the philosophers whom scholars study. It has been argued that Averroes wittingly and purposefully departed from Aristotle's text, that he did so in order to make particular points he could not otherwise have made. In other words, it is supposed that Averroes had enough of an understanding of what Aristotle intended that he was able to recognize some of the flaws in the text that came down to him and to use these to advance his argument. After all, the author in question is the same Averroes so widely known by
eminent students of Aristotle for his independent and novel interpretations of the "first teacher." As is only fitting when faced with the writing of such a philosopher, every attempt must be made to respect and present his text as he composed it. Thus, to indicate those instances where flaws appear in the translation available to Averroes or where he seems to be genuinely confused and even misled, notes—not hypothetical reconstructions—are properly used.

As has been seen, however, proponents of the philological determinist approach examined here wish to oppose their own meager understanding of Averroes and his abilities to the judgment of the philosophical tradition. Though Averroes was honored as the commentator on Aristotle even by those who disagreed with him, our critic has no qualms about dismissing him as a second-rate author. He insists that, because of the flawed text to which he had access, Averroes could not do anything other than what he did—that he could not have known better. Hence the critic categorically denies the possibility of Averroes having an understanding of the text that would permit him to use Aristotle selectively. As has now been made clear, he can insist upon his narrow interpretation only by shutting his eyes to the subtlety with which Averroes and his fellow philosophers set forth their teaching and by resolutely ignoring the larger political dimension of that teaching.

In the preceding it has been shown why the other approach does not lead to the faults of interpretation imputed to it, and the translation in question has been defended against those imprecations. Along the way, attention has been paid to the erroneous consequences to which the criticism leads both with respect to the way it understands Averroes' *Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics* and, just as significant, to the way it would render that text in English. What is especially important to remember is that anyone choosing to proceed along the path recommended by the critic would only with great difficulty and unnecessary verbal detours arrive at Averroes' commentary. Indeed, it is quite unlikely those efforts would ever result in anything but a conjectural reconstruction of the text, one rendered in rebarbative English. The critic's faith in the superiority of his supposed historical knowledge both makes him incapable of learning anything from Averroes and inspires him to replace sympathetic inquiry into these larger philosophic questions with questionable conjectures about what Aristotle's text could possibly mean to Averroes.

Moreover, when his blameworthy reading habits are noted as has been done here, it becomes evident how little trust is to be placed in the assertions and conclusions to which they lead. It must be said, nonetheless, that all of these criticisms are leveled only against a particular kind of philology and reading of history, namely, one that does not understand its own limits and thus pretends to become a philosophy of history. They are not leveled against philology or historical interpretation per se.

Reproduced at the head of this article is St. Cyprian's declaration to Demetrius that his calumnies will no longer be ignored. Observing that "we must no longer be silent, for it already begins to seem that we are silent not from modesty but from timidity," St. Cyprian goes on to explain "and as long as we disdain to refute false accusations, we will be seen as acknowledging the reproach."
NOTES

Author’s note: Readers familiar with the contemporary secondary literature may wonder why this article—focused so on the review essay cited in n. 1, below—does not appear in the journal that published the original review essay. The principal reason is that the Journal of the American Oriental Society allows no replies, even though the editors permitted the review essay to conclude by demanding one. Another is that, although speaking to issues raised there, I go beyond them to broader questions of interest to scholars generally. I am very grateful to the editorial referees at IJMES for the professional, thoughtful reading given my manuscript and for their helpful suggestions.


2See “On Translating,” 93b–94a; again, the emphasis is in the original. The reference is to Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, trans. (with intro. and notes) Charles E. Butterworth (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), x. In context, the passage within single quotation marks reads:

In the introduction, I explore some of the questions that need to be addressed for a more accurate grasp of Averroes’ argument and elucidate the basic themes of his interpretation. For example, aware that Averroes considers the art of poetry to be part of the art of logic, I try to explain why he adopts such a position and search for corroboration of it in Aristotle’s own writing.

3See “Introduction,” Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, 49; also ibid., 14 and the references to Averroes’ text. The citation that follows is from “On Translating,” 94a.

4For indications of how Averroes diverges from Aristotle when it suits his purposes, see Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, trans. (with notes and intro.) Charles E. Butterworth (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 91–92. That such innovations were consciously used by philosophers within the medieval Arabic tradition for various doctrinal reasons is now generally accepted among most scholars. Miriam S. Galston, for example, shows in a recently published article that al-Farabi does not portray Aristotle as saying rhetoric and poetry belong to the art of logic in his Philosophy of Aristotle even though he attributes this notion to Aristotle in his Enumeration of the Sciences; see “Al-Farabi et la logique aristotélicienne dans la philosophie islamique,” in Aristote aujourd’hui, ed. M. A. Sinaceur (Paris: Érès, 1988), 202–6, 208–10. Another article relevant in this regard is Thérèse-Anne Druart’s “Al-Farabi and Emanationism,” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 42–43. See also Deborah L. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 1–16, esp. 8–13.


6“On Translating,” 93a; for what follows, see ibid., 94b–97b and 95a.

7The original texts are to be found in Averroes, Talkhīṣ Kitāb al-Shīr, ed. Charles E. Butterworth and Ahmad Haridi (Cairo: GEBO, 1986), par. 20; and Abū Bishr Mattā Ibn Yūnus al-Qunawī’s, Kitāb Arīstāfālīlīs fi al-Shīr, in Arīstāfālīs Fann al-Shīr, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawi (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīyya, 1953), 96:24–27.

8The conjectural text differs from Abu Bishr Matta’s only in the last six words. For Abu Bishr Matta’s wa tanaqqi wa tunzifū [sic, “On Translating,” 95a; but the Arabic should be read as tunazzifū, there being no fourth form of the verb] alladhīna yanfūsālānā, the critic proposes that Averroes understood wa yanqū wa yanzafū alladhīna yafūsālānā (96a). As he translates the texts, this corresponds in English to Abu Bishr Matta’s “and it [sc. the craft of poetry of praise] purifies and cleanses those who suffer” being understood as “while those who act are pure and clean.” Readers of Arabic will note that the critic needs to read tunazzifū in order to translate “cleanses” causitively and defies all rules of grammar in his translation of the text he presents as Averroes’ understanding of Mattā.

For Abu Bishr Matta’s yanfūsālānā, the critic also suggests reading yafūsālānā and rendering that as “[those who] act.” The text would make better sense and not need to be emended were yanfūsālānā simply rendered in its more obvious meaning as “[those who] are affected,” that is, affected by the passions of pity or compassion and fear.
The “apparently slightly modified form” of Abu Bishr Matta’s text, as it “was understood by [Averroes],” is proposed here by the critic to help him make sense of Averroes’ commentary on this passage: *wa dhālikā bi-mā yahhayyil fi al-fādīlina min al-naqā‘i wa al-nazāfā*, which he translates as “through the images of purity and cleanliness which are evoked [as existing] in virtuous men” (94b; the brackets are his addition). A direct and forceful version, one that gives a sense of poetry’s unique power to move those who hear it by giving an affective imitation of what others do, is: “it does this by imitating the purity and immaculateness of the virtuous”; see Averroes’ *Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics*, par. 20.

9 Though the critic refers to Dahiyyat’s translation here, as well as to the accompanying footnotes, he apparently prefers his own rendition of the passage; see “On Translating,” 96b, n. 18.

10 For example, S. A. Bonebakker and J. C. Bürgel; see ibid., 99a.

11 Ibid., 92.

12 For the critic’s translation, see ibid., 94b; the square brackets are his. The other version is from par. 20 of Averroes’ *Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics*.

13 Although “mercy” is intended to indicate how Averroes reads Aristotle from a Muslim perspective, nothing warrants such a prejudgment. Nor does it advance our understanding of the text.

14 See “On Translating,” 97b. For the purposes of his subsequent remarks, the critic reproduces the passage in the following manner, acknowledging the marks of emphasis as his own:

Aristotle and Averroes infer the constituent parts of poetry[1] from their understanding of what tragedy or[1] eulogy is supposed to do, namely, to represent a complete or whole virtuous[1] action in speech that is both metrical and harmonious.

The sentence in question occurs on p. 20 of Averroes’ *Middle Commentary of Aristotle’s Poetics*.

15 On Translating,” 97b; emphasis in the original. For what follows, see ibid., 94b and also n. 7.


17 See ibid., 118. The translation is mine. There is no argument about translating aretē as virtue or excellence. Although a simple craft is at issue, the linkage of aretē and ho spoudais is important. Clearly, ho spoudais means the good man—one excellent, virtuous, or skilled in the important human tasks. And so the question turns on whether spoudais as an adjective relating to human actions can be understood as referring to such concerns or merely to mean something ponderous. Here, at any rate, it is a bit thick to claim that a “serious shoe” results from the “shoemaking excellence” exercised by “a good shoemaker.”

18 See Nicomachean Ethics 1166a13; again, the translation is my own. The context emphasizes that the good man (ho spoudais) is the man having both practical wisdom or intellectual excellence for action and moral virtue. In lieu of this passage, Lucas cites Nicomachean Ethics 1177a3 where Aristotle uses spoudais to illustrate virtue (aretē) in action:

The life of happiness is thought to be what is according to virtue. It comes about by what is good [spoudēs], not by what is childish. We say that good things [ta spoudaia] are better than funny and childish things and that the activity of a part or of a man is better the more it is in accord with goodness [spoudaioteron].

Clearly, each of these occurrences of spoudais could be translated as “serious” only if “serious” were understood as “lofty” or “noble,” that is, as something virtuous.

19 For a fuller explanation of these thoughts and indication of how they might be applied, see Charles E. Butterworth, “Review of F. W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione,” *The Muslim World* 78 (1988): 149–50; and “An Account of Recent Scholarship in Medieval Philosophy,” *Interpretation* 16 (1988): 87–97. Consider also the following remarks from the preface to the translation of Averroes’ *Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics*, xiii–xiii:

I strive here for both literalness and eloquence, as is only fitting for a text on the art of poetry, but I have willingly sacrificed eloquence for literalness when the choice appeared inevitable. To the extent feasible, I have used the same English word for the same Arabic word throughout the translation and have always noted significant exceptions to this rule. . . . My goal has been to present a readable yet faithful English translation of Averroes’ treatise. In keeping with
that goal, I have alerted the reader to problems via footnotes while avoiding interpretative translations that conceal the problems without resolving them.


21See “On Translating,” p. 92; also 93a and 98a.


It should be noted, however, that the salient question here is not the use the translator did or did not make of the secondary literature, but what takhyīl (and thus mimēsis) means and what single word best renders its meaning. Citations from other scholars, no matter how numerous, are not equivalent to reassembled argument.

23See Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, 63, n. 18. The reference to paragraph 2 in the first sentence of the footnote, a typographical error, should be to paragraph 3.

24In this respect, D. W. Lucas, Aristotle, Poetics, app. 1, “Mimēsis” is especially informative. Acknowledging that “the stock translation of mimēsis is ‘imitation’” (258), Lucas nonetheless goes on to urge (259) that:

The word mimēsis has an extraordinary width of meaning, which makes it difficult to discover just what the Greeks had in mind when they used the word to describe what it is that the poet and artist do. To translate it we need in different contexts “imitate,” “represent,” “indicate,” “suggest,” “express.” All of these can be referred to the single notion of making or doing something which resembles something else.

Then, having traced the different ways mimēsis is used in 4th-century Greek writings and considered various other possible translations, Lucas pays special attention to Hermann Koller’s Mimēsis in der Antike (Bern: A. Francke, 1954). Arguing that the term mimēsis eventually goes back to the ritual dancer, mimos, Koller urges that the “primary meaning of mimeisthai is not ‘copy’ or ‘imitate’ but ‘give expression’” (see Lucas, Aristotle, Poetics, 270–71).

Although he does not provide page references, Lucas seems to have Koller’s pp. 46, 104–6, 110, and esp. 39 in mind. Koller’s contention is that to translate mimēsis as “Nachahmung” (“imitation”) is too narrow and sometimes even misleading, especially with respect to dance; see ibid., 18 and 210. He urges, instead, that mimēsis be rendered as “Darstellung” (“expression” or, even better, “representation”). In a schematic diagram of the development of the terms mimēsis and mimēsthai on p. 120, Koller urges that “Darstellung” best captures the theoretical use of the term, whereas “Nachahmung” better captures the way it is used in everyday speech.

Lucas’s final judgment, based on his examination of the various texts cited by Koller in defense of his argument, is that in most instances “it cannot be said that the conventional meaning ‘imitate’ is impossible.” Indeed, he is willing only to say “it must be granted that there are passages where Koller’s rendering is neater” (Lucas, Aristotle, Poetics, 271). That judgment, applied to the case at hand, makes eminently good sense: there are instances where another rendering—even “evoking images”—would be “neater.” On the whole, however, and it is the whole that is at issue, “imitation” captures Averroes’ meaning much more clearly. And it provides an important link with Aristotle’s Poetics, the text on which he is commenting. For example, even though it is implied in “imitation,” “evoking images” would simply not work when rendering takhyīl in par. 77 of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics.

25See al-Fārābī, Risāla fi Qawānīn Śinā‘at al-Shirār, in Arisṭāq.digital, Fann al-Shīrāzī, ed. ‘Abd al-Rahmān Badawi, 150:3–9, 15–16, 151:7–8, 15, 155:10–14, 156:1–3, and 158:2–3; also al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Shīrāzī, ed. Muḥsin Mahdi, in Shīrāzī 12 (1959) 91:4–6, 92:3–4, 12–17, 93:7–10 ff. These are the two works on which Heinrichs grounds his first discussion of takhyīl in Arabische Dichtung and from which he departs when he seeks to determine how al-Farabi uses this term and its cognates by examining virtually all of the “second teacher’s” writings in the article “Die antike Verknüpfung.”

The reason for the different use of muḥākā and takhyīl by al-Farabi and Averroes may go back to Abu Bishr Matta’s frequent rendition of mimēsis by both muḥākā and tashbih (see Heinrichs, Arabische Dicht-
tung, 121, 146) or arise from the different understanding each of these philosophers formed of Aristotle’s text. Whatever the reason, it is clear that al-Farabi’s terminology cannot be used to explain Averroes without first considering how Averroes understands poetry—somewhat as the translator sought to do in footnotes like the one just mentioned.

Though the difference between the two philosophers is the decisive issue here, it should also be noted that Heinrichs is unable to preserve his novel terminology in translating passages from al-Farabi—especially when he has to broaden his net to include tasawwur (see “Die antike Verknüpfung,” 283–84, 288, 290 and nn. 112 and 114, 294). And, as he acknowledges, not all of the texts support this interpretation of al-Farabi’s terminology (see ibid., 285–86, nn. 101–4, esp. n. 104 and the two lines coming before those cited).

26See Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, 76, n. 19; and “On Translating,” 98a. The reference is to the text in par. 22 of the edition and translation.

27See Butterworth, trans., Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, xx. Pascal’s assessment of the human condition, with its implications for learning, seems especially apt in this context: “notre état véritable . . . nous rend incapables de savoir certainement et d’ignorer absolument”; see Pensées (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1958), 90, no. 72. So, too, does Nietzsche’s reflection in his letter to Overbeck of 23 February 1887: “Zuletzt geht mein Missbrauch jetzt bis zur Frage, ob Geschichte überhaupt möglich ist?”

28See “On Translating,” 98b, and V. Cantarino’s Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age: Selection of Texts accompanied by a Preliminary Study, Studies in Arabic Literature, Supplements to the Journal of Arabic Literature, Vol. IV (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975). Although he does not cite the subtitle of Cantarino’s work, the critic makes a special point of mentioning pp. 70–99 for “a discussion of Averroes’ work in the context of the development of Aristotelian poetics in Arabic” and pp. 177–90 for the translation of the text.

Despite a lengthy denunciation of the translator for not making more of an earlier article on Averroes and poetry by Cantarino, the critic fails to note that the discussion on pp. 70–99 of the Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age volume is simply a reworking of the article; see V. Cantarino, “Averroes on Poetry,” in Islam and its Cultural Divergence: Studies in Honor of Gustave E. von Grunebaum, ed. Girdhari L. Tikk (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 10–26; also “On Translating,” 99a–100 and nn. 22–23. The following remarks about Cantarino’s translation in the Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age volume explain the translator’s complaint in the preface (ix) that Cantarino’s “imaginative rewriting of Averroes’ phrases to fit his own preconceptions has gone unchallenged for more than fifteen years.”

In passing, it should be noted that Heinrichs’ appreciation of the merit of Cantarino’s work is more in keeping with that of the translator than that of the critic; see “Die antike Verknüpfung,” 263, n. 31; 264, n. 37.

29See Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age, 184; the translation moves abruptly from what Cantarino calls “Section II” (Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, chap. 3, i.e., pars. 13–19) to what he calls “Section IV” (ibid., chap. 5, i.e., pars. 33–47).

30In the “Averroes on Poetry” article, Cantarino displays the same kind of hesitancy; see pp. 14–18.

31The Arabic passage is: fi al-umūr al-irādiyya—dā’ni al-ḥusna wa al-qabīha. See Averroes, Talkhīṣ Kītāb al-Shīr and Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, par. 3, with Cantarino, Arabic Poetics, 177. Again, the “Averroes on Poetry” article (14, 18–19) shows a similar confusion about these terms. The moral judgment inherent in these terms does not escape Heinrichs; see Arabische Dichtung, 161, n. 4.

32See Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, par. 8, with Cantarino, Arabic Poetics, 180.

33See Cantarino, Arabic Poetics, 83–84, 92 with Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, par. 65; see idem, “Averroes on Poetry,” 20.

34In contrast to such unwarranted assertiveness, it is instructive to consider the observation of an older, more thoughtful philologist that “in der Wissenschaft haben die Überzeugungen kein Bürgerrecht, so sagt man mit guten Grunde”; see F. Nietzsche, Fröhliche Wissenschaft, Aphorism 344. See also Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Aphorismen 224 and 227; and Genealogie der Moral, III.23.

35The Latin phrase is: “et dum criminationes falsas contemnimus refutare, videamur crimen agnoscre.”